

ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

ROYAL COMMISSION

ON THE

WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

(VOLUME I.)

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

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1903.

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Royal Warrant.

EDWARD, R.

Edward the Seventh, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith; To Our Right Trusty and Right Well-beloved Cousin and Councillor Victor Alexander, Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, Knight of Our Most Noble Order of the Garter, Knight Grand Commander of Our Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Knight Grand Commander of Our Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire; Our Right Trusty and Well-beloved Cousin, Reginald Baliol, Viscount Esher, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Commander of the Royal Victoria Order; Our Right Trusty and Well-beloved Councillor, Sir George Dashwood Taubman-Goldie, Knight Commander of Our Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George; Our Trusty and Well-beloved Sir Henry Wylie Norman, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Companion of Our Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Field-Marshal of Our Forces; Our Trusty and Well-beloved Sir John Ommanney Hopkins, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Admiral on the Retired List of Our Navy; Our Trusty and Well-beloved Sir John Edge, Knight, and Our Trusty and Well-beloved Sir John Jackson, Knight: Greeting!

Whereas We have deemed it expedient that a Commission should forthwith issue to inquire into the Military preparations for the War in South Africa, and into the supply of men, ammunition, equipment, and transport by sea and land in connection with the campaign, and into the Military operations up to the occupation of Pretoria;

Now know ye, that We, reposing great trust and confidence in your knowledge and ability, have authorised and appointed, and do by these Presents authorise and appoint, you, the said Victor Alexander, Earl of Elgin and Kincardine; Reginald Baliol, Viscount Esher; Sir George Dashwood Taubman-Goldie; Sir Henry Wylie Norman; Sir John Ommanney Hopkins; Sir John Edge and Sir John Jackson to be Our Commissioners for the purposes of the said Inquiry.

And, for the better effecting the purposes of this Our Commission, We do by these Presents give and grant unto you, or any three or more of you, full power to call before you such persons as you shall judge likely to afford you any information upon the subject of this Our Commission; and also to call for, have access to, and examine, all such books, documents, registers, and records as may afford you the fullest information on the subject, and to inquire of and concerning the premises by all other lawful ways and means whatsoever.

72B. 750—Wt. 23374.—1/04. Wy. & S. 2138r.

hwe

And We do by these Presents authorise and empower you, or any three or more of you, to visit and personally inspect such places as you may deem it expedient so to inspect for the more effectual carrying out of the purposes aforesaid.

And We do by these Presents Will and Ordain that this Our Commission shall continue in full force and virtue, and that you, Our said Commissioners, or any three or more of you, may from time to time proceed in the execution thereof, and of every matter and thing therein contained, although the same be not continued from time to time by adjournment.

And We do further Ordain that you, or any three or more of you, have liberty to report your proceedings under this Our Commission from time to time, if you shall judge it expedient so to do.

And Our further Wish and Pleasure is that you do, with as little delay as possible, report to Us under your hands and seals, or under the hands and seals of any three or more of you, your opinion upon the matters herein submitted for your consideration.

Given at Our Court at Balmoral, the Ninth day of September, One thousand nine hundred and two, in the Second Year of Our Reign.

By His Majesty's Command,

(Signed) A. Akers Douglas.

Royal Warrant.

EDWARD R.

Edward the Seventh, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith.

To Our right trusty and well-beloved Donald Alexander, Baron Strathcona and Mount Royal, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, High Commissioner in London for Our Dominion of Canada; and Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Frederick Matthew Darley, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Lieutenant Governor of the State of New South Wales, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of that State: Greeting!

Whereas by Warrant under Our Royal Sign Manual bearing date the ninth day of September, One thousand nine hundred and two, We were pleased to appoint our right trusty and right well-beloved cousin and councillor Victor Alexander, Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, Knight of Our Most Noble Order of the Garter, Our right trusty and well-beloved cousin Reginald Baliol, Viscount Esher, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, and the several gentlemen, therein named, or any three or more of them, to be Our Commissioners to inquire into the military preparations for the war in South Africa, and into the supply of men, ammunition, equipment and transport by sea and land in connection with the campaign, and into the military operations up to the occupation of Pretoria;

Now know ye, that We, reposing great trust and confidence in your knowledge and ability, have authorised and appointed. and do by these Presents authorise and appoint, you, the said Donald Alexander, Baron Strathcona and Mount Royal; and Sir Frederick Matthew Darley, to be Commissioners for the purpose aforesaid, in addition to and together with the Commissioners whom we have already appointed.

Given at Our Court at Saint James's, the eleventh day of October, One thousand nine hundred and two, in the second year of Our Reign.

By His Majesty's Command,

(Signed) A. Akers Douglas.

LIST OF WITNESSES ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED.

Name of Witness.	Designation.	Date.	Question.	Page.
Altham, Lieut.-Colonel E.A., C.M.G.	Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Division.	15 October 1902 -	458—689	19
Ardagh, Major-General Sir John C., K.C.I.E., C.B., LL.D., R.E.	Director of Military Intelligence from 1896 to 1901.	31 October 1902 -	4964—5244	209
Brabazon, Major-General J. P., C.B., C.V.O.	Commanding Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa from March 1900 to end of November 1900.	21 November 1902 -	6836—7001	293
Brackenbury, General Sir Henry, G.C.B., K.C.S.I.	Director-General of Ordnance - -	21 October 1902 -	1553—1834	71
Borrett, Major-General H.C., C.B.	Inspector-General of Recruiting - -	31 October 1902 -	5245—5443	220
Chesham, Major-General The Right Hon. The Lord, K.C.B.	Inspector-General of Imperial Yeomanry.	20 November 1902 -	6717—6835	287
Chichester, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward, Bart., C.B., C.M.G., R.N.	Principal Transport Officer in South Africa from October 1899 to November 1900.	2 December 1902 -	9885—10017	419
Clarke, General Sir C. M., Bart., G.C.B.	Quartermaster-General to the Forces -	23 October 1902 -	2342—2594 2807—2816	109 123
Clayton, Colonel F. T., C.B. -	Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters.	23 October 1902 -	2595—2806	117
Cowans, Lieut.-Colonel J. S., M.V.O.	Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters.	23 October 1902 -	2817—2930	124
Crutchley, Colonel C., M.V.O. -	Assistant Adjutant-General for Recruiting.	31 October 1902 -	5245—5443	220
Davidson, Colonel J., C.B. -	Staff Officer assisting the Yeomanry Committee.	20 November 1902 -	6710—6716	287
Deane, Colonel T., C.B. - -	Member of the Yeomanry Committee in 1901.	20 November 1902 -	6673—6709	285
Douglas, Sir Arthur Percy, Bart.	Under Secretary for Defence in the Government of New Zealand.	3 December 1902 -	10018—10181	424
Duck, Veterinary-Colonel F., C.B., F.R.C.V.S.	Director General Army Veterinary Department from 1897 to October 1902.	24 October 1902 -	3147—3366	132
Dunne, Colonel W. A., C.B. -	Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters.	24 October 1902 -	2931—3146	127
French, Major-General Sir George A., K.C.M.G.	Representing the Australian Contingents	26 November 1902 -	8017—8342	340
Fripp, Mr. Alfred Downing, C.B., C.V.O., M.S., M.B., F.R.C.S.	Civilian Doctor with the Forces in South Africa.	10 December 1902 -	11813—11965	501
Graff, Mr. Stephen J., C.B. -	Assistant Director of Transports - -	2 December 1902 -	9519—9781	404
Grant, Lieut.-Colonel S. C. N., C.M.G., R.E.	Officer, Mapping Section Natal Field Force, October 1899 to March 1900; subsequently employed on Royal Engineer duties in Natal, Orange River Colony, and Transvaal.	16 October 1902 -	721—867	29
Grove, Major-General Sir Coleridge, K.C.B.	Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, 1896–1901.	28 November 1902 -	9376—9518	395
Gubbins, Colonel W. L., M.B., M.V.O.	Assistant Director Army Medical Service Corps from March 1895 to December 1899; Principal Medical Officer of the Sixth Division in South Africa from December 1899 to 26th July 1900, and afterwards Principal Medical Officer of the Pretoria District and the Northern Line of Communication.	28 October 1902 -	3900—4023	163
Hamilton, Lieut.-General Sir Ian S.M., K.C.B., D.S.O.	Military Secretary - - - - -	5 December 1902 -	10857—10940	468
Harris, Mr. C. - - - -	Principal, Accountant-General's Department, War Office.	25 November 1902 -	7797—8016	331
Harrison, General Sir R., K.C.B., C.M.G.	Inspector-General of Fortifications - -	22 October 1902 -	1835—2059	88

LIST OF WITNESSES ARRANGED ALPHABETICALLY—*continued.*

Name of Witness.	Designation.	Date.	Question.	Page.
Hills, Major E. H., R.E - -	In charge of Mapping Section, Intelligence Division.	16 October 1902 -	868—930	36
Jameson, Surgeon General J., C.B., M.D.	Director-General of the Army Medical Service from 1896 to the end of 1901.	10 December 1902 -	11472—11812	491
Jarvis, Lieut.-Colonel A. Weston, C.M.G., M.V.O.	Commanding a Regiment of Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa in 1901.	21 November 1902 -	7244—7274	309
Johnston, Colonel W. - -	Assistant Director Medical Service to 31st May, 1901.	28 October 1902 -	4024—4068	169
Kelly-Kenny, Lieut.-General Sir Thomas, K.C.B.	Adjutant-General to the Forces - -	30 October 1902 -	4472—4963	191
Kitchener, General, Viscount of Khartoum, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., R.E.	Commander-in-Chief in India - - -	14 October 1902 -	159—263	7
Knight Major Wyndham C., C.S.I., D.S.O.	First employed with the Yeomanry in London to raise the force; then Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General for Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa, to November 1900; afterwards representing Imperial Yeomanry at Army Headquarters.	21 November 1902 -	7089—7243	302
Knox, Sir Ralph Henry, K.C.B.	Permanent Under Secretary of State for War till January 1901.	17 October 1902 -	1122—1429	51
Lake, Colonel P. H. N., C.B. -	Assistant Quartermaster-General, Mobilisation Division.	16 October 1902 -	1065—1121	48
Lucas, Colonel Alfred G., C.B., M.V.O.	Deputy Adjutant-General of Imperial Yeomanry.	20 November 1902 -	6451—6672	272
Mackinnon, Major-General W. H., C.B., C.V.O.	Commanding City Imperial Volunteers in South Africa.	25 November 1902 -	7361—7586	315
Major, Mr. Alfred - - -	Director of Army Contracts - - -	19 November 1902 -	6296—6450	267
Marzials, Mr. Frank T., C.B. -	Accountant-General, War Office - -	25 November 1902 -	7797—8016	331
Montgomery, Colonel R.A., C.B.	Deputy Director-General of Ordnance -	21 October 1902 -	1553—1834	71
Mulcahy, Colonel F. E., C.B. -	Chief Ordnance Officer, Royal Army Clothing Department.	21 October 1902 -	1553—1834	71
Nicholson, Lieut.-General Sir W. G., K.C.B., R.E.	Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence.	8 October and 15 October 1902 -	1—158, 264—457	1 13
O'Grady-Haly, Major-General R. H., C.B., D.S.O.	Representing the Canadian Contingents	26 November 1902 -	8343—8597	350
Ogston, Professor Alexander, C.M.	Professor of Surgery at Aberdeen University, and Civilian Surgeon with the Forces in South Africa.	9 December 1902 -	10941—11264	472
Penton, Lieut-Colonel A. Pole, R.A.	Commandant of the New Zealand Forces from October 1896 to October 1901.	26 November 1902 -	8598—8694	359
Pitt, Captain Francis J., C.B., R.N.	Naval Assistant Director of Transports -	2 December 1902 -	9782—9884	415
Richardson, Colonel Sir W. D., K.C.B.	Director of Supplies under Lord Roberts in South Africa.	24 October 1902 -	3367—3588	138
Robb, Colonel F. S., M.V.O. -	Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General at outbreak of War till 31st December 1901, afterwards Assistant Adjutant-General.	29 October 1902 -	4389—4471	186
(V.C.) Roberts, Field Marshal The Right Hon. Earl, K.G., K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.	Commander-in-Chief - - - -	4 December 1902 - 5 December 1902 -	10182—10629 10630—10856	429 451
Robertson, Lieut.-Colonel W. R., D.S.O.	Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Division.	15 October 1902 -	690—720	28
Salmond, Major-General W., C.B.	Deputy Adjutant-General, Royal Engineers at Head Quarters from 1896 to 30th June 1902.	22 October 1902 -	1994; 2060—2128	96
Scarbrough, Colonel The Earl of, A.D.C., Yorkshire Dragoons.	Second in Command of one of the Battalions of Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa.	21 November 1902 -	7275—7360	310

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Name of Witness.	Designation.	Date.	Question.	Page.
Steevens, Colonel Sir J., K.C.B. -	Principal Ordnance Officer - - -	21 October 1902 -	1553—1834	71
Stopford, Brigadier-General The Hon. Sir Frederick W., K.C.M.G., C.B.	Chief Staff Officer, First Army Corps -	16 October 1902 -	931—1064	41
Turner, Major - General Sir A. E., K.C.B.	Inspector-General of the Auxiliary Forces	25 November 1902 -	7587—7796	323
Valentia, Colonel Viscount, C.B., M.V.O., M.P.	Assistant Adjutant-General for Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa from January 1900 to November 1900.	21 November 1902 -	7002—7088	299
Vincent, Colonel Sir C. E. Howard, K.C.M.G., C.B., V.D., M.P., A.D.C.	Colonel - Commandant of the Queen's Westminster Volunteers, and Aide-de-camp to the King.	18 November 1902 -	5444—5692	229
Ward, Colonel Sir E. W. D., K.C.B.	Permanent Under Secretary of State for War.	17 October 1902 - 18 November 1902 -	1430—1552 5693—5981	65 240
Wilson, Sir Guy Fleetwood, C.B.	Assistant Under Secretary of State for War.	19 November 1902 -	5982—6295	249
Wilson, Surgeon-General Sir William, M.B., K.C.M.G.	Principal Medical Officer in South Africa	28 October 1902 -	3589—3899	152
Wilson, Lieut.-Colonel E. M., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	Deputy Assistant Director-General, Army Medical Department.	9 December 1902 -	11265—11471	485
Wolseley, Field-Marshal The Rt. Hon. the Viscount, K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G.	Commander-in-Chief from 1895 to 1901 -	27 November 1902 - 28 November 1902 -	8695—9079 9080—9375	363 382
Wood, Major - General Sir Elliott, K.C.B.	Commanding Royal Engineers, Aldershot, from 1st April 1899; proceeded to South Africa as Commanding Royal Engineer with the Army Corps (Sir R. Buller's force) on 9th October 1899, and remained as such until the cessation of hostilities.	22 October 1902 -	1835—2341	88
V.C.) Wood, General Sir Evelyn, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.	Adjutant-General from 1st October 1897 to 1st October 1901; afterwards General Officer Commanding Second Army Corps.	29 October 1902 -	4069—4388	171

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Date.	Name.	Designation.	Question.	Page.
FIRST DAY: 8 October 1902 -	Lieut-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B., R.E.	Director-General of Mobilization and Military Intelligence.	1—158	1
SECOND DAY: 14 October 1902 -	General Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., R.E.	Commander-in-Chief in India - -	159—263	7
THIRD DAY: 15 October 1902 -	Lieut-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B., R.E.	Director-General of Mobilization and Military Intelligence.	264—457	13
	Lieut.-Colonel E. A. Altham, C.M.G.	Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Division.	458—689	19
	Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Robertson, D.S.O.	Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Division.	690—720	28
FOURTH DAY: 16 October 1902 -	Lieut-Colonel S. C. N. Grant, C.M.G., R.E.	Officer Mapping Section Natal Field Force, October 1899 to March 1900; subsequently employed on Royal Engineer duties in Natal, Orange River Colony, and Transvaal.	721—867	29
	Major E. H. Hills, R.E.	In Charge of Mapping Section, Intelligence Division.	868—930	36
	Brigadier-General the Honourable Sir Frederick W. Stopford, K.C.M.G., C.B.	Chief Staff Officer, First Army Corps -	931—1064	41
	Colonel P. H. N. Lake, C.B. -	Assistant Quartermaster - General, Mobilization Division.	1065—1121	48
FIFTH DAY: 17 October 1902 -	Sir Ralph Henry Knox, K.C.B.	Permanent Under Secretary of State for War till January 1901.	1122—1429	51
	Colonel Sir E. W. D. Ward, K.C.B.	Permanent Under Secretary of State for War.	1430—1552	65
SIXTH DAY: 21 October 1902 -	General Sir Henry Brackenbury, G.C.B., K.C.S.I.	Director-General of Ordnance - -	1553—1834	71
	Colonel R. A. Montgomery, C.B.	Deputy Director-General of Ordinance -	1553—1834	71
	Colonel Sir J. Steevens, K.C.B.	Principal Ordnance Officer - - -	1553—1834	71
	Colonel F. E. Mulcahy, C.B. -	Chief Ordnance Officer, Royal Army Clothing Department.	1553—1834	71
SEVENTH DAY: 22 October 1902 -	General Sir Richard Harrison, K.C.B., C.M.G.	Inspector-General of Fortifications -	1835—2059	88
	Major-General W. Salmond, C.B.	Deputy Adjutant-General, Royal Engineers at Headquarters from 1896 to 30th June 1902.	1994; 2060—2128	96
	Major-General Sir Elliott Wood, K.C.B.	Commanding Royal Engineer, Aldershot, 1st April 1899; proceeded to South Africa as Commanding Royal Engineer with the Army Corps (Sir R. Buller's force) on 9th October 1899, and remained as such until the cessation of hostilities.	1835—2341	88
EIGHTH DAY: 23 October 1902 -	General Sir C. M. Clarke, Bart., G.C.B.	Quartermaster-General to the Forces -	2342—2594 2807—2816	109 123
	Colonel F. T. Clayton, C.B. -	Assistant Quartermaster - General at Headquarters.	2595—2806	117
	Lieut-Colonel J. S. Cowans, M.V.O.	Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters.	2817—2930	124
NINTH DAY: 24 October 1902 -	Colonel W. A. Dunne, C.B. -	Assistant Quartermaster - General at Headquarters.	2931—3146	127
	Vet. - Colonel F. Duck, C.B., F.R.C.V.S.	Director-General Army Veterinary Department from 1897 to October 1902.	3147—3366	132
	Colonel Sir W. D. Richardson, K.C.B.	Director of Supplies under Lord Roberts in South Africa.	3367—3588	138

LIST OF WITNESSES IN ORDER OF EXAMINATION—*continued.*

Date.	Name.	Designation.	Question.	Page.
TENTH DAY: 28 October 1902 -	Surgeon-General Sir William Wilson, M.B., K.C.M.G.	Principal Medical Officer in South Africa	3589—3899	152
	Colonel W. L. Gubbins, M.B., M.V.O.	Assistant Director Army Medical Service Corps from March 1895 to December 1899; Principal Medical Officer of the Sixth Division in South Africa from December 1899 to 26th July 1900, and afterwards Principal Medical Officer of the Pretoria District and the Northern Line of Communication.	3900—4023	163
	Colonel W. Johnston - -	Assistant Director Army Medical Service to 31st May 1901.	4024—4068	169
ELEVENTH DAY: 29 October 1902 -	(V.C.) General Sir Evelyn Wood, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.	Adjutant-General from 1st October 1897 to 1st October 1901; afterwards General Officer commanding 2nd Army Corps.	4069—4388	171
	Colonel F. S. Robb, M.V.O. -	Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General at outbreak of War till 31st December 1901; afterwards Assistant Adjutant-General.	4389—4471	186
TWELFTH DAY: 30 October 1902 -	Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Kelly-Kenny, K.C.B.	Adjutant-General to the Forces - -	4472—4963	191
THIRTEENTH DAY: 31 October 1902 -	Major-General Sir John C. Ardagh, K.C.I.E., C.B., LL.D., R.E.	Director of Military Intelligence from 1896 to 1901.	4964—5244	209
	Major-General H. C. Borrett, C.B.	Inspector-General of Recruiting - -	5245—5443	220
	Colonel C. Crutchley, M.V.O. -	Assistant Adjutant-General for Recruiting.	5245—5443	220
FOURTEENTH DAY: 18 November 1902 -	Colonel Sir C. E. Howard Vincent, K.C.M.G., C.B., V.D., M.P., A.D.C.	Colonel Commandant of the Queen's Westminster Volunteers, and an Aide-de-camp to the King.	5444—5692	229
	Colonel Sir E. W. D. Ward, K.C.B.	Permanent Under Secretary of State for War.	5693—5981	240
FIFTEENTH DAY: 19 November 1902 -	Sir Guy Fleetwood Wilson, C.B.	Assistant Under Secretary of State for War.	5982—6295	249
	Mr. Alfred Major - - -	Director of Army Contracts - - -	6296—6450	267
SIXTEENTH DAY: 20 November 1902 -	Colonel Alfred G. Lucas, C.B., M.V.O.	Deputy Adjutant-General of Imperial Yeomanry.	6451—6672	272
	Colonel T. Deane, C.B. - -	Member of the Yeomanry Committee in 1901.	6673—6709	285
	Colonel J. Davidson, C.B. -	Staff Officer, assisting the Yeomanry Committee.	6710—6716	287
	Major-General The Right Hon. The Lord Chesham, K.C.B.	Inspector-General of Imperial Yeomanry	6717—6835	287
SEVENTEENTH DAY: 21 November 1902 -	Major-General J. P. Brabazon, C.B., C.V.O.	Commanding Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa from March 1900 to end of November 1900.	6836—7001	293
	Colonel Viscount Valentia, C.B., M.V.O., M.P.	Assistant Adjutant-General for Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa from January 1900 to November 1900.	7002—7088	299
	Major Wyndham C. Knight, C.S.I., D.S.O.	First employed with the Yeomanry in London to raise the Force; then Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General for Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa to November 1900; afterwards representing Imperial Yeomanry at Army Headquarters.	7089—7243	302
	Lieut.-Colonel A. Weston Jarvis, C.M.G., M.V.O.	Commanding a Regiment of Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa in 1901.	7244—7274	309
	Colonel the Earl of Scarbrough, A.D.C., Yorkshire Dragoons.	Second in Command of one of the battalions of Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa.	7275—7360	310

LIST OF WITNESSES IN ORDER OF EXAMINATION—*continued.*

Date.	Name.	Designation.	Question.	Page.
EIGHTEENTH DAY: 25 November 1902 -	Major-General W. H. Mackinnon, C.B., C.V.O.	Commanding City Imperial Volunteers in South Africa.	7361—7586	315
	Major-General Sir A. E. Turner, K.C.B.,	Inspector-General of the Auxiliary Forces.	7587—7796	323
	Mr. Frank T. Marzials, C.B. -	Accountant-General, War Office - -	7797—8016	331
	Mr. C. Harris - - -	Principal, Accountant-General's Department, War Office.	7797—8016	331
NINETEENTH DAY: 26 November 1902 -	Major-General Sir George A. French, K.C.M.G.	Representing the Australian Contingents	8017–8342	340
	Major-General R. H. O'Grady Haly, C.B., D.S.O.	Representing the Canadian Contingents	8343–8597	350
	Lieut.-Colonel A. Pole Penton, R.A.	Commandant of the New Zealand Forces from October 1896 to October 1901.	8598–8694	359
TWENTIETH DAY: 27 November 1902 -	Field-Marshal The Right Hon. the Viscount Wolseley, K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G.	Commander-in-Chief from 1895 to 1901 -	8695–9079	363
TWENTY-FIRST DAY: 28 November 1902 -	Field-Marshal The Right Hon. the Viscount Wolseley, K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G.	Commander-in-Chief from 1895 to 1901 -	9080–9375	382
	Major-General Sir Coleridge Grove, K.C.B.	Military Secretary to the Commander-in Chief, 1896–1901.	9376–9518	395
TWENTY-SECOND DAY: 2 December 1902 -	Mr. Stephen J. Graff, C.B. -	Assistant Director of Transports - -	9519–9781	404
	Captain Francis J. Pitt, C.B., R.N.	Naval Assistant Director of Transports -	9782–9884	415
	Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Chichester, Bart., C.B., C.M.G., R.N.	Principal Transport Officer in South Africa from October 1899 to November 1900.	9885–10017	419
TWENTY-THIRD DAY: 3 December 1902 -	Sir Arthur Percy Douglas, Bart.	Under Secretary for Defence in the Government of New Zealand.	10018–10181	424
TWENTY-FOURTH DAY: 4 December 1902 -	(V.C.) Field-Marshal The Rt. Hon. Earl Roberts, K.G., K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.	Commander-in-Chief - - - - -	10182–10629	429
TWENTY-FIFTH DAY: 5 December 1902	(V.C.) Field-Marshal The Rt. Hon. Earl Roberts, K.G., K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.	Commander-in-Chief - - - - -	10630–10856	451
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TWENTY-SIXTH DAY: 9 December 1902	Professor Alexander Ogston, C.M.	Professor of Surgery at Aberdeen University and Civilian Surgeon with the Forces in South Africa.	10941–11264	472
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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

ROYAL COMMISSION

ON THE

WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA,

AT

ST. STEPHEN'S HOUSE, WESTMINSTER.

FIRST DAY.

Wednesday, 8th October 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The EARL OF ELGIN AND KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable The VISCOUNT ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

Lieut.-General Sir W. G. NICHOLSON, K.C.B., R.E., Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence, called and examined.

Lt.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B., R.E.

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1. (*Chairman.*) You are the Director-General of Military Intelligence and Mobilisation?—Yes.

2. And that is a new office, I think. You are the first holder of it?—Yes; the constitution of the office was altered by an Order in Council of the 4th of November last year, which, in fact, altered the whole of the functions and amalgamated mobilisation with intelligence.

Q. 282. 3. And before that you were in South Africa as Military Secretary to Lord Roberts?—First as Military Secretary to Lord Roberts, and afterwards as Director of Transport.

4. And you went to South Africa when Lord Roberts went, coming from India, where you were Adjutant-General?—Yes, I went there at the end of December, 1899.

5. That being the case, you are not personally cognisant of the affairs of the War Office previously to the time when you took up office?—Not until the 1st of May last year, when I took up the office.

6. You mentioned an Order in Council which altered the constitution of your office; are you prepared to inform us with regard to any other alterations or as to the constitution of the War Office under that Order in Council and before; or would you prefer that to be done by another witness?—It is simply shown by the two Orders in Council.

7. But an Order in Council may be understood in the Department or it may not; I am not quite sure that it is very easily intelligible outside?—I can give you roughly what the difference was.

8. If you please?—The difference was this: that under the previous Order in Council the Military Secretary, the Director of Military Intelligence, and the Assistant Adjutant-General for Mobilisation were the three Staff officers under the Commander-in-Chief, but the rest of the Heads of Departments, namely, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the Director-General of Ordnance were only subject to the Commander-in-Chief's supervision, and had direct access to the Secretary of State for War.

9. You are speaking now of the Order in Council of 1899?—Yes. Under the new Order in Council the Military Secretary, the Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence, and the Adjutant-General are directly under the Commander-in-Chief; the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the Director-General of Ordnance remaining, as before, under the Commander-in-Chief's supervision, but going direct still to the Secretary of State for War. The Adjutant-General, myself, and the Military Secretary cannot go direct to the Secretary of State for War; we must submit to him through the Commander-in-Chief.

10. But the Secretary of State for War is responsible for all the departments, is he not?—He is responsible for all the departments, the Commander-in-Chief being, of course, subject to his orders, but the difference is that formerly the Adjutant-General could go direct to the Secretary of State for War without going through the Commander-in-Chief. Now he must submit things to the Commander-in-Chief. In fact, it is shown in the Order in Council by the words "control" and "supervision"; the Adjutant-General, the Military Secretary, and the Director-General of

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Mobilisation and Military Intelligence being under the Commander-in-Chief's control, and all the other heads of departments under the Commander-in-Chief's supervision.

11. During the war there was a separate organisation, was there not, in the War Office—a committee, in a sense, combining some of these departments?—Well, it was a committee very similar to what is now called the Army Board. I forget its exact title; it is mentioned, I think, in the statement which I propose to submit. It was really a committee, with the Commander-in-Chief as President, and the heads of departments to attend it. The same committee is now in existence under the title of the Army Board.

12. And that committee combines the departments which are under the Commander-in-Chief and those which are not?—Yes; the Assistant Under Secretary of State and the Accountant-General are members of it also.

See Q. 283-

13. What is the relation then of that committee to the Secretary of State for War?—The proceedings are submitted to the Secretary of State, but the Army Board at present practically sits very seldom. It chiefly deals with the Estimates. It examines the Estimates, and makes recommendations on the Estimates of the various departments to the Secretary of State.

14. The Secretary of State does not sit with the committee, does he?—No. There is still another committee, so to speak, called the War Office Council. The War Office Council consists of the Secretary of State (presiding), the Commander-in-Chief, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, the Director-General of Ordnance, the Director-General of the Army Medical Department, the Director-General of Mobilisation and Intelligence, the Permanent Under Secretary of State, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, the Financial Secretary, and the Accountant-General, if he is called in to give advice on financial matters. That War Office Council meets generally every week—on Monday.

15. And it takes up the general affairs of the Army?—Yes, anything that the Secretary of State thinks desirable to submit to it—all bigger questions of administration and organisation, and things of that sort.

See Q. 265.

16. But the other committee was for a more special purpose?—The War Office Council has only been started, I fancy, since the present Commander-in-Chief assumed office; I think it was only started last year.

See Q. 265.

17. Was there nothing of the kind under the Order of 1899?—No, there was no War Office Council so far as I know.

18. Does the report of the committee which you have described before, which deals with estimates, go before the War Office Council?—No, that goes to the Secretary of State, and he gives orders on it.

19. I do not know whether you have anything else that you wish to say about the organisation of the War Office?—I do not think so.

20. I was asking these general questions to lead up to this question. You attend here to-day, I understand, to submit certain statements from the different departments of the War Office?—Yes. I have here statements from the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the Director-General of Ordnance (*these were handed in*), and I hope in a day or two to have ready statements from the Director-General of the Army Medical Department, and from the two branches of my department, namely, the Mobilisation and Intelligence Branches (*these were subsequently handed in*).

21. And those statements are designed to put us in possession of the facts before the war and during the war?—Yes, that is so.

22. Of course, without seeing them it is not possible to examine upon them, but I understand that the proposal is that hereafter, after we have had time to examine them, officials will be ready to come from the various departments to give us detailed information?—That is so.

23. In the meantime have you any general statement to make with regard to the submission of these papers?—I can make no general statement of my own personal knowledge connected with these papers, because I was not here at the time at which most of the events occurred.

24. I understood that the purpose of your attendance here to submit them was to say generally if there is any scheme, on which the War Office have drawn them up, to submit to us?—Unfortunately I have not brought with me the paper on which I asked the departments for the information. I can put in the memorandum which was sent to each head of a department, but unfortunately I have not brought it down with me.

25. I suppose, generally speaking, the purport is what I have already said; it is to give us full information of the facts?—Yes.

26. Have you at all decided upon the particular officers or number of officers who would wish to submit evidence on the various statements?—With reference to your last question, if I may I will send the secretary a copy of the memorandum which I sent to the various heads of departments, to show the exact things which they were asked to draw these papers up about. (*This was subsequently sent in, Vide Appendix Vol., page* 12.) But as regards the various departments, I thought it would be most convenient if the Commission would first call the heads of the departments and take their evidence, and then ask them what subordinates to them they would propose should give evidence. I have a sort of list of them. Some put down a large number of officers whom I am sure the Commission would not think it necessary to examine, or probably not, and some have put down very few, but I can mention them for the departments, taking them one by one.

27. I think we had better have information on that, because evidently we must make a selection, and we must have your assistance in making the selection, because you know the officers better than most of us?—Taking the Adjutant-General's Department, the Adjutant-General at the time was Sir Evelyn Wood; he was Adjutant-General till last November. The present Adjutant-General is Sir Thomas Kelly-Kenny.

28. Then you suggest that both Adjutant-Generals should be examined?—Yes, I suppose you would have to have both Adjutant-Generals. One of the principal Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-Generals who was there throughout, was Colonel F. Robb, and Colonel Crutchley was also another Assistant-Adjutant-General who was there throughout the war. Those are the two officers whom the Adjutant-General's Department think should be called.

29. That would be four witnesses?—Yes.

30. Then we come next to the Quartermaster-General?—Just previous to the war Sir George White was Quartermaster-General, but then he was ordered out to Natal, and was succeeded by Sir Charles Mansfield Clarke, who is the present Quartermaster-General. Sir George White is at present at home, but he leaves, I think, to-morrow, for Gibraltar.

31. But Sir Charles Mansfield Clarke was Quartermaster-General practically the whole time?—Yes, practically. As regards sea transport in the Quartermaster-General's office, Lieutenant-Colonel Cowans was Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General; for details of supply, Colonel W. Dunne; for details of remounts, Major-General Truman; and I think the Secretary of State told me that he had ordered a copy of the evidence in the recent Inquiry into the Remount Department to be sent to the secretary for the Commission's information (*the Evidence was subsequently received*); for details of the Army Pay Department, which is under the Quartermaster-General, Colonel Kitson; for details of land transport, as distinguished from sea transport, Colonel Clayton; and for details of the Army Veterinary Department, Veterinary-Colonel Duck. Taking the next department, the department of the Director-General of Ordnance, Sir Henry Brackenbury has been Director-General throughout the war; he recommends as witnesses Colonel Steevens, principal Ordnance officer at Woolwich, and Colonel Mulcahy, who was in charge of the Army Clothing Department. The army clothing is under the Director-General of Ordnance, and Colonel Mulcahy was in subordinate charge of the Army Clothing Department. Then as regards engineer business, the Inspector-General of Fortifications is Sir Richard Harrison.

32. And he was in that position throughout the war?—Yes, throughout the war. The Deputy-Adjutant-General of Royal Engineers was Major-General Salmond. The Commanding Royal Engineer in the field is at home now; he is Major-General Sir Elliot Wood; he is Commanding Royal Engineer at Aldershot. I may perhaps hand to the secretary the very long list that

Sir Richard Harrison gave me, but I do not suppose there are many of them that the Commission would want to examine.

33. You have given us three or four?—Yes, and I will hand the list to the secretary. (*The list was subsequently sent in.*)

34. I should think that is enough in the first instance?—Then as regards my own department, the officer who had most to do with this business was Sir John Ardagh. Sir John Ardagh was Director of Military Intelligence until May of last year. He is just coming home; he has been out as a member of the Revision of Sentences Commission to South Africa. He has already started, and will be home, I fancy, in less than a fortnight. Then for Intelligence there are Lieutenant-Colonel Altham and Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson, both Assistant-Quartermaster-Generals. They were there before and at the beginning of the campaign. And as regards Mobilisation there is Colonel Lake, also an Assistant-Quartermaster-General, who has been here practically throughout the war. Brigadier-General Stopford, now Chief Staff Officer at Aldershot, was Colonel Lake's predecessor, but he went out on the staff of Sir Redvers Buller, and was succeeded by Colonel Lake. Then as regards the Army Medical Department, the Director-General is Surgeon-General Sir William Taylor. He came home from India and took up the office at the beginning of last December (his predecessor was Surgeon-General Jameson); but I have not got a list from him. I asked him to send a list, but he has not sent it yet.

35. You will give us that afterwards?—Yes.

36. Then, how about contracts and the Director of Contracts?—As regards the Director of Contracts, I sent him a memorandum of the same description as I sent to all the other heads of departments, but that department said that a statement would be a difficult thing to prepare, so that I have not got it, in fact. I referred to the Accountant-General, and he said he thought that he and the Director of Contracts had better be examined, and then they would be able to state what they could give, and how long it would take.

37. Who is Director of Contracts?—Mr. Major.

38. Has he been in office throughout the war?—Yes.

39. The Commission have not discussed the matter, but I should have thought that a difference could be drawn between contracts which are issued in the ordinary course of supplying the Army and contracts which were rendered necessary by the emergencies of the war, and that there might have been a statement drawn up showing how far it was necessary to go to the second alternative, and under what conditions. Of course, if you have not got it ready, I can only make that remark, and if the officers are not prepared to furnish a statement, we shall have to examine them without it; but it would be very much more convenient if they would give us some statement on which to base our examination?—Shall I see the Accountant-General and explain that the Commission would like to know, not for contracts in South Africa, but the home contracts, what are normal and what are abnormal owing to the war?

40. Yes. I quite understand that for contracts taken locally on the spot it would probably be very difficult for the office here to draw up a complete statement, but I should imagine they could give us a pretty complete statement, without much trouble, of abnormal contracts in this country?—I thought so too; but, of course, it was a matter for the Accountant-General to deal with.

41. Then, perhaps, that remark of mine might assist you. Now, these departments are all military departments of the War Office which you have been dealing with, are they not?—All military departments, except that of the Director of Contracts, which is a civil department.

42. Are there any other civil departments of the War Office?—There is the Financial Secretary and the Accountant-General's department. The Accountant-General, I presume, is practically under the Financial Secretary.

43. But the Accountant-General's department is not included in any of the departments that you have mentioned?—No, it is not included; but the Accountant-General was the official whom I went to for this return.

44. But in order to complete our review, if we want to make a review of the whole organisation of the War Office, we should require something more than is included in the number of departments that you have mentioned, should we not?—You will find in the Order in Council that the responsibilities of the Financial Secretary are laid down, so far as I remember.

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45. There must be a permanent organisation of a civil branch of the War Office in the same way as of these various military departments?—I have no personal cognisance of that; I have hardly anything to do with it except when money is involved, and then the matter goes to the Accountant-General, and eventually to the Financial Secretary. But I think the Order in Council defines it.

46. I only draw attention to the fact because you are putting in statements from the military departments of the War Office, and in order to complete our information we ought to have something of the same kind from the civil departments?—Certainly.

47. Just to revert for a minute to the evidence that you gave at the beginning. The War Office Council, I think you said, considered subjects which were submitted to them by the Secretary of State?—Yes, that is so; but it is open to any member of the War Office Council to send to the Secretary of that Council any question that he wishes to be brought up for discussion, and if the Secretary of State approves of it, a *précis* is prepared of that matter and submitted to the Council. *See* Q. 4504.

48. So that in that sense they can originate proposals themselves?—They can originate proposals themselves subject to the Secretary of State approving of their discussion.

49. And the Council embraces any subject of importance affecting the Army?—Yes.

50. Might I also just ask you to tell us precisely the dates at which you took over the different offices you mentioned? You came from India to take office with Lord Roberts as Military Secretary when he went out to South Africa?—Yes. The exact dates I could not give unless I had an Army List. I succeeded Sir John Ardagh on the 1st of May, 1901.

51. At home?—At home.

52. That was in the office, distinctly, of Director of Military Intelligence?—Yes, they called me Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence from the time I took up the office, when they increased the status and pay of the appointment; but the Order in Council was only issued on the 4th November of that same year, and then I became responsible for Mobilisation duties as well as for Military Intelligence. That was the 4th November of that same year.

53. And during your time in South Africa you also were for a part of the time Director of Transport?—Yes. I went out as Military Secretary, but (I cannot give you the exact date) when we began the march to Bloemfontein for the relief of Kimberley the transport got rather into a state of confusion, and Lord Roberts said that I must undertake the duty of Director of Transport, which I did.

54. And you held that office until you came home?—Yes, I went back to India after leaving South Africa, and then came home.

55. When Lord Roberts left South Africa you went back to India?—No; I left a week or so before he left South Africa. I went back to India, and arrived at home just at the same time as he did.

56. You mentioned that Sir Henry Brackenbury had been in charge of his department throughout the war. Can you tell us when he was appointed?—No, I could not, exactly. He was appointed some time, I know, before the war—a year or so before.

57. Then is it from his department that we should get all the information with regard to guns—the nature of the guns, and so on?—Yes, he is responsible for that.

58. (*Viscount Esher.*) Who presides over the Army Board?—The Commander-in-Chief.

59. And who presides over the War Office Council if the Secretary of State is not present, or is he always present?—He has always been present hitherto. I do not think the Council is held if he is away.

60. You say the Army Board does not often sit now?—No, practically speaking, I think the Army Board has been absorbed by the higher body, the War Office Council. It would be almost unnecessary to have two boards sitting simultaneously.

61. The War Office Council was not constituted under an Order in Council; it was constituted by the Secretary of State, was it not?—Yes. *See* Q. 265.

62. You say comparatively recently; I think you *See* Q. 265.

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told us since the present Commander-in-Chief has taken office?—Yes.

63. Have all the telegrams which passed between the Secretary of State and Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers Buller during the war been printed for the use of the department?—Yes, they have.

64. And have the telegrams which passed between Lord Wolseley and Lord Roberts, and Lord Wolseley and Sir Redvers Buller also been printed?—Yes, I believe so.

65. Does that apply also to the despatches? There have been written despatches, I presume?—Yes.

66. Have they also been printed for the use of the department?—You mean letters from the War Office, and so on?

67. Yes?—On ordinary subjects, do you mean?

68. Yes?—I do not think so; nor the replies. The telegrams have undoubtedly been printed. There are large files of secret telegrams, and ordinary telegrams, and so on.

See Q. 1547.

69. They all exist?—Yes, and the letters exist, but they are all in their separate cases, according to the War Office system.

70. You do not print all written despatches in the War Department?—No, hardly any.

71. Are you producing any list of the documents which you have handed in for the use of the Commission?—Those documents have been prepared by the various departments concerned. I do not think there is any list accompanying them of all the documents. Apparently there has been no list prepared by each of the departments. (*A list was subsequently handed in, vide Appendix Vol., page* 13.)

72. With regard to what the Chairman was saying about the civil departments of the War Office, you have not mentioned, for instance, the late Permanent Under-Secretary of State. Is it not suggested that he should be among the witnesses called?—Undoubtedly, both Sir Ralph Knox and Sir Edward Ward; and Sir Edward Ward was the Chief Supply Officer, too, in South Africa.

73. Would you desire to add those names now to the list that you have given us?—Yes, I should. Sir Ralph Knox, Sir Edward Ward, and Sir Fleetwood Wilson, I should think.

74. Then in the Financial Secretary's branch, there is the Financial Secretary himself, who is a Parliamentary officer; is there a permanent civil servant under him of any importance?—The Accountant-General.

75. The Accountant-General is his immediate subordinate?—Yes.

76. Those are really the two heads of that branch?—Yes.

77. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I would like to ask you, was not the Order in Council of 1901, which placed the Adjutant-General more directly under the Commander-in-Chief, merely a revival of a previous practice?—Yes, I believe so. I believe that under the previous practice all the heads of the military departments were under the Commander-in-Chief, and when Lord Wolseley was made Commander-in-Chief they altered it. At that time they took all the heads of departments and put them, as it were, under the Secretary of State; but previously to Lord Wolseley being Commander-in-Chief the Ordnance, Fortifications, and everything, I think, were under the Commander-in-Chief, subject to the superior authority of the Secretary of State.

78. You think now, as I understand, that the Army Board, as distinguished from the War Office Council, is hardly working?—It is chiefly employed for the revision of the estimates. Before the estimates go to the Secretary of State all these heads of departments meet at the Army Board with the Accountant-General there, and they consider the relative urgency and importance of all new proposals for fresh expenditure—the relative urgency.

79. Other business does not come before it?—It might come before it, but, as a matter of fact (I am only speaking of my own experience), the Army Board has only met, so far as I am aware, last January or February, for that purpose, and I do not think it has ever met since.

80. And the Secretary of State does not attend it?—No, the Commander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-Chief can order the Army Board to assemble whenever he pleases.

81. Is the Commander-in-Chief understood to be bound to send on to the Secretary of State everything that is brought before the Army Board, or does he decide whether it is to go forward or not?—I suppose the Commander-in-Chief as President can decide whether it goes forward or not.

82. Is a record kept of the proceedings of the War Office Council?—Certainly, a printed record.

83. Not like the Cabinet, which, I understand, does not keep any record?—No, it is worked in a very systematic manner. Previous to the assembly of the War Office Council, a day or two before the secretary circulates printed papers— a *précis* of the subjects to be discussed, and all information connected therewith. Then the decision of the War Office Council is printed in the next proceedings, and is read over by the Secretary of State, and signed by him as being the decision of the War Office Council.

84. I think you said just now that most of the letters from the authorities here to the authorities in South Africa are manuscript letters; but I suppose the really important letters are printed?—I do not think so.

85. You do not think that important letters or despatches are generally printed; that is to say, we could not get copies?—Of course, despatches when they come home are printed in the "London Gazette" if they are of any importance; but subsidiary despatches are not printed. I speak subject to correction, because I do not see the proceedings of all the departments, but I am not aware of letters from the War Office to General Officers in South Africa or letters from those General Officers having been printed. They are typewritten almost always, but not printed.

86. Have you prepared a statement showing the responsibilities and *personnel* assigned to the Intelligence Division for the war, as well as the work accomplished? That is, I suppose, one of the documents that you have brought to submit to us?—I had hoped to have been able to submit it this morning. I had it printed yesterday, both for the Intelligence and Mobilisation divisions, but it may require some slight correction. In any case, I will send it to the secretary in the course of either to-day or to-morrow. (*The statements were subsequently sent in. Vide Question* 293.) I had got it ready, but Mr. Brodrick seems to think that some slight alteration might be made in it.

87. (*Sir John Edge.*) I am ignorant of a good deal of these matters, and I want a little information, of course. I do not quite understand whether the War Office Council has practically superseded the Army Board?—They both exist, but while, on the one hand, the War Office Council meets every week whenever the Secretary of State is in London, and both the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief are generally present, as a matter of practice, the Army Board hardly ever meets.

88. Does the War Office Council take up the subject of Estimates, which I understood you to say was dealt with by the Army Board?—No, it does not take up the subject of Estimates.

89. Then that is a separate subject altogether?—Yes.

90. Does the War Office Council originate matters, or does it only take up practically the matters sent to it by the Secretary of State?—As I said before, any member of the War Office Council can initiate any subject he likes, and send it to the Secretary of the War Office Council, and say, "I shall be glad if the Secretary of State will approve of this matter being discussed at the War Office Council." If the Secretary of State approves—and the chances are that he does—then the matter is discussed at the Council.

91. But it is not discussed unless with the approval of the Secretary of State?—Not without the approval of the Secretary of State.

92. Speaking generally, what class of subjects come before the War Office Council; for instance, armament and new guns—would that subject come before the War Office Council?—It might come before it, but, as a matter of fact, new guns being a technical matter, that would be decided chiefly by the Commander-in-Chief, the Director-General of Ordnance, and the Ordnance Select Committee. It would not generally come before the War Office Council, because the members of the War Office Council would most of them have no technical or expert knowledge of the subject.

See Q

93. Now which Department can give us information as to the trials and experiments with new guns?—The Director-General of Ordnance.

94. And can Sir Henry Brackenbury speak to that for the three, four, or five years before the war?—He will be able to suggest witnesses who can. He is responsible under the Order in Council for all matters of armament.

95. Then I understand that those matters would not come before either the Army Board or the War Office Council?—They might, but I do not think, as a matter of ordinary routine, they would, because no advantage is gained by consulting officials who have no immediate knowledge of the subject. Guns, for example, is a technical subject.

96. Then what class of subjects generally come before the War Office Council?—Matters connected with Army organisation, such, for example, as means for getting Reserve officers. We want a large number of Reserve officers. There is a great scarcity of Reserve officers in the event of war. That is a question that would be considered by the War Office Council, what inducements should be held out. I could get you a list of the sort of things—all administrative questions.

97. I only want to know generally?—It is difficult to define. If the Secretary of State decides that a thing is sufficiently important to go before the War Office Council he says, "Let it be considered by the War Office Council."

98. Then the War Office Council exercises no general control over the different departments of the War Office?—No; but I think I can produce the exact terms of the constitution of these various bodies—Army Board, War Office Council, and so on. I think there is an Office Order defining them.

65. 99. (*Chairman.*) You may as well do that?—If I can get it I will send it to the Secretary.

100. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) I was just going to suggest that we should have before us the actual composition of these different bodies, and what their functions are?—I think I can get that. I think a printed Office memorandum contains that.

101. I think it will save us trouble if we get that. Do you know, in regard to your War Office Council organisation, whether it is anything analogous to what we have at the Board of Admiralty, which is presided over by the First Lord; all the Naval Lords sit under him, as also the Secretary, and all important measures are then discussed at the Board, when either a measure is carried out or modified, or some other line taken in that direction. Is there anything analogous to that in the War Office Council?—I should say that it was analogous to that with this exception, that it rests with the Secretary of State to determine what matters shall be discussed. He might have a very important question, and decide it on his own responsibility without reference to the War Office Council. On the other hand, he is not likely, perhaps, to do that. But I fancy in the Admiralty it is absolutely essential; it is a sort of executive committee that carries out the duties of the Admiralty.

102. Quite so. If there is a question of shipbuilding for the ensuing year, or anything of that kind, that is discussed at the Board, and according to the line of the Board's discussion it is carried out or modified as the case may be. If it was a case of Army organisation, would it be discussed at the War Office Council?—Yes, it would, undoubtedly; but it is not obligatory to do so. The decision rests with the Secretary of State whether he will do so or not.

103. In fact, the Secretary of State for War has it in his power, if he wishes to do so, to do a thing offhand himself?—Yes.

104. In the case of the Army Board, which, as you say, seldom meets, they consider mostly financial requirements, I suppose, and the amount that is involved?—Yes.

105. And having prepared their statement, or made out their papers in connection with it, then it would go before the War Office Council?—No, not necessarily. It would generally go direct to the Secretary of State, and he would give his decision upon it without going to the War Office Council, because practically the Army Board is very similar in composition to the War Office Council.

106. But on the Army Board you always have somebody from the Accountant-General's Department present?—Yes, the Accountant-General or the Assistant Accountant-General—generally the Accountant-General himself.

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107. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Between the 1st May, 1901, and the 4th November, 1901, the word "Mobilisation" did not enter into your title?—Yes.

108. Was mobilisation part of your duties?—Not before the 4th November.

109. Then during that period mobilisation was being dealt with in the same manner, I presume, as it had been dealt with prior to the war?—Yes.

110. It was worked directly under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, I think?—Yes.

111. But what department worked it?—No department worked it. The officer responsible for Mobilisation was then called the Assistant Adjutant-General, but the Assistant Adjutant-General for Mobilisation was the one officer of the General Staff who was directly under the Commander-in-Chief's orders, except the Director of Military Intelligence. They were the two staff officers that Lord Wolsley had under his direct control.

112. Then Lord Wolseley worked it personally—is that so?—Yes, he worked it personally. *See* Q 408

113. And he was directly responsible for mobilisation prior to the war?—Yes.

114. I am afraid that I have not quite grasped what corresponded to the War Office Council prior to 1901, what body there was?—There was nothing. Until Mr. Brodrick started this War Office Council there was nothing that was exactly similar. There was a special committee that was formed for the war. And there was also the Army Board; I believe that existed before. *See* Q. 26

115. But with regard to the period prior to the formation of that special committee in June, 1899? You cannot speak from personal knowledge, but you come on behalf of the War Office?—I must look it up; I have not inquired about it.

116. What I want really to know is what responsible body was there for dealing with general questions in the War Office prior to that special committee of June, 1899?—I will find out; but, speaking casually—at least, from what I have heard—I understand that the Army Board at that time used to meet more frequently.

117. But without the same extensive powers that the War Office Council now has?—Of course, it was not so important a body, because the Secretary of State was not president of it.

118. And it had a smaller number, probably, of officials on it?—Yes; but I will get information about that.

119. And the Defence Committee?—Of the Cabinet, do you mean?

120. Yes. Has the War Office nothing to do with the Defence Committee?—I know nothing about the Defence Committee of the Cabinet except that the Duke of Devonshire, I believe, is president of it.

121. Have you never been called upon to attend any of its meetings since you took office?—No.

122. Do you know if it meets at the War Office? Has it ever met at the War Office since you took office?—It may have done, but I should not hear of it. I think it may have met once or twice.

123. But, at any rate, you, as Director-General of Military Intelligence, have not been summoned to attend any of its meetings?—Nobody attends it, so far as I am aware.

124. Not even to give information?—Many papers, or a good number of papers, have gone from my Department on which the Secretary of State has noted, "This must be considered by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet," but I have never attended it.

125. With reference to witnesses to be called, if I remember rightly Sir George White left England about September, 1899, did he not—at any rate, just before the war?—Yes.

126. Then he, of course, is the person responsible for the Quartermaster-General's Department prior to that time?—Yes.

127. All the information connected with the Quartermaster-General's Department as regards the preparations for the war would come within his knowledge?—Yes.

128. So that he would be an essential witness with regard to the preparation for the war in that Department?—Yes.

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129. Sir Charles Mansfield Clarke would only personally know of it from the date that Sir George White left England?—Yes.

130. And then as regards these other witnesses whose names have been suggested by the heads of departments, should you imagine that the whole of them were in their respective Departments some time prior to the war, as well as since the war began?—I think so, with the exception of those I have mentioned.

131. Did not Colonel Altham go out to South Africa?—But he was here till he went out to South Africa. He was at Ladysmith. But the Intelligence Division prepared a great deal of information about South Africa before he started; he did that, and he is a very valuable witness on that account. Then he was succeeded by Colonel Robertson, who did the work for some time; and then he too, eventually, went out to South Africa; but Sir John Ardagh was here the whole time.

132. The War Office will be prepared, I presume, to submit copies of all the maps that were in existence for war purposes in Natal or Cape Colony or in the Republics prior to the war?—Yes. In that printed statement which I hope to submit to-day or to-morrow there is a long account about the maps. You will find there that it was quite impossible for us to prepare maps before the war unless we had spent something like, I should say, a quarter of a million in doing so. And even if we had had the money we could not possibly have got into the country in the state of tension that then existed. I may say that our maps, such as they were, were better than the Boer maps. You will find in that statement it is shown that the Boers actually reproduced our maps for their own use. The only map, as you know, that there is of South Africa is Jeppe's map, and Jeppe's map was only finished in 1899.

133. When you say that you could not have got into the country without arousing suspicion, that would not apply to Natal, of course?—Of the northern part of Natal you will find a map was issued by the Intelligence Department, which the Boers used; but you will find full details about the maps.

134. And the maps themselves?—Yes. (*The maps were subsequently sent in. For list, see Appendix, page* 513, *post.*)

135. (*Sir John Edge.*) I presume that the Intelligence Department would prepare such maps as it could beforehand, not in anticipation of war, but they would have maps of a possible theatre of war?—For possible theatres of war in various parts of the Empire it is an exceedingly desirable thing to do; and if the Treasury would be prepared to let us have, say, £80,000 a year to do it, I should be most glad to undertake it; but if you reflect—for example, take the theatre of war in South Africa—to make a reasonably good map of the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, and Cape Colony (there is no map of Cape Colony at present suitable for military purposes; we hope they are going to start one) would take five or six years, at an expenditure of about £200,000 or £300,000.

See Q. 144; 887; 5015.

136. Then I may take it that it would probably have been done had it not been for the expense?—Yes; and remember there are many parts of the empire of which there are no suitable maps.

137. I am aware of that?—But who is to find the money? They have not even finished the Ordnance Survey of the United Kingdom, at which they have been at work for the last 118 years, and I wonder how much they have spent on that.

138. But were there in existence before the war any reliable maps of the Orange Free State or the Transvaal for military purposes?—None. The only map of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal was, as I say, Jeppe's map, which is simply a compilation of the maps of various farms joined together.

139. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Do you hold, as Director of Military Intelligence, that it is essential to have maps based on triangulation; that there would be no assistance given by maps of a rougher kind—by military sketches?—I think great assistance may be given in that way.

140. Did any such exist?—Do you mean of this theatre of war?

141. Yes?—Yes. You will find in the statement that a number of reconnaissances were prepared by officers sent on that special duty, but in such a large country you must understand they could only be of various strategical points, not of the general country.

142. (*Chairman.*) When you speak of a large expenditure, you mean for maps prepared by triangulation?—Yes; if you are going to survey a country you must triangulate it, because the rough and ready method will not answer when you have a very large extent of country. That will do where the area is comparatively small, but you cannot survey a large country without triangulation.

143. (*Sir John Edge.*) One has seen it stated in the papers with regard to the war that took place between France and Germany some years ago, that one of the powers had very accurate maps of the whole frontier of the other. Those were not obtained by triangulation surely?—Undoubtedly those countries had been surveyed in the most scientific manner, and there were maps that could be bought in almost any shop I suppose. You go and buy the maps and you fill in the details; there is no difficulty in that. But the difficulty is where no map exists at all.

144. (*Viscount Esher.*) You mentioned the sum of £80,000 a year; I did not quite gather what it is you said you would be able to do with that sum?—A scheme was put forward by the head of my topographical branch. He pointed out how important it was to survey the various parts of the British Empire which are still unsurveyed, and he wanted to start a very large section, as it were, of the Intelligence Department, and I think he put down as his estimate something like £80,000 a year; but I did not put it forward, because I saw no chance whatever of such a thing being attempted. The policy of the Government, so far as I understand it, is that each self-governing colony, at any rate, is responsible for surveying its own territory. *See* Q. 2

145. But is that satisfactory to the Intelligence branch of the War Office?—It is not satisfactory, but I do not see how we are to get the money. *See* Q. 2

146. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Has any self-governing colony ever shown a desire to give a sum of money for surveys, such as would satisfy you?—No, but at present I believe they are starting it in South Africa.

147. (*Viscount Esher.*) Do you think that you are likely to get money if you do not ask for it?—I do not think I am likely to get the money whether I ask for it or not. *See* Q. 2

148. What rate of progress do you think would be made, if any survey such as you would require for the military purposes of the Empire were carried out, if you had your £80,000 a year to spend? Have you ever had an estimate of the approximate time it would take?—I will look that up. I must consult Major Hills about that, and the scheme which he put forward also.

149. He did put a scheme forward to you?—Yes, he did

150. I suppose you would not mind our seeing that?—No, I can submit it.*

151. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Neither Colonel Altham nor Colonel Robertson dealt specially with the Topographical Department, did they?—Colonel Altham would give you information about the reconnaissances. Major Hills is the head of the Topographical branch.

152. Then we should add him to the list of witnesses?—Certainly.

153. Was he there prior to the war as well as during the war?—No. He joined the Intelligence Department on the 14th September, 1900. His predecessor was Lieutenant-Colonel S. C. N. Grant, R.E., now employed on the Ordnance Survey, who can also be called as a witness.

154. (*Chairman.*) You would prefer, I understand, to take up these points in detail when the statement to which you have referred is before us?—Yes.

155. Your own statement, as you say, will be lodged immediately, and you are lodging some already. Does that mean that we could continue with the evidence next week, say?—Certainly.

156. You would be prepared to speak to your statement then?—Yes.

157. You have nothing else that you wish to say to-day with regard to the wishes of the departments?—No, nothing.

158. (*Sir John Jackson.*) With regard to the copies of correspondence that will be put before the Commission from the officials in South Africa, how far back will that go prior to the commencement of the war?—I presume as far back as the Commission desire. Recalled Questio 264 and 18133.

* This was fully dealt with by Major Hills in his evidence. *See* Q. 868–930.

SECOND DAY.

Tuesday, 14th October, 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The EARL OF ELGIN AND KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable The VISCOUNT ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable The LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

General Viscount KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., R.E., called and examined.

General Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., R.E.

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159. (*Chairman.*) Lord Kitchener, you were good enough to offer to give us a statement on certain points on which we desired your opinion before you went to India, and we handed to you a memorandum which pointed out that the heads of our reference divided themselves into three: the military preparations before the war; certain supplies and preparations during the war; and the military operations up to the time of Pretoria. I understand that you are now prepared to make a statement based generally upon those three divisions?—Yes.

160. With regard, then, to the first—the military preparations before the war, you, no doubt, were not cognisant personally of most of the operations that took place either in England or in South Africa?—It is impossible for me to give any information with regard to the military preparations for the war, as, owing to operations in the Soudan, I was not in England at the time they were going on, and I took no part in them. I have just made a note as regards the provision of maps. The Director of Military Intelligence, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, who went out to South Africa with Lord Roberts and myself, started immediately on his arrival in Capetown upon the compilation of a war map from all available sources. That is the only information that I know that would be of assistance to the Commission on that head.

161. Does that mean that there was no map before Colonel Henderson started upon that work?—There was no map before of the Orange Free State. We captured a certain number of Jeppe's maps of the Transvaal at Capetown, and from those and from all other available sources he commenced to compile a map.

162. And that map was completed?—The map was sufficiently completed to help us in the advance, and it was afterwards entirely completed.

163. Does that apply only to the Orange Free State?—No. To the Transvaal and Natal as well.

164. There was no map of the colony or of Natal, further than there was of the other states?—I am speaking of the map we made. It was a complete map for Natal, for the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony.

165. But before the war, as far as you know, there was no complete map either of the Cape Colony or of Natal?—Of Cape Colony there were always a certain number of maps.

166. But not complete?—Fairly complete; the Colonial map was not a bad one of Cape Colony.

167. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) What scale was it?—I do not remember.

168. But was it sufficiently large to be available for military purposes?—I think it was roughly available for military purposes.

169. (*Chairman.*) Is that all you have to say about the preparations for the war?—Yes.

170. You have no information to give with regard to the provision made in men and supplies before the war?—No, not before the war; I can only speak for the time I was there.

171. The second head refers to the steps taken in connection with the war?—Yes, first, the supply of men.

The number of the troops in South Africa on paper when Lord Roberts and I arrived in Capetown was approximately 94,600. Of these, 51,500 were with General Buller in Natal.

In my opinion the development of the war in Natal had reduced the number of effective troops available in Cape Colony to a dangerously low limit. Reinforcements were asked for, and sent from other parts of the Empire. From this time on, the numbers of men in the field were kept up.

In a country as vast as South Africa, large numbers of men are required to protect lines of communication and, possibly, threatened points; these men do not come into the field of active operations; but, considering the numbers of the enemy, I do not think it can be said that our troops were deficient in number. A fairly constant flow of drafts and reinforcements to meet the wastage of war was kept up from home. Occasionally there was some delay in the arrival of these drafts, causing the *cadres* of battalions to become reduced, but I am of opinion that, on the whole, the strength of the Army in the field was well maintained.

172. That is after the date when reinforcements were sent out?—Yes. After January, 1900, when we went out.

173. What have you to say as to the quality of the men?—

In the early stages of the war there was a certain amount of want of training amongst the men of the Reserve who had been long in civil life. This temporarily affected the efficiency of some units, but the Reservists quickly picked up their training, and were then some of the best men in their regiments.

In regard to the marching capacities of the men I have no serious fault to find. Our men were not as quick and accurate as their opponents in shooting rapidly, but they had not been trained for this during peace time, and could not, therefore, be expected to excel in what the Boers had learned to practise from childhood. Opportunities were also sometimes lost by the delay which almost invariably occurred before our men opened fire. This I attribute greatly to the strictness of fire discipline, which our system of training enforces, and which, I think, should be somewhat relaxed. During the later stages of the war this slowness was corrected, with the result that our fire effect was considerably increased.

The rifle is capable of improvement, and was no better than, if as good as, the Mauser.

The men marched well, but at first the soldier was not good at taking care of himself and looking after his health and comfort in bivouac and on the march, and he was generally ignorant or quite oblivious of sanitary precautions. He was usually too dependent on his officers, and lacked individuality.

The material is very good, but hard work and intelligent training is wanted to render it capable of answering every test. Before the war, in all the combatant branches of the service, mechanical perfection had been cultivated at the expense of individual resourcefulness.

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Men who had received training in riding were good horsemen, but the care of horses required much more attention.

It is difficult in time of war to instruct men in horsemanship or in horse management, and for this reason more of our men, I think, should receive careful instruction in horse management during peace time. In the latter stages of the war men improved very much in the matter of looking after their horses.

The instructions for the construction of intrenchments contained in the drill books which were in force at the beginning of the war did not sufficiently accentuate the importance of adapting the actual work to the conformation of the ground, and to the topography of the surrounding country. This defect has, however, been remedied in the drill books now in use by the troops.

Many valuable lessons have been learnt in this respect during the war; they should, I think, be taken advantage of in the future training of the Army.

The importance of the use of cover under modern conditions of rifle fire has been brought prominently forward, whilst the great value of even very nasty entrenchments has been proved over and over again.

I am of opinion, that all infantry and artillery should carry with them sufficient tools to enable them to construct hasty entrenchments, for as the accuracy of weapons improves, so in equal degree will the value of such entrenchments increase.

174. What is your opinion as to the quality of the officers?

There appears to be too often a want of serious study of their profession by officers who are, I think, rather inclined to deal too lightly with military questions of moment.

The junior officers were, in my opinion, better than the senior officers.

The officers on the staff were very mixed. Some were excellent, whilst others had no staff training, and had everything to learn. There was no reserve of qualified staff officers to fill vacancies. The tendency on the part of some generals and commanders to do their own staff work was noticeable, and should be discontinued.

I consider that the training of officers to fit them for war can best be provided by manœuvres, which should be made to follow as closely as possible every characteristic detail of war up to the actual contact between the combatants.

War training other than manœuvres should be made as interesting and up-to-date as possible; the independent instruction of squadrons, troops, companies, half-companies, and even sections, should form the fundamental principle of our training. Captains and subalterns should be *real* commanders, and battalion and brigade commanders should confine themselves to supervision, while they refrain from meddling with details. Officers who show marked professional zeal and ability should be considered for special substantive promotion.

I am of opinion that field exercises should be kept up. Hunting and polo are the best and quickest means of exercising and developing the qualities and muscles required in the field, and there is no reason why such field exercises should unduly interfere with an officer's serious and proper study of his profession.

A strong constitution and good health are of the greatest importance, and weakly officers who cannot stand real hard work should be carefully eliminated from the field army. Lives of men should not be entrusted to the care of officers who may fail in war, not from want of training or knowledge, but from physical inability to stand the strain of a campaign.

Officers should be trained to take responsibility. They should be induced to exercise their brains and to strike out ideas for themselves, even at the risk of making mistakes, rather than to stagnate, or to follow the dull routine which at present affects the officers in our service and moulds them into machines of very limited capacity. The habit of acting on their own initiative should be fostered among officers in every way, and I deprecate taking the judgment on an officer in the field for carelessness or for other fault, out of the hands of the General Officer Commanding, either by public opinion or otherwise. Such action affects officers in a most serious and vital manner by cramping their initiative, and by making them shun responsibility—thus depriving them of two great essentials for command.

The commanding officers of Regular battalions have not taken a prominent part in the conduct and progress of the war.

This is probably accounted for by the fact that they sometimes obtain the command of their battalions at such an age that their powers of endurance cannot withstand the physical and moral strain which the responsibility of command in modern war necessarily entails.

This applies also to brigadiers. It was found on more than one occasion that the reputation of officers acquired in peace time, and even in other wars, was not sustained under the more modern conditions of South Africa.

I had some difficulty, even with the experience of a year of the war to guide me, in obtaining a sufficient number of competent officers to command the columns in the later stages of the war. The prolongation of hostilities without interruption or rest, and under the continuous moral strain which modern war entails, wears out the individual commander in a remarkably short space of time, and it was often not easy to replace him.

I should like to point out, further, that in the higher ranks also there seems to be a want of that professionalism which is essential to thorough efficiency.

175. You mentioned a want of qualified staff officers, I think; what did you particularly mean by using the word "qualified"?—Officers who have practised staff work, and know thoroughly their duties as staff officers.

176. Does that mean the Staff College?—Not necessarily; officers can be thoroughly qualified for staff work by practice in manœuvres or in former wars.

177. Do you look upon the Staff College as an important element of qualification?—I do not know that I had much experience in the war which would give me the right to form an opinion upon that point.

178. Is there any other way you would suggest for the training of officers for the staff than that which is now followed by the Staff College, or otherwise?—It is rather difficult to answer questions as to how officers should be trained for staff employment. The Staff College, of course, is a very useful one, and turns out some very good staff officers. It certainly is of great assistance to officers when learning staff duties to go through the Staff College.

179. But there are other elements in the training of a staff officer for the staff which you would also like to see?—I think the practice of staff work is perhaps more instructive than studying the theory.

180. In order to get that, must an officer be taken away from his regiment?—Yes, he must be taken away.

181. Does that not amount to this, that there must be a limited number of officers in the Army who are qualified for staff work?—Certainly, everyone cannot be qualified for the staff; but there are a considerable number of officers available.

182. Would it not be possible so to arrange the training of the officer in his regiment as to bring him up to a point in qualifying for staff work, and thereby increase the number from whom you would be able to draw eventually?—Instruction in a regiment might make an officer more suitable for staff employment than it does now, but it never could absolutely qualify him for staff work, or to be considered as a safe reserve to fall back upon for staff duties. An officer who has never done staff work in the field really does not know the difficulties there are before him.

183. I quite understand that there might be a rotation of officers from regiments; two things might happen, either you might take a man definitely from his regiment and employ him continuously on staff work, or you might have a rotation of officers from regiments, each getting a term of staff work?—I think it ought to be a rotation of officers, that they should come from their regiments and learn staff duties, and if they have been thoroughly satisfactory in those duties, they might go back to their regiments with promotion. Then they would be available as a reserve to call upon at any time.

184. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) As a matter of fact, was there a large or a small proportion of your staff officers who had gone through the Staff College?—I really could not say what number had passed through the Staff College, but you could easily see from a list of the staff.

185. (*Chairman.*) What have you to say as to the Medical Service?

The criticisms on the medical service during the war were, in my opinion, unfair. An army marching in a new country cannot be supplied with medical appliances to meet more than the recognised proportion of sick and wounded.

It is the old question of "bullets or pills," and the proportion laid down cannot be altered without affecting the efficiency of the army. If, then, an epidemic

amongst soldiers occurs, the army, if distant from its base, cannot be at once prepared to meet it with every appliance, and with necessary accommodation, and special steps have to be taken to meet the contingency for which the army is advisedly unprepared.

At a moment of epidemic the medical service was severely criticised during the war. No doubt some mistakes were made, but I do not consider that on the whole the medical service was in any way inefficient, and in the later phase of the war the arrangements for sick and wounded were in every way admirable.

The professional ability of medical officers is not entirely satisfactory. They do not seem to take sufficient advantage of local resources to supplement what the Army provides, and in my opinion the Royal Army Medical Corps rather fails in point of administration, and a good deal too much stress is laid on the preparation of multifarious reports and on compliance with innumerable regulations.

They should also understand that the medical side of their profession comes first, though a soldierlike spirit of discipline is naturally required.

186. As to supply of ammunition and equipment, including food and forage, what have you to say?

Ample supplies of ammunition and artillery equipment were always forthcoming in South Africa.

And in no case were guns or rifles without ammunition, whilst the artillery equipment, comprising some 600 guns of 17 different natures, was maintained in an effective condition throughout the war.

Whilst the arrangements for the distribution and issue of general stores remained in the hands of the Principal Ordnance Officer, the control of the supply and distribution of all ammunition was placed by the Commander-in-Chief in the hands of the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery.

This system worked well.

Owing to the great variety and complexity of the spare parts and technical stores for the many different guns employed in the field, it was found necessary for the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery to take up the supply and distribution, though working through and in co-operation with the Ordnance Store Department.

The similarity of the duties of provision and supply, which are carried out by the Supply and Ordnance Departments, leads me to the opinion that these great supply branches could with advantage to the Service be amalgamated into one general supply branch. I think that the present transport branch should be separated and formed into an independent department, while the supply of technical stores, which are often of great complexity, instead of being administered by the Ordnance Department, should be handed over to the branches of the service to which the stores belong.

This arrangement is to a large extent already adopted by the Royal Engineers and Royal Army Medical Corps.

The supply of ammunition, both gun and rifle, should be undertaken by the Royal Artillery.

18171. Lastly, in urging the formation of a separate transport department, I would point out that there is no more important work in any branch of the Army and none in which a thorough and careful training is more necessary, more especially at a time like the present, when mechanical transport will probably be an important adjunct to the military transport service.

Officers of the transport will have to become experts in dealing with mules, oxen, camels, elephants, wagons, cart and mechanical vehicles of all descriptions. My contention is that, to learn all this thoroughly, is all that can be expected of any body of officers, and that to add supply duties to the list of the necessary acquirements of these officers is to detract from the efficiency of the transport service.

The head of the Transport Department should study the various conditions required for transport in all parts of the world, and be able to advise on all subjects connected with any probable theatre of war.

187. What is the transport service combined with now?—The Army Service Corps includes transport, but the Ordnance Department is separate.

188. And the Army Service Corps deals with food and forage as well as other supplies?—Food, forage, and transport.

189. And ammunition?—No, that is Ordnance. With regard to equipment, the general quality of the clothing and equipment supplied to the field force was on the whole very satisfactory.

I am of opinion that the accounts and the system of requisitions for stores should be simplified, and that the forms and regulations dealing with the indents sent in by units should be remodelled on the lines of those now in existence in the Army Service Corps.

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The local resources of South Africa proved to be very much larger than was anticipated, and after a period were drawn upon to their fullest extent and to the greatest advantage of the Service. The prices in the early part of the campaign were excessive, but after a good system had been introduced at the base for local purchase, this objection may be said to have disappeared.

I wish to call special attention to the peculiar unsuitability of the ammunition pouch for practical work in the field. Moreover, although this article was gradually replaced in the field by a bandolier, I am satisfied that we have still to improve upon the pattern of this article also by the introduction of the clip. Our losses in ammunition in this campaign, which in itself proved a source of supply to the enemy, cannot be ascribed to the want of care of the individual soldier, so much as to the peculiar unsuitability of the article supplied to him in which to carry his rounds.

There is a great deal to be done in the way of collecting useful information during peace time as to the manufacturing capabilities and resources of different countries. I think this point should be more carefully watched in the future.

190. You say that ammunition was lost from the pouches?—Yes, in a great many cases, and even from the bandoliers. I think a clip will improve that.

As regards the supply of food and forage to the South African Field Force, it has always been sufficient and of good quality. Of course, there were occasions at the beginning of the advance, when the soldier did not receive quite his full ration, but this was due more to considerations of mobility and the consequent limit to the available transport.

I consider that the soldier was better fed than in any previous campaign.

Complaints were few and far between, and the majority were of a trivial nature, which speaks well for the sufficiency of the ration and the general quality of the food supplied.

The fact that only a single line of railway, and this often interrupted, was available for bringing the enormous quantities of food and forage from the base ports up to the railhead was a very serious handicap to the administration of the Army Service Corps, and when it is recollected that the railhead was often three or four days trek behind the main body of the Army, it will be realised that with such extended lines of communication, punctual supply to the field force was very difficult and harassing.

The food was always available in the country, the great difficulty was in conveying it from the sources of supply to the consumer without interfering with mobility.

As to the forage of the Army, this was a still more serious question. Every effort was made to collect all available forage, and as far as possible to live upon the country, but it was obviously impossible to rely on this source of supply alone. In addition to the enormous numbers of horses belonging to the mounted branches of the force, there were also to be fed the actual animals engaged in the transport.

There were approximately to be fed daily in the general advance upon Pretoria the following:—

Animals - - -	65,000
Men - - - -	80,000

I hand in a statement of the reserves available in the country in food and forage (*the statement was handed in.* (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 240) by which it will be seen that by the middle of March, 1900, there was practically 120 days' supply accumulated for the force in the country. When it is recollected that the daily feeding strength at this time was about—

Men - - -	200,000
Animals - -	90,000

I think that was highly creditable.

No doubt the war horse suffered to some extent for the shortness of the ration that he received in the field, especially the larger animals that were so generally in use at the beginning of the campaign; but I consider that the falling off in condition was more due to the want of rest and the general hardships experienced from the heavy work and new climate, a condition in which an extra 6lbs. or 8lbs. of oats would have little or no effect.

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As far as I know, there were no delays due to the failure of the contractors, nor was there any serious failure to carry out contracts, which were on the whole, I think, satisfactory.

Very considerable amounts of supplies were purchased in South Africa, and, owing to a good system, the prices of local purchases were well watched, and good quality secured at lowest market prices.

191. Who entered into the contracts in South Africa which you have just mentioned? Was that done under the supervision of the officers in the field?—Yes, the contracts in South Africa were all under my Director of Supplies, and they were also supervised by the Financial Adviser if the supplies were large. I think the limit was £1,000, if I remember right; if the contract was for more than £1,000 it was supervised by the Financial Department before being approved of.

192. (*Viscount Esher.*) That is the local Financial Department?—Yes, in Africa.

193. Was that by an officer sent out?—Yes.

194. Did you appoint the Financial Advisers?—At one time I had Mr. Fleetwood Wilson, but afterwards I appointed an officer, Major Armstrong, who is now the Financial Adviser.

195. (*Chairman.*) All those contracts were entered into and settled in South Africa?—Yes, we were entirely responsible for all the supply of food, forage, and equipment bought in South Africa.

196. And your demands for supplies from home were based on the estimated deficiency in your supplies out there?—Yes, our demands were reduced when we knew we had so much available in the country.

197. (*Sir John Jackson.*) In the first instance were not some of the contracts settled from the War Office here in the way of food supplies?—Yes, all very large contracts had to be referred to the War Office, such as a meat contract, which is made by the War Office; but I was speaking more of purchasing in smaller quantities.

198. (*Viscount Esher.*) When you expressed yourself as generally satisfied with the way in which the contracts were, on the whole, carried out were you referring to the contracts you had entered into in Africa, or generally speaking?—Generally. It did not come to my notice that any contracts were badly carried out at home, and I did not see any bad stuff coming out, or very little. There were some ships that were damaged, but it never affected the Army, and I do not think we lost any large sum of money, not more than any ordinary trader would experience; in fact, I think our loss was a great deal less than any trader would have suffered, considering the magnitude of the stores required.

199. (*Chairman.*) You were satisfied with the meat?—The meat was a very expensive contract at first, but you must remember that the contractor ran enormous risks. It was a very difficult contract to get taken up at all. The transport in the same way was most expensive, and a difficult and dangerous contract for anybody to embark upon. Therefore, their profits were very considerable if they succeeded, but their losses might have been just as great.

200. As far as the quality was concerned you were satisfied?—Yes. The transport contract was stopped as soon as ever we could possibly manage the transport ourselves. The meat contract was also stopped the moment we could do so, and reduction in rates was obtained, because as the war went on the risks were diminished.

201. (*Sir John Jackson.*) With regard to the supply, you found sellers out at the Cape, and your local officer was in a position to see where there were opportunities of making a good bargain; could he conclude a bargain or was it necessary for him to consult?—I could give him authority to conclude a purchase of that sort, and then we reported to the War Office that we did not want so much of that article. A great deal was bought in South Africa. Of course we knew what the prices were at home, and we did not pay more than it would cost us to be supplied from home, unless it was an absolute necessity to get an article at once.

202. If you saw a good opportunity of getting flour or whatever it might be there, knowing the prices paid at home, you could complete the purchase without referring?—Yes, and we reported what we had done. Of course, with regard to perishable goods like flour and that sort of thing, we had large quantities in store; we did not purchase because some one offered it to us cheap, as it is a perishable article

203. (*Viscount Esher.*) But you had complete authority to enter into any contract of that sort without reference to home?—Yes, I had authority to approve of purchases in the country, and I do not think I was limited in any way.

204. (*Chairman.*) Will you give us your opinion as to the number and quality of the horses supplied?

My indents for horses were met, and were, with some exceptions, satisfactorily carried out. Of those supplied, the South African were the most satisfactory; next, the smaller English horses, North Americans, and Russian ponies. The larger Russian horses were quite unsuitable. Australian horses proved to require much longer to acclimatise on account of their physique, but the smaller ones were useful. Hungarian bred were showy, but not useful for South Africa. Argentines proved so unsatisfactory that their supply was discontinued.

There were, of course, periods when the supply was not equal to the demand, but this was the result of a sudden increase in the number of mounted troops, who arrived more quickly than it was possible to supply them with fit horses.

Experience has shown that 14.2 to 15 hands to be the best military size for South Africa.

Owing to large numbers of improvised mounted men, with little or no knowledge of horsemastership, expenditure in horseflesh was considerably beyond expectations.

I would further point out that all horses imported from the northern hemisphere arrived in South Africa in the summer time, with heavy winter coats on them. This great change in climatic conditions was the cause of a considerable percentage of loss.

Later on I appointed an officer of experience as a travelling inspector of all remount depôts and horse hospitals in South Africa, to see that the treatment and care of horses was systematic.

Towards the end of the war the class of horse imported seemed to improve in quality. Owing to constant requests to send small, compact animals, and owing to the extra care and to the better system of horse management, a considerable reduction was noticeable in demands for remounts in the field.

The system I pursued as regards the issue of horses was, that the animals were kept at one of the depôts established close to the port of disembarkation for a period of one week to ten days, during which time they were, if possible, all shod; in order to relieve the congestion at the Cape ports, they were then railed to one of the big remount depôts in the centre of operations, where they were better looked after. At these depôts the animals were kept for three weeks, clipped, and exercised.

Every horse during his last week at the depôt was doing eight miles' trotting work daily.

The draught horses supplied to the Royal Artillery were, for the most part, of excellent quality, and batteries were well horsed throughout the war. Horses supplied by the omnibus companies were specially good and suitable.

I am of opinion that at the outbreak of hostilities an officer should be at once appointed to the staff of the army in the field, who will be charged with the organisation, administration, and issue of all army horses required.

Finally, I would recommend that the Remount Department should keep in touch, at all times, with the best and cheapest markets for horses and mules, so as to prevent having to purchase hurriedly in case of emergency through rapidly appointed agents, who may or may not be fit for the purpose.

I would point out that this could be done through our consuls and military attachés abroad.

In this manner very valuable information would be procured as to numbers, characteristics, suitability for saddle or draught, names of the principal dealers, and the best ports for shipment.

It might also be worth while to keep in touch with such good centres as Texas and Canada, to the extent of purchasing a few horses each year, in order to test their suitability for military purposes.

The following statement shows the number of horses demanded and the number of horses supplied. It shows that the demands were well met.

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EXTRACT FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF ENQUIRY ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARMY REMOUNT DEPARTMENT.

Quarter Ending.	Demanded.		Supplied.	
	Horses.	Mules.	Horses.	Mules.
31 December, 1899	4,272	12,900	5,901	18,095
31 March, 1900	13,930	18,000	14,155	15,092
30 June, 1900	19,830	20,600	34,104	18,749
30 September, 1900	18,530	6,000	19,751	9,988
31 December, 1900	10,072	5,000	10,090	6,055
31 March, 1901	35,394	6,000	25,118	4,467
30 June, 1901	30,716	7,000	23,468	5,971
30 September, 1901	31,716	6,000	30,855	7,500
31 December, 1901	30,816	6,000	40,365	5,113
and for				
31 January, 1902	9,972	2,000	13,056	3,000
	205,248	89,500	216,863	94,030

205. (*Chairman.*) I suppose that period of training for the horses in South Africa which you have referred to did not exist at a certain stage of the war?—No, not until we got settled down.

206. And during that time there was still greater wastage, because the horses were sent straight up without sufficient training?—Well, they always had their depôt at the port; the principal depôt for horses when they arrived was at Stellenbosch. We always tried to give the horses as long as we possibly could, to acclimatise them, in the depôt, before putting them into the field, so as to get them over their voyage. They could not go to work at once.

207. Cases have been mentioned of horses being sent up almost straight from the port?—Yes, and cases have occurred frequently. I have had to order it myself on some occasions. There are very many possibilities and difficulties that have to be met. You might be able to train them up one day and not another, and you have to send them up when you can, or you might not have the necessary accommodation or a possible place to put them in. It might therefore be better at times to send them off, as greater loss might be incurred by keeping them at the base. There are many occasions of that sort that do occur, without considering the necessity for hastily mounting men in the field, which would justify the Chief of the Staff in giving the order for horses to move, although perhaps he might regret having to do so.

208. By the time you were able to bring into operation the system you have described just now, things were in a more satisfactory state?—Yes.

209. And the supply of the army in the field then was fairly satisfactory?—Of course, I should have liked to have the horses longer, but this was quite impossible, as the number of horses you have to feed in the country in order to keep a greater reserve in your depôts is so great. In these calculations time is everything, for if you keep horses longer in the depôt you must have more of them.

210. Looking to the different sides of the question, the system you tried was a fairly adequate system for the emergencies of the case?—Yes, I think it about balanced the difficulties both ways.

211. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) The proportion of horses from South America was very large, was it not?—Argentines?

212. Yes?—It was large at the beginning of the war, but we did not have any Argentines later.

213. They were not equal, I understand, to those from England and the colonies?—No, they were a bad class of horse.

214. Are you aware why a larger number was not drawn from England and the colonies?—I had nothing to do with the purchase of horses except in South Africa.

215. (*Viscount Esher.*) Before you leave the horse question, you have placed the horses in a sort of category, mentioning those you think best, and so on; were you there speaking only of South Africa, or would you say that that category would apply if a war took place elsewhere?—I was only speaking of South Africa, although, of course, South Africa is not so very different from other parts of the world. In certain circumstances, in certain countries, you might find that that category would not be quite correct.

216. Those facts are new facts, based, I suppose, upon experience of the war?—Yes, they are.

217. You have no reason to suppose that the Inspector-General of Remounts here had formed any opinion corresponding to yours upon these questions?—No.

218. (*Chairman.*) What have you to say with reference to the Army Pay Department?

The Army Pay Department, as at present composed, merely records the expenditure of the Army without any idea either of improvement or economy, and ignores financial considerations of any kind. Its labours are purely clerical and mechanical, which, though necessary and essential, do not, in my opinion, require other than clerks to carry them out effectively. *See* Q. 21826.

There is a marked want of financial assistance to Generals in the field, which, if it were met by the appointment of competent military financial advisers on the staff, would result, I am sure, in a more efficient and economical expenditure of the public money supplied.

The system of accounts in the Army requires thorough examination and simplification.

I now come to the transport. I can give no comments on the sea transport, which was done by the Admiralty.

219. Except that you have no complaints to make from your point of view?—That is so.

During the first stage of the war first and second line transport was issued to units as they arrived in South Africa, in accordance with the allotment laid down in Field Army Establishments on Mobilisation. Under this system there was no effective control over the transport service, and there was no balance of transport to form convoys on a large scale. The troops in the field, therefore, during 1899, had been practically tied to the railway. In January, 1900, it was decided by Lord Roberts to remodel the transport service, and a distinct transport system was organised from the second line with certain modifications of the first line transport, which was left with units as shown in the pamphlet on

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transport, which I will now hand in. (*The pamphlet was handed in.*) The new organisation was composed of transport companies, which took over the transport on charge from the units, and formed it into transport companies, whose chief duty was to carry food, forage, stores, and equipment for a mobile force, operating at a distance from the railway. These companies also provided the convoys necessary to furnish the Army in the field with food and ammunition.

These measures admitted of the transport being effectively handled and utilised, the immediate and practical result being to enable the Army to leave the railway and move on Bloemfontein.

Throughout the later stages of the war, large bodies of troops were able to operate at great distances from the railway, and the transport of the Army was available for general use, instead of being tied up in the charge of regimental units.

During the year 1901 the mule transport with mobile troops was increased, so as to carry seven days' supplies. This greatly enhanced their mobility, and the ox transport was withdrawn from mobile columns for convoy work on lines of communication and blockhouses.

The mules at first were in some cases stallions of inferior quality, but the general supply of mules subsequently improved, and was satisfactory.

We had about 45 steam road transport trains; as a rule they did useful work, but questions of weather, roads, water, and coal, distinctly limited their employment, as compared with animal transport, to which they can only be regarded as a supplement.

The motor lorries sent to South Africa did well. Thorneycroft's are the best. They will, in the future, be found superior to steam road trains as field transport.

The working of the railways during the war has been very fully dealt with in the railway report already forwarded to the War Office. It would, I think, be advisable, as Sir Percy Girouard suggests, to form in peace time some department whose duty it would be, not only to take over and work the railways during war, but also to collect all information regarding the railways in any possible theatre of operations.

There should be, in my opinion, a small permanent department of this nature at Army headquarters. It is immaterial whether it be under the Quartermaster-General or the Intelligence Division; but it is, I think, desirable that such a department should be brought into existence.

220. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Before you leave the question of transport, the system you found working in 1899, of transport being allowed to the different units, was, of course, the system laid down by regulations at home?—Yes.

221. And the only system existing in the British Army?—Yes. It was the system laid down by regulation for field service.

222. Taking the system as it was (I am not entering into its merits as a good or bad system) did you find that the provisions made for that system were satisfactory so far as the system itself went? Could you say that the transport had been properly provided for on the system that then existed?—I think it was impossible to provide for the transport of the Army on that system, which locked up so much transport.

223. Taking the separate units, was the transport for each unit fairly satisfactory?—There was a considerable amount of transport, but I do not think it was satisfactory in every unit. By the new system, of course, the transport became available for the whole Army, and was not locked up in any particular unit.

224. (*Chairman.*) The amount of transport provided by the regulations had been supplied to the different units, had it not?—I cannot say exactly, as this was prior to my arrival in Capetown, but I do not think it was complete in every unit. I think, possibly, they may have had their first and second line of transport complete, but that did not leave any available for convoys, and, accordingly, they could not get away from the railway or go any distance.

225. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Who are your subordinates who would go specially into details of that nature under your directions?—Colonels Richardson, Bridge, and Wickham.

226. (*Chairman.*) With regard to the railways, did you take them out of the hands of the people that managed them before?—No, they were not taken over absolutely.

227. I suppose the Cape railways are what you had to deal with principally?—Yes, the Cape railways were worked by their own officials very loyally and very well, and they helped in every possible way; we had a Director of Railways who worked with these civil authorities, and they had an office together.

228. What did you do when you got into the Free State?—Then we had to work military railways, which were entirely our own.

229. You worked them yourselves?—Yes.

230. That is all you want to say about Head 2?—Yes.

231. Head 3 is as to the military operations up to the occupation of Pretoria?—That I thought Lord Roberts would give full information upon.

232. There were one or two questions we drew your attention to, as to the value of mobility, and so on, but you would prefer in all cases to reserve these points for Lord Roberts?—I think it would be better, as Lord Roberts will deal with that general question.

233. I think you told us that if on any of the points we wished hereafter to get your individual opinion, you would be very glad to send it to us from India?—I will. (*A further statement from Lord Kitchener will be found in the Appendix, page* 511, *post.*)

234. (*Viscount Esher.*) You gave an answer to the Chairman when he asked you whether you had any suggestions to make as to how officers should be trained for staff work, and there is only one point I wish to ask you about that: as I understand, your suggestion was that the majority of officers should be given a chance in peace time of doing work on the staff. Is that your idea?—I think as many as possible. I would not say the majority of officers.

235. At present if an officer is selected, as he often is, to go upon the staff, he generally remains a staff officer, does he not? That is the ordinary practice?—I think according to the rule laid down in the War Office he is supposed to go back to his regiment after he has done a turn of staff work.

236. In point of fact, we know officers who remain on the staff pretty well the whole of their lives. Your suggestion would be, I presume, that the rule, whatever it is, should be rather more strictly adhered to, so as to give more officers a chance?—I think it would be adhered to more closely if an officer who did well on the staff thought he was going to get promotion on returning to his regiment.

237. Since you have been back have you been asked by the Secretary of State to prepare a memorandum or memoranda of your criticisms generally upon the state of the Army organisation?—No.

238. This is the first occasion on which you have stated practically your views?—Yes, in this form; but the War Office have my reports, and I have had verbal conversations. I think my views are known in the War Office.

239. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Do you think there was any reason to complain of delay on the part of the War Office here in complying with your requisitions for stores, equipment, and so forth?—No, I have said there was none in my opinion; the stores and equipment all came out, and we had at times 120 days supply on hand.

240. When you landed at the Cape with Lord Roberts there was not sufficient transport available for you to undertake the operations you were subsequently able to commence?—Not in the way it was organised. As reorganised we were able, as you know, to march to Bloemfontein, and we could not have done that march without the reorganisation of the transport.

241. I suppose also that the transport was increased during the time you were reorganising?—Yes, but it was not a very long time. We certainly had the usual consignments of mules arriving during that time, but we arrived on the 10th January, and we left on the 11th February, so that we had about a month.

242. And then you had sufficient transport to carry on your operations?—Yes, although we had not got as much as we should have liked, and everything had to be cut down to its lowest point to enable the march to take place.

243. I suppose there are returns to show what transport was available when you landed and the subsequent amount of transport that became available from other countries or from the Cape itself?—Yes.

244. You made some remarks about the Medical Department; do you think you had a sufficiency of medical officers?—I think so.

245. You had a good many civil medical officers?—I am including the civil; there would not have been anything like enough if there had been only the Army Medical Department.

246. I suppose there were civil medical officers available at the Cape to a certain extent?—They generally came from home.

247. You had a very large number of staff officers, had you not? The lines of communication and various other places that had to be filled caused a great drain for staff officers?—Yes, it did.

248. More so than usual with an army in the field?—Yes, I should think more than usual.

249. Had you any difficulty in supplying capable officers?—Yes.

250. (*Sir John Edge.*) As I understand with regard to transport, when you arrived there the difficulty was more in the way in which the transport was organised than in the quantity of transport?—There was not sufficient transport to be liberal, and as it was organised, we could not have advanced on Bloemfontein.

251. But with the change in the organisation you were able to advance practically with the same transport?—Just able, but only just; it was a touch and go whether we could do it, and everything had to be cut down to the very lowest limit.

252. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I have one question to ask you, and it does not apply to the time you were in command, but I must ask it because it is one that exercises the minds of a great number of people. I am sure you must have given a great deal of attention to the idea, and you are one of the two persons who are best competent to answer it; what number of British troops properly distributed in South Africa in the early part of 1899 would, in your opinion, from the military point of view only, have been sufficient to garrison Kimberley, to hold the Orange River, and substantially to protect Natal from an invasion by the combined forces of the two Republics?—I have a paper which would give you the numbers of Boers actually in the field, working back to the beginning.

253. Take it in this way: before we went to Bloemfontein what force would have sufficed to have safeguarded the Colonies—not the long Bechuanaland frontier and possibly not the apex of Natal, but substantially to safeguard the Colonies pending the arrival of reinforcements—from your knowledge?—It is very difficult to give an opinion without considerable thought.

254. (*Chairman.*) Are you of opinion that a much larger number of men was available to the Boers than the Intelligence Department gave them credit for?—Yes.

255. You can give us a statement showing what the actual number was?—I think I can. (*The statement was subsequently sent in and the figures are the same as those shown on page* 155 *of the Appendix to the Report of the Commission.*)

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See Q. 5163; 21107.

256. (*Sir John Edge.*) What rough estimate do you make of the numbers of Boers in the field?—That would mean between 65,000 to 70,000 Boers. I think that during the whole war they had 95,000 men out but that includes the Cape rebels and a certain number of foreigners.

257. (*Viscount Esher.*) Did you get much assistance from the Intelligence branch here in the course of the campaign?—No, I do not think I did. I had information from all sources, and even that from the very best sources in South Africa (people who had lived for 40 or 50 years with the Boers) was absolutely erroneous and entirely wrong—men like Samuel Marks, and people who absolutely lived with them, and were their greatest friends, had no more idea what was going on, in fact, much less than we had, because we came with an open mind, and they were completely deceived.

258. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Might I ask if you had the opportunity of judging of officers educated at the Colonial Military Colleges?—I think they were very good.

259. Say, for instance, those from Kingston as compared with those who had not the advantage of being at such colleges?—I should not like to make a comparison, but the officers turned out by Kingston were certainly well trained and equipped for army work. I do not think I should compare them with others.

260. Do you consider they would compare well with those educated at similar institutions here?—They would compare very well.

261. And you think that it really is an advantage to have such institutions in the Colonies?—I certainly think so.

262. May I ask with regard to horses, have you considered that it would be well that there should be remount depôts in the Colonies, looking to the quality of the horses that were sent to South Africa from Canada and from Australia?—You mean permanent establishments?

263. Yes; to be able to draw from year to year as might be required?—I suggested that a certain number might be drawn from year to year from those places which provided really very good and useful horses, to keep up the desire and advantage of breeding horses in those places, but I did not say that there should be a remount depôt in those Colonies; that would be a financial question that might or might not be advisable, and which should be thought out rather carefully. I think it would be a good thing to buy a certain number of Canadian and Texan horses and other horses proved to be useful, so that farmers in those countries might have an inducement to go on breeding.

THIRD DAY.

Wednesday, 15*th October*, 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable The Viscount Esher, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable The Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir George Dashwood Taubman-Goldie, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wylie Norman, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir Frederick Matthew Darley, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir John Ommanney Hopkins, G.C.B.
Sir John Edge.
Sir John Jackson.

Bernard H. Holland, Esq., *Secretary.*

Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B., R.E., re-called, and further examined.

Lt.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B., R.E.

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264. (*Chairman.*) Resuming your evidence that you were giving us on the 8th October, you now appear definitely for the office of which you are the head?—Yes, but may I make one statement with reference to my evidence this day week?

265. If you please?—As regards my answers to Questions 16, 17, 61, 62, and 114, I wish to say that on referring to the papers which I have handed in to the secretary, I find that the War Office Council was first instituted by Mr. Stanhope, when he was Secretary of

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State for War. I have handed all these various Memoranda and Orders in Council to the secretary. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 269.) I had not gone into them myself before, and my answer on that point was incorrect.

266. You do not wish to go further into that matter?—No, simply to correct it.

267. We shall hear further of that from other witnesses?—Yes, and I have also handed in the Order of Mr. Stanhope creating that Council. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 272.)

268. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) There is a question I should like to put to you, as it has reference to your evidence on the last occasion. I think there is another committee at the War Office which was not mentioned in your evidence, called the Joint Military and Naval Defence Committee, of which you, I think, are a member?—Yes, I am a member of that committee.

269. What are supposed to be the exact functions of that committee?—It advises the Admiralty and the War Office on strategical questions which are referred to it; strategical questions in matters of defence.

270. Does it meet regularly or only at uncertain intervals?—At uncertain intervals.

271. Would it fall to the lot of that committee to deal with the question of the defence of Natal, or any portion of Cape Colony from attack from the land side?—No, I should say that it would not.

272. Is it only for naval defence?—It is for strategical questions affecting both the Admiralty and the War Office.

273. And you think that question of the defence of Natal, say, would never come before this Defence Committee in anticipation of an attack by the Boers?—It would only come before the Joint Naval and Military Committee in the event of the probability of an attack by sea, by some foreign power, on Natal.

274. Not by land?—Not by land.

275. In point of fact it has nothing to do with this inquiry at all?—It has nothing to do with this inquiry.

276. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I wish to draw your attention to your answers to Questions 144, 145, and 147, put to you by Lord Esher. I suggest that if these answers are published, as they will be, I suppose, ultimately, without any further explanation, there might be some anxiety felt in the country as to a very large department, such as yours is now, not putting forward demands that they think necessary for the defence of the country, out of fear that they would not get the money. Would you wish to add anything to what you said then as to the general system of how you put forward your demands, and on what ground you put forward your demands, and on what grounds you abstain from putting them forward?—My reason for saying that I was not likely to get the money is that I understand there is a strong opinion on the part of the nation, we will say, or the Government, that the military estimates have increased so rapidly of late years that it is desirable to be as economical as possible in all matters of expenditure which are not of urgent national importance. Last year I put forward a proposal for an increase to the staff of my department, which is at present inadequate. That proposal was supported by the Commander-in-Chief, and concurred in by the Secretary of State for War; but on financial grounds it was negatived. I put that as a very moderate proposal. Similarly, I imagine if I put forward a proposal involving very considerable expenditure, the chances are that unless there was any urgent necessity for it, it would be likely to be postponed until more money was forthcoming.

277. It would be refused by the Treasury, do you mean?—It would be refused by the Treasury.

278. (*Viscount Esher.*) Of course, I do not want to press you in the least, but you must see yourself that the responsibility for a refusal of that kind should properly be thrown either upon the Secretary of State for War or upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Do you not feel that?—Yes.

279. I mean that it is unfair upon you that you should take the responsibility of saying that the country will or will not agree to a certain expenditure. That is a matter for the Secretary of State for War, or for the Chancellor of the Exchequer?—For the Government.

280. You feel that?—I feel that.

281. (*Chairman.*) When you say that you did not put forward that demand for that sum of money, does that mean that it in no shape or form went before the Secretary of State for War?—I did not put it forward to anybody; it did not go before the Secretary of State.

282. (*Sir John Jackson.*) In answer to Question 3, you stated that you went out to South Africa as Military Secretary to Lord Roberts, and later were made Director of Transport. As Director of Transport I take it you were only responsible to the Commander-in-Chief. Is that so?—That is so.

283. Then, in answer to Question 13, you said that the Army Board chiefly dealt with the estimates. Do the heads of the departments, as a rule, pass their recommendations to the Army Board, or do they sometimes go direct to the Secretary of State?—I cannot answer that question, beyond saying that under the constitution of the Army Board it is supposed to examine the estimates.

284. Important estimates?—The estimates of all departments. It is in the paper which I put in giving the constitution of the Army Board; that is one of its principal duties, but whether heads of departments go direct to the Secretary of State or not it is impossible for me to say.

285. Then, in regard to Question 92, what are the particular duties of the Ordnance Select Committee to which you there refer?—That question I should prefer to be answered by Sir Henry Brackenbury, to whom the Ordnance Committee reports. He is practically the department concerned with the Ordnance Committee.

286. But, as I understand, you have a committee outside General Brackenbury's Committee, have you not?—The Ordnance Committee do you mean?

287. The committee on which you have some civilians, Sir Frederick Bramwell, Sir Benjamin Baker, and so on?—That is the Ordnance Committee, but it is employed for the purpose of investigating the suitability of new types of guns or gun carriages and ordnance matters, and reports to the Director-General of Ordnance.

288. In other words, if the Director-General of Ordnance brought forward some new ideas they would come to be considered by that Ordnance Select Committee?—I believe so.

289. (*Sir John Edge.*) Would you object to telling us what was the estimate of the increase of expenditure that would have been involved if your application for assistance in your department had been granted?—I could tell you on examining the papers, but I imagine £3,000 a year, something approaching that.

290. About?—About, but I can look it up.

291. (*Chairman.*) Then you appear, as I was saying, as the head of the department which, as you explained last week, is now a larger department than the former Intelligence Department, that is to say, it combines with it the Mobilisation Branch?—Yes.

292. I suppose you still work the office in two divisions?—In two divisions.

293. Therefore, the papers that you now submit to us are, one for the Intelligence Division and one for the Mobilisation Division?—Yes. (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 153, *and Appendix Vol., page* 17).

294. We will take then, first, the Intelligence Division?—Yes, whichever you like.

295. That statement deals entirely, or almost entirely, with the preparations for the war in South Africa, does it not?—Yes.

296. With regard to that statement, you have compiled it from the records of the office, but not from personal knowledge?—Not from personal knowledge.

297. And I understand that we may expect to have Sir John Ardagh, who was in charge of the office, at an early date?—Yes.

298. Would it be better, then, so far as the director of the office is concerned, that we should go into matters of detail with him, rather than with you, or would you wish to speak to those in detail also?—I should prefer that Sir John Ardagh, Colonel Altham and Colonel Robertson should speak on those points.

299. Colonel Altham and Colonel Robertson were concerned with the preparations for the war?—Yes.

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300. And they are to be present here to-day?—They are here to-day.

301. So that we could examine them upon this statement, even though you yourself do not go through it in detail?—Yes, and also Major Hills and Colonel Grant, who was his predecessor, are here to-day to speak about maps, and so on.

302. Then is there any point in the statement which you, as the present director of the office, would wish to comment upon?—The only comment that I should wish to make is that the information given by the Intelligence Division seems to have been remarkably accurate; so was the forecast of the war that took place.

303. There are certain memoranda which you mention in the course of this statement; do you give us the memoranda themselves?—We can submit copies of the memoranda, if the Commission wish for them.

304. I think the Commission would certainly prefer to see the original documents?—Then they can be produced. (*The documents were subsequently sent in. Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 161).

305. In what sense would you produce them—will you produce them for public use, or are they to be treated as confidential documents?—I think I must refer that point to the Secretary of State.

306. I should like to be a little precise in the matter. For instance, I asked some weeks ago for a hand-book of "Military Notes," and I got it, but I got it with a "secret" label on it. I find in your report that it has been published and issued?—Yes, it was issued to the Houses of Parliament.

307. So that it is a public document?—Yes.

308. I think it would be convenient that you should, if you wish the documents to be treated as really confidential, mark them as such, and, of course, then we should deal with them confidentially, unless we had further consent from the Secretary of State?—I will ascertain from the Secretary of State about the documents.

309. If a document is for public use it is much more convenient that it should be put in as a public document?—Quite so.

310. The office, as you explained last week, I think, was an office under the Commander-in-Chief under the previous system?—Yes; it still is under the Commander-in-Chief. I am one of the three staff officers, the heads of military Departments, who are under the Commander-in-Chief's control, as I explained last time.

311. Then it consisted of, I think you say here, two officers and one clerk?—That section of the office.

312. The Intelligence section?—Yes, the particular section dealing with South Africa.

313. That was the whole of the Intelligence Department?—No, there were other sections of the Intelligence Department.

314. What section, then, do you refer to in the two officers and one clerk?—You see, upon the first page, (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 154.) "Intelligence duties connected with South Africa were assigned to the section of the Intelligence Department which was charged with the strategical consideration of defence schemes at home and abroad. . . . This section had to carry out the following work," and so on. Then it describes it.

315. The section is charged with defence schemes at home and abroad?—Yes, the duties of that section are as there defined.

316. Then there are several sections in the office?—There are several.

317. Can you enumerate them?—Whether the existing subdivision of duties existed before I took charge, I am unable to say without reference to papers, but at present there are three main sections in the Intelligence Division. The first section is the one mentioned in this paper. The second section is the one which collects and collates information regarding all foreign countries, and supplies that information to such departments as it may be useful to. The third section deals with what I may call confidential matters, or secret questions, chiefly in connection with the Foreign Office and with topographical matters.

318. And the full strength of the office is what?—Three Assistant-Quartermaster Generals.

319. That is one at the head of each section?—Yes, eight Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster Generals, eight staff captains, and one Deputy-Assistant Adjutant General for permits to return to South Africa.

320. Twenty officers?—Twenty officers.

321. And with regard to the clerical side, can you say what that is? Perhaps we could get that from one of the other witnesses?—I can get a regular return prepared. I cannot exactly say.

322. We should like to know the full staff of the office?—There are also a certain number of attached officers, but they vary from time to time, and I cannot quite say how many I have just at present.

323. I think it would be convenient if you would lodge a full statement of the staff of your office, because the strength of the office is one of the points that is under observation?—If you please. (*The statement was subsequently handed in. Vide Appendix Vol., page* 41.)

See Q. 391; 445.

324. Can you say whether the clerical staff is civil or military?—The clerical staff, with the exception of the librarian, is military. The War Office librarian, who is under me, is a civilian, but the rest of the staff, except draughtsmen, printers, and the map curator, and his assistant, are Royal Engineer clerks.

325. I think you said just now that you had asked for an increase in the office, but it had not been sanctioned?—It has not been sanctioned.

326. And it remains now as it was before the war?—I have brought the question of an increase forward again, and it is to be considered by a committee, of which Lord Hardwicke will be chairman.

327. But up to the present moment?—Up to the present moment it remains the same. I may say that when I took charge I got a certain increase of establishment. Shortly after I took over the duties, when these three sections were formed, I got two additional Assistant-Quartermaster Generals to be the heads of those sections.

See. Q21706.

328. Then they are included in the list which you have just mentioned?—They are now included in the list, but they were not on the staff at the beginning of the war.

329. There were, in fact, 18 permanent officers instead of 20?—Yes.

330. As regards the Director-General of Military Intelligence, it is his duty in this particular section which this statement refers to, to draw up these schemes of defence, and they are submitted to the Commander-in-Chief; is that so?—Yes.

331. And have you anything to do with what happens to them thereafter? Do you bring them before the War Office Council or the Secretary of State, or is that left entirely in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief?—Most of these questions the Commander-in-Chief sends on to the Secretary of State, with his remarks, and then orders are passed thereon, and when orders are passed thereon, if action is required, they come back to me to take the necessary action.

332. And this Intelligence Division, of which you have been speaking, is the Headquarters Division permanently established in London?—Yes.

333. There is an Intelligence section, I suppose, in each field army, is there not?—Do you mean in peace time?

334. No, in the field?—Yes.

335. Has that anything to do with your Department?—The head of the Field Intelligence Staff in South Africa, for example, corresponded with my office almost weekly during the war, and gave us information of all sorts, which he thought would be useful.

336. But your office is not so organised as to expand into an Intelligence Department in the field?—No.

337. You always remain at headquarters?—Yes.

338. Then in what way is the Intelligence Department in the field organised?—Staff officers are selected and appointed to perform the duties of field intelligence.

339. But quite apart from your office?—Quite apart from my office.

340. In some Departments the occurrence of a war would necessitate augmentation and expansion; in your office, as I take it, it would not do so?—The war threw a great deal of extra work on my office, because the whole question of dealing with deported Boers, or the prisoners of war, or questions, for example, of secret information about the action of the Boers in various parts of Europe, and all things of that sort, were dealt with in the Intelligence Department.

341. But your prime object is to prepare schemes of defence, or to make other preparations for the occurrence of a war?—Yes.

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342. There may be incidental things of that kind, though I do not quite see why the charge of prisoners of war should come under the head of Intelligence?—All questions of martial law have been dealt with in my Department also. I may perhaps add that under the new Army Corps organisation, which has recently been started, we propose to have certain officers in each Army Corps to be styled Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster Generals, who will attend to local intelligence duties in each Army Corps.

343. And correspond with your office?—I presume that they will draft such letters as will proceed from the General Officers Commanding to my office on matters connected with mobilisation and intelligence.

See Q. 358.

344. What would their duties be in time of peace?—In time of peace there are questions of mobilisation, and arrangements for the mobilisation of an army corps or parts of it; there are questions of local defence in all parts of the United Kingdom, which are Intelligence matters. Schemes of local defence are prepared and revised from year to year.

345. Is there any other point with regard to the organisation of your office to which you would like to draw attention as regards the Intelligence Division?—No, I do not think so.

See Q. 303-4.

346. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) With reference to the memoranda of which the Chairman was speaking, which are referred to in the statement, you said, I think, you would produce those to us in any case, but that you would have to go to the Secretary of State as to whether they should be confidential or not?—Yes, the Commission has the right to call for anything.

347. I quite understand that, but that was your reply?—Yes.

348. I only want to say that it will be extremely convenient to us that we should have them for the moment confidentially at once, because I do not see how we are to examine Sir John Ardagh on this statement unless we have had those memoranda in our possession for some days beforehand?—I hope to have them put in in the course of a day or two.

349. Does that mean within two days?—Within two days.

350. And there is one other document that I should like the Chairman to call for. I think it is the April 1898 edition of "Military Notes"—the previous edition of "Military Notes." Can we have one copy at once?—Yes. (*The book was subsequently sent in.*)

351. (*Chairman.*) Any documents, in fact, mentioned in this statement we should wish to have?—Certainly.

352. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) In addition to these documents, you are here not only representing the Intelligence Division, but you came on behalf of the War Office to tell us what you could produce and what you could not?—I came to put in these various papers prepared by the other departments.

353. Then I think it is through you that one must ask for any further papers—at present, at any rate?—Yes.

354. Among the papers mentioned in this statement are there any letters from Sir William Butler while he was in command at the Cape?—There is Sir William Butler's report; you will find it at the bottom of page 12. (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 159.)

355. Yes, I see it at the bottom of page 12, but that hardly covers the documents that one would like to see. It is well known that there were several despatches sent home by Sir William Butler, probably of a confidential nature; and it is very important that the Commission should have those despatches before them?—I will endeavour to get those despatches as soon as possible. (*The despatches were subsequently sent in. Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 181 *et. seq.*)

356. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Have you in the Intelligence Division orders connected with the different sections of the division generally, under which you work, in print?—Yes, we have the Distribution of the Duties.

See Q. 344.

357. Will you produce them?—Yes.

358. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) The Chairman asked a question about the Intelligence officers in the various corps of the Army which have been recently constituted, and I think you said that you would prepare schemes of defence connected with those army corps. Supposing, for instance, that you wanted a scheme of defence for Plymouth; would that be prepared in your department, or in the department of the officer commanding that army corps?—It would be prepared, and has been prepared, for each defended port, at home, by the local authorities; that is to say, by the General Officer, assisted by his Commanding Royal Artillery officer and the Commanding Royal Engineer, who will in future be assisted by the staff officers of the Quartermaster-General's Department, in charge of intelligence and mobilisation duties. That scheme is submitted every year to the War Office; it comes up into my department, and is there examined, and the various questions raised therein, according as they concern ordnance or fortifications, or other things, are discussed with the departments concerned, and eventually the views of the War Office on the scheme as a whole are submitted to the Commander-in-Chief for his orders, and action taken accordingly.

359. Then that would have applied to the Cape command prior to the war, would it?—It would apply to the Cape command prior to the war.

360. It would apply, in fact, to any foreign command?—Yes, it applies to every foreign command.

361. (*Viscount Esher.*) Are you allowed to report to anyone else except the Commander-in-Chief? Can you report direct to the Secretary of State?—No.

362. Everything for the Secretary of State has to go through the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

363. With regard to your staff, you have asked for an addition to your staff?—Yes; and, in fact, the Treasury refused the addition. Now the matter is to be brought up again.

364. But you are strongly of opinion that your staff requires strengthening?—Yes, the staff requires strengthening. It compares most unfavourably with the General Staff, which does the same work, for example, in the German Army. I cannot give you the exact figures, because I could not get the paper which I drew up on the subject; but so far as I remember, to do the same work which we do with 20 officers, they use, I think, in Berlin, something like 150; and similarly in France, the French War Office staff, with the same duties, is very much larger than ours. And it is not as if the problems before them were in any degree more complicated than the problems before us, but the exact reverse, because we have an empire so large and so exceedingly varied in its conditions that our defence schemes, mobilisation schemes, and so on, are much more intricate than they are with a country like France or Germany.

365. Then you tell us it is your strong opinion that in order to carry out the work of your department satisfactorily your staff requires increasing?—Most decidedly.

366. Do you also think that the scope of your work, as compared with that of the German Intelligence branch, should be increased?—It is not called the Intelligence Branch; it is called, of course, the "Great General Staff" in Germany, and the "General Staff" in France.

367. The scope of their work is wider than yours, is it not—the sphere of it? Are there, for instance, matters entrusted to them with which you have not to deal?—I cannot say that the scope is wider, because the scope of my work, which combines organisation with mobilisation and defence, is extraordinarily wide. Organisation may include almost anything.

368. Let me put it to you in this way. Would you desire to see any work with which you are not now directly concerned transferred to your branch?—I do not think work can be transferred to my department, according to the French or German system, without adopting the staff organisation of France and Germany, which is extremely different from our organisation. Their organisation is that of a chief of the staff, who does all the thinking part of the work. Then the routine work is done by the *adjutantur*, which is entirely occupied in it, so that they separate more strongly than we do what I may call the routine part and the intellectual part of the General Staff duties.

369. Then who is supposed to do the thinking part of the work under our existing system?—My department is supposed to do it.

370. Then are you precluded from dealing with any matters with which you consider, as the head of the thinking department of the Army, you should properly deal?—No, I am not precluded from doing so.

371. On the other hand, have you imposed upon you any duties of which you think you should properly be relieved?—No, but it is difficult to explain without going into it at very great length—the different systems of the foreign armies as compared with our Army.

372. That is not so much my point. What I wanted

to know was, whether, in your opinion, the organisation of your branch was what it should be, or whether you have any suggestions to make for its improvement?—It might be improved, but it would only be improved by entirely reorganising the military staff of the War Office.

373. There is one point which I want to understand quite clearly, viz., the staff of the Intelligence Department in the field. I see on page 14 (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 160), there is this statement: "Towards the end of the war the Field Intelligence Department included 132 officers." Were any of those officers at any time in your branch, or were they staff officers selected without any special reference to their previous knowledge of the Intelligence branch of the Army?—I could not answer that question.

374. Do you think it would be desirable that the Field Intelligence Department should be recruited to some extent from the Intelligence branch in London in time of war?—Yes; it was so during this war.

375. That is to say, that officers were sent out?—Yes, Colonel Altham was sent out, and Colonel Robertson was sent out, and possibly others whose names I do not remember at the moment.

376. Those were officers who were serving at the time in the Intelligence branch?—They had been actually engaged in the work connected with South Africa.

377. But then were there other officers employed in South Africa who had had experience in the Intelligence branch beforehand?—I believe so, but I cannot give you their names without looking at the lists.

378. I suppose it is an advantage, is it not, to an officer serving in the Intelligence branch in the field that he should have had some experience of Intelligence work in London?—A decided advantage.

379. And there is no trained Intelligence branch of staff officers in the British Army for service in the field?—There is none.

380. It is just an accident, I suppose, that the services of Colonel Altham were at the disposal of the Officer Commanding in South Africa?—Exactly; he was selected by the War Office, I presume, for his knowledge of the subject, and so on.

381. And who took his place in London?—First Colonel Robertson took his place, then Colonel Robertson went out, and I cannot say who took Colonel Robertson's place; I do not know.

382. If you look at the first page of this statement (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 154), you will see: "(e) A study of boundary questions affecting British Colonies and Protectorates, and consultation with the Colonial Office and Foreign Office thereon." What local assistance does the Intelligence branch get in dealing with these matters? Do you send officers abroad?—We sometimes send officers abroad.

383. On special service in time of peace?—Yes.

384. Do the Military Attachés of foreign embassies correspond with you?—Certainly.

385. Are they subject to you in any way?—They are supposed to be in constant communication with me, and they are so. They write private letters, generally speaking, to the head of the section in charge of the country, and on matters of importance they frequently write to me.

386. And you send occasionally, do you, your own officers to the colonies?—We send them for any special work either to the colonies or elsewhere.

387. Then I see in the next paragraph (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 154), you say: "(f) The collation, preparation, and distribution of information concerning the resources and topography of all parts of the Empire, except the United Kingdom and India." I understand the exception of India, but why except the United Kingdom? What does that mean? I do not quite understand it?—The United Kingdom, as regards these questions that this section deals with abroad, is dealt with by the Mobilisation Division.

388. Of your own department?—Yes.

389. (*Sir John Edge.*) You got two Assistant-Quartermaster-Generals, I think you told us, after you came to the department?—Three.

390. You got two such additional officers?—Yes.

391. That accounts for 20. Can you tell me whether, before the war commenced, the strength of your department was 18?—I could not say. I will put in a paper; I have made a note to do so. (*Subsequently handed in. Vide Question* 323.)

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392. I only want it cleared up, because I inferred that you were only speaking of the condition of things when you took charge?—Yes.

393. One other question: You have spoken of the German General Staff; do you know whether they have to deal with subjects that do not come before the Intelligence and Mobilisation Department here?—They have to deal certainly with other subjects in Germany—railways, and work which is similar to work done by our Ordnance Survey—but in making my calculation of the number of the officers of the General Staff at Berlin, I cut out those that were employed on those duties to make a fair comparison. The real number, so far as I remember, of the German General Staff is over 250, and I cut out about 100 for those duties which are not performed in my department.

394. Then the 150 you, roughly, were referring to you assume do practically the same kind of work that is done in your department?—Yes, I made that comparison.

395. And no outside work?—No, simply the work that is done.

396. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) How are the officers that you have mentioned selected for the Intelligence Department?—They are selected first from personal knowledge of their qualifications; secondly from the reports received from the Commandant of the Staff College when they leave the Staff College; thirdly, from their acquaintance with modern languages, which is very necessary; and, fourthly, on account of personal knowledge of their ability and aptitude for the work.

397. Then after they have been some time in the department they become trained Intelligence officers?—Yes.

398. Would there be any objection to the Intelligence officers of the different corps being officers of your department, attached to the corps from your department, who, after they have been trained in your department, becoming officers in the corps, but still responsible to you?—The objection to that is that a staff officer in a district or command ought to be responsible only to his General. He cannot well be responsible to his General and responsible to an officer at the headquarters of the Army, and the object of creating these Army Corps was to decentralise, as far as possible, by making the General officers in command responsible for everything in that command.

399-400 (*Chairman.*) Now, with regard to the other Statement—the Statement of the Mobilisation Division (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 17) in that case also the statement deals entirely with the work of the division before the war in South Africa?—Yes.

401. And, there again, you were not in charge?—I was not.

402. Who was in charge?—Brigadier-General Stopford was in charge; he was Assistant-Adjutant-General for Mobilisation from the 6th October, 1897, to the 8th October, 1899, when he went out to South Africa as Military Secretary to Sir Redvers Buller. His successor was Colonel Lake, who became Assistant-Adjutant-General, and subsequently Assistant-Quartermaster-General, from the 9th October, 1899.

403. Then how do you propose to deal with the details of this statement; are you prepared to deal with them?—General Stopford is in attendance, and also Colonel Lake, the two Assistant-Adjutant-Generals.

404. And you prefer that they should deal with them?—I prefer that they should deal with them because they were entirely responsible for their own work.

405. I think that you said that until the alteration was made after you took office on the 4th November, 1901, this department was really worked by the Commander-in-Chief?—It was directly under the Commander-in-Chief. The Assistant-Adjutant-General used to report continually, and take the Commander-in-Chief's orders, I presume, on every question of importance that came before him.

406. It was more distinctly in the Commander-in-Chief's hands than it is now?—Yes.

407. Then I suppose that for some part of it we ought to refer to Lord Wolseley himself?—Yes; the necessity for that I cannot judge. When the Commission has heard the evidence of General Stopford and Colonel Lake it will be easier for them to decide.

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408. I see in your evidence at Question 112, you were asked: "Then Lord Wolseley worked it personally; is that so," and you answered: "Yes, he worked it personally"?—Yes.

409. Then with regard to this office, has there been any change in its establishment since you took it over?—No.

410. And what is the nature of the establishment?—The nature of the establishment is that the head of the division is an Assistant Quartermaster-General, Colonel Lake, and there is a Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, and a Staff Captain, and generally one or more attached officers.

411. Say, five or six officers?—Yes. Lately there have been more attached officers than usual, on account of the revision of certain reconnaissances in the United Kingdom, which had to be carried out last year, and is being carried out still.

412. I gather from what you said in answer to a question of Lord Esher's, that this branch takes up all the schemes for defence and things of that kind in the United Kingdom?—Yes.

413. And that work is going on in time of peace?—Yes.

414. What else is going on in time of peace?—The revision of war establishments, and all questions of organisation connected with the Army at home.

415. And that is work which employs five or six officers, and five or six officers are sufficient to undertake it. Is that the position?—I proposed an increase in the staff of the Mobilisation Division also.

416. To any large extent?—No. I proposed two Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-Generals, and two Staff Captains, and some slight reduction in the number of attached officers.

417. That is to say, you might want ten officers, or something of that kind, instead of six?—Yes.

418. But when war occurs then there is a large amount of extra work thrown on the branch, is there not?—At the beginning or in the preparation for the war there is a great deal of extra work thrown on the branch, but when the war is once started then the extra work ceases.

419. The branch has to do with the mobilisation of each division detailed in this statement, and to despatch the troops, has it not?—No, because when the orders are prepared for mobilisation, and the mobilisation has been settled, the executive orders for the mobilisation are issued from the office of the Adjutant-General; and as regards the despatch of the troops, that is carried out by the Quartermaster-General.

420. Then your work stops at an earlier period altogether?—Yes.

421. That again is almost entirely preparation for the war?—Yes, but in peace time also there are continual questions of organisation and matters of that description.

422. What do you exactly mean by organisation?—The distribution of the troops into various Army Corps, and the staff of the Army Corps, and things of that sort.

423. All that goes through the branch, does it?—Yes, and questions also, connected with the maintenance of the troops in peace time; for example, the reorganisation of cavalry, the reorganisation of infantry, and all such questions come to the Mobilisation Branch.

424. I only want to understand what you mean by organisation; do you mean the actual strength of a cavalry regiment?—No, I mean, for example, the question of how cavalry regiments can be kept up to strength—those abroad as well as those at home; what should be the number of squadrons; whether they should have reserve squadrons or not; things of that sort.

425. But not recruiting?—No, that is under the Adjutant-General—under the Inspector-General of Recruiting.

426. Then, if you prepare a scheme of organisation, that has to be considered in the same way as a defence scheme, I suppose, and submitted by the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State?—Yes.

427. And action is only taken upon it if orders are then given?—Yes.

428. Have you any statement to make to us with regard to the work of this branch of your department generally, as apart from the statement on the war in South Africa?—No.

429. You think that, subject to the addition of the staff which you have suggested, it is qualified to undertake the work which is necessary?—Yes, I think so.

430. (*Viscount Esher.*) If you look at the bottom of page 1 of the statement (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 17), it says: "In December, 1898, the General Officer Commanding, South Africa." Who was he; was it Sir William Butler?—Yes.

431. Then, if you look at paragraph 6 (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 17) you will see again: "In addition to the secret letters of December, 1898, referred to in paragraph 3, a further secret letter was addressed to the General Officer Commanding, South Africa, on 23rd February, 1899." I suppose there were replies to those letters or comments upon them. Perhaps you do not know that?—No, I do not know that.

432. In all probability there were?—No doubt.

433. Those are documents that we should like to see. First we should like to see the secret letters referred to in those two paragraphs, and, secondly, we should like to see any replies which Sir William Butler may have sent to them, or any comments which he may have made upon them. Who would produce those, could you produce them?—I can produce them subject to reference.

434. Then, if the Chairman thinks we ought to see them, you might ask for them?—Yes, I will do so.

(*Chairman.*) If you please. (*The documents were subsequently sent in. Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 181).

435. (*Viscount Esher.*) I asked you when you were last before us about the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. I want to make it quite clear. You have never been called before that body, have you, to give evidence?—Never.

436. They have never seen you since you have been at the head of the Intelligence Department?—No.

437. Nor have you ever been asked directly to prepare any memorandum or memoranda for them, so far as you can recollect?—I have never been asked by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet to prepare any memoranda for them, but the secretary of State sometimes sends me an order to say that a *précis* or a paper on a certain case should be prepared, because he wishes to submit it to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. That is done.

438. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I am not sure whether you have answered this question before. Which division of your department deals with the preparation of schemes of offensive and defensive operations?—Schemes of offensive and defensive operations are dealt with by that section which is alluded to at the beginning of this statement.

439. By the Mobilisation or Intelligence Section?—By a section of the Intelligence Division. I would make this qualification, that schemes of defensive operations in the United Kingdom are dealt with by the Mobilisation Division.

440. I understand that?—But schemes relating to abroad are dealt with by what is called Sub-division 1 of the Intelligence Division.

441. What is the strength of that section?—At present Colonel Altham, Colonel Hansard, Lieutenant-Colonel Haldane, and Major Woodward, and as attached officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Money and Major Clime; but two of those officers are still specially employed on matters connected with the war in South Africa.

442. I am speaking of the future?—For the future you may take those numbers, but Lieutenant-Colonel Money will disappear in a few months; he is specially employed.

443. Then the number must be reduced by one?—Yes.

444. And could you roughly say what proportion of the annual expenditure of your department is allocated to that branch?—I can have a return prepared showing the expenditure for the entire organisation.

445. I think it will be very desirable that we should have that?—If you please. (*The statement was subsequently handed in. Vide Question* 323.)

446. There is one other question which may assist us in obtaining evidence; which department in the past should we look to for information, as, for instance, to the choice of Ladysmith as our main position in Natal before the war. I am not speaking of the Commander-in-Chief, who is, of course, ultimately responsible under the Secretary of State, but who would be the head of the Department whom one would have to examine on that subject?—I am quite unable to say unless I looked up the papers and saw who gave the decision; on whose advice Ladysmith was selected as the principal garrison in Natal.

447. Could you do this; could you tell us to whom we should go to get the information that you cannot give?—I cannot tell you, because it is impossible to say in any particular case on whose advice a certain decision is arrived at.

448. Is no record of it kept?—A record would be kept, but one would have to look up each particular case. No doubt if I got hold of the Ladysmith papers I could find on whose advice Ladysmith was selected.

449. But would not General Stopford be able to give us the information, he having been in the past the head of the Mobilisation Department?—I should imagine he would not—certainly not unless he could look up the papers. I could tell you about this particular point: it so happens that the papers about Ladysmith and its selection are in my office at the present time, and I could refer to them.

450. (*Chairman.*) We shall certainly require to know that?—If you please.

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451. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) And the sooner we have the information the better?—Colonel Altham tells me that he has the papers on his table, and he no doubt, if he is examined, will be able to speak to that.

452. That is the point I wanted to get out?—But it does not follow that the selection of Ladysmith rested with any branch of my department.

453. I quite understand that; I merely wanted to know where to go. As you came from the War Office to put certain papers before us, and to tell us whom we should call, I wanted to ask you to whom we should go for information of that kind?—Do I understand that you mean, generally speaking, about these questions?

454. Yes?—If you will let me know what information of that kind that you require, I will endeavour to get it. I thought your question meant what department was really responsible.

455. That is one of the details that will come out, but the general principle is what I wanted to know: to whom we should go for such information generally?—I shall be most happy to get you any papers of the kind that you may require.

456. (*Chairman.*) It is on the notes already that you were in South Africa, and held important positions there. It might be more convenient, however, both for the Commission and yourself, if we desire your evidence on any subjects connected with those offices, that we should recall you for that purposes?—That would be more convenient.

457. I think we have no more questions that we need put to you to-day?—Thank you.

Re-called at Q. 18133.

Lieut.-Colonel E. A. ALTHAM, C.M.G., Assistant-Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Division, called and examined.

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458. (*Chairman.*) You have been connected with the Intelligence Division for some time?—I have.

459. What was the date of your first appointment?—I first joined the Intelligence Department in April, 1895, as an attached officer. I was there for three months, and then I was sent out to South Africa as Military Secretary to the General Officer in Command. I had instructions from the Commander-in-Chief to do certain Intelligence work while I was there. I was in South Africa eight months, when I was recalled to the Intelligence Department to take up a permanent appointment.

460. In 1897?—In 1897; and I remained in the Intelligence Department from that time until the commencement of the war. Just before the war, in September, 1899, I was sent out with Sir George White.

461. And you remained in South Africa until March, 1900?—I was out in South Africa from September, 1899, till the end of July, 1900, when I was again recalled to resume my work at the War Office.

462. Then you were in the Intelligence Department when the greater part, at any rate, of this work that is summarised in this statement, put in by Sir William Nicholson, was done?—Practically so.

463. And you can answer any questions that the Commissioners wish to put to you on any points connected therewith?—I hope so—I believe I can.

464. With regard to the maps, I suppose you would prefer to leave that to Major Hills?—I had no direct responsibility with regard to maps. Colonel Grant was in charge of the mapping section up to the outbreak of the war, and he will be in attendance; and Major Hills subsequently succeeded him.

465. It appears that a good deal of attention was paid in the Intelligence Division to preparation for the war?—At the time I joined the Intelligence Division there was great anxiety about South Africa, and from that time forward we used every exertion we could to obtain information and to study the whole question.

466. Do you mean that it was one of the prominent parts of your work?—Decidedly so. From time to time, of course, other urgent questions cropped up in other parts of the world, which occasionally appeared to overshadow it for the moment, but it was never lost sight of the whole time.

467. Throughout the whole of those years, from 1896 onwards, it was regarded as an outstanding danger, which you were bound to deal with?—It was.

468. Are you prepared to give us any information with regard to the sources from which you collected the groundwork of the reports which you submitted?—I should not like any evidence as to that to go on the public notes.

469. Have you anything to say on the question of defence schemes?—The defence schemes, I may say, as General Nicholson, I think, told the Commission just now, are never initiated, so to speak, at Army Headquarters, because the responsibility for drawing up a detailed defence scheme invariably rests upon the General in local command. What is done is this: Supposing that no scheme is in existence for a particular contingency, and it is considered desirable at the War Office that a scheme schould be drawn up, a letter is written to the General in command, in which he is requested to draft a scheme and submit it for approval. We never draft a scheme in London, and send it down to him to consider; we tell him to draft what he proposes to do.

470. And does that draft come to you?—It comes to the War Office. Under the organisation existing at the War Office at that time, my particular section was responsible for the strategical consideration of schemes, while the mobilisation division considered them technically in detail; we were responsible for the examination of them, as to their general sufficiency, as to whether they fitted in to the strategical conditions of the contingency which they were intended to meet.

471. But the result was a scheme for defence which had been worked out in the way you have described, and approved by the War Office?—Eventually it would be that. Another thing I may mention is that it is laid down in the King's Regulations that defence schemes are to be based entirely on existing resources. Otherwise, a General might draw up a purely hypothetical scheme suggesting that if he had so many brigades and so many divisions, he would like to do this or that. He is confined in his scheme to what he has actually got or can get together in case of sudden emergency arising; but he is also told that if he considers that what he has got is not sufficient, he is to put forward a recommendation separately.

472. Then some of these memoranda, if not defence schemes, which were submitted at that time, dealt with the defence of Natal and Cape Colony from the point of view of what was really necessary in the event of a war breaking out, did they not?—The Intelligence Division memoranda aimed at placing before the Commander-in-Chief the existing situation, and drawing his attention to points which we considered of great

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importance, and which required consideration. We were not in a position then to give any direction, so to speak, or to take any definite action in the Intelligence Division. The Intelligence Division at that time was not quite in such close touch with the War Office as the present Intelligence Department is.

473. But your memoranda dealt with the forces of the Boers?—Yes.

474. And did they not go on to say what number of men would be required on our side in the event of an expedition being undertaken by those Boer forces?—No, not in those memoranda that you refer to. The only occasion on which I can recollect our being asked that question was once when Lord Wolseley sent for me to discuss the situation in South Africa, and at the end, just as I was going away, he said, "How many men do you think we should want to beat them?" As the result of that I think the next day I put forward a short note through the Director of Military Intelligence; but we were not at that time charged with the preparation of offensive schemes at all. There was no one at the War Office who was specifically charged with that except Lord Wolseley himself.

475. Defensive schemes?—Offensive schemes.

476. Was not this a question of defence?—Oh, yes, I see what you mean. You mean from the point of view of defending the colonies?

477. Yes, we are speaking of an expedition into the colonies?—So far as I recollect I do not think we were ever asked to give or ever gave any opinion as to the specific numbers which were required to defend the colonies. We had repeatedly urged, as will appear from these papers, that the numbers should be increased.

478. Without seeing the memoranda one cannot speak very accurately, but my impression from reading the statement was that the memoranda certainly pointed out from time to time that the forces were deficient?—Yes, that was certainly our view.

479. But you did not go further and say how far they were deficient?—I do not think so; personally, I have not seen any paper in which my chief at the time expressed any definite opinion upon that subject. I recollect on one particular occasion we urged that a certain force should be sent to Cape Colony as local reinforcements there, as distinct from Natal.

480. You did not work out in the office what number of men would be required for defensive operations?—No, because at that time I do not think we should have been regarded as responsible, as the proper branch to deal with a matter of that kind.

481. Then what was the proper branch?—My impression is that nobody dealt with those things except the Commander-in-Chief himself. However, as to that possibly the Commission may like to take Sir John Ardagh's views.

482. Yes; but, at any rate, it was not the view in your department that it was your business?—I do not think it was my business at the time personally, as the head of the section, to say definitely that certain forces should be in Cape Colony and Natal.

483. Does not a defence scheme almost imply that there must be some statement of the number of men required to carry out the defence?—Quite so; but my duty was the strategical review of the scheme. We pointed out the defects; as you will see in the memoranda, we constantly say, "The existing force is insufficient."

484. Then you say, that being so, you handed it over to the Commander-in-Chief to say what number of men were necessary to carry out your scheme?—What number of men were necessary to meet the defects.

485. To meet the defects pointed out in the scheme?—Yes, I think so. I think it would have been considered that we were going a little beyond our proper functions at the time to say that a certain number of men must definitely be sent there. But I may say that the responsibility was not very clearly defined at that time.

486. You say at that time; is that changed now?—Yes, certainly. A War Office memorandum now in force holds my particular sub-division responsible for the strategical distribution of the military forces of the Empire, and therefore it is my business at the present moment to express a very definite opinion with regard to any place which I consider has an insufficient garrison.

487. You would consider it your duty with regard to any place with an insufficient garrison to say definitely that it ought to be increased up to a certain point?—Yes; of course, that would be to represent it to my chief. I have merely to represent it to Sir William Nicholson.

488. And that is a piece of work that you are now engaged upon?—Yes, that is part of my present duties now.

489. That must increase the work of your section, does it not?—Yes, it does very much. My sub-division at the present moment includes the military defence of the Empire, including the preparation and maintenance of schemes for defensive and offensive operations other than in the United Kingdom.

490. And you would have to review periodically, I suppose, the strength of the garrisons all through the Empire?—Yes.

491. With regard to this hand-book, "Military Notes," which has been supplied to me, it was first issued as a secret publication in April, 1898, I think?—Yes.

492. And then it was revised in June, 1899?—Yes.

493. And it was presented to Parliament in 1900?—Yes.

494. So that it is now published?—Yes, it is now public.

495. In the same form as it was?—It was presented to Parliament simply by means of spare copies; it was not reprinted; there were 30 or 40 copies got together. There was a great demand for it at the time for the Parliamentary Libraries, and we got together as many copies as we could possibly find left over.

496. And were the particulars in this hand-book all collected through your office?—Yes, they were entirely collected in my section.

497. Were the local details obtained from Intelligence officers in South Africa at the time?—They were got in the way I have described generally. Information of this kind, of course, we get in all sorts of ways. A certain amount of it no doubt comes from other books, and we always take advantage of anybody who has been travelling in the country to get information. For instance, take the Delagoa Bay chapter. I got a great deal of valuable information in that from a gentleman who was then British Consul at Lourenço Marques, who had travelled through the country shooting.

498. Looking at that handbook now, would you maintain that it is a fairly reliable statement of the state of the case at the time it was published?—I think it gives a generally correct impression of the military strength and armament of the Boers. There are no doubt some mistakes in it, but I do not imagine that any handbook of that nature could be prepared without mistakes.

499. There have been a good many questions raised as to the numbers of the Boers in the field?—With regard to the numbers of the Boers in the field, we somewhat over-estimated the number of forces that they put into the field at the commencement of the war. As to the number of burghers who were actually liable to military service, we relied, as is stated in my memorandum, on the official census returns of the Boers. Those official census returns, it would appear from the captures at the end of the war, were a good deal under the mark; but the captures have to be discounted by the fact that boys who were under 16 were undoubtedly included in the prisoners of war; and I have no doubt also that old men who were over 60 were included. I still think that we were fully justified in accepting the official census, indeed our local advisers thought that that census was an over-estimate. We received hints that the Boers had made up the returns in order to magnify their political strength.

500. On page 9 of the Statement (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 155) you give the numbers, you say, that can now be determined at the termination of the war; is that a reliable statement, do you think?—That is a statement which was furnished to us by the Field Intelligence Department about six weeks after the war; they went through the whole returns of the captures, and that is their final statement.

501. How does that compare with your estimate?—That works out, as explained on this page 9, that as regards the Transvaal estimate the actual numbers—that is judged by the number of casualties and surrenders—were 9,000 over the number we estimated as liable to military service; and in the Free State the actual numbers were 3,264 over what we estimated as liable for military service. But the sur-

renders, as I have said before, include boys and old men who were not legally liable to military service; and I have grounds for saying that the Commandant-General, Louis Botha, was himself extremely surprised at the number of men who came in. He told the Head of Lord Kitchener's Intelligence Department that he had no notion there were so many men out still.

502. At the time of the surrenders?—At the time of the surrenders. But there is no doubt that the Boers themselves relied on their official returns, because the Military Attaché of the American Army, who was with them, and whose report is dated at the end of 1900, quotes figures similar to ours as correctly representing the right numbers.

503. The other difference in figures would be as to the number of rebels; there were more of them than you estimated?—Yes; but the important point at the commencement of the war was rather the number of men that the Boers could actually put in the field. It was not a question of the total male population, so much as what number they were likely to bring out against us, and as to that the handbook somewhat over-estimated rather than under-estimated, so far as we have been able to get the exact numbers or will ever know the exact numbers. The Boers did not keep up proper returns themselves of the numbers they had in the field.

504. And similarly with regard to the number of guns, do you maintain that your information was correct?—I think it was extraordinarily accurate. You will see the practical result is that we a little overshot the mark; we estimated the number of guns at 107, and the actual number was 99, and that over-estimate was principally due to the fact that we had heard that 16 of those six-inch guns—they were called Long Toms afterwards—had been ordered, and we were under the impression that they had arrived in South Africa, whereas only four had actually arrived before the war commenced.

505. Were there only four all the time?—Only four; there were no more in the country.

506. Were they ever traced?—Yes, they have all been accounted for.

507. And as regards ammunition do you speak in the same way?—As regards ammunition you observe that we estimated that there were 33,000,000 rounds in Pretoria magazine, and there were actually 33,050,000; we were within 50,000 of the exact number. That is at Pretoria, the central reserve. And as regards general supplies, we said that the supply was sufficient for a protracted campaign.

508. You are aware that there were supplies of ammunition in various parts of the country?—There were local supplies—local magazines.

509. In addition to the reserve at Pretoria?—Yes.

510. To any large extent?—I have not the papers here. We have the reports that were sent home; possibly Colonel Robertson can give you more information than I can about that, because he dealt with the papers in Pretoria.

511. Topographical information, I suppose, I must take from Colonel Grant?—For the provision of maps, but not the topographical information on page 11 (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 158); that is a matter which concerns me.

512. Then will you say anything that you have to say about that point?—All I have to remark upon that point is that I think we got together as much information as we possibly could having regard to the means we had for obtaining information. Of course, if we had had larger means, more information would have been obtained, which would have been of considerable value to the Army during the operations. As it was we were only able to examine and report on what appeared before the war to be important points, such as the bridges over the rivers, the main line of advance up from the Free State, and the main roads through the two Republics, and in the northern portions of the Colonies.

513. Take No. 2 of Section B on page 11 (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 158): "Lines of advance through the Orange Free State." Was that sufficient for the purposes of the Army?—It is rather difficult for me to judge of that particular one, because I did it myself when I was in South Africa, and I was not in the main advance upon that side afterwards, so I can give no opinion as to what practical value it was.

514. You did that when you were in South Africa?—Yes, when I was Military Secretary there.

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515. You got the information then and embodied it at home?—The information was printed at home before I arrived at home; it was sent home by General Goodenough.

516. I suppose you would be more cognisant with No. 5 then (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 159)—"Report on the communication in Natal north of Ladysmith"?—Yes; No. 5 I know from the Ladysmith point of view. After the siege of Ladysmith I came round the other side, but I was laid up with enteric for two months, so I did not pick up until they had passed Bloemfontein.

517. But, so far as you know, what happened from the Ladysmith point of view upon that No. 5 report?—No. 5 was certainly useful at the earlier operations before the siege commenced. I used it myself at the head of Sir George White's Intelligence Department, and referred to it.

518. No. 5 being in Natal, which is a colony, I suppose it could be compiled with more detail than those in the Orange Free State?—Yes. No. 5 was really to illustrate a map. Colonel Grant could give you full particulars of No. 5, because he personally compiled most of it himself; it was an explanation, so to speak, of a map which had been very carefully prepared of the country before Ladysmith.

519. I do not want to be met with the same answer you gave me with regard to No. 2?—Quite so. I can only judge of how far it was used prior to the siege of Ladysmith, which, of course, only deals with a limited area, the area between Dundee and Ladysmith, and I can say it was useful—of considerable use.

520. But it was not all you would have liked to have had for the advance of the Army?—I do not suppose a report of that kind is ever an ideal one; it is difficult to see beforehand the exact information that is required. If every detail of country was recorded and reproduced there would have to be an enormous library carried round with the troops.

521. You regard it as almost impracticable to provide beforehand all the topographical information which an Army really requires for its advance?—Yes, all the information. I think a good deal of the information has necessarily to be obtained by the staff of the Army itself on the spot; the more, of course, that can be obtained beforehand the better; but when you are dealing with a very large theatre of war like South Africa I should say it was really impracticable to obtain all that may be needed. Even supposing you had unlimited means and unlimited *personnel* to put together in a concise form every possible piece of topographical information that was required afterwards, it would run into such stacks of books that they never would be carried about by the Army. You must give a general impression of the country and such general information that enables the General on the spot to give his decisions in the earlier stages and make his preliminary dispositions.

522. And you must have enough information to make that general information accurate?—Yes, quite so.

523. The statement says that these reports with sketches and plans were printed, and a large number of copies issued to the troops. Does that apply to all of these?—Yes, the whole of them; they were all issued to the troops. I have a complete set here, if you care to look at them, of all these reports. The maps will be produced by another witness.

524. We had better have them; you can leave them with the Secretary?—If you please. (*The reports were handed in. See list in Appendix, page* 512, *post.*

525. Then on page 12 (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 159), with regard to these local defence schemes, is there anything you would wish to add to the detail given in regard to their preparation?—No, except that, of course, in every case the defence scheme was based on an inadequate force; it was merely that the generals reported how they could make the best of what troops they had.

526. Take just one almost at random, the fourth paragraph (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 159): "The G.O.C. (Lieut.-General Goodenough) replied on 24th July, 1897, submitting a fresh scheme, the gist of which was the concentration of the main force at Ladysmith, with strong detachments at Van Reenan's Pass and Glencoe." Was that based on the small number of men that were then in Natal?—Yes, it was based on General

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Goodenough's garrison of two cavalry regiments, three batteries of artillery, and three infantry battalions. The Natal people had always been, from the outset, in favour of a forward policy.

527. Whom do you mean by the Natal people?—The Natal General and the Natal Government, too.

528. By a forward policy, do you mean holding the frontier of the Colony?—Yes.

529. And did they really think that that garrison would hold it—could carry out that defence scheme?—I do not think they thought they would be able to resist a determined attack in those positions, but I should imagine it was assumed and hoped that the Boers would adopt a defensive attitude in the same way as they did in the 1881 war.

530. That was the assumption running through the whole, was it?—I take it so.

531. Then if that were so, does that account for the selection of Ladysmith as the main position?—I am not prepared to say at the present moment. To the best of my recollection—I am only speaking from memory now—Ladysmith was rather adopted in lieu of a more forward position. Ladysmith was first occupied as a station, I think, in 1897, when certain reinforcements were sent out to Natal of, I think, three batteries and one or two battalions; and if my memory serves me right, the local authorities, I rather think, the Natal Government, were anxious that the troops should go right forward to protect Newcastle, and I think there was a reference to Lord Milner, who considered that the more forward position would be likely to increase the political friction with the Boers, and both Lord Milner and the military authorities in South Africa agreed that having regard to the political and military situation, Ladysmith was the best station that could be selected.

See Q. 659.

532. That was in 1897, was it?—In 1897.

533. That was about the time of the preparation of this scheme to which I referred, the 24th of July, 1897?—Yes. You see the General first submitted a scheme based on his original garrison; then these reinforcements went out, and as a result, a fresh scheme was called for at once, to be based on his reinforced garrison.

534. And then he proposed Ladysmith?—Then he proposed to make Ladysmith practically his base.

535. But I observe further on in this statement that in June, 1899, the General Officer Commanding in South Africa put it a different way: that he proposed occupying Dundee and the Biggarsberg with detachments at Ladysmith and Estcourt?—Yes, you see he occupied a still more forward position. Sir William Butler's proposal was to put his biggest force in the Biggarsberg Pass north of Ladysmith, and I think that was more or less Sir Penn Symons' view

536. Who was commanding in Natal from 1897 to 1899, do you know?—Major-General Cox was commanding up to the beginning of 1899, and he was succeeded by Sir Penn Symons. Sir Penn Symons had been there more than five months when the war broke out.

537. There is another thing. In June, 1899, there were proposals submitted by the Intelligence Division to the Commander-in-Chief which led to certain action. Those were proposals distinctly from your Intelligence Division?—Yes, those proposals were for organising local forces. Colonial forces. We have always dealt more freely, as it were, with forces which were not under the War Office than with regular forces, because under the old system the Adjutant-General considered that the regular forces were entirely a matter for him to consider—the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General; but for the Colonial forces there was nobody at the War Office who, as it were, took charge of them at all except ourselves. I was the head of the section that collected the information about Colonial forces, and therefore felt in a freer position to make suggestions about them. Moreover, this particular proposal was the result of a conversation that Colonel Hanbury Williams and myself had when he was at home, and we had worked it out in private correspondence beforehand.

538. Under whose authority were the steps taken resulting from your scheme?—The Secretary of State's authority.

539. By the authority of the Secretary of State for War?—Yes, the Secretary of State for War. I have no doubt that the assent of the Secretary of State for the Colonies was obtained, but it was a War Office force. In fact, the Secretary of State for the Colonies agreed to Colonel Baden-Powell taking command of all the forces in Southern Rhodesia; that was done with his specific consent.

540. And you deal with all proposals of that kind in the Colonies for Colonial forces in the same way, do you?—Regarding Colonial forces, of course, nobody at the War Office has direct responsibility, but we advise. The Colonial Office are good enough very often to consult us about the organisation of the Colonial forces, particularly the forces of the Colonies which they administer; and in the same way the Foreign Office consult us. In that way we advise very frequently, and have to watch those questions particularly.

541. And that advice is given through the Intelligence Division?—Yes, that advice is given direct by semi-official notes written by the Director-General of Military Intelligence to the Colonial Office, or the Foreign Office, as the case may be. Of course, if the Colonial Office or the Foreign Office consult the War Office officially on any subject, then the papers are dealt with in the ordinary official manner, and we should take the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State.

542. But in any case the subject would come to your department?—Yes, the subject would probably come to my branch.

543. Then the next section is about the organisation of a field intelligence department. Is there anything that you would like to add about that?—No, except that the change that Sir William Nicholson indicated to the Commission just now which has taken place in the organisation of the staff in peace time by the establishment of a branch of what is called the Quartermaster-General's Department in the Army Corps, and which we hope will be effected in the same way at stations abroad, will greatly, in future, facilitate the formation of an intelligence staff in the field, because we shall have in the Army Corps staff, and possibly in the local staffs in the Colonies, officers who have been dealing with these questions in peace time, who know the local conditions and who have a certain familiarity with the subject.

544. You went out as head of Sir George White's staff?—I was originally appointed by the War Office to be head of the Intelligence Department in South Africa, that is to say, it was a provisional appointment if there was war. I was told about the end of August. Then Sir George White was sent out at the beginning of September to Natal, and he asked that I should be allowed to go out with him. That was approved, and I went out with him on the understanding that eventually I should join the headquarters staff, but I got shut up in Ladysmith, and so it was impossible.

545. How was Sir George White's Intelligence Department organised?—The first step regarding the organisation of a Field Intelligence Department was what is recorded in the statement: that in the beginning of July or the end of June we sent out 10 officers. Of those one was told off specially to go to Natal and get together people who would be useful, local colonists, and so on, as scouts and guides, and another was told to go to Cape Colony and get together people there, and establish channels of communication, and those two officers were to be the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generals of Intelligence for the Army Corps staff. The officer sent to Natal, it was intended, should be in charge of the whole of Natal. Sir George White, therefore, when we arrived had only myself and this officer, Colonel David Henderson (who was Lord Kitchener's head Intelligence officer afterwards) as Intelligence officers, but two other officers had been nominated by the Indian Government to accompany the Indian contingent, Colonel Murray of the Inniskilling Fusiliers and Captain Kenny Herbert; but even with those we found we had not sufficient staff, and afterwards Sir George White gave me Major Adye of the Irish Rifles, and other officers who from time to time worked under me—occasionally an officer got wounded—and Colonel Grant was in charge of the Mapping and Surveying Section in Ladysmith. I think at one time I had three or four Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generals there.

546. And that is the way that a Field Intelligence Department has to grow?—It was gradually built up, but I do not think that the regulations that existed before the war allowed sufficient *personnel* for field intelligence work.

547. It is satisfactory that it should grow up in that way?—It must always grow, I think, because it is essential to get hold of local men, and you cannot keep up an enormous establishment of local people in peace time; the men probably that you kept up would not be the men you wanted in war. But it would be a great advantage in future to have a permanent nucleus in the General Staff of the Army, from which the Intelligence Branch can be built up.

548. (*Viscount Esher.*) On page 2 of this Statement (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 154), there is a reference to "a Memorandum drawn up in the Intelligence Division, dated the 11th of June, 1896." What happened to that memorandum?—I am afraid the records of my section do not show exactly what became of it.

549. What would naturally happen to a memorandum of that kind?—So far as I am concerned my duty ceases when I have laid it before my own particular chief, who was Sir John Ardagh. In a good many cases I can say specifically that the memorandum went on to the Commander-in-Chief, and so on, but I have not been able to trace that that particular memorandum went beyond Sir John Ardagh; it was a matter for him to decide.

550. Take the next, "a Memorandum written by Sir John Ardagh in October, 1896"?—That went to the Commander-in-Chief.

551. Did you ever see yourself either of those two memoranda with any comments upon them by the Commander-in-Chief or the Secretary of State?—No, we have not got records of the comments.

552. Would they come back to you, if they had been commented upon, with the comments upon them?—Very often in those days we never saw them again. Now I think we nearly always get them. I do not know a case where a paper does not come back eventually with orders on it.

553. You have had lately papers of that character returned to you with comments?—Frequently; it is almost certain to come back eventually.

554. I suppose you have copies of these memoranda?—I have copies here of al these memoranda. (*The Memoranda were handed in. Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 161.)

555. You said that there was no one charged specifically with the preparation of offensive schemes?—That is so.

556. Were you speaking of the Intelligence Branch as it was constituted before the war?—Yes, as it was constituted up to the last Order in Council; that is, last year.

557. Is there anyone specially charged with the preparation of offensive schemes now?—Yes; I am charged at the present moment with the duty.

558. And has your staff not been increased?—Yes, my staff has been slightly increased. Before the war my permanent staff for the section was two officers only and one clerk. Now the section has been expanded into two sections, and there is myself as Assistant Quartermaster-General at the head, and I have a Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General and three Staff Captains; that is a permanent staff of five altogether; and at the present moment I have in addition an attached officer.

559. Then it is your duty to consider the possibility, for example, of a war between this country and a great European Power?—Certainly.

560. And you have to prepare not only schemes of defence but schemes of offence in view of such a contingency?—Yes. I may say that my branch is greatly assisted in that particular point by the foreign subdivision, Colonel Robertson's branch.

561. What does he deal with?—He deals with all the foreign countries, and he collates the information, and ascertains from me what schemes are needed. Take Norway: supposing it was considered for strategical reasons necessary to draw up a scheme for the capture of Norway, I should take of course my chief's orders, and inform Colonel Robertson. Then the officer in charge of Norway would draw up a scheme; that scheme would be considered in the first place by Colonel Robertson, and then would come to me, and from that point I am responsible for putting it into final shape for submission to the Director-General of Military Intelligence, who would submit it to the Commander-in-Chief.

562. Do you consider that your staff is sufficient for all your purposes?—No, undoubtedly I consider it inadequate.

563. Have you represented that to Sir William Nicholson?—Yes.

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564. And that is one of the points he is raising, is it?—Yes, that is one of the points that he is raising. I may say that in the German army, in the German General Staff, there are 48 officers doing the work that is done by Colonel Lake's mobilization division and my sub-division, and yet the whole of our permanent staff amounts altogether only to eight officers. And our work is really much bigger; we have a much larger empire to defend, and the problem, as Sir William Nicholson said this morning, is much more complicated in every way.

565. And I suppose that in view of the events of the last three years you have practically to reconsider the whole of your schemes of defence and offence?—No, I do not think defence so much. Defensive schemes for the various defended ports round the world have been very carefully worked out for years; they are subject to annual review, but they were in a fairly complete state before the war.

566. But before the war had you taken into consideration the great Colonial forces that were brought into the field, for example, for operations in South Africa?—One great difficulty in dealing with Colonial forces is that we do not know for certain how many we can count upon.

567. Quite so; but had you considered before the operations in South Africa—it had never occurred to you, I imagine—that you would have at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief the Colonial forces which were subsequently brought into the field?—No, not from the colonies other than the South African Colonies. We had very carefully considered the question of the organisation of the local forces in South Africa.

568. But I am speaking of the forces of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand?—No, I do not see how we could have counted upon them.

569. Then my point is, that in view of what has occurred during the last three years, you would have to some extent to reconsider your general schemes?—Yes, for defending the Empire. It is rather a delicate and intricate question how far we can count in our general scheme Colonial contingents for the future.

570. Still, I suppose you would take that into consideration?—Undoubtedly we should take into consideration that we should hope always for Colonial support.

571. My point is, that you have a considerable amount of extra work thrown upon you in view of that?—Yes, quite so.

572. And that is one of the reasons which leads you to think that you are undermanned at the present time?—Yes, and so far as regards reconsidering the big defensive schemes which I take it are in your mind, when I said they were complete, I had in my mind the local schemes of defence of defended ports; but regarding the bigger schemes, say such a scheme as the defence of Canada or India, or something of that kind on a large scale, they have to be perpetually reconsidered because the conditions change—they change every year nearly; something fresh is always cropping up; some new side issue affects the whole big scheme.

573. When you put forward your demand for an increased staff, are you telling the Secretary of State frankly what you think should be the proper organisation for your branch, or are you merely asking for what you think you may get?—Personally I have asked for what I think I may get.

574. Do you not think that on the whole it would be fairer to the Secretary of State and to the country generally to put quite frankly what you think you ought to have?—Yes, perhaps so, but as a matter of practical politics I think we generally find it is better to ask for what is possible.

575. Well, that is not my experience in the public service generally?—Of course, a great deal depends on the question of staff (as Sir William Nicholson said just now) on the whole question of status and position. If responsibility for the military defence of the Empire is to be made a real one, then undoubtedly we should require a very much larger staff. The more responsibility and the more work that is thrown on the department of the Director-General of Mobilisation and Intelligence, the more staff he will require.

576. But I was only putting it to you that you free yourself from responsibility, if you state exactly what

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you consider the organisation of your department should be?—Yes.

577. You said, to take another point, that it was assumed that the Boers would take a defensive attitude as in 1881, but I see here, on page 4 (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 155), referring to the Memorandum of 1898, that "it was also stated that projects for offensive operations had been drawn up in Pretoria, although at that time (September, 1898) it was held in the Intelligence Division that these attacks would be limited to an attempt on Kimberley, the occupation of the northern apex of Natal, and raids of 2,000 to 3,000 men in other directions." That shows that the Intelligence branch had in its mind the possibility of an invasion?—Yes, undoubtedly we had. We considered it quite possible, if not probable.

578. I suppose that these memoranda were in some shape or form before the Government. They were before the Secretary of State, in any case?—Undoubtedly our handbook was before several members of the Government.

579. Did any letters or telegrams come before you from the military authorities in South Africa during the years 1897, 1898, and 1899, pointing out the inadequacy of the garrison in the Cape Colony and Natal?—No, I do not think that any definite letter or report of that nature was received.

580. It never came before you personally; you do not remember to have seen anything of that kind?—I am not quite sure that General Cox in Natal may not have represented that his force was a very small one, having regard to possibilities.

581. You see, these memoranda to which we are referred here, show that you were quite aware of the great probability of a war between us and the Boers?—Yes.

582. I suppose in the Intelligence branch there was some anxiety as to the number of troops in South Africa?—Yes, we felt very considerable anxiety.

583. But you do not remember to have seen any special remonstrance from the General on the spot?—I do not think there was one. The only General I am doubtful about is General Cox, whether he did not make some allusion to it in a letter, but it would have been, I think, about two years before the war, and possibly that may have been before the Natal garrison was increased, as it was in 1897. But there was no big letter, so to speak, from the General in supreme command, saying that the whole force was too small.

584. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You alluded to the information that you got before the war about the prospects of hostilities, and so on. That came from the Colonial Office, a good deal of it, did it not?—No, on the contrary, I think we used to furnish information to the Colonial Office. I said, I think, that one of our sources of information was from His Majesty's agent at Pretoria, Sir Conyngham Greene; that we received generally through the Colonial Office, though at times he was good enough to write to me personally or to write to the Intelligence Officer at Capetown. If it was purely a military detail, such as he had heard that a particular gun had been ordered, or something that he did not think sufficiently important to report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he would send it to us direct.

585. Was Sir Conyngham Greene supposed to be the representative of the Colonial Office there?—Yes, he was directly under the orders of the Colonial Office.

586. Then he would, in the natural order of things, send constant reports when he saw that the armament that the Boer Government was getting out was increasing?—Yes, he did; we got a certain part of our information direct from him. When I say direct, either he would write to us direct or report to the Colonial Office

587. And those reports are on record, I suppose?—I have no doubt that the Colonial Office would have details of his reports. I do not think that his reports represent the full information that we have in the handbook, because the handbook represents not only his reports, but reports which we had from many other persons.

588. His reports would give the actual dates, that so many guns have arrived, and so much ammunition, and so forth, at the particular time, and would put the Government at home rather on their guard?—My impression is that the Government at home really got more—the Colonial Office got more specific warnings as to the armament of the Transvaal from us than from Sir Conyngham Greene. I do not mean that he did not call attention to the thing; but, of course, it was our business to watch it more closely than even it was his; and we sent them nearly every week letters or reports from South Africa. You will find in this memorandum that in April, 1897, for instance, Mr. Chamberlain wrote a letter to the War Office in which he specifically thanked the Intelligence Division for the many reports he had received regarding the vast importation of munitions of war.

589. Now, both for offence and defence, in most cases the Army and the Navy must act conjointly; have you any officer of the Navy on your Defence Intelligence branch?—The Naval Intelligence Department is a part of the Admiralty, and works under the direct orders, I think, of the Senior Naval Lord. We are, of course, in constant and close communication with the Naval Intelligence Department, but we are distinct branches because we are branches of distinct departments, but we work in with each other as much as we can. My chief, Sir William Nicholson, constantly sees and discusses questions with Admiral Custance, and in the same way his subordinates discuss with Admiral Custance's subordinates.

590. And you think the intercommunication between the two departments is sufficiently constant?—I think so; at any rate, we are in close touch.

591. Before the war was the General Officer Commanding in Natal supposed to be in any way under the General Officer Commanding at the Cape?—Entirely under him up to the date of Sir George White's arrival, but on his arrival in Capetown, Natal was cut off from the Cape Colony; Sir George was given a separate command in Natal, and General Forestier-Walker was responsible for Cape Colony. Up to that moment Natal had been for ten years under Cape Colony.

592. Then it was the duty of the General Officer Commanding at the Cape to make representations as to the sufficiency of the forces, and so on, of Natal?—Yes.

593. You do not think General Goodenough or Sir William Butler or Sir Forestier-Walker made any representations?—I cannot recollect seeing any report of that kind, and I think it would be a very prominent feature in my memory if I had.

594. But they had sent a scheme of defence; Sir William Butler clearly sent one?—Yes.

595. And you do not think he thought his troops were inadequate; he did not say so?—May I be permitted to refer to his letter? I have his letter here. This, I think, is the only passage in Sir William Butler's report which practically suggests that his forces were insufficient. He says this: "The foregoing details explain generally the dispositions I would propose for adoption in the event of it becoming necessary to protect the frontier line. I would, however, desire to remark that the consideration of this question presents many possibilities which make it different from preliminary operations which would be undertaken in the event of war between two regular military powers whose populations were divided by defined frontiers. In the case of South Africa there dwells on one side of the frontier a preponderating Dutch population, closely connected by family ties and mutual intercourse with the people on the other side. The events of the past few years have served to increase suspicion and racial antagonism, and, therefore, the possibility that at least the opening stages of war between the Dutch Republics and ourselves might produce active or secret combinations against our communications must be considered." And then, in a subsequent paragraph, he refers to "the contingency of complications with a foreign Power." (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 206.) But, of course, I may say that the King's Regulations themselves state distinctly that when a General Officer submits a defence scheme, that defence scheme is to be based on the forces he has actually got, and if he wishes to make recommendations for improvement or increase of those forces, he should make them separately; and I think, if I recollect rightly, that the General was told that in one of two letters sent him.

596. (*Sir John Edge.*) You have not given us the date of that letter which you have quoted?—The 14th of June, 1899.

597. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) That is from Sir William Butler?—From Sir William Butler.

598. I think that is sufficient for the present, I sup-

pose in making out your schemes connected with the late war you never contemplated the possibility of very considerable forces coming from the colonies, such as North America, Australia, and New Zealand?—No, we did not.

599. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Was it known at any time previous to the war that the men you calculated, the 48,000 men mentioned on page 3 (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 155) would be all mounted men of the Boers?—Certainly; it was a well-known fact that the Boers never fought except mounted.

600. Then it was thoroughly understood what the mobility of their force was before the war?—Entirely so. There is a chapter in the handbook called "Boer Organisation and Tactics" which gives a resumé of their action in previous wars, and lays great stress upon their mobility. I think we specially point out that the difficulties that Sir George Colley got into were chiefly due to the want of mounted troops.

601. How, then, can you account for the small number of mounted men, comparatively speaking, that were sent to meet these 48,000 mounted men in comparison to the large number of infantry?—That I am afraid I cannot answer; it is for a higher authority.

602. Are you aware that when the first offer was made of troops from Australia, the Australian colonies—I speak particularly of the colony to which I belong, New South Wales—were limited to sending a very small body of mounted men with a larger body of infantry?—That is not a matter which my branch dealt with at all at the time.

603. (*Sir John Edge.*) When you put forward a memorandum from your Department it goes to your chief, I suppose, to begin with?—Yes.

604. You have no personal knowledge of what takes place afterwards, unless it comes back with a comment upon it?—As a rule, I should have personal knowledge, because probably he would tell me what he has done with it. What usually happens now is that Sir William Nicholson gives the paper back to me to see what he has written, and it goes through my registry, and I send it off to the actual authority whom he has addresed it to.

605. Are you aware that it has gone, for instance, to the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes, I should have a record in my branch.

606. Then you know nothing further about it, unless it comes back to you with a comment?—No.

607. It might remain in the Commander-in-Chief's pocket, or go forward?—Quite so. It must absolutely rest with the Commander-in-Chief, what he does with a paper, of course.

608. In reference to the questions raised in 1897 and 1899 as to what positions the forces were to take up in Natal: are those matters in which the Secretary of State would be consulted?—I think the Secretary of State was in every case consulted; that is to say, his approval was given finally before any decision was sent out.

609. I assume that he would act upon the advice of the Military Department?—Quite so; I think the papers were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, the Commander-in-Chief made certain recommendations to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State approved.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

610. (*Sir John Jackson.*) You mentioned the question as to the number of Boers that could be put in the field immediately preceding the date of declaration of war, and that was, of course, an important question. With regard to what Lord Esher said as to the correspondence that took place immediately preceding the war, that was probably one of the questions that would be dealt with in any correspondence that exists between General Butler and the War Office?—Yes. I may say that the letter the War Office wrote to the General Officer Commanding in South Africa, that is Sir William Butler (I think the letter went out immediately after he had taken over command, and it was the letter that called for the defence scheme referred to here), gave a sort of general sketch of what we conceived was the then strategical position in South Africa, and in that general sketch it was stated officially that we had estimated at that time that the Boers would, exclusive of all local garrisons, and so on, be able to bring across the border for offensive operations, a force of 27,000 men. That was written in December, 1898; we afterwards increased that to 34,000—that is, 7,000 more; but in December, 1898, we anticipated that the actual force from which an attack might be expected was 27,000.

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611. And then between December, 1898, and the date of Sir William Butler's leaving, I understand we shall have correspondence and statements signed by him with regard to these questions. (*The papers were subsequently sent in. Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 181)?—Sir William Butler's letter, answering our letter of December, 1898, is dated 14th June, 1899. It was called for by telegram. When I say 27,000 men, I mean the force which would attack; that is, the main army which did actually attack Natal, and, as pointed out in this statement, that actual main army only really amounted to 23,000, as it turned out.

612. Can you tell us from your own knowledge whether at the time that war was declared we had any modern quick-firing guns in South Africa?—I think not, but I think the Commission on that point should look at the statements that have been put in from the Director-General of Ordnance's Department.

613. I suppose we can get that information from General Brackenbury?—I think you have already got a statement from General Brackenbury which no doubt he will be prepared to be examined upon.

614. So far as you are aware, we had no quick-firing guns in South Africa at the time of the declaration of war?—I am afraid I cannot say whether all the batteries in South Africa had what they called the spade attachment, which would enable them to fire as quick-firers; Sir Henry Brackenbury would be able to tell you. Of course, on the question of quick-firing guns, the quick-firing came in very little during the war, and it was more a question of range. Our difficulty at the commencement of the war, at any rate in Natal, lay in the fact that the Boers could fire at us from a longer range than we were able to reply to.

615. I take it that if we got to close quarters there would be no question of the enormous advantage of quick-firing guns. The Boers, I believe, at that time had many quick-firing guns, had they not?—Yes, most of their guns were quick-firing, but I doubt myself whether they derived very great advantage from the quick firing of the guns; they derived very great advantage from the longer range of their guns, and their greater velocity.

616. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Is it the business of the Intelligence Department to indicate or advise on the composition of a force going on a foreign service expedition, or war?—No, it was not at that time.

617. Is it now?—Yes, it would be the business of the Department of the Director-General of Military Intelligence and Mobilisation; the composition, of course, would partly form the Mobilisation Division's work and partly my work. What we do in practice is to work it out together. It is the duty of my branch now to prepare and maintain plans of offensive operations, and those plans always contain proposals as regards the composition and strength of the force which would be allotted.

618. Were the telegrams asking for reinforcements referred to the Intelligence Department in those days before the war?—I do not know; I said before that I do not recollect any specific application for reinforcements.

619. And during the war?—That I cannot say; I was not at the War Office during the first part of the war.

620. It did not come to you at any rate?—No; when war is actually going on telegrams go straight to the Secretary of State; the General commanding the force in the field communicates direct with the Secretary of State, and the question of asking for large reinforcements, say a Division, would be a matter which the Secretary of State himself would decide.

621. As to the composition of the reinforcemtnts sent out, the Intelligence Department would, I take it, be consulted?—I certainly hope we shall be in future wars.

622. For instance, you have in your department in connection with the Mobilization scheme, I take it, information which enables you to put your finger on anybody there is available to go out?—That would be the Mobilization Division, not my particular branch; it is entirely for the Mobilization people to say what troops can actually be found. If I want to know what forces are available I go and ask them.

623. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) You referred just now to a War Office Memorandum that you had in your hand, detailing the duties of your office. I think we

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have not got a copy of that, and it might be of advantage that we should have it?—I will see that one is sent to the secretary; it is the War Office Memorandum of 27th November 1901. (*The Memorandum was subsequently sent in. Vide Appendix Vol., page* 282.

624. There is one other little point. You said that at present you had to deal with offensive and defensive operations everywhere except in Great Britain; you did not add "and India," but I think India does not fall within your branch?—It does for strategical questions.

625. What is the change now? It was not so formerly, and Great Britain and India were both excepted from your purview?—Paragraph (*b*) on page 1 of the Memorandum (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 154), says "the observations of military operations conducted in any part of the Empire except India"—the observation was excepted. I had very little to do with India at all under the old system.

626. Under the new system?—Under the new system any strategical schemes affecting India are a matter for my branch's consideration; they are dealt with first under Colonel Robertson's branch, and they come to me for strategical consideration. Colonel Robertson has a section whose business it is entirely to watch India, and to collate all the information about India. They are experts on the subject. Then when it becomes a question of considering generally from the point of view of the defence of the empire what operations should be carried out, the strategical questions come to the Strategical branch.

627. So that India now really falls under your purview as well?—Yes, everything except the United Kingdom, which the Mobilization Division deals with, as it always has done.

628. (*Chairman.*) Does that information come to you from the Government of India?—It comes from every source, official sources chiefly, but the Indian section is in close weekly communication with the Intelligence branch at Simla.

629. Is there any change in your relations with the Intelligence branch there?—Not at all, as far as I know; I am not personally aware of it. Colonel Robertson can tell you, but I know there is weekly communication

630. (*Sir George Taubman Goldie.*) Going back to the period before the war, will you just state (we could get it from the Estimates) what was the sum of money allotted to the Intelligence Division altogether, the annual sum?—I am afraid I have not got that in my head. You mean the cost of the *personnel* of the establishment?

631. Yes; I think things reduced to pounds, shillings, and pence are more easily understood?—I do not know how many thousands of pounds.

632. It was stated to be somewhere about £11,000; is that correct?—I am afraid I cannot say.

633. You could not say how much was devoted to the particular section which had to carry out the work on page 1 of this paper (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 154)?—Roughly speaking, I should say, about £1,500 a year as the maximum, but I am only just running the thing up in my head considering what the pay of the officers would be, and I cannot say what the total cost of the clerks would be.

634. To carry out those duties (*a*) to (*g*) referred to on that page?—Yes.

635. Take, for instance, the case of negotiations with France; did that section furnish the information to the Colonial Office, or did some other section do it?—You mean regarding the questions as to the boundaries of Nigeria?

636. Boundaries generally?—Very often questions overlapped a bit, and they were considered by more than one section. As a rule, the section which finally dealt with the thing was the Colonial section; but if we were doubtful about the French side of the question we always consulted the French section.

637. But a large amount of the labour connected with those French Boundary questions must have fallen on the Intelligence section?—Yes, in 1898 we had an enormous amount of work over West Africa, and for the moment I think that was a more anxious question than South Africa. We regarded it as a more delicate matter.

638. There was more danger really?—Yes, at that particular moment.

639. Passing to the statement of the Boer forces, there was one point that I think surprised the public, viz., the mobility of the large guns of the Boers, the Creusot guns, and so on. I suppose you had not been able to get any information on that subject before?—Undoubtedly I think the Boers succeeded in carrying out successfully an entirely new departure. I do not think anybody had contemplated previously using guns of the calibre of 6in. as field guns; 4·7 guns and 5in. howitzers were the heaviest that anyone had ever thought of using as guns of position, but you will see in that handbook we did actually point out that it was possible to use that 6in. gun as a gun of position, and I think that was about the extreme limit that the artillery experts would go to. That particular information was drawn up for us by the officer who was at the moment considered one of the greatest experts on the subject in the Army.

640. The next point is as regards the numbers of Boers who were available for military service; it may not be so, but it seems to me that there is a slight discrepancy between the figures. Take, for instance, your book, "Military Notes," page 18. You have a total of 29,279 available for military service. I do not ask this question for the purpose of finding fault, but just to see exactly what your idea was at the time. There is a grand total there of burghers liable for military service of 29,279?—Yes.

641. Then, turning to page 27, there is a total of 31,329, from which had to be deducted 4,533 men under 18 or over 50, leaving a balance of 26,796?—I have got 31,000.

642. And from that the next paragraph says that 4,533 men should be deducted as being under or over age?—No, the paragraph says: "It is to be noted that the above figures represent a levée *en masse* of the burghers, and include 4,533 men under 18 or over 50 years of age." It does not say that those numbers must be deducted, and, on the contrary, if you look at the other page you have referred to you will see that those over 50 and under 18 are included in the figure of 29,279 given there.

643. Is 31,329 the number you state is liable for military service, or is it 29,279?—31,329 is liable for military service, but that includes the Staats Artillery and the police, and the police were not all burghers.

644. That is the point I want to get at; the 29,279 referred to on page 18 did not include the police?—No, as far as our information went—we were not quite certain on the point, and it was not a very important point—we believed the police to be really in addition to the burghers, and that they were not all burghers.

645. I do not wish to refer more than is necessary to unofficial histories of the war, and so on, but there have been histories of the war which have referred to the "Military Notes," and have stated that they had official information, and they always give 23,000 as the number of Transvaalers that you considered was the number. I remember it was set forth that the number of Transvaalers was 23,000, and the number of Free Staters 15,000?—There was always a confusion in the minds of the people who criticised this handbook between the number of men we said were liable to military service and the numbers we estimated would be actually put in the field.

646. Take "The Times History of the War in South Africa"—there is no harm in mentioning the name—I believe they applied to you and obtained information from Governmental sources, as they state in the preface?—That I do not know.

647. They give 23,000 for the South African Republic and 15,000 for the Orange Free State?—I do not know what their authority is for that.

648. You are prepared to pin your faith on the 31,329; is that so?—That is the statement in the book; that is from the official census returns of the Transvaal, and that was the best information we could get.

649. I only want to know the basis to start upon in order to ask you this question, which I must preface with the remark that you have had under your consideration for a number of years the question of the defence of the colonies, Natal and Cape Colony, and therefore you are in a position to answer the question: What, in your oinion, would have been the smallest number of men necessary, not to defend the long Bechuanaland line or, perhaps, to hold the apex of the

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northern triangle of Natal, but to hold against a sudden invasion of the Boers, temporarily, and pending the arrival of reinforcements from England or India, Kimberley, the Orange River and the Biggarsberg, including Dundee, down to the sea?—When you say the Orange River do you mean to hold the bridges across the Orange River, or to hold a general line behind the Orange River?

650. The bridges across the Orange River to prevent any large incursion; I do not speak of sudden raids that might be made, but so as to hold in check any disaffected population south of the Orange River at a time when there would be no Boer successes to encourage them to rise—in fact, to conduct the initial operations of a defensive war pending the arrival of large reinforcements from home?—Knowing what we do now, I do not think it could have been safely done with less than two Divisions in Natal and one Division in Cape Colony.

651. Making a total in men of about what number?—35,000. I give that only as a personal opinion.

652. I may say that you must be specially qualified to deal with this matter, because it lies with your Department to deal with the defence of the Colonies?—That is the smallest possible number that could have made any really good stand, to hold the bridges, Kimberley and the Biggarsberg, and even then I think there would have been needed troops for the lines of communication, and so on, in addition.

653. I am assuming that in the case of a sudden outbreak of war the reinforcements would be there as soon as possible?—What I have indicated would have been a matter of pure defence.

654. You have had special opportunities for becoming acquainted with the condition of things in Ladysmith and about Ladysmith; you had studied the question before going out there from the defensive point of view, and I understand you were shut up in Ladysmith?—Yes.

655. I may take it that the Intelligence Division, at any rate, contemplated the possibility of an invasion of Natal?—Certainly.

656. With the insufficient numbers we had at first to defend it?—Yes; we always contemplated the probability that if the Boers went for anything they would go for Natal for historical and political reasons, and for tactical reasons too.

657. Assuming that, owing to the small force we could throw into the country in time, they came forward to the north of the Biggarsberg, it was not an improbable thing that they would attack Ladysmith?—That is so.

658. It was probable, in fact?—Quite so.

659. And therefore, when Ladysmith was selected as the great centre for our military stores, it became a matter of importance that those stores should be protected in some manner against a possible surprise?—Quite so; but I may say that I do not think, as far as I am aware, there was ever any definite selection of Ladysmith as a great centre for stores, and the thing, as it were, grew up gradually. Originally, sufficient stores were sent there for the actual force engaged. Perhaps I should say this with reference to a question I was asked this morning, as to why Ladysmith was selected; what I said then was entirely having regard to the selection of Ladysmith as a peace station. When certain reinforcements were sent out to Natal it was necessary to decide where that reinforcement was to be stationed, and for various reasons Ladysmith was selected. The moment you select a place for a peace station certain stores naturally collect there, and then when the General on the spot proposed, as appears from this statement, to push troops forward to the Biggarsberg, and to Van Reenan's Pass, and so on, that obviously pointed to Ladysmith being used as an advanced depôt, and stores therefore had to be concentrated at Ladysmith for that reason.

660. Can you remember at this moment what the total value of the military stores accumulated at Ladysmith was?—At the outbreak of the war?

661. Yes?—I am afraid I have not got that in my head, but I should think Sir Edward Ward could give you the figure.

662. At any rate, you are aware that there were stores of very large value at Ladysmith?—Yes.

663. So large as to make it a matter of difficulty for troops to withdraw south of the Tugela and abandon those stores?—Undoubtedly; but there were a great many other reasons beyond the value of the stores. I do not think the value of the stores came very much into the decision as to abandoning them or not, but I am only speaking as far as I know. The final decision to hold Ladysmith and stand there was based on strategical reasons.

664. And the value of the stores was not a large element in deciding that question, you think?—You mean as to the question whether Sir George White should retire across the Tugela?

665. Yes?—I should not think it weighed with him in the least, except as to the military value of the stores to his own force.

666. It was the military value only that I meant?—I thought you meant the actual value in pounds, shillings, and pence.

667. I meant solely the military value of the stores?—That would have weighed with him, and that was from the practical point of view a very important element.

668. He would have had difficulty in replacing those military stores in sufficient time to be of service to his force?—You mean after the battle of Lombard's Kop? Undoubtedly after the battle of Lombard's Kop he could not have replaced them, and he would have lost them if he had withdrawn; the larger portion of them would have had to be destroyed, or would have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

669. And he could not have had for some time other stores to replace them?—No; on the contrary, if he had been invested elsewhere lower down we should have been starved out; but I should like to say that I do not think that was the sole reason for Sir George's decision.

670. But it is very important to feed an Army?—It is very important.

671. To what branch of the Service do you belong?—The infantry—the Royal Scots was my regiment.

672. But you have studied engineering questions?—I have been through the Staff College, of course.

673. Do you feel competent to give any opinion as to whether proper precautions were taken to defend Ladysmith—I do not take Sir George White's time, but prior to the war—so as to make Ladysmith a strong place of defence?—There were no precautions taken prior to Sir George's arrival and taking command; no defences existed at Ladysmith, and Sir George White was the first person to take them in hand. The moment he came to Ladysmith he foresaw the possibility of an investment, and he ordered at once a Defence Committee of the Staff to be formed to consider the question, and a defence scheme was drawn up on the spot.

674. How many weeks was that before he was invested, roughly?—War commenced on the 11th October—I cannot give you the exact date—but I think it was about the 11th or 12th that he ordered this committee to be formed.

675. And the investment began on what date?—Nominally on the 1st or 2nd of November.

676. So that there were only three week actually available in which to prepare Ladysmith for defence?—Yes, with field entrenchments.

677. But for three years it had been contemplated that Natal might be at any time invaded?—Yes; but, of course, Ladysmith is practically a place which is indefensible except by a large force. You will see from one of the papers that I have handed in—the report on the Natal Government Railways—that an Engineer officer was sent up the Colony, and reported on every place, and it is ludicrous to look at it now; the defence scheme drawn up by him for Ladysmith proposed placing two companies there. That scheme was not therefore of very great value.

678. I suppose that Engineer officer was not aware of the enormous mass of stores that were to be placed there?—The conditions changed with the size of the force, and supposing General Cox, we will say in 1897, when he first got these reinforcements, had drawn up a scheme, it would not have been of the least use to Sir George White, and probably any entrenchments he made would have been very little use, because naturally if you had a bigger force you had to push out your enceinte. The great difficulty about Ladysmith was that to hold it properly you had to hold an enceinte of practically 14 miles, and anything less gave the enemy ground commanding the town.

679. And that in your opinion would require how many men?—We did it with about 12,000 men.

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680. But the larger perimeter?—That was our perimeter—the 14 miles, and even then we could not hold ground like Bulwana.

681. Take Bulwana; how many extra men would have been required to hold Bulwana?—It is very difficult to say; I should say practically you want an army corps to hold it and Ladysmith properly, but it depends on whom you are holding it against. The Boers at the early part of the war were singularly deficient in offensive power; they were not prepared to risk themselves in a vigorous attack, and portions of our defences were very weak indeed, with hardly any men at all.

682. There is one statement you made with regard to the staff in the field; it was called Local Intelligence, but we were talking of the staff officers in the field?—The Field Intelligence Department is the official name.

683. You said that they must grow up, and cannot be maintained in time of peace?—They cannot be maintained at their full strength in time of peace.

684. Would you call from 1896 to 1899 entirely a time of peace as regards South Africa, or would you say we were during all that time on the eve of the possibility of war?—That was one of the ways we were handicapped for want of a local Intelligence staff; under the regulations the Field Intelligence Department did not spring into existence until war was actually declared.

685. Do you not think it would be safe to say that that was one of the big causes of our difficulties?—I am afraid I could not go as far as that, but I think it would have been a great advantage for us to have had several officers whose sole duty it was to attend to defence and intelligence questions.

686. It is said that the staff is the brains of the Army?—Yes. A system had grown up of regarding, during peace, current administrative duties as the more important part of staff work, and the preparations for war as mere theoretical work.

687. And, practically, the staff had really to be created after the emergency had arisen?—That is the case as far as the Field Intelligence Department was concerned.

688. There is just one other thing I want to ask you about. You have been questioned about these various memoranda, and you said the handbook, at any rate, dealing with military matters, was in the hands of several members of the Government. Can you trace whether the memoranda passed beyond the Commander-in-Chief, especially the memorandum of the 21st September, 1898?—No, I am afraid I cannot; that was the long memorandum.

689. Can you trace whether that ever went into the hands of the Secretary of State?—No, I never saw the original of that memorandum back again; I have got a copy here, and I have a note that it was sent to the Mobilisation branch on a certain date. It is just possible that Sir Frederick Stopford might be able to say whether it was put by the Commander-in-Chief in front of the Secretary of State. I feel sure he showed it to the Commander-in-Chief. I remember we had a talk about it, and he pressed me to send it in as soon as possible.

Recall at Q. 14688.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Robertson, D.S.O., Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Division, called and examined.

Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Robertson, D.S.O.

690. (*Chairman.*) You joined the Intelligence Division, I think, in April, 1899?—Yes.

691. And from January to October, 1900, you were in South Africa?—Yes.

692. What appointment were you holding in South Africa?—I was Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General for Intelligence on Lord Roberts' Headquarters Staff.

693. Is that the head of the Intelligence Department?—I was not the head of the department, but I was on the headquarters staff.

694. From the 1st October, 1901, to the present date you have again been in the Intelligence Division?—Yes, under the new organisation of the division.

695. What is your position in the Intelligence Division?—I am in charge of one of the sub-divisions you were told about this morning, the sub-division responsible for the collection and collation of military information regarding the whole world with the exception of British possessions—that is to say, regarding all foreign countries.

696. What is the staff you have under you in that division?—The total staff, including myself, is nine permanent officers and one attached officer. That is for the whole world except British possessions. Perhaps I might mention that the corresponding division in the German War Office (which does not perform all the duties we do, although we perform all that it does) consists of 38 permanent officers and about 38 attached officers. I might also add that the Intelligence branch in Simla, where I was employed for five years, consists of 9 officers, and is responsible for Persia, Russia in Central Asia, and the frontiers of India.

697. Is that the same division of the Intelligence Department?—No, the whole of the branch in Simla is concerned mainly with the frontiers of India, Russia in Central Asia, and Persia, and consists of 9 officers.

698. Your representation is that your office is under manned?—Very much so.

699. I suppose you have a vast number of documents that you have to study in different languages?—Yes. The sub-division is divided into four sections, and the foreign countries of the world are distributed amongst these four sections. There are two officers in each section, and in most of the sections the officers must be acquainted with four or five languages; for instance, one section deals with France, Belgium, Central and South America, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, and another with Germany, Normay, Sweden, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States. There are very many documents to peruse. In Germany, for instance, military books are constantly being published, and we receive sometimes 150 of these a year that ought to be gone into, but it is quite impossible to do this. Then we have, besides what you might call pure intelligence work, to do a great deal of work for the War Office generally. For instance, a foreigner goes to the War Office with an invention, and perhaps no one there knows what he is saying, and we are asked to examine and find out what he wants. Another may write a letter, and no one be able to read it. The German section had 700 of these documents, varying from a postcard to about 13 pages, to translate during one year. These are incidentals outside of what you might call preparation for war.

700. In the statement which has been submitted to us dealing with the war in South Africa, is there any particular portion which you wish to speak of?—No, except that I can corroborate the accuracy of some of the figures given in it, because I went through some of the documents mentioned, and had them translated; in fact, I found a great part of the documents myself in Commandant General Joubert's office. These documents helped us to compare the number of burghers in the field with the numbers we had previously obtained. We got most of our comparisons, as regards guns, from the invoices, way bills, and similar documents, and the number of burghers from lists furnished to Joubert in September, the month previous to the outbreak of war.

701. That corroboration came from official documents?—It did; I went into the matter very fully, and spent a good deal of time over it. As to the Free State, we found some documents in Mr. Steyn's office about the imported guns; and as to the Transvaal, I found the documents in Joubert's office in the Government offices at Pretoria. But the Boers themselves were not quite sure of the number of men they had. The field cornets, and commandants of districts, and many others had a hand in making up and compiling these returns; and in a big country, with the people scattered about, accuracy was hardly possible, but practically the numbers given in the "Military Notes on the Dutch Republics," as regards guns and burghers, compared very well with what we found in official documents in Pretoria and Bloemfontein.

702. Have you been concerned in the drawing up of the numbers in the handbook?—No, I was only in the Colonial Section of the Intelligence Division about six months before war broke out. The time of the officer I worked under was largely taken up with it, and as a matter of fact the book was produced in June, while I did not join till April, so that I could not have had much to do with it.

703. When you went to South Africa, what was the organisation of the Intelligence headquarters staff there?—There was only a small staff in Natal, because Colonel Altham, who was the head of it, and another officer belonging to it, were shut up in Ladysmith. I did not go to Natal, but I believe there were about three officers with General Buller in Natal on the Intelligence staff; then there was an Intelligence officer at Cape Town, and there was one with Lord Methuen. That is as far as I can remember.

704. Was that when you went out?—That was when I went out with Lord Roberts.

705. You did not go out until Lord Roberts went?—No; in fact, I went out about a fortnight afterwards.

706. Lord Roberts' intelligence staff was organised, I suppose?—He took out a head of the department with him, and then began to organise the department as soon as he arrived in South Africa.

707. Who was the head of the department?—Colonel G. F. Henderson, who is now writing the history of the war; he organised the department on a very large scale.

708. Was it recruited, as Colonel Altham has described, from officers on the spot?—It was recruited from local men, with myself and five other staff officers. There was also an Intelligence officer told off to every column, no matter what the size of the column might be—it might be a division or half a brigade. In the war establishments there was then no Intelligence officer detailed to any unit below a division, but under the new arrangement an Intelligence officer was given to every column or detachment, and the local people were employed as scouts and guides. The guides were largely used because the country was practically without roads.

709. What was the duty of the Intelligence officer with these columns?—To provide scouts and guides, and to procure and give to his General information regarding the enemy.

710. Procuring information with regard to the route he was to take?—Yes, the General would know the place to which he wished to go, and the Intelligence officer would be expected to tell him the best route to it and what opposition he might meet with on the way. He would find out about the enemy the best way he could from spies, deserters, and the usual sources.

711. Do you think, in the result, the Intelligence work was carried on effectively or not?—I think it was up to the time Pretoria was reached; I left soon afterwards, and do not know what happened then, but up to that time it was, in my opinion, carried out well. It was carried out very well certainly up to the time Bloemfontein was reached. The information obtained about Cronje's retreat was specially accurate and opportune, and enabled Lord Roberts to direct his troops the right way in order to stop him.

712. When you, on the Intelligence branch in South Africa, had to lay out routes, were you hampered by not having sufficient maps?—Yes, the maps were a difficulty certainly; we had maps, but some of them were not very good, and we followed no recognised road in going from the Modder River to Bloemfontein. The route we took was not a defined line of advance, and the maps were vague, but we got up other maps pretty well as fast as we advanced. We secured a map in Cape Town, and had it reproduced there, and also copies of Jeppe's map. These were better than the others, but they were not very good.

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713. Would it have been possible to have had maps of a sufficient scale and detail to lay out a route upon in a country of that kind?—That is rather a question for the mapping section, but under the circumstances I should think not, because the only way it could be done was by going over the country and surveying it, and that we could not do. The Boers had no maps as good as ours.

714. No map other than one completed after a survey would enable you to lay out a route accurately?—The route would either have to be surveyed or reconnoitred; it must be gone over by somebody capable of making a rough survey of it.

715. But you do not require a survey by triangulation?—No, not as much as that. When you come to a country like South Africa there is no road to guide you, and you do not know which line you may follow until operations begin. It is not as if there were defined roads in the country; you might send out any number of officers to reconnoitre, but probably none of their reports would fit in with the line you advance by, because you can go practically any way you choose from one town to another. What is required is a map showing the whole country, and that could not be made.

716. Unless the reconnoitring had covered the whole country you could not have relied upon it?—No. Of course, in a country with a few main roads you could reconnoitre these roads, and would then have something definite to go upon.

717. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) I should just like to ask you upon what scale you find a map most useful as a rule?—In a country like South Africa I should be content with one on a scale of four miles to the inch.

718. Was the map you have referred to on a smaller or a larger scale?—The map we reproduced was on a scale of four miles to the inch; Jeppe's was about eight miles to the inch.

719. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Did not the late Commander-in-Chief make a remark once with reference to manœuvres on Salisbury Plain that maps of four miles to the inch were little use for tactical purposes?—I do not remember.

720. He did make that statement: you do not agree with that opinion?—For general purposes, no. I do not think you could use any other map in a large country like South Africa; you would have an enormous number of sheets if the map were on a larger scale.

FOURTH DAY.

Thursday, 16*th October*, 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E. (*Chairman*).

The Right Honourable The Viscount Esher, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable The Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir George Dashwood Taubman-Goldie, K.C.M.G.
Field Marshal Sir Henry Wylie Norman, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir Frederick Matthew Darley, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir John Ommanney Hopkins, G.C.B.
Sir John Edge.
Sir John Jackson.

Bernard H. Holland, Esq., *Secretary*.

Lieutenant-Colonel S. C. N. Grant, C.M.G., R.E., called and examined.

721. (*Chairman.*) You were in the Mapping Section from 1897 to 1899?—Yes, from the beginning of 1897, until the outbreak of war.

722. Then you went out to the Natal Field Force?—I got to the Natal Field Force. I went out originally to join what was supposed to be the main force at Cape Town, but when I got there I was sent round to Natal. I was shut up in Ladysmith.

723. And after that you remained out in South Africa?—After Ladysmith, I went round to the Cape side, and went up with the advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria.

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724. In what capacity?—I was in command of an Engineer Field Company at that time.

725. You have now rejoined the Intelligence Division?—I rejoined when I came home, and then I went back to the Ordnance Survey, and am now on the Ordnance Survey.

726. And not in the Intelligence Division?—No, I rejoined the Intelligence for a week when I came home, but I went to the Ordnance Survey after that.

727. I understood from Sir William Nicholson that you could speak to some of the maps which have been laid before us?—Yes.

728. Especially with regard to the map of Northern Natal?—I made that map myself in 1896.

729. Under what circumstances?—It was in 1896, when there was a tension between the Boers and ourselves. It arose after the Jameson Raid, and at the time of the tension it was grasped at home that we had no efficient map at all of the north of Natal. It seemed very desirable that we should get the information as quickly as we could, and I was sent out in a great hurry to write Reports of, and reconnoitre all the communications north of Ladysmith, including the positions of Laing's Nek and the Biggarsberg.

730. How long did that occupy you?—I may say we never went to the Treasury for any money. I got assistance out in the Colony, two officers from the garrison. I went out in August, 1896, and was back again by December of the same year. It took three months' work on the ground, and it was very rapid sketching, because the tension was still existing, and I did not want it to be known that I was there, and I think that the Ministers in Natal did not wish it to be known either, so that we did it as rapidly as we could and got home again.

731. You do not represent it as a finished map, in any way, of the country?—No, but it is the best map we had for military purposes of the northern portion of Natal; it is a fairly finished military reconnaissance map, done under great pressure, and that is all.

732. And that style of map you consider useful for military purposes?—I think that style of map is good enough for military purposes.

733. Was there any special reason why you stopped at Ladysmith?—I think at the moment that seemed to meet the necessities, and if we had gone beyond Ladysmith, we might have gone anywhere; it was desirable of course to have an immense amount more mapping, but we had no money, and I think the Intelligence Department considered that at the moment that met the necessities of the case, and that was all I was sent out to do.

734. It was deliberately done; that piece of the country was considered an important piece to map, and it was done?—It was done deliberately as being very urgent at the moment.

735. For the piece south of Ladysmith there is no similar map?—No, I did no mapping south of Ladysmith.

736. What is the best map south of Ladysmith?—The best map south of Ladysmith, I think, is probably the Intelligence Division Map 1190, but, personally, south of Ladysmith I should have felt inclined to use Russell's map of Natal, which is a Colonial map, five miles to the inch. Russell was, I think, an Inspector of Schools in Natal.

737. Is that a map that would be useful for military purposes?—Better than none, that is all. It might be useful for strategical purposes. It was some use for tactical purposes, but that is all I can say for it. It was not what you would call an efficient military map.

738. There has been a considerable controversy as to whether maps existed of that part of the country; that is the best map that did exist?—The best general map, yes.

739. Was that map served out to the troops?—Yes, I think they had the use of that map. I cannot say how many copies we bought, but I think we wrote out and got all the copies we could. It was available not for regimental officers, but for commanding officers; I think we had sufficient copies for commanding officers.

740. When it is stated that the Boers used our maps, does that refer to your map or to Russell's map?—They told me afterwards they captured a great number of our maps in Dundee, and amongst those my map, but I believe the map they copied is an old Intelligence Division map, known as Intelligence Division 1190. The detail may be right, but the hill shading is terribly wrong.

741. And this map extends as far south as Colenso?—Yes, but we did not like it; really we had thrown it over, as we found out before the war that the contours were wrong. That map does not give a good idea of the country at all.

742. What is the history of this map?—It was compiled in the Intelligence Division from all the information obtainable. It was compiled before I went to the Intelligence Division, and I do not know what the date of it is.

743. It is dated May, 1897?—I may just have completed it, but the greater portion of it was drawn and ready for printing before I went to the Intelligence Division, and it was compiled, like all our other work, from any information we could get.

744. On what did the contours pretend to depend?—I did not compile it, and I do not know where they got those contours from.

745. You said it was done on the same footing as other maps in the Department; how would a map with so many apparent contours be drawn out in a Department, except from survey?—Well, you see, we had no power to make surveys ourselves; we simply used to get maps that existed, and information or sketches from anybody who could supply it, and then make a map of our own from those. I cannot say exactly where that hill work was drawn from.

746. Was it ever drawn on the spot at all?—Not by anybody that I know.

747. It seems to be very difficult to understand how contours can be put on a map without some sort of reconnaissance or survey to justify them?—They are not really accurate contours, but simply a representation of the ground; perhaps I was wrong in calling them contours, and I should rather call them form lines. You may take it really more as a style of hill-shading, and they are not meant to be accurate contours.

748. I suppose for military purposes now a-days you do want accurate contours?—Well, if you have accurate contours it is all the better; of course, if you have a good hill-shaded map of a country like South Africa that may be good enough.

749. You say you discarded this map yourselves?—Yes.

750. That means to say you did not regard it as good?—I did not think it a good map at the time of the outbreak of war.

751. It is not reliable?—No; as you see, we made a note on it saying that for the detail on the north of Natal they should go to another map, but as we had that map printed, and it was the best map we had got outside those areas, we sent it out, but we put a note on it to say that the detail north of Natal was erroneous, and if they wanted the information they must go to another map for it.

752. I see; that for the correct detail of Natal they were referred to your map?—Yes.

753. The question occurs to my mind whether it is useful work to draw up a map upon which you cannot rely?—It comes to this, that if you have not money to make a survey, what are you to do? It is either that or to have no maps at all, and that is the position one was in, to put it plainly. That is the work we are employed on entirely; we had in Intelligence Division F two officers, and a third officer, an attached officer, when we could get him, and we were practically responsible for collecting and collating geographical information all over the world, and even working on those lines the maps we gave to the Army on the outbreak of war, I have no hesitation in saying, were the best that could be provided at the time. We had possession of all the material that existed, and we compiled it as best we could. I do not know any map in South Africa that we did not know

o at the time, and that we had not copies of at the time; and our information was all compiled, and those sheets which have been handed in (*for list of these see Appendix, page* 513, *post*), and which you have now before you, the large number of sheets, comprise the information, including the information that was obtained by our officers who went out just prior to the War. Their reconnaissances were sent home as quickly as possible, and it was all compiled in that map.

754. Which map do you refer to now?—The large number of sheets of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, of which there is an index there which gives you the date when each sheet was ready and left England to go to South Africa.

755. They are mostly dated 1900, are they not?—The beginning of 1900, it may be, but some went before that. I began the compilation of that map in November, 1898. I sent the first two sheets to South Africa, and asked that they might be examined, and that I might be told what they were worth, and whether it was worth while going on with the compilation, but I did not get a reply till the end of May, so that really delayed us somewhat in the compilation of that map. Still, I think most of the sheets, at all events, were out there, and even the beginning of 1900 was before our troops crossed the Orange River. I have not compared this critically as I was shut up in Ladysmith, having left before the finishing of the compilation.

756. I only mentioned the date of 1900 on looking through them?—But January, 1900 would be before the troops crossed the Orange River.

757. Those were sheets that were used in the advance through the Orange Free State?—Well, I did not join the advance through the Orange Free State until we advanced again from Bloemfontein; I do not know what maps they used before that, but when we got to Bloemfontein there was another issue of maps that had been drawn up by the Intelligence Division at Cape Town, and printed by a firm in Cape Town. These sheets were not issued; they had had a further six months over the time we had in England to compile them, and then there was another good map published about that time, which was called "Boer and Briton." That was a well-compiled map at the time, and was compiled after the outbreak of hostilities; we had that, and afterwards we had sheets of Jeppe's map, of which I do not think we could buy any large quantity before the outbreak. This map was published in 1899, but we had an advance copy in the Intelligence Division in 1898, and this was all compiled—in fact, it was chiefly from this map that those sheets were compiled.

758. Neither Jeppe's map nor your sheets of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal were from surveys?—Jeppe's map is compiled from the farm surveys; of course, it is not from a regular survey, and it has very little military detail in it. The only advantage of Jeppe's man is that it has got the farm names, and if you told a man to go to a farm he could go somewhere within a square mile of where you wanted him to go Our orders used to be issued that the Division would march to such and such a place, generally a farm name, but that map has very little detail in it useful from any other tactical point of view.

759. And that applies to your sheets, too?—My sheets have a little more, I think, because, at all events, they had all the reconnaissances; we tried to put in the roads and streams as much as possible, and the hills, and I daresay my sheet is on a larger scale. You see we have more hills on my sheets, but I do not say that the hills are very good. Jeppe's is essentially a farm survey map, and my sheets were compiled from the other information we could get. We got the reconnaissance sketches from the officers who went out six months before the War began, and they were valuable, giving all the main lines of advance.

760. In the Orange Free State?—Yes.

761. I think after you were out in Natal and made a map north of Ladysmith in 1896 there was an attempt made to get the Colonial Government to complete the mapping southwards?—Yes, we never lost sight of the importance of the Natal mapping from the time I came home at the beginning of 1897 or the end of 1896. We were doing all we could and when Sir H. Escombe came to England Sir John Ardagh had a meeting with him, and pointed out to him the extreme necessity of continuing my work over the whole colony, but he frankly admitted that if we put it forward as a military necessity he would have very great difficulty in getting us any money or assistance. I think the feeling at home—I do not know how it arose, but I think there has always been a feeling, and certainly there was when I went to the Intelligence Division, that it was very little use going to the Treasury for money to survey our self-governing colonies. The only way, therefore, we could get this survey of Natal at the moment was to arrange with the Premier that we would, if we could, get one or two officers in the Cape garrison who would do the work as long as we had not to bear any expense outside their military expenses, and we said that if he would pay the incidental expenses and give us the transport we would manage to do the work for him. We also had to point out to him the extreme usefulness of such a map for administrative purposes, leaving out the question of military purposes altogether, and the Premier said that he thought he would be able to get us perhaps the £800 a year we asked for. Of course, when he went back the Ministry changed, and then things were so near the outbreak of war and the tension was so great that it was no use thinking of beginning a survey of South Africa then, even if we could have got the money.

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762. And it did not go any further?—No. We got a sketch made by an officer at Maritzburg of the country round Maritzburg, and we got together all the mapping we could, but there was no practical survey done after that, and I do not know that we could have done it. In 1896 I found when I got out there that there was a strong feeling—I do not say I met with opposition, because I did not, I got assistance—but still I was not welcomed there; in fact, I was frankly told they wished I had not come out, because they thought my surveying in Natal would increase the tension then existing with the Boers. That was the feeling, and it was difficult to get anything done at that moment. Of course, to have made a military survey of the whole of South Africa we should have had to begin years ago, long before the tension existed.

763. It would take a long time to complete that survey?—Well, roughly, if we speak after the events, and simply take the area covered by the War, leaving out the whole west of Cape Colony and nearly all Bechuanaland, I do not think we could have done it under between £300,000 and £400,000, and to have done it economically it would certainly have taken at least 10 years. You certainly could not do it under five years, and to do it in that time would be a great waste of money. I mean, you would have to do it in a rush and in such a way that you would not get the most for your money.

764. What sort of a survey are you speaking of in that case?—Just sufficient for military purposes; I am taking about two miles to the inch, and that is the least that you could say would be an efficient military survey of South Africa.

765. On the same style as your map of Northern Natal?—Practically something of that style, only that is one inch to the mile, and I would suggest half that scale.

766. Not with any triangulation?—Yes, you would base it on fairly good triangulation; you could not carry out a survey of South Africa with a large area like that without basing it on a good triangulation.

767. And that increases the time and the cost, I suppose?—I have included that in the cost. It would be impossible to do it in any other way.

768. Is there any other point with regard to the question of mapping that you would like to speak to?—No, I do not think I have anything further to say.

769. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) I think you said you consider your maps, other than that of the north of Natal, good enough for the purposes of the Army?—No; I say they were the best we could make under the conditions.

770. But not good enough, not such as you would desire?—No, I say a good enough map is the one I suggest that would have taken £300,000 to make; it could not be a military survey of South Africa without that, and I do not think one would be justified in saying

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anything short of that would be a good enough map. All I wish to maintain is that under the conditions then existing it was the best map in existence. In the Intelligence Department we really had other information, and that information was all given to the Army at the time.

771. But they were not such as you felt it desirable to have?—No.

772. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) With regard to the map which you made north of Ladysmith, do you consider that that has military value?—I consider that good enough for military purposes.

773. What was the cost of compiling that, taking into account the services of the officers, and so on?—It is a little difficult to say. Am I to allow for their pay? Mind you, we worked under pressure at that work, and in a way that you could not get people to do for three years, but the cost of that map, I think, over and above our pay was only £300.

774. Was it under £500 altogether?—No, say roughly £1,000 altogether, but it was done under conditions of pressure; I got certain assistance in the Colony, first of all I used artillery mules, and secondly, the Colony lent me wagons, and all those for a big thing would have to go into the expense.

775. Supposing you could have done it under contract for all these things, what would the cost have been?—It was practically 3,000 square miles, but I did not complete the detail. That work could be done in the way I did it for £1,500; that is the value of that survey.

776. I do not remember Russell's map?—It is before the Commission.

777. Is it hill-shaded?—Yes, it is hill-shaded.

778. Sufficiently for practical purposes?—It is in four sheets. (*The map was pointed out to the Commission.*) The main roads are fairly good there, but, of course, it is a small scale. It is not a bad map as maps go, and it is the best that exists in the Colony.

779. Was this published before you made yours?—Oh, yes.

780. Did you use this at all as the basis for starting your map?—We used everything; we take what we believe to be the best.

781. I am speaking of yours which you made out there?—It was no good for me; I may have had it to show me where the roads went, but I did mine without anything else.

782. How did you fix your main points?—I had about five points of Colonel Morris' main triangulation. I found in the Surveyor-General's office at Maritzburg the observations for secondary triangulation which had been made out there under the Colonial Government, but had never been completed and calculated. He gave me the Field Books and I plotted the points, and I found the beacons were up in position and I was able to use those, and it was really on those points that I based my survey.

783. As to the Cape map you used, the "Boer and Briton map," was that contoured or shaded in any way?—It is a very small scale; I have forgotten the exact scale.

784. It was not worth considering for military purposes at all?—Not at all except for strategical purposes.

785. You spoke of those Reconnaissance Officers going out to the Orange Free State. I think six months before the war began?—Well, I speak roughly when I say six months; they did not go out under me.

786. You know that during the last six or eight months they were working there?—Yes, I say six months; you must just take that.

787. During 1899 at any rate?—During the latter half of 1899.

788. And I suppose we may take it that the tension between the countries at that period was very much greater than it had been at any previous period?—I suppose so, except perhaps after the Jameson Raid; I daresay the tension was greater then.

789. But since the time you came into office in the Intelligence Division in 1897 the tension was actually greater, having grown during he last six months?—Yes.

790. At the top of page 12 of the Statement of the Intelligence Division (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 159) there is a paragraph beginning: "It would be absurd," and ending, "has not been impugned."—Yes.

791. I refer you to the words there, "Even had the *personnel* been available, it is doubtful whether in the political tension of the time complete reconnaissance would have been possible"; do the words "of the time," which are used there, apply merely to 1899 or to a previous period?—You could not have surveyed the Orange Free State or the Transvaal openly any time since 1881. I was asked if I had anything to say in addition, and I may add that I forgot that it would have been impossible to have surveyed the Orange Free State and the Transvaal at any time since 1881.

792. That I quite understand, but reconnaissances were made in 1899?—Yes.

793. The point I want to get at is this: Would it not have been easier to have made reconnaissances in 1896? After the closing of the Drifts in 1895 when the first great tension began, would it not have been easier to have made reconnaissances in 1896, 1897, and 1898 than in 1899?—Yes, it would have been in 1897 and 1898, of course, but 1896 was a year of tension. If you go back before the Jameson Raid again it would have been easier still. In 1897 it would have been easier than in 1899.

794. So that if the work of reconnaissance had been commenced in 1897 we might have had a great deal more sketch mapping done than was done?—I think so, undoubtedly.

795. You do not see any reason why a considerable portion of the Orange Free State and Transvaal should not have been sketched in those years?—You could not have made surveys from the sketches; you could not have done anything in the way of triangulation, and it would have been very little more than just rapid, rough reconnaissances.

796. Still those are valuable for military purposes, are they not?—In a civilised country they would be, or I may say in most countries they would be, but in the whole of South Africa the country is so open, and you can go anywhere, that roads are not the only means of communication. In the march from Bloemfontein to Pretoria, my Division never had a road from beginning to end. We had to keep five miles distant from the other Division, and we just went in a bee line, and it is not like another country where an Army would be bound to stick to the roads.

797. The country for some distance on either side of a railway is very important in a campaign, is it not, where you carry your troops and stores forward by rail and you require to leave the rail and march five or six miles from it?—Yes.

798. Would you say that sufficient sketches existed of the country on either side of the great railways, the main Natal line, or the main line up to Bloemfontein, or the Kimberley and Mafeking line?—No, we had reconnaissances of the lines themselves, but with the Army we were extending for thirty miles, taking the advance up to Pretoria; I suppose our Mounted Infantry Divisions were 30 miles to the west of the railway.

799. Taking the earlier period of the War, in Lord Methuen's advance, do you think he had sufficient information in the shape of sketches and reconnaissances of the country on either side of the railway to Kimberley?—I do not know. Major Altham yesterday said it is impossible to prepare all information for every Army prior to a war, and of course a certain amount must be filled in by troops on the spot to meet their own requirements. The Reports written by me on the north of Natal simply covered the state of things and conditions which I might have had in my mind. I was imagining a Force of a certain strength under certain conditions, but you cannot meet every condition, and an Army must be prepared, I think, to make small local sketches itself. I have all along said that nothing but a survey would give you a map that I should be prepared to say was a good enough map for military purposes.

800. But without going into counsels of perfection, and taking the best we can get for the money, sketches such as you got of the northern apex of Natal are

valuable?—I say they are good enough there, but that was the only place where you had a sketch that was good enough.

801. And good enough similar sketches could have been made on the north and west?—Yes, they could have been made if the necessity had been foreseen.

802. Do those reconnaissances cover the line to Bloemfontein, say for 30 miles on either side of the railway?—No, we had no special reconnaissance of the country so far on each side. The officers merely had time to run along the railway and note what they could see, and I have no doubt most of the reconnaissances were done from the train itself. I am only speaking generally, but I think that is the way they had to do it, looking to the time they had to do it in, and the tension that existed.

803. In 1897 reconnaissances could have been made if you had had the money?—I think so, with difficulty in the Free State.

804. In No. 2, on page 11 (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 158), it says: "A reconnaissance of the roads and railways leading from Burgersdorp and Colesberg in Cape Colony to Bloemfontein, with military sketches of the country traversed"?—Those only extend a mile or two on each side of the road or railway reported upon.

805. And on the road to Kimberley there was practically nothing at all?—Up from Bloemfontein to Kimberley?

806. No, from Cape Colony to Kimberley?—The country on either side of the railway?

807. Yes?—No, there we had not made any survey and we did not anticipate that we should require tactical maps there, but there we had only the 12 miles to the inch map of Cape Colony. The officers did not go out under me as Topographical Officers, they went out in a section as Intelligence Officers, to gain intelligence, and I cannot say exactly what they did except that I know I compiled all their information into the Intelligence Division map. You may take it for certain that the reconnaissances over these roads or railways took no further than they could see from the road or railway as they went along it.

808. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) What do you consider the best scale for military purposes if you were going to issue maps such as you would wish?—It would depend somewhat on the country and on the amount of details you have to show in your map.

809. A good deal of your mapping in these maps is on the inch scale?—At that time the inch scale was the recognised military scale, that is to say in England; a Military Committee had decided that the one inch to the mile scale was to be the map for military purposes, and it was to be the map issued, so that the officer's eyes should become attuned to that scale, but now there is a feeling that it is a little large even for England, and that the two miles to the inch is the more convenient map for military purposes as it covers more ground.

810. And especially for a large area like South Africa?—For South Africa it is a question whether four miles or two miles to the inch would be better; on two miles to the inch you can show all the detail; there is so little of it.

811. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I think in the early part of your evidence you stated that these sketch maps were sufficient for military purposes, and then, in answer to Sir George Taubman-Goldie, you said they were not?—If I did say so in the beginning of my evidence, I meant that they were sufficient for some military purposes; for instance, strategical purposes do not require such detailed maps as tactical purposes; and again, for a map for the tactical working of a Division you do not want so much detail as if you are thinking of the tactical work of a battalion. They were good enough for some purposes, but, on the other hand, I distinctly said that I could not say any map there, except that of the North of Natal, was really a map such as I should like to issue to the troops.

812. Having regard to the time that a proper survey by triangulation would have taken, these sketch maps would have been very valuable?—Yes; they were valuable.

813. Are you aware of any application having been made to the Treasury at this end for the supply of money for such sketch maps for the War?—Do you mean sketch maps of small areas?

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814. Sketch maps such as you referred to in your evidence?—No; I do not know that we made any, because the difficulty was, two years before the War, to say where we were going to make a sketch map; sketch maps would not have met the purpose. We wanted a survey of South Africa, and then that opened up the question of the survey of the whole of our self-governing Colonies.

815. Then you said that if you had made a proper survey, that would have taken, possibly, ten years?—From five to ten years.

816. And that would have been quite impracticable?—Yes.

817. Do you see any reason why, two years before the Declaration of War, instructions should not have been given to prepare sketch maps of the main parts of what eventually became the theatre of war?—No; I suppose it would have been possible. Of course I have already explained that we were considering Natal specially; we thought undoubtedly at that time that Natal would have been perhaps the main and only theatre of war, but it would have been possible to put your finger upon other localities which would have been undoubtedly important in time of war, and it would, of course, have been important to get local surveys made at those places such as we did in 1897. Major Altham was then Military Secretary at Cape Colony, and he was sent up specially to reconnoitre and write reports on the bridges and railway communications across the Orange River; that was one case where we wanted drawings, but that system could be extended to any amount if the money was forthcoming, or if the officers were forthcoming; it has always been very difficult to get officers for this sort of work, because any requisition has generally been met with the reply that they cannot be spared from their regiments.

818. Looking to your estimate of the probable cost of preparing these sketch maps, do you not think that in view of contingencies the War Department should have been sure that at any rate they had sketch maps of all the countries which possibly might become the theatres of war in which we might be engaged?—I do not like the words "sketch maps," because sketch maps are really a waste of money; I mean, in South Africa we could have never picked on the right place, and you must begin a survey from the beginning. If you make sketch maps of localities you can never put them together, and the expenditure of any large amount of money in making small surveys of little localities is a thing I should not like to say I advocated.

819. The only way is to get the grant for a great survey?—The only way is to begin from the beginning, and all the sketch mapping in the world will not give you a proper map. I quite agree that you could put your hand on one or two places and say that we ought to have had bigger surveys of them; for instance, the whole of Natal; but I have already explained how we did our best without going to the Treasury. I do not know that we ever asked for money, but I believe everybody was quite aware—I had only to go as far as my chief, Sir John Ardagh, and he was also aware—that we had no surveys of these Colonies.

820. At any rate, at ten shillings a square mile, which you put it at, the cost could not have been a very large item?—Fifteen shillings I put as the cost of the whole survey.

821. (*Sir John Edge.*) I understand that in 1897, when you were out in North Natal, the local Government feared that your surveying there might cause extra friction with the Boers?—Yes; they told me when I went out there that if the Boers knew what I was doing it would increase the tension, and they rather deprecated my going.

822. I asked that question to lead up to another:—Do you conceive that it would have been possible, in 1897 or 1898, to make any practical survey 30 or 40 miles from a main road or 30 or 40 miles from a rail way in the Orange River Colony or Transvaal without drawing attention to the fact that the survey was being made?—I do not think you could do anything, practi-

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cally, there without its being known; you could do nothing but what you could do in a buggy.

823. Supposing you sent officers out to make reconnaissances, and such sketches as they could so as to cover the ground 30 or 40 miles on each side of the roads and railways, do you think that could go on for any length of time without attention being drawn to it?—It could not go on for a week without attention being drawn to it.

824. That probably would produce more friction than your surveying in Natal alone?—No, because they knew what we were to do, and in the north of Natal there were a large number of Boers, and they knew what I was doing.

825. If you send officers out to wander about over 30 or 40 miles on each side of a railway or a main road, would not the Boers probably know what you were at then?—Certainly.

826. There was no game to be shot there?—No, and besides that you could do no surveying worth anything without a plane table. I wish to express definitely that I think it would have been quite impossible to have done any mapping worth much in the two States. These reconnaissance sketches which the officers managed to do they simply did from a buggy driving along the road. You could not carry a plane table or prismatic compass along the road.

827. They had to make the best sketches they could under the most favourable circumstances for avoiding attention being drawn to what they were doing?—Yes, and I think they were all known before they had been out there a month or two; I think most of the officers we sent out were known before they had been there a month, and they had all to come back again from the Transvaal before the declaration of war.

828. May I take it that in your opinion from 1896 it would have been practically impossible to have made a valuable map, a map valuable for military purposes, of the ground 30 to 40 miles on either side of a main road in the Boer States?—I think it would have been quite impossible.

829. Now I want to come to the system on which you prepared your map when you had no accurate data to go upon. As I understand your evidence, perhaps I did not apprehend it correctly, in districts where there has been no actual survey you collect the best information you can from travellers?—Anywhere we can get it, from travellers.

830. From military men?—From military men, the Geographical Society, from travellers, and from any surveys that may be done by a foreign country; anywhere we can get it.

831. From that you make up the best map you can?—We put all the material together the best way we can.

832. From the military point of view what use is a map of that kind?—It is better than none; that is all I can say.

833. You say that it is better that a man should know there is a river or a mountain pass somewhere about than that he should not know anything at all about it?—Exactly, and it may be very well to know that a road is there; if you have two villages they may be 25 per cent. out, but it is better to have that than no knowledge at all.

834. You mean that it is better to have an indication of something somewhere in front of you than not to know anything at all about it?—Yes.

835. Would a military officer act on a map so prepared as if it was a reliable map?—No; there again a map is a map, but the value of the map depends very much on the training of the man who is using it. A man accustomed to survey and who knows how to read a map will know what is likely to be wrong and what is likely to be right.

836. Were these sketch maps issued as maps that could be depended upon or merely as sketch maps?—May I read a letter I wrote Sir William Butler when I prepared those first two sheets, and which explains entirely how the map was made. I wrote this when I sent out the two first proofs of those sheets which we prepared of the Orange Free State and Transvaal to Sir William Butler asking him to have them examined and to let me know as soon as convenient what they were worth. I had my doubts as to what they were worth for military purposes. The letter is dated 23rd December, 1898: "Dear Sir William Butler,—At present we have no military map of the Transvaal and Orange Free States. We have, however, commenced to make one, and Sir John Ardagh desires me to forward herewith photograph copies of the MSS. of the first two sheets and a small scale index showing the position of the sheets." (They were sheets round Johannesburg.) "The mapping of the sheets is based on the Railway Survey from Vereeniging to Johannesburg, and on a traverse made by Captain FitzHenry, 7th Hussars, of the road and railway between Standerton and Johannesburg. The detail is filled in principally from Jeppe's map, enlarged, as regards the Transvaal, and Herfst's as regards the Orange Free State." (That was another map compiled something like Jeppe's of the Orange Free State just from the farm surveys, and it had never been published; we only had a ferro-type copy from tracings which we got privately from the Orange Free State.) "It is impossible to say, however, what reliance can be placed upon the work, and we should be glad if you could take any opportunity that may arise to ascertain its worth. The towns and villages may be expected, I think, to be correctly placed relative to one another. The roads are all shown in one character, but it would be a good thing if we could differentiate the more important roads from town to town, provided they are good enough for wheeled traffic, and I should be glad if you could by any means get this done on one of the copies. The streams may or may not be correct, but in the latter case to correct them would probably require too much work on the ground. The same may be said of the hills, but any one who knows the country could say whether they are generally correct or not. The next sheet to be prepared will be the Kroonstad, and then the one to the west along the Vaal River, both shown with dotted blue lines on the index map." And then I told him of three gentlemen whom we knew who lived near the locality who might be able to give him information. It was the 23rd May when I got a reply to that letter from the Intelligence Office at Cape Town, giving me a few explanations as to a few mistakes in the map, but I think the general opinion was that it was of some use.

837. Would that map, which you have referred to in the letter, be issued to the Commander of a Division or the Commander of any body of men without a warning that he could not strictly depend upon it? Putting it in another way, would such a map as you are referring to there be put into the hands of an officer commanding without giving him a warning that he must deal with it carefully and that it is not quite to be depended upon?—It is possible that it might get into the hands of an officer commanding a body of troops and without any notification of what reliance could be placed upon it. He would understand, I think, that it was the best map to be got, but then I think his advanced cavalry and his intelligence officers could very soon find out what it really was worth. I think the mere look of the map is enough, it is so badly finished, roads are left hanging and streams are left hanging, that I think anyone accustomed to map-reading could see at once, on looking at the sheets, that they were very rough.

838. And that would put the man on his guard?—I should think so; if they were an entirely finished work one might be apt to think they were complete, but there is so much left hanging there that anyone accustomed to read a map would at once be put on his guard that they might not be worth much. No doubt it wanted corrections, but at the time I thought the advanced cavalry, or the advanced troops, would be able to mark upon it any corrections that would affect the movements of the troops in rear, and would be able to send back that information.

839. Only one question more. Was it by directions which you received before you went out that you limited your survey to the district north of Ladysmith?—Yes, my instructions were to report, which includes reconnaissance sketches, on the lines of communication into the Orange Free State and Transvaal, on the country north of Ladysmith, and to survey Laing's Nek and Biggarsberg positions, but as regards

the Laing's Nek and Biggarsberg positions I was given a free hand to survey so much as I thought would cover the tactical position. That was put in; I was to limit it to what we called the area within the Biggarsberg position. I was told to include Ladysmith and the four passes just to the west of Ladysmith; in fact they were all the communications from the Orange Free State and Transvaal into Northern Natal, because there are no communications across the Drakensberg for some distance south of that.

840. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) At No. 2, page 11 of the Intelligence Division Memorandum (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 158), you will find: "1897. A reconnaissance of the roads and railways leading from Burgersdorp and Colesberg in Cape Colony to Bloemfontein, with military sketches of the country traversed." Are these military sketches now forthcoming or have they been distributed?—Those books were left by Colonel Altham yesterday.

841. You do not mean that book (*showing "Military Notes" to the Witness*)?—No, it is not on the "Military Notes," it is "The Lines of Advance through the Orange Free State, Part I.," and the sketches are undoubtedly bound up with the book.

842. If you look at the last lines of that clause you will see, "It also contained a memorandum on the Defence of Kimberley, Notes on the Country between Kroonstad and the Vaal, and six reconnaissances of important roads in the Free State." Do the six reconnaissances merely mean a Report on the roads, or do they mean a Report and a sketch of the roads?—I cannot say, because those were not drawn up in the Topographical Section, but the book itself will show at once.

843. What is the meaning of "reconnaissance" there? Does it mean simply report?—It might be both; it might mean a report without a sketch, or it might mean a report with a sketch. It says in the first part of that article, "With military sketches," so that I expect this at the end means six reconnaissances without sketches.

844. It is simply a report on the road?—I am not quite certain, but I think so.

845. I suppose these reports are to a certain extent common form; an officer is instructed to report on the water and the forage on the road. Will these reports disclose that?—Yes, if these reports are good reports they ought to give all the information required by an army on that road.

846. As to what might be expected to be found on the road?—Yes.

847. And you think that may be there?—Yes.

848. In your map of Northern Natal in 1896 you put in contours?—No, form lines; we will not call them contours, because 3,000 square miles was done by three officers in three months.

849. Are the form lines themselves from survey or from sketch?—Just from eye-sketching.

850. Looking at a mountain you sketched in the form of that mountain or the form of a line of hills?—Exactly.

851. You were not able to form the contour through the hills?—No, each spur was surveyed separately, and the lines were joined up in the best way we could. Perhaps the lines are joined up too well, but that was the fault of the draughtsmen in England.

852. Although they were the very best that could be done in the circumstances, seeing that merely form lines were put in, and the contours through the hills were not put in, do you think they were of sufficient military value to enable a Commander to determine where to attack or where to defend?—I think so; I think I put the heights in the chief hills, and if you watch those form lines I think you can form a very fair idea of the relative heights of the hills. I always endeavour to do that in the form lines; I was careful that a form line round a high hill should not be continued round a lower hill, but it was a question of military necessity. They are not so good as contours, but we were in a hurry, and contouring takes a long time. It may be that I speak from a knowledge of the ground, and I am not in a position to say what idea a man who did not know the ground might get from the map, but still I do not think an army going to a foreign country ought to complain if they get such a map as that—in fact it is a better map than our Army ever had before in such a war.

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853. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) What military operations in South Africa were you present at, speaking generally?—I was present in the north of Natal. I was up there before we were shut up in Ladysmith—I presume you do not want the particular actions—and after Natal was opened I went round with the Tenth Division with General Hunter to Kimberley. I was there only a few days, and then I went to Bloemfontein, and I went up with the general advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria.

854. Did you on any occasion hear from the Commanding Officers of Columns or otherwise that any serious inconvenience had arisen in the course of the operations from want of sufficient information in the shape of maps?—I do not know that we were really hampered at Ladysmith; it would have been very nice if we had had better maps at Ladysmith. We had a very bad map, and after we were shut up a couple of days I was wounded, practically in trying to make a map. But I do not know that it would have affected the results of the siege or the relief—I do not know about the relief, but the siege—if we had had any better map than we had. We were able to make a sketch, and by means of putting together the material I found in the town, and getting men who knew the country and the farms, I was able to compile a very fair local map. Then when I got to the other side I cannot say, because my position was such that I was not brought into contact with staff officers whose work would have necessitated the use of a map. I was merely a regimental officer, and we never used to trouble to look at the map in those days; we were too tired or something. We used to find out where we were to march that day, and we looked at the map for that only, and then never looked at it again. I do not speak for the officers who wanted the maps chiefly; but the regimental officers I do not think looked at the map very much.

855. As far as you know then, not much real inconvenience was experienced from the want of better maps during the operations of which you had cognizance?—I should not like to answer that question, because I am not in a position to say.

856. You did not hear, at all events?—I do not know whether an absolutely perfect map would have made any difference to the campaign from beginning to end; but I should not like to say, as I do not know.

857. (*Viscount Esher.*) I see on page 2 of this Statement of the Intelligence Division (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 154): "The condition of South Africa was a subject on which the Intelligence Division felt much anxiety even before the Jameson Raid, and from that time up to the outbreak of the War every exertion was made to obtain accurate information on the subject." Is there any correspondence, or are there any memoranda, to show that Sir John Ardagh laid before the Secretary of State or the Commander-in-Chief the desirability of having maps of South Africa during the period from 1896 to the outbreak of war?—I do not know; I believe you will have an opportunity of asking Sir John Ardagh himself that question. I did not join the Intelligence Division until after the Jameson Raid.

858. From the time you joined the Intelligence Branch did you yourself prepare any memoranda stating that you thought it desirable to have an accurate map of the north of Natal or of the frontier of the Orange Free State?—No, I did not, because in daily conversation with Sir John Ardagh we arranged this meeting with the Premier, and of course my opinion was well known by Sir John Ardagh at that time. I knew that Sir John Ardagh knew as well as I did all our difficulties as regards maps.

859. And you never saw any memoranda of his laying stress upon the importance of a survey of our Colonies in South Africa?—No, I cannot say.

860. Have you pressed at any time for a survey of any other portions of the Empire?—To get money, do you mean?

861. I suppose money is an essential condition?—It is. I cannot say. I can only say that when I went to the Intelligence Division there seemed to be a rooted idea

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that there was no use asking for money to survey our Colonies. The idea was that it was useless to ask for money for the survey of our self-governing Colonies, or even the Crown Colonies, and as far as I know it was really never put forward.

862. Are you concerned with obtaining maps of other portions of the world, apart from our own possessions?—As to every country that has a survey, we have copies of their maps that would enable us to print other copies if it came to tension; in fact, we have copies of all the published maps in the world.

863. And I suppose you have also some copies of unpublished maps?—We have anything that we can beg, borrow, or steal, but we have never bought any.

864. (*Chairman.*) Have you anything else you would like to say?—No.

865. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) I think there was difficulty in getting money, and also in getting officers qualified for the work?—To have done the survey even in five or ten years I dare say we should have had difficulty in getting at once the officers who could have started the work; but if we had got the money we could have done the survey all right; we could have trained the officers.

866. You have no staff of officers for the purpose?—No; the Topographical Division of the Intelligence Branch consists of two officers, two clerks, or a clerk and a half, because they are used for other purposes, and ten or twelve draughtsmen. Beyond that, we have no means of making a survey.

867. So that when the necessity occurs at any particular moment you have to look round to get officers, and you have a difficulty in procuring them?—You would have great difficulty in organising suddenly sufficient topographical assistance, even if you were allowed a free hand in choosing the officers you would like, which is very difficult; and if you were suddenly told to survey South Africa in ten years, you would have some difficulty in immediately putting your hand on the number of officers properly trained in topographical duties to do it. Your first year would be little more than one of training.

Major E. H. Hills, R.E.

Major E. H. Hills, R.E., called and examined.

868. (*Chairman.*) You have been in charge of the Mapping Section of the Intelligence Division since September, 1900?—Since 23rd September, 1899; I took it over from Major Grant when he went out to South Africa.

869. You have been good enough to hand me a memorandum on various points; would you wish to read that memorandum or to be examined upon it?—Perhaps it is rather long to read; it deals only with a portion of the work, and that is the question of Colonial Surveys.

870. I think it is a memorandum we should rather like the Commissioners to hear. You take them by divisions?—Yes; I could give an account of them.

871. The first point is the arrangements made by the different European Powers owning African territory for the survey of their possessions?—The powers we have to consider are France, Germany and Italy. The only other nations owning African territory are Spain, Portugal, and Turkey, whose circumstances are so different to those of Great Britain that for obvious reasons they afford no just grounds of comparison, while still less do the purely African States, Abyssinia, Morocco, and Liberia. Egypt and the Egyptian Soudan are somewhat peculiarly situated, and may be mentioned in due course. In France the survey and mapping of their African possessions is in the hands of the "Service Géographique de l'Armée," a powerful expert department which employs about 150 officers, and spends annually a sum of nearly £60,000. This Department does some of the work which in England is the province of the Ordnance Survey, *i.e.*, it produces the French equivalent to our one-inch map. The larger scale maps are produced locally in France. The "Service Géographique de l'Armée" has been engaged for some years in carrying out the survey of Algeria, a piece of work of the highest quality, which it may be presumed will eventually be extended over the whole French possessions in North Africa. It also produces an excellent general map of the whole of Africa on a scale of $\frac{1}{2000000}$ (32 miles to 1in.), in the construction of which it utilises the very complete series of sketch maps which the officers and local administrators in the various French Colonies are compelled to furnish of the country round their particular stations. Independent of the money spent on the Army Geographical Service, France spends a considerable amount on Colonial Surveys, the funds of which are provided in the Colonial budgets. Thus a good survey of Madagascar is in progress, on which about £7,000 a year is spent, and much larger sums upon the Eastern Colonies, Cochin China, etc. (in Cochin China alone France spends something like £30,000 a year on the Survey), while certain Colonial maps, as for instance that of the Congo, are produced by a geographer employed by the Colonial Office. In Germany the Colonial mapping is in the hands of an expert geographer to the Colonial Office, Baron von Danckelman, who collects all his material from the surveys carried out by German officers in the colonies, and incorporates them in maps which are produced by the firm of D. Reimer in Berlin, a firm well known as the publishers of all Kiepert's maps. A similar arrangement obtains in the case of the German Foreign Office, which also has a geographer, Herr E. Vohsen, who is again in close connection with the same firm of map publishers. We have no means of knowing the annual expenditure upon surveys or map making, but the resulting maps are of a high degree of excellence, well printed, and apparently of considerable accuracy. Not comparable perhaps to the maps based upon precise triangulation that exist for some French possessions, but, considering the short time that Germany has been interested in Africa, very creditable productions, and, as we shall shortly see, far superior to anything that exists for the British possessions. I have here a specimen of some French maps which perhaps might interest the Commission to see, as showing the sort of things that are produced; these are three sheets of a portion of Tunis, on different scales, one three miles to the inch, another 1½ mile to the inch, and the third a mile to the inch. (*Handing the same in.*) Both France and Germany, while differing in their methods, appear to have two important points in common; firstly, they insist upon the officers or officials employed in their colonies making sketch surveys of the neighbourhoods of their stations, or of routes they traverse, and secondly, they have an expert department, apparently amply supplied with funds which incorporates this material into finished maps of the highest quality. They differ in that from our practice, which is only to hope that officers will furnish sketch maps. In Italy, where the colonial interests are naturally much smaller, the mapping work is done by a department apparently somewhat similar to the French "Service Géographique," employing about 16 officers and spending about £20,000 per annum. Some maps of the Colony of Eritrea, of a high degree of excellence, have been produced. In connection with this point, perhaps, I might give a table out of another memorandum I wrote, more directly dealing with the Topographical Staff of the War Office, which gives the staff and the annual cost of the Topographical sections of the War Offices of different countries. In France the staff is composed of 149 officers and 83 subordinates, and spent £57,000 last year; in Italy the staff is 16 officers and 120 subordinates, and spends £20,000; in Russia the staff is 46 officers or officials (the "officials" in the Russian War Office are equivalent in rank to officers in ours) and 112 subordinates, and we have no means of knowing how much they spend; in England we have three officers and 25 subordinates, and we spend £6,500 a year.

872. (*Viscount Esher.*) That is for the Colonies?—That is the Topographical Section of the War Office.

873. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Has that anything to do with India?—No, nothing to do with India at all.

874 (*Chairman.*) Can you compare the duties of the Foreign War Offices in that department?—Yes, I can;

it is rather difficult to compare them very rigorously because in England there is some work done by the Ordnance Survey which abroad is done by the Topographical Department of the War Office, but we might add that in England the Ordnance Survey employs 22 officers. Of course, a large portion of the time of the Ordnance Survey is taken up with the production of large scale maps, 6in. and 25in. maps, which do not exist in France, and would in any case not be undertaken by the Army Topographical Service; but even if we take the whole 22 officers as employed on military mapping, we still have only 25 in England as against 150 in France. In Russia the work of the Ordnance Survey is done by a separate corps of Military Topographers, which employs 400 officers, who are independent of those given before as belonging to the Topographical Department of the War Office. In Austria the Ordnance Survey and military mapping are undertaken by a Department of the General Staff which is called the Military Geographical Institute, which employs 109 officers. It is a combination of our Ordnance Survey and our Military Topographical Department.

To resume the memorandum on the other question of Colonial Surveys, the British possessions in Africa fall under these heads:—Self-governing Colonies, Colonies administered by the Colonial Office, and Protectorates administered by the Foreign Office. In none of these are there any arrangements similar to those that exist in the case of the French and German possessions. There is no department in England charged with the superintendence of colonial surveys or the production of the resulting maps, and any question of the survey of any particular colony is treated as an independent one, having no relation to other colonies. The result of this is that when survey work has been done it has often been carried out upon ill-considered, unscientific methods, which, while giving results of only small value, has involved, in the aggregate, a very substantial waste of money. I might give some striking examples which have occurred of that in the Malay States, for instance, where there was a Survey Department which was conducted on crude methods, so that one man, when he was appointed Surveyor-General, rejected *en bloc* seven years' previous work, which was simply thrown away because it was done by ill-considered methods. Now, to take the case of the African colonies, Cape Colony may fairly be considered as an example of how a survey should not be carried out. The method adopted has been to accumulate a series of property or farm plans, executed by land surveyors of varying degrees of skill, and with no uniformity as to the representation of the topography. The attempt has then been made to combine the plans into a map, but as they are based upon no system of triangulation the errors of the individual plans, which in the aggregate are considerable, become cumulative, and the only way of making the plans fit together on the paper is by allowing gaps or overlaps at certain places in the map. Now, as an example of that, I have here a sheet of one of what they call the Divisional Maps of the Cape, which was produced only last year by an official called the Surveyor-General of the Cape. This has been made by pasting together inaccurate farm surveys, and the result is that at a certain place they do not fit, and a gap has to be left. Where it does not fit can be seen, because there happens to be a railway running across the map, and the two ends are in the air. (*Handing the map to the Chairman.*) Such a map is not only absolutely untrustworthy as regards the position of any given place, but has a far more serious defect from a military point of view, in that the topography of the country is not represented even in an approximately accurate manner. Thus one land surveyor may not think it worth while to show any rivers or hills on his plan, and another may show a mound 30 feet high by the same symbol as a third uses to represent a hill 2,000 feet high, while both may be equally careless as regards the exact situation of the feature. In fact, the only thing that the surveyor cares about laying down with any degree of precision is the boundary of the farm or estate, a feature necessary for land registry purposes but topographically unimportant. This method of procedure is not uncommon in new countries, but, unless adopted strictly as a temporary expedient, to be replaced at the first opportunity by a proper survey, inevitably ultimately results in a large waste of money. I am perhaps taking up too much of your time on this point, because it is only a repetition of what happened in England; in England the amount of money wasted by not starting the Ordnance Survey at an early enough date was very large. I have here a history of the Ordnance Survey by Captain Palmer, where he says, "In 1842, when the Tithe Commutation Act passed, a demand arose for a great number of plans on a large scale. That demand was supplied by plans got up in a hasty and impromptu manner, on different scales, on no uniform principles, and without reference to any general system of triangulation. Of 12,000 tithe plans thus prepared, and extending to three-fifths of the country, about one-sixth only are of a first-class description; many of the remainder are very imperfect and inaccurate, some of them, indeed, scarcely worthy of the name of plans, and useless for public purposes. Two millions of money, a sum which would have more than paid for a 25-inch national survey of England, were thus spent on plans which can never be juxtaposed so as to form a national *cadastre*, and which would not have been needed had a *cadastre* existed." Then he goes on to apply the same to railway surveys, and to point out what a large waste of money there was in England through the non-existence of a national survey at the time railways were started. The case of Cape Colony is the more remarkable in that there actually exists in the country the foundation for really accurate mapping in the shape of a triangulation of the highest degree of precision, executed by various competent surveyors, latterly under the skilful direction of His Majesty's Astronomer at the Cape, Sir David Gill. No attempt has ever been made to connect any of the points on the maps issued by the Cape Surveyor-General with the positions fixed by this triangulation, though to do so would not have involved any large amount of labour. In Natal no pretence has been made of producing any sort of map, and the Colonial Survey Department has confined itself entirely to land registry purposes. Of the Colonies administered by the Colonial Office the only ones in which any sort of survey is in progress are: The Gold Coast, where a survey of the area including the principal goldfields is now being made; Southern Nigeria, where a Royal Engineer officer and small staff are employed. The Department is on too small a scale to have yet produced much work. In the other colonies of this class, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Lagos and Northern Nigeria, no regular survey has been attempted. Of the Protectorates administered by the Foreign Office, the only one where survey is in progress is British Central Africa, where there is a civilian Surveyor-General with a small staff, and where a certain amount of work has been done, somewhat vitiated, however, by the unsound methods of survey that have been employed. Somaliland, British East Africa, and Uganda are unsurveyed. Then I go to the question of Egypt, which is not exactly an English colony, but where there is a well-organised survey department under the Minister of Public Works, which, though only recently established on a satisfactory basis, is likely to accomplish good work. In the Soudan, while no regular survey department exists, a substantial amount of good work has been done, principally due to the personal initiative of Colonel Talbot, R.E., who both works at the actual survey himself, and also undertakes the task of arranging and compiling all the route reports and sketches executed by the officers of the local administration in the course of their journeys in the country. Owing to the absence of an expert staff and the fact that not much money is available his progress is naturally slow. A considerable number of international boundaries in Africa have been delimited, and in so doing some incidental survey work has been accomplished. The amount of work thus done has depended upon the skill of the individual officer engaged on the delimitation and on the nature of the country, but a boundary demarcation would not generally result in the survey of a greater area of the country than is contained in a belt a few miles wide. To summarise the matter, we may fairly say that with one possible exception, *i.e.*, the gold-bearing area of the Gold Coast Colony, no attempt has yet been made to survey upon sound, well-considered methods any portion of any of the British possessions in Africa. This is doubtless partly due to the diversity in methods of government

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and control, and the want of any central regulating authority, which renders British Africa such a striking contrast to British India as regards this question of survey no less than on other points. Thus, while the Survey Department of India is justly considered a model of efficient organisation and technical skill, and the scientific mapping of the country is, therefore, in a high state of development, in the case of our African possessions we have to be content with the crudest maps, based upon all sorts of heterogeneous material, and useless for all purposes demanding any approximate degree of accuracy. The evils which result from this condition of affairs are numerous, and might be enlarged upon at considerable length. For my present purpose it will be sufficient to remark:—(1) That we have no maps of any of these countries in which the topography is sufficiently detailed to render them of appreciable value for conducting military operations; (2) we have no maps which would enable us to settle on the approximate alignment of a proposed railway, road, or even a telegraph line; (3) we are often in total ignorance of the geographical conditions which obtain in the neighbourhood of our own frontier lines, and we are thus unable to make a boundary treaty wherein the frontier is defined with such precision as to avoid the possibility of future misunderstandings. When we realise that we have at present in Africa about 5,000 miles of Anglo-French frontier, and about 3,700 miles of Anglo-German, the vital importance of this consideration becomes manifest. As we have already seen there was at the time of the late war no proper map of any portion of Cape Colony. The same was also true of Natal, with the exception that an officer sent out specially by the Intelligence Division in 1896 executed a reconnaissance survey of the country north of Ladysmith. The Dutch Republics had adopted very similar methods of mapping to those in vogue in Cape Colony, and though there existed both at Pretoria and Bloemfontien so-called Surveyors General, with magnificent offices, no sort of actual survey had been attempted, and the only general map of the country (Jeppe's) had been compiled by placing together the farm surveys. As this had been done with a considerable degree of skill and intelligence, a fair general map of the country was the result, topographical details being, however, very crudely represented. British Bechuanaland had been surveyed by the officers under Sir Charles Warren in 1884. Zululand and Basutoland were unsurveyed. In Rhodesia a survey department, paid for by Mr. Rhodes himself, existed, but it had been occupied with principal triangulation work under the tutelage of Sir David Gill, and no topographical survey had been embarked upon. There was thus in existence at the beginning of the War no proper survey of any part of the ground that ultimately became the field of operations, with the possible exception of Natal, north of Ladysmith, though even in this case the reconnaissance survey, while highly creditable to the officer who carried it out, was, owing to the necessarily hurried execution, hardly sufficiently detailed for military purposes. The existing state of affairs cannot be regarded as satisfactory, and it becomes a pressing question what steps shall be taken to remedy it. In discussing this it will naturally be convenient in the first instance to decide what we want; after this the methods of arriving at the required result and their cost can be entered into. In a civilised and settled country, where land values are high, commercial interests demand maps of the greatest attainable accuracy, and on such large scales that all details can be shown. The construction of such maps may be considered as being divided into three parts:—(1) The principal triangulation wherein the exact position of a limited number of points are determined with the greatest possible precision by the use of all refinements of observation and calculation known to modern science; (2) the secondary triangulation which determines the position of a much larger number of points, still with considerable accuracy, but without that extreme degree of minute precision that characterises the primary work; and (3) the detail survey wherein all the topographical and other features of the country are drawn in more or less completely, according to the scale of the ultimate map. In an efficient survey, both the principal and secondary triangulations are done with such a degree of accuracy that they are only liable to errors so small as to be impossible of detection on a printed map. When the detail of a country alters by new buildings, railways, etc., or when it is required to make more complete maps, say on larger scales, a revision or new survey of the detail only is required, the triangulation standing good for all time. This method of survey is, however, very expensive, and though its adoption ultimately saves money in that the fundamental work never requires repetition, it would hardly be possible to formulate a scheme whereby the whole of British Africa could be surveyed in this way, at a cost which would bring the execution of the project within the range of practical affairs. Nor, indeed, is such necessary. For British South Africa, where land is of considerable value, and where the principal triangulation is already far advanced, there is no doubt that an absolutely first-class survey is both desirable and attainable; but for vast areas of our African possessions, such as Uganda, British East Africa, Somaliland, and Nigeria, such will not be required within a long period of years. What is wanted in all cases is that we should be in possession of a good topographical map of the country, showing accurately all the geographical features, and on a scale large enough to render it of real value in the solution of those military and administrative problems which arise in an unsettled or partially civilised country. Such maps would be obtained by basing a topographical survey upon a rapid or secondary triangulation, or upon accurate traverses, according to the nature of the country, using the former in an open country, such as South Africa and the larger part of East Africa, and the latter in a close, forest-covered country, such as is found in West Africa. It must not be understood that in advocating a method of survey which falls short of ideal perfection any ultimate sacrifice of accuracy is contemplated. Such a topographical survey as is now proposed would, if executed on sound lines, be eventually readily adjustable to the positions given by a geodetic triangulation; and though the secondary triangulation on which it is based would not in general be susceptible to large errors, even if such did occur, they could rarely be of such magnitude as would necessitate the re-survey of the topography. No waste of money would, therefore, occur, and we should have the two chief desiderata of African or, indeed, of any mapping fulfilled, namely, that we should get good topographical maps at the earliest possible date, and, at the same time, lay a firm foundation for the ultimate precise survey of the Continent. To accomplish this end it is obvious that the present system of treating each Colony as a separate unit must cease, and we must organise a Department for African Mapping, somewhat on the lines of the Survey Department of India. To get some idea of the scale on which such a Department should be started we must first consider the area to be covered by its operations. The approximate areas of our principal African possessions are as follows:—

British South Africa (including Rhodesia) - - - -	1,200,000	square miles.
Soudan - - - -	950,000	"
Somaliland - - - -	68,000	"
British East Africa - -	280,000	"
Uganda - - - - -	140,000	"
Nigeria (including Lagos) -	360,000	"
Gold Coast - - - -	80,000	"
Sierra Leone - - -	30,000	"

(The area of British India is about 1,700,000 square miles.)

The amount of work turned out by a Survey party will vary within large limits, but, as an average, we may take the experience of the Indian survey as a guide. In India a topographical party, such as those who carried out the ¼-in. survey of Upper Burma, would consist of two officers, three or four white subordinates, eight plane tablers, one clerk, labourers, etc.; such a party would do an average of 12,000 to 15,000 square miles of survey per annum, and would cost about £5,000 a year. In Africa it would be rather more expensive and would, I reckon, cost £6,000 a year, and would turn out about 15,000 square miles of country per annum. For the triangulaion work you would have a trigonometrical party, consiting of two officers, two white subordinates, labourers, lamp-men, etc.; and I reckon that these trigonometrical parties would be re

quired in the proportion of one to every three topographical parties. The cost of either of these parties working in Africa would be about £6,000 per annum, so that a survey unit, consisting of one trigonometrical party, three topographical parties, and headquarter office, with reproducing establishment, would cost about £30,000 per annum, and would turn out, on an average, between 40,000 and 50,000 square miles of work each year. A comparison of these figures with those just given as the areas of the various colonies will indicate that a total strength of three such units would be a reasonable one at which to fix the size of the new department. There are, however, many strong arguments in favour of treating British South Africa as a separate country, and giving it a survey department independent of our other African possessions. The Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence has made representations to the Colonial Office, pointing out that the present time gives an unique opportunity for starting such a department upon comprehensive lines, and there now appears to be some chance that these may be acted upon. If this is done, we may strike British South Africa out of our list, and may, in that case, be content with two of the survey units mentioned above; we then, by excluding South Africa, arrive at a total cost of £60,000 per annum for the survey of our African colonies. It may be noted, in comparison, that the cost of the Indian survey is about £220,000 per annum, and that of the Ordnance Surveys of Great Britain and Ireland about the same. Should this new work be undertaken, there are naturally a number of problems that will arise, which cannot profitably be discussed at present; foremost among these would be the question as to whether the African Survey should be an off-shoot of the Ordnance Survey or of the Intelligence Division, or whether it should be an independent organisation. There will also at once arise the question as to the training and employment of natives as surveyors, as has been done with such success in India, and could, without doubt, be done in Africa. These, however, are details that may well be left for future settlement. For our present purpose the main facts of the case stand out clearly enough. Accurate maps are absolutely necessary for military and administrative purposes, and cannot be obtained without surveys. It is useless to expect the administration of various colonies to undertake such work for which a homogeneous, scientifically-directed, central organisation is essential. Such organisation must be in the nature of an Imperial survey department for Africa, and the whole, or at all events the main portion, of the cost must be met from Imperial funds. Compared with the enormous value of the work it would do, this department would not be unduly costly, and as, apart from the immediate material advantage gained, the proper survey of its own territory cannot be regarded as other than a duty of a civilised and civilising Power, it is to be sincerely hoped that this long-neglected work may be now at last taken in hand. The foregoing estimates deal with Africa only. But it should be clearly understood that the need for accurate maps of British possessions in other parts of the world is often just as great as in Africa. In the case of some colonies there does not, indeed, appear to be any prospect of military operations being undertaken, but in such matters it is dangerous to prophesy. Preparation should be made to meet any possible contingency, and, under any circumstances, maps are required for administrative purposes. The question, therefore, arises as to whether the new survey Department, should such be constituted, should not be one to deal with all British possessions abroad and not Africa only. It is not likely that we should, under any circumstances, undertake the survey of the large self-governing colonies such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; but there are large areas of British territory practically unmapped, such for instance as British Guiana, where it is hardly conceivable that the local revenues will admit of an efficient survey, and where the provision of accurate maps is now important, and may at any time become urgent. Even if the new Department were not formally charged with the duty of executing all such surveys the mere fact of the existence of a well-organised central office competent to give expert advice, and able on an emergency to send parties of thoroughly-trained topographers to any quarter of the globe, would be a national asset of the utmost value. The Ordnance Survey, which at present is the only body of which such a service could be asked, has been engaged so many years on the large scale surveys of a close country, that it has available practically no men competent to execute a topographical survey in a wild or tropical country, nor can such men be trained except by actual practical work. The Intelligence Division has lately asked for and been granted a small section comprising two Royal Engineer officers and four non-commissioned officers and men for the purpose of carrying out surveys of the ground in the immediate vicinity of British military stations abroad, and which is now doing a survey of the island of Mauritius. The work done by this section will be of great value for military purposes, but its annual output will, of course, be very small compared with the vast area of unsurveyed British territory.

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875. You said that there was this difference between the position of the establishments in foreign countries and in this country, that you had to add the Ordnance Survey to the War Office Establishment?—Yes, in some foreign countries the Ordnance Survey is part of the War Office, as it used to be in England up to 1872. The Ordnance Survey was part of the Intelligence Division of the War Office when the latter was started.

876. But I suppose the Establishments in France cover all the colonial work?—Not the colonial work that is paid for out of Colonial Budgets; they cover the work of the Northern Colonies of Africa, the French Soudan, Algeria, and Tunis, but not work like Madagascar or Cochin China, or New Caledonia, which are paid for by the Colonial Budgets.

876.* Are they separate Establishments?—Yes, entirely.

877. In addition to the 150 officers you have mentioned?—Yes, entirely independent of those.

878. But at any rate there are larger additions to be made in the case of this country in respect of the Colonies being more distinguished in the way of Establishment than they are in France?—Yes.

879. In drawing any comparison you have to bear that in mind also. With regard to the maps, as I understand it, you would not consider a map sufficient for military purposes unless it had at any rate secondary triangulation?—It is hardly a question of being sufficient for military purposes, but the attempt to make a topographical survey without a secondary triangulation always ends in waste of money. It is impossible, you may say, over a country of any area to make a topographical survey without basing it upon secondary triangulation.

880. If it is impossible to make the survey, I suppose it is impossible to bring out a map which would be sufficient for military purposes?—Yes, you cannot make the map; it is waste of money to make the attempt to make a topographical map without basing it upon secondary triangulation, anyhow. I do not say that geodetic triangulation is necessary in the first instance for a map.

881. You have given an estimate of what it would cost to do this for Africa, but you have added that there are other parts of the Empire where it is required too. Have you any idea what it would cost to do the work for the Empire in a way which you would consider sufficient?—I think that with about £150,000 a year you could place on a sound basis a Department which would make a topographical survey of the Empire.

See Q. 5019.

882. For how many years?—It would be for ever, I expect. It is difficult to say what we want; the Soudan, for example, is 950,000 square miles, but there is a large portion of that which we are not able to say will ever be of any value to us or at all worth even a topographical survey. It is so difficult to say where to stop. British South Africa again is 1,200,000 square miles. Roughly speaking the actual area of British Africa is about three million square miles.

883. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Including Egypt?—Including the Soudan.

884. Not Egypt?—No.

885. (*Chairman.*) But you do not regard the whole of that as a possible theatre of war?—No, I was rather looking at the matter from a larger point of view than the military one only, because of course the military one is only one particular point in which the survey would be

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valuable. Such a survey would be immensely valuable for ordinary administrative purposes as well.

886. No doubt, but looking at it as we are bound to do from the military side there would be a restriction upon that amount you have given us?—It is very difficult to say, though, that any portion of that is not a possible theatre of war.

See Q. 135 and 144.

887. We had an answer from Sir William Nicholson that "for possible theatres of war in various parts of the Empire it is an exceedingly desirable thing to do; and if the Treasury would be prepared to let us have, say £80,000 a year to do it, I should be most glad to undertake it"?—Certainly; I should perhaps explain that mine is only an estimate for the survey of British Colonies. Our preparation for war includes also maps and reconnaissances of foreign countries. That is a different question. As to that I have also made an estimate of what would be a reasonable staff and establishment, if the Commission would like to have it.

888. Yes?—That would be the function of the Topographical Section of the War Office, whose duties are to prepare all maps required for military purposes, and the collection and utilisation of all topographical and geographical information relating to any countries which are, or may become, important from a military point of view. Practically this means the whole habitable portion of the world. As regards the duty of the Topographical Department of the War Office, its primary function is the provision of military maps, and the section cannot be considered as being in a state of efficiency unless it is always in a position to produce, at very short notice, a map of any portion of the globe, embodying all the latest information, and printed in a clear legible style. This cannot be done unless maps of all countries that are likely to become the scene of military operations are held ready, at all events in manuscript, with all new information added to them as received, and thus kept continuously up to date. The compilation, or the putting together of a map from different sources of information, is necessarily a slow process and cannot, with due regard for safety, be left for hurried execution on an emergency. For use on military operations, the maps provided must not only be good ones, but must be the very best that can be constructed, no delays in issue, no omissions, no failures to utilize any available sources of information can be tolerated, nor can such maps be allowed to fall short in any way of the highest possible technical excellence. Unless the Topographical Section can supply such it must be judged inadequate for its functions. The Topographical Department of the War Office at the present moment is, as I have already stated, three officers and 25 subordinates. It is quite obvious that such a staff is very inadequate. I have already given the comparisons with different War Offices, and I think a reasonable staff for a Department of this character would be about 13 officers and 53 subordinates, costing about £17,000 per annum. Then the point arises at once as to what is the division of responsibility between such a Department as this and the corresponding Department in India. If the Indian Intelligence Division (the Quartermaster-General of the Indian Army) would undertake the military mapping of the whole of Asia, a contingency which does not appear probable, the staff of the section could be reduced by about three officers and the cost by about £3,400, but otherwise I do not see how any appreciable reduction could be made. I am inclined to regard the above as the minimum upon which efficiency could be absolutely guaranteed.

See Q. 5018.

889. Does that include the self-governing Colonies?—That does not include any survey at all, that is a section which is to make use of the best available material and is always to be in a position to produce a map not based upon a survey, but which is guaranteed to be the best map that can be produced from existing material. That does not include any surveys either of colonies, military stations, or anything else.

890. But it may include maps?—It would include production of the maps of Colonies.

891. (*Viscount Esher.*) I just want to understand this: if a survey such as you have been suggesting were to be produced, would it be undertaken under the supervision of the Topographical Section of the War Office, or would it be independent? What is your idea as to which would be desirable?—My idea personally is that it should be independent, because I do not see how you are to carry out a large business like that otherwise. The chief of it must be a person of considerable position, an analogous position to the Director-General of the Ordnance Survey or the Surveyor-General of India, and I do not see how you could place him in the position of a staff officer. At present the officers of the Intelligence Division only hold their appointments for three years; a Survey Department could not be conducted on those lines.

892. You see you have instituted a comparison between the Topographical Sections of other War Offices and our own?—Yes.

893. If you take France they have got 149 officers, you say, and 83 subordinates and they spend £57,000 a year?—Yes.

894. They do prepare maps?—Yes, they do certainly.

895. Maps of this character?—Of the highest character, but I do not think they change their staff.

896. That is another question and quite a different question. It is the Topographical Section of the French War Office that is responsible for these maps?—Oh, yes, and it certainly might be with us, the Topographical Section of the War Office. I did not quite catch your question; you said, could it be part of the Military Intelligence?

897. I did not ask you that. Your view then is that the Topographical Section of the War Office should not be subordinate to the Director-General of Intelligence?—Not if it is going to extend into a Colonial Survey Department; that is my own personal view, but at the same time I know that my immediate chiefs think otherwise.

898. You see you would have to add considerably to the staff you suggest; what you call a reasonable staff for a Topographical Section of the War Office would have to be very much added to if the survey work were thrown upon that section?—That I have allowed for in giving an estimate of the cost of the survey; that allows for all the extra staff that would be thrown on the Topographical Section of the War Office.

899. Suppose your Topographical Section undertook the production of maps not based on a survey, which you say is one essential thing, and also maps of the highest possible character, supposing they did the two things, could you form any estimate then of the cost of such a section?—I must simply add them together then.

900. You cannot do that straight away and give me the number of officers and the number of subordinates and the total cost?—I could give it to you if you would take it only as an approximation. On what supposition? On the supposition that the new Department takes all British possessions abroad except India, Canada, Australia and New Zealand?

901. That is it?—And includes the Topographical Department of the War Office also. The annual cost would be about £170,000, and it would employ about 70 officers and altogether about 340 subordinates, roughly.

902. That is proceeding on a very much larger scale than France?—Yes, because the Topographical Department of the French War Office does not undertake the survey of all the French Colonies.

903. That is done independently?—That is done independently; it only undertakes the survey of the French Possessions in Africa, as I understand, Algeria, Tunis, and eventually of the African Possessions, but not of the Colonies such as French China or Madagascar.

904. In estimating the amount which you say the survey would cost, over how many years do you spread that?—I do not spread that over any number of years; I take it at so much a year.

905. For how long would that continue?—It all depends if you want to extend your survey over the whole country. As I say, British Africa is something very roughly about 3,000,000 square miles, but there are large areas of that where, as far as we can see at present, even a topographical survey will never be required, so that it is difficult to say. If you are to survey the whole, the Department that I foreshadowed for Africa only at a cost of £90,000 per annum would produce

150,000 square miles of survey each year. Therefore it would survey the whole of British Africa in about 20 years. There is a large part of the country that we cannot now get to.

906. I suppose Sir William Nicholson is aware of that Memorandum of yours ?—Oh, yes, he is.

907. Have you furnished a similar Memorandum to him at some previous record ?—On the question of the survey of the Colonies ? No, I have not ; I furnished this to him the other day, but I have always been brought up to the idea that it is useless to talk of instituting an Imperial Survey.

908. You have now, however, laid that proposition before him ?—Yes, but he has not considered it yet.

909. With regard to the other point, is he aware of that ?—Yes.

910. Your conception of a topographical section of the War Office ?—Yes.

911. Has that been before him for some time ?—Yes, it has been before him since some time in June.

912. Did you serve under Sir John Ardagh ?—Yes.

913. Was he also aware of your views ?—He did not see my final views, but he is quite aware of my general views.

914. But you never placed before him your views in a specific form ?—Not until the War was over ; at the time of War it was our business to make the best of existing things.

915. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) In order to make an accurate scientific survey of a country, you must have a base line, must you not ?—Yes.

916. That is the first thing to be fixed upon ?—Yes, but you can measure them very rapidly now-a-days.

917. That is done by astronomical work, is it not ?—No, it is measured by wire ; the best way of measuring a base line is by what is called the Jäderin wire, and we are enabled to measure base lines very rapidly. The old method of reading the ends of bars by microscopes and that kind of thing would not be attempted now.

918. Is there a good base line in South Africa ?—Oh, yes.

919. In Cape Colony or Natal ?—I do not know where the primary base was measured, but there is a triangulation all over Cape Colony and Natal, a geodetic triangulation.

920. Are they taken from the same base line ?—They are checked together ; you measure several bases, and the whole thing is computed and checked. Any point on that triangulation is known within a few inches—its position on the surface of the globe.

921. But without a properly fixed base line you cannot have an accurate scientific survey ?—The first thing in a triangulation is to measure the base, but it is not at all a formidable operation measuring a base now-a-days ; it is no longer like what it was when the principal triangulation of England was done.

922. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) As you entered the Intelligence Branch in 1899, you can probably furnish some information that Colonel Grant could not give to us ; to what extent were Russell's maps issued to the troops in Natal ? Did you issue them ?—Yes, a certain number were sent out, but I could not tell you off-hand.

923. Would every Field Officer have them ?—No, only Staff Officers.

924. Regimental Officers would not have them ?—No, I should think, speaking without the book, Staff and Commanding Officers only.

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925. And the same would apply, of course to Colonel Grant's own sketches of Northern Natal ?—The one inch to the mile sketch of Northern Natal was issued sparingly, because it was a bulky and expensive map, but I had a photographic reduction of that made of four miles to the inch which was issued in very large numbers. I have some more notes about the history of the mapping during the War time, after the troops went out. I should rather like to bring out one fact ; after the War was started it seemed obvious that the duty of issuing maps passed from the Intelligence Branch of the War Office to the Field Intelligence, and the question was once raised by me as to whether survey sections should not be sent out, who would be charged with the duty of revising these maps, which were known to be very rough. I raised the question of sending Survey Sections out on October 12th, 1899, and I wrote a Report to Sir John Ardagh, pointing out that that was necessary. Sir John Ardagh was very anxious that this should be done, and fully concurred that it was highly desirable, and he took the matter before the Army Board on October 14th, 1899 ; they refused sanction for any further Survey Sections to be sent out. The question was taken up by him again, I do not know if more than once, but I fancy he brought it up again whenever he thought there would be a favourable opportunity, and it was eventually approved by the Army Board on December 20th, 1899. Survey Section No. 1 left England early in January, and a second Section was immediately prepared, and that left in February. At the same time, as the first Section went out, the General Officer Commanding the Cape was asked by wire on January 4th whether any more men were wanted for survey work, and he did not answer at all.

926. Have they been at work ever since ?—They were at work until the end of the War, when the whole stock of the maps and stones that they had was sold by Lord Kitchener to the Civil Government, and they are broken up now. They produced all the maps which were used actually.

927. (*Chairman.*) You mean the Survey was broken up—not the stones ?—I mean the organisation was broken up ; the stones were sold to the Civil Government.

928 (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Had Colonel Henderson anything to do with it ?—He was Director of Military Intelligence, but he did not actually have very much to do with the mapping ; the mapping was under Major Jackson, R.E., who was sent out with one of the early sections, and he is the senior who has been in charge of the mapping out there in the Field Intelligence Department the whole time.

929. (*Chairman.*) Is there any other point you would wish to mention ?—No. I do not know whether it would interest the Commission, but I have brought one or two maps of India to illustrate the sort of things that they produce in India where they have a well-organised Survey Department. These (*handing two maps to the Chairman*) are specimens of the one-inch sheets and of the quarter-inch sheets. The quarter-inch extends over the whole of India, but the one-inch survey is not yet completed for the whole of the country.

930. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) If an officer goes into the Survey in India he remains there ?—Yes.

(*After a short Adjournment*)

Brigadier-General the Honourable Sir FREDERICK W. STOPFORD, K.C.M.G., C.B., Chief Staff Officer, First Army Corps, called and examined.

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931. You were Assistant Adjutant-General for Mobilisation from October, 1897, to October, 1899 ?—Yes.

932. And then you were Military Secretary to Sir Redvers Buller from October, 1899, to January, 1901 ?—Yes.

933. You have been good enough to send in a *précis* of the evidence that you are prepared to give in regard to mobilisation, and generally ?—Yes.

934. I think it would be convenient if we took that first ; it deals with the scheme for mobilisation which existed at the time of the outbreak of the War ?—Yes.

935. Will you describe what that was based upon ?—The scheme of mobilisation was based upon the placing on a war footing in every particular (men, horses, and material) of three Army Corps and four Cavalry Brigades for Home Defence, out of which two Army Corps and

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two Cavalry Brigades were regarded as available for service abroad on an emergency arising. Owing to the peculiar conditions of our Empire and the fact that units are constantly proceeding abroad to India and the Colonies, our scheme for mobilisation is much more complex than the mobilisation schemes of other European nations. It is necessary to base our scheme for the organisation of the Field Army on stations, not on units; that is to say, a given formation such as a Division or a Brigade, is made up not of definite units but of units which, on mobilisation being ordered, are quartered at definite stations; and units, on changing stations in peace, pass from one formation to another. The three Army Corps and four Cavalry Brigades, of which the Field Army at home was composed, were, therefore, made up of units quartered at certain fixed stations; for instance, the First Army Corps for Home Defence was composed of units quartered at Aldershot and its vicinity, and the Second Army Corps, of units quartered in Ireland, and so on. As, owing to the exigencies of service abroad, all the barracks at home are not always occupied by Regular troops, whose places are filled temporarily in the Home Defence Scheme by Militia Battalions, and as some of the most efficient units for service abroad may be quartered in the Third Army Corps Rayon, it does not follow that if two Army Corps were sent abroad they would be composed of the same troops as form at the moment the First and Second Army Corps for Home Defence. It may also happen, as was the case in the South African War, that some of the units composing the Field Force come from stations abroad; for example, Guards Battalions went out straight from Gibraltar; but the selection of units to form a Field Force causes no dislocation of the mobilisation arrangements, as a scheme drawn up for the mobilisation of the whole Field Army naturally admits of the mobilisation of a portion of it.

936. I do not quite follow what happens. The units, as I understand it, for the First Army Corps ought to be all quartered at Aldershot?—Not entirely; at Aldershot and its vicinity.

937. But in the neighbourhood of Aldershot?—Yes, but in our scheme for mobilisation it did not in those days follow that the troops to compose the two Army Corps for service abroad were identical with those forming the first and second Army Corps for service at home, as the latter were composed of the troops which at the moment were quartered at Aldershot and its vicinity, and in Ireland. We, therefore, selected the two Army Corps out of the three Army Corps at home; but naturally we did take the troops at Aldershot as being those who had then the best opportunity of training for field service.

938. But you say in the fourth head here that the First Army Corps for Home Defence was composed of units quartered at Aldershot and its vicinity, and the Second Army Corps of units quartered in Ireland?—Yes.

939. Yet, as I understand, the Guards Battalions which were in the First Army Corps were quartered at Gibraltar?—Yes, they were selected for the first Army Corps for service abroad. The First Army Corps for Home Defence, quite irrespective of the First Army Corps for service abroad, was quartered at Aldershot. In making up the Army Corps for service abroad we took, as a matter of fact, the troops quartered at Aldershot. It did not follow that because they were at Aldershot they necessarily formed the First Army Corps for service abroad.

940. Then what you say here refers to the scheme for Home Defence?—The scheme for Service Abroad was not identical with the scheme for Home Defence. It might happen that some battalion that was in the Rayon of the First Army Corps for Home Defence had just come home, and was not therefore in such a fit condition to go abroad as a battalion quartered in some part of England not in the first Army Corps Rayon.

941. That was the rule in 1899?—Yes.

942. Is that the rule still?—I cannot quite say what the rule is. You will get that from Colonel Lake. I would sooner you asked him as to that. There is, however, one cause which introduces difficulties in the mobilisation of a Force for service abroad which is not met with in a mobilisation for Home Defence; that is to say that no unit is truly mobilised until it is complete in every particular with animals, vehicles, etc., and the conditions of service in our campaigns abroad are so diverse that the provision of the transport cannot be made long beforehand. For instance, boats are required for a Nile campaign, camels for a Soudan campaign, men for a West African campaign, and special wagons, etc., for oxen and mules for a South African campaign. In the same way clothing suitable for service at home is not suitable for service in a tropical country or in a cold country such as Canada. The provision of the necessary animals, vehicles, etc., is therefore dependent on the willingness of the authorities at the moment to provide the money necessary for the purpose. This is a very serious factor in a mobilisation for service abroad, which does not exist in a scheme for mobilisation for Home Defence. In the case of the South African War the sanction of the Secretary of State was given on the 22nd of September for the expenditure of about £600,000 to meet immediate requirements, and it was not until the 30th September that sanction was given to proceed with all preparation necessary for the equipment and mobilisation of the force for South Africa, although the Mobilisation Branch received instructions from the Commander-in-Chief in June, 1899, to work out in detail the organisation of the Field Force consisting of one Army Corps, one Cavalry Division, and Line of Communication troops. The units composing the Field Force for South Africa were not fully mobilised until they had received in South Africa their vehicles and animals; whereas in the scheme of mobilisation for Home Defence no unit leaves its place of mobilisation until it is complete in every particular; it then proceeds to its place of concentration ready to take the field. This is an important point which is not generally understood.

943. What were the actual steps that were taken to carry into effect the scheme of mobilisation?—The steps may be divided into two categories: (*a*) Those required to place on a war footing as far as was possible at home the Field Force selected for South Africa; (*b*) the completion of the mobilisation in South Africa of the Field Force by the provision of vehicles and animals in that country. As regards (*a*), the Mobilisation Regulations for the Field Army which had been revised in 1898, and which gave detailed instructions to all concerned, were carried out in their entirety as far as they applied; but to avoid any misunderstanding, special regulations for the Mobilisation of a Field Force for service in South Africa were prepared and issued on the 8th September, 1899, not with a view to supersede the Mobilisation Regulations of 1898, but in order to bring together in a convenient form the modifications rendered necessary to meet the case of a Field Force operating in South Africa. I can give the Commission any details they require respecting both these regulations. Very shortly the scheme is as follows: "War Establishments," giving in detail the war strength in men, vehicles, and horses of every unit, with summaries of ammunition and rations, forage, and tools to be carried, were revised in 1898 and published to the Army. The Reservists necessary to complete the establishments rejoin at their depôts (there are certain exceptions, but this is the general rule), where they are clothed, armed and equipped before joining their units. The equipment to complete units for war is stored in charge of units at their peace station—this equipment did not include special clothing for South Africa, which had to be specially issued—and for a mobilisation for home defence units have also in their charge the transport vehicles necessary for their equipment, food, forage, etc., and they also are completed there with the horses they require. Thus each unit of the Field Army is brought from a peace to a war footing at its place of mobilisation. In fact, with the exception of the Reservists, who receive their arms, clothing, and necessaries at their depôt, the entire war outfit of a unit is either in its possession in peace time, or is drawn by it, or is delivered to it, at its place of mobilisation. Posters calling out Reservists are prepared and decentralised in peace time, and notices for the Reservists to rejoin are also made out and kept ready for issue; they include a travelling warrant, on presentation of which the railway authorities furnish each Reservist with a ticket for his journey by the quickest route to the place at which

he is ordered to rejoin. The notice to join includes a postal order for 3s., on presentation of which the postal authorities furnish him with an advance of pay of 3s. General officers commanding districts draw up local mobilisation orders based on the Mobilisation Regulations, so that when the order to mobilise is given, the Army Headquarters give no further instructions, but merely receive a daily telegraphic report from general officers during the period of mobilisation reporting progress, and a notification by telegram reporting when the mobilisation of each unit is complete. As regards the mobilisation for the Field Force for South Africa in 1899, the Mobilisation Branch, acting under the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, drew up tables showing the detailed composition of the Field Force, including vehicles and animals. These tables were circulated confidentially to all general officers at home on the 18th August, 1899, in order that preliminary arrangements might be made and the necessary action decided upon if it should become necessary to mobilise the force. The Regulations for the Mobilisation of a Field Force for service in South Africa, referred to above, were issued confidentially to all concerned on the 8th September, 1899, and instructions regarding the special scales of clothing and equipment were issued at the same time by the Director-General of Ordnance. On the 4th October tables showing the complete detail of the troops to compose the Field Force, the Special Army Order calling out the Reserves, retaining men in Army service and ordering the mobilisation of the Field Force, and schedules necessary to complete the placards (already in their possession) calling out the necessary portion of the Army Reserves were sent to all general officers commanding districts at home for their information, but not to be acted upon until the receipt of telegraphic instructions ordering the mobilisation. The Royal Proclamations were signed at Balmoral on the 7th October, and the same day a telegram was sent to general officers to mobilise. October the 9th was named in the Special Army Order as the first day of mobilisation, and October the 17th as the last day for Reservists to rejoin. As regards (*b*), the completion of the mobilisation of units in South Africa in vehicles and animals, I cannot speak from personal knowledge as to when these requirements were completed, as the provision of them did not rest with the mobilisation branch, but with the Quartermaster-General and Director-General of Ordnance; but I wrote a memorandum on the 5th August pointing out that unless preparations were made beforehand for the provision of animals and equipment the completion of the mobilisation of the Field Force could not be completed in South Africa under about four months, and though I had nothing then—*i.e.*, in South Africa—to do with mobilisation, I know from personal observation that the troops on arrival in South Africa were not completed with transport for about that time, as pending the financial approval of the Secretary of State, the officers concerned with the provision of the transport could not procure in advance the necessary vehicles, harness, and animals. As stated above, the approval of the Secretary of State for all the necessary expenditure was not given until the 30th September, 1899.

944. Then that delay in the approval of the Secretary of State delayed the preparations?—It delayed the preparations because the officers in charge of the branches concerned had not the power to get the necessary articles until they received financial sanction to do so.

945. (*Sir John Edge.*) What was the period of delay, I have not quite caught that?—The Mobilisation branch was ordered to make a scheme for the organisation of the Army Corps in June. I may say that the actual work connected with the provision of the equipment, horses, and vehicles does not rest with the Mobilisation Branch. The orders for *personnel* rest with the Adjutant-General, for Transport with the Quartermaster-General, and for equipment with the Director-General of Ordnance. But the orders to provide the equipment that was necessary to completely mobilise the Army Corps were not given in their entirety till the 30th of September, so that until that date these officers, I understand, were not in a position to provide in its entirety all the equipment that was necessary; but no doubt they could tell you from personal knowledge exactly the state of the case.

946. (*Chairman.*) Then that necessary expenditure which you speak of as being delayed to the 30th September was expenditure which affected the other Departments more than the Department of Mobilisation?—The Mobilisation Department deals with the organisation, making up the scheme; but it does not deal with the executive work of the provision of vehicles, transport, or equipment; so that I cannot speak from personal knowledge as to the actual dates at which the officers in charge of the branches concerned were able to proceed.

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947. You have nothing to do with the actual expenditure?—No.

948. But your point is that you gave warning, at any rate on 5th August, that unless the expenditure was sanctioned there would be delay?—Yes, and my point, as I put it later on, is that this is inherent to mobilisation for service abroad, when special equipment has to be provided. I think the essence of mobilisation is to have in peace time everything arranged and prepared absolutely in detail, so that everybody can know exactly how to act, and also that the equipment, etcetera, should be forthcoming when it is wanted. As I have pointed out, owing to our Service in different parts of the world, one cannot keep in store boats, camels, and so on, but I think that as soon as ever an order is given to prepare for mobilisation, financial sanction should be given at once to make ready every particular for whatever force is decided upon to be mobilised, so that there may be no delay when the force is called upon to act.

See Q. 21842.

949. What is the date that you name as the date on which the order for mobilisation was given?—The actual order for mobilisation was the 7th of October, but the Mobilisation Branch was given instructions to prepare a scheme of mobilisation in June for the force selected, consisting of one Army Corps, one Cavalry Division, and Line of Communication troops.

950. You think that at that date, corresponding to June in this particular case, there ought to be a sufficient financial sanction to carry out the necessary preparations?—I do, most distinctly.

951. The next point is how far the effects of the mobilisation answered to anticipations?—I cannot speak personally as to this, as I left England for South Africa before the mobilisation was complete, but from telegrams I received from the Secretary of State for War and from the Commander-in-Chief, I understood that everything had worked smoothly and that the mobilisation at home was successful. Over 98 per cent. of the Reservists rejoined the colours, the units were completed to war establishment without difficulty except as regards the vehicles, harness, and animals provided in South Africa, and the embarkation began on the 20th October—three days after the last day named for the Reservists to rejoin; in fact, I think, so far as regards the mobilisation of the force at home, the arrangements worked quite as well as we expected. It was not possible to carry out in its entirety the mobilisation scheme as laid down in the Regulations as all the mobilisation buildings and clothing stores were not completed at the time mobilisation was ordered. Mobilisation is a comparatively new organisation in our Army, and all the arrangements connected with it were not complete in 1899, but they were sufficiently in progress to admit of the mobilisation being carried out successfully. When the arrangements are complete a mobilisation for Home Defence can, I think, be carried out as rapidly and as smoothly in this country as in any nation in Europe, but, as stated above, as regards mobilisation for service abroad, the same difficulties as were experienced in 1899 will arise as long as the preparations for it are dependent in any degree on money being forthcoming at the last moment. The essence of a successful mobilisation is the preparation for it in every particular in peace time, so that when the order to mobilise is given everyone is in a position to act on a previously-prepared plan without a moment's delay, and when the mobilisation of a Field Force is in contemplation provision should be made in sufficient time for every article of equipment and every animal to be forthcoming, so that the Field Force, properly organised, may take the initiative the moment it lands at the scene of operations.

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952. You held your post in the Mobilisation Subdivision on a somewhat different footing from what it is now ?—Yes. The officer in charge of the Mobilisation Branch then, worked directly under the Commander-in-Chief. Mobilisation as such, was practically started (I cannot give the exact date, but I could find it out for you) about 1885 or 1886, when Sir Henry Brackenbury was the head of the Intelligence Branch, and a Committee was formed, on the representation of Lord Wolseley, who was the Adjutant-General, consisting of Sir Henry Brackenbury and Sir Ralph Thomson, when Mr. Smith was Secretary of State for War, which was the beginning of the Mobilisation Branch as such. Although there had been a talk of it before, there was no absolutely organised mobilisation until about that time; it was for a certain time under the Director of Military Intelligence. It was subsequently placed under the Adjutant-General, and later, when I was in charge of it, it was directly under the Commander-in-Chief.

953. It had been separated again from the Adjutant-General ?—Yes. It became a Central Branch under the Commander-in-Chief, and when I took it over it was in that condition.

954. At that time it was directly under the Commander-in-Chief, and he was personally concerned in the arrangements made ?—Yes, I received all my instructions direct from him.

955. We have had a Statement submitted by the Mobilisation Division, which deals with the question of preparation for the War in South Africa. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 17.) I suppose in regard to all that part of it which goes up to the time that you went to South Africa you are the person responsible ?—Yes, as far as the Mobilisation Branch is concerned. This Statement, I wish to say, is new to me; I have not seen it until quite lately. I did not draw it up.

956. But the Statement shows that there were a good many steps taken to improve the position of affairs in South Africa ?—Yes, there were.

957. There was a Memorandum written, I suppose, by yourself, in June, 1899, on the subject ?—Yes. The provision of transport to the troops in South Africa did not come directly under the Mobilisation Branch. The mobilisation of the troops in South Africa really rested with the General Officer Commanding there, as far as lay in his power. The Mobilisation Branch made out the details of the mobilisation scheme for troops at home, such as provision of Reservists, etc.; but until war broke out, the troops in South Africa did not receive any Reservists, in fact they were on a peace footing, except that provision was made for giving them a certain proportion of transport, and the authorities at home, as you notice in this paper, gradually increased the force from about six and a half battalions to what it was at the time when the expedition started. I personally had nothing to do with the details of the transport given in this Paper; but I drew up a Memorandum showing what had been done. The Quartermaster-General, I think, could give you information as regards the transport provided.

958. Had you nothing to do with the contracts ?—Nothing at all; it was all done entirely by the General Officer commanding in South Africa working in correspondence with the Quartermaster-General at home.

959. There is a letter mentioned on page 4 of the Statement (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 17) that was sent to the General Officer Commanding in South Africa in December, 1898. Did that go from your Department ?—It went from the Intelligence Department. A secret letter showing the strategical situation in South Africa was drawn up, I think, by the Intelligence Department and sent out by the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. I remember seeing the letter; and in addition to that there was the confidential letter mentioned on page 4, in which the General Officer Commanding was directed to consider the mobilisation arrangements required to enable him to carry out the dispositions referred to in the secret letter. He was given a free hand, not to adhere rigidly, if I remember rightly, to the scales of equipment laid down at home, but to make such additions or alterations as might be necessary and suitable to his command.

960. That went from your Branch ?—So far as I remember the letter went from my Branch; anyhow I remember seeing it.

961. And it states the reserve of ammunition which was then in existence. Was that under your Department ?—No, that was under the Director-General of Ordnance. I may mention that when the reply to our confidential letter referred to before was received from the General Officer Commanding in South Africa the Mobilisation Branch was instructed by the Commander-in-Chief to consider it with a view to modifying our scales of equipment for South Africa so as to bring them in touch with the scales recommended by the General Officer Commanding in that country; and this was done.

962. The following paragraphs in this Statement refer to the steps taken in regard to mobilisation, which I suppose you have already alluded to in the evidence which you have given ?—Yes, I can give the Commission any further details they require as regards our system of mobilisation—as full details as they think necessary. I have the "Mobilisation Regulations" here. The main work of the Branch has been to organise a workable scheme of mobilisation and then to work out in very great detail all the requirements necessary to bring the Army from a peace to a war footing, so that every unit may know absolutely in every particular exactly what it is required to have and to do on Mobilisation. This, of course, requires very careful and detailed work in the Branch.

963. And you maintain that that has been done ?—Yes, that has been done.

964. Completely ?—Yes; we have prepared a book called "War Establishments," supplemented by Field Service Manuals for all branches of the Service, showing every detail, every man required, every vehicle, every horse, etc. Take, for instance, an Infantry battalion. These books show what is carried in every wagon and cart, and exactly what kits are carried by officers, and by the men, etc.; so that when the mobilisation comes everybody is fully informed. Then the General Officers Commanding Districts at home make up their own mobilisation regulations for their commands based on our regulations, and we do not interfere with them any more. And it worked extremely well. As I have already said, we had not quite completed all our preparations; all the storehouses were not built for the decentralisation of the clothing, which is a very important point. Our Reservists go now to their Depôts, and every man has his own little cupboard where he has his kit ready for him to put on. That was not quite complete, but it was sufficiently far advanced to admit of its going without a hitch.

965. You maintain that the experience of this particular Mobilisation establishes that your arrangements were well completed ?—I think so. You can never try a Mobilisation scheme, unfortunately, in its entirety in peace time, because to do so means calling up all the Reservists, who would be taken away from their employment; and it means taking up registered horses, which can only be done in case of emergency. But Colonel Lake has gone into that more fully than I have since the War, and I think you will find that, although there were certain blots in the scheme, they were small ones and quite capable of being remedied, and possibly are remedied by now. But the scheme as a working scheme proved successful, I think. The number of Reservists that came up were more than we expected. Practically everybody came up.

966. Is there anything else that you would like to draw attention to in this statement ?—The Commission may like to know that though, in order to make it quite clear that there should be no hitch about the mobilisation, the Mobilisation Branch drew up special regulations for the campaign in South Africa based on our larger Regulations, it did not alter the latter, but only made such modifications in them as were necessary to meet the special requirements. For instance, we call up every man capable of bearing arms and who has been through a recruits course of musketry in the Regulations for Home Defence. In the case of South Africa, men had to be 20 years of age, and had to have certain musketry qualifications. All this was drawn up and issued specially. I should like to mention that this detailed work would not have been properly done if it

had not been for the extremely hard work done by my subordinates, who consisted of three officers and only four clerks, who had the whole of the working of this to do in addition to all their other work. The only other point that I wish to accentuate is what I, from my knowledge of the requirements of a successful mobilisation, feel very strongly about, viz., that quite irrespective of this particular War, I consider that unless some means can be provided of having absolutely everything cut and dried beforehand for a campaign abroad, the same as we have for a mobilisation for Home Defence, there is always a liability of the arrangements breaking down owing to, at the last moment, the money not being forthcoming, for some reasons quite beyond Military control. I think seriously that the moment it is decided to send a force of any particular strength to any campaign the money necessary to complete the force in every particular by the time it is required to act should be spent, even if it would to some extent be wasted, if at the last moment the campaign does not take place.

967. You refer to such things as providing equipment?—Whatever may be necessary, such as special wagons, alterations of vehicles; special animals such as oxen or mules; special clothing, such as helmets—whatever may be necessary to make the Field Force absolutely complete—so that when it lands in the country it is going to operate in there is no question of delay; my great point being that the force is not absolutely fully mobilised until it is complete not only in *personnel*, but also in animals and equipment of all sorts and kinds. There are no other matters that I desire to call attention to.

968. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) In your Department have you, in arranging schemes for mobilisation, to take into account the quality of the troops serving with the colours at all or does that come solely in the Adjutant-General's Department; that is to say, how many would be sent abroad, what proportion of them?—I should ask the Adjutant-General as regards that. For Home Defence it has been decided that practically everybody capable of bearing arms who has been through the recruit's course of musketry is fit to defend his country.

969. And at what age?—All soldiers we would consider fit for service in Home Defence who are in the opinion of the Commanding Officer capable of bearing arms, and who have completed the recruit's course of musketry in the cases of men to whom that is applicable. That condition was altered for the late War as follows: Men were considered fit for service who fulfilled the following conditions: (1) In all units except Artillery were over 20 years of age, and had not less than one year's service, and in Artillery units were men over 19 years of age and had not less than nine months' service; (2) were medically fit for service; (3) had completed a recruit's course of musketry (in cases of men to whom this was applicable).

970. As a matter of fact, the first mass of troops sent out, the first six or seven Divisions practically, were all Reservists, were they not?—I can give you the proportion of Reservists; they were not all Reservists.

971. Not practically all, but to a very large extent, was not that so?—The proportion is given in the statement that was made by the Mobilisation Division. If you turn to the Statement sent in by the Mobilisation Division you will see at the end of it a Return which we made out in August, 1899, showing exactly the proportions. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 21.)

972. I only wanted to get it on the notes?—It runs to about half: for instance 2 Royal Highlanders, 441 Effectives, 464 Reservists; 1st Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders, 436 Effectives, 546 Reservists; 1st Connaught Rangers, 447 Effectives, 349 Reservists, and so on. For the whole force sent out the proportion of Reservists was:—Cavalry 44 per cent., Artillery 48 per cent., Engineers 34 per cent., Infantry 46 per cent.

973. There was a Statement made by the late Secretary of State for War in the House of Lords at an early stage of the War when he was challenged as to the numbers of the men, and if I remember rightly he was asked what had become of 92,000 men, where the balance was, and he said that the 92,000 men were not fit to take foreign service. Do you remember that?—I cannot say that I do.

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974. Would you say that the 92,000 men were unfit through being under age or not having gone through the musketry course, or not having had sufficient drill—from one cause or another?—I should not say so great a proportion.

975. But you cannot say at this moment?—No, it would not come under me, but I think the number of all regular troops and Army Reserve not fit by age, service, or medically to go abroad was under 35,000.

976. Then I will take if from another witness?—I should like to mention, as you have asked me that point, that for mobilisation for service abroad there is a much larger proportion of Reservists in the ranks than would be the case for service at home, because there would be in the latter case a large number of serving men in the ranks.

977. Passing to another point, you mentioned just now the special clothing for South Africa. Was it ready for issue or had it to be made?—I am almost sure that most of it had to be made. You will get full information as regards that from the Director-General of Ordnance.

978. But I thought you, perhaps, as dealing with mobilisation, would be able to give independent information on that point; you brought it into your evidence?—I did, but as the provision of the clothing did not rest with me, I cannot say accurately how much had to be made. When I wrote my memorandum of the 15th August I was aware, from reports of the Director-General of Ordnance, that it would take two months to procure the supply of helmets, and three weeks after authority was given to complete serge frocks, putties, etc., for the Force.

979. Then you referred to the "Mobilisation Regulations," one of 1898 and the other of 1899; was the change very extensive from the one to the other?—No, I have copies of both here; the changes were only modifications; there was no change of system of any sort, kind, or description. The changes were due to alterations in the conditions of service of the men, and our arrangements for provision of horses for Home Defence fell out. Further, we had to give special regulations as regards clothing, etc., special to a campaign in South Africa.

980. Would you mind leaving out anything relating to South Africa as South Africa, and only tell me the general alterations?—Practically there was no alteration of system.

981. They were all specific to South Africa?—Absolutely. We should have taken this book absolutely as it stood if it had not been that men were required for service in a country where they required special animals, special vehicles, and special clothing.

982. What I meant to get at is, that you had not at the last moment, in September, 1899, to revise our own mobilisation regulations?—Not by one syllable.

983. There is only one other point that I want to ask you about, and that is the last point in your evidence in chief, which you have partly explained, but I am not quite sure that I have exactly grasped what it is you think ought to be done?—You are referring, of course, to authorisation by the Treasury for expenditure?

984. Yes. At what moment do you think that ought to be given? Before they decide on mobilisation?—Yes, I do.

985. In peace time?—Yes, I think it is penny wise and pound foolish not to make the necessary preparations in good time in the hopes that a war will not take place. If you go so far as to organise a force for war, I think, from the military point of view, it would be right to spend without delay money necessary to complete that force in every particular.

986. The mobilisation was not ordered until the 7th of October?—No.

987. When was it decided on, practically decided on. A public decision of that sort is one thing, and a private decision is another?—I presume that it was finally decided on the 30th of September—the date on which the Secretary of State gave authority for the full expenditure necessary to equip and fully mobilise the force.

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988. But then you think these steps ought to have been taken prior to that ?—I do.

989. What date do you fix ?—I think that when the time had come to absolutely lay down the forces that would be required to act, namely an Army Corps, a Cavalry Division, and the Line of Communication troops, at once money should have been forthcoming to make provision for that force.

990. You say that that force was ordered to be organised at that time ?—I had instructions from the Commander-in-Chief in June to make out the scheme of organisation.

991. Only on paper ?—Yes.

992. Not to do it ?—No, I could not do anything.

993. But you might have had that order two years before ?—Yes. I might, but my point is that money should be forthcoming in sufficient time to make a certainty of the Force being complete in every particular when required to act, and I know that the Military authorities certainly felt on this occasion that the provision of the necessary money was put off till the very last moment. I think I am right in saying that they urged the Secretary of State more than once to allow them to spend the money necessary for this force.

994. Still, you can give no special reason why June, 1899, should have been selected rather than June, 1896 ?—I mention June, 1899, because it was then that the force was definitely decided on. I realise of course that, taking a Soudan campaign, you cannot keep camels and boats, etc., in store permanently; but I certainly think it is a serious factor that the officers responsible for the completion of a mobilisation should be dependent for the expenditure of the necessary money on whoever happens to be in power at the moment, who might want to put off expenditure till the very last moment, as this gives rise to the danger of the troops not being fully equipped in time.

995. I understand that you have no special connection with the ordering of the animals ?—None whatever.

996. Or recommendations ?—No. My work was purely making out the proportion of animals that would be necessary for the force selected.

997. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Where do you feel the want of the money so acutely ?—Taking the late war as a specimen it was necessary to get mules, oxen, and vehicles in South Africa, and it was necessary to alter such wagons as were taken out from home to South Africa by fitting special brakes, etc.; it was necessary to buy mule harness, and to get helmets and special clothing for the men. The officers in charge of the branches concerned can give you particulars better than I can, but I understand that they could not purchase equipment or make preparations for altering the vehicles, harness, etc., until they had received the financial authority to do so.

998. Then as a matter of fact an order for mobilisation does not imply that you have the means of settling, in the process of organisation of your force, the purchase of animals and harness and special equipment for any campaign of that sort ?—You have no power whatever until the authority is given from the Secretary of State to spend the money unless it happened to have been in that year's Estimates, when of course it would be already authorised.

999. So far as the organisation of an Army Corps goes for field work, is everything, so far as it can be, provided. Take the question of transport—take the carts ?—For mobilisation for home defence or for a European campaign our wagons and our equipment are absolutely complete, decentralised and with each unit, so that when an Infantry Battalion for instance is ordered to mobilise it has all its equipment and its wagons in its own charge, and it is joined by its reservists, who come fully armed, clothed, and equipped, and as soon as its horses arrive it is ready to take the field.

1000. Has that long been the case ?—It has been growing gradually. With reference to a former answer of mine, I see that it was in 1886 that General Brackenbury submitted three papers drawing attention to the condition of our Army, and pointing out certain main lines of a system both for Home defence and for the despatch of an Army Corps abroad; and from that time the mobilisation scheme has gradually grown. The paper by the Secretary of State for War in June, 1891, which is now a Parliamentary Paper—it was issued last year—shows the general objects for which our Army was maintained. It says: "After providing for these requirements"—that is garrisons, fortifications, and coaling stations—"to be able to mobilise rapidly for Home Defence two Army Corps of Regular troops, and one partly composed of Regulars and partly of Militia, and to organise the auxiliary forces, not allotted to Army Corps or garrisons, for the defence of London and for the defensible positions in advance and for the defence of mercantile ports. Subject to the foregoing considerations and to their financial obligations, to aim at being able in case of necessity to send abroad two complete Army Corps with Cavalry Division and Lines of Communication." The necessary authority has by degrees been given to complete the preparations for that.

1001. Have the Commission a list before them of what is included in a Corps that is mobilised for field work ?—You have the detail in the statement submitted by the Mobilisation Division, Appendix B. (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 21) which gives the exact composition of the force that went out, showing its peace station, place of mobilisation, *personnel*, horses, mules, guns, and vehicles.

1002. Then we have that before us ?—Yes; and a full statement of the War establishments of the Army is contained in the War establishment circular, which gives the details of each unit in an Army Corps.

1003. Have we a copy of that ?—I have one here.

1004. Does that include medical officers ?—Yes; every detail of the *personnel* of the Army Corps.

1005. The supply of medical officers is provided also, I suppose, in detail; you have not got the specific number at this moment ?—No. The War establishment gives what we require, but the provision of medical officers would be a matter that the Director-General of the Army Medical Department could give full details about. The Mobilisation Branch is not responsible for finding officers; it states how many officers are required, and then the Military Secretary provides the officers that are required; and I presume as regards medical officers he does it in consultation with the Director-General of the Army Medical Department.

1006. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I should like to know what arrangements there are. Have you arrangements for supplies for such things as saddlery and carts for mobilisation requirements, or have you to go into things of that sort after you have an order for mobilisation ? Are there any arrangements that these people are to supply these things at definite rates when they are required, or have you to negotiate and make your own arrangements after you get an order ?—I have nothing to do with the actual provision of these supplies; the Director-General of Ordnance could give you information as regards that point; it does not come under me personally.

1007. (*Sir John Edge.*) What was the date of the Order that you received to mobilise ?—The 7th of October, 1899.

1008. If you had been ordered to mobilise an Army Corps for service at home for home defence, would you have done it at once—instantly ?—Yes.

1009. Without waiting for any sanction of the Secretary of State for the spending of money ?—Financial sanction had, I think, been given for every point as regards home defence, but at that moment all the storehouses which had been sanctioned were not built. Practically, I may say we could have mobilised for home defence without further sanction.

1010. Then it was the special conditions of sending a force to South Africa that required sanction ?—Yes, it was so; it was the conditions which make our campaigns abroad differ from our home defence which rendered special sanction necessary for the expenditure of whatever money was required to complete the supply of special animals or special vehicles or special clothing.

1011. Can you tell us when the application was made for that special sanction ?—I cannot give the exact date. The Director-General of Ordnance and the Quartermaster-General, who are the officers concerned, could give you full details with regard to that.

1012. You say that sanction was not given until

the 30th of September ?—My recollection is that sanction was given for the most pressing needs on the 22nd of September, up to about £600,000, so far as my memory serves me, but that the full sanction for all requirements of mobilisation was given on the 30th of September.

1013. What you are speaking to now has, of course, no reference to getting animals and transport in the Cape ?—Yes, it has. I have no doubt that there was authority given to get some of the animals before, but I do not think the sanction for all the money necessary to complete all the requirements of animals and transport had been given ; but that I do not like to speak about, because I do not know it of my own personal knowledge.

1014. With regard to what articles was the delay caused here ? I think you mentioned helmets for one thing ?—Again I should be speaking rather of matters outside my own Department.

1015. Then I will not ask further about it.

1015.* (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) As regards the clothing required for South Africa is it similar to the clothing for India, is that the way you provide it ?—It is not the same ; but as to that again the Director General of Ordnance could tell you exactly what the difference is between the Indian clothing and the clothing supplied for South Africa.

1016. I see that on the 8th of September special instructions for mobilisation for service in South Africa were issued confidentially to all officers of battalions, and instructions regarding special scales of clothing and equipment were issued by the Director-General of Ordnance about the same date ?—Yes.

1017. Did you commence to prepare the clothing on the 8th of September or about that date ?—To make it ?

1018. Yes ?—I cannot quite say, but I expect it was begun before ; but that again I had nothing to do with.

1019. The actual Order for mobilisation was on the 7th of October ?—Yes.

1020. When do you say the troops under that Order were completely mobilised ?—The first troops were completely mobilised, so far as was possible, at home—that is, without what they received in South Africa—by the 17th, I think it was. I cannot answer that question as regards every unit, because I had left for South Africa before the mobilisation was complete ; but I know that the Reservists did join up to the date on which they were ordered to join, viz., the 17th of October, to within 98 per cent. What happened after that I am afraid I do not know, because I had left the country on the 14th of October.

1021. They were not completely embarked until the 17th of November, but it may be that they were ready some time before that ?—Colonel Lake will tell you as to that, but I am sure they were ready and waiting to embark long before that date.

1022. That would be a period of 41 days, which would seem rather a long time, would it not, if that date—the 17th of November—is correct ?—I think that what we heard from the Admiralty then was that they could not embark the force under a month from the day when the ships were ordered ; they could embark some of the force in a fortnight, but having to get ships and fit them up with horse fittings and so on caused a delay. My recollection is that they said it would be a month before they were prepared to embark the whole force. I think the mobilisation, so far as the Army was concerned, was practically done by the 17th of October.

1023. That would be only 10 days after the 7th ?—Yes ; but Colonel Lake will no doubt tell you better than I can as to that.

1024. You mean that they would have been ready to take the field on the 17th ?—So far as preparations in England were concerned.

1025. That is to say, that if the ships had been there they would have been ready to embark on the 17th ?—Yes, but not to take the field. They had to receive their animals and vehicles in South Africa, and I think certainly there was delay there owing to the fact of authority not having been given before the end of September to provide all the necessary vehicles, etc. The officers who went out beforehand had, I believe, authority to improvise vehicles, oxen, etc., in the country as soon as the mobilisation was ordered. I understand (I cannot speak from personal knowledge) that it was about the 30th of September that they were given a free hand to hire as necessary ; but the vehicles which had to be procured specially at home or altered at home were not all ready by the time the troops arrived in South Africa. Sir Redvers Buller could tell you as to that.

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1026. The date I want to get at is this : the order for mobilisation was the 7th of October, and I want to ascertain the exact time at which the Army Corps was ready to take the field. I understand that one Army Corps was then ordered to mobilise ?—One Army Corps, a Cavalry Division, and Line of Communication Troops.

1027. I want to know when that Army Corps was ready to take the field or ready to embark on board ship, if the ships were ready to take them, as a complete unit to take the field ?—I believe I am right in saying the 17th of October, but Colonel Lake could tell you that.

1028. Do you mean the 17th of October or the 17th of November ?—I mean the 17th of October ; I left the country myself on the 14th of October ; but one battalion or unit can mobilise as quickly as another, and they all came up simultaneously ; some embarked on the 20th October.

1029. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I understand from you that on the 7th or 8th of October mobilisation was sanctioned so far as the Army Headquarters was concerned ?—Yes, on the 7th of October.

1030. And orders sent out ?—Yes.

1031. But that practically nothing could be done for want of financial authority to draw the money until some subsequent date ?—No ; I do not say that nothing could be done. The authority was given beforehand on the 22nd of September for a certain sum to be spent upon the most immediate requirements, and authority was given on the 30th of September for the full requirements ; but the fact of getting the money did not mean that the stuff that the money was wanted for was ready.

1032. You mean that what was paid for was not ready ?—The officers concerned could not give the order for certain requirements until they got the authority to spend the money, and then the manufacturers, I understand, had to make the articles, and so on.

1033. But the money, or a portion of the money, seems to have been sanctioned some time before the mobilisation was ordered ?—Yes, but I think it was at a very late date. I think if you have a mobilisation ordered on the 7th of October, and you are only given authority to spend the money necessary to complete that mobilisation a week before, it stands to reason that the manufacturers and so on cannot complete their orders in a week. That, however, did not come under me personally.

1034. (*Viscount Esher.*) Your contention is that something should have happened in June which did not happen. What did precisely happen in June, because that is the month you fix ?—What happened precisely in June was this (I am speaking from memory) : I received instructions from the Commander-in-Chief to prepare in full detail the organisation of an Army Corps, Cavalry Division, and lines of communication troops to go to South Africa.

1035. Were those verbal instructions or written instructions ?—They were verbal, and probably they were written too, but I was constantly with him.

1036. Tell us exactly what happened. Lord Wolseley sent for you, did he ?—Yes.

1037. What did he tell you to do ?—He said (I expect it is in writing too, but I cannot quite say at the moment) that I was to make out the organisation for the composition of an Army Corps, Cavalry Division, and Line of Communication Troops consisting of seven battalions and other troops, showing exactly what would be required in the way of reservists, animals, wagons, carts, and so on. He gave me instructions also to make out the actual units of which this force would be composed (I have said before that it does not follow that they were all troops in the First Army Corps for Home Defence), and he gave me my instructions for working it out ; he made out a Guards Brigade, an English

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Brigade, a Fusilier Brigade, a Highland Brigade, and so on; then we worked it out in the branch, showing exactly the number of Reservists, according to our calculations, that would be required, the number of horses, the number of mules and wagons, and everything else that would be required.

1038. But that was a paper organisation ?—Yes.

1039. And your contention, as I understand, is that when that Instruction was given by the Commander-in-Chief you ought to have been given also the power practically to mobilise ?—That is my contention.

1040. It all amounts to this, that the Order for mobilisation should have been signed in June instead of on the 7th of October if they wanted to use or embark the troops on the 7th of October ?—There is a little misapprehension, I think, about signing the Order for mobilisation. The actual order for mobilisation cannot be given until the Royal Proclamations calling out the Reserves have been issued. But the order could have been given to the Military Authorities in the War Office to make all preparations for it. I believe if the Military Authorities had been told in June that this force must be ready, and had then been authorised to spend whatever money was necessary to complete the force on the scale shown on this table in every particular, the force would have been absolutely ready by October.

1041. Then you think that after the order for mobilisation was once given the mobilisation was a great success ?—Yes.

1042. That is to say between the 7th of October and the 17th all the work done was exceedingly good work, as practically the troops were ready to embark on the 17th ?—Yes; the reason being that we had had an opportunity before, in peace time, of making a very careful scheme.

1043. That is of course a fair amount of time, 10 days ?—Yes. The Reservists might have been ordered to rejoin three to four days after the order for mobilisation was given, but there was no necessity to do this as the ships would not have been ready for them so soon.

1044. On the other hand, the lapse was, as I understand, that certain equipment was not ready, and it would have been ready if you had had authority to spend the money at some previous date ?—That is my contention.

1045. How long beforehand do you think that authority should have been given—does it follow that it need have been given as early as June ?—I could not say. The Director-General of Ordnance would know what he would have to provide, and he would know how long it would take to make that provision.

1046. That is his affair ?—Yes.

1046.* Therefore, as regards the actual mobilisation, you do not consider that ten days could have been made much shorter under any circumstances ?—I think that if it had been necessary it could have been made shorter, but that there was no necessity.

1047. (*Chairman.*) The Order by the Commander-in-Chief to you in June to prepare a scheme was an entirely confidential one, I suppose ?—Yes.

1048. Did it go outside your office at all ?—It was known by all the heads of Departments in the War Office, but it was confidential to the War Office.

1049. But it was treated as a perfectly confidential order ?—Yes.

1050. If orders for equipment had been given would it have been possible to have kept it as a confidential matter ?—I do not think it would have been necessary for the manufacturers to have known what the clothing, etc., was wanted for.

1051. Part of your contention is that it was necessary to provide special equipment ?—Yes.

1052. Would they not have been able to put two and two together ?—I daresay they might, but I would sooner that they did that than that the stuff should not be ready.

1053. I am not arguing it; but that might be a reason for deferring the sanction ?—It might have been. I did not wish in any way to go into the question of the reason why the sanction was deferred. I only wish to point out how a mobilisation is affected if it is in any way dependent on the money for it not being forthcoming until the last moment.

1054. Your contention is that unless sanction is given at a sufficient period before the actual mobilisation is put in operation there must be delay ?—I think there must be delay; in fact, I do not think that any scheme of mobilisation should be dependent upon the actual political exigencies of the moment, and upon whether money is or is not then forthcoming. Financial arrangements should, in my opinion, be made to admit of a scheme of mobilisation for service abroad being as complete as a scheme of mobilisation for service at home.

1055. The difficulty arises, as you yourself point out, from the different conditions of different parts of the Empire, and that you cannot keep everything on the spot ?—Yes, but I think it might be possible that the order to make all necessary preparations should be given at an earlier date than was given in this instance.

1056. Mobilisation and schemes for mobilisation are confined to the Regular Army, I suppose ?—No, they refer to the whole Army.

1057. What do you mean by the whole Army ?—I mean to the Yeomanry, Militia, and Volunteers, as well as the Regulars.

1058. Do they refer to any Colonial troops ?—We have not drawn up any regulations for them; they would be drawn up by the Colonies.

1059. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) In the arrangements for mobilisation, was it ever considered that assistance might be had from the Colonies outside of South Africa, and if so that it could really be effective ?—I cannot speak personally as to that, as the question of employing Colonial troops outside of South Africa for service in that country was not dealt with by me.

1060. (*Sir John Edge.*) Would you suggest that we should keep in store a sufficient number of helmets, for instance, for a force going to South Africa, 50,000 or 60,000 men ?—Yes, I do. Since the War our arrangements as regards clothing have been much simplified by the introduction of Field Service clothing suitable for service in South Africa as well as at home. Colonel Lake can tell you about this better than I can.

1061. But in June, 1899, would you have said, not knowing that we were going to war, that we ought to have had in store here helmets for 50,000 men for South Africa ?—Certainly I think we ought to have a proportion of everything that would be necessary for a given force for service in every climate.

1062. Everywhere, anywhere you want to send them ?—Yes, for a cold climate or a hot climate; and something has been done in that direction.

1063. But what limits would you draw ?—I should draw the limit at what would be considered necessary to complete the force with which it would be proposed to operate.

1064. It would not be reasonable probably to ask you what limit you would have fixed then in June for South Africa ?—Hardly.

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Colonel P. H. N. Lake, C.B., Assistant Quartermaster-General, Mobilisation Division, called and examined.

1065. (*Chairman.*) You succeeded General Stopford ?—I succeeded General Stopford after a certain interval. I was in India at the time and was summoned home at once and I arrived in London on the 13th of November.

1066. You practically succeeded him and you have been in the office since ?—Yes.

1067. And you have not been in South Africa ?—No.

1068. Then I suppose you confirm the evidence given by General Stopford about the mobilisation of the 7th October 1899 ?—Yes.

1069. He referred us to you for any further details which the Commission may wish to enquire into ?—

Yes. You will recollect that it is three years ago, and it may not be possible to give the details at once; but, generally speaking, I think I can answer most questions that you may wish to ask.

1070. Is there anything that you wish to add with regard to that particular mobilisation of the 7th October of the 1st Army Corps, to what General Stopford has said?—The only thing that it occurs to me to add is that he said that so far as he knew the mobilisation in England was entirely successful from the point of view of the Mobilisation Branch, its orders and regulations; perhaps I might say that, so far as I am aware, no letter or query asking for further instructions about those regulations arrived after my coming to London. I believe that General Officers Commanding found those regulations fully sufficient to inform them on every subject on which they wanted information.

1071. And with regard to the dates, I think it is stated here (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 18) that the Army Order was dated the 7th October, and that the embarkation began on the 20th October?—Yes.

1072. Does that mean that the whole force was practically ready to embark at that time if ships had been ready?—It is difficult to say whether the whole force was completely ready, but, at any rate, a very large portion was. General Stopford has already told you he could not give you the details as to how much clothing suitable for service in South Africa was in hand; the Director-General of Ordnance can tell you that, but in regard to other articles of equipment, *e.g.*, wire-cutters and things of that kind which required ordering in rather large quantities, I cannot tell you the exact number of units which, on the 20th October, were absolutely completed and ready to embark. Of course, a large number were. Speaking generally, the whole of them were ready by that date, subject to the provision of such articles of special equipment for South Africa as the manufacturers had not been able to deliver before then.

1073. And the embarkation was spread over from the 20th October to the 17th November, partly for those reasons you have mentioned, and partly for the convenience of the provision of transport?—Mainly for the ships.

1074. Then there were subsequent mobilisations?—Yes.

1075. I think the next one was the 5th Infantry Division, was it not?—Yes, the 5th Infantry Division. Orders were issued on the 11th November for that. If you look at the bottom of page 7, you will see it. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 19.)

1076. Orders were issued on the 11th November, and the embarkation began on the 24th November, and was completed on the 13th December. You say generally, I believe, that from that time onward it was the question of the provision of ships that was the guiding factor?—Yes.

1077. Did the Regulations work in the same satisfactory way with regard to that mobilisation?—So far as I am aware, yes.

1078. And the subsequent ones?—And the subsequent ones. I ought, perhaps, to qualify that by saying that, with reference to one of them—I believe it was the 4th Cavalry Brigade—the Secretary of State for War did not wish to completely mobilise it, even so far as England was concerned, until he had had further information from Lord Roberts. We, therefore, simply completed the regiments composing it with horses and men, but we did not form the other bodies that would be required for complete mobilisation until we received further orders, and we did receive from the General Officers Commanding concerned one or two questions asking exactly how far they were to go.

1079. That was natural enough?—That was natural enough.

1080. And the last Division was the 8th?—Yes.

1081. You had nothing to do with the organising or mobilisation of the Militia or Volunteers?—No; we were of course, consulted about any point which arose, such as the establishment, for instance, of a Company of Imperial Yeomanry, which was practically Mounted Infantry, so that they should be on the same lines as a Regular Company; but the actual work of regular equipping, and despatching was done by the Executive branches of the Office.

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1082. There is no provision in your general scheme of mobilisation for your undertaking anything of that kind?—No, there was no provision in the general scheme of mobilisation for service abroad for raising such a body as the Imperial Yeomanry or for sending the Militia abroad in organised bodies; because, of course, the Yeomanry, as it then existed, could not be sent out of England; the Militia could not be sent out of the United Kingdom, even to the Channel Islands, without their volunteering to go, and according to law Volunteers as such cannot proceed for service out of the United Kingdom. Therefore, we have never considered that it was necessary to make mobilisation regulations for that condition. As Sir Frederick Stopford told you, the Division has grown from a very small beginning. There has been an enormous amount of work to do, and we have generally found that other pressing work which we had in hand was quite as much as we could cope with.

1083. But looking to the experience of the War would it not be necessary in future to take into consideration these auxiliary forces?—It would be wise to do so. Of course, this point has been so far considered, that the War Establishments which General Stopford referred to show exactly how any unit for war should be composed. One of the first steps, so far as mobilisation is concerned, is to show the war composition of a unit such as a regiment or battalion or battery in full detail; and, secondly, the composition of a brigade or division; the organisation of a body of auxiliary troops will follow as closely as possible the organisation of a similar regular force. Perhaps I ought to say that the function of the Mobilisation branch is to discuss with the Executive branches, and arrange the procedure and manner of mobilisation. When that has been arranged, the carrying out of the regulations is done by the Executive branches.

1084. I quite understand that, but then will it not be necessary for you to consult with the Executive branches as to whether they will not in future have to take into account forces like the Imperial Yeomanry, in drawing up those schemes?—Yes, quite so.

1085. But that has not been done yet?—That is so, so far as recruiting the men required, or asking them to come out. You are referring to matters of that sort?

1085.* Yes. I do not know what form it would take, but the experience of the War shows that we can look beyond the Regular Army for military strength, and, therefore, I should have thought that the Mobilisation branch would take that into account. That has not been raised yet?—We do take it into account, as I have said, by these War Establishments, and also by our mobilisation regulations, which contemplate the mobilisation of the Militia, the Volunteers, and the Yeomanry.

1086. But not Colonial troops at present?—No, not Colonial troops. We cannot; we have no authority over them in any way. We can only give them our own Regulations, and ask them to conform to those Regulations as nearly as possible.

1087. Is there any point either in this statement, or in reference to the mobilisation division as it is now organised, that you would wish to mention?—I think I have really nothing to add to this particular statement. That was intended to be a mere statement of what actually took place, and Sir William Nicholson has already told you of the application for an increase of *personnel* in the Division for working these matters out.

1088. That you consider necessary?—That I consider certainly necessary. We are at present unable to cope with the work.

1089. (*Viscount Esher.*) In 1899 the mobilisation of an Army Corps for Home Defence was automatic, was it not?—It was clearly laid down, and practically the requisite stores and equipment were ready, and at the places at which the respective units should mobilise.

1090. But for foreign service that was not so. What is the present state of things? Is your mobilisation for Home Defence for the First Army Corps still automatic?—At the present moment we have not succeeded in working out the details for the new organisation of the six Army Corps.

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1091. Perhaps not, but how about the First Army Corps? Supposing that there was an Order to mobilise the First Army Corps for foreign service to-morrow, would you still have to pick out battalions from here or there to sail with it, or is your whole Army Corps at Aldershot and in the vicinity of Aldershot?—We should still have to pick them out, for the reason that a very large portion of our forces is still in South Africa, but as the troops come home we shall naturally put those troops first in the places where most required.

1092. Therefore you look forward to your first Army Corps Mobilisation for foreign service being as automatic as if it was for Home Defence?—With the necessary modifications due to the nature of the country in which it is to operate. Evidently you require more water, for example, if you are operating in a waterless country, to be carried with your troops, and you require a redistribution and rearrangement; you would also have camel transport rather than wagon transport. Subject to such modifications the mobilisation of an Army Corps for foreign service, we hope, would be as automatic as for Home Defence.

1093. Certainly as regards the battalion?—As regards the *personnel*, it is absolutely as automatic.

1094. But after the dispatch of the First Army Corps you ceased to think in Army Corps, did you not?—No, we did not. I speak from my own personal knowledge, though possibly it is not entirely my province; but I am aware that the Commander-in-Chief then asked for permission to mobilise a second Army Corps, and indeed I had actually put the proposal to him.

1095. That was never done. After that you mobilised in divisions?—The decision was to go on mobilising in divisions; at least, I assume the decision was so, because I was told by the Commander-in-Chief to go on mobilising in divisions and brigades.

1096. Who selected the regiments and battalions that were sent out?—When the Commander-in-Chief sent for me and informed me that the mobilisation of an additional brigade or division had been ordered, I had always up to date in front of me a statement of the regiments, battalions, batteries, etc., available, and an organisation in draft of those that appeared to be most suitable. I then went to the Adjuntant-General and discussed the question with him from his point of view, because he is the man responsible for the provision of *personnel*, as to whether they were suitable. Having got his opinion, I went back to the Commander-in-Chief to get his sanction to that choice of units and composition of the force. If he gave his sanction, and pending the formal order to carry out the mobilisation, I communicated this information confidentially to all branches of the War Office concerned, and generally to the General Officers in whose commands these units were quartered, so that they might know what was in contemplation.

1097. As these divisions were mobilised do you consider that there was any undue delay?—They were always ready before the ships were ready.

1098. You recollect no occasion where ships were waiting for a regiment or a battalion?—I ought to qualify that by saying that I believe that on one or two occasions an outbreak of pink-eye took place, or something of that kind, but barring that, which we cannot control, I cannot recollect any; I do not think there were any.

1099. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Do you think it will ever be possible to rely upon our being able to send an Army Corps straight away on foreign service wholly without changing the regiment, say, from Aldershot and along there—that all the regiments there would be fit as regiments that you would like to send on foreign service, having regard to the fact that such a large portion of our Army is always abroad and the regiments when they come home require sometimes to be knocked into shape. Is there any scheme that provides generally that the Aldershot force should go out at once as the First Army Corps?—I see no real difficulty about that. I see no reason why the regiments coming home from abroad, who, as you say, at first might not be quite fit for service should not be put into the fourth, fifth, or sixth Army Corps—those last for foreign service—why they should not go in regular rotation from those Army Corps to the third, to the second, to the first, so that the First Army Corps would be always composed of those regiments which had been longest at home and were first for service abroad and were presumably the most fit for foreign service. That would fit in with the general principle upon which we were told to frame the future organisation, namely, that the units to compose a Field Force should be commanded and administered in peace by the same officers who should command and administer them in war; and I think, speaking in general terms, that that is practicable.

1100. Is that now being carried out?—It is one of the many questions under discussion and consideration. Owing to the present condition of affairs in South Africa, the uncertainty as to the date and time at which units there will be available for home service, and questions of how soon barracks, to provide for the increase of the Army which was sanctioned in 1900, can be erected, many questions of that sort are still in the air and largely prevent our making our scheme cut and dried. We try to keep up with the decisions that are given and the developments as they take place, and we are working steadily towards a single end of that sort.

1101. But it has not yet been settled that all the corps of the First Army Corps should be the regiments which you would wish to take for foreign service?—It has not been formally settled. I have actually, as a matter of fact, put it forward on a paper, saying that I hoped that, in arranging changes of stations, this policy would be kept in view.

1102. You do not anticipate any great difficulty?—Not in general terms You may find it occasionally necessary, perhaps, to bring a particular battalion to Aldershot out of its turn; but out of the 25 battalions which compose the First Army Corps that ought not to apply to more than two or three, and the same thing is true of batteries and regiments. The large mass ought to be those that we wish to have there.

1103. (*Sir John Jackson.*) It appears from what General Stopford and you have told us that there was delay in waiting for ships after the troops were ready to embark. Is not that a delay that could have been avoided if the Government had had an arrangement with the owners of those ships by which they could have called for the ships at a few days' notice without having at that time to enter into negotiations?—You are asking me a question which is somewhat out of my province, but this is of course evident: that for ships which carry Artillery or Cavalry or the Army Service Corps, anything that requires horses, you must have special fittings. The Admiralty know what time it takes, and they know what ships they can have at their disposal. I have always understood that any case, if such occurred, of the ships not being ready, was mainly due to that question of having to fit up ships which had to carry horses specially for the purpose.

1104. So that I gather that the Admiralty, you believe, had arrangements such as I have indicated, that they could call for ships at a day or two's notice?—I am not personally aware of the fact. The Quartermaster-General can answer that question for certain.

1105. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) As regards the Army Corps in rotation for service abroad, the first you say is always kept at Aldershot; that is the case now?—That is intended to be the case. Previously Aldershot only contained 12 or 13 Battalions of Infantry out of the 25, and we, therefore, had to draw from other districts to make up the number. It is intended for the future that Aldershot shall contain 24 out of the 25 Battalions, and the other shall be close by, and the same with the other arms of the Service.

1106. Then the other Army Corps for foreign service will be at the other big camps for concentration like Salisbury. That would be the second?—Salisbury and the South of England constitute the Second Army Corps.

1107. Do the regiments composing the Army Corps know that they are first for the field if war breaks out?—Yes.

1108. For instance, you do not put it in the Army List?—We do not; but we put it into what we call the Field Army Tables, which are printed and are sent to the General Officers Commanding.

1109. So that they absolutely know that they are

first in turn say for foreign service if they happen to be of the First Army Corps?—They are intended to know it.

1110. (*Chairman.*) Is there anything else you wish to say?—Possibly I might be allowed to refer to the Army Board. I think you have made a reference to that. I should like to say that most of the matters relating to actual decisions about sending troops abroad were discussed at the Army Board, and referred to the Secretary of State through that Board, which held constant meetings all through the period when the war was going on.

1111. You are speaking of the Army Board that was formed in 1899?—Yes.

1112. Which began as a Committee of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

1113. Do you want to say anything about that?—I merely wanted to say that all the questions that arose as to the force to be sent out were discussed and considered at that Board in the presence of all the heads of Departments who were responsible for carrying them out, and that was the procedure adopted for dealing with any question that arose.

1114. Were you present?—I was Secretary of the Board. The Assistant Quartermaster-General for Mobilisation is the Secretary of the Board.

1115. (*Sir John Edge.*) Is that the Board that Sir William Nicholson described as the Army Board?—Yes.

1116. Or is it the War Office Council?—No, the Army Board. It sat constantly until, under the comparatively recent Order in Council, the War Office Council was given a more specific existence. I think the War Office Council has largely superseded the Army Board.

1117. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Are you still Secretary of either of the Boards in the War Office?—I am still Secretary of the Army Board.

1118. And that now only deals with financial matters generally?—Its general reference is wider than that, but the institution of the War Office Council has practically relieved it of many of its duties.

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1119. It deals now chiefly with the Estimates?—Yes.

1120. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Might I ask, from your great experience with regard to Colonial troops—you have been in Canada and held an important position there—if there is any recommendation you would make as to their use in the future?—The recommendation I would venture to make is that the authorities at home who are responsible for the consideration of schemes, either offensive or defensive abroad, should have some fairly close idea of the amount of assistance that they might depend upon under certain conditions. Their difficulty is that they neither know whether a given Colony would be prepared to co-operate under certain circumstances, nor what force, if it did wish to co-operate, it could place at our disposal. Consequently it is extremely difficult in working out any plan of campaign to decide the force available for the operations or to really settle the strategical questions which arise. We naturally, of course, have no control over the Colonial troops, and we do not know to what extent in any particular we can rely upon their co-operation. We know that the good-will exists and the power to help, but we do not know to what extent we can count upon the material.

1121. But would you consider such forces, such troops, both in respect of officers and men to be quite equal at least to those to be drawn from the Yeomanry and the Militia of Great Britain?—I should consider them valuable forces in every way, but, as you are aware, the amount of training undergone in different Colonies, and even in different forces in the same Colony, differs so largely that one can hardly express a general military opinion as to the value of the officers and men.

FIFTH DAY.

Friday, 17th October, 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable Viscount Esher, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir George Dashwood Taubman-Goldie, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wylie Norman, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir Frederick Matthew Darley, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir John Ommanney Hopkins, G.C.B.
Sir John Edge.
Sir John Jackson.

Bernard H. Holland, Esq., *Secretary.*

Sir Ralph Henry Knox, K.C.B., called and examined.

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1122. (*Chairman.*) You have been till recently, I think, Permanent Under Secretary at the War Office?—Until about a year and a-half or two years ago.

1122*. And you held that office for a considerable time?—Not as Permanent Under Secretary. I held that office for a little under four years; before that I was for a very long time Accountant-General.

1123. So that you are well acquainted with the history of the organisation of the War Office over a long period?—I think so.

1124. We are aware that you have given evidence lately before Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee with regard to the organisation of the War Office, and, of course, we do not wish to take you over the whole of the ground that you then covered, but the particular point in the first place, which I think the Commission are anxious to be quite clear upon, is the history of the organisation of the upper branches of the War Office, regulated, as I suppose it has been, by Orders in Council from time to time?—That is so.

1125. Then I suppose one could begin it from 1888?—Yes; with one slight allusion to the condition of things before 1888.

1126. If you would make your own statement as concisely as you can it would be a great benefit?—I will as concisely as I can. When Lord Cardwell organised the War Office, and put an end to what was called the dual system, by bringing the Commander-in-Chief under the same roof as the Secretary of State, he formed it into three principal departments. The first was the Military Department so called, which was under the Commander-in-Chief in all its branches; the second was the Surveyor-General of Ordnance's Department; and the other the Financial Secretary's Department. The Commander-in-Chief's Department really consisted of his own old Special Department, which embraced the Military Secretary's Department, the Adjutant-General's and the Quartermaster-General's Departments, which were small, almost quasi-independent departments up to that time, but he was given them as his assistants or assessors for carrying out the Order in Council of 1870.

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If you were to read those through you would see that the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General, and so forth, were not mentioned in the Order in Council at all. The Commander-in-Chief was the head of his department, and the duties allotted to him were really the duties of the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster General, and the Military Secretary. The Surveyor-General of Ordnance took up the duties, which were those mainly of the old Ordnance Department. It included all the stores, supplies to a certain extent, and the Commissariat Department—food and so forth, and the buildings, which were administered in the Engineer branch of the old Ordnance Department; but, speaking in very broad terms, the duties of the Surveyor-General represented very much the work of the old Ordnance Department. He was absolutely independent of the Commander-in-Chief, and practically was a controlling force upon the Commander-in-Chief and upon military officers in the different districts wherever officers of the Surveyor-General existed. For instance, if the military department made a demand upon the storekeeper in a particular district, he would control that demand, and say, "Under my regulations you cannot have such and such things."

1127. Was the Surveyor-General's department a military department?—It was an office of a hybrid kind. There was a tendency to grow towards a military character in the department, but the department had up to that time certainly been a Civil department. The Director of Supplies, for instance, was one of the branches under the Surveyor-General, and that was the old Commissariat branch, presided over for a long time by Sir William Power and the present Lord Haliburton; they were a Civil department acting under the Surveyor-General.

1128. Was the Surveyor-General himself a military officer?—The first Surveyor-General was a military officer—that was Sir Henry Storks—the idea being that a high military officer should be the Assessor in the House of Commons of the Secretary of State. That was the view that Lord Cardwell took; he professed to be eminently a civilian, and he claimed that he must have a high military officer in the House by his side, and that was the original idea.

1129. Sir Henry Storks sat in the House of Commons?—Sir Henry Storks sat in the House of Commons, but you may say that he was the first and last of the high military officers who were available for that duty, for it is not so very easy to get a seat in the House of Commons for the person that you may desire to hold that particular office. You may very much wish to give it to a military officer, but if you have not a high military officer in the House it is very difficult to get one in. I remember the attempts that were made to get in various persons of high military rank who it was desired should hold that position—Sir John Adye was one; but the unfortunate result of this difficulty was that the position dropped into the hands of men who were really only civilians, having had comparatively short service in the army, not sufficient as it were to give them authority and weight from a military point of view; and there was a succession of Surveyor-Generals who were extremely good men, but you could not call them officers of high military rank fulfilling the conditions which Lord Cardwell had in his mind. Then the other department was that of the Financial Secretary, who was charged with practically the control from a financial point of view; not possessing the power to say a final nay to anything that was proposed, but only to weigh the proposals that were made by the other departments, whether the Surveyor-General's or the military department. In his hands was the principal work of preparing the Estimates every year; he would make the necessary calculations where he was the expert, and would take the calculations from others, subject to a check, where others were the experts. This worked on until 1888, and the 1888 organisation may really be described as the lesson of a war. What was found as the result of the campaigns in Egypt was that when things went wrong the departments that were principally blamed were those that were not military departments. Certain things went wrong in connection with the medical service attributed to the deficiencies in the medical supplies, and the medical department was blamed. Things went wrong as regards some supplies; then the supply department was blamed. There was always a scapegoat handy in the Surveyor-General's departments when difficulties arose as regards the various supplies and equipments, the military department being in no way responsible for their administration. The whole of the equipment in the Army was under the Surveyor-General; there was always somebody to say, "Well, that was his fault." I am speaking very openly and generally of what I understood to be the arguments at the time. It was decided, in consequence of that, that the whole of the departments that were under the Surveyor-General should be transferred so far as regards the direction and administration, suggestions for Estimates, and so forth, from that department to the military department, and that the Surveyor-General should be abolished. That is to say, that all the services in connection with the feeding, the equipping, the clothing, and so forth of the army should be regarded as executive military work, and that the military department in the office should have the direction and control of all those services; and that in the field in the same way they should be absolutely under the general officers, and that none of the departments there were to be regarded as a check, as it were, upon the general officer, or have the power to say nay to him; he would have the final authority to say, "Such and such things are to be done," and would do them. The War Office then became formed practically into two departments. One was the military department, consisting of the Quartermaster-General, the Military Secretary, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, the Director of Artillery, and all branches of the Surveyor-General. To the Quartermaster-General, however, I should say was transferred the work of several of the Surveyor-General's departments. The Quartermaster-General had up to that time really comparatively little to do; his duty was limited to the direction of the movement of troops, the quartering of them, and so forth. He had few executive officers representing him; there used to be the Quartermaster-General's officers, who were called Deputy Quartermaster-Generals and Assistant Quartermaster-Generals in the districts, but the work that they had was the quartering, the barrack part of the business, not the construction of accommodation, but the distributing the accommodation and arranging for the moving of the troops. He was regarded as insufficiently supplied with work, and he took up the whole of the commissariat work, which was the provision of food, forage, quarters, transport, and remounts (work which the Quartermaster-General did not before perform), the movement of the troops and the distribution of their stores and equipments (which he had before); he also administered the commissariat and transport corps, the pay department, and the establishments in connection with those services; he dealt with sanitary questions relating to the Army; and in concert with the Director of Artillery and the Inspector-General of Fortifications he prepared the annual estimates for all those services. Thus several of the functions of the Surveyor-General's department were transferred and added to the Quartermaster-General's work.

1130. And did that all come under the Commander-in-Chief at that time?—They were all placed under the Commander-in-Chief; there was a distinct Order issued laying down the way in which the heads of these various departments should work. The Commander-in-Chief was the supreme chief, and the executive officers under him, the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, carried out their executive duties practically on their own responsibility, only referring the important matters and proposals for large changes to the Commander-in-Chief. It would have been quite impossible for the Commander-in-Chief to have had executive charge of these branches; but there was an open communication recognised, although not laid down in the regulation, between the heads of these departments and the Secretary of State. If he wished, he was in constant communication with them; but under the new organisation they were placed absolutely under the Commander-in-Chief.

1131. And then they could not go to the Secretary of State except through the Commander-in-Chief?—Well, they did, just as before the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General used to frequently hold communications with the Minister at his desire. They were not supposed to seek an interview, but he had constant interviews with the heads of those departments by sending for them.

1132. I suppose the Secretary of State, then, as now, was supreme, and could send for anybody?—Quite so. That was the change of 1888. The department, instead of being three departments, was practically divided into

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two. One was the Military Department, having complete charge of the executive work of all kinds, and the other was the Finance Department, having entrusted to it the audit of all expenditure and also the financial review of new expenditure. Any proposal made by any of these departments was reviewed by the Financial Secretary always as regards the estimated cost.

1133. But the estimates were made up in the Military Department?—In the Military Department they made proposals and sometimes gave estimates of those proposals. Sometimes they would ask for an estimate to be made in the Finance Department, which was available for those purposes. If the scheme or suggestion was at all favoured, and no estimate had been framed in the Military Department, it went to the Finance Department, as the expert department in those matters, to make an estimate. The Director of Contracts was so placed in the Finance Department, and also the Manufacturing departments, they being regarded not as military departments, but practically as shops; I mean the Manufacturing Departments at Woolwich and the Clothing Department at Pimlico. I should say that, although not one of the causes but rather a consequence of this arrangement, a very important change was made, namely, the decision to hand over to the Admiralty the whole function of demanding, estimating for, accounting for, and storing their own material of war. Up to that time that had been part of the duty of the Surveyor-General; but it was thought important, as the War Office was being divided into a purely military department and a civil department, that the Military, *qua* Military, should have no voice in deciding what naval stores should be made or how they should be obtained. It was a subject that had been debated and discussed for years and years. Very great difficulties were found in dealing with it, but ultimately I devised a method under which a financial division could be effected as between the Navy and the Army. The factories were regarded as a shop, and placed under a highly-skilled engineer to supply the various services requiring stores, viz., the Admiralty, the India Office, and the War Office, but large Colonial orders were also received.

1134. Was he a military engineer?—No; a civil engineer, Sir William Anderson, who had been the head of a large manufacturing business; I think Easton and Anderson was the firm that he was connected with previously. The control by the Finance Department was of course not an executive control in any sense. This high officer was appointed, possessing very great technical attainments, and was held responsible for the details of manufacture; the Finance Department only controlled him with regard to the issues of money, seeing that the accounts of expenditure, cost accounts, and so on, of the factories were properly kept and worked out. I do not know whether I have conveyed clearly the principle of the division of the functions between the several departments.

1135. Yes, I think so. What was the next Order in Council?—The next was 1895. That was the result of several committees and commissions, whose reports are in all probability in your hands, one principal one being Lord Hartington's Commission. The general idea was that it was advisable to lower to some considerable extent the supreme position of the Commander-in-Chief, and that he should not be held in the same sense responsible for the details of the large number of the departments which had been placed under him; and for the first time the functions of the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector General of Fortifications, and the Adjutant-General's Departments (who were not personally mentioned in the 1870 Order in Council) were detailed as duties for which each of these high officers was held to be personally responsible, and as to which they were the advisers of the Secretary of State. For instance, in the case of the Adjutant-General in the last clause of his duties it is stated: "It will be his duty to advise the Secretary of State on all questions connected with the duties of his department"; and the Quartermaster-General in the same way: "He will submit proposals for the annual estimates for the above services, and it will be his duty to advise the Secretary of State on all questions connected with the duties of his department." With regard to the Inspector-General of Fortifications, the same clause is inserted at the conclusion of the description of his duties; and similarly, as regards the Department of the Inspector-General of Ordnance.

1136. The Commander-in-Chief becoming the principal adviser?—Yes, the Commander-in-Chief was stated to be "the principal adviser of the Secretary of State on all military questions, and charged with the general supervision of the military departments of the War Office." Those are the words in which his duties were described, but for the first time this quasi-independent status is recognised; although, as I have explained, constantly under the old organisation, these high officers were in communication with the Secretary of State, this Order in Council recognised not only the communication, but also an absolutely independent responsibility as between them and the Secretary of State.

1137. And all the principal departments were on the same footing?—They were on the same footing. The Commander-in-Chief had particular duties assigned to him as well as a general supervision, and the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the Inspector-General of Ordnance were all given their distinct duties with this more or less independent status. The other departments that were difficult to attach entirely to any one of these four military officers were placed in a somewhat independent and anomalous position, but they had not the same independent status, and had no immediate access to the Secretary of State as had these high military officers. These more subordinate departments were the Army Medical Department, the Military Education Department, the Chaplain-General, and the Army Veterinary Department.

1138. Were they under the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes, all those were under the Commander-in-Chief. "Reporting to the Commander-in-Chief, the Adjutant-General, or the Quartermaster-General, according to the nature of the matter submitted"—that is the way in which their duties were described.

1139. Was there not another method of communication with the Secretary of State under that organisation, though it is not mentioned in the Order in Council; was there not a War Office Council established?—Yes. I was going to mention that the Army Board was established as one of the methods of procedure as an outcome of this arrangement; but it was restricted in its functions. I will read out the duties that were allotted to it. I am reading from the "Details of Office Procedure," which states the method of carrying on the duties of the office, and which was issued at the same time.

1140. On what authority did that body sit—on an order of the Secretary of State?—Yes. "The Commander-in-Chief, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the Inspector-General of Ordnance, or such of them as may be summoned will form a Board under the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief, for the purpose of reporting upon: (A) Selections for promotion in the Army, above the substantive rank of major. (B) Selections for staff appointments above the rank of lieutenant-colonel. (C) Proposals for estimates, see paragraph 16, and such other questions as may be referred to it by the Secretary of State"; that is to say, they had the power of initiative as regards those three points, but had no power of initiative as regards anything except proposals for the estimates, and they could only consider "such other questions as may be referred to it by the Secretary of State."

1141. Then that Board had no independent authority at all?—They had no independent authority. Their selections for promotion, and so forth, were practically independent; they very seldom went further, although everything of that kind is submitted formally to the Secretary of State, and has his formal approval. But "proposals for estimates" is a very extensive term; it was in their power under that to make any proposals they desired to be included in the forthcoming Army Estimates that were being prepared.

1142. You attended the Board then, did you not?—I attended the Board.

1143. As Accountant-General?—As Accountant-General.

1144. Proposals before the Board for estimates were submitted to the Board; was any decision come to upon them?—No, no decision was come to; they were all recommendations to the Secretary of State.

1145. But I mean collective decision by the Board itself?—Yes, they would make a demand. A store vote for instance, would come up for consideration, and they

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would say, "We have gone through this, and think such and such stores should be provided"; and the same with regard to small arms and small arms ammunition, etc.

1146. If there was a difference of opinion on the Board, what happened?—The majority would decide; but the Secretary of State himself, in considering these matters, would have the War Office Council (which was the medium by which the Secretary of State considered these things) to consult with before he finally gave his decision as to what could be provided.

1147. Then you are not talking of the War Office Council just now?—No, the Army Board.

1148. Does the Army Board meet regularly?—Not on fixed days; only as the Secretary of State required it or could conveniently attend.*

1149. Frequently?—Yes. Well, it varied at different times of the year, of course; but very frequently in the late autumn and winter, very frequently indeed.

1150. When the estimates were under consideration?—Very frequently indeed when the estimates were under consideration.

1151. But I am afraid I do not quite follow. This is the Army Board; was there not a War Office Council?—Yes; that the Secretary of State attended; that was his meeting, as it were. But the Army Board was presided over by the Commander-in-Chief, and prepared the demands; they had no final voice in deciding anything, but they would consider from the military point of view what they thought was necessary. They would work out the establishments of men that they thought ought to be maintained in the various commands and districts, with a view to fulfilling certain requirements, and they would consider the stores and reserves that were necessary, and so forth.

1152. But following on the Order in Council of 1895, there was also established a War Office Council?—Yes, a consultative body.

1153. What was the nature of the War Office Council?—It was a meeting of the principal heads of departments, these members of the Army Board, under the Secretary of State, with the Under-Secretaries of State, and such other persons as were experts, as it were, or more fully informed upon the details of the questions that came under consideration, specially summoned.

1154. I see that that War Office Council came into existence in 1890, before the Order in Council of May, 1895?—Yes, in May, 1890. Of course, there had always been meetings in the Secretary of State's room; that is the way much of the business was carried on when it came before the Secretary of State; but I see it was in 1890 that the War Office Council was first recognised, and it was not an outcome of the 1895 organisation.

1155. In 1890 and afterwards, it was recognised as a part of the organisation of the War Office?—Yes.

1156. And met at irregular intervals?—Yes, at irregular intervals. The Secretary of State, except with regard to the estimates, would have questions of more or less difficulty referred to him constantly, and in some of them he thought it was necessary or desirable that he should have a consultation with his chiefs in council to discuss them before he would give a decision upon them, and he would mark the papers, "For War Office Council." Unless it was extremely pressing, as the business accumulated and became sufficient to provide work for the War Office Council, the Secretary of State would decide that a council should be held.

1157. But it was a purely consultative body?—A purely consultative body to assist the Secretary of State in coming to a conclusion.

1158. The decisions being always the decisions of the Secretary of State?—Yes, always.

1159. Is that all you have to say with regard to the Order in Council of 1895?—Yes, I think so.

1160. Then the next was in 1899?—The next was in 1899, and that was a change affecting only one of the military departments—that is, the Ordnance Department. The arrangement under which the highly skilled technical engineer was given charge of the manufacturing departments was very carefully worked out by Mr. Stanhope and Mr. Brodrick at the time, who thought that it met a very large number of difficulties which had arisen upon the administration of those places, but when Sir Henry Brackenbury came into office as Inspector-General, he thought differently, and pressed Lord Lansdowne very much to place the manufacturing departments under him completely, and to make him responsible for the whole detail and executive work of the factory—to abolish the high civil engineer, and to place it under a military officer. Lord Lansdowne took his view and carried out the change. That was discussed, of course, freely and publicly at the time, but it was quite contrary to the view which was held by Mr. Stanhope and Mr. Brodrick.

1161. That was the main change in 1899?—That was the main change in 1899. I think practically there was no other change.

1162. Then do I rightly understand you to think that that change has worked well?—Well, the departments have done extraordinarily good work under both systems, but, as I explained, one of the main objects that Mr. Stanhope had in view was to meet the Naval difficulty. He did not like throwing upon the Military Department the decision of what naval work should be taken up in the factories. He thought it would be far better placed in the hands of an absolutely independent officer, as independent as he could make him as between the two services, and that to avoid the chance of naval work being set aside to take up Army work, and so forth, or its being said that it was, he thought it was very important that it should be under an independent officer. It was also decided to separate as completely as possible the responsibility for inspection and for manufacture. But further, it was thought that manufacturing was not military work, and that to have a highly skilled mechanical engineer was better than to have an officer of Artillery, who had become a colonel, who was an extremely good man and knew a great deal about his profession and the requirements of the Army, and so on, but was not the best mechanical engineer available.

1163. As regards the relations with the Admiralty, are you aware of any difficulty having arisen from the change?—I have some recollection, but I cannot exactly point from my memory to a particular case. I think there have been complaints that the Admiralty was not being served to the full.

1164. Then that was the position at the beginning of the war?—That was the position at the beginning of the war, but I should refer to another committee not referred to in the regulation as to procedure which had been in existence for very many years, in connection with war preparations. So long ago as 1877 there was established what was called a Confidential Mobilisation Committee, and for the various campaigns that have taken place since then (it was with reference to a particular campaign then in operation it was established), this Committee has been summoned in order that the military departments in communication with the Financial Department, should consult together as to what steps were necessary to meet deficiencies, large or small, that existed for carrying out the operations and to make them good, and so forth, and on every occasion of active operations that Committee has been assembled to deal with them. It consisted, when first constituted in 1877, under the old organisation, of the Adjutant-General, the Director of Transports—that is the Naval Director-General of Transport—the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces, the Director of Supplies and Transport, who was then a civil officer, the Director of Artillery and Stores, and Director of Clothing, and the Director-General of the Army Medical Department; and the proceedings of that committee and their recommendations were always printed and laid before the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State's decision noted. The tendency was from its comencement (because they exerted the general power of calling to their assistance any officer who was supposed to have in charge duties that were affected by the campaign) to enlarge this committee. I find here in 1895 and 1897, instead of those officers whom I have just named there were the following officers summoned, of course to some extent due to the fact that the organisation of the Department had been altered: The Adjutant-General, the Assistant Under Secretary of State, the Director of Transports, the Director of Military Intelligence, the Director of Artillery, the Deputy Adjutant-General Royal Engineers, the Deputy Adjutant-General Royal Artillery, the Assistant Adjutant-General, the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General—in fact, I remember on that occasion he was a junior officer; it was in November, and his chief and immediate superiors were not present at the office.

1165. And he represented the Quartermaster-General?—Yes; there were also present the Director-

* Witness desires to say that he misunderstood this question. His answer refers to War Office Council.

General of the Army Medical Department, the Accountant-General, which I was at the time, and the Assistant Director of Clothing. Then subsequently in 1897 I find the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Artillery, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces and Recruiting, the Inspector-General of Remounts, the Military Secretary, the Director of Military Intelligence, the Deputy Adjutant-General Royal Engineers, the Deputy Adjutant-General Royal Artillery, the Assistant Adjutant-General, Director of Transports (Navy), Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Director-General of the Army Medical Department, the Assistant Financial Secretary, the Accountant-General, and the Assistant Director of Clothing. So that the tendency was to enlarge.

1166. It had become a very large Board then?—Yes, a large Board. But the way in which this worked was that all these men, having independent charge of certain executive duties, should have from the President a general idea of what was about to take place, and that they should take up, as it were, that idea and apply it to their departments so as to be in a position at once to say, "Well, such and such a move necessitates my doing so and so." In that way they had at once, of course, cognizance at the earliest date of what steps it was necessary to take, and they would on that make their submissions as to what was needed.

1167. That was not so much for deliberation and consultation as for receiving instructions?—A great number of them would say "I think under these circumstances such and such a thing should be done." But they would distinctly make recommendations which would be considered by the Board as a whole, as to whether it was advisable to take up a suggestion or not. Of course, some of them would be brushed aside, regarded as unnecessary, or perhaps faddy; but each of these men had executive duties which were affected by a campaign being undertaken, and they freely made suggestions which came into their minds as to what it was advisable to do under the circumstances. On the occasion of this war a Confidential Mobilisation Committee was summoned; the first one in June, 1899.

1168. This committee of which you have just been speaking?—Yes.

1169. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Was there no meeting between May, 1897 and June, 1899?—No, this committee was hardly ever set on foot, except when active operations were being undertaken or contemplated. Of course, if anything was in the air which would contemplate a mobilisation, or if any fighting was contemplated where the home Army would be needed, or the Army in the various Colonial stations, the Committee would be summoned to consider a special point. But this Committee was only set in operation, revived as it were, when active operations were contemplated, the officer in charge of the Mobilisation branch being always the secretary. This Committee met in June, 1899, and there were present the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Director-General of Ordnance, an officer representing the Director of Military Intelligence, the Deputy Adjutant-General Royal Engineers, the Inspector-General of Remounts, the Assistant Adjutant-General, the Director-General of the Army Medical Service, the Director-General of the Army Veterinary Department, the Assistant Under Secretary of State, and the Accountant-General. In the meantime, as the outcome of these various changes that had been introduced, and more especially the institution of the Army Board, it was thought that this system of a Mobilisation Committee, consisting of this comparatively large number of officers might be reconsidered. I think the idea was that a committee summoned *ad hoc* by the Commander-in-Chief, consisting of the head military officers, could deal with the problem more satisfactorily, and that they would take note of what decision they came to or what they would recommend, and would communicate their ideas to these various subordinate officers, as the result of their deliberations. This smaller committee went on for some time, no great length of time—this was June—and the recommendations for the various demands in connection with the war were made by it.

1170. That is the committee that we have heard of, called the Commander-in-Chief's Committee?—Yes, but I think I may say that I called attention to the fact that this change had set aside the Mobilisation Committee, which had been the machinery recognised for a long time, and had worked very satisfactorily in preparing for the various campaigns we had had to deal with; the new committee certainly required strengthening, though the Mobilisation Committee might be held too numerous as a consultative body. On this the Secretary of State decided that the Army Board recently constituted should take up this duty (of course all these principal members who attended the Mobilisation Committee were members of the Army Board), and the following instruction was issued:—"When it has been decided to prepare for the mobilisation of a military force, or to reinforce the garrisons and stations abroad, the necessary measures will be considered by the Army Board supplemented by such officers as may be specially summoned to attend. Whenever such subjects are being considered the Assistant Under Secretary of State, the Military Secretary, the Director of Military Intelligence, and the Accountant-General will be members of the Board, and the Assistant Adjutant-General for Mobilisation will act as secretary."

1171. What is the date of that, please?—The date of that is the 21st of September, 1899, and from that time to the end of the war, I believe, that Board performed these functions of consulting as to the various requirements that were necessary for maintaining the Army in an efficient and well-equipped condition. The proceedings of the meetings of that committee were always regularly noted and printed, and are in existence. I have not power to give them in, but I can just give an idea of the working of the thing. I will state here the members who were present.

1172. (*Chairman.*) Are these proceedings regarded as confidential?—Yes, they always were regarded as strictly confidential. I have no doubt that your Commission can have them, but I am not the person to give them in.

1173. But you think they would be submitted if we asked for them?—I think so; I cannot think anything else.* This instruction was issued and put into operation as soon as it was decided upon, and I think practically the enlargement of the committee began early in September. I see there were present, for instance, at one meeting, the Commander-in-Chief, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Director-General of Ordnance, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, the Military Secretary, the Director of Military Intelligence, the Director-General of the Army Medical Service, the Assistant Under-Secretary, and the Assistant Accountant-General.

1174. (*Sir John Edge.*) What is the date of that meeting?—The 8th of September—just before the issue of this instruction.

1175. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Who was in the chair?—The Commander-in-Chief. I ought to have said that the Commander-in-Chief presided.

1176. (*Chairman.*) The Commander-in-Chief was the regular Chairman?—The regular Chairman.

1177. And did the Secretary of State ever attend?—No; the Secretary of State consulted with these officers in a War Office Council. I find that practically the same officers attended on the 11th September, and on the 13th practically the same.

1178. If we can get the papers, of course, we can examine those details?—Quite so; I was only just instancing the way in which it worked.

1179. But with regard to the procedure of that committee, would each member have the power of bringing up any subject?—Certainly; and I may say that when an agreement was come to by that Board, practically everything that was agreed to was sanctioned.

1180. But just one step before that. Any member might bring up any subject, and it would be deliberated and decided upon by the majority of the meeting?—Yes.

1181. And their decision, you say, was properly recorded?—Yes.

1182. And reported to the Secretary of State?—Always, immediately.

1183. And it was left entirely, of course, to his final decision?—Quite so.

1184. But could he direct that any subject should be brought before the Board?—Yes, certainly. His special officer was the Assistant Under-Secretary, who was always there. He was made a member. The Permanent Under-Secretary had too much to do to attend it, and his assistant was made a member of the Board, and

* The proceedings of the Confidential Mobilization Committee were subsequently sent in. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 421.)

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he would take his instructions to bring any question forward, if desired by the Secretary of State; but, of course, if he mentioned it to the Commander-in-Chief or any officer, it would be brought forward.

1185. But the decisions of the Army Board had no executive authority?—No, they had not; they were covered by the Secretary of State, but he gave from time to time very general powers to them to deal with these subjects or these recommendations.

1186. Do you think if would be workable if a board of that character had greater executive powers?—My experience was while I was at the Office that it was practically plenipotentiary when war was on, but not when war was in contemplation, and that is the crux.

1187. That means that you think it worked well when war was on, but it was not sufficient during the time of preparation?—Well, the time of preparation is in this country so eminently a political question that such a Board at that time could not be given full powers; but the political officers are the persons who are absolutely responsible for what is done and at what time it is done or not done.

1188. (*Sir John Edge.*) That is the time of preparation?—Of course, different people would form various views as to what the time of preparation was; one person would say "Wait till we are invaded," as we did very nearly; and another person would say, "Well, make no preparations at all," as one very important political leader said. But the subordinate Army department, which public opinion apparently holds responsible, would be hammering for preparations at a very early date.

1189. (*Chairman.*) You are aware that there has been a proposal that the War Office Council in future should differ fundamentally from the existing War Office Council or Army Board?—I cannot say that I know what your Lordship is referring to.

1190. I am referring to the recommendations of Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee?—Well, their recommendation practically was to adopt the Board system, that is to say, the Admiralty system, for governing the office; though I think, as well as I can remember it, it does retain the ultimate power of decision, for the Secretary of State, as I imagine, is practically the case at the Admiralty. The Admiralty Board may suggest and discuss and recommend a great number of things, but it is ultimately the Chief Minister, with the Cabinet, that comes to a decision.

1191. No doubt the Secretary of State must be secured his proper functions; but what have you to say with regard to the proposal that Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee made, that there should be a Board at the War Office?—I think that if the Army Board system were to be worked *con amore*, which I do not think it ever has been, it would be the better system. I think that the high military officers meeting together independently would work out better their views as to what the military necessities of the country are. Under the constitution of the Board they have the assistance of the whole department at their disposal; the Assistant Under-Secretary and the Accountant-General assisting to elaborate the schemes of the military officers. They are supposed, of course, to have a full sense of their responsibility in making their proposals. They know what public opinion is both in favour of and in opposition to these proposals, and it may be assumed that they would work out their plans with that in their minds. When completed, their scheme would go before the Secretary of State. Then he would call his Council together and discuss it in all the details. But there is a great advantage in having the thing completely worked out as a whole before it is taken up for final deliberation and decision.

1192. Yes, but I have not said that that is the difference that is proposed. The difference that is proposed is that after that consultation between the officers who are members of the Board has taken place, then the Board is charged with the supervision and control of the working, and that makes a very essential difference, does it not?—Do you mean that the Board as a whole should direct the executive details of the Quartermaster-General's Department, the Adjutant-General's Department, and so forth?

1193. No, that is not my meaning. I am only reading from the report of the committee; the report of the committee says (*Vide* page 22), "The Board should be charged (under the Secretary of State) with the supervision and control of the working and management of the War Office, with the consideration of the annual Estimates prepared by the heads of departments, and with the allocation of the sums allotted for military purposes." That gives the Board as a collective whole an executive function?—I do not think that that is a good plan. I think that it is better to have the various officers charged with a defined function and duty of spending so much money in accordance with the Regulations.

1194. So they would in each department under the control of the Board?—They have absolutely full powers to act so far as their own department is concerned. The Quartermaster-General can decide any question connected with the regulations of his department, unless it involves some large new expenditure.

1195. And so he would in the future, but it is scarcely possible to examine you upon this report if you have not studied it?—I read it through, but I did not take in the idea that all the Board was to be called in to deal with was the detailed administration of these various departments.

1196. It specially says not. "The Board should not attempt to deal with matters of routine or minor questions" (*vide* page 22)?—It is a question what is "routine" or "minor questions" to send up to the Board. All the questions that come up now to the Quartermaster-General or the Adjutant-General are far beyond routine or minor questions. I do not think it would be a workable plan.

1197. How far do minor questions go to the Secretary of State at present?—They never go to him at all.

1198. They are decided entirely in the department itself?—Entirely.

1199. I imagine that the system proposed would not touch those matters which you call minor matters?—But there are many things which are certainly beyond routine and minor matters that these high officers deal with and decide themselves, and I think to carry those to the Board for decision would be a clumsy arrangement.

1200. I do not wish to go into a discussion of what the Board of Admiralty is, but is it not that what you meant when you spoke of the system at the Board of Admiralty?—I am not familiar with the machinery at the Admiralty, and I do not know how far these smaller questions come up, I mean not very great questions, of course. Every great question must come, of course, before the Board, but to refer many of the questions that I have in my mind, that arise in these different departments to the Board to consider, which are certainly beyond routine, I do not think would be a workable arrangement.

1201. What is the difference between what I have been reading and the system of almost every industrial commercial company?—I believe the procedure as regards deciding upon these various matters varies in a great number of companies.

1202. No doubt, but the principle?—The principle is that they have practically a right to decide everything, but they entrust to subordinates the power to decide up to very large matters.

1203. Quite so?—And, of course, the question is where you draw the line. I think that if you give the heads of departments considerable power, the power that they have had up to the present time, there will be literally nothing for the Board to do in regard to the deciding of these questions that are below very important questions.

1204. But with regard to the decision of the more important questions, is it not desirable that here, as in other organisations, you should have a power of collective decision?—As regards a great number of things discussed at the Board, I think you must ultimately leave them to the Secretary of State to decide. Is the Secretary of State held to be a member of the Board?

1205. Yes, the Secretary of State is the President of the Board, according to the recommendation; but of course, naturally there is always a reservation that the Board is charged under the Secretary of State, and that the decisions are taken subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. That I imagine we may take as an axiom?—Yes.

1206. And I suppose the same thing applies to the Admiralty; but it is suggested at any rate to give the Board at the War Office a collective right of decision?—Including the Secretary of State?

1207. The Secretary of State is the President of the Board. I do not know how it would work, but I presume he would have the power of veto besides his position as President of the Board?—Such a system as that, of course, is worked at the Admiralty, but I am not familiar with the points that *de rigueur* have to come before the Admiralty Board.

1208. I am only asking you from your great knowledge of the War Office whether you think that a system of that kind would be an improvement on the present system, which does not give any collective power and decision to any Board?—It may be that I have been educated to hold such respect for the position and responsibility of the Secretary of State, as the responsible political officer, that I cannot get out of my mind the necessity for putting upon him personally the responsibility for the ultimate decision of any question of importance.

1209. Please do not take it that I have suggested that, or that I believe that this Committee suggested it?—I prefer the Army Board.

1209*. As it is?—As it is.

1210. Very well, that is what we want to know. We are much obliged to you for the history of the organisation, and that brings it up to the time of the war?—Yes, to the starting of the first Mobilisation Committee, on the 17th of June, 1899. In that committee there were, I may say generally, recommendations made which were in the direction of preparations, some of which were approved and some were not approved, because at the time it was thought matters had not advanced sufficiently far, and there was not much money available to carry out some of those recommendations.

1211. The actual order for mobilisation was, I think, on the 7th October?—Yes, but the Committee was summoned and arrangements of some extent went on continuously from the 27th June, 1899, until the end of the war.

1212. But it has been stated before us in evidence that the mobilisation, when it did come, on the 7th October, was to some extent delayed because there had been a want of financial authority until, I think, somewhere at the end of September?—You will find in the proceedings of this Committee what was from time to time sanctioned and ordered. A good number of things it was possible to carry out within the general means available for the War Office, the earlier preparations being directed to thoroughly equipping the force that was gradually being collected in South Africa. During this period, when affairs began to look serious, up to the ultimate outbreak of war and the order for general mobilisation, we were collecting from time to time troops quietly to strengthen the garrison there, so that at all events it should be in a position to meet any attack which might suddenly come upon us, and ultimately we had there, before this large force was dispatched, something like 21,000 men.

1213. Which you had done out of the ordinary resources of the War Office?—Yes, we had not been granted any additional money, but we were spending the money out of the £20,000,000 which we had been granted on the 1st of April.

1214. I am not, if I may explain, referring to an additional request for money from Parliament; but as I understand financial sanction was required in order that certain equipment might be ordered, for instance, clothing for the Army Corps to which the Mobilisation Order of the 7th October referred, and that that sanction was delayed from the 27th June, when you had a meeting of the Mobilisation Committee, to somewhere at the end of September?—Demands were made for a great number of things by those who anticipated something very big coming off, and they were not all complied with, principally for the reason that there was not the money available, and I suppose the Government thought probably there would not be any war, and it was not necessary to make large preparations.

1215. But this was at the time at which the Mobilisation Division of the War Office were making their preparations for the mobilisation of the First Army Corps, which they were making privately and confidentially?—Well, the preparations were not very great. I think if you go through those reports that I have been referring to you will find that there was not very much approved.

1216. But allow me just to say what I mean. According to the evidence from the Mobilisation branch, they did everything that was in their power to do in the way of making preparations for the Army Corps taking the field, but the equipment not being ready, the actual embarkation, and at any rate the putting of the Army Corps in the field, was delayed in consequence. I am only asking you whether you are aware that financial sanction was not given?—I do not think that created any delay during the period that your Lordship is referring to, that is to say, from an early day in October till the 17th.

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1217. That is not the date I am referring to; it was from the 27th of June?—Well, the Government had not contemplated sending such a large force abroad at that time, and did not make preparations for a large force then.

1218. Can you tell us what the Mobilisation Committee did in June when it met?—It made some recommendations, as I mentioned, on the 27th June, and some were approved, and some were not approved.

1219. Did it not make a recommendation on the 27th June that the Mobilisation Department should take up the necessary work for the mobilisation of the First Army Corps if called upon?—I do not know whether you have it before you, but I can read this. I am sure there is no harm in my doing it:—"Adjutant-General.—Although there is no present intention of reinforcing the troops now in South Africa, we should see to it that those already there are in a thoroughly efficient state as to stores, equipment, and transport. This question should be at once taken up. With regard to transport, I am of the impression that we have nothing but regimental transport, and that even this does not exist for a part of the force. I do not suppose it is necessary to provide transport, or, at all events, much transport for the battalions which form the garrison of the coaling station at Cape Town, or for the half battalion which belongs to Mauritius, but the rest of the force ought to be reasonably mobile." (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 426.) And that was what they had before them on that day.

1220. Who was the Adjutant-General at that time?—Sir Evelyn Wood. He says: "Besides this there are questions as to the sufficiency of our *personnel* in regard to Army Service Corps and Engineers, and of our material in regard to commissariat supplies and medical stores and transport. But the transport question is the most urgent—'What do we want, where and at what probable cost, and within what time can we get it?'" (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 426.) That was put by the Adjutant-General, practically reciting the minute of the Secretary of State; but you see there he only deals with the force that was then in South Africa, or immediately about to be sent to South Africa, and nothing is said about a larger expedition.

1221. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Not the First Army Corps?—No.

1222. (*Chairman.*) Of course, I do not know what took place at the meeting of the Mobilisation Committee, but is it not the case that at the end of June, in consultation with other War Office branches, the organisation and composition of a field force, of one Army Corps, one cavalry division, and lines of communication troops had been worked out in all its details, and this information had been communicated to the War Office branches concerned?—A force of 10,000 men, is it?

1223. One Army Corps and one Cavalry division?—I do not find that it came before the Mobilisation Committee then.

1224. That, of course, I cannot say, but it was communicated to the War Office by the Mobilisation Branch, and they also at the same time prepared all the forms of Proclamation, the mobilisation placards, and the schedules?—I find that at one of their meetings, on the 13th of July, there were words to this effect: "Mobilisation of Army Corps and Cavalry division, its composition in the advanced force, force from India, officers from ammunition column, dress, tents, purchase of mules, buck wagons," and so on. All those were under the deliberation of the Mobilisation Committee then.

1225. Are those proceedings on record?—Yes.

1226. Was that meeting to which you refer not the first meeting of the Special Committee called the Commander-in-Chief's Committee?—Yes.

1227. And the proceedings of that committee are on record?—Yes.

1228. Can we see those?—You will have to ask someone else to hand them in, but I remember well the way in which Mr. Wyndham laid before the House of Com-

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mons when it assembled his first demand for additional money and men, and he placed the statement before the House of Commons, dividing the expenditure into three heads. Of course, it was also divided according to the subheads of the votes, or an attempt to do so was made; but there were three headings in which the money asked for, the ten millions, was divided: "Expenditure to increase the efficiency and mobility of the force in South Africa on 1st July last, with the addition of two battalions of infantry for the protection of Natal, and the raising of local bodies of mounted infantry for the protection of Rhodesia," and that included provision for that up to the end of the year. The amount which is stated as prime charges, expenditure that had to be incurred in the way of stores and equipment and purchase of mules, and so on, was put down as £315,000.

1229. What date is that?—This was presented with the Estimate asking for the 35,000 men on the 17th October, 1899. Then the next group was: "Expenditure on the despatch of reinforcements from home, the Mediterranean, and India, three Cavalry regiments," and so on. This was the 10,000 men sent out, half of them practically from India, and half from home and the colonies. The prime charges for that were £942,000. Then comes the very big charge: "Expenditure on despatch of a cavalry division, Army Corps, and lines of communication troops, including the calling up of a portion of the Army Reserve and replacement of stores and clothing, including also the embodiment of a portion of the Militia," and so forth. That was put down at £8,000,000 out of the £10,000,000, £5,700,000 being stated as prime charges. Of that amount £2,760,000, or nearly half of it, was for the purchase of animals connected with transport. You will find from this statement the various demands on which various decisions were given. When an expedition of this kind is undertaken by this country, a very difficult problem, a problem which could not be solved before, has to be solved at once. The Department, in times of peace, never knows where the next campaign is to be carried on, and our experience is that there is always an enormous amount of *ad hoc* expenditure to be incurred, because of the great variety of the places in which our campaigns are conducted. In Egypt we have to collect all the camels that exist, and "stern wheelers" have to be manufactured to get up the river, while at another place you organise your transport of natives to carry everything on their heads; at another place it is all mules, at one place it is horses, and the clothing required by the troops varies in the same way. I remember that during this time of pressure it was decided that we were to begin to clothe our men in khaki. That was drill khaki—khaki which would be mainly usable in either a warm climate or a temperate climate. It was decided when the question of this campaign came up that everybody must have khaki woollen clothing, a perfectly new equipment, quite different from anything we had in existence, and the whole of that had to be prepared, and was prepared, for the force contemplated before those men started.

1230. That is exactly the point I put to you. What was represented to us was, that because of the want of financial sanction the starting of those men was delayed in order to get that equipment?—Well, I am not absolutely cognisant of the fact; I hardly think so; I do not think that delay was consequent upon that. The despatch of this expedition was decided upon absolutely on political grounds, and the time for the despatch of it was governed entirely by political arguments. Although the difficulty was found that we were, as it were, changing horses while crossing the stream, or appeared to be doing so, those difficulties were tackled and overcome in the most extraordinarily short time, and I do not certainly remember the fact that the actual date of the despatch, or the date for mobilisation of the troops, was governed by the fact that they were waiting for any of these things.

1231. I understand you to say that in June there was no distinct intention by the Government, or almost apprehension by the Government, that they would have to despatch a force of the size of an Army Corps?—Quite so.

1232. You are aware that they had received warnings beforehand from the Intelligence Department that it might be necessary?—Yes.

1233. Those reports of the Intelligence branch I suppose you saw, and were cognisant of?—I cannot say that I am.

1234. Would they not come before the Army Board?—Not necessarily; under the arrangement by which the various officers are made the principal advisers on certain points of the Secretary of State, they are in constant immediate communication with him, and these matters were thought to be so secret that there was little or nothing, as it were, on record in the Department.

1235. But there was the handbook "Military Notes"?—Of the Intelligence Department?

1236. Yes?—As to the calculated force of the Boers, and so forth?

1237. Yes?—Yes, I am aware of that.

1238. And that was based upon various memoranda submitted by Sir John Ardagh?—Yes.

1239. These I should have thought the Permanent Under Secretary would have seen?—No, they did not come through me.

1240. And they did not therefore come before the Army Board in any way?—I do not think so.

1241. You are a member of the Army Board?—No.

1242. Not as Permanent Under Secrtary?—No.

1243. There have been so many boards that I have got confused. You are speaking now of the Commander-in-Chief's Committee as the Army Board?—Yes; the Commander-in-Chief's Committee was the Mobilisation Committee in another form. It was made the Army Board afterwards.

1244. Were you a member of the War Office Council?—Yes. To discuss these things a formal meeting of the War Office Council was not always summoned; the Secretary of State dealt with these matters very much himself in personal communication with the officers.

1245. I may take it the reports from the Director-General of Military Intelligence do not come under the cognizance of the Permanent Under Secretary?—Well, they should, but they do not necessarily do so; these officers having personal access to the Secretary of State really opens the door to a large number of irregularities of that kind.

1246. At any rate, the handbook you saw?—Yes.

1247. And that, I suppose, was in the possession of the members of the War Office Council?—Well, I am not quite sure of that.

1248. It would not come before the War Office Council?—No, I do not remember its being discussed before the War Office Council.

1249. But, at any rate, whoever was responsible for the matter had the information from the Intelligence Division, whose duty it was to give the warning, that the state of preparation in South Africa was deficient long before June?—Certainly, if there was to be a fight.

1250. You are aware that the Boers were accumulating very large stocks of arms and ammunition?—Well, it is so stated, and I suppose it has been proved that they were.

1251. That was to be seen from the handbook?—Yes.

1252. For what purpose could they have been accumulating these stocks?—I am afraid you are getting into the politics of the question.

1253. I only ask you as a matter of fact?—Well, it was to make their position sure against any attack, and to give them the power of attacking, supposing they wished to do so.

1254. And we made no corresponding preparations?—Practically none; we were simply sending into the country a force which was thought to be sufficient to repel any sudden attack that might be made, and were equipping it as fully as we could. Our efforts were really limited to that, but there were certain preparations in progress pressed on because all these disturbances were in the air. The field gun for instance, we were at that time endeavouring to discover the best possible pattern of quick-firing gun, and having designs sent in by all the principal gunmakers available, and the arsenal were devising and making out designs as well, and when it seemed that things were getting towards a crux, instructions were given to alter, according to the best pattern that had been devised, every field gun in the country, and that was done.

1255. Of what date are you speaking now?—It was really in the interim period from about that time; it was not a question of mobilisation or Army Board, but for some time we were anxious to get a pattern for a quick-firing field gun.

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1256. You are speaking of the summer of 1899?—Yes, and orders were given to push the thing ahead as much as ever they could, and to convert every one of the field guns into the new pattern. It was a question of a spring to govern the recoil, and every field gun in the country was converted within that period.

1257. I suppose that we shall get all these details from Sir Henry Brackenbury?—Yes. That sort of preparation was going on. It was what would be done in ordinary course, only it was pressed on with greater rapidity.

1258. But not till the summer of 1899?—No, the pattern had not been decided upon. We were in an awkward position; our patterns, due to experiments and experience, and learning the changes introduced by other countries, are being constantly revised, and this was one of the patterns that was being examined just at that time, and a good deal of money was spent upon it. So with regard to some other things—I am mentioning things that occur to me—for instance, the transport carts; when it was seen that if there was a campaign, it would be a campaign in South Africa, it was decided to alter every transport waggon in the whole service from shafts to pole, in order that they would be fitted for the mule draught. That sort of thing was going on. You will get the details from Sir Henry Brackenbury.

1259. Is there any other point that comes under your special observation and experience that you would like to call our attention to?—Of course I should like to repeat what I have said on several occasions, that it is almost fruitless re-organising a department unless you give it a proper house to live in. I know one member of your Commission here knows well how, and for how long so far as the department is concerned, it has been pressing for a proper office in which to carry on its duties.

1260. It is being built?—One is now being built, due very much to one of the distinguished members of your Commission, and of course also to an accident—I mean the Death Duties surplus. Whether it would ever have been decided upon if that surplus had not turned up I cannot say, but the department as a department has been pressing for a house in which it could carry on its business for years and years. We thought some 15 years ago we were going to have it. It was most awkward to be found in the position of entering upon such a campaign as that which has just been carried to a successful issue, in a series of offices very badly constructed and separated from one another by distances which made conference almost an impossibility, and at all events involved always enormous waste of time.

1261. Of course the dislocation of offices must tend to the inefficient working of a department?—Yes. I know that the Admiralty have suffered very much in the same way.

1262. At the same time you will get now a very much better office than you would have got 15 years ago?—I doubt it

1263. Have you not increased in size?—Yes, we have increased in size, but I remember the plans at that time, and I thought they were excellent plans. I cannot remember exactly the increase that has taken place in the interval, but it has been considerable. Since the war it has increased. It was extremely awkward being placed in the difficulty of carrying out all these arrangements, when the office was scattered in the way in which it was.

1264. From Pall Mall to a fourth floor flat in Victoria Street?—Yes. I have no doubt they were the best within reasonable reach that could be provided, but we were absolutely without a house, and to reorganise a department without a proper house to put it in is practically fruitless. I may mention one instance to which attention has been drawn, the Intelligence Division and the Mobilisation Division; those were, I remember, some few years ago integral parts of the same division, the Intelligence Division, but they were down at Queen Anne's Gate with a very large amount of impedimenta, not very easily removed. However, in order that the mobilisation part of it should be in touch with the high military officers, that limb of it was cut off from the Intelligence Department, and it was brought up to the War Office, so that the Intelligence Department and the Mobilisation were locally divided, and that tends very much to absolutely cut off the connection between one and the other. Now, fortunately, owing to our having been lucky enough to lay hold of a big house in St. James's Square for the time those departments can be brought together again, and they are being amalgamated now. Your lordship has pointed two or three times to the general belief that preparations upon the necessary scale were not entered upon sufficiently early. I do not think anybody, however, with any experience at all, would deny the fact that the War Office did enormous things; I know the efforts that were made and the difficulties that were overcome, and one or two of those I have mentioned called upon people to do work which they were willing to do, but had never done before in their lives, and I do not believe, in consequence of having done them now they would ever be capable of doing them again, and very great difficulties were overcome in obtaining what was necessary. It is absolutely clear that if any operations of this kind have to be entered upon, they must be entered upon, and preparations made as to the provision of transport long before the time at which they were made on the occasion of this war. That was not due to the department, but due entirely to political exigencies.

1265. (*Viscount Esher.*) Sir Ralph, what papers go before the Under-Secretary of State, as a rule—everything that goes to the Secretary of State?—That is the rule; but, unfortunately, there are very many exceptions in consequence, as I have said, of this power of personal access on the part of the heads of departments to the Secretary of State himself, and they were constantly carrying papers to him and getting decisions from him which, according to my view, should properly go through the Under-Secretary of State.

1266. Therefore it was not certain that you saw everything that the Secretary of State saw?—Certainly not, by no means.

1267. When was your attention drawn to the probability of a war in South Africa?—I cannot fix any particular date; it varied with different people. There were those who thought that the difficulty would be overcome in other ways than by a war, but that it was a possibility really, you may say, began with the raid, as it is commonly called.

1268. How soon do you remember efforts being made by the military authorities, by the Commander-in-Chief or the Intelligence Department, to bring pressure upon the Secretary of State to make preparations in South Africa?—These things were done so very much by conversation between the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief and other officers, that I really cannot say.

1269. Do you remember, or do you know, that Lord Wolseley pressed the Secretary of State, say a year beforehand, or six months beforehand, to make preparations for the possible despatch of an Army Corps to South Africa?—I believe about this time there were various proposals made.

1270. You mean about June?—Yes, about June. I understand from the speech made by Lord Lansdowne in the House of Lords that Lord Wolseley had suggested what I suggested, viz., the mobilisation of an Army Corps. I was very much interested indeed in the scheme that had been adopted 30 years ago, as I practically devised it myself, of working the system of short service in our Army, but I was never able to answer those people who criticised it by saying: "Oh, this thing will not succeed. You will not get the men," and that was the sort of popular criticism. I always had great confidence in the system, and I said: "I cannot say to you or to anybody that this thing will come off satisfactorily, but I think that we are bound almost at our first opportunity to see whether it will come off, and to see whether it is a system on which we can rely of any strength at all," and I urged that an Army Corps should be mobilised.

1271. At what date was that?—I cannot say the exact time; I did it verbally.

1272. Was it early in 1899?—Yes, it was early in 1899, and I understand that Lord Wolseley recommended the same thing.

1273. There is no record of that, is there?—No record of my suggestion.

1274. Your point is that the military authorities, the War Office practically apart from the Secretary of State, did what they could to mobilise an Army Corps early in 1899?—Yes.

1275. And that the refusal to do so rests entirely

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with the Government?—Yes, the Government; I imagine, as it was done not by me but by Lord Wolseley, it did go before the Government, and I think Lord Lansdowne has explained his reason for not doing it in the House of Lords.

1276. Your representations were made to the Secretary of State?—Yes, I said so myself.

1277. The Chairman asked your opinion about the recommendations of Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee. Do you not think that if such a recommendation as was made by you and by the Commander-in-Chief independently had come from a board such as is suggested by that Committee, it would have come with greater force?—I think not greater force than if it had come as the deliberate opinion given by the combined military authorities. Do you mean greater force with the Government generally as a whole?

1278. Yes, would it have carried greater weight with the Government as a whole?—Well, if it had been come to, and the Secretary of State in his strong position was not a consenting party, and, looking at it from the political point of view, was quite against it, I doubt whether it would.

1279. But you do not know at this moment whether Lord Lansdowne agreed with you and Lord Wolseley, or whether he did not; all you know is that the decision was not come to by the Government?—That is so.

1280. You see my point?—I do.

1281. You said that you preferred the existing Army Board to the recommendation of the Dawkins Committee, but then you said earlier that you had indicated that the Army Board was not worked *con amore* as you called it?—Yes.

1282. I suppose you would not suggest that the Army Board at the present moment is a very influential body in determining the action of the Government?—No, not with the restrictions upon it that have been imposed, which restrictions I would withdraw altogether. As I explained, the Army Board was to deal with promotion and the preparation of the Estimates; practically it was limited to that, together with such subjects as the Secretary of State referred to it. Well, I would give them the power of initiative, and I think they ought to have the power of initiative. Men in that position, very high general officers in the Army responsible for the military defence of the country, should be in the position to be able absolutely without a Secretary of State to say what they think is necessary, and to put before him as many plans as they like, thoroughly threshed out, and that then the question becomes purely a political question, and the Secretary of State should deal with it.

1283. Now you are coming to something very like the recommendation of Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee, except that the Secretary of State is not to be consulted at all; that is the only difference between you and that Committee?—That is the difference.

1284. Did you see all the telegrams which passed between the Secretary of State and the officers commanding in South Africa?—Well, yes; they were open to my inspection, at all events.

1285. They were all printed?—Yes, they all exist.

1286. Do they not go to the Under-Secretary of State?—Not before they are sent.

1287. But I mean after they are printed?—Certainly, from time to time they would come up as they were printed.

1288. The confidential despatches which are not necessarily presented to Parliament are not printed in the War Office, are they?—Yes, the war despatches were printed.

1289. That is to say, any despatches which were sent home by Lord Roberts or Sir Redvers Buller are all printed?—They were all printed.

1290. They do exist in a printed form?—They do exist in a printed form.

1291. Take the instructions to Sir George White, for instance, are they printed?—I cannot recall; I should imagine——

1292. They would be printed?—That is to say, before he started?

1293. Before he started?—I cannot recall whether they were printed or not.

1294. You said that the Quartermaster-General had full powers to decide on questions arising within his department. What did you mean exactly by that? Is it not the fact that a great many questions of detail go to the Secretary of State?—Not unless they involve questions of principle or involve any large expense.

1295. Take an ordinary routine question like the despatch of drafts to India, for instance, is it not the fact that the Secretary of State would be informed in the ordinary official way by a paper going up to him that the drafts were leaving for India on such and such a date?—A return is made out and printed, and such papers are distributed through the office for the information of all concerned, and that would go to his private secretary.

1296. Who would give the order for the despatch of drafts?—The Adjutant-General.

1297. He would give the final order without reference to the Secretary of State at all?—Certainly.

1298. Papers of that character were not sent to you day by day?—Oh, no, nothing of that kind, unless some crux arose as to being able to supply drafts or anything of that kind, but the ordinary routine of despatching drafts would not go beyond the Adjutant-General's own department.

1299. What did the immense pile of papers which used to come to you day by day consist of, as a rule, not when you were Accountant-General, but when you were Under-Secretary of State? Would you not call those routine questions, or a great many of them?—No, I do not think you could call them routine; there were some routine questions, certainly. Take promotions beyond a certain rank, these would come up to the Secretary of State, the appointment of a general officer or staff officer of high rank, any promotion, in fact, which although contemplated by the regulations, was very exceptinal, or anything of that kind.

1300. Take the ordinary promotion to be commander of a regiment, for instance, would that come to the Secretary of State?—Yes.

1301. That would not be dealt with by the Commander-in-Chief?—No, the Army Board would recommend, and it would go to the Secretary of State to approve.

1302. Do you not call that a mere routine question?—No, I do not think so.

1303. Why?—The command of a regiment is one of the most important positions that a man can possibly hold.

1304. And the Commander-in-Chief is not supposed to be qualified to decide a question of that kind, even on the recommendation of the Army Board?—Well, questions arise with reference to them which sometimes the Army Board even is not prepared to face.

1305. Supposing such a question did arise, I suppose it would be obvious beforehand that it had arisen. What sort of question could arise which would necessitate bringing in the supreme authority of the Secretary of State?—The supersession of an officer—the special compulsory retirement of an officer in consequence of this promotion being given. It might lead to the compulsory retirement of another officer.

1306. And you consider, at least it is considered in the War Department, that these are questions which it is not competent for the Commander-in-Chief, in spite of the great position which he occupies in the Army, to decide?—It is intended, I think, more as a safeguard than otherwise, and to let the Secretary of State be aware of the exceptional proceedings which are taking place, because, as your Lordship knows very well, when those exceptional proceedings do take place, the next day there is a question in the House of Commons.

1307. I know prefectly well that the Secretary of State is ultimately responsible, but at the same time you know perfectly well, as Under-Secretary of State, that he cannot deal with every question which may possibly give occasion for a query in Parliament?—Certainly, one does not know anything about a great number of things that are made the ground of questions in Parliament, as they have arisen in the district, and no one at headquarters can know anything about them without special inquiry.

1308. With all your great experience in the War Department, is it not your opinion that the Secretary of State could be relieved of a great deal of routine work which would give him more time to attend to questions of greater issue?—I think he could, and I would relieve him. I think the proper plan is to entrust

the various duties to persons who would be held responsible for giving decisions, and if they do not do it properly, get rid of them.

1309. You think that it would be a good change in the War Office to throw more responsibility upon the heads of the great departments?—I think so, certainly; but that is always subject to revision; that is to say, a man is not held responsible unless there is the machinery for holding him responsible. A man is not accountable unless he renders accounts.

1310. Did you not have, as Under-Secretary of State, sometimes to make decisions without referring to the Secretary of State?—It depended entirely on the importance of the question.

1311. Say as Accountant-General?—Well, I would give decisions as Accountant-General, but the military authorities always had the right of appeal from those decisions to the Under-Secretary of State.

1312. Did the Under-Secretary of State give a final decision?—Yes, he would, according to the importance of the matter.

1313. That is the sort of responsibility I mean; you took, then, the responsibility of the decision?—Yes.

1314. If the Secretary of State were relieved of a great deal of what I call ordinary routine work, do you not think it would leave him freer to deal with larger questions of administration?—I do not think the amount of routine work is considerable, although he is absolutely troubled with the duty of signing every commission which is regarded as part of the Constitution; that sort of thing he certainly ought to be relieved of in some way; some machinery ought to be invented to get rid of it; but still things go up to the King for signature which are purely routine.

1315. Did you see any of the correspondence between the Secretary of State and Sir William Butler?—Yes, I saw some of it; whether or not I saw all of it I do not know.

1316. Do you know whether Sir William Butler urged that steps should be taken to reinforce the garrison in South Africa at an earlier date than that at which reinforcements were sent out?—Well, Sir William Butler did ask for certain reserves to be laid in, but I think his recommendations did not go further than that.

1317. I suppose that correspondence is printed, too?—Yes, he was asked generally to advise, and that was, I think, principally the advice he gave.

1318. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You gave us a very interesting account of the progress and changes in the organisation of the War Department up to the beginning of the war, but there were subsequent changes—for instance, the positions held by the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General are now quite different?—The position of Adjutant-General is quite different.

1319. I did not clearly understand what your duties were as Under-Secretary of State for War; you clearly have no executive control over any of the departments?—None.

1320. Although I suppose you are really the person to make promotions amongst the clerks, and that sort of thing?—Yes.

1321. I always thought that the duty of the Under-Secretary of State was to submit almost all the papers of importance that go to him to the Secretary of State, but apparently from what you say a good deal which you have never seen goes straight to the Secretary of State?—That was so during my time, certainly.

1322. Did you not understand that in most departments it is understood that the Under-Secretary of State is the sort of channel of communication with the Secretary of State?—That is the general rule, but I know there are departments in which exceptions are made to that from time to time to meet the convenience of the Secretary of State. In the Colonial Office, for instance, some branch may be very heavily worked, and, to make everything in connection with it go through the Under-Secretary as a matter of course, might, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, give rise to inconvenience, and he would rather deal with the head of the branch, but I think it is a bad plan. I think there should be some permanent officer certainly who is cognisant of everything that goes on, and if the Secretary of State has not confidence in him he ought to get rid of him.

1323. Then we cannot assume that the Under-Secretary of State knows everything, although something of considerable importance has been done by the Secretary of State?—That is so. I do not know whether you know the location of the War Office, but the Commander-in-Chief has a room adjoining that of the Secretary of State practically, with a door into it, and they are in constant communication with one another, and of what verbally passes there is no record whatever; and so with regard to the other officers; say, the Director-General of Ordnance would go into the Secretary of State's room as a matter of course and discuss many questions with him. That I always understood there could be no objection to. I mean if the Secretary of State wants to see any officer of his department he sees him, but when the question takes the form of the *litera scripta*, whatever discussion may have taken place, there ought to be a written decision upon it, and that ought to be submitted through the Under-Secretary of State, I think, without question. It was constantly occurring that decisions were obtained direct by the heads of different departments on their *ex parte* statement by the Secretary of State.

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See Q. 21469.

1324. There are tables of equipment for all branches of the Service in the War Office?—Yes.

1325. Showing exactly what is to be kept up for each branch at home and abroad?—Yes.

1326. Those include, of course, ammunition and other stores?—Yes.

1327. Were those complete at the time war broke out, or were there any serious deficiencies?—For the force that was contemplated they were absolutely complete. Of course, as I have said, changes are constantly going on; we were introducing new clothing for the Army, khaki clothing, and whether everything was ready at that particular time or not I cannot say in consequence of this change, but the quantities that had been laid down were certainly in existence. It was the business of the Mobilisation Branch to be constantly looking into this, and seeing that the reserves were up to what was contemplated. Sometimes, in consequence of a large issue at a particular time, they would be apparently depleted, and it would always be asked what steps had been taken to replenish the stores.

1328. Does the Mobilisation Branch perform that duty and constantly represent?—Yes, it does.

1329. And by that system the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State at all times know what articles are deficient?—Well, returns go to the Mobilisation Branch; the Mobilisation Branch draws attention to anything which, according to their view, is deficient in any way. Of course, changes of pattern always give rise to a difficulty, and one of the difficulties that arose on the eve of this war was with regard to the small arm ammunition. It was decided that the Mark IV. ammunition should not be used, and the greater part of our reserve consisted of this Mark IV. ammunition, which had been approved. Mark IV. and Mark V. were both under consideration, and it was decided that it was a bad form of ammunition, and in order that they should not be used, the stock, having been, as it were, condemned or regarded as obsolete, was reduced to something very low indeed; but measures were immediately taken to replenish up to the full all the reserves that were contemplated. The Manufacturing Departments and the trade were making some 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 rounds a week.

See 1389.

1330. That created a real danger for the time?—When you know that you have a reserve power of making 5,000,000 rounds of ammunition a week, the danger hardly exists. Of course, there was some Mark II. in existence, and that was utilised, and all that was necessary was easily made up by turning on this large manufacturing power.

1331. Did a portion of that ammunition that was discarded form part of the equipment of the troops in South Africa?—No, the desirable ammunition was available for them; of the other not a round, except by pure accident, was used by the troops in South Africa.

1332. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) What position did Sir John Ardagh hold in October, 1896?—I cannot recall at the present moment.

1333. I am informed that he was Director-General of Military Intelligence. There is a memorandum which was written by him: through what channel would that reach, first of all the Commander-in-Chief, and then the Secretary of State?—It would go to the Commander-in-Chief; the head of the Military Intelligence Department

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has always been under the Commander-in-Chief, and it would go to him, but it would not necessarily come to me.

1334. Did you happen to see a memorandum written by him entitled "The Transvaal Boers from a Military Point of View," in October, 1896?—No, I cannot say that I remember it.

1335. Had you heard of that memorandum?—I would not have heard of it in 1896; I was not in the position of Under-Secretary at that time.

1336. That memorandum pointed out the then situation in South Africa, and stated that the South African Republic was expending that year £2,350,000 on military preparations, and goes on to say: "This large expenditure can have no other explanation than an anticipation of war or an intention of aggression against this country and its supremacy in South Africa." (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 163.) It also stated "that the Boers are still more disposed and better prepared for a rupture with England than ever before, and in no way inclined to redress the grievances of the Uitlanders." (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 164.) Is that according your recollection?—It would not come to me at all then, as I was not Under-Secretary at the time.

1337. But it would have reached the hands of the Commander-in-Chief?—I cannot say that there was any security that it would, but in all probability it would.

1338. To whom would Sir John Ardagh, as matter of fact, being Director of the Intelligence Division, address such a memorandum in the first instance?—To the Commander-in-Chief.

1339. And I suppose it would reach his hands if addressed to him?—Certainly it would go to him as a matter of course, but he might have taken it directly to the Secretary of State without its coming to me.

1340. However, it must have reached the hands of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

1341. That is in October, 1896: can you say whether anything was at that time done with respect to preparation of guns? You say that great efforts were made to transpose the guns into quick-firing guns: was anything done in October, 1896?—The pattern of those guns was being constantly under consideration. I cannot connect it definitely with that particular date, but the pattern of the field gun has been a point of constant consideration with a view to improving it and making it the best gun in the world as long as I can remember. That process is going on constantly.

1342. Who was the head of the Intelligence Division in September, 1898?—Sir John Ardagh.

1343. Were you then Under-Secretary?—Yes.

1344. Do you remember a memorandum drawn up by Sir John Ardagh or by the Intelligence Division reaching your hands about that date?—No. I do not.

1345. Will this passage bring it to your recollection? It was pointed out in that memorandum (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 168) that "the Transvaal has during the last two years" (that is up to 1898) "made military preparations on a scale which can only be intended to meet the contingency of a contest with Great Britain"?—Well, I should like to refresh my memory as to whether I saw that; I have some recollection.

1346. I will read you another portion: "These preparations still continue, and the condition of affairs in South Africa has practically now become that of an armed neutrality which may last for years or may culminate in war at very short notice"?—No, I do not remember seeing that report.

1347. Would that, in the ordinary course of business in your department, pass through your hands in order to reach the Secretary of State?—As I explained, not necessarily so; it would come to the Commander-in-Chief, and the Commander-in-Chief might take it straight in to the Secretary-of-State.

1348. Without your seeing it?—Yes.

1349. But it would reach the hands of the Commander-in-Chief?—Certainly.

1350. The same report gave the latest information as to the armed strength of the Republics, and after pointing out that there were reasons to believe that "in a war against the Transvaal we should certainly find the sister Republic ranged against us," estimated that after deducting all local garrisons and non-effectives, the Republic could organise for offensive operations beyond their frontiers a force of not less than 27,000 men?—That is the pamphlet.

1351. No, that is a statement in that memorandum of the 21st September, 1898?—I do not remember that.

1352. It was also stated in the same memorandum that projects for offensive operations had been drawn up in Pretoria?—No, I do not remember having seen those documents.

1353. Your attention has never been drawn to those?—No.

1354. You are aware that very large stores were placed at Ladysmith?—Yes.

1355. Do you know to what value military stores were placed there?—No, I cannot state what the value was—I believe very considerable.

1356. It has been stated that it was a very large store?—Very large.

1357. Who was responsible for placing the stores in that position? Would that be the Commander-in-Chief?—Not necessarily; the Secretary of State's decision might have been taken upon it, but I cannot say that I can remember.

1358. Would that be done by any officer subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief; for instance, the Quartermaster-General?—No, I think not; there must have been some recommendation, as I think there was, that Ladysmith should be the station in which a reserve should be accumulated in defence of the frontier. Of course, it was some distance from the frontier, but whose ultimate decision it was I cannot remember.

1359. Do you know whether there was any report placed before the Commander-in-Chief as to the position of Ladysmith and its capabilities of being defended, and so forth, in case of attack?—I cannot say; I do not know whether any representations on those points were made to him or not.

1360. Previous to placing large quantities of military stores in a certain position, would it not be reasonable to suppose that some representations had been made?—Yes, certainly, but do you mean representations as to the inadvisability of placing them there?

1361. Or the advisability as the case might be?—His decision certainly would be taken, or his opinion, as to whether stores should be collected there.

1362. Whose opinion?—The Commander-in-Chief's; I do not think it would be decided without his opinion.

1363. If large military stores are placed in a position which by possibility may be attacked, would you not expect at the same time to find some preparations made for defence, for instance, guns of position being sent there?—It is entirely a military question as to what should be done to defend a place of that kind.

1364. But if large quantities of military stores are collected, are they not generally put in a place capable of defence—in a citadel or in a place defended by forts?—One would certainly suppose that it was defensible; I would suppose that was a point that would be considered in the decision.

1365. You are not aware that any report was obtained by the Commander-in-Chief as to the state of affairs at Ladysmith, although you are aware that large quantities of military stores were sent there?—The occupation, although it was not in my time, of Ladysmith was certainly reported upon; the desirability of locating stores there was reported upon by officers out there, and their recommendations considered, and a decision given upon the point, and the stores went there after that decision was come to.

1366. (*Sir John Edge.*) When was that, roughly speaking—1896, 1897, 1898, or 1899?—I have not refreshed my memory as regards those dates, and I should be afraid to speak exactly.

1367. Your recollection was that it was on local representation that the stores were collected at Ladysmith?—Yes.

1368. Mark IV. is an expanding bullet, is it not?—It is a cup-nosed bullet.

1369. Which you say was contrary to the recommendation?—Yes.

1370. Mark V. was also in the same category?—Yes.

1371. They, I suppose, were withdrawn on account of the Hague Conference?—The question was very much

discussed, and although I think our representatives took the view that it was an admissible bullet, still the Government came to the decision that it should not be used on this occasion.

1372. In South Africa?—In South Africa.

1373. And it was not?—And it was not.

1374. I understand that the memorandum prepared by the Director-General of Military Intelligence, by Sir John Ardagh, for instance, and handed to the Commander-in-Chief might or might not come to you?—Yes.

1375. And might or might not go to the Secretary of State?—Quite so; the Commander-in-Chief might think if he did not agree with it, that it was not of sufficient importance, and he would retain it himself; but if it was of real importance—and you must leave him to form his own judgment about it—he would necessarily see that it went to the Secretary of State. Some of his representations he used to send through me, and some he did not.

1376. Personally you are unable to tell us whether these memoranda prepared by Sir John Ardagh, which have been referred to to-day, ever went to the Secretary of State at all?—I cannot say.

1377. You told us that in 1899 you recommended that an Army Corps should be mobilised. Was that before, or during, or after the Bloemfontein Conference?—I cannot fix the exact date, but it was about June.

1378. Not earlier in the year?—Not earlier in the year.

1379. I suppose that had reference to the possibility of its coming to be used in South Africa?—Yes, we had never tested our Reserve scheme.

1380. But your recommendation was not for the purpose of testing but to be ready with a definite purpose of sending out to South Africa?—Yes, with a double purpose really.

1381. (*Sir John Jackson.*) With reference to the despatch of the Army Corps in October, 1899, and the delays in getting ships to hand at that time, is it the fact that under the then existing contracts between the Admiralty and the owners of the large shipping lines, such as the Orient Company, the Admiralty had no call upon these steamers as transports, but only as armed cruisers?—That, I think, was the case; but I think perhaps it would be advisable to ask an Admiralty representative the definite question. It was always contemplated that we should have to get together the transport from the mercantile marine for carrying any force from one part of the world to the other. We had no special call upon any ships, I think, as transports, as you have said, and we had no transports of our own.

1382. If the Government was able to arrange that they had a call on these vessels as armed cruisers, do you see any reason why such an arrangement might not have been made that they should have had a similar call upon them for transport purposes?—Yes, I think that is so; and I imagine that to some extent is what is now being contemplated, but yet there is this disadvantage as regards a call of that kind, that the ships may not always be in a position in which they are any good to you; they may be at the other end of the world when you want them.

1383. But, on the other hand, if these ships were in British ports at that time, there would be no practical difficulty, provided there was such an arrangement?—No, but I do not think there was any difficulty really in getting together the necessary transport of the very best kind. The Admiralty have always said that they could within, I really forget what number of days, but a very short time, get together sufficient ships to convey a body of a certain number anywhere, and the War Office have always said that by the time those ships are ready to take the force abroad the troops would be absolutely ready to embark.

1384. From the evidence I have heard so far it appears to me the delays have been rather in getting the ships ready. Now, if, as you say, the Government had no call upon these ships as transports, they then, having decided that they required these vessels, would have to enter into negotiation with the owners as to questions of price, and so forth, would they not?—Yes, that would be so, but I do not think any difficulty arose on this occasion in that way. The Admiralty, I believe, were a little bit beforehand in making enquiries as to what vessels were available (for some week or ten days perhaps, and that you can get from them), and when the troops were ready on mobilisation the ships were ready, and when the ships were ready the troops were ready, so much so that within one week, as I have no doubt you are aware, 25,000 men were embarked; that is to say, they were mobilised on a certain date, and within ten days the men had all come in and were fully equipped, 98 per cent. of them; the units were formed, and they were ready for embarkation one day or two days after that, and within a week 25,000 men were embarked.

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1385. Is it the fact that when war was declared we had no quick-firing guns in South Africa?—That is a question I cannot answer. There was not much artillery there; some had come from India, and they would not be of the most recent pattern. As I have explained, the pattern was under discussion in the early part of the year, and as soon as the decision could be come to as to a practical design every effort was made to convert those guns, and I believe, perhaps with the exception of the Indian guns, every single field gun that went out there was according to the latest pattern.

1386. But before war was declared the Boers had these quick-firing guns, and what they called their pom-poms?—They bought guns of all kinds wherever they could. We, to repeat, were examining the different patterns of these guns, trying to get hold of the best pattern wherever it existed, whether in France or Germany, or the best that could be designed by our own people, and a decision was come to as soon as it could be to adopt a certain pattern, and immediately the work was commenced, and, I remember, completed, within an extraordinarily short time.

1387. In point of fact, it was after the Boers had rather played havoc with us with these pom-poms that requisitions were made from the theatre of war to have pom-poms provided?—I think evidence upon that would be better obtained from others, but my own impression has been that the pom-pom never did very much destruction, but it had an extraordinary moral effect upon our troops. That pom-pom had been offered to our Government for the distinct purpose of defence against torpedo boats; it was tried for that purpose, and was rejected by our people, as they thought it was not satisfactory, but they had never up to that time contemplated using it in the field.

1388. The pom-poms are of British manufacture, Elswick or Vickers?—Yes, it was designed by the trade, but it was designed and presented to our people, in my recollection, as a weapon to meet the attack of torpedo boats, and for that purpose it was rejected. I do not know that they considered it for field purposes; they had their own field gun, of which they were very proud, and with which they were completely satisfied, and they did not contemplate the use of the pom-pom in the field.

1389. Then you spoke of our reserve power; if I am correct I put it down, "We were able to manufacture 5,000,000 rounds a week"?—Yes.

See Q. 1329.

1390. Is it a fact that shortly after the commencement of the war large quantities of ammunition had to be procured, and, in point of fact, were procured, on behalf of the Government from continental sources?—Not continental sources; what the Government did was to collect from stations that were not likely to be exposed to attack as much of the Mark II. ammunition as could be collected, and that was a considerable supply, and was immediately sent out, and at the same time this power of manufacture was turned on. I have no recollection of our buying from foreign sources.

1391. The reserve power you spoke of, I take it, had regard to what could be done by the Government factories?—Government and tradesmen who manufacture practically only for us; we are the only market for that sort of thing that Kynochs and one or two other companies make. I think at the factories they can make about 2,500,000 rounds a week.

1392. It is not within your knowledge, then, I take it from what you say, that some of the British manufacturers, in order to get these supplies sufficiently quickly, bought ammunition from continental sources?—They may have bought the components of the ammunition, but I do not think they bought the ammunition.

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1393. I will say the components of the ammunition?—They may have; we use chemicals and various things of that kind in the manufacture of cordite, and at one time certainly the Continent was our only chief source of supply. I cannot say from my own knowledge whether any of those articles were bought during the war, but we were setting to work, I know, manufacturing some of these components ourselves. They were chemicals principally, and it might have been that purchases of that kind were made abroad.

1394. With reference to the control of the factories by the Order of 1888, to which you referred this morning, you stated, I think, that they were controlled by a civil engineer, Sir William Anderson?—Yes.

1395. He was a man, of course, who had had very successful experience as a contractor for the manufacture of machinery—Easton and Anderson, I think?—Yes.

1396. What I should just like you to give the Commission an opinion upon is whether you consider that this plan as laid down by the Order of 1888 had not many advantages, particularly in regard to the cost of manufacture, over the present plan of having the control of these factories in the hands of a purely military officer?—I am very strongly of that opinion; I agree with Mr. Stanhope and Mr. Brodrick, and do not agree with either Sir Henry Brackenbury or Lord Lansdowne.

1397. A reference was made this morning to the correspondence immediately prior to the war between Sir William Butler and the Secretary of State; that, I take it, we should have before us?—I have no doubt that it will be presented by the War Office if asked for.

1398. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) We were informed yesterday in evidence that an order to mobilise would be delayed in its execution in part by having to wait for the provision of funds. Are you cognisant of this?—Well, the Government can always, upon its responsibility, give orders, as they did on this occasion, for some expenses to be incurred, they taking the necessary steps immediately to obtain in constitutional ways a grant of funds. The Treasury cannot give funds beyond those that have been voted for the year, but the Government as a body can sanction expenditure on their responsibility being incurred, intending to get a vote from the House of Commons to cover it, and that was what was done. That estimate for £10,000,000, which I have shown some members of the Commission, was dated the 17th October, and I think was proposed on the 20th October by Mr. Wyndham, but steps had been taken to spend some portion of the money before. The earlier portions had been sanctioned; that is to say, the earlier steps that had been taken in connection with the troops that were first sent out and then in connection with the 10,000 that followed. This had been done on the responsibility of the Government, they knowing that they would have to ask Parliament subsequently to grant them that money.

1399. But it was clearly pointed out to us that there would be a delay, say in a future case of mobilisation, if there was not some automatic order or direction by which, when the order was given to mobilise, money could immediately be found to purchase horses and so on?—An order could be given for the purchase of things of that kind, certainly, beforehand without the money being obtained, but there is a difficulty about mobilising the forces. If the forces are to be mobilised, the Government must call Parliament together immediately to sanction that, and at the same time the Government would have to ask for the money necessary for maintaining that mobilised force.

1400. In fact, to mobilise requires Parliamentary sanction?—Yes.

1401. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) You informed us that at times of emergency a committee, which you called the Confidential Mobilisation Committee, was called together?—Yes.

1402. At times of crisis?—Yes.

1403. You mentioned one being called in 1897?—Yes, but I think I went on further to say that this committee can be called upon to consider any particular point with reference to mobilisation without having in view a particular campaign.

1404. I particularly wish not to ask you what was the crisis with reference to which that Mobilisation Committee of 1897 was called, but I think I am right in saying it was not in connection with South Africa?—It was not necessarily or definitely in connection with South Africa, but a general examination into our preparedness—South Africa was not alluded to.

1405. We may take it that the first Confidential Mobilisation Committee that was called together in connection with South Africa was that of the 17th June, 1899?—That is so.

1406. Prior to that time there had been no special general consideration of how to deal with the crisis in the War Office?—Not the special South African crisis, but the office was constantly engaged upon the work of preparing two Army Corps and a cavalry division for embarkation. The scheme was governed by the idea that European requirements were to be met.

1407. You have referred to the fact that the Army Board had not initiative under the Orders in Council of 1895 and 1899?—That is so.

1408. And who do you say had initiative in the War Office at that time?—Well, almost all these heads of departments were in a position to suggest that certain topics should be taken up; but if they were of an important character they would generally consult with the Secretary of State, I think, as to the advisability of threshing out the question.

1409. I am speaking of initiative generally; would you not say that under the Order in Council of 1895 the Commander-in-Chief had that power. It says he shall be the principal adviser of the Secretary of State?—He might start anything or make a proposal to the Secretary of State of any kind, but I imagine in most cases he would do that verbally, he would speak to him, and say: "I think such and such a thing ought to be taken up," and he would not be likely to take it up unless the Secretary of State was really in agreement with him; but, of course, if it was a point upon which he held very strong opinions indeed, he would send a memorandum to the Secretary of State expressing those views, and the Secretary of State would deal with it; but it would be done by him in a very confidential manner, and it is one of those things I think he would not send through the Permanent Under-Secretary, although he might do so. There has been a variance in practice. I have had some of these, and I have not had some others.

1410. As Permanent Under-Secretary, with considerable experience of the working of the Order in Council of 1895, did you not know when you were at the War Office that the initiation of military schemes and so on was provided for under the Order in Council by this phrase: "he shall be the principal adviser of the Secretary of State on all military questions"?—No, because their function was limited; they were only to deal with these promotions and such things as were put forward in the Estimates.

1411. It is not the Army Board; I am talking of the Commander-in-Chief. Do you hold that that question of initiation had been provided for by that phrase?—Yes, I think so.

1412. I will not take you back to the Cardwell Scheme, but going back to 1895, may we not take it that the relations between the military and civil sides of the War Office have chiefly been that you have exercised the powers of audit and financial control as a sort of intermediary between them and the Treasury to some extent?—Yes. When a proposition was made involving expense, the financial people checked this to see whether what was put forward really represented the expense or not. We were a check upon the proposal being either underestimated or overestimated as regards the charge involved.

1413. They did not go into the question as to whether the expenditure was desirable in itself or not?—Well, they might draw attention to the fact that similar proposals had been considered, and how they had been previously dealt with, but they would not, from the military point of view, make any suggestion as to its advisability.

1414. Would it not rather be their business to point out to the military authorities that there was no probability of the Treasury consenting to such a thing?—No, they would not go so far as that; they might point out that such suggestions had been made to the Treasury, and that the Treasury had refused them, if that had been the case; but if it was a perfectly new thing

they would never say: "Oh, no; the Treasury would never consent to this." The Financial Department would not; the Secretary of State might take that view.

1415. I am dealing with the Financial Department?—Certainly not.

1416. Supposing a proposal was put forward involving expenditure, who argued out the case of the War Office with Sir Edward Hamilton or Sir Francis Mowatt, as the case may be?—The Financial Department would be normally the department that would discuss the point with the Treasury, but arrangements were made, where the matter would be explained by letter, that no letter to the Treasury should go pressing any demand on the part of the military authorities without that letter being considered by the Military Department that advocated the change—that is to say, that there should be an agreement between the Finance Department and the Military Department as to the manner in which it should be presented to the Treasury.

1417. You know, of course, better than I do, as to these things, when there is any discussion or dispute on a point of this sort, as to whether money should be granted or not, it is always dealt with, to some extent, by personal interviews?—Yes.

1418. In that case would the military authorities themselves have personal interviews with officials of the Treasury, and argue their case?—Certainly not, under ordinary circumstances. I have known occasions on which the military authorities have, with others, met in a conference with the Treasury authorities to discuss matters with very high officials—the members of the Cabinet even; but ordinarily the discussion would take place between the Finance Department and the Treasury.

1419. So that even in the case of fairly important demands the military heads of departments would have to put their case first before the financial heads in one form or another, and then the financial heads would argue the matter with the Treasury?—Only if the Secretary of State approved.

1420. I will give you an instance. A statement has been put forward in rather an important book—the "Times' History of the War"—which has been greatly read, to this effect: "About September, 1899, the Treasury repeated its refusal to a request made nearly two years before to sanction an expenditure of some £25,000 to provide certain necessary fittings for horse stalls for the sea transport of cavalry and artillery." I do not know whether you remember the incident or not?—I remember there was some difficulty about getting the money for a reserve of these horse stalls, but I did not know that the Treasury had twice refused that; only, as September, 1899, is referred to, it might have been put forward in one of the general demands for so much money, and included amongst those that would not be allowed, others having been allowed. I should imagine that might be the case, but I cannot recall the exact details.

1421. They are referring to a case of two years previously. You do not remember the incident?—I remember the proposal as to increasing the reserves, so to speak, for that purpose, and it had not been all included in the Estimates. Whether the Treasury were the absolute refusers of that particular item or not I cannot remember.

1422. My object in asking you is this: Assuming it occurred, in such a case, would the military authorities who had to control this matter have an easy opportunity of arguing the matter out with the officials of the Treasury?—No: I think their argument would be with the Secretary of State; they would put before him their view that it was absolutely necessary that this should be done, and that it was one of the things they preferred being provided for above everything else if it was so very urgent.

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1423. Supposing it was not a very urgent thing, but rather urgent, a desirable and expedient thing, the Secretary of State would not see the Chancellor of the Exchequer on a subject of that sort; the course would be that some high official of the War Office would see some high official of the Treasury, and would argue the matter out with him verbally?—It might or might not be so; it would arise really in considering the total Estimates, and I think by those who are here, members of this Commission, it will be readily understood that there is a very large number of these things proposed at the War Office, which are every year cut out of those Estimates.

1424. I think there is only one other matter as regards the appointments at the War Office. You have had a very long experience there, and must have had a long experience of the kind of men who form the best men for an administrative capacity. I suppose you will agree that it does not always follow that because a man is a great general in the field he need be a great economist or administrator in office?—Quite the reverse. I do not know that there is more difference between them than there is between other people. I remember saying to some Committee of Inquiry that men are divided into two classes as regards the method of overcoming difficulties. One class of men—half of them, I should think—propose to get over the difficulties by heavy expenditure of money; another class of men to recommend an improved administration. I apply that to general officers and civilians, and everyone else; some take one view and some another. I have found some generals extraordinarily economical and very good administrators, but whether they had been good in the field or not I cannot say; and, on the other hand, I have known men who have been very good in the field who have been extremely good administrators too.

1425. There are exceptions undoubtedly, but my point is really this: Would it not be desirable that the heads of the military departments in the War Office should be selected rather for their capacity as administrators than because they have been successful soldiers?—I think the endeavour has been to combine both, and I think there are those men who combine both qualities.

1426. Assuming there is not a sufficient number then, it is a very rare combination?—It is a rare combination, but I think that the machinery that exists provides for the offices being held by those men who go most for the efficiency of the Service, and that there is sufficient force in the Finance Department, and the permanent officials there, to ensure the avoidance of anything that is glaringly wild in the proposals.

1427. It may be an advantage to have on the Notes the addresses of the various scattered buildings in which the War Office did its work before the war?—It could be very easily given.

1428. You cannot remember them at this moment?—I cannot. Pall Mall, Winchester House, Queen Anne's Gate, Queen Victoria Street (there are two or three places in Queen Victoria Street, different buildings), Horse Guards, and some others.

1429. (*Chairman.*) We can get a complete list?—Yes, Lord Esher will well remember it; I think he used to pay the rent. (*The list was subsequently sent in. Vide Appendix Vol., page* 297.) I have not said anything about the administration of the war, but it appears to me that the first and most important lesson learned is to avoid the amateur. I hope if you find anything deficient in my evidence you will ask me to correct it or add to it.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

Colonel Sir E. W. D. Ward, K.C.B., Permanent Under Secretary of State for War, called and examined.

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1430. (*Chairman.*) You succeeded Sir Ralph Knox?—I did in April of last year.

1431. Before that you had been in South Africa?—Yes, I was about six weeks at work in the War Office on the military side before I succeeded Sir Ralph.

1432. You went out with Sir George White?—I went out on the 16th September, 1899, with Sir George White.

1433. And after the relief of Ladysmith what did you do?—I joined Lord Roberts as his Director of Supplies with the Field Force, and I remained with him until I returned home shortly before he came himself.

1434. What we think would be most convenient would be that we should take your evidence to-day simply with regard to your War Office experience, and then we might ask you to come at a subsequent time to give us any evidence we require as to your experience in South Africa?—Certainly.

1435. We have had from Sir Ralph Knox a description of the organisation of the War Office under the Orders in Council up to the time that he left it; the

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left it for you to speak as to the alterations which have taken place subsequently. There have been alterations?—There have been alterations, and I prepared a paper on the subject.

1436. Perhaps you will say what the chief alterations in the organisation were which were affected by the Order in Council of 1901?—The principal one was really the clearer definition of the duties of the various departments of the War Office, especially in the following particulars (a) the definition of the duties of the Military Secretary and Director-General of Military Intelligence; these were formerly assigned in general terms to the Commander-in-Chief: (b) the allocation of certain duties not previously assigned to any one department. One of the principal alterations was the grouping under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief of all the branches of discipline, training, organisation, mobilisation, and offensive and defensive schemes, etc., for which he is now immediately responsible. The third alteration is the elevation of the Department of the Director-General of the Army Medical Department to a similar position with that of the other great departments of the War Office.

1437. That is the Medical Department?—Yes, we have increased it in importance and given its chief larger scope than he had before. He is a member of the War Office Council, which he was not before. In the paper which has been handed in (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 292) is the definition of the Commander-in-Chief's duties. The Commander-in-Chief is the principal adviser of the Secretary of State on all military questions, and controls the departments of the Adjutant-General, the Director-General of Military Intelligence, the Military Secretary, and has general supervision of the other military departments, the Quartermaster-General, the Director-General of Ordnance, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the Director-General of the Army Medical Department.

1438. What is the precise difference between those two divisions?—The principal difference is that in the case of the Quartermaster-General, the Director-General of Ordnance, and so on, the Secretary of State can refer to them; they are in a more independent position as spending departments than the others, which are purely discipline, training, etc.

1439. The heads of the Department of Quartermaster-General and the others in that group have the right of access to the Secretary of State?—They have.

1440. And the Adjutant-General has not?—No, he ordinarily would go through the Commander-in-Chief.

1441. In the ordinary course of business his communications would go through the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes, under the former Order he had practically a separate department himself.

1442. And that is the chief difference, the change in the Adjutant-General's Department?—That is the most important.

1443. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) That is only reversing what was the case before?—Yes. There is another slight alteration which you see in those remarks, that formerly the Deputy of the Commander-in-Chief was the Adjutant-General, but now he is the senior officer of the Headquarters Staff.

1444. (*Chairman.*) That means that it may be any one of the principal officers?—It might be the Inspector-General of Fortifications, or whoever the senior was; following the usage of the service he takes the place of the Commander-in-Chief as his representative. Formerly the Adjutant-General was his definite deputy.

1445. I suppose the Adjutant-General has generally been the senior officer, has he not?—Generally. The Adjutant-General's Department deals with (1) the discipline, military education, and training of officers and men of the regular reserve and auxiliary forces: (2) matters relating to the general efficiency of the Army and the effective strength of units; that was not included in the former Order, and we have made it more distinct: (3) the allocation of the troops to their respective duties; that has also been specially put in the Order: (4) patterns of clothing and necessaries and the maintenance of returns and statistics connected with the *personnel* of the Army: (5) enlisting and discharging for regular and auxiliary forces: (6) proposals for the establishments for all the above services.

1446. There are two points which are mentioned as not formally assigned; is there anything omitted which used to be under the Adjutant-General's Department?—No, there is nothing omitted. The departments of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence were formerly separate, though both under the Commander-in-Chief, but they are now under one officer, the Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence. The duties of the Director of the Military Intelligence, Sir William Nicholson, were not defined in the old Order, but were attributed in general terms to the Commander-in-Chief. They are now specially defined. The Department of the Inspector-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence deals with (1) the preparation and maintenance of detailed plans for the military defence of the Empire and for the organisation and mobilisation of the regular and auxiliary forces; the organisation is a thing we have included which was not included before: (2) the preparation and maintenance of schemes of offensive and defensive operations: (3) the collection and distribution of information relating to the military geography, resources, etc., of foreign countries and of the British Colonies and Possessions.

1447. I suppose organisation included some of those duties before?—Yes, it was done practically between the Mobilisation and the Adjutant-General, but now, after Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee, it was one of the alterations we made under that that there should be these definitions of duties and distinctive departments.

1448. This puts it entirely in the hands of the Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence Department?—Yes. The Military Secretary's Department deals with (1) appointments, promotions, and retirements of officers of regular and auxiliary forces; (2) administration of educational establishments for candidates for commissions, and the educational qualifications required for such candidates. That is an addition in the new Order in Council which was not included in the old one.

1449. There was one point I noticed in reading the Order, that the Adjutant-General's Department includes military education also in the first head?—Yes. At the present moment I may mention that this is rather under consideration in consequence of another committee appointed to consider the education and training of officers of the Army which was presided over by Mr. Akers-Douglas. At present the Adjutant-General is responsible for the military education of the officers and men, and the military secretary is responsible for the educational establishments, such as Woolwich, Sandhurst, etc.

1450. How does the Adjutant-General exercise his control over military education?—His proportion of the thing is really the sort of field education, that is, the education of the young officer after he joins, and also of officers generally.

1451. And the Military Secretary has to do with him before he joins?—Yes, he is responsible at the present moment for Sandhurst, Woolwich, and those sort of establishments.

1452. Is there any Director-General of Education?—No.

1453. It is all under the Military Secretary?—Yes, that department is at the present moment being considered in connection with Mr. Akers-Douglas's Committee.

1454. And there may be further alterations?—Yes. The Quartermaster-General, under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief is charged with (1) supplying the Army with food, forage, fuel and light, quarters, etc.; (2) land and water transport, and conveyance of stores; (3) provision of remounts; (4) the movement of troops and distribution of their barracks, stores, and equipment; (5) the administration of the Army Service Corps, Army Pay Department, Army Veterinary Department, and the establishment employed on the above services. The Army Veterinary Department has been specially allotted to the Quartermaster-General under the new Order. (6) Annual estimates for the above services; (7) such inspections as may be necessary to secure the efficiency of the services under his control; and (8) advising the Secretary of State on all questions connected with his department. I might point out that in connection with those departments you were asking me about, that is an addition; he advises the Secretary of State. The Director-General of Ordnance, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the Director-General Army Medical Service are also the Secretary of State's advisers

1455. That means that he does so without an inter-

mediary?—That means that he goes straight to the Secretary of State. The Inspector-General of Fortifications, under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief, is charged with (1) the selection of sites for barracks, ranges and manœuvring grounds; that is an alteration we made in defining the duties: (2) the construction and maintenance of fortifications, barracks, and store buildings; (3) the inspection of Ordnance factory buildings and engineer stores; (4) military railways and telegraphs and engineer stores; (5) the purchase of land and the custody of War Office lands and unoccupied buildings; (6) advising as to design and issue of Royal Engineer and submarine mining stores; (7) annual estimates for Engineer services, including Engineer stores; (8) advising as to distribution of the Corps of Royal Engineers, and as to the appointment of officers to, or their removal from, responsible positions in connection with works; (9) advising on questions relating to technical instruction of the Corps of Royal Engineers; (10) such inspection as may be necessary to test professional training of the officers and men of the corps, and to secure the efficiency of the services under his control; and (11) advising Secretary of State on questions connected with his department.

1456. I see you have a remark that this office was not previously placed explicitly under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief; so that, although he has special access to the Secretary of State now, still he does so under a restriction which did not exist before?—To a certain extent that is true. There is practically no difference in it, but it was never put down properly before. In practice the thing goes on exactly the same—that is to say, he keeps him cognisant of all his duties in connection with barracks, and so on, in the same way as he did before.

1457. He is bound to report to the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes, because he is under his supervision. The Director-General of Ordnance, under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief, is charged with (1) supplying the Army with warlike stores except engineer stores, equipment and clothing; (2) the direction of the Ordnance Committee and manufacturing departments of the Army; (3) questions of armament, patterns of inventions and designs; (4) the inspection of all stores except engineer, medical and veterinary stores; (5) the administration of the Army Ordnance Department and the Army Ordnance Corps; (6) such inspection as may be necessary for efficiency of the service under his control; (7) annual Estimates for above services; (8) advising Secretary of State on questions connected with his department.

1458. Under whom are the engineers' stores?—They are under the Engineer.

1459. The Inspector-General of Fortifications?—Yes. The Director-General of the Army Medical Department, under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief, is charged with (1) the administration of the medical establishments of the Army and of the Royal Army Medical Corps; (2) sanitary questions relating to the Army (that was the duty formerly of the Quartermaster-General); (3) the preparation of medical and sanitary statistical returns; (4) the supply of medical stores; (5) annual estimate for medical services; (6) necessary inspections to secure efficiency of the services under his control; (7) advising the Secretary of State as to the distribution of the Royal Army Medical Corps, as to the appointment of officers to and their removal from that corps, and on other matters connected with his department. The duties of the Financial Secretary are not altered by the Order in Council of 1901, but remain as under the Order in Council of 1899. It should, however, be observed that a recent reorganisation of the Finance Department has placed each spending branch of the military side of the Office in close touch with a separate Finance Branch. It is the duty of the head of each of these spending departments to keep himself fully informed of the state of the vote or votes with which he is concerned, and to furnish the Accountant-General's Department with the earliest possible notice of all expenditure incurred or projected. On the other hand, the officials of the Accountant-General's Department are instructed at all times to assist the military departments, formally or informally, with such financial information and advice as they may require. A similar principle has led to the sending of a representative of the Accountant-General with a small staff to each of the first three Army Corps, and this system it is proposed to extend as the remaining Army Corps are constituted.

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1460. Is that an alteration in the carrying out of the recommendation of Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee?—Yes, that is one of the things in connection with the decentralisation; we are decentralising as fast as we can, and we think it right to decentralise the financial part as far as it is safe to do so.

1461. That, I suppose, is not complete yet?—We have only started with the three first Army Corps, but up to now the result has been most satisfactory.

1462. And, generally speaking, has this fresh definition of duties facilitated the work at the War Office?—I think it has very much, as the different officers in the departments know much better now when a question comes up whether it is theirs or somebody else's.

1463. There used to be questions of overlapping?—Yes, that was a difficulty we had, that there was a good deal of overlapping, and in some departments it was almost impossible under the old Regulations to avoid that.

1464. Do you think that difficulty has been met?—Yes. Of course, there are other improvements one hopes to make gradually, but I think we have stopped the overlapping that used to occur.

1465. You are prepared to name the principal War Office Committees?—Yes. The instructions to the War Office Council have been rather amplified. The Council was started in 1890, and last year the Secretary of State brought out new instructions. The Secretary of State has directed that in future the War Office Council shall be constituted as follows: The Secretary of State, the Commander-in-Chief, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, the Financial Secretary, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, the Director-General of Ordnance, the Adjutant-General, the Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence, and the Director-General of the Army Medical Department for Medical and Sanitary Questions. Of course, the additions to the new Council were the Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence and the Director-General of the Army Medical Department for his own special services, and such other members of the staff of the War Office as may be specially summoned from time to time. In the absence of the Secretary of State the Commander-in-Chief will act as president. The Council will meet on Mondays, unless otherwise ordered, at 12 o'clock, in the Secretary of State's room. The Council will discuss such matters as may be referred to it by the Secretary of State, and any question brought before it by individual members. In order that a précis may be prepared, notice of the matters for discussion, together with the Office papers on the subject, should reach the Secretary not later than the Wednesday evening before each meeting. Records of the proceedings will be kept, and copies will be supplied to each member.

1466. The Council now meets regularly?—Yes, every Monday, at 12 o'clock.

1467. That is a change?—Yes; before it used to meet at irregular intervals. We have added two more members. I think under the old arrangement, as far as I understand, they used not to send the précis over, but now the members have their précis a couple of days beforehand, and are able to think the matter over before it comes up for discussion.

1468. Is not the provision that any question may be brought before it by individual members a new one?—Yes, that is a new one too; formerly the Secretary of State only practically brought up questions he wanted to discuss, but now any member of the Council can bring forward a question for discussion.

1469. Can he bring it forward without submitting it first to the Secretary of State?—He is supposed to do so, but we have to get all the papers ready, and the *précis* and so on; he would notify me that he wished to bring it forward, but practically it would be reported to the Secretary of State.

1470. I understood the former Regulation was that no subject could be laid before the Council without the previous approval of the Secretary of State, and that he could in fact veto any proposal?—Yes, it is a new departure, allowing the members to bring forward things themselves.

1471. Now could they bring forward any subject even

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if the Secretary of State disapproved?—Yes, he has allowed it by his own Regulations.

1472. Then a discussion takes place freely on the subject proposed?—Yes.

1473. And a decision is come to?—Yes, which is in the end approved by the Secretary of State.

1474. It goes to the Secretary of State as Secretary of State?—Yes, it goes to him as Secretary of State.

1475. So far as the Council is concerned, they come to an opinion which is recorded as their opinion on a specific subject?—Yes; minutes of the meeting are kept, and an expression of every member's opinion is put down as he states it.

The constitution and duties of the Army Board remain as before, subject to the following alterations, which have been approved by the Secretary of State—(a) The Director-General Army Medical Department will be a member; he was not a member before. (b) In addition to its present duties the Board will be charged with the consideration of (1) the annual estimates prepared by heads of departments, and the allocation of sums allotted for military purposes; (2) the establishments of officers and men of the Regular, Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteer Forces; (3) any important subject which the Commander-in-Chief or the head of a military department may desire to bring forward for discussion. (c) The Board will meet at such dates as may be fixed by the Commander-in-Chief. Perhaps I ought to have stated previously in connection with the Army Board prior to October, 1901, that when it has been decided to prepare for the mobilisation of a military force, or to reinforce the garrisons of stations abroad, or during the mobilisation or maintenance in the field of a military force, the necessary measures will be considered by the Army Board. The Army Board will also consider such proposals for estimates and such other matters as may be referred to it by the Secretary of State. After a question has been considered by the Board the head of the department mainly concerned will be responsible for submitting the case when necessary for the decision of the Secretary of State, and for taking action. The presence of the Accountant-General at the Board does not dispense with the necessity for submitting to the Financial Department all questions requiring financial consideration. The Assistant Adjutant-General for Mobilisation will act as Secretary to the Army Board. He will keep full records of its proceedings, showing the questions discussed, and the decisions arrived at in each case. Any member who dissents from the decision of the majority may record his dissent in the proceedings of the Board. The record of proceedings will be submitted by the Secretary for the information of the Secretary of State.

1476. The Army Board is distinctly a more military body than the War Office Council?—Yes, with the addition of the Assistant Under-Secretary of State and the Accountant-General; practically it is the Commander-in-Chief's Board.

1477. You, for instance, have no place on it?—No.

1478. It meets at irregular intervals?—When the Commander-in-Chief desires it.

1479. Under the old Orders it was more for specific purposes?—It was practically established for purposes of mobilisation, and in the early stages of the war I believe it met very frequently.

1480. During the war?—Yes.

1481. Now, it has regular duties with regard to the Estimates?—Yes, it considers all the Estimates.

1482. And any other important subject that the Commander-in-Chief or the heads of the departments may want to bring forward for discussion, would not that clash with the consideration of the War Office Council?—Well, the idea was more to have a sort of informal discussion before the question arose in a sufficiently advanced stage to be brought before the War Office Council. It was more that the Commander-in-Chief might like to have an opportunity of talking to his advisers, and that they might hear each other's views.

1483. The preparation of the annual Estimates is scarcely unimportant?—I beg your pardon. I am talking of the things outside that; the Estimates are one of their regular duties which we do not discuss on the War Office Council.

1484. Do the Estimates not come before the War Office Council?—Only the big questions come forward.

1485. The consideration by the Army Board is only a conjoint consideration of the Estimates?—Yes, before they come to the Secretary of State.

1486. They go from the Army Board to the Secretary of State?—Yes.

1487. Has that Board met frequently of late?—Not lately.

1488. There is one other committee, is there not?—There is the Permanent Executive Committee, which was established in October, 1901: (1) A committee, consisting of representatives of every principal department, will meet, twice weekly, under the chairmanship of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, or, in his absence, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State. (2) It is the duty of the representative of each department to bring to the notice of this committee, as soon as they arise, all important questions which are being dealt with in his department, especially any which concern other departments. He will explain to the committee the steps which his department is about to take, and he must also report any important development which may arise in a matter in which action has commenced. (3) He is responsible that he is kept informed for this purpose by the sub-divisions and other authorities in his department of the questions, of the nature indicated above, with which they are dealing from time to time. The committee will discuss the general course to be pursued, and representatives of departments are responsible for reporting subsequently to the committee the progress of action decided upon. (4) It is the duty of the secretary to supply copies of the record of the proceedings to all sub-divisions of the office; but it will be the duty of a member attending any meeting to make the sub-divisions of his department acquainted, at the earliest possible moment, with any matter concerning them which may be discussed at the committee. (5) It is the duty of the Chairman to bring to the notice of the committee any cases in which it appears that there has been delay in connection with the completion of a subject. (6) It is to be understood that the objects to be served by this committee are to co-ordinate and expedite the work of the Office, to inform the several departments of the questions being dealt with in other departments, and so give each an opportunity of securing that matters in which it may be concerned are not decided without its being consulted. The proceedings of the committee are not to be considered as taking the place of action by sub-divisions of departments, to which is assigned the executive work in detail. It is also intended that the committee shall assist in securing that any delay in settling a question shall be brought to light.

1489. What is meant by "principal department"?—Those are the ones in the Order in Council with the Director of Contracts added. Practically this committee is composed of the second men in each branch, such as the Deputy Adjutant-General and the Deputy Quartermaster-General; they attend twice weekly, and the advantage of this committee is that we are able by these men all meeting together to know exactly what is going on in the Office. Every branch knows what the other branch is doing if it is of importance. No big subject can be started without the other departments knowing about it.

1490. What sort of case comes before it?—You might say, for instance, if the Adjutant-General was to take a camp for Militia, or something of that sort, he would bring that forward, or if the Engineers were proposing to build barracs, that would come forward. In fact, any subject of importance which is started or upon which there has been important development during the time it has been in action comes before this committee.

1491. That has been in existence for the last year?—Yes, it was started last year.

1492. Have you found it a convenience?—I have found it a very great convenience, because in a big office like ours, scattered as we are, it very often happens that a subject may get started and be almost run to a finish by a man without the other departments, which may be concerned perhaps only in a distant way, knowing anything about it until the decision came off. We have found that this Committee bringing everyone together has stopped that, and it is also an assistance that we can find out if there is any suspicion that a question is hanging over too long. I can ascertain

through the representative of a department on the Committee the reason why a thing has appeared to be put on one side, and it may be that there are sound reasons for the action not being finished

1493. Being mentioned at the Committee the department would be obliged to report itself?—Yes, and then they have to report to the next meeting.

1494. Do the meetings last long?—It generally takes about three-quarters of an hour, as a rule; we have a regular printed sheet, a *précis* of the different things, which goes round to the members the day before, and when they get this they are responsible for having all the answers ready and explanations to give to the other members of the Committee.

1495. Besides that, there is the Advisory Board?—Yes. The principle of securing the benefit of technical and professional advice from outside the department, which had already been recognised in the constitution of the Ordnance Committee, has been extended by the institution of the Advisory Board, Royal Army Medical Service, the Nursing Board, and the Advisory Board for Auxiliary Forces. That has only been very recently started.

1496. What is the function of an Advisory Board?—Well, the Advisory Board primarily is responsible for the organisation of the Medical Service, that it is kept up to the proper pitch of perfection, and so on. We have got, in addition to the military members, five members of the civil profession, and the Nursing Board is on the same lines.

1497. I suppose it has no executive functions?—No. They are executive in one way, as regards the inspection of hospitals now; a civil member of the Advisory Board and a military member of the Advisory Board pay surprise visits to the various hospitals, and inspect them together.

1498. These embody the alterations that have been made since you took charge?—Yes.

1499. And your general opinion is that improvements have been introduced?—Yes, I think they have been very satisfactory.

1500. And you still hope to improve further?—Yes, we are now struggling with decentralisation, which takes some time to work out, and reducing returns, and things of that sort, so that it is really a question of time. We have decentralised a great many matters, and we hope to decentralise more, which will ease off the pressure a good deal. The general officers of Army Corps now will have an opportunity of deciding questions which it would be a waste of time sending up to us.

1501. You do not consider your work of reorganisation finished?—Oh, no.

1502. You do not present it to us as a perfect organisation?—No, it is the best we can do in the time.

1503. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I should just like to ask you one or two questions about what has been done in consequence of the recommendations of Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee. Have you a copy there of their recommendations?—I have an extract here. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 289.)

1504. I will just run through them quickly?—I have a short memorandum that I drew up for the Secretary of State.

1505. Could you run through them one by one; what has been done under Head 1?—The first recommendation of the Dawkins' Committee is shortly to abolish the present system of reports, and we are reducing these. We have simplified a good many of the regulations. I have also got a staff officer just now going through the whole of the returns. As to the correspondence, we have issued fresh instructions, and the Army Corps system will reduce the correspondence a good deal in addition. We have given them some latitude in connection with questions which they need not send up to us at all. I think the principal thing we hope to get a lot of satisfactory progress out of is the returns; I think the returns have got unnecessarily complicated, and we hope by making stringent rules about increasing returns, to save a lot of work in the districts. I would like to make it penal for men to make out manuscript returns, because I found last year they were heavy, a source of extra work in districts.

1506. You have practically answered No. II.?—Yes.

1507. As to No. III., have you been able to create any system of proper supervision by inspection?—That is coming in a good deal with the Army Corps.

1508. As to No. IV., that has been done?—That is the new Order in Council. No. V. is to place a branch of the Accountant-General's Department in close touch with each spending department, and that has been done.

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1509. What do you say about No. VI., the company pay lists?—I think we have got a very satisfactory solution of that, and we are going to try, if all the returns and things are printed, in January or, if not then, in February, a very simple form of pay list, which will practically give the regimental officers very little to do, and make it so simple that any man could do it. The complications of the old pay lists are practically wiped out.

1510. What about relieving the soldier from small stoppages?—That has been done, because the extra pay covers that.

1511. It has been practically carried out?—Yes.

1512. No. VII. is as to increasing the financial power of the Secretary of State and of General Officers Commanding?—We have carried out that. Each General officer now has £250 at his disposal, and the Secretary of State has £5,000 which he can practically use.

1513. No. VIII. is to abolish reference to the Treasury in certain cases?—The Treasury met us a great deal on this point, and a large amount of reference has been abolished now.

1514. Has that been sufficiently done in your opinion?—I should like a good deal more.

1515. You have got as much as you could get?—It takes a certain amount of persuasion to get them all done.

1516. But a substantial amount has been conceded?—Yes, a very substantial amount; they met us very well on the Dawkins' Report.

1517. No. IX, to re-arrange the Works Vote so as to secure elasticity, and to carry over unexpended balances: has that been granted by the Treasury?—That portion has been a little delayed; there is another committee which has considered it, of which Lord Esher was Chairman, and we are rather waiting until its report is approved.

1518. No. X. you have already answered?—Yes.

1519. As to No. XI., have you carried out the reduction?—That has been carried out.

1520. As to No. XII., have you been able to bring the relations of the Contracts Branch and the Supply Departments within the scope of definite regulations?—Yes, we have brought out new regulations which have carried out, I think, almost entirely the Dawkins' Committee recommendations.

1521. I need not ask if you have carried out No. XIII. As to No. XIV., to replace second division clerks in the military departments, that has been done, too?—Yes.

1522. As to No. XV., have you been able to strengthen the Central Department?—Yes, we have done it very considerably, and have put it directly under the Assistant Under-Secretary of State.

1523. No. XVI. you have answered; at least you are still at work upon that?—That is so.

1524. You have not done with it?—That is so; we are not satisfied yet. We get so much done every month.

1525. And No. XVII. depends upon that?—Yes.

1526. No. XVIII. is already answered by that, is it not, or do you mean decentralisation inside the War Office?—Yes, that is what we are doing.

1527. Do you mean decentralisation by the action of the Generals or inside the War Office?—That refers to decentralisation which has been practically completed by the new organisation for the War Office. Formerly, practically everything was concentrated on the Accountant-General, but now we have divided the Financial branch of the War Office into 9 branches, each in charge of a principal, and he can practically do to a large extent what the Accountant-General was allowed to do before.

1528. On a particular vote your papers will not have to pass through so many departments?—No, this principal is allowed to write letters now to outside people, and practically to give the ordinary decisions which are really covered by precedent or regulations, and so on. All these things used to go to the Accountant-

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General before, and in the same way in the central branch the same principle has been carried out; we have two principals there.

1529. And No. XIX. you have answered already?—Yes.

1530. (*Viscount Esher.*) You spoke very highly of the work done by the Permanent Executive Committee of the War Office; what do you feel about the use of the War Office Council?—The War Office Council, I think, is very useful, because practically it is a good deal on the same principle as the Permanent Executive is useful in its way; you have all the heads of the departments present, and they are able to discuss matters.

1531. You gave us an idea of the sort of questions raised before the Executive Committee; what sort are raised before the War Office Council?—Important general subjects like the organisation of a cavalry regiment, or whether a battery of the First Army Corps is to be six or four guns.

1532. If the Director-General of Military Intelligence required a reconstruction of his own department or additional sums of money to carry out certain things he thought very essential, would he bring a question of that kind before the War Office Council?—He would.

1533. It would be his duty to do so?—It would be his duty to bring that forward, and, of course, as a matter of fact, in that particular case we have a Committee which meets next week.

1534. Did you have a great many reports from Lord Kitchener dealing at all with the efficiency of the Army under him in South Africa?—No; I daresay a large number have come that I have not seen.

1535. Are there despatches from him criticising defects which he found in the organisation of the Army out there, and suggesting remedies?—Yes, I believe they have been rendered to the Commander-in-Chief.

1536. Are those printed?—No, I do not think any of them are printed yet.

1537. Are there many of them?—Yes, most of those things he brought home himself, and they have not really filtered to me yet. He had his own office, which he has just closed up, and all his recommendations on these sort of general subjects have been there. The despatches I have seen are practically all war despatches.

1538. But you think there are recommendations made by him?—I am certain there are.

1539. To whom have they been presented—the Commander-in-Chief?—Certainly, the Commander-in-Chief. I am only judging by what Lord Kitchener has told me himself, that he has given recommendations.

1540. There must be a certain number of reports written from South Africa?—Yes, up to the date Lord Roberts left we had a very large collection of reports from every branch, such as the Supply, Transport, Engineers, Post Office, and all those things. Each branch has sent in a pamphlet giving its ideas on its work and recommendations for the improvement, and there is no doubt when Lord Kitchener's officers have time they will do the same for the period from the date of those reports up till now.

1541. You do not know of any steps that have been taken yet, at any rate, to act on the recommendations Lord Kitchener has made?—No, I cannot just at present think of any definite steps.

1542. I suppose you could produce, if the Commission asked for it, the Instructions to Sir George White before leaving for South Africa?—Yes, I suppose, if the Commission wanted them; I have not seen them myself, and cannot therefore say if we have them.

1543. Anyhow, the demand would be made to you to produce it?—Yes, it would.

1544. And also the telegrams which passed between the Secretary of State and Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers Buller, and again between the Secretary of State and Sir William Butler, would also be produced by you if you were asked for them?—Yes.

1545. (*Chairman.*) I want just to clear up one matter. As regards the practice of the War Office, Sir William Nicholson told us all telegrams were printed, but that it was not the case that all despatches were printed; is that so?—All important despatches are printed; I think probably he referred to minor despatches of subordinate commanders.

1546. Sir Ralph Knox mentioned this morning—at least, so we understood him—that all despatches were printed too?—They all ought to be, but I think there is a very large number of minor despatches which have not been printed. I think all the principal ones were printed, as far as I can remember.

1547. What Sir William Nicholson said was that "the telegrams have undoubtedly been printed. There are large files of secret telegrams, and ordinary telegrams, and so on"; and he said, "The letters exist, but they are all in their separate cases, according to the War Office system." And then he was asked "You do not print all written despatches in the War Department?" and he answered, "No, hardly any"?—I think he means really the whole official correspondence. I think he is rather thinking of the Indian system, where all important papers are printed. I think he used the word "despatches" more as meaning official letters. We are endeavouring to work up a system of printing all important papers in the form of *précis*. I think Sir William Nicholson refers to what they have in India, where all important papers are printed and sent round the various departments, who keep them.

1548. I suppose, anyhow, that it is probable that any important document we ask for would be in print in the War Office?—In the nature of a despatch, certainly; as regards letters which are not war despatches, there are a large number of official letters which are not printed.

1549. For instance, memoranda by the Intelligence Division would be all in print?—They would be all printed.

1550. There are some despatches which are presented to Parliament which necessarily are printed?—All important despatches have been printed.

1551. (*Viscount Esher.*) Whether presented to Parliament or not?—Whether presented to Parliament or not.

1552. (*Chairman.*) Naturally there are a good many documents which have not been presented to Parliament which it may be convenient or necessary for the Commission to see, and I have no doubt the Secretary of State would furnish those if we applied for them?—Certainly. No doubt he would.

SIXTH DAY.

Tuesday, 21*st October* 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable the EARL OF ELGIN AND KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW-DARLEY G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

General Sir HENRY BRACKENBURY, G.C.B., K.C.S.I.; Colonel R. A. MONTGOMERY, C.B.; Colonel Sir J. STEEVENS, K.C.B.; and Colonel F. E. MULCAHY, C.B., called and examined.

General Sir H. Brackenbury, G.C.B., K.C.S.I.; Colonel R. A. Montgomery, C.B.; Colonel Sir J. Steevens, K.C.B.; and Colonel F. E. Mulcahy, C.B.

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1553. (*Chairman.*) Sir Henry Brackenbury, you took up the duties of the Director-General of Ordnance in February, 1899?—I did.

1554. So that you have been in charge of the Department throughout the war?—Throughout the war.

1555. Would you be so good as to explain to us your duties under the Order in Council?—Under the Order in Council of the 7th March, 1899, the Director-General of Ordnance is charged with supplying the Army with warlike stores, equipment, and clothing; with the direction of the Ordnance Committee and the manufacturing departments of the Army; with dealing with questions of armament, patterns, inventions, and designs; and with the inspection of all stores, whether supplied by the manufacturing departments or by contractors. He administers the Army Ordnance Department and the Army Ordnance Corps, and makes such inspections as may be necessary to secure the efficiency of the service under his control. He is to submit proposals for the annual Estimates for the above services, and shall advise the Secretary of State on all questions connected with the duties of his department. That work of the Director-General of Ordnance is carried out through certain officials under him. The duties of the Principal Ordnance officer, who at present and throughout the war was Colonel Sir John Steevens, are to make provision of armaments and weapons, ammunition, and general stores, to store those, and to supply the Army with them. The Chief Ordnance Officer of the Army Clothing Department has similar duties with regard to clothing and necessaries, and the Chief Ordnance Officer at Weedon has to store and supply rifles and such arms as lances and swords. Then there are several chief inspectors; there is a Chief Inspector at Woolwich, who is the head of the branch which deals with the inspection of what we may call purely warlike stores, guns, ammunition, mountings for guns, carriages, and so on; there is a Chief Inspector of Small Arms, and a Chief Inspector of General Stores, with a large staff under him, who deals with the inspection of all the general stores for the Army. There is also the Chief Inspector of Steel, who inspects all steel for guns before it is put into the guns, the guns made by contractors, as well as the guns made in the Ordnance Factories, and he has a large staff of assistants. Then there is the Chief Inspector of Range Finders, who deals specially with instruments for range finding, and there is the Chief Inspector of Clothing, at Pimlico, who inspects all materials supplied by the contractors, clothing and necessaries, and all finished garments as well, before they are issued to the Army. Then, also, one of the duties mentioned in that Order in Council is the direction of the manufacturing departments of the Army. The head of the Ordnance factories is an officer called the Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories, and the Order in Council was altered on the 7th March, 1899, from the previous Order in Council, and placed those Ordnance factories under the direction of the Director-General of Ordnance. Previous to that date they had been for several years under the direction of the Financial Secretary in the War Office, and after I had been offered the Director-Generalship of Ordnance I pressed very much that the direction of the Ordnance factories should be transferred to the Director-General of Ordnance, and the matter was considered by the Cabinet, the direction was so transferred, and the Order in Council was modified accordingly.

1556. Can you give the reasons for that?—I had been the head of the Ordnance Committee which sits at Woolwich, and for three years I had watched the working of the system, and I was satisfied that the existing working there was unsatisfactory, and I laid my reasons before Lord Lansdowne and before the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, and they were satisfied that I was right, and the change was made.

1557. You could not tell us briefly what those reasons were?—I thought the Ordnance factories had got into an unsatisfactory condition, and I also thought that it is absolutely essential that the officer who is charged with supplying the Army with stores should have the control of the people who are making them.

1558. That was the main reason?—That was the main reason. I also thought that under the system then going on the factories were going to the bad instead of improving.

1559. Was that a necessary consequence of the system?—I think it was a necessary consequence of the management at the time.

1560. I do not want to enter into personalities, but I only wanted to know whether it was a matter of management or a matter of system to which you objected?—Both management and system.

1561. With regard to the difference of system, I think you might tell us how it is, in your opinion, preferable that it should be altered as it has been?—It would be a very long story. Under the system which was being introduced in the Arsenal, expert knowledge of the requirements of the Army and of the wants of the Army, and how to meet those wants, was gradually, I think, being divorced from the management of the factories.

1562. Do you mean that if expert knowledge showed a certain step had to be taken, it was not practicable to have it carried out under the previous system?—The Army wants, or requires, a certain improvement in any particular thing used during war. It wants to find in the Ordnance factories men with the knowledge and experience to enable them thoroughly to understand that, to grasp it and produce it. The skilled superintendents of the factories were being removed and done away with. Enfield, which makes our rifles, had been for more than two years without a superintendent, and I attribute it largely to that that our manufacture of rifles was found at the beginning of the war to be defective. In the same way, the gun factory which made all our guns had been at that time for months without a superintendent, and I think it was a very unsatisfactory condition of things.

1563. That is all a question of management?—It was more than a question of management, I think; it was a question of principle.

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1564. The previous system, I think we had it in evidence, was that there was a civilian head of the manufacturing departments?—That was an incident of it; the head may be either a soldier, sailor, or civilian, or anybody, and that was and is entirely in the hands of the Secretary of State. When the civilian head died a soldier was appointed in his place, being considered the best man, but it is equally now, as it was then, open to the Secretary of State to appoint a soldier, a sailor, or civilian to any one of these appointments in the Arsenal.

1565. But the whole branch was under the control of the Financial Secretary?—It was under the control of the Financial Secretary.

1566. Which is the civil side of the War Office?—Which is part of the civil side of the War Office.

1567. So that the change in system that was made was to bring it into the military side of the War Office?—The direction of the factories; the financial control remains entirely with the civil side.

1568. But the direction of the factories was transferred from the civil side of the War Office to the military side?—Yes.

1569. And that is a point on which you insist as necessary?—As absolutely necessary, and I do not think it would have been possible to get the Army supplied during this war if that change had not been made. If the Director-General of Ordnance, instead of being able to go direct to his head of the factories, and turn him off from this work on to that work, to suit the exigencies of the moment, had had to go with his hat in his hand to the Financial Secretary and ask that this, that, and the other might be done, I do not think we could have supplied the Army during the war, and I trust that if your lordship's Commission examines Lord Lansdowne you will ask his opinion on this point.

1570. (*Viscount Esher.*) What was the date of the change?—The change was made in the Order in Council on the 7th March, 1899.

1571. (*Chairman.*) But the Director-General of Ordnance and the Financial Secretary are both members of the War Office Council, are they not?—They are.

1572. Would that not be a medium of bringing about united action?—There was no War Office Council at the time covered by your Lordship's inquiry, or, if there was, it scarcely ever met.

1573. Quite so; but there was a War Office Council; it did not often meet?—I think the Secretary of State called the high officials of the War Office together whenever he pleased, and called it a War Office Council.

1574. We have had a good deal of evidence about it, and it is a little confusing, but we are glad to hear what your impression of the War Office Council was?—I do not think until Mr. Brodrick came into office the War Office Council met more than a half dozen times within my recollection.

1575. It would not have been of service in such a case as I have been putting?—Not the slightest.

1576. Is that because you, as Director-General of Ordnance, would not have been able to bring forward a subject of the kind before the War Office Council?—This question of the direction of the factories affects our daily needs; the Director-General of Ordnance wants to be able to correspond directly with his factories, to give them his orders, and to get what he wants from them with the utmost possible rapidity. The War Office Council even now, meeting as it does once a week, could not deal with such subjects as that.

1577. Certainly not in detail?—It is all a question of detailed work.

1578. But if there came any question of importance between the Director-General of Ordnance and the Financial Secretary as controlling the factories in the old times, the War Office Council would not have been a body which could have dealt with it?—Not at all.

1579. Could it deal with it now?—Such a question would never have come before the War Office Council at all; it would have come before the Secretary of State personally.

1580. It could now?—It could now if the Secretary of State chose to refer it to a War Office Council.

1581. We understand that now any member of the War Office Council may bring a subject before the Council; is not that your understanding of the position?—I have no doubt that if I wished to bring a question before the War Office Council, the Secretary of State would allow me to do so. Personally I would very much prefer to deal with those questions without the intervention of the Council.

1582. It is of importance to us to know exactly how the Council stands, and we understood from the witnesses last week that now any member of the War Office Council can of his own motion bring a matter that he considers of importance before the War Office Council for decision by them; is not that your understanding?—I did not know that it was the case; it may be.

1583. Just as incidental to that question of the War Office Council, we were informed that there were memoranda drawn up by the Director-General of Military Intelligence with regard to the position in South Africa; did that come before the War Office Council, so that you would be cognisant of it?—No.

1584. Is that all you wish to say with regard to the duties of the Director-General of Ordnance?—Yes. I should like to say, if I may, with regard to the duties of the Ordnance Department in South Africa, that it is laid down in the first three paragraphs of the Regulations for Army Ordnance Service as follows: "The General or other officer commanding a district or command at home or abroad is responsible for the efficient and economical performance of all Army Ordnance services in his command. The Chief Ordnance Officer of a district or with troops in the field will be an officer on the Staff of the Army, and will be an officer of the Directing Staff of the Army Ordnance Department. It is to be clearly understood that such Chief Ordnance Officer will perform his duties entirely under the orders of the General or other officer commanding, and in such manner as he may direct. Where in these Regulations it is stated that particular acts will be done by the Chief Ordnance Officer, it is not intended to imply that he has an independent responsibility, but merely to indicate that he is the officer appointed to carry out the duty under and for the General or other officer commanding. The Chief Ordnance Officer will have free access to the General or other officer commanding at all times in questions relating to the Department."

1585. What is the date of that?—This is the 1902 edition; but it was the same in the previous edition.

1586. How far back, roughly?—It was so in 1899, at all events. Then I should like to say that the Director-General of Ordnance is charged with all these duties under the Order in Council, but that his powers are limited, first of all, by the authorised scales of equipment and clothing. If the Director-General of Ordnance wishes to make any change, or if the Commander-in-Chief wishes to make any change in these, he has to obtain the authority of the Financial Department of the War Office for that. It is the same thing with regard to reserves; my power of making provision is limited to the authorised reserves, and, of course, there is a still further limit beyond that, which is the provision of the funds in the Estimates which are at the disposal of the Director-General of Ordnance for obtaining even up to the authorised scales.

1587. Has he full control over the total amount of his estimate?—He has, subject to the check of the Financial Department, control over two Votes, Vote 9 and Vote 8 in the Army Estimates. Vote 9 is the Vote for Guns and Stores, and Vote 8 is the Clothing Vote.

1588. He has not to go for authority in regard to each provision out of those Votes?—No; in the first instance he submits his estimates in detail, showing all that he requires. Those estimates are, of course, examined in the Financial Department, and subsequently reviewed by the Secretary of State, and, as a rule, cut down, and then, when once the Votes are passed, the Director-General has the administration of those two Votes.

1589. Without reference to the Treasury?—Without reference to the Treasury, except that when he wishes to transfer from one sub-head to another, that may be done with the consent of the Accountant-General of the War Office; but if he wants to transfer from one head to another, he has, I believe, to go to the Treasury. I am not certain as to that.

1590. In that matter the references to the Treasury are not excessive?—I do not think they are.

1591. Have you ever had any refusal from the

Accountant-General to transfer?—Never, unless it was a reasonable refusal, and I think he was right. I have had every assistance from the Accountant-General.

1592. Is that all you wish to say about the Office?—That, I think, is all.

1593. You have been good enough to supply us with certain Statements, and the first Statement deals with the Field Army?—I should like to say, my lord, that these Statements were prepared in answer to certain definite questions from the Director-General of Military Intelligence. I was asked to prepare a Statement of the normal standard sanctioned prior to the outbreak of the South African War, of the equipment for the Field Army for active service abroad, and of the reserves of guns and stores, showing how far such equipment and reserves were complete. That is answered in Statement I. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 178.) I think I have nothing to add to the first paragraph of that Statement I., except (perhaps it may be well for me to say here) that equipment is provided in two portions for all units which compose the Field Army, viz., that portion required for and used during peace, and that to be taken into use on mobilisation for war. In some cases, where buildings have been provided in barracks, the war equipment is in charge of the unit for whose use it is intended on mobilisation, and in other cases the equipment is held by the Army Ordnance Department, each unit's equipment being separately stored and kept apart, and by that department issued to the unit on mobilisation. Upon the outbreak of war these war equipments were complete. Tents, blankets, and waterproof sheets were not stocked in the ordinary war equipment, as they were only to be issued when specially ordered, and these issues were therefore carried out from the peace stocks, except in the case of the special eyeletted blankets, which were prepared and issued to all units prior to embarkation.

1594. And that equipment you speak of was for a Field Army under the Regulations of two Army Corps?—Yes, two Army Corps, one cavalry division, and lines of communication troops.

1595. Beyond that there was no provision?—A third Army Corps was provided for, for home service, but not as to anything specially required for foreign service. There was no further provision beyond the peace provision; that is to say, the ordinary stocks kept for use at home.

1596. The third Army Corps was supplied on a peace footing; was that it?—We had the equipment for them to enable them to take the field in this country.

1597. I think you made a report on this state of the case?—The point is that no special reserves were provided for up-keep of the equipment of the Field Army in war. What we had was the mobilisation equipment ready to enable the troops to take the field, but there were no special reserves for up-keep of that army if it went to war, and we only had what could be called peace reserves. As you say, my Lord, I made a Statement pointing out the state of the case, and how we had been affected by the war, on the 15th December, 1899. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 278.)

1598. Was that Statement based on the necessity of special provision for every expedition out of Europe?—No, not so much that as that we might have that which was necessary to enable us to supply any army we might send abroad and keep it supplied.

1599. And the Statement shows that at that time you were not in that position?—It shows that at the outbreak of war we were not in that position. If you wish me to amplify that, I may say that we had in reserve the material of only one Horse Artillery battery, and that battery had been converted to an experimental quick-firing system. We had only material for eleven 15-pounder batteries, of which two had been converted to an experimental system, leaving only nine available, and those were so immediately required for arming batteries which had to be raised in this country in consequence of all our artillery going out to the war, that having sent out five to South Africa, as soon as we had handed over the rest here we had none whatever in reserve. We had to send out to South Africa three batteries of 5-inch howitzers, and in reserve we had only one 5-inch howitzer. In order to send out three howitzers to South Africa to replace, I had to take two of those appropriated to movable armaments of fortresses. This is a statement of what I had to do on the 15th December, but at a later date we got into a worse condition. Then of gun ammunition we had only a reserve of 200 rounds per gun for each horse and field and mountain gun or howitzer, in addition to the 300 rounds which were with the batteries, and the whole of this reserve was absorbed by South Africa long before the 15th December, and the whole powers of the Ordnance factories and the trade had to be turned on for further supplies. Naval orders for ammunition had to be held in abeyance from the beginning of October. We borrowed ammunition from the Navy, and we borrowed ammunition from the Government of India, and yet I was unable to meet Sir Redvers Buller's demands for 5-inch howitzer ammunition and 7-pounder ammunition until a fortnight after they should have been complied with. I had to deplete the quantities of ammunition for the siege train in order to supply the 6-inch howitzers in South Africa, and to take guns from the armament at Plymouth to meet Sir Redvers Buller's demand for longer range guns. We had only 500 single sets of harness in reserve, less than sufficient for five batteries, and in the Statement that has been given to you it has been shown what was the quantity of harness we sent out during the war. We had to send out 3,448 sets of transport harness alone during the war. We were 326 machine guns deficient of the authorised number, and we had to draw upon the machine guns provided for the movable armaments of fortresses to meet South African requirements. We had only 500 sets of cavalry saddlery in reserve at the beginning of the war to meet the wear and tear of 16,000 sets in possession of the troops, and by the 15th December, 1899, I had had to order 600 sets to be sent out to South Africa, and we sent out to the war 23,249 sets of saddlery, and had 500 sets in reserve. We had about 10,000 sets of infantry accoutrements in reserve to meet the wear and tear of 364,000 sets. We had already none left, not one in hand, on the 15th December. We had 500 sets of saddlery for mounted infantry in reserve, and before the 15th December I had had to order 11,525 sets from the trade to equip troops for the South African campaign. The trade could not supply all we wanted in time, and we had to go to America, and I may state that later on we had to go not only to America, but to Canada, to France, to Austria, to Germany, and to Belgium to get saddles in time.

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1600. I suppose the demand for that sort of saddlery was quite unexpected?—Quite unexpected. Many of the vehicles for the Army Service Corps were old, obsolete vehicles, which were all very well just to rub along on the very good roads in this country, but they were perfectly impossible in South Africa. We had to send all our serviceable general service wagons out of the country, and we had to order large numbers of vehicles, and, of course, they take a long time to make. We had only 1,700 sets of mule harness, and we had to buy an equipment of 25,000 single sets from the trade before the 15th December. The only things of which our reserves had up to December, 1899, proved sufficient were rifles, carbines, pistols, and lances. Of cavalry swords the authorised reserve was 6,000, but owing to a change in pattern having been under consideration for a long time it had been allowed to fall to 80. We had an authorised reserve of 5,000 single circular tents and 100 hospital marquees. Before the 15th December we had had to send 17,000 circular tents and 900 hospital marquees to South Africa. Of camp equipment we had 2,000 camp kettles in reserve, and one single demand from Cape Town was for 5,000. Our reserve of picketing pegs, ropes, mallets, etc., was not sufficient to supply one-fiftieth of the demands from South Africa, and I may state that there was nothing in which we found it more difficult to keep up the supplies from the trade than in picketing pegs. Then, as regards small arm ammunition, our authorised stocks on the 31st March, 1899, were 151,000,000 rounds.

1601. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Was that complete?—That was complete, and we had about 21,000,000 more towards the year's practice; but I shall have to tell you, in connection with that, a great difficulty which arose. We had to send out over 50,000,000 to South Africa before 15th December, and I was on the 19th December supplying Sir Redvers Buller, at his demand, with about 3,000,000 weekly, and the Ordnance factories and the trade together could only produce at that time about 2,500,000 weekly, so that we were rapidly denuding ourselves here, because, besides having to send out 50,000,000 to South Africa, as Ordnance reserve, which afterwards grew to 102,000,000, we had to supply all the troops who were

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going out with ammunition, including all the Imperial Yeomanry who were raised. We had to send out ammunition for all the colonial troops who went.

1602. (*Chairman.*) In addition to the 3,000,000 a week?—No, but that 3,000,000 a week went on and on till June, I think; we sent out altogether 102,000,000, besides all that went out with the troops. There was one great difficulty we had with regard to the supply of small-arm ammunition, which, perhaps, I had better mention here. Owing to the experience of the Chitral campaign, it was considered desirable that we should have a more deadly bullet than the ordinary Mark II. ammunition, which was in use with the ·303-inch calibre magazine rifle. The Mark II. ammunition bullet is, as you know, a very small bullet, less than one-third of an inch in diameter, including the cupro-nickel envelope with which it is covered, and it was found from the experience of the Chitral campaign that it had not what was called sufficient stopping power against the rush of Ghazis, and, accordingly, in this country, as well as in India, an effort was made to find a satisfactory bullet which would have a more deadly effect. In India they produced the Dum-dum ammunition, in which the head of the bullet is not covered by the nickel envelope. In this country we produced a bullet in which there is a small cylindrical hole in the lead at the top, and this is left as an opening, and is not covered over with the nickel. This bullet was an expanding bullet. We had every intention of using this bullet and making it, in fact, the bullet for the British Army all over the world, and, I think, about 66,000,000 of it up to the 31st March, 1899, had been delivered, and formed part of our stock of 172,000,000. It was known as Mark IV. We had an exceptionally hot summer in 1899, and it was found that, especially in the hands of Volunteers, where the rifles had not been kept particularly clean, there were several instances in which this bullet stripped, to use the technical term; that is to say, the lead of the bullet squirted out through this opening in the top of the nickel envelope, and left the envelope behind in the rifle. Then, if there was a second load, you were apt to get an accident, a blow back in the breech. This happened at Bisley, and it happened in several other places with Volunteers. There could be very little doubt of what was the cause of it; it was due to exceptional heat, and it required a rifle which was not clean. We carried out a great number of experiments to try to reproduce this, and we always found it most difficult to reproduce, and the only conditions under which we could reproduce it were the conditions of great heat and a dirty rifle. Those two conditions of great heat and a dirty rifle were exactly the conditions which were likely to occur in war, and, therefore, it seemed to me, and I so advised the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State, that none of this ammunition should be considered serviceable for war, and, consequently, 66,000,000, or thereabouts, of our reserve was non-effective for purposes of war. It was about the same time also in that summer that the Hague Convention sat, and passed a resolution against all expanding bullets, but our Government was not a party to that Convention, and they declined to be bound by it; but, nevertheless, it is impossible to avoid a feeling that it had a certain moral effect, and that it was not considered desirable to use an expanding bullet in time of war. The reason why we did not use the expanding bullet in South Africa was not the Hague Convention, however, but because the Mark IV. ammunition, our expanding ammunition, had proved unfit to be used in war. Consequently, about two-fifths of our reserve of ammunition could not be used. We were driven to great straits at one time, because we had actually got reduced in this country to two or three boxes of Mark II. ammunition, so that if we had had to go to war with a European Power we should have had to fight them with expanding bullets. Then, as regards hospital equipment, we had no reserve, and we had only material for one general and two stationary hospitals in our mobilisation equipment, and by the 15th December we had sent out five general hospitals, and were asked for a sixth, and I have stated here, in Statement IV. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 187.) that before the 30th September, 1899, we equipped and shipped from Woolwich five stationary hospitals and 16 general hospitals, each of 520 beds. That shows how inadequate our reserves were.

1603. The same was the case with the general stores?—Yes, our reserve of general stores was utterly inadequate to meet the demands; we had to buy on the market whatever we could get. As an example, we had an authorised reserve of 52,000 sets of horse shoes, but no mule shoes, and I had before December to send 35,000 sets of horse shoes and 40,000 sets of mule shoes to Africa monthly to keep the animals shod. Later on, this grew to about 100,000 sets of horse shoes and 70,000 mule shoes.

1604. Monthly?—Monthly, and we had to go to Germany and Sweden for horse shoes, and to the United States for mule shoes. Nobody in this country at first seemed to be able to make mule shoes. Our reserves of clothing were inadequate to meet even peace requirements, and before the war broke out I had asked for a reserve to be prepared equal to six months' ordinary supplies, which would cost £320,000, and that demand had received no answer. It had been put forward, I think, by us in February, 1899, just after I took office, and it remained in the Accountant-General's Department, not minuted upon, until after the Mowatt Committee had assembled, and it then saw daylight again.

1605. How long was that?—From February, 1899, till January, 1900. Then I should like to say that the responsibility for the supply of clothing had only been transferred to the Director-General of Ordnance shortly before the beginning of 1899. I think it was on the 1st of December, 1898, that Colonel Mulcahy, a first class Ordnance officer, took over the charge of the Clothing Department, and at that time the Estimates for the year 1899-1900 had been already prepared, so that my department was not responsible for the Estimates; but Mr. De la Bere, who had been Assistant Director of Clothing under the old system, in sending in the final estimates, had stated that the amount of money would be insufficient for ordinary peace requirements.

1606. (*Viscount Esher.*) That was in the preparation of the Estimates for what year?—From 1st April, 1899, to 31st March, 1900.

1607. (*Chairman.*) Was that statement of Mr. De la Bere sent on in any way?—Yes, that accompanied the estimates to the Accountant-General.

1608. When a representation of that kind is left dormant, do you not take any further steps?—You mean as regards the £320,000 for clothing?

1609. Yes?—I did take steps; I called attention to it more than once, but I think, the war then coming upon us, everybody's mind was taken up with bigger things than providing this peace reserve; the whole question grew so very much bigger.

1610. The delay was owing to the special circumstances?—Yes. In ordinary circumstances, if a representation of ours in regard to money requirements is not dealt with at once we should try to hasten the reply, and I should press it personally.

1611. And, probably, you would get an answer?—Yes. Again, special difficulties arose in regard to clothing, and in order to clothe the Army the whole trade of the country was occupied by us and for us, and the clothing factory at Pimlico was working to its full power and a great deal of overtime. We could not get sufficient helmets, and we had to borrow them from India. We could not even get sufficient boots, and we had to borrow boots from India.

1612. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) This is 1899 you are still speaking of?—Yes.

1613. Not after the 15th December, but during the first portion of the war?—Yes; but we could not, at first, send out sufficient reserves to meet proper wear and tear, and we could not get the stuff. Then, as regards the Ordnance factories, in order to meet the demands of the Army in South Africa, in the laboratory and in the carriage department all Naval orders had to be put aside from the beginning of October, and the whole of the departments manufacturing material were employed up to their fullest capacity. The Ordnance factories were working day and night and Sundays, and yet we were only just able to keep pace with demands. A great deal of the machinery in the Ordnance factories urgently needed replacement by labour-saving machines, and we had no real reserve of power of output in the country; and it caused me the deepest anxiety as to what would take place in the event of a war in which both Navy and Army were engaged, for if in this war, in which only the land forces were engaged, we had, in order to keep up sup-

plies, to borrow ammunition from the Navy, what would happen if the Army and Navy were both to be engaged? It would be impossible to meet the demands for ammunition under the conditions then existing.

1614. (*Chairman.*) That was the state of things in December, 1899?—Yes.

1615. Caused, no doubt, by the special circumstances of the war?—You may say caused by the provision which had been made, and which I suppose had been considered sufficient, being totally insufficient to meet such a demand as was made by this war, unprecedentedly large as far as this country is concerned.

1616. Can you state what came of that representation?—I made a very strong representation in writing on the 15th December to the Commander-in-Chief on the subject, and I asked that the work should be at once commenced, and that the money should be provided to enable the country to be put into a condition of safety, so that this could never occur again. That minute was forwarded by the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State, who laid it before the Cabinet. The result was that an inter-departmental Committee was appointed, of which Sir Francis Mowatt, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Treasury, was chairman, and Mr. Wyndham, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War, and Mr. Burls, the Director-General of Stores in the India Office, were members. They took a great deal of evidence from me, from the officers of my department, from the Director of Contracts, and from representatives of the trade, and many others, and they recommended that a sum of £6,482,567 should be given to the War Office to provide reserves of guns and mountings for fortresses and coast batteries, to complete the siege train and to give reserves of guns and carriages for horse and field artillery, reserves of machine guns and carriages, reserves of general stores, comprising camp and other equipment required for the outfit of three Army Corps, one Cavalry Division, and lines of communication, in all about 135,000 men, including a reserve to maintain that force in the field for the period of six months, and special reserves to meet possible temporary additions to the force, and special reserves of particular stores not based on the requirements of the above field force, but on the total establishment of the Army, and reserves of clothing, comprising clothing required as an outfit for the above field force, as well as a reserve for that force to be sent out to the base of operations on the outbreak of hostilities, and a six months' working margin of stock in store at home for the whole establishment of the Army. This sum also included certain alterations in the Ordnance factories and modernisation of existing machinery, and additional storage accommodation to provide for increased reserves of stores and for the decentralisation of clothing from Pimlico to district depôts. There were also other questions dealt with by that Committee which do not concern the field Army, and they referred to the recommendations of the Expert Committee, which had recommended that £5,139,303 should be given for those services, and that brought the total estimated expenditure, as dealt with by what we call the Mowatt Committee, to £11,621,870. Her Majesty's Government granted a sum of £10,500,000 to be provided in the three years 1901-02, 1902-03, and 1903-04, together with certain sums which we could get in the Estimates of the year 1900-01 towards these services.

1617. (*Viscount Esher.*) Not in subsequent years?—No.

1618. (*Chairman.*) And that provision fairly met the necessities of the case which you represented in December, 1899?—It did; there was only one item on which, in my opinion, and that of the Army Board, sufficient provision was not made, and that was the movable armaments for fortresses. The money was not sufficient to give all we thought was required under the movable armaments of fortresses for defence of the land fronts. The Mowatt Committee further recommended that whatever Reserves were granted should be permanently maintained, and that any guns, ammunition, stores, or clothing withdrawn for service should be immediately and automatically replaced; and the Secretary of State informed the Treasury of his intention to act upon that recommendation, as he considered the point of vital importance.

1619. We have been dealing with Statement I.; is that all you wish to say with regard to that?—With regard to the reserve of clothing and necessaries for a force of 25,000 men, as detailed in the form marked A (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 180) which I have mentioned, that had only been raised to 25,000 men in 1898, and it was not khaki; it was red or blue clothing, so that it was not really available for the war. On the 1st April, 1899, money was given for 40,000 khaki drill suits. As to the reservist kits as detailed in the form marked B. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 181) that was for 82,500 men, but the body clothing was unsuitable; the great coats, cloaks, field-caps, and so on, were suitable for foreign service, but the home pattern boots were unsuitable for field service.

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1620. Why was the body clothing unsuitable?—Because it was the wrong colour. I should like, if I may, to read part of a minute which I wrote on the 11th January, 1900, on the subject of clothing. This is what I said:—"All my difficulties have arisen from the fact that the troops sent out to South Africa had to be entirely re-clothed from head to foot before being sent out. In the infantry the blue helmet had to be replaced by a white helmet, and the red serge frock by khaki drill. After embarkation had commenced the khaki drill frock was discarded for khaki serge. After manufacturing the khaki serge had commenced, a new pattern frock was ordered, that had to be discarded, as contractors objected to it, owing to difficulties of manufacture." The Director-General of Ordnance is not responsible for patterns of clothing; that rests with the Adjutant-General. "Tweed trousers had to be replaced by khaki drill, afterwards changed to khaki serge. Even the boots had to be changed, as the foreign service boot differs from the home service boot. In cavalry and artillery there were the same changes in helmets and frocks as in the infantry; cloth pantaloons had to be replaced by cord pantaloons, knee boots had to be replaced by ankle boots and putties. Similar changes had to be made for all services, Royal Engineers, Army Service Corps, Army Ordnance Corps, etc. I submit that a system such as above described is eminently unpractical, and unsuited to the requirements of an Army which is maintained to enable us to make war. I recommend the present opportunity, when nearly all our troops are clothed in khaki, for making that colour, or some other variable colour of brown, the working dress of our Army."

1621. That has been done?—That has been carried out. With regard to the articles stored in the Reservists' kits, there were the same difficulties.

1622. Who was responsible for the different patterns of boot? Is that the Adjutant-General, too?—That is the Adjutant-General, too; he is responsible for all patterns.

1623. Is it necessary that there should be a separate pattern for field service and for home service?—I think not, and there is not now; we have got rid of that. We have now got what we may call a universal pattern boot. The home boot was a great, thick, clump-soled boot. The men liked it at home in time of peace; it did not wear out quickly, and, consequently, it saved their pocket; but when they went to war these clump-soles separated, and they would not stand the tremendous wear and tear of a campaign. The foreign service boot, which was a hand-sewn boot, and a very good boot, indeed, we could not get in sufficient number.

1624. On home service is the soldier bound to replace his boots?—Yes, he has a certain issue of boots made to him, but he has to have mending done himself. He gets a pair every six months.

1625. If he is put to any extra duty during that six months, is he still called upon to replace his own boots?—Oh, yes.

1626. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Is a pair of boots supposed to last six months?—Yes. A recruit gets two pairs to begin with, and he gets another pair every six months, so that he always has two pairs, you may say.

1627. (*Chairman.*) When you found these difficulties, did you correspond with the Adjutant-General on the subject?—At that time these sort of things would be brought up before the Army Board, as the Army Board was then sitting. This particular minute was addressed by me to the Adjutant-General.

1628. What was the date of that minute?—11th January, 1900; so that the condition was that we had clothing for the Reservists, we had clothing for the

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troops, but it was only suitable for home service, and even then was not really suitable for fighting because of its colour, and we only had an authorised provision of 40,000 suits of khaki drill for the whole of this campaign.

1629. You do not want to refer specially to C, D, and E in Statement I?—I do not think there is anything special to refer to in those; those reserves, as far as numbers are concerned, were complete when war broke out.

1630. Do you pass on now to Statement No. II?—As to Statement No. II. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 178.) I was asked to prepare a statement showing what special steps, if any, were taken to complete or add to the above equipment of reserves between 1st January, 1899, and the outbreak of the war. That is my Statement II. With regard to that statement, I think it is necessary for me to make at once this general statement, that with a few trivial exceptions, such as I mentioned here, of 1,200 wire cutters and stores for converting 14,000 general service blankets to special service; that is to say, eyeletting these blankets so that they could be used in South Africa, no addition was sanctioned to the equipment and reserves shown in Statement I., until 22nd September, 1899, when the Secretary of State for War authorised the immediate expenditure of £645,000 on pressing requirements for the preparation and despatch of an Army Corps and Cavalry Division. I think I ought to say that we had constantly asked for money, and I think I might give you, as a typical example, this first item in this statement, which was granted to me on the 22nd September, £17,750, stores for converting carts and waggons to ox and mule draught and harness for the same. I should like there to say this, that in my opinion it is practically certain that in every foreign expedition there will be some, what may be called, special provision required. It would, I think, be impossible to store in this country everything for an immense expedition in every different part of the world, the conditions are so different, whether it is a very cold, or a very hot, or a dry or a wet climate; and then, on the question of roads especially, comes in the question of transport. Now, all our vehicles in this country are vehicles suited for European warfare, and that means for warfare in countries where there are good roads and where you have horse-draught. The first thing that had to be done for all the vehicles for South Africa was to put on South African brakes to make them suitable for transport in that country, very powerful screw brakes; and the second thing was to convert all carts and waggons to mule draught, and that required the provision of mule harness. Now we knew it would take some weeks to convert these carts and waggons to ox or mule draught and to get harness for them, and, accordingly, at an early stage, I commenced asking that the money for this small service might be granted, and on the 10th October, feeling that the delay which would be caused by the money for this not having been given to us might seriously hamper the operations of the Army, I wrote a minute to the Commander-in-Chief placing on record exactly what had taken place in regard to this alteration of waggons and harness. If you will allow me, I will read that minute to the Commission:—"Commander-in-Chief,—I shall have to report to the Army Mobilisation Board at their next meeting that I see no prospect of the vehicles required by the Army Corps and the Cavalry Division, which are to be taken from this country, being fitted for mule or ox draught and ready with their harness before the expiration of 10 weeks from the 22nd September. In order that the responsibility for this may be clearly defined, I state the following facts: On the 26th July the Army Mobilisation Board decided that the alterations necessary to fit vehicles which were to be sent out from this country with pole draught and screw frame brakes should be done in this country, and also that the new harness for the vehicles which were to be sent out from this country should be provided here. As you are aware, the Secretary of State declined at this stage to sanction any expenditure on preparations for the despatch of an Army Corps for South Africa. The cost of these services, for which authority was required, was conversion of carts and waggons £9,000, and conversion and provision of harness £8,650. On the 31st August the Board considered it useless to postpone any longer these services, and directed the Director-General of Ordnance again to ask for authority. On the 1st September, the Director-General of Ordnance again asked for authority. On the 5th September, in putting forward a schedule of requirements, he pointed out that this service would take 10 weeks, and said the sanction of these items should be given at once on account of the time required to manufacture and obtain them, and that if put off till the force is ordered to mobilise it would be impossible to guarantee their being ready in time. On the 5th September, he reported that the authority had not yet been received. On the 8th September he again reported no authority received. On the 20th September the Assistant-Under-Secretary informed the Board that the Secretary of State was prepared to consider the expenditure necessary to meet the most pressing requirements. On the 21st September the Board met and considered the schedule containing the provision for this service. On the 22nd September the Director-General of Ordnance was informed that the Secretary of State had sanctioned the expenditure, and orders were given the same day for the work to proceed."

1631. On the 26th July you had fairly in your mind the probability of an Army Corps going to South Africa?—Certainly we had; we soldiers wanted to be ready for it, it looked so uncommonly like it.

1632. It was the Mobilisation Committee that met on that date?—It was what was called the Army Board; it was really the Army Board for Mobilisation. Before the 11th September it was called the Commander-in-Chief's Committee to consider questions relating to operations in South Africa, and on the 11th September it was called "The Army Board for Mobilisation Purposes, late Commander-in-Chief's Committee." The proceedings of the Army Board are full of instances of our asking to be allowed at that time to spend money in making preparations and of our being told we could not do it. It was perfectly clear that it was the decision of the Government they would not spend money in preparations for the despatch of an Army Corps at that time.

1633. If it was stated that that refusal was justified by the fact that the expedition of an Army Corps was not contemplated at that time, your reply is that you, on the military side, did contemplate an expedition at that time?—Yes; but then we had not the knowledge—I certainly had not the knowledge—which the Cabinet had. Looking at it from what we saw, it looked so much as if an expedition would be required and as if the Army Corps would have to go out that we were anxious to make provision so that when the word came for mobilisation there should be no delay due to our not having made the provision.

1634. By making the requests, you warned the Government that there would be delay?—Yes, we did. I may say that I put these facts on record before the Commander-in-Chief, and at the same time I gave a copy of that minute to Lord Lansdowne personally, as I did not want to be doing this behind his back.

1635. Was there delay in consequence?—There was delay. It was less serious than I had anticipated. On the 6th November I see I reported to the Board that the number of vehicles converted for mule or ox draught and fitted with South African brakes was 977, that up to the 3rd instant 52 units had embarked with vehicles complete, that 16 units had left all their vehicles behind, and those vehicles were to be sent out afterwards.

1636. The order for mobilisation was on October 7th; the mobilisation began on the 17th October, and was completed on the 17th November?—Yes.

1637. By the 17th November was all your equipment complete?—I reported to the Board on the 20th November that the fitting of the vehicles for mule or ox draught, and with South African brakes for the Army Corps, Cavalry Division and Lines of Communication troops was completed by the Ordnance factories by 15th November, sixteen days within ten weeks from the date of the order to commence, which was estimated as the time required for the completion, and with the exception of some fittings for some Royal Engineer telegraph waggons they had all been shipped to South Africa. But they were not ready in time to go with the units in, at all events, the 16 cases on the 3rd November, and I could not say without rather an elaborate examination exactly how many went with the units and how many did not.

1638. But except in that particular, the force as a whole had its transport with it when it landed in South Africa?—I am only speaking of the actual vehicles which belonged to the units. I may say that, according

o the normal conditions of working the War Office, the Director-General of Ordnance is charged with the provision or all waggons, whether they be for transport or for any other service, but when this war was imminent, from, you may say, the end of September, I arranged with the Quartermaster General that he should take over the provision of transport waggons and transport harness, and with the Inspector-General of Fortifications that he should take over the provision of Royal Engineer stores. I was, in fact, in normal times as Director-General of Ordnance, a sort of post office for the Quartermaster-General and for the Inspector-General of Fortifications, being charged with the provision of their stores, and they having to come to me for everything. I arranged with them that they should do it direct, so that the Quartermaster-General will tell you about the transport vehicles. Then on the 5th October, I should like to say that the Secretary of State sanctioned further expenditure of £152,380 for ordnance stores, and different sums of £203,000 for clothing. Then, perhaps, it might be well if here I showed how the provision went on. On the 22nd September, 1899, I made this report to the Army Board: "The Director-General of Ordance brought to notice that considerable delay is caused in complying with demands for stores made urgently by the General Officer Commanding in South Africa, or required for service in connection with South Africa, by his being compelled, under the system at this moment in force, to make out beforehand estimates of cost of all items necessitating reference to Woolwich, Weedon, and Pimlico. For example, demands received in one day involved the pricing out of 138 separate items. These have all to be priced out in detail before the Director-General of Ordance can estimate the total cost of the demand, and it is only then that he is in a position to go before the Army Mobilisation Board for their concurrence in asking for authority to issue and replace stores, and he has then to apply to the Permanent Under-Secretary for that authority. He expressed the opinion that it is impossible to make preparations for war with due despatch under this system, and asked that he should be given a free hand to comply with all demands from general officers commanding in the Cape and Natal, and the departments at home for stores required for the use of troops in and on the way to South Africa, and to replace all stores thus sent if taken from reserves, reporting the financial aspect of the situation to the Accountant-General after despatch of the stores"; and the Board state: "The Board are of opinion that the system in force is not one that can be satisfactory under the present pressure, and that the time has come when the Director-General of Ordnance should be given a freer hand." On the 29th September, I reported to the Army Board as follows: "The Secretary of State has written as follows: Director-General of Ordnance has shown that the practice now followed leads to undue delay, and might lead to a breakdown at a time of unusual pressure. Where the service is urgent, we cannot afford to suspend orders for two or three days, while the cost is being calculated to a farthing, and in some cases the sum involved is relatively so small as to make the waste of time quite inexcusable. When the Army Board, as constituted for mobilisation, advises me that it is satisfied both as to the urgent necessity of the service, and as to the reasonableness of the expenditure, which will probably be involved, I shall be ready to give my decision without waiting for detailed calculations. These will, of course, have to be made and submitted as soon after as possible. In cases of extreme urgency it must be for the head of the department concerned to decide whether he will, on his own responsibility, give the necessary orders without waiting for a meeting of the Army Board. In such a case he must, of course, report his action to the Army Board at its next meeting.'" At that time, you may say everything was of urgency, and I do not think I went to the Army Board much after that before giving the orders. I used to ask the opinion and advice of the Army Board on every question where I thought it was of importance, but where it was merely complying with the requests of the general officer for authorised stores, I did that without any hesitation. I see on the 25th October, I reported to the Board that I had a supplementary item of £100,000 for stores to be purchased if required for South Africa up to the 31st March, 1900, in addition to the sum of £500,000 for replacement, and that the Secretary of State had authorised me to say (I think my conscience was then getting a little uneasy at the free interpretation I had given to Lord Lansdowne's authority to act in cases of extreme urgency, and I had spoken to him personally) that the Secretary of State only requires the Director-General of Ordnance to report proposals for expenditure of an exceptional or novel character to the Army Mobilisation Board. So that that was practically actually giving me a free hand from that date to supply the Army, and if from that date anything went wrong, and there was any defect in the supply, it is either because we could not get the stuff at home or abroad in time, or because it was my fault. I see that on the 20th November, I reported to the Board that the orders given by me against the £100,000 authorised for stores and clothing to the 31st March, 1900, amounted up to the 18th November, to £231,637, and that I had reported this to the Adjutant-General, stating that large further sums would be necessary to meet Sir Redvers Buller's demands, and for the increased numbers of troops. From that time the expenditure went forward, and the totals amounted eventually to about £19,000,000 for both clothing and ordnance stores.

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1639. Those are weekly reports to the Army Board?—Yes. I used to report to the Army Board, and here, for instance, is a form: "D.G.O. reported to the Board the following expenditure. The orders given by him during the week ended 9th December, 1899, amounted to £491,411."

1640. Are those weekly reports available?—They are in the proceedings of the Army Board, which I take it the Commission will have. I went on week by week practically until the end of the war. I used to report to the Army Board and then tell the Army Board what the chief items were.

1641. I suppose we can get these records?—I suppose so, my Lord; I do not suppose there would be any difficulty about it. The records of the Army Board are confidential papers, but I have no doubt about their being laid before your Commission.

1642. Is that all you wish to say on Statement II.?—Yes. There is a clothing statement, but I do not think I have much to add to what is stated here.

1643. With regard to the question of the free hand to the Director-General of Ordnance, do you put it that that would be a necessity in the case of any war?—Absolutely necessary; if a man has reached the position of being the general officer selected to be the head of one of these great administrative departments, and he is not to be trusted when it comes to war, he had better give it up.

1644. Otherwise there would be too much delay?—Oh, yes; it would be quite impossible to carry on war. With regard to the clothing statement in Statement No. II. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 178.) I have already mentioned the difficulty in my previous evidence, but one of our great difficulties about the provision of clothing was, first of all that the whole of these blue and red suits were useless for fighting purposes, and we had only a small authorised reserve of 40,000 suits of khaki drill. Luckily, we had a little more than that up our sleeve which helped us out of the first difficulty. We were equally refused money by the Secretary of State in the early stage to make any preparation for providing clothing for the First Army Corps, and nothing was done until 22nd September, and then on 22nd September, £38,000 was given for serge frocks and trousers, and £5,000 for frocks. The exchange from khaki drill to khaki serge caused us a great deal of trouble. That was due to representations from the authorities themselves in South Africa, strongly backed up by the Director-General of the Army Medical Service at home. The khaki drill was not a warm enough clothing for that climate, which at certain seasons of the year is, of course, very cold—the summer nights are very cold—and that caused the Adjutant-General to propose the substitution of khaki serge for drill. There was a great deal of difficulty in getting this khaki serge made. (*Colonel Mulcahy.*) We had to buy it off the looms, practically. (*Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) At first, if the khaki serge clothing which went out was not up to standard, it is because we really could not get it. In order to clothe the troops at all in it we had, as Colonel Mulcahy has said, to buy the stuff off the looms wherever we could get it.

1645. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I do not quite understand where the hurry came in for the khaki

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serge; the Commander-in-Chief approved on the 18th August, and in any case it could not have been manufactured for six weeks or two months; at any rate, the war had not then broken out. It could not have been used by the troops out there before November, 1899?—(*Colonel Mulcahy.*) The first three divisions went out in cotton drill.

1646. And they got there in December?—Yes.

1647. Supposing the demand had been allowed earlier, they could not have been issued and used in South Africa before November?—I think we would have been able to give the men one suit though not two.

1648. Supposing it had been granted when the Commander-in-Chief made his first application on the 18th August, and there had been no delay, and if the war had broken out directly afterwards, still you would have had to wait some time before issuing it?—Yes; I calculated it would have taken four months to get an adequate supply.

1649. And by that time the hot season would be on in South Africa, when one knows that khaki drill is much more comfortable than khaki serge?—I think the medical authorities considered it was the wet, not the heat, that made it desirable to have serge.

1650. The wet in that season, certainly in the western portion of Cape Colony, on the main line, and in the Orange Free State and the South African Republic, was not a very serious consideration?—Many of the troops liked the khaki drill out there very well.

1651. Do you not think, Sir Henry, as a matter of fact, that the khaki serge did not become a matter of importance until the cold weather was coming on in the following spring?—(*Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) That was a matter in which we were guided by the Director-General of the Army Medical Service, and he was pressing for khaki serge, whether it was summer or winter, instead of khaki drill, considering that the former was more healthy. He laid tremendous stress on the wet.

1652. I quite understand it was not your department that initiated it; it came from the Medical Service?—It came from the Adjutant-General, urged by the medical people.

1653. And you merely had to satisfy the demand?—That is so.

1654. (*Chairman.*) In your reserves now is it khaki serge that you have?—Khaki serge.

1655. And that only?—And that only. There is a question now before the Secretary of State as to the use of khaki drill in certain stations, which will, of course, complicate things a good deal. On the 31st August, 1899, the Adjutant-General pointed out the unsuitability of khaki drill for wear in a wet climate such as may be expected in South Africa during the months from November to March.

1656. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) He was referring to Natal there, I suppose?—I suppose he was.

1657. Was it not originally contemplated that the advance to Pretoria should take place from Cape Town?—I do not know.

1658. You do not know the plan of campaign officially?—I do not know the plan of campaign officially. The Adjutant-General pointed out "the unsuitability of khaki drill for wear in a wet climate such as may be expected in South Africa during the months from November to March. The Director-General of the Army Medical Service considered khaki drill dangerous to health in such a climate. The Commander-in-Chief's Committee recommended that two suits of khaki serge or other woollen material be provided for all the troops of the field force. The Director-General of Ordnance reported that this would cost £80,000 for material, in addition to the cost of making up the garments, and he was authorised to ask at once for sanction. If the serge suits could not be ready in time for issue before the troops embark, they should be sent out to South Africa as soon as they are ready."

1659. That is not taking account of the fact that there are really two climates in South Africa?—The Adjutant-General, who was Sir Evelyn Wood, was of course more familiar, as I was myself, with the Natal and Transvaal side than with the Cape side.

1660. (*Chairman.*) And if you had an expedition to a part of the world in which khaki drill was the proper uniform, you would be in very much the same position now?—Yes; I cannot myself think that the khaki serge could not be worn in any climate. For instance, I was all through the Ashantee campaign in 1873-74, and the troops then wore homespun, which is thicker than our serge, or quite as thick.

1661. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You practically had no option in the matter?—None.

1662. (*Chairman.*) How do you select the material?—Would you allow Colonel Mulcahy to answer that? (*Colonel Mulcahy.*) I should submit several samples of the kind of material asked for, and the Adjutant-General would give the official decision as to which pattern was to be accepted.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

1663. (*Chairman.*) (*To Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) We have got now to Statement III. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 178.) Is there anything you wish to say with regard to that?—I have very little to add to Statement III., except I might say that in addition to the points mentioned in 1, 2, 3, and 4, we had to issue in Field Hospitals for South Africa double circular tents instead of single tents as stored for home defence; that blankets were eyeletted, that there was extra pack saddlery required for signalling equipment, and there was a change of equipments in the Rifle regiments from black belts to buff, which gave us a good deal of trouble. And as regards the clothing regulations, the question which was put to me was, "A statement showing how far the equipment of the reinforcements despatched to South Africa during 1899 prior to the outbreak of the war and with Sir Redvers Buller, departed from the normal standard laid down for an Army in the Field, and giving the reasons for such departure." The clothing, of course, was all khaki drill or khaki serge. The Clothing Regulations of 1899 do not mention either khaki drill or khaki serge, and therefore practically, as I have shown, the whole clothing of the men had to be altered.

1664. That is covered by what you have already said?—Yes; I think what might be taken as the average scale of equipment for home was the Reservists' kits, which are mentioned in one of the supplements sent in to Statement I.

1665. Then we come to Statement IV. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 179.)?—I was asked there to give "a statement of the equipment subsequently despatched to South Africa"—that was after the despatch of Sir Redvers Buller's force up to the date of the occupation of Pretoria—"showing the proportions of such equipment drawn from the existing reserve, obtained from the Government factories or Arsenal, or purchased from private factories." There I have not given you in this great list a statement which finishes on the 5th June, 1900, because it would require, Colonel Steevens tells me, a very elaborate investigation of the Woolwich ledgers; but if you particularly wish to have it got out, it can be got out. The statement I have given you goes on up to the 30th September; it is only four months longer.

1666. If we do find that we want it, we can get it?—You can get it if you want it. It will take some considerable time to get it out. This list shows the enormous quantity of things we had to send out. The largest item I see there is small-arm ammunition, of which we sent out nearly 102,000,000 rounds, besides all that was taken with the troops. Again, you see that we sent out over a million and a half—1,619,562—pairs of horse and mule shoes, which we had really to go all over the world to get. The question was asked me how far they were drawn from existing reserves, obtained from Government factories or the Arsenal, or purchased from private factories. I think we have shown you what the existing reserves were, how trifling they were. Then the great mass of boots was supplied by the trade, and of the purely warlike equipment we got a great deal more from the Ordnance factories than from anyone else. We had to go to America and to Germany for tents. We got a number of tents even from India. Horse and mule shoes we went to America, Germany, and Sweden for. For saddlery we went to Canada, America, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, and even such things as felling axes we could not get in sufficient quantities in this country.

1667. A very large proportion was not got from the Government factories?—Yes; when you speak of the Government factories, there is the Gun factory which makes guns, there is the Carriage department which makes military carriages, there is the Laboratory which makes ammunition and all the different components of ammunition, there are the Small-arms factories which make rifles and pistols and swords;

there is what is called the Royal Gunpowder factory, which makes cordite, and there is the Clothing factory which makes clothing; but with the exception of those articles, for this list everything was obtained from the trade, and besides what was made in our own factories, guns, ammunition, carriages, rifles, small-arm ammunition, cordite, and clothing were obtained from the trade also.

1668. But the other articles are always obtained from the trade?—Yes.

1669. You do not attempt to make them?—No; we do not attempt to make what we call general service stores. But the difficulties were immense in getting things. We had the greatest possible difficulty in getting tents at all up to our requirements. There are other items which occur to me here, pickaxes and spades; we had the greatest difficulty in getting those in the trade—in fact, generally it was so. After the trade had got once well started (and it took them some months to get well started) then they began to supply us more freely, but at first our difficulties were enormous.

1670. Is that all you wish to say on Statement IV.?—Yes, I think so.

1671. Statement V. deals with guns. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 189?—Yes. There we were asked to give a detailed statement of the "number, classes, and range of guns with which (a) the force in South Africa at the outbreak of the war, (b) the force despatched to South Africa under Sir R. Buller, and (c) subsequent reinforcements up to the occupation of Pretoria were equipped," and those are contained in these Statements. I do not know whether the Commission wish to go into such questions as the power and ranges of the guns?

1672. I think we certainly would like to hear about that?—And the question about heavy artillery in the field, and so on?

1673. Certainly?—That is a matter, of course, about which the War Department was tremendously attacked in the Press at the early stages of the war—that the ranges of our field guns were altogether insufficient, that we were altogether behind other nations, and that we ought to have had heavy artillery in the field.

1674. I may say that other witnesses have referred us to you for this information?—At the risk of troubling you at some little length, I should like to read two memoranda that I have prepared on that subject, if I may. The first is on the question of Field Artillery. The question of the range at which our field guns were intended to be used cannot be properly considered without reviewing the experience of the great wars of 1866, 1870, and 1877, and the artillery lessons which have been deduced from them. As far as this country goes, the views on the employment of Field Artillery were up to 1899 mainly based on Prince Kraft von Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen's letters on Artillery, published in England in 1887. You will, of course, remember that our own Army had not been engaged in any European war since the Crimea, when we had smooth-bore guns. Prince Kraft points out very strongly the failure of the Prussian Artillery in 1866, and contrasts it with its great successes in 1870. The failure in 1866 was very largely due to the distance in the rear at which the artillery was then kept, so that it signally failed to support the infantry. In 1870, however, the artillery was invariably pushed well to the front, long-range firing was entirely discountenanced, and at the commencement of the war orders were issued to the artillery of the German armies that they were not to fire at a longer range than 1,800 paces. Events proved that these orders could not always be carried out, but they show the spirit of the training of the German Artillery. Our own artillery—and that of other countries—has been since trained in that same spirit; it has been taught that it must get into effective range and must not waste ammunition. The experiences of the 1877 war bore out those of 1866 and 1870, the Russians used their artillery at long ranges (as did the Prussians in 1866) and their infantry got little or no support accordingly. In 1866 the Prussians made up for the failure of their artillery by having a breech-loading rifle against the Austrian muzzle-loader; in 1877 the conditions were reversed; the Turks had the best rifle, and the Russians were heavily repulsed on numerous occasions. In 1896 we find that the teachings of these wars as applied to more recent armaments had led us to lay down in our Artillery Drill Book (1896) that the limits of "distant to medium artillery ranges" were 3,500 to 2,500 yards. "Infantry Drill (1896)," which is a text-book, laid down 3,000 to 1,500 yards as "distant artillery ranges," and added that "the extreme useful range of Field Artillery may be said to be 3,000 yards. Artillery officers"—this is all quotation from the Drill Book—"claim effective action for their guns at much greater ranges, but it is not necessary for infantry to practice formations intended to lessen the effect of Artillery fire at longer ranges than those at which objects can be clearly seen, for the distance at which the effect of fire can be observed practically fixes the extreme range of useful artillery fire." These Drill Books were in use in 1899. The German Drill Regulations of 1899 lay down that in the attack the distance from the enemy of the first position to be taken up by the artillery should be as short as circumstances would permit; in the defence "opening of fire at an excessive range is to be avoided." The German Field Service Regulations of 1900 indicate 3,000 metres (3,300 yards) as the distance at which Field Artillery fire becomes effective. The following table shows the average ranges at which a large number of batteries carried out their practice at Okehampton in recent years:—

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Before the War	1897	1,500 yards.	
	1898	1,540 ,,	
	1899	2,148 ,,	
After commencement of War	1900	2,329 ,,	
	1901	2,648 ,,	12 batteries.
		3,209 ,,	10 ,,

Thus it is seen that the main teaching of the late great European wars as regards the range of artillery fire was that long-distance shooting was to be deprecated, and that the guns should commence work at effective ranges. But whilst European Artillery generally accepted this main lesson, and learnt it, it would seem that a subsidiary effect which artillery is capable of was to some extent lost sight of, and that is the effect of long-range fire. Instances can be quoted from probably every war of the tendency to use weapons up to their extreme range. The effect of this fire is principally moral, and, as moral effect goes for nothing in peace time, it is not to be wondered at that our officers who had no experience of being under hostile artillery fire from modern guns readily accepted the lessons of 1866, 1870, and 1877, that long-range fire should be checked, and effective ranges sought. Under these circumstances there can be no doubt that nearly all artillery officers would up to 1899 have strongly deprecated the employment of field guns of the power of those in use in England, Germany, France, and other continental nations, for these guns are all of much the same ballistic power at ranges much exceeding 4,000 yards. It was known that the physical effect would be very small, the consumption of ammunition considerable, and the moral effect was not thought worth the expense. Thus our field guns with a maximum range of 5,500 yards and a time fuse available up to 4,100 yards, were considered equal to what was expected of them. If the tendency in war to use guns up to their extreme range had been more appreciated, perhaps a demand would have arisen for a time fuse available up to the full range of the gun. The following table shows the ballistic power of the field guns of the principal Powers. The German, French, and Italian guns have been adopted in the last few years only:—

See Q. 10569.

Country.	Calibre.	Weight of Shell.	Muzzle Velocity.
	Inches.	Lbs.	Foot Seconds.
England	3	14	1,574
Germany	3·03	15	1,525
France	2·95	15 to 16	1,640
Russia	3·42	15½	1,700
Austria	3·42	14	1,470
Italy	2·95	14¾	1,640

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Though the muzzle velocity of the Russian gun is high, its striking velocity is less at fighting ranges than that of the English gun, as its calibre is so large compared with the weight of the shell. The Boer "long range high velocity" field gun had a calibre of 2·95 inches, shell of 11½ lbs., muzzle velocity of 1,955 foot-seconds, maximum range of 6,800 yards; thus they secured a long range, but at the expense of effect at more moderate distances, because they had shell of so little capacity—11½ lbs. All field guns can be made to range further than their nominal ranges by digging a hole for the trail, and this is said to have been done by the Boers. But though the Boer 2·95-inch gun could shoot further than our 15-pounder, the fact that the Boer guns were frequently used at longer ranges than ours was probably due at least as much to the reluctance of our artillery officers to use up ammunition in a way that they did not think gave sufficient results as to the ranging capabilities of the two guns. There is a case on record of an infantry officer using one of our 15-pounders up to 7,300 yards. South African conditions encouraged long range shooting, owing to the clearness of the atmosphere, the large features of the ground, its usually open nature and the absence of trees and other objects which might obstruct the view. All these conditions are wanting in England, where the bulk of our artillery is trained, so there was no impulse to consider the use of field guns at long ranges. While, during the years previous to 1899, attention was directed to endeavouring to quicken the rate of fire of our guns, and every effort was made to obtain this, no one ever suggested that longer range was required for our field guns than that which they already possessed. But in spite of the peculiar features of the Boer gun and of the country, it cannot be said that long range artillery fire was proved to be effective. It did not secure the success of any attack which was seriously resisted; it never repulsed any determined advance. The moderate range-fire of our guns did both, and those who have studied numbers of reports from South Africa can have no doubt whatever of the very great value to our Army of our field artillery fire. On the other hand, during the four months' siege of Ladysmith, the Boer artillery fired about 20,000 rounds, and caused a loss of 30 or 40 killed, and about 250 wounded. One camp in an exposed position, containing 600 men and 600 horses, was shelled daily, and lost one man wounded, one horse killed, and one horse wounded. The Boers handled their artillery in a manner similar to that adopted in 1866 by the Prussians and in 1877 by the Russians. In all three cases there was the same exaggerated fear of allowing the field guns to come anywhere near the zone of rifle-fire. The actual results obtained in all three cases were, therefore, small, and it is very probable that the reason we have heard so much of the Boer artillery fire is, that the accounts have been mainly rendered by superficial observers (writing at times for effect) exposed to the long-range fire, whilst, in the 1866 and 1877 wars, our knowledge comes mainly from the side which made use of the long-range fire, and was disappointed at the results obtained. It is possible that a civilian spectator, writing from the Turkish Army for the benefit of readers at home, might have enlarged considerably on the great range at which the Russians annoyed them with their shell fire. Doubtless, however, the effect, moral or otherwise, of long-range fire is appreciable, and should not be despised. At the same time there can be little doubt that our main aim before 1899 was correct, viz., good effect at moderate ranges; the war has brought into prominence the desirability of effect at longer ranges. The teaching of history shows that there is almost always some demand for this effect, though it may not be of the first importance. The drill books of 1902 give the following table of ranges, and we are carrying out trials with guns designed to give these ranges:—

Terms applied to Ranges.	Rifle.	Field Artillery.	Heavy Batteries.
	Yards.	Yards.	Yards.
Distant - -	3,000 to 2,000	6,000 to 4,500	10,000 to 6,000
Long - - -	2,000 to 1,400	4,500 to 3,500	6,000 to 4,000
Effective - -	1,400 to 600	3,500 to 2,000	4,000 to 2,500
Decisive -	600 and under.	2,000 and under.	2,500 and under.

Those are based upon the advice and experience of the officers who have served in this war.

1675. In your view, therefore, the guns that we had then, so far as range was concerned, were satisfactory?—It would have been a good thing if we had had long-range guns against the Boer guns, but I have endeavoured to show the reasons why we, knowing how the European Powers felt, thought it unnecessary to have long-range guns.

1676. There may be other changes, I suppose, in the Drill Book besides that?—Yes, no doubt, there will be. I am not, of course, responsible in any way for the Drill Book; that is the work of the Adjutant-General's Department.

1677. For instance, there has been some criticism as regards massing batteries?—There may have been, but that I am not prepared to speak about. It does not come within my purview at all.

1678. Did I rightly understand you to say that you are experimenting as to the class of gun to adopt for those ranges?—We are actually experimenting with guns which have been made to give us those results, with the intention of re-arming the artillery.

1679. With a different class of gun from that which was used in South Africa?—A longer range and a more powerful gun. Then as regards long-range time fuses, I have spoken in that memorandum of the range of our field gun being 5,500 yards. That is the range of the gun which you can get with its carriage. Of course, the carriage only admits of elevation to a certain extent, and with the ordinary time and percussion fuses, with which we can get 5,500 yards, the time fuse only burns up to 4,100 yards, and beyond that shrapnel shell, which is the one shell we have for these guns, can only be used with percussion fuses. In regard to the length of burning of the time fuse, I wish to make the following remarks: Previous to 1894 the time fuse (No. 55), used by the horse and field artillery, burnt in flight for nine seconds only—corresponding to a range in the 12-pounder breech-loading gun of 7 cwt. of 3,200 yards. In 1894 a fuse (No. 56) was introduced, having a time of burning of twelve seconds, corresponding to a range of 4,100 yards in the 15-pounder breech-loading guns, and 3,700 yards in the 12-pounder breech-loading gun of 6 cwt. In 1896 experiments were being made with fuses to burn 17 seconds and 22 seconds for use in firing at balloons. The latter was not at that time successful, owing to irregular burning. At the beginning of November, 1899, as soon as he got reports as to what was going on in Natal, the Director-General of Ordnance directed the Ordnance Committee to push on with the question of obtaining a satisfactory time fuse effective up to longer ranges than those then in the Service, and again (on the 17th of the same month) pressed the matter. Trials were then made of substituting a slower burning composition in the Service fuses then under manufacture, with satisfactory results, and by the 15th of January, 1900, the Director-General of Ordnance was able to report that 4,000 fuses capable of burning 21 seconds, corresponding to a range 6,400 yards, were ready for despatch, and 15,000 more were ordered. This fuse was numbered 57, and was known as the blue fuse, from its distinctive colour. By July, 1900, 26,000 of these fuses had been sent to South Africa. These were all in addition to a complete supply of fuses of the earlier pattern. By March, 1901, 46,000 of these fuses had been dispatched to South Africa, and at the conclusion of the war there were still 4,438 available in that country. Meanwhile, experiments were being carried out with other patterns of long burning fuses, resulting in the adoption of the present pattern known as No. 60, also a 22 second fuse. That shows that as soon as this desire for longer range shrapnel came to our knowledge, we endeavoured to give effect to it.

1680. And with success?—And with success, although we never had any call, anything like a sort of outcry from South Africa, asking for long range fuses; it was entirely our own doing here. Then in regard to another point, a great deal has been said in the Press about our not having what may be called heavy field artillery, and with regard to that, the Commission have, of course, had before them the statement of the Intelligence Department, which shows that they had told us with considerable exactness what the Boers had. The only thing in the nature of heavy guns that the Boers

had was, according to the Intelligence Department, 16 "Long Toms," as they termed them. They really only had four, and we knew somewhere about October, I think, that the Boers had three of those guns in position, but we understood, we so gathered from the report of the Intelligence Department, that they were not really mobile guns at all; they were fortress guns, which they put on to a peculiar sort of carriage and dragged up the hills and mounted them in the positions overlooking Ladysmith; and there were only those three heavy guns that the Boers had against us. In regard to heavy artillery in the field, I would like to read the following memorandum: The reasons which led to long-range fire from field guns in South Africa also led to a demand for heavy long-range guns. The use of heavy artillery in the field is not absolutely new; at the same time its extensive use is unusual. Probably the most marked cases of the use of large numbers of heavy guns in the field were the two Sikh wars; in the first war the Sikhs brought heavy guns into the field; in the second war Lord Gough followed their example. Heavy guns do not appear to have been used in the field to any extent in 1866, 1870, or 1877, though they were used in the fighting on the Lisaine in 1870; those are the guns which were taken from the siege of Belfort and brought into the field. The French and German and, to some extent, the Austrian Armies have contemplated since about 1898-9 the use of a small proportion of heavy ordnance with the field army, but the ordnance intended to be used in each case is howitzers, to deal with entrenchments and overhead cover, and not "long-range" guns. After extensive trials carried out at Lydd over many years, our Ordnance Committee recommended in 1892 that our siege train should consist only of howitzers, a few long-range guns to be available, if special circumstances demanded them. The siege train sent to South Africa included such guns.

The following are the German guns of position:—

Calibre.	Weight of Shell.	Maximum Range.
	Lbs.	Yards.
5·9-inch howitzer -	88	6,600
8·27-inch mortar - -	174	6,600
4·7-inch gun - -	34 to 42	7,100

The German Field Service Regulations, 1900, only refer to the howitzer and mortar; they say the effective range of both is under 6,600 yards; the howitzer is intended for employment against strong field works, and the mortar against overhead cover of permanent works. It appears that the decision to employ the howitzer and mortar in the field army was arrived at in 1898. Though the Germans possess the 4·7-inch gun referred to above, they do not appear to have formulated any plan for using it in their field armies; no war formations have been organised for it for mobilisation as part of the field army, and the gun has never, as far as we know, been used at their manœuvres.

The heavy artillery of the French field armies is armed with the following howitzers:—

Calibre.	Weight of Shell.	Maximum Range.
	Lbs	Yards.
4·7-inch - - -	45	6,200
6·1-inch - - -	94	7,000

The former was introduced as a field howitzer, and might still be classed as such, but it is very heavy for the purpose (46½ cwt.), and appears now to be regarded by the French as a "heavy" howitzer. The use of the 6·1-inch howitzer in the field appears to have been first considered in 1899; a few batteries of these howitzers were tried as an experiment at their manœuvres that year for the first time. The French possess a number of 3·7-inch position guns (27lb. shell, 7,650 yards maximum range). These are believed to be intended for fortress use and for their siege trains, and not for use with their field armies, and no organisations for this latter use exist as far as we know.

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The heavy piece which the Austrians appear to rely on principally for field army use is a 5·9-inch howitzer, which also forms part of the siege train. No definite regulations as to its use in the field have been laid down. The Austrians have decided this year to introduce a field howitzer. They have not had one hitherto.

Since 1878, the Russians have had a large number of their field batteries armed with a 28-pounder; this gun is at this moment, it is believed, being replaced by the new 3-inch field gun (15 to 16-pounder). They also possess a 6-inch field mortar, throwing a 68lb. shell, with a maximum range of 3,600 yards. With the exception of the above, the Russians do not appear to have any heavy ordnance for field use, nor any intention of using heavy guns in such a manner. The following are the guns of their siege train, which would seem to be most suitable for field use:—

Calibre.	Weight of Shell.	Maximum Range.
	Lbs.	Yards.
4·2-inch - - -	37	9,500
6-inch - - - -	78	8,000

The first intimation that we had that the Boers were using any heavy guns in the field against us was about the middle of October. On the 25th October the General Officer Commanding in South Africa was requested by the Director-General of Ordnance to send to Durban, if possible, two 6·3-inch rifled muzzle-loading howitzers, with carriages and all ammunition available, which were at King Williams Town, the property of the Colonial Government. We did not know in my department that these guns were in existence in South Africa, but Sir John Ardagh brought it to my notice, and suggested that they might be useful at Ladysmith; accordingly, we sent them up (we had sent them this telegram), and they got to Ladysmith in time, and were there during the siege; they christened them Castor and Pollux, and used them frequently. The General Officer Commanding reported that these two 6·3-inch rifled muzzle-loading howitzers left East London for Durban by the steamship "Border Knight" on 28th October, 1899. On the 30th October, 1899, the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the Cape of Good Hope Station reported that the captain of the "Powerful," with officers and men and two 4·7-inch guns and four 12-pounder 12-cwt. quick-firing guns proceeded to Ladysmith on the 29th October, 1899. On the 4th November, 1899, the Secretary of State approved four 4·7-inch quick-firing guns being taken over from the Navy at home, the Admiralty, on the 2nd November, 1899, having offered to loan a reasonable number of these guns. Steps were taken on the 4th November, 1899, to have suitable platforms, holdfasts, and vehicles for transport made and modified as required, the work being promised for completion on the 1st December, 1899, and those four guns were despatched on the 9th December, 1899. The *personnel* for these guns, one company of Garrison Artillery, took them up. The issue of eight 6-inch breech-loading 30-cwt. howitzers as part of the siege train for South Africa having been approved, the necessary steps were taken and the equipment was despatched at the same time as the 4·7-inch quick-firing guns referred to in the previous sentence, and the *personnel* for this equipment, one company of Garrison Artillery, went out with it. The Naval Commander-in-Chief at the Cape of Good Hope reported on the 13th November, 1899, that the following had been landed for the defence of Durban: Eighteen 12-pounder guns and one 4·7-inch quick-firing gun; and in a separate communication, also dated the 13th November, 1899, he stated that at the urgent request of the Governor of Natal he had ordered two 12-pounder quick-firing 12-cwt. guns from Maritzburg to Estcourt, and two

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of the same nature of guns from Durban to Maritzburg, and that he would send shortly another 4·7-inch gun on travelling-carriage to Durban for use outside Ladysmith. It was also stated that the Queenstown Naval Force had been ordered back to Simons Town to pick up four 12-pounder 12-cwt. guns and proceed to Orange River to relieve Kimberley. On the 1st December, 1899, General Buller asked for eight or ten long-range guns on good travelling-carriages. He was informed on the 2nd December, 1899, that if they would meet his wishes eight 5-inch breech-loading guns on low siege-carriages, with a range of 7,000 yards could be despatched in about three weeks from the date of his reply. On the 3rd December, 1899, General Buller replied that the 5-inch breech-loading guns offered had not sufficiently long range, and that he considered a few 4·7-inch quick-firing 41-cwt. guns on travelling-carriages would be best. On the 4th December, 1899, General Buller was asked what elevation and ranges were obtainable with the guns on extemporised Naval mountings, to which he replied, on the 5th December, 1899, that the ranges were 4·7-inch, 13,000 yards; and 12-pounder, 10,000 yards. On the 9th December, 1899, the Director-General of Ordnance wired that 5-inch breech-loading guns had fired at Shoeburyness that day successfully up to 10,000 yards range, and that he and all his artillery experts strongly recommended these in preference to 4·7-inch quick-firing guns; that the eight 5-inch guns could be ready in 10 days, whereas it would take a month to get eight 4·7-inch guns ready to embark. On the 10th December, 1899, General Buller accepted these by wire. The eight guns, with carriages, etc., were despatched on the 22nd December, 1899, and the *personnel* to man them, two companies of Garrison Artillery, went out on the same date. The Army Mobilisation Board having approved a proposal made by the Director-General of Ordnance, instructions were given on the 16th December, 1899, for eight 4·7-inch quick-firing guns on 6-inch breech-loading howitzer carriages to be got ready for South Africa. The eight guns, etc., were despatched on the 22nd January, 1900, and also the *personnel* to man them, two companies of Garrison Artillery. The India Office having offered six 4·7-inch quick-firing guns (on repayment), the Secretary of State approved their acceptance on the 22nd January, 1900, and these were shipped to South Africa from Bombay on the 28th January, 1900. These guns were intended for replacement, if necessary, of the Naval guns, which were beginning to show signs of wear. On the 28th December, 1899, the Secretary of State on the recommendation of the Army Mobilisation Board approved of the proposal of the Director-General of Ordnance that a second batch of eight 5-inch breech-loading guns should be sent to South Africa to relieve some of the Naval guns at that time employed. The necessary action was taken, and the guns and equipment were despatched on the 3rd of February, 1900. The *personnel* to man them, two companies of Garrison Artillery, accompanied the guns. At the beginning of 1900, the Army Mobilisation Board considered a proposal to purchase from a private firm four 9·45-inch breech-loading howitzers for South Africa. This step having been approved, arrangements were made for their purchase and transport to South Africa. This was at the time, I may say, when we thought there might be a siege of Pretoria. The *personnel* to man them, one company of Garrison Artillery, embarked on the 2nd of February, 1900. On the 7th of April, 1900, Lord Roberts was asked whether he wanted any more 6-inch breech-loading howitzers, of which eight could be got ready in a fortnight, and was also informed that 6-inch breech-loading guns on siege mountings could be got ready in three months if he wished it. Lord Roberts replied: "I should be glad of four 6-inch breech-loading howitzers of 30 cwt.—do not think remainder will be required." The four 6-inch breech-loading howitzers were got ready and despatched on the 27th April, 1900. On the 31st December, 1900, Lord Kitchener asked for two 5-inch breech-loading guns with carriages to replace those which had become unserviceable. Two were despatched on the 16th January, 1901. That is the whole story of the despatch of guns to South Africa. The only thing that I should like to say is, that our siege train, which comprised the only heavy artillery we contemplated moving about at all, consisted entirely of howitzers, as had been recommended by a body of artillery officers, as I have said above; and we had no heavy guns, no guns heavier than our field guns, on moveable carriages, or what we call travelling carriages; 4·7-inch guns were among the weapons we always wanted to have as moveable armaments, but we never could get them. The 4·7-inch guns that we had were all part of the armament of fortresses on fixed mountings, and we had to take the guns off those fixed mountings, to that extent denuding our fortresses, and invent carriages for them and send them out. In exactly the same way we had no 5-inch guns on field carriages; we put the 5-inch guns on to 6-inch howitzer carriages and sent them out. We adapted the old 40-pr. R.M.L. carriages also for the 4·7 inch guns.

1681. But, as a matter of fact, if it had not been for the Naval guns there would have been no guns in Ladysmith to cope with the Boer guns?—There would have been nothing at all except those two howitzers, which were sent on from King William's Town to cope with those three heavy guns of the Boers. Ladysmith, of course, was not a fortress; there was simply a portion of the field army shut up in a town.

1682. But it might have had serious results?—Do not think I want to disparage the Naval guns, because I think the moral effect of the Naval guns was very great, so far as our troops were concerned, but I do not think the physical effect of the Boer heavy guns was ever anything at all. They never did any serious harm of any sort, and nothing was so astonishing to me, and I think to many others among us, as the extraordinary moral effect which the presence of these big guns had upon our troops, especially the cavalry.

1683. The Boer big guns you mean?—Yes.

1684. It had a moral effect on them you say?—I think, undoubtedly—much greater than any of us anticipated. It is another lesson learnt from the war. We are going in now—and I have no doubt we shall find that all the Continental armies will do the same thing—for heavy field batteries. We have been experimenting, as I have said, with guns to give 10,000 yards range, and throwing a very heavy 60 lbs. shell, to be moveable guns—part of the field army in future.

1685. That the war has shown to be necessary?—That is the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief.

1686. Is that all you wish to say on Statement V.?—I think that is all.

1687. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Before leaving Statement V. would you like to say something about the Boer pom-poms?—I did not think of that. The first thing we knew about the pom-poms was when we got a telegram from Sir Redvers Buller asking us to send out some of these Vickers-Maxim guns—pom-poms—and saying it was a wonderful weapon. Accordingly, we immediately got as quickly as we possibly could, within a very short time, some of these pom-poms, and sent them out, and ultimately we sent out 49; but the curious thing is, that when we went to Vickers for these guns, he said that the only nations that had got them were the Boers and the Chinese, and that they themselves did not think much of them—they had never pushed them in any way whatever, they thought so little of them. It has a very short range, you know—the maximum effective range is 3,000 yards and a very small shell. Here again, we have had reports, of course, from South Africa—we have endeavoured to learn every lesson that could possibly be learnt from this war; we have had reports from large numbers of officers on every item of equipment, on all the artillery and everything else, in order that we might learn; but there does not seem to me to be any very great opinion of the pom-poms. Everyone, I think, agrees that their effect is moral, and that they do scarcely anything in the way of man-killing. It is the moral effect, it is the noise that seems to have had such an effect upon our troops to start with.

1688. You sent 49 out?—We sent out 49.

1689. (*Chairman.*) Are you going to get any more?—I may say that we had a Committee on this question after the war as soon as we could get officers home. General Lyttelton, I think, was the chairman of it, and other officers of experience in the war were members. All the reports on the subject from South Africa were laid before them, and their Report went before the Army Board, with Lord Roberts presiding. It was discussed, and the decision was that each battery of horse artillery should have a section of two pom-poms.

The pom-poms have been provided by my department, but the *personnel* has not yet been provided by the Secretary of State.

1690-2. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) The Field Artillery batteries have none?—No.

1693. By the way, you mentioned the three Long Toms as being of very long range; they were 155 m.m.?—Yes.

1694. Besides that, they had 120 m. m. howitzers?—Yes, but they are comparatively short range.

1695. Do you remember what range they were?—7,000 yards.

1696. They were far beyond anything we had opposed to them?—Yes, they were longer range than our field howitzers.

1697. Those were Krupp howitzers, I think?—Yes. You see, there again the position was much the same with our howitzers; we had 5-inch field howitzers with a range, I think, of about 4,900 yards. We had not contemplated requiring longer range artillery, except for a siege.

1698. (*Sir John Jackson.*) We had no quick-firing guns in South Africa?—We had none until we sent out some 4·7-inch guns, and the Navy sent up their 4·7-inch quick-firing and 12-pounder quick-firing guns also; the 12-pounder gun of 12 cwt. is a gun used in the Navy. We do not use it, except in our coast fortresses against torpedo attacks.

1699. Not as a field gun?—Not as a field gun.

1700. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Are the pom-poms which it is proposed to add to the Horse Artillery batteries in addition to or in substitution for the present arms?—In addition.

1701. Then how many additional men will that require for the battery and horses?—I cannot tell you that exactly, but approximately 35 to the section; that is taking the drivers and the gunners in round numbers, 35.

1702. And horses?—And you have to provide horses, guns, and ammunition.

1703. (*Chairman.*) We now come to Statement VI. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 190.) Is there anything you wish to add to that? I think you have gone through most of it?—I think it has been already gone through. I am happy to say that the issue of woollen drawers, woollen jerseys, and cardigans is one of the things which, as the outcome of this war, has come to stay. The troops are to be provided with those things now permanently.

1704. (*Viscount Esher.*) What post did you hold immediately before the post that you hold now?—Immediately before I took over my present post I was what was called President of the Ordnance Committee.

1705. That was in the years previous to 1898?—Yes, from May, 1896, to February, 1899.

1706. What were your responsibilities then?—The Ordnance Committee is a consultative body, which is appointed to take up such questions as may be referred to them by the Director-General of Ordnance. It is not an initiative body; it is a consultative body. It is a body which has upon it as President a General of Artillery, the Vice-President is an Admiral of the Navy, and the members are two Artillery officers, an Engineer officer, two Naval officers, a consulting officer from India, two civil engineers, Sir Frederick Bramwell, and Sir Benjamin Baker; and the other members are members for special purposes, for instance, the chemist of the War Department and Dr. Dupré, the chemist of the Home Department, and such other associate members as are required from time to time.

1707. How long did you hold that post?—For nearly three years.

1708. Do you remember whether any strong remonstrances were made to the Government during those three years as to the state of our armaments?—None came before me. (*Colonel Montgomery.*) There were no cases in connection with the Field Army.

1709. (*To Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) Your connection with the War Department dates, of course, a long way back?—I first joined the War Office on the 1st January, 1886, when I was appointed Director of Military Intelligence, and I remained there until the 1st of April, 1891, when I went out to India as Military Member of the Viceroy's Council. I came straight home from India in April, 1896, and in May, 1896, I took up the post of President of the Ordnance Committee. Their office is at Woolwich, it is not in the War Office.

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1710. As regards the organisation of your present department, has it changed during your tenure of the office?—Very little indeed. As I have said, the clothing was handed over to my department in the December previous to my taking it over. The great change made was that to which I referred early in my evidence, namely, the Ordnance factories being placed under my direction, which was done when I joined.

1711. Up to that time they had been directly under the Financial Secretary?—They had.

1712. Therefore that officer was practically responsible for them until you took them over?—He was entirely responsible for them, because he had both the direction and the financial control; he audited his own accounts.

1713. And he is a Parliamentary officer?—Yes.

1714. I suppose you remember that in 1895, according to the popular idea, we were not very far off a rupture with France?—Yes.

1715. And later on, in 1898, the same thing occurred?—Yes, according to the popular idea.

1716. Have you any reason to suppose that our preparations for war at that time were any better than they were for the outbreak of this war in 1899?—I have no reason to suppose that they were better.

1717. I suppose there is nothing that you have told us which it was not perfectly open to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and the Government to make themselves acquainted with?—They have, I suppose, the power to go behind the Secretary of State and behind the Commander-in-Chief and behind all the responsible heads of departments in the War Office if they please.

1718. Did you not always understand that it was the function of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet to go behind the Secretary of State?—No, I do not think I did. I think I understood that the function of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet was really, so far as I have seen it exercised, at any rate, to consider the questions which are placed before it by the Secretary of State, or I suppose by the Admiralty, but that I do not know.

1719. You have been examined by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, have you not?—I have attended several meetings of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. When, for instance, any proposals of mine, large or small, were under their consideration, I have attended the Defence Committee of the Cabinet.

1720. But from time to time you have made strong representations, have you not, to the Secretary of State as regards the efficiency of your own branch?—I do not think I have made any, except those I have mentioned. Before I entered the department I made a very strong representation about the Ordnance factories, and I was examined by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet upon it. Then in December, after the war broke out, I made this strong representation, which was at once placed before the Defence Committee of the Cabinet by the Secretary of State.

1721. And you have made no other representations between those you speak of?—No; no other. All these comparatively small recommendations about making preparation for the war, and so on, were, of course, made by me as regards the detail of my own department, and no doubt others were equally made by other heads of departments and by the Commander-in-Chief.

1722. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You have stated that prior to your taking charge of the office the Financial Secretary had the control of the Ordnance Factories, and you have stated that he is a Parliamentary officer; that is to say, he comes in and goes out with his party, and is liable to go out with any reconstitution of the Ministry?—Yes, that is so.

1723. But there is no sort of guarantee that he has any kind of knowledge or aptitude for that particular work?—None, I think; there can, of course, be no such guarantee.

1724. And you think that the present system, by which he has been relieved of that duty altogether, is far preferable to what obtained when he was in charge;

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and you have stated several reasons for so thinking?—I think it is infinitely preferable. In fact, I may say that so strong an opinion had I formed upon that point before I took my present office that I was very unwilling to accept the office unless that change were made, and the office of Director-General of Ordnance was kept vacant from December to February, while that question was being decided by the Cabinet.

1725. You have stated that there was a great want of store room for stores, and that much of the machinery employed in the Ordnance factories was very antiquated. Is that all being improved?—It is all being improved.

1726. And you have reason to expect that it will be, comparatively speaking, perfect?—In a very much better condition; and that, if the money which is allowed every year for what is called depreciation fund in the Ordnance factories is properly expended, and not, as it was formerly, diverted to other services, the whole of the machinery will gradually become really up to date. We got a large sum from the Mowatt Committee for modernisation of machinery, and I think that all we want ought to be fairly complete within the next year or two.

1727. There is only one other question I want to ask you. Did you become aware at any time, or did you ever hear, that the arms brought by any portion of Colonial troops from various parts of the world could be used with the ammunition that you had sent out, or had they any pattern of arms for which there was no ammunition except in England?—No arms were brought by any Colonial contingent except such as were suitable for our ammunition.

1728. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You are now aware that Sir John Ardagh so far back as 1896 sent in certain reports to the Commander-in-Chief with reference to the state of preparation of the Boers for war. When did you first become aware of that?—I knew nothing of the information of the Intelligence Department as to the Boers until—I think it was—June or July. (*Sir John Steevens.*) It was when we got those "Military Notes" on South Africa, in June or July, 1899.

1729. (*To Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) That is the first time you heard?—That is the first time we knew of it.

1730. If you had had that information in 1896, I take it that you would have felt it your duty then to have pointed out what you did point out in 1899?—Well, I was not at the War Office in 1896; besides, in 1896 nobody, I suppose, was contemplating war with the Boers.

1731. Sir John Ardagh did?—That is all right if he did. I would not like to answer a hypothetical question as to what I would have done under certain conditions; there are so many things that may come in.

1732. You were aware, at any rate, when you took over your present office in February, 1899, of the deficiency and want of supplies?—No, I was not aware of it then. It took me some considerable time to find out exactly what the condition of things was; everybody at the War Office, I think, was under the impression, and Sir Ralph Knox so stated in evidence before the Mowatt Committee, that there was no reserve kept up for war upkeep of the Army, because it was supposed that the Ordnance factories and the trade would supply what we wanted from week to week. The earlier stages of this war burst that bubble. I thought you could get anything you wanted out of the trade of this country at short notice. I found it was impossible, and it was then, when I saw what the state of things was, that it was borne in upon me that I must put forward that minute of 15th December.

1733. Are you now in such a position that you can, without financial authority, order stores which you consider necessary of your own motion?—No, not unless the money has been provided for them in the Estimates. If money has been provided for them in the Estimates, then I can order them.

1734. But not without that?—No.

1735. Then, in point of fact, you can only recommend?—That is all.

1736. (*Sir John Edge.*) I understand that you desire a free hand in the event of war?—Yes.

1737. Not in peace time?—No; I do not ask for such a thing. You cannot get it; it is no use asking for it.

1738. You desire a free hand simply, I presume, in order to avoid delays?—I want a free hand, so as to avoid delays.

1739. (*To Colonel Montgomery.*) About these Vickers' Maxims; had there been any trials made of these guns at the War Office, or at Woolwich, or wherever it is done?—We tried them for the Admiralty, who wanted to see if they would be efficient against torpedo-boats. After the trial the Ordnance Committee made a report, and the Admiralty decided not to proceed with them, that they were not worth having for putting into ships to fire the torpedo-boats with. Those are the only trials that have taken place.

1740. When was that?—That was in 1894 and 1898.

1741. (*To Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) You did know, I think you told us, that the Boers were armed with Vickers' Maxims?—Yes, we knew they had some of them.

1742. They did not commend themselves to you?—No, I never dreamt of ordering any. Even now I do not think very much of them. I think their chief effect is their noise.

1743. Do you know whether any European nation is arming with Vickers' Maxims now?—Certainly, no nation was then.

1744. But at the present time?—I do not know of any; I have not heard of any. With the Vickers-Maxim machine gun they are—that is a different thing.

1745. I am speaking of the pom-pom?—I do not think any, so far as I know; and, as I tell you, Mr. Vickers told me himself that they did not think much of them, and that nobody had bought them except the Boers and the Chinese.

1746. Before the outbreak of this war, I understand it was contemplated it might be necessary to mobilise for a European war three Army Corps; is that so?—For a European war, yes.

1747. One Army Corps for home defence, and two to send abroad?—Or three for defence at home.

1748. Can you tell me whether, in June, 1899, so far as your department was concerned, you had sufficient material to arm three Army Corps?—Yes, we had sufficient material to arm three Army Corps, and sufficient material to equip three Army Corps, but nothing for their maintenance after they were once armed and equipped.

1749. You had no reserve?—We had no reserve, except the trifling quantities which have been already mentioned.

1750. But you could have put three Army Corps into the field?—Yes, we could have done that.

1751. But with an insufficient reserve?—With a very insufficient reserve.

1752. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Had you, immediately preceding the declaration of war, ever advised the purchase of quick-firing field guns?—The question of a quick-firing field gun had been taken up some two or three years before that, and we had tried different quick-firing field guns and equipment when I was President of the Ordnance Committee, but we had not found any which was satisfactory for the field guns, and the Secretary of State had come to the decision that the best thing to do for the time being was to attach a certain spade arrangement to the existing field guns, which checked the recoil and rendered their rate of fire considerably more rapid, while we were endeavouring to find a thoroughly efficient quick-firing field gun for the future. That had been done, and all the guns which went to South Africa had this spade attachment, which reduces the labour and very considerably quickens the rate of fire and prevents the recoil.

1753. How many shots a minute would the quick-firing guns that the Boers had be able to fire?—Ten or 12 perhaps. (*Colonel Montgomery.*) They made more than 12 with unaimed fire. Of course, with aimed fire you would not get more than from six to eight rounds.

1754. Then what would you get out of the ordinary field guns?—I should think we get four. Our average rate at Okehampton with the spade is four rounds of aimed fire.

1755. (*To Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) Then, if it is a question of aimed fire, there is no advantage in quick-firing guns?—There is the difference between four and six to eight. I am bound to say in that con-

nection that up to the present time, so far as I know, and certainly up to 1899, no European Power had got a real quick-firing gun except France, and France had kept her's most tremendously secret. Germany has not got one yet; she is like us; she is using the gun with a spade. But during the war, by the decision of the Cabinet, I was authorised to go abroad for equipment, which was badly wanted for the Artillery at home, because the Ordnance factories and our own firms were full up with as much as they could do making field artillery equipment; Vickers and Armstrong were full up with orders, which they have scarcely completed yet. I had any amount of rubbish offered me, but there was one equipment which seemed good, so I sent out my chief inspector and somebody else to see these guns, to see them fire, and examine them, the result being that we got from a firm in Germany 18 batteries of real quick-firing guns, and we are at the present moment, I believe, the only people who have got them except France. We got those 18 batteries of quick-firing guns, and that caused the gunmakers here to wake up, and taught them a lesson. Now we are trying better quick-firing guns than those; we have just been experimenting with them, and I hope we shall have a still better quick-firing equipment for the whole Army.

1756. With reference to the home makers of guns, are the Elswick people and Vickers the only makers of guns in England?—Yes, they are the only makers of guns except the Ordnance Factories.

1757. At that time you found, I suppose, that those firms, at any rate, were doing their very utmost?—Their very utmost. They have done everything they possibly could do to help us. They took up the manufacture of new things for us that they had never made before, like filling lyddite shells and making this, that, and the other; and they never refused to help us in any single way.

1758. In reply to a question by me as to whether you went to the Continent for ammunition at that time, Sir Ralph Knox told us that it was for the components of ammunition. What part of the Continent did you go to?—I must ask Colonel Montgomery to answer that question. (*Colonel Montgomery.*) It was not we who went; the Elswick people and Vickers themselves went to the Continent and put the shell together for us. The only thing in the way of warlike material, weapons directly manufactured abroad, was those 18 batteries of guns with their ammunition, fuses, and everything else: but Vickers did make an arrangement, and so did the Elswick people, I believe, to get component parts of their ammunition abroad, things like bodies of shrapnel shells, that they could not turn out quickly enough. But we had nothing to do with that. I know in one case a firm that Vickers had contracted with went back from their contract, and refused to supply.

1759. (*To Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) It is not a very easy thing to arrange these matters during time of war, I take it?—Certainly not.

1760. You also gave some evidence with regard to the fuses, and a longer range for them. I take it that your opinion is generally that these guns of very long range are not any great advantage?—They never have had much effect other than moral effect. It remains to be seen when all the Powers have got these very long-range guns what they will do. Certainly the Boer long-range guns had very little physical effect, although they had a moral effect that surprised me, and, I believe, many others. I think nearly all artillery officers will say that the thing which brought about long-range firing almost more than anything else was the extraordinary clearness of the atmosphere, that you can see five or six miles there, while here it is dim at two or three thousand yards.

1761. From your evidence it appears, I think, that although you made many requisitions, delays usually occurred mainly from the disinclination of the Government to provide ways and means?—Up to a certain date; up to the date when the Government authorised the commencement of the expenditure. Previously to that it looked to me as if there was a definite decision of the Government that for some reason of their own they would not expend the money upon the preparations for the despatch of an Army Corps. I could find instances in the earlier stages in which a demand was sent in and was refused I forget what the particular thing was, but at all events I asked for a certain amount, I think it was of serge clothing, in which part of the money was granted and part refused. (*Colonel Mulcahy.*) We asked for £20,000, and we got £2,500. (*Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) And that was granted because it was for the force in or on its way to South Africa, but the remainder, which was in preparation for the Army Corps, was refused.

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1762. And it was said a good deal at the time, as you know, that the Government were disinclined to send more war material out to South Africa for fear of precipitating war?—I do not know about that.

1763. That is a high military question?—That is not a military question. The soldier is the servant of the politician.

1764. You do not think that if we had had more material there would have been less chance of the war being precipitated?—I have not entered into it. It can, after all, only be surmise.

1765. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Do you work in your department under and through the Commander-in-Chief at all?—Yes; there was a slight change made in the Order in Council when Lord Roberts came to be Commander-in-Chief. I have already read you the Order in Council of 1899. It now says in each case that the Quartermaster-General and the Director-General of Ordnance, and so on, are "under the supervision" of the Commander-in-Chief; but, as an actual matter of fact, we were just as much under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief before that alteration as we are now. The Commander-in-Chief was the chief adviser of the Secretary of State. We were members of the Commander-in-Chief's headquarter staff, and we always referred to him any big question. As I have stated, my minute of the 15th of December was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief.

1766. You referred to the immediate enlargement of the area of the buildings of the Army Clothing Department, but I do not think we have had it from you that that was under weigh at all?—I am sorry to say it is not. I am afraid it is found to be a practical impossibility. We have hired a great deal of accommodation, but the fact is, there is no more room in the enclosure of the Army Clothing Department. (*Colonel Mulcahy.*) We have gone a long way towards decentralisation in building store houses at out stations.

1767. Do you consider that matters are in a satisfactory condition as regards the provision of more space for buildings?—We should like more space if we could get it. I think that when the buildings are finished which are now being erected at Salisbury Plain, Aldershot, Weedon, and Dublin, there will be enough storage room. We are decentralising the issue of clothing certainly. (*Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) The fact is that we have a lease of this large area ($7\frac{1}{2}$ acres) in Grosvenor Road, on the Embankment, and it is all built round, so that there is no room for extending; it is as full of buildings now as it will hold.

1768. In fact, you do not see your way to doing much better than you are doing at present?—No. When the time comes for that lease to fall in, I hope they will move the clothing factory out of London to a place where it can have proper space to build upon.

1769. Have you had any reports in connection with the erosion of the field guns in South Africa?—Yes, we have had reports as to that.

1770. Has it been bad?—No, I should say less than we expected. (*Colonel Montgomery.*) There was one peculiar case where they eroded after 800 rounds.

1771. (*To Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) Were you satisfied with the general behaviour of the cordite out there?—Yes, very well satisfied. We have never had any complaint at all.

1772. You are endeavouring to get a little better description of cordite so far as erosion goes?—Yes, we are, and we are getting it.

1773. I see that you sent six guns out "manned by Elswick Battery"; I think it was presented by Lady Meux, and those guns are given with a range of 8,000 yards. They were probably Naval pattern?—They were 12-pounder quick-firing 12 cwt. guns—the same gun as that in use in the Navy and in our fortresses; but they went out as field guns.

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1774. Were any of the batteries that you bought from the Germans sent out to the Cape?—No, not any of

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them; it would have complicated their ammunition supply.

1775. They require a different ammunition?—Yes; it is a quick-firing gun.

1776. And so far as those guns have been tried in England, have they given satisfaction?—Very great satisfaction. We sent out four Austrian howitzers to the Cape, thinking they might be useful if we had to attack the forts at Pretoria, which, of course, never had to be done.

1777. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) In the early part of your evidence, when you were remarking on the unsatisfactory state of things before the change in the Order in Council of 1899, you gave as one instance that our rifles were deficient at the beginning of the war. Can you say to what extent, and how they were deficient?—I am very glad you have reminded me of that; I intended to mention it. That is another of those unfortunate difficulties that we had to meet. I have told you the one difficulty with regard to the small arm ammunition, and we had this difficulty with the rifle. The whole of the British infantry is armed with the Lee-Metford rifle. Years ago it was decided to change, for future manufacture, from the Lee-Metford to the Lee-Enfield. The calibre is exactly the same, the mechanism is the same, and everything else, but there is a difference in the rifling; that is to say, in the number and depth and width of the grooves. All our rifles manufactured from that date forward were Lee-Enfields, and the Lee-Enfields were the rifles we had stored to the number of some 200,000. Lee-Enfield rifles had never been issued to any troops except in Canada; they had been given to the Canadians, and we had never had a complaint about their shooting; in fact, many prizes had been won with them at Bisley. When we began to hand over these Lee-Enfield rifles to the Imperial Yeomanry for trying the recruits, to see whether they could shoot before they were accepted for the Imperial Yeomanry, reports came in to us that this rifle was shooting 18 inches to the right at 500 yards, which seemed a most extraordinary thing. We made inquiries, and had the matter tested, and found it was true. We then immediately went into the question of how the rifle had been sighted, and we found it had been sighted, on the experience of a certain number of rifles, on the recommendation of Dr. Anderson, who was then Chief Superintendent of the Ordnance Factories, and that it had been sighted differently from the Lee-Metford rifle, and although the twist (1 in 10) of the rifling was exactly the same in the two, so that you would think the sighting ought to have been exactly the same in the two, it was not; a considerable difference had been made in the sighting of the Lee-Enfield as compared with the sighting of the Lee-Metford. There is no doubt whatever that that was wrong. We inquired into it, and the reports proved that this rifle was shooting 18 inches to the right at 500 yards.

1778. When was that discovered?—It was discovered in the winter of 1899, I think in December, when the Imperial Yeomanry were first enlisted.

1779. Meanwhile the whole of the troops had gone out with these rifles, had they not?—No, only about 25,000 reservists. The rest of the regular troops had gone out with the Lee-Metford. The reservists and then the Imperial Yeomanry were the first to have the Lee-Enfield. What we proceeded to do immediately was to make a back sight with a differently placed notch on the leaf, and we sent these out to South Africa to be put on the Lee-Enfield there, so that they could alter their rifles at once. But it was an awful blow just at the moment when we were beginning to take this new weapon into use to find that this mistake had been made.

1780. Coming to the cartridges, about what time was it discovered that the expanding bullets stripped?—In July.

1781. Had they been in use for a long time then?—They had been tried for a long time. I have explained the reason that this bullet was to take the place of the Mark II., and, as we always use up in practice our oldest ammunition, we had not tried the Mark IV. in practice. We had only been using up the Mark II.; we were gradually going to have nothing but the Mark IV., but it was found out when we came to issue this ammunition, even some which was specially made for Bisley, that it squirted.

1782. You spoke of a million and a half horse shoes being sent out. Your department would have nothing to do with supplying farriers?—No.

1783. You may have seen the accusation that there were practically no farriers in South Africa. Which department would deal with that?—The supply of farriers would be in the Adjutant-General's department. All *personnel* is with the Adjutant-General.

1784. Then you gave one figure that I think I must have taken down wrong, namely, the number of machine guns that were deficient. I have got down 326?—That is right.

1785. That cannot possibly be?—Yes, the authorised number was 1,224; of these we had only 898, leaving 326.

1786. I could not believe it possible. How do you account for it?—Because we were obtaining a more or less gradual supply. The numbers authorised had been increased from time to time. We want machine guns for our fortresses for movable armaments, and we want machine guns for all the infantry and cavalry of the Army, and at that time we were only buying about 300 a year. It was a question of money.

1787. I fancied that your position was that you were always close up to the mark in things that were authorised, but that the difficulty was in getting things authorised?—That generally is the case; but this is a case in which we have never yet reached what we want. (*Sir John Steevens.*) It is a comparatively new supply, and we have never yet reached the allowed standard.

1788. (*To Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) Then on the question of boots and body clothes, you say now that there is a general pattern which will probably do for most climates?—Yes, for boots.

1789. And for khaki suits?—Yes.

1790. Does that apply to other things? You have not got a helmet that will do for any climate, have you?—No, and you cannot well get it. They brought out what is called the field service hat, which is one of the felt hats very much like what the Boers wore in South Africa; that is all right, but it will not do in tropical climates. You must have helmets in tropical climates.

1791. But the Americans use a hat in the Philippines?—Perhaps it is a double hat. At all events, we cannot get any hat that appears to give any satisfaction to the Adjutant-General.

1792. Then you mentioned that up to a certain date you could not get authorisation for expenditure. I want to ask you what your date is, because I think a different date is given by the Mobilisation Department?—The 22nd of September.

1793. No, hardly; because, you see, a large portion of the balance was not authorised till the 2nd of October?—No, the 22nd of September was the first day.

1794. But you give the main portion of the balance on the 2nd of October, I see?—On the 21st of September the Board considered the schedule, the Secretary of State having stated that he was prepared to spend money for the most urgent requirements, and they considered the schedule which had been drawn up by the Assistant Under-Secretary.

1795. For the Army Corps?—Yes. And the Board recommended on the 21st that this Statement be at once submitted to the Secretary of State for his approval of an immediate expenditure of £645,000. The Board considered this sum to be the minimum expenditure necessary to meet immediate requirements for the mobilisation of an Army Corps and cavalry division, and said that authority should be obtained without delay for the expenditure necessary to meet the preliminary mobilisation requirements of that force. And on the 22nd of September, at our meeting, the Commander-in-Chief informed the Board that the Secretary of State had sanctioned the immediate expenditure of the £645,000 which had been referred to. That really was a fraction of what we wanted for the Army Corps most urgently.

1796. Then you give the 2nd of October as your date in the Statement for the balance of the articles immediately required; you will find it in (b) Clothing Statement II. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 178.) The 29th of September is the date we got from the Mobilisation Department?—On the 29th of September the Commander-in-Chief informed the Board that the Secretary of State had authorised the full provision of supplies asked for to enable an Army

Corps, cavalry division, and lines of communication troops to proceed to South Africa—heads of branches concerned to take action.

1797. How do you account for three days' delay?—On the 5th October the Secretary of State sanctioned a further expenditure of £152,350.

1798. Are those two Statements consistent? The minute of the 29th of September says you are to have everything?—That is a general statement.

1799. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) It is stated in one paper that on the 20th of September the Secretary of State refused, but on the 23rd he assented?—In the meantime these demands of mine for clothing had been before the Secretary of State, and he had refused me permission to get them. His sanction to that expenditure was not obtained until the 5th October.

1800. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) What I want to get at is this. For a month you had been making preparations for war, and it was not until the 29th of September that the Government at last made up their minds to authorise the necessary expenditure?—Yes.

1801. Was that a time when days were important and hours were important?—Yes.

1802. I want to get from you whether the detailed authorisation was given on that day, or whether it was held over till the 5th October?—I am convinced it was held over till the 5th of October, but I can make absolutely sure of that, because I have the numbers of the papers, and I can get hold of them. (*Colonel Mulcahy.*) I have it down that on 4th of October a sum of £150,000 was granted. (*Sir Henry Brackenbury.*) I reported it to the Board on the 6th. The Board had sat on the 4th. It is just possible it may have been the 4th and not the 5th.

1803. That is immaterial. If the Government took that decision on the 29th of September, where would it hang up in the interval between that date and the 4th of October?—I would like, if you will allow me, to get the papers and answer it definitely.*

1804. Thank you. The next point is this: You mention in this Statement a number of comparatively small amounts, really of small value, but which you consider to be of real importance to complete your preparations; could not the bulk of those things have been bought without attracting publicity in Pretoria?—That is a question I am afraid I cannot answer.

1805. I am not speaking about politics. Could they have been bought without attracting publicity in this country?—I should think so.

1806. I will ask you merely as a buyer, could you not have bought most of those things or ordered them, as the case may be, without attracting publicity?—I think the purchase of mule harness would attract publicity.

1807. Undoubtedly, but there are a good many things here. I suppose that serge clothes would not have attracted much publicity?—I do not think so at that time.

1808. Or the provision of helmets. Apart from mule harness, what is there that would attract publicity?—I do not know that there is anything that would attract publicity.

1809. I pass to another question, and this is only a matter of interest. It would be interesting to know whether the large amount of equipment that came to the War Office at that time raised prices very much?—Yes, enormously.

1810. I suppose the Director of Contracts would know more about that?—Yes, but prices went up frightfully.

1811. You have told us that you obtained from abroad 18 batteries of guns, with their ammunition, and so forth; as a matter of fact, was that all that you obtained from abroad?—I was under the impression that I had stated that we also bought one battery of 9·4-inch howitzers. I have also mentioned saddlery, horse and mule shoes, etc.

1812. (*Chairman.*) There is just one question I should like to ask you. You said that you were Director of Military Intelligence in 1886. Was the question of the position in South Africa before you at that time?—Very little. We kept up information as far as we could as to what was going on there; but at that time and prior to 1891 things were very quiet there; there was no great armament there.

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1813. The circumstances were, of course, quite different; but you do not think there were any reports made by your Office at that time on the position in South Africa?—I do not think we made any special reports to the Government. I cannot remember that I did, I should have done so if I had thought it in the least necessary, if there was anything worth reporting, anything special. I remember there was one occasion on which there was a question that I had to report to the Government, when more or less the Boers were concerned in the report that I made, but it was not a report with a view to war between the Boers and ourselves.

1814. Nor as to provision of maps or any information of that kind as to the frontier?—No, I think at that time we relied mainly on one map, but we were not contemplating war in the smallest degree at that time in South Africa.

1815. Is it your view that it would be impossible to prepare schemes of military defence for all portions of the Empire?—No, I do not think it is at all impossible to do it. I think it can be done, and I think it is being done.

1816. It was not being done in 1886, was it?—Well, yes, it was to a very great extent. We worked then at schemes of defence, at schemes for operations in different parts of the world.

1817. Of course; but you selected the points at which you thought there was danger at the time?—No, we were always working out what would be in case of a war here or there, in relation, of course, to possible complications; that was all.

1818. And South Africa was not one of them at that time?—No, it was not considered one of them at that time by us, at all events; we never had anything from the Colonial Office to lead us to think that they expected the slightest complication.

1819. (*Viscount Esher.*) I should like to ask you one question. You have read, no doubt, and are familiar with, the Report of Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee?—I am very familiar with it.

1820. There is one recommendation which they make upon which I should like to have your opinion; it is the 19th of their Recommendations in their Summary, in which they suggest the establishment of "a War Office Board, on a permanent basis, with clearly defined duties and powers, which, acting under the authority of the Secretary of State, and without in any way detracting from the individual responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief, and of the military heads of departments, would control and supervise the business of the War Office as a whole." I should like to know whether you have any strong opinion upon that recommendation?—So much depends upon the constitution of the Board, and how it is worked. At present there is a War Office Council. I do not remember whether that is what the Dawkins' Committee mean.

1821. If I may tell you, their suggestion was to supersede the War Office Council and the Army Board by a board which was to consist of the heads of the great branches of the War Office, who would have really administrative authority over the whole War Office, not relieving the Secretary of State of his responsibility, but that they should interfere actually in administration. That was their scheme?—I do not see how it would work. I think one of the great difficulties at the War Office is in all keeping in touch with each other; I have always found that one of the difficulties. This Army Board, while war was going on, was the most invaluable thing that ever was. We met nearly every day under the Commander-in-Chief after it was constituted as an Army Board, and the Accountant-General and Assistant Under-Secretary were put upon it. We each of us made our report, and asked our points, and got the most valuable interchange of opinion possible between us.

See Q. 21611.

1822. But then the Secretary of State was not a member of it?—No, but the Assistant Under-Secretary was.

* Sir Henry Brackenbury found, on referring to the papers, that this was formal sanction to certain definite sums for specific purposes which had been asked for prior to 29th September. The orders for these supplies were given on the Secretary of State's general authority on 29th September without waiting for his formal sanction.

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1823. Then, supposing that such a Board were to meet in time of peace to consider such questions, do you think that would be advisable?—I think it would be a most excellent thing. Instead of that, we have a War Office Council, which meets about once a week under the Secretary of State.

1824. And is their work of a practical kind?—Sometimes it is, and sometimes, in my humble opinion, it is not.

1825. How does it compare with the work of the Army Board—that Commander-in-Chief's Committee that you have described?—You cannot very well compare them. At the Army Board we were a body, at which each one brought forward his own proposals, and everybody gave his opinion on those proposals, and then the Board decided. It was not the Commander-in-Chief, as the head, who decided, but the Board decided. Of course, the Commander-in-Chief, if he chose, could absolutely veto something or other, but he never did. The War Office Council, on the other hand, appears to me to be only a council.*

1826. They decide nothing?—They decide nothing. The Secretary of State decides.

1827. The suggestion of the Dawkins' Committee, you see, is rather that the Board should decide, and if it did decide, you think it might be an improvement on the War Office Council. The Army Board actually came to a decision, you say. Did you vote?—We very seldom had to vote; occasionally we did. If the Commander-in-Chief saw that there was a difference of opinion, he would say: "What is your opinion?" "What is your opinion?" and the majority would decide.

1828. As I understand, you arrived at a decision which, of course, was not effective unless the Secretary of State approved of it?—That is so.

1829. As I understand, the suggestion of the Dawkins' Committee is practically that an Army Board should meet in time of peace?—Yes, and it would be a most excellent thing. I think it is a thousand pities that the Army Board has dropped out of use.

1830. (*Chairman.*) But we have had it in evidence that changes have been made in the constitution of the War Office Council by which a decision is arrived at now?—Yes, the decision of the Secretary of State.

1831. No, a decision of the War Office Council?—The Council may express an opinion, but the Secretary of State decides; you will see that on the proceedings of the Council it is so worded. The Secretary of State is not bound by the majority of the Council.

1832. (*Viscount Esher.*) Of course not. Does the Secretary of State generally act upon the recommendation of the Council, or does he not—that is what it comes to?—I think, as a general rule, where there is a difference of opinion, the subject is deferred, but when there is any decision arrived at, I think the Secretary of State does what he thinks best.

1833. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) But under your Army Board, if you come to a decision, the Secretary of State has to give his assent?—Yes.

1834. Does it not come to the same thing?—No, it is a very different thing. The Army Board discussed each question fully and freely, without the Secretary of State being present. We made our recommendations to the Secretary of State, and he, if he liked, could send for the Board, or any member of the Board, and discuss the matter with them, and do what he pleased. That is a different thing from sitting on a Council with the Secretary of State present, and sometimes expressing his opinion before other members have had any say.

SEVENTH DAY.

Wednesday, October 22nd, 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Hon. Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Hon. Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

General Sir RICHARD HARRISON, K.C.B., C.M.G. Inspector-General of Fortifications; Major-General W. SALMOND, C.B. retired; Major-General Sir ELLIOTT WOOD, K.C.B., called and examined.

General Sir Richard Harrison, K.C.B., C.M.G.; *Major-General W. Salmond*, C.B.; *Major-General Sir Elliott Wood*, K.C.B.

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1835. (*Chairman*) (*to Sir Richard Harrison.*) You are Inspector-General of Fortifications at Headquarters?—Yes.

1836. And you have been so since 1898, I think?—Yes. I have been so for four years and a half.

1837. At any rate, all through the War?—All through the War.

1838. And you appear to-day with Major-General Salmond and Major-General Sir Elliott Wood?—Yes, they are here with me.

1839. Would you kindly, in the first place, explain to us your position at the War Office and the duties of your office?—My position is defined in the Order in Council.

1840. Was it altered in any way by the Order in Council of 1901?—Yes, slightly.

1841. You are in charge under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief of the selection of sites for barracks, ranges, etc., the construction and maintenance of fortifications and the inspection of Ordnance Factory buildings and Engineer Stores. Do all those apply to this country or to this country and abroad?—Everywhere throughout the Empire except India.

1842. And to military railways and telegraphs and Engineer Stores?—Yes.

1843. And the purchase of land?—Yes.

1844. And to advising as to design and issue of Royal Engineer and Submarine Mining Stores. You submit proposals for annual Estimates for Engineer services, and you advise as to the general distribution of the Corps of Royal Engineers and the appointment of officers?—Yes.

1845. That, generally speaking, is a description of the duties of your office?—Yes, the only change in it has been a slight change in regard to the selection of sites, a change that has been made since that Order in Council; but I do not think I need mention it unless you wish, because it does not affect the present question at all.

1846. With regard to the War, I suppose you were chiefly concerned in the provision of Engineer stores and of all the equipment of the Royal Engineers?—

* "In a subsequent communication Sir Henry Brackenbury stated that when he gave his evidence he had not seen the War Office Memorandum of the 12th October 1901 in which it was stated that the War Office Council will discuss such matters as may be referred to it by the Secretary of State and any question brought before it by individual members and that he had not been aware that this difference existed between the present War Office Council and that which had been occasionally summoned by Lord Lansdowne."

Yes, so far as my duties went. The Adjutant-General, represented by Major-General Salmond was responsible for the sending out of the troops and for their personal equipment.

1847. Including the Engineers?—Yes all the Engineer troops. I was responsible for arranging for such other stores, such special Engineer stores as do not form part of the personal equipment of the troops defined in our regulations, of which I have brought a small copy.

1848. Will you give us the actual definition?—This particular Order specifies what the Commanding Royal Engineer of the Army has to do, and the Commanding Royal Engineer of the Army, of course, worked more or less in connection with me. I saw him and he specified what stores were required, and those stores were ordered in my office and sent out to the War from time to time as soon as we were authorised to send them.

1849. Is the Commanding Royal Engineer an officer at home or in the field?—The Commanding Royal Engineer is Sir Elliott Wood. As soon as he was appointed, his duty was to find out what the nature of the campaign was to be from the Chief of the Staff. There was no Chief of the Staff for this War at the commencement, and we discussed together what the possibilities of the War were. Then he drew up a list of stores which we thought would be required at the commencement of the War. The lists are contained in the Statement prepared in my Department which has been submitted to you by Sir William Nicholson (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 199).

1850. Then had I better question Sir Elliott Wood with regard to those points?—The lists are here before you.

1851. Yes, I know?—I shall be quite prepared to say anything about them, or you could ask him any questions.

1852. I understand from the statements, that generally speaking, the equipment was satisfactory?—The stores are specified in the Regulations defining what sort of stores they are.

1853. Will you read it?—It says, "The stores required for the services may be classified thus:—(1) Stores forming the equipment of the field units and accompanying these units; (2) reserve stores as regulated for these units; (3) stores which it is considered can be procured at the scene of operations; and (4) special stores which must be sent from England to accompany the first troops and required later."

1854. Then your Statement says that the equipment was satisfactory with certain exceptions?—The equipment of the troops, yes. That is what I call the personal equipment, the equipment that accompanied the troops. We have had full reports, so that you can actually get what was said from the seat of War. We had Reports from the general officer commanding or the Commanding Royal Engineer on all the units and all the stores, and those reports, I suppose, we can lay before the Royal Commission.

1855. But they are satisfactory on the whole?—Speaking generally, all those stores were satisfactory—the equipment stores.

1856. But they were not sufficient in all respects?—They were not quite sufficient. I did not consider that they were sufficient for the probable requirements of this War. We anticipated that the War would be a big one. We knew that there were very large rivers to cross, and I thought we ought to have more pontoons, to take one case, than we actually possessed; and we sent out a great many more; we sent out in fact all we could lay our hands on in the country.

1857. When you say you thought you ought to have had more pontoons, what period are you referring to?—This was before the War.

1858. At what date, I mean, in 1899?—Directly we began to think that there was a possibility of war, a long time before war was declared, some months before war was declared.

1859. Say June, 1899?—I should think so. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) I should think it was nearer July. (*Sir Richard Harrison.*) We had been thinking of it before that.

1860. But in July, 1899, you came to the conclusion that in certain respects the stores were deficient?—Yes. I thought certain extra stores would be necessary to those that were provided by the Regulations.

1861. Did you make any requisition in consequence?—Yes, I represented it to the Army Board.

1862. And what steps followed?—I was authorised to take steps to collect all I could.

1863. Then were you given a special grant for the purpose?—No, we collected all the pontoons that were scattered about in the country for instructional purposes, and sent them out eventually to follow up the actual pontoons; to reinforce, so to speak, the pontoons in the possession of the troops.

1864. Then it was not a question in July of wishing to augment the war material in your possession. You did not want extra money in order to purchase or construct?—Later on we had to get money because we took, of course, all the reserve pontoons out of England, and then we had to create another reserve for the defence of England for the new troops that were raised in England; that is how the money came in; but as long as we had any stores, of course, it cost nothing to send them out except the transport, nothing as far as the stores were concerned.

1865. I only wanted to be quite clear as to what took place upon your representation to the Army Board?—Directly I represented what we considered would be the requirements in the way of bridging, the Army Board voted (the whole thing can be seen in the proceedings of the Army Board) that I should take steps to procure all pontoons possible.

1866. From reserves?—From the reserve, and there were a certain number issued for educational purposes, more or less condemned ones, old pontoons; any that we could collect we sent out.

1867. But that denuded the country both of its reserves and also of all those pontoons for instructional purposes?—Yes.

1868. Therefore, in order to replace them, you had eventually to purchase new ones?—We had to get money and buy new ones. It is rather a long process, because pontoons are not an article of store; you cannot go into the market and buy them; you have to have them made specially, and, therefore, it took time to get them.

1869. But would it not be a more satisfactory process to have a sufficient reserve without calling in those that are issued?—We have them now. Sir Francis Mowatt's committee established a larger reserve of all stores than we had before.

1870. And that is the position now?—That is the present position; the stores are being filled up with a larger reserve than we had before this War began.

1871. Which would enable you to deal with a war in future in a different way from the last time?—Yes. We should not have denuded England, for instance, to supply South Africa if that had been the case before the War.

1872. Has the result been to put you in what you consider a satisfactory position in that respect?—I think quite as satisfactory as one could hope for.

1873. With regard to what I think you call special stores, you only had a small reserve stock, I think?—"Special stores which must be sent from England" are stores of which you would not have a reserve; that would mean the sort of stores like wood and iron, and stores of that kind that you can buy in the market.

1874. There is no difficulty in getting those at shops?—There is no difficulty in getting those at shops.

1875. They are not manufactured goods?—No, with the exception of some I will mention afterwards. The railway stores and certain telegraph stores you cannot get in the market quickly, but the ordinary stores that we sent out in the first instance were chiefly wood, I think pumps, and certain other things; there is the detail of them here in my statement—piping, and so on.

1876. And I see most of them were got from the trade, and there was no difficulty in getting them from the trade?—There was no difficulty in getting them.

1877. But with regard to manufactured stores, the railway plant, how do you go to work with regard to

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them?—Railway stores are rather peculiar. In page 10 of this list (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 213), they have entered in error—it ought not to have been put in this list of stores—"Rolling stock and material for 2ft. 6in. gauge." That was a reserve of stores that we held for railway work; and it ought not to have been in this list here because it was not sent out to the War at all. We knew what the gauge was in the country; we knew that there was no difficulty in landing and that we had hold of the line, and, of course, we imagined that that line would be used, and that we should not require a special line. But for small expeditions, for different sorts of expeditions, like the expedition to the Crimea or Suakim and others, it is necessary, or at least we think so; it is advisable, anyhow, to have a certain quantity of light railway reserve so that you can send it out quickly at the commencement of the expedition of the war, and it is for that purpose that we hold in hand this certain proportion of light railway stock. We want more of it, and I have been trying very hard to get it for some years. It is always a moot point whether we should stick to that gauge or not. I believe the gauge has been very fairly settled, but it is thought by some that it is hardly necessary, perhaps, to keep a large stock of that in hand.

1878. You only have about 3½ miles?—We have very little.

1879. That would not be of much service in a campaign except under very special circumstances?—No, we ought to have more, I think. I have always said so for some years. It is a simple question of money. But that did not arise in this War; it would only arise in case of a war where there was no railway, or where you had to land and communicate with the railway; to land on the open beach, or something of that sort.

1880. Then, with regard to the railway plant which you had to send out to South Africa, have you any remarks to make?—I can tell you about that. Directly Sir Percy Girouard was appointed he came to me and we talked over the whole question of the railway. I always anticipated that the campaign would depend to a great extent on the railway because of the enormous distances. I knew the country pretty well—I had been out there before—and seen how little use mules were, and even bullocks when there is no grass; and, therefore, I anticipated that the railways would be a great factor in the campaign, which they were. We found out with Sir Percy Girouard, directly he was appointed, all we could about the existing railways, where the rolling stock was, and so on, all the information we could possibly get; and he also busied himself in getting information. Then he went out to the Cape, and he left an officer with me, a special officer, to buy railway stores, what he thought were the most necessary at the commencement of the campaign. Then, from time to time all through the campaign, he telegraphed home to me, and I took his telegrams to the Army Board, and if they recommended his demands then the Secretary of State approved of our buying the stores and sending them out. And that is what went on all through the War. But, of course, when we had to make engines that was a long business; we could not get engines quick enough for them.

1881. You could not get them quick enough?—Oh, no; it takes a long time to make special engines for the railways at the Cape, which have a particular gauge.

1882. I think your statement shows that the value of the railway stores altogether was about half-a-million sterling?—Of those that we ordered, yes. I do not know whether it represented all the cost. I should think not. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) I should think not. (*Sir Richard Harrison.*) You see, the Commanding Royal Engineer had power in the country to order anything he could get in the country besides what we ordered from England.

1883. Yes, I understand this to be as sent out from England?—Yes, this is as sent out from England only. I do not know yet, but I think in that very full railway report you will see every detail of what happened all the way through from the very begnining to the end. It is a most admirable report, written by Sir Percy Girouard, on the railways.

1884. Yes, it is very interesting; but this Statement in Appendix B is the whole of what was sent out from your Department in England?—Yes, it is List B, pages 7 and 8. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 210).

1885. Yes. You say there was delay in regard to locomotives?—It takes some time to make them.

1886. Quite so, but was the delay in consequence of hindrance; was the delay in the preparation of this rolling stock, do you consider, a hindrance to the operations in South Africa?—I had nothing to do with South Africa, Sir Elliott Wood will be able to speak as to that. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) Yes, it was, inasmuch as they could not get so much supplies over the railway when they had insufficient rolling stock. (*Sir Richard Harrison.*) I thought you were talking of the stores being made in England. We had delay in getting the engines built in England, which takes a long time because they were special engines, and we had to get them in England. I believe we might have got them quicker perhaps if we had gone to foreign nations; I do not know. Of course, the more rolling stock you have on a railway the better you can get up your stores. I fancy the weakness of the railway at the Cape was a great blow to them.

1887. I was only asking that question to lead up to another, namely, have you considered whether any steps can be taken to prevent the same thing occurring in a future war?—Well, one has to consider each war when it takes place. It depends in the first place upon what the railways are. If you make war in a country where there are plenty of railways and the gauge is an ordinary one, and where you can get plenty of rolling stock, I do not suppose there would be any delay. I remember when I went out to Alexandria at the time of the war in Egypt, we had immense trouble because none of the engines that we could get would fit the railway, and we took out one old engine, I think. Arabi Pasha had taken away the whole of the rolling stock and we could not get hold of any engines at all at first; then we managed to seize two or three at Suez and brought them up. It was altogether very difficult. It is for that reason that we propose to have a light railway, to enable you to commence a war either where there are no railways or where the railways are impossible at first—a place like Suakim, and landing in the Crimea, or landing in Varna.

1888. But you said yourself that where there are railways in a country you would expect to use the railways?—Yes, if you are campaigning along the line of railways.

1889. And we are instructed to inquire into the preparations for the war. You have told us in this respect that there was delay because these matters were not provided for beforehand. Is there no means by which in the future that might be provided against?—We want to know first what country you are going to campaign in. I do not think you could hold in hand a quantity of rolling stock of all the railways in Europe where you might possibly campaign.

1890. I am quite content to get your opinion, but I want to get it?—My opinion is that you should have a certain proportion of light railway always in hand, which we can use in England in various ways in our camps of instruction, and which would be useful at the commencement of almost any campaign, partially so where there are no railways. But if there are railways in the country that we can use we must get the rolling stock at the time either in the country or by ordering more from any place where it is procurable.

1891. Obviously 3½ miles of light railway is not enough?—No, it is not nearly enough. Our present reserve is nothing at all.

1892. What would you call enough?—I think if we had about 300 miles of railway.

1893. Three hundred miles of light railway?—Yes. It is not the rails so much as the engines that we want; it is the rolling stock that we require to have in hand. It is not the line so much; but if we had something like 300 miles, with a proportion of engines, I think that would be sufficient.

1894. But you cannot use light railway rolling stock without laying a track to correspond?—No.

1895. Therefore if you went into a country where there were already railways, with only a light railway stock to rely upon, you would be at a disadvantage would you not?—If you have a railway in the country you have the rolling stock in the country.

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1896. Not necessarily ?—If you can get hold of it. The Boers took it away at the Cape.

1897. And you must calculate on that happening again ?—Yes; that is why I would not rely upon it. I would have a light railway so that you could be independent of the railways in the country.

1898. You might be independent up to a point, but that certainly could not take the place of the use of an existing railway ?—No, but I do not think you could lay up a large stock, as I said before, of rolling stocks of all the railways in Europe and the world in fact. It would be a gigantic thing to do.

1899. That is what I wanted to get at ?—The gauges vary.

1900. You have a memorandum in this Paper, in addition to the Statement to which we have been referring, on the situation ?—Yes, at the commencement.

1901. I think you have spoken to the first two heads. In the third head you mention certain departures from the Standard Equipment ?—Yes, in paragraph III., "The reasons for such departures mentioned in these Instructions from the Standard Equipment were," and so on. Those are what Major-General Salmond will tell you about; it is the reason for the departure from the ordinary equipment of each unit.

1902. Then I will wait for that till we examine Major-General Salmond. You have also mentioned certain special sections which were formed, under paragraph V. ?—Yes. First of all there were two search-light sections. These were experimental. These search-lights were stores which had never been used before in any war, and they were really extemporised for this war; they were more or less experimental. Sir Elliott Wood will tell you all about their use and so on. It is quite a new thing.

1903. Then there was also a Steam Road Transport Company ?—That was also quite a new thing. That really belongs to the Quartermaster General, but there were no Army Service Corps men who could work it, and the Royal Engineers came to the fore and said they would do the best they could, and they worked it.

1904. You have also shown in this statement the Engineer units as they went out ?—I think that came from the Adjutant-General's office. I know pretty well what went out; but the Adjutant-General really ordered them all.

1905. Is there any other point to which you would wish to speak yourself, as the head of the Department ?—I do not think there is anything more.

1906. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) You said at the beginning of your evidence that there was no Chief of the Staff in this war at the commencement; to what period do you refer ?—I do not know that there was ever a Chief of the Staff such as I have been accustomed to in former wars.

1907. That is what I want to get at. Would you state the difference you have in your mind ?—What I meant was that in our Regulations it says that the Chief of Staff is to give the instructions to the Commanding Royal Engineer, when he is appointed, in regard to the campaign, so that he may have an idea what stores to procure. Well, as I did not know (and I do not know at the present day) that there was any Chief of the Staff in that sense, I went and discussed them personally. Then I referred to the Army Board, and said what stores we were proposing to send out. We discussed it all at the Army Board.

1908. Would you mind instancing previous wars in which you have been engaged in which there was a Chief of the Staff ?—All. In the Indian Mutiny there was a Chief of the Staff.

1909. In the Zulu War ?—I was Quartermaster-General. No, there was no Chief of the Staff there. That was a small war.

1910. In the Transvaal, 1879–1881, was there one there. You were there I think ?—No, I was not in the Transvaal War. I was there before. There was a Chief of the Staff in that war.

1911. But of course in the Crimea there was a Chief of the Staff ?—There was a Chief of the Staff in the Crimea.

1912. And in the Mutiny ?—There was a Chief of the Staff in the Mutiny and in all the big wars that I can remember.

1913. And you cannot say that in this war there was a Chief of the Staff. Is that so ?—I do not know who he was. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) General Wynne was appointed Chief of the Staff to Sir Redvers Buller. (*Sir Richard Harrison.*) I thought he was Chief Staff Officer. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) He was practically Chief of the Staff.

1914. And when was he appointed ?—General Kitchener was Chief of the Staff to Lord Roberts.

1915. I am speaking of the early stages of the war ?—In the early stages General Wynne went out with me in the "Dunottar Castle" as Chief of the Staff with Sir Redvers Buller.

1916. But your discussions would have been before that ?—But not with him.

1917. Because he was not appointed ?—I do not know when he was appointed, at what date, but he went out as Chief of the Staff in October, 1899. (*Sir Richard Harrison.*) It may have been that our discussions were before the Chief of the Staff was appointed.

1918. That is what I want. There was no Chief of the Staff at the time you were making preparations ?—No; but I do not remember that there was any one, such as I remember, until Lord Kitchener was appointed. I may be wrong about it.

1919. May I take it generally from your evidence that prior to the Mowatt Committee the state of the reserve supplies was decidedly unsatisfactory ?—It would not have been unsatisfactory for a small war.

1920. For a war that would engage two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division ?—Yes. There were the regular reserves which were laid up; there was a certain reserve of pontoons and a reserve of stores before, which in old days were considered enough for any probable war. But this War was a very large one, and neither the amount of troops nor, of course, of reserves was sufficient in our opinion.

1921. My point is this:—The country contemplated having possibly to send abroad two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division, and to have another Army Corps at home. I think that is the case, is it not—that that was the original intention ?—I think that was about it. I have never heard it laid down exactly what we were supposed to have.

1922. I think that was laid down by the Secretary of State in Parliament ?—Yes, perhaps it was.

1923. But were the reserves ample for such forces as that ?—I do not know quite what reserves you mean. Shall we take pontoons ? What reserves do you mean, because I say most of the reserves we buy when a war is contemplated ?

1924. But I would hardly call reserves things you go and buy in the open market ?—No; but then we look upon the market as our reserves.

1925. But you said there were many things that of course had to be in stock, which is a real reserve ?—I should say the reserves were about as small as they could be.

1926. For the force I have mentioned ?—Even for those two Army Corps they were small reserves no doubt.

1927. I want to draw a distinction, if possible, between what should be supplied for a force such as the country contemplated and what would be necessary for a force that was never contemplated ?—It depends very much upon the country that you are going to campaign in. If you were going to campaign, for instance, in a country where there was no river, pontoons would not be required so much; but as we were going to campaign in a country that we knew was crossed by very large rivers, we imagined that pontoons would come in, and that we should require a great many of them. We knew, for instance, that the Orange River was 300 yards across, and our pontoons with the ordinary equipment can only make a bridge 80 yards across, so that it was necessary to send them out something behind.

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1928. Pontoons take some time to make, I suppose?—Yes.

1929. You cannot buy them in the open market?—No. I have said before that they are a special store which you have to make beforehand.

1930. That leads to the next question. You said that you took your first action in July, 1899, I think?—About then.

1931. But you added that you had been thinking of it before?—I personally had.

1932. How long before—for years?—Yes; ever since I was in that country, I think.

1933. Then you had been alive for some years, at any rate since the Jameson Raid, let us say, to the possibility of a war in South Africa?—Yes, we always thought there might be. I always thought so. In fact, the Boers told me they would make war when I left them.

1934. In what year—1881?—Yes. They said, "We will wait a little bit, and when you get weak we will attack you." I daresay they told a great many other people the same.

1935. Then before the Commander-in-Chief's Committee was established at the end of June, 1899, was there any regular formal means of pressing views on the War Office generally other than by Memoranda to the Secretary of State or by personal interviews with him?—Of expressing views?

1936. Of pressing views, not expressing views; such views as that of the necessity of having stores ready; was there any regular formal system, such as now exists in the War Office Council I assume?—We have had the Army Board as long as I have been at the War Office.

1937. And at the Army Board were general subjects of that kind brought up?—Yes, you could bring up anything.

1938. And was it the practice to do so?—So far as I know. You see the War began very soon after I became Inspector-General of Fortifications, and then the Army Board sat regularly; we sat almost every day at first.

1939. You joined on the 18th of April, 1898, did you not?—Yes.

1940. That was eighteen months before the War?—Yes. I do not know quite what you mean by your question. I should not bring up my own private ideas before any Board or Council that I know of unless I were asked.

1941. My point is that you, among other great officers at the War Office, had a feeling that war was not improbable in South Africa?—Yes.

1942. Would you, under those circumstances, consider what you would need in case of war breaking out?—I had my own ideas about what would happen.

1943. And at moments of great tension in South Africa would you bring those views in any way before the Army Board?—If I were asked.

1944. Only if you were asked?—I do not think it would be my business to press them unless it came across me in the course of business. I had as a matter of fact, I think, a year before, when I was Quartermaster-General, expressed my views (I do not know where the papers are—they are somewhere in the War Office) in regard to the necessity for being prepared in Natal in case of an attack by the Boers.

1945. Would that be on record?—I should think it would be.

1946. Could we get it, do you think?—I do not know. I can try.

1947. I do not wish to suggest that it was your business; I only want to get at the fact whether it was the business of the great officers of the War Office to do that or not to do that?—If it came across you. It was, for instance, a question of transport for troops in Natal when I was Quartermaster-General, and I pressed to try and get transport for them to make them a mobile force instead of being a stationary garrison force.

1948. I think perhaps you have not quite understood the drift of my question. For about three years there had been great tension between this country and the two Republics, as we know?—Yes.

1949. And at times it appeared as if war was imminent; at other times it appeared more distant or that it might be averted?—Yes.

1950. Take a question such as pontoons for the Orange River; would it be the business of the Inspector-General of Fortifications to suggest that in the event of war we had not got a pontoon establishment sufficient for bridging those rivers?—Not enough you mean?

1951. Yes?—I think we brought it forward every year that we had not enough. If you ask Major-General Salmond he will know. For several years past we have brought it forward.

1952. Then I will reserve these questions for him?—If you please. We thought our pontoon equipment was not sufficient for war. I have said it very often. I have said it in lectures at the United Service Institution twenty years ago, I think, and in various other places.

1953. Then, prior to June, 1899, when the Commander-in-Chief's Committee was formed, were you ever asked, either by the Commander-in-Chief or the Secretary of State, to consider the position of your reserves and your supplies with a view of the possibility of war with the two Republics?—I do not remember that I was ever asked. The Intelligence Department would work that.

1954. Yes; but they would not consider the question of your supplies?—No.

1955. What I mean is, did either the Commander-in-Chief or the Secretary of State put before you the possibility of a war with the two Republics?—I do not think it ever was put before me until the Army Board began to sit.

1956. In June, 1899?—Yes. I daresay you have the date.

1957. June 29th, 1899?—That was the commencement, of course. We began to sit, not before there was an idea of war, but before there was any arrangement made for the war. I think we were sitting two or three months before war was declared.

1958. From the end of June, 1899, until October?—Yes; and then I did express my views at the first meeting.

1959. Quite so; but before that you had not been called upon to do so?—No.

1960. You made the remark that you have to consider each war when it takes place, when it breaks out; you remember, perhaps, saying that?—I ought not to have said when it took place, but when it is contemplated. It is not for me, I suppose, now to consider whether it is probable that there is going to be a large war in Somaliland.

1961. But in such a case as that would not the Secretary of State put before you the possibility of engineer stores being required?—Yes, if I were likely to have anything to do with it. At present I have nothing to do with it; it is being worked by India.

1962. This particular war in Somaliland?—Yes, that is what I mean. It is not exactly for me to say. I must be told by somebody or other—by the Secretary of State or the Commander-in-Chief.

1963. I was not suggesting that it was for you to say; I was only asking you whether you have said it?—Certainly it is not my business. I have only to administer what we have got.

1964. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) In regard to the purchase of stores on demands from the General Officer Commanding in the field, were you empowered to purchase right away without any reference to their cost?—No; I had to get authority from the Secretary of State.

1965. And was it convenient always to get that authority at once? The Secretary of State might have been at the far end of England?—I had no difficulty.

1966. Somebody would be acting for him?—Yes; I never found any difficulty.

1967. You stated that you relied on the markets for a great number of your stores?—We had to wait, you mean?

1968. You had to rely in the case of a war for really filling up reserves, or getting reserves—upon getting stores from the market?—Yes, certain stores.

1969. And you were empowered to purchase as soon as a requisition was made on you?—Yes, very nearly. I had to get authority from the Secretary of State for the money.

1970. There was no delay?—There was no delay about it. There was some delay about contracts occasionally afterwards.

1971. So far as you know, was there any deficiency felt from want of stores required in your department by the Army in the field?—I think they would have liked them quicker than we could send them very often, especially the telegraph stores and railway stores certainly, and very likely some other things. We got them as quickly as we could.

1972. In your department do you work directly under the Commander-in-Chief?—I suppose I do. I am supposed to be under the Secretary of State, I think. I am partly under the Commander-in-Chief and partly under the Secretary of State.

1973. Do you take any action in your own department of a general character without its going through the Commander-in-Chief?—Not if there is anything new, like new guns or anything of that sort. If it is anything that is approved, I do; but if there is anything new, any change, I submit it to the Commander-in-Chief first. I get his authority, and then I put it forward to the Secretary of State for funds. That is the ordinary way. We never do at any time work without submitting to the Commander-in-Chief what we do, if it is anything new. Anything that is approved we go on with.

1974. In this War was there any difficulty at any time on account of money in connection with purchases?—No, not so far as I know.

1975. (*Sir John Jackson.*) In July, 1899. when, as you say, the War was expected, and you had a knowledge that rivers would have to be crossed, and that you had a scarcity of pontoons and bridge-work, had you before you at that time any rough maps or surveys showing where the falls of these rivers were and every high bank and that kind of thing?—Yes; for our purposes we had quite enough maps. We knew what the rivers were like, where what they call the drifts were, and where the railways crossed the rivers; and we knew where the lines of railway went. I think for our purposes the maps were good enough. I believe they wanted better ones in the field; but that is another question.

1976. You told us that you were so short of pontoons that you had to send out old pontoons, and that England was practically denuded of pontoons; but that now you thought things were in as satisfactory a condition as you could hope for?—Yes.

1977. I take it that the idea in your mind then was that that state of things arose from the disinclination of the Government to spend money in making these provisions, which we know have been often suggested?—There is always a disinclination in time of profound peace to spend anything, and then when war breaks out there is no disinclination. Directly the War began the money came in as quickly as we asked for it.

1978. Now, in this particular case of yours, I think you stated that as regards the railway stores, their value might in round figures be something like half a million sterling? In that particular case, if the whole value of those stores had been reserved, the interest charged would only have been about £15,000 a year as to that one department, which would not be a very big charge?—No; but then I do not know that we should have laid up railway stores, and kept in England engines for the Cape, and Russia, say, and generally for all Europe. It would require a good many millions if we had to keep rolling stock for all the railways in Europe.

1979. You also spoke of the difficulty there had been in Egypt in utilising the Egyptian railways, because the rolling stock had been taken away, and we had not rolling stock to suit their gauges. Is it within your knowledge at all that locomotives and rolling stock generally have been made to suit varying gauges?—I do not think I know about that. It is possible.

1980. I put to you the question because I happen to know of my own knowledge, in connection with my own work really, of cases where we have gauges that will vary from 4 feet 8½ to 7 feet. I do not suggest, of course, that any rolling stock in peace time would be a good thing, without there were some special reasons, for you to have it on two gauges or varying gauges; but in a case of war, do you not think it would be practicable to have rolling stock arranged so that it might be fitted with gauges varying to such an extent as would cover all the differences of the main lines in Europe, say?—It is worth experimenting, I think. That is really why I want to get a certain reserve store of what we call the light railway, and we should experiment then with engines. You see, we could put them on to a 2 feet 6 inch gauge, which is the one we have arrived at as being the most useful for military purposes.

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1981. That is when you take a special light railway out?—Yes.

1982. But speaking with regard to the main lines that you might find in a European campaign, what is about the maximum difference in gauges of the main lines in Europe, do you happen to know?—No. I do not think there is much difference.

1983. It is a question of something less than a foot, about 4ft. 8½in. up to 5ft. or 5ft. 5in.?—The Cape Railway is a smaller one. It is a 3ft, 6in. gauge.

1984. I am speaking of the main lines in Europe?—Yes; the Cape line is a narrower gauge, than the European; and it is narrower than ours. I do not think there is any other gauge like the Cape gauge, and that is one of the difficulties in regard to rolling stock.

1985. Then in the event of your requiring to take possession of the enemy's line, and finding that your rolling stock is not suitable, and that they have removed their rolling stock, the only alternative, I suppose, is to set to work to alter their gauge?—If we had a light railway do you mean?

1986. No, I am speaking of utilising the enemy's lines. Take the gauge in Egypt?—Yes, to alter the gauge to your own rolling stock; I should think it might be so. We hardly contemplate in England a great campaign in Europe, in which we should use their lines. I do not know if it ever may come.

1987. (*Sir John Edge.*) You say that the gauge of the Cape Railway is 3ft. 6in.?—That is so.

1988. I gather from what you have said that the Administration at the Cape allowed a large quantity of rolling stock to be taken across our border from the Cape Colony?—They had taken it right up to the north of the Transvaal, by Barberton, I think it was. All the railways in South Africa are the same gauge; the Cape Railway, the Orange Free State Railway, the Transvaal Railway, and the Natal Railway are all the same gauge.

1989. What I am coming to is this:—If the Administration at the Cape had not allowed the rolling stock to be taken out of the Colony, would the difficulty of railway transport have arisen?—It would not have been anything like so much, of course; it would have been a great relief if they had had plenty of rolling stock down there, but it is only a single line, as you will remember, and of a small gauge, while the stores that went up were something enormous.

1990. But I suppose it was the removal of the rolling stock from Cape Colony that accentuated the difficulty?—Of course. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) They moved very little The exchange of rolling stock was very little against the Cape Government at the beginning, that is to say at the north of the Orange River; they had not taken much of the stock that did not belong to them into the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal. The loss of stock was all due to the destruction of rolling stock later on, and to the fact that the Boers moved it clean away from Pretoria, right down to Barberton, and down below, and then they destroyed it wholesale; and the loss of rolling stock was also due to the blowing up of the line from time to time, and with it sometimes engines and sometimes carriages.

1991. But before we commenced operations, is it not the fact that rolling stock had been moved in sections into those two Republics?—Yes, there was some removed but it was not anything very great. I think the greater part, chiefly trucks, that they got, were trucks that then

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belonged to them north of Cape Colony, which were in the Colony and were removed north of the Orange River.

1992. (*To Sir Richard Harrison.*) You have told us that your largest pontoon that you had in reserve was 80 yards?—The equipment that is drawn with a pontoon troop is 80 yards. (*Major-General Salmond.*) About 85 yards.

1993. (*To Sir Richard Harrison.*) Can you tell me why that limit was fixed?—That limit was fixed because it was a convenient amount to draw; it is a question of transport; this is a moveable bridge, it is a bridge that would go on quickly (they could go at a trot), and be put over the river, Or if the river is too broad it is used as a raft to take the troops quickly across; then the horses and men cross and take the bridge on to another river, and so on. You could not have a very large portable bridge, and this is absolutely a portable bridge. Then behind that we send out other pontoons, which are intended to make another bridge behind, or to lengthen that bridge; but of course it takes a longer time to bring them up, they have to be brought up slowly.

1994. Would these two pontoon companies carry 160 yards of bridge between them?—Yes; three times 80 is 240, if it is 80 yards each. (*Major-General Salmond.*) Each pontoon troop carries 55 yards of heavy bridge, 85 yards of medium bridge, or 165 yards of light bridge. (*Sir Richard Harrison.*) But it is the medium bridge that would take the troops and wagons or guns across, and that is 85 yards.

1995. Do you happen to know what the distance by railway line is from the Cape to Bloemfontein, or to the Orange River?—I can very soon measure it off for you. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) From Cape Town itself it is about 800 miles, roughly (I can only say very roughly), to Bloemfontein.

1996. (*To Sir Richard Harrison.*) And to the Orange River from Cape Town?—That is only about 100 miles short; that would be about 700 miles, roughly. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) Not quite, but very nearly. There is, of course, a shorter line from Port Elizabeth, and another shorter line from East London.

1997. To Bloemfontein?—Yes, crossing the Orange River where they come together.

1998. What is the distance from Port Elizabeth to Bloemfontein by railway, roughly?—500 miles, I suppose; more than 100 miles shorter than from Cape Town; but one could take that off the map.

1999. (*To Sir Richard Harrison.*) I only wanted to see how far your 300 miles of light railway would have carried you?—But you would not send that, probably, at all, to a war of that sort, where you know that you have the railways; you would keep a reserve of that sort to use for expeditions where you could not get a railway, or where you knew that the railways could not be made use of.

2000. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) So far as I can gather from your evidence the only deficiency in reserve of stores was in pontoons; everything else could have been got in the open market?—Not telegraph stores; we had to buy them largely.

2001. But still you were able to buy them?—Well, they take longer; telegraph stores are not articles that you can buy at once in the market.

2002. That is to say they have to be prepared for you?—Yes, some of them have to be made, and it takes time to buy them; but most of the stores that we use, such as pumps and wood to make piers and watering arrangements and so on, can be bought in the market quickly when required.

2003. You stated in your evidence that the Boers told you, as I understand, in 1881, that they would attack, us when they considered that England was weak; was that stated to you by Boers holding leading positions in the country?—I merely mentioned that as showing that the idea was in the air even so long ago as 1881, when I left the country.

2004. But still I will ask you to answer that question, if you can. Was that idea one that seemed to pervade the minds of leading Boers?—The man who said it to me was a man who commanded my escort for some time. He was a man who commanded some Irregular Horse out there, and was with me accompanying me; he had been fighting for us and with us at that time. They were very friendly indeed to me at that time. I used to know them all very well.

2005. Did you consider at the time that they really meant it or that it was mere boasting?—They intended it, I think, unless they got certain things; that was what they told me. They said they wanted certain rights and certain privileges, and that if they did not get them they should probably fight.

2006. You are now aware that Sir John Ardagh did report on the preparations that the Boers were making in 1896?—I saw his report.

2007. But did you see it in 1896 or about that time; June, 1896, was the date of his report, I think; however, it was in 1896?—I have read so many reports that I do not quite know to which report you are alluding. When the War broke out first I got hold of every paper I could lay my hands upon.

2008. I daresay you have seen a little yellow book?—I cannot remember that particular one.

2009. It is the report in which Sir John Ardagh gives the number of guns that the Boers were then possessed of?—I remember hearing about it, but I could not identify any particular report.

2010. It is this one (*holding up a book*)?—Yes I have looked at that.

2011. This was revised in June, 1899, but Sir John Ardagh's first report, so far as we know, was about June, 1896?—I cannot give evidence about it. I do not remember.

2012. But you do remember seeing the report?—Yes, I expect I have seen it among others, because I generally look at all those reports.

2013. But before the War broke out, I mean?—Yes, I got hold of every report I could.

2014. Considering that you have seen this report, and that you had heard those remarks being made at the Cape when you were there in 1881, do you not consider that that was a matter to bring before the Army Board?—I have no doubt that I have said it to the Army Board, because we used to talk about all kinds of things.

2015. But I mean in relation to getting a sufficiency of pontoons?—At the Army Board I brought the question of pontoons up, at either the first or second meeting—quite early—directly we met.

2016. And was it rejected?—No, I was authorised, as I said at the commencement, to get every pontoon that I could lay my hands upon.

2017. But that was after the War broke out?—No, that was when the Army Board first met.

2018. In what month was that?—We could easily get that from the Proceedings of the Army Board.

2019. (*Chairman.*) I think you said July?—At any rate, it was two or three months before the War broke out—directly the Secretary of State ordered the Army Board to assemble, and to consider the question of the Cape—as soon as they thought there was even any possibility of a war.

2020. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I think you said that you got pontoons from places where they were being used for instruction, and so forth?—Yes.

2021. But were any new pontoons ordered then?—Yes, directly we were ordering out the old ones we began to consider how best to make up our reserve in England. New units were raised in England, and new equipment had to be prepared for them.

2022. Was that commenced or initiated in July, 1899?—It was commenced within a reasonable time, I think. As the troops went out others were raised. It could not all be done at once—in a few days or a few hours.

2023. Was it initiated in July, 1899?—Yes, it was all started about then; it was all started within a month or something like that. We prepared to send out all the pontoons that there were in the country, and then we took steps to get more as a supply for the troops in England. We did not get them all quite at the same time.

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2024. I think you stated that previously to holding the appointment of Inspector-General of Fortifications you were Quartermaster-General ?—I was.

2025. And that in your capacity as Quartermaster-General you did send in some report in which you pointed out certain deficiencies ?—Yes, in regard to the troops in Natal.

2026. Do you think we can see that report which you made at that time ?—I do not know whether I can find the report. I can look for it, and ask if you can have it. I do not know where it is now; it may be lost; shall I try and get it ?

2027. (*Chairman.*) Yes, if you please, if you can. It will be on record in the Quartermaster-General's Department, will it not ?—I dare say; it would not go there necessarily.

2028. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Can you recollect—perhaps it is trespassing too much upon your memory at this length of time—whether in that report you referred to Ladysmith as a depôt for stores ?—No, my business was in regard to transport.

2029. Merely how to get stores there ?—In regard to the troops being provided with transport.

2030. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) (*To Sir Elliott Wood.*) I gather from what you said that the amount of rolling stock belonging to Cape Colony which fell into the enemy's hands was not very great ?—I do not think it was very much, but, of course, the railway management was specially under Sir Percy Girouard, and he worked almost entirely independently of me in railway matters, so that I can only say that I know it was not anything very great.

2031. I suppose what fell into their hands was mainly the stock which, in the natural course of business, was up in that portion of South Africa at the time ?—Quite so. (*Sir Richard Harrison.*) Sir Percy Girouard's report deals with all those questions most fully, stating what he did from the very beginning. It is a most admirable report. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) Yes, and it will cover almost everything, including that.

2032. Does it give the amount of rolling stock ?—Yes, I think it does. (*Sir Richard Harrison.*) Yes, I think it will touch on that so far as I can remember; it is a very full report.

2033. I asked a witness the other day what the Joint Naval and Military Defence Committee did, and it came out, so far as I could understand the evidence, that really they only provided for the defence of sea fronts, and that they had never taken into consideration, or were not in the habit of taking into consideration, a land frontier. Was it anybody's business to make any proposal, not in anticipation of immediate war, but as a matter of precaution, for the defence of the Natal frontier from the Boers? Is it within your knowledge that any scheme was drawn out or that any works were proposed with that view; because that cannot be done when war has begun—it must be done beforehand ?—That was done beforehand. There is, of course, a scheme of defence for Natal. In old days we did not contemplate an attack from the shore. The scheme for the defence of Natal was chiefly—in fact entirely—for the defence of Durban against an outside foe. There was that, and I am under the impression—in fact I am almost sure—that a special Report was called for in regard to the defence of Natal as a whole against a possible attack from the Boers—it could be nobody else; and I presume that that Report can be got.

2034. An attack by the Boers upon our territory seemed to you very probable, did it not, and to many other officers ?—I always thought, and I think most people had an idea (otherwise we should not have had troops in Natal) that there was a possibility of attack. We might have left the Cape like Australia without any troops; we should not want to keep those troops in Natal unless there had been some possibility of attack from the Boers. I suppose the only question was, what would be the magnitude of that attack, whether it would be a small raid or whether it would be as big a war as it eventually turned out to be.

2035. Would it not have been desirable to consider whether some measures could have been taken in the way of erecting works, particularly in places where large quantities of stores were heaped up, as at Ladysmith; that question never was taken up, was it ?—There were no works built that I know of.

2036. But was such a measure ever contemplated or proposed, so far as you know ?—I think that that Report on the Defences of Natal contemplated something of the kind. I suppose you have that Report.

2037. At all events that matter was not pressed at all, it was not seriously considered, and nothing was done towards erecting expensive works or works for protecting Natal at all ?—I can only speak generally from what I hear. I do not think there were any works for the defence of Natal or the frontier proposed.

2038. (*To Sir Elliott Wood.*) Perhaps you are able to speak as to that ?—There were defences round Pietermaritzburg years and years ago—old works that are still standing. (*Sir Richard Harrison.*) That was against the Zulus. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) Yes, but not on the frontier. The frontier is, of course, very extensive, and there are a great many passes to be dealt with; and certainly as to Ladysmith it was treated as an open camp. I do not imagine that the idea was that they would ever contemplate standing a siege there.

2039. But it is not so very far from the frontier, is it ?—Not from the Orange River Colony frontier, but it is a good distance from the Transvaal.

2040. (*Viscount Esher.*) (*To Sir Richard Harrison.*) If you would just go back for one moment to the meeting of the Army Board in June, you told us that you were authorised on that date to incur a certain amount of expenditure for the purchase of pontoons; is that so ?—What I said before was that there was no actual expenditure in reference to collecting the existing pontoons. The expenditure came afterwards when it was a matter of piling up reserves and fitting out new companies which were raised to take the place of those that went out.

2041. Then between June and September did you incur any expenditure at all ?—Not until we were authorised by the Secretary of State; we did not get any authority to spend money. It is all on record. I am not sure what the date was

2042. Not until the 29th of September, or somewhere thereabouts ?—Not till some months afterwards.

2043. But the 29th of September was within two or three days of war breaking out ?—Yes.

2044. And you incurred no expenditure between June and September ?—Not till we were authorised.

2045. And you were not authorised till the end of September ?—No, but we should have sent out all the stores we had, and then the expenditure was to replace them in England.

2046. Quite so; but what you did in June, as I understand, was merely to collect together the stores which you had in hand ?—That is so.

2047. But you did not spend any fresh money ?—I cannot remember the date, whether it was the first of June or a little later, but it was somewhere about then.

2048. But is that so ? Do you recollect being authorised by the Army Board ?—As I say, without reference to the Minutes of the Army Board, I cannot remember which meeting it was, but directly I came to the Army Board I know I brought the matter forward. I could very easily refer to the Proceedings of the Army Board and find out on what date I was authorised to collect these pontoons and send them out.

2049. Have you any reason to suppose that you were authorised to incur an expenditure at any date previous to that at which the Director General of Ordnance was authorised ?—No.

2050. We know, of course, when he was authorised ?—We none of us could spend money until a certain time; it is all laid down. All we did before that was by way of preparation and consideration what to do.

2051. You referred just now to Sir Percy Girouard's Report; do you agree with his proposal in regard to the formation of a Railway Department for the Army ?—I think he goes a little further than is necessary, but we have not taken that question up yet

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2052. But what is your view of that suggestion of his?—I think there is a certain amount in it. I think our railway companies, as they were originally, want strengthening now, and probably making larger. I also think we want a little more training in time of peace, and a certain proportion, as I said before, of stock which could be used for training the troops in time of peace, and as a reserve to send away in time of war.

2053. Do you agree in the main with his proposed organisation of that branch?—I am not prepared to say that now. I agree with a great deal that he has said, in fact, nearly all; but he has not had very much experience of English works, and I think there are a few details probably in which I should not quite agree with him; but I think I may say that I do in the main.

2054. (*Chairman.*) Is there anything else that you would like to add?—No, thank you.

2055. (*Sir John Edge.*) You say that first you were instructed to collect the pontoons that you had in England?—Yes.

2056. Then afterwards you incurred expense in replacing these?—Yes.

2057. Did you ultimately send out any of the pontoons which you had to manufacture in order to replace those that went to the front?—I do not think we did. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) No; we managed to get on with what we had.

2058. (*To Sir Richard Harrison.*) In fact, you sent out no pontoons in respect of which expense was incurred?—We sent out none that we had made after the War began.

2059. You sent out none that you had not got in hand at the time in England?—No, I do not think we did. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) That is so.

(*General Sir Richard Harrison withdrew.*)

2060. (*Chairman.*) (*To Major-General Salmond.*) You were Deputy Adjutant-General, Royal Engineers, at Headquarters from 1896 till when?—Till the 30th June, 1902.

2061. That is throughout the War?—Yes.

2062. What were your special duties in connection with the Inspector-General of Fortifications?—To have all the Engineer units fit and efficient and properly equipped. I did that for the Adjutant-General.

2063. And you were distinctly under the Adjutant-General?—Absolutely.

2064. What was your connection with the Inspector-General of Fortifications?—To consult him at all points as to what was necessary for the Engineers. It is done in consultation. The Deputy Adjutant-General Royal Engineers has more to do with the numbers and the equipments than with special stores, such as Sir Richard Harrison has referred to.

2065. Is he the link between the two Departments?—Quite so.

2066. But his responsibility is entirely to the Adjutant-General?—That is so.

2067. Then so far as we are concerned to-day, the special point that you would speak to is the preparation of the units for service, and the expedients adopted to meet the various demands for the *personnel*?—Yes.

2068. And in regard to that you would propose, I understand, to sum up the facts contained in this Statement which has been submitted to us by the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and more particularly to the Paper on Royal Engineer units which is embodied in that Statement (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 201)?—Yes; I put the last-named forward as my *précis* of the evidence I shall give.

2069. That is your own Paper?—Yes, it is my own Paper, signed by myself. It is the one I prepared when I was Deputy Adjutant-General. I kept it going through the War, and it continues till the conclusion of the War. It shows the units sent out, and the extra units formed, and how we did it: Telegraphs, Railways, Survey Sections, Militia, and Volunteers.

2070. Is there any general explanation of that Paper that you would like to make?—The position that I had before me was to be ready to make up all the units required for an Army Corps to war strength whenever Mobilisation should be ordered. Everything was all cut and dried beforehand, and had, in fact, been kept so automatically for years. All the Orders were ready; they only had to be signed, and they were signed, and it was all done quite easily and automatically.

2071. So far as the Engineers were concerned, the Mobilisation was carried out perfectly and effectively?—Yes; quite easily in every respect. A feature which has been somewhat specially alluded to in your inquiries, and in Sir Richard Harrison's evidence, is the railway organisation; Sir Percy Girouard's Report has been specially alluded to. You will find at the beginning of that Report he says that when he was appointed no staff existed, even on paper, for a railway service. I think he must a little have forgotten the facts. Automatically, the name of an officer for the post of Director of Railways is always kept noted in the War Office, whether there is a war coming on or not coming on. Directly Major Girouard, as he was then, was appointed Director of Railways I sent to him by hand the printed "Rules and Regulations for the Working of Railways in War in Foreign Countries." This is a pamphlet that had been prepared some years back at Army Headquarters in consultation with the Army Railway Council, on which are the managers of the principal commercial railways of the United Kingdom. After its preparation it was referred to the Body of Managers to see if they had any remarks or suggestions to make. They made a few suggestions, which were adopted, and the result was this book.

2072. I do not think we have got the book?—No; but I will give it to you; I have brought it for the purpose, because I was afraid that a wrong impression might get about. Paragraph 11 runs as follows: "The number and composition of the staff of the Director of Railways will depend upon the extent of the line or lines to be worked, and upon the magnitude of the operations. It may, however, be assumed that even to efficiently work a line of 50 miles he must be assisted by the following officers: (*a*) Assistant Director of Railways; (*b*) Traffic Manager; (*c*) Locomotive Superintendent; (*d*) Superintendent of Works; (*e*) Paymaster; (*f*) Storekeeper or Quartermaster; (*g*) Adjutant or other staff officer to look after any railway corps that might be formed, or any companies of Royal Engineers that might be employed, either in the construction, maintenance, or working of the railways." A further subordinate staff is mentioned later on. Paragraph 13 runs: "The names of the following railway officials, civil or military, will be published in the Orders for the Lines of Communication: Director of Railways, Assistant Director of Railways, Traffic Manager, Locomotive Superintendent, Superintendent of Works, Adjutant, Paymaster, Quartermaster." As I said before, I sent this book to Major Girouard at once. He came to me about an hour afterwards with that book, and on that basis he named his staff. Everything he asked for was approved and was sent out. So that I think it is an error to say that it did not exist even on paper. The individuals had to be named, of course, when an occasion arose. I will put in this book. (*Handing in the same.*)

2073. Then these officials whose titles you have read out were appointed at once?—Yes, and some more of them; he asked for additional Deputy Assistant Directors of Railways. Whatever he asked for was given at once. He selected the officers, some from England, some from India, some that he knew personally and some by repute. And that book, as you will see, gives you a basis for a short line of 50 miles, and it says that that, of course, can be expanded, as I read out.

2074. It is entirely rules and regulations for working. It has nothing to do with the provision of plant or anything of that kind?—No; that assumes that the plant is provided. I thought I would correct that impression about the staff, because it would be a pity that a wrong idea should go from what is otherwise a very valuable report.

2075. Is the Report that you are referring to the one that is embodied in this Special Report on the Organisation and Equipment of the Engineer arm in South Africa?—No, it is not; it is a longer report. That is another one. Then, again, the pontoons have been referred to.

2076. Were you concerned with the pontoons?—

Yes; it is part of the equipment and part of the reserve equipment.

2077. What have you to say about them?—Some years ago our existing pontoon troop was split up into two, a higher and a lower establishment, with the idea that it might be worked for two Army Corps, the second pontoon troop to be augmented when the time came to enable the second Army Corps to be mobilised. At the same time two pontoons were given to each field company, so that although there was a reduction in the number of pontoons that each pontoon troop carried, still by making the additions to the field companies there was, in fact, rather an increased total of pontoons available for a Field Army over what there had been before. The number of pontoons for each troop is 16, which will make 55yds. of heavy bridge or 85yds. of medium bridge, 85yds. being the one in more general use. You asked some questions as to the basis on which that was fixed. I cannot tell you that it was fixed from any special consideration as to the width of individual rivers, certainly not in South Africa. So far as my own ideas are concerned, I think that you want a heavy reserve of pontoons. I think you ought to have in this country sufficient pontoons to enable you to throw three bridges of 200yds. each (these are my personal views), which you ought to have ready somehow or other, either as reserves or otherwise. I do not say that all these ought to be carried by the pontoon troops themselves; if they are coming up close behind it will do, but they ought to be ready. Sir Richard Harrison, as he said, foresaw this as one of the causes of difficulty, and he arranged that all the spare pontoons in the United Kingdom should be sent out. That left us at once without any pontoons, except just a very few with a field company or two; and if we had been called upon to embark on another operation we should have had to do without them, because they take so long to make. I have mentioned this without being asked because my idea is that between the Railways, the Telegraphs and the Bridging service of an army you have the mobility of that army vitally concerned. If you come to a river and you cannot get over it your mobility is gone, you are done. It was so in the Peninsula. The Duke of Wellington was constantly in trouble from not having a sufficient pontoon service, and he organised one and made it up by degrees, got it gradually together, much larger than what we have got. I have only mentioned this so as to clear the ground about these pontoons and what occurred. The instant those were sent away we set to work to buy and to make. The Engineers made them at Aldershot and Chatham, and they were replaced.

2078. When you say the instant they were sent away that means to say after they were sent out of the country in October?—Yes; we began as soon as possible, practically.

2079. But nothing was done till then in the way of making new pontoons?—No; the War Office themselves are fully alive to the desirability of having more pontoons and of, in fact, increasing slightly the size of our existing pontoon units. I believe they are taking that in hand. But since I left, of course, I do not know. They are fully alive to the desirability of an increase, I know, but it remains as a fact that with the pontoons we happened to have about the country that were sent out, some of them more or less unserviceable, a fairly sufficient supply of pontoons was sent to the troops in South Africa.

2080. Do I rightly understand that 85yds. of medium bridge goes to a pontoon troop?—Yes.

2081. Then if you want to bridge a larger river than that you must have a second troop, is that so?—You must get some more pontoons. You need not have a second troop.

2082. But if you had two troops marching together the second troop could add its pontoons?—Yes, it could double it. But they would not be marching together.

2083. That may be?—The second pontoon troop belongs to another Army Corps.

2084. A pontoon troop is the equipment for an Army Corps?—Yes.

2085. What is the *personnel* of a pontoon troop?—One Captain, two subalterns, a medical officer, a veterinary officer, and 208 non-commissioned officers and men, with a total of 186 horses.

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2086. That does not quite correspond with the figures in this statement that has been given us?—Which statement do you mean?

2087. The statement submitted by the Inspector-General of Fortifications, page 2 (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 200)?—I am reading from the "War Establishments."

2088. If you look at that statement, in the second line, you will see the pontoon troop, showing the difference between the normal war establishment prior to the War and the establishment for South Africa. The establishment of the pontoon troop nominally apparently was five officers, 127 mounted and 99 dismounted non-commissioned officers and men, making 231; but the establishment for South Africa was five officers, 40 mounted and 99 dismounted non-commissioned officers and men, making 144. I wanted to know what the reason for that difference was?—It is in the drivers, I think. (*Sir Elliott Wood.*) It is ox transport for Cape Colony instead of horse transport, which makes the whole difference. (*Major-General Salmond.*) Yes, that accounts for the difference between South Africa and the normal establishment.

2089. (*To Sir Elliott Wood.*) It is a question of drivers, is it?—Almost entirely; it is a different transport altogether—the ox transport in South Africa and the horse transport in England.

2090. In other parts of the Paper I find a recommendation for more mounted men in the Engineer units; and it seemed strange that in South Africa, in this statement, the mounted men were very much fewer; the drivers were much fewer?—Because they had natives to drive their oxen and their mules instead of Englishmen. (*Major-General Salmond.*) The figures I gave you were taken from "War Establishments," page 69.

2091. Your figure was 208, and this figure is 234! that is an inconsistency?—I do not know where that figure comes from; this "War Establishments" is my authority.

2092. And with regard to the Regular forces, in the details of your statement, is there anything you wish to add. You give us all the different detachments which were sent out from time to time throughout the War?—We had to improvise searchlight units; they were a new departure. We sent two sets from Chatham, and also notably, a unit from the Electrical Engineers, which was extremely valuable.

2093. That was a Volunteer unit, I suppose?—Yes. Colonel Crompton, the commanding officer, came forward with his proposal from his corps, and they were very good indeed. He took three traction engines, one for each of his sub-sections, and one in reserve, and each carried a dynamo and had a projector and cable car, and they could run a light half-a-mile from their engine. That was a feature of his proposal. He brought it in directly after Magersfontein. He said how valuable it would be to have the engine in security and half a mile off have a searchlight working. They took out also a number of arc lights. As a matter of fact, I believe they were never actually employed in the manner for which he had provided them, that is to say, as a searchlight in the fighting line, because the occasion did not afterwards occur; but they were extremely useful in providing lights for working parties on bridges at night; they turned to and made some bridges. Sir Richard Harrison alluded also to the formation of a Steam Road Transport Company.

2094. Yes; what have you to say about it?—That came about in this way. Colonel Templer, I think, originated the idea of sending traction engines out. Of course, transport is a Quartermaster-General's service, and not an Engineer's service. The difficulty was to find the engine drivers, so Lord Wolseley asked the Engineers to do that. Accordingly I picked out about 100 engine-drivers by taking a few from here and there; submarine miners, a few from one station and a few from another—anybody who understood engines, and some men from the auxiliary forces; and thus we put together this company without any loss of efficiency in the different places from which we had drawn them. It is a valuable asset being able to deal with the whole Corps from a central place like that, to meet a sudden demand, to take an Engineer from here and another one from there and then train them in their special work, and, as

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quickly as possible, replace them with other men who have been trained at Chatham.

2095. And that is the organization of the Royal Engineers?—Yes. We found it very valuable to be able to interchange. The balloon sections were sent out complete; we had to make fresh sections; they were sent out complete with tubes sufficient to carry the number of fills per balloon that were allowed, and with a factory behind them to make gas so as to fill up these; and I fancy they were quite efficient. In fact, I may say that there was never any difficulty made whatever about adding engineers to the Corps directly I put the case forward to the Adjutant-General and the Commander-in-Chief. The units detailed in paragraph 10 of the Memorandum (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 201) which I have put in were, I believe, all authorised on one demand of mine. I put it forward and it was all authorised. Lord Lansdowne saw me about it himself, and he approved the formation of all this large number to replace what had gone out in order that we might be stronger at home than we had been left.

2096. At what date was that?—I should think it would be about January, 1900; it might have been a little before.

2097. From its position in this Memorandum it would probably be about that date if it comes in order?—It might have been before.

2098. That addition was then sanctioned?—Yes, at once, and the stores for all these extra units had to be provided by the Director-General of Ordnance; he had to find them, and he found them; it was all done. So far as regards everything I had to do with in regard to putting forward the necessities of the Engineers for this war through the Adjutant-General and the Commander-in-Chief, and up to the Secretary of State, there has been no difficulty; everything asked for has been granted without any trouble whatsoever.

2099. And are those additional units still in existence?—Yes.

2100. Was that made upon requisition?—Yes. My own personal view is that the whole of these are necessary for this country, and should remain even if you reduce them in strength, so as to leave only a *cadre*, because it takes time to train these Engineers in their duties. They are only a very small force when you add it up. For instance, the allotment of Engineers to a division of an Army Corps is one Field Company, a strength of about 200 men, including drivers. A division of an Army Corps is roughly speaking 10,000 men, so that you have about 150 sappers for the engineer work of 10,000 men; it is a very small allowance. Some people have the idea that in a war, the Engineers should do all the entrenching for the Infantry. It is absolutely impossible, it is not intended. The Infantry entrench themselves. As you can imagine, 150 sappers amongst 10,000 men can do nothing of that kind. The duty of the Engineer on these occasions is to supplement himself by indenting on the country in such a way as he can, for which he has very ample authorities. With all that knowledge of the aid that we can get from the Auxiliary Forces, from the Volunteers, and Militia, and from any other system, I still do think it would be very wise and would be a very reproductive expenditure to keep up the force of Engineers that we at present have got.

2101. Can you say what the total number of Engineers is at present?—In the Army Estimates for this year, exclusive of India, there are 708 officers and 9,430 men; but that does not include some of the additional companies which were raised for this War, and which have been ear-marked as being for the War only, and therefore I presume the Secretary of State in his necessities will consider about striking those out. The units so omitted are one Pontoon troop, one Field company, four Fortress companies, three Field troops, one Balloon section, and two Searchlight units.

2102. Making the number of men, what?—I cannot quite give you that. I could work it out.

2103. Without those men, there are something over 10,000 men and officers in the Army Estimates?—Yes.

2104. And you sent to South Africa, I see in your paper, page 8 of your summary, 6,944 Regular (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 204)?—Yes, those figures are correct.

2105. Showing that a very large proportion of Engineers were sent to South Africa?—Yes, that includes the drafts to make up waste, the reserves, and so on.

2106. The largest monthly total was about 4,500, I see?—The largest monthly strength kept up. We had one higher I thought, than that. No, I was thinking of the general total, including Militia and Volunteers.

2107. You have spoken of Militia and Volunteers, were they good services too?—Sir Elliott Wood can speak better to that; but, judging from the reports, they have been exceedingly useful in supplementing the Regulars.

2108. And you had no difficulty with regard to their equipment?—Oh, no. As regards the telegraph operators, we were gradually coming to an end (that is on page 4 of my Report) (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 202). We had to go to the Telephone Company. We have an admirable system, you see, which I believe is better (so I am informed) than the system of any other country in regard to the Telegraph Service of the Army. We work in with the Post Office, who keep on passing their operators to the Telegraph Reserve direct. Simply for the practice of our own men in line work, the Engineers have had handed over to them the whole of the Telegraph Service south of the Thames for maintenance. That has been so for thirty years, so that the men are kept in full practice, and the operators themselves, when we form up for war, are drawn from the Post Office, from the men actually in the full blast of practice. I have been told by War Correspondents that our Telegraph Service in the field beats that of other nations; for instance, for rapidity one of them told me it beats them altogether, and he said that is the reason why. He said in other cases if a man has belonged to the Telegraph Service, when he goes to the Reserve, he does not necessarily keep up his employment; he is called up after two years or so for a war, and his hand has lost its cunning. It really is a very admirable system. It suffices, and will suffice for this country's wants in the Telegraph Service in the field through all time. And my notion about the railway organisation of the future is that we should look to an extension in that direction. We have now Railway Reservists appointed, who belong to the commercial railway companies of the United Kingdom—a small number here and there. They are recommended, and without any further ado they are put on the books as Reservists. They continue in their employment, and they get their 6d. a day; and we indented on them, we sent them all out, and my idea will be for the future to ask these railway companies to go higher, and to allow higher officials to have their names put down—station masters, traffic managers, and all these people—so that we could call upon them from the full blast of practice for any war that we might have to undertake. If it were a European war we should want their experience at once, and very largely, and they would be men in the full blast of practice at this very work.

2109. You think it would be a practicable organisation?—I have put it forward; it is now, no doubt, being considered. I am a retired officer now, and I have nothing to do with these things, but my heart is keen upon it.

2110. While you were in office you put this forward?—Yes.

2111. At what date?—In connection with Sir Percy Girouard's Report.

2112. So that no decision has been come to upon it?—I cannot tell you what has passed since. Probably all these questions are coming up.

2113. I think the only other matter you have not mentioned is the Survey sections. I see you sent out some Survey sections in 1900?—Yes, that is like the rest. "The Director-General of the Ordnance Survey is responsible for keeping three Survey sections trained and available for carrying out topographic and other service." That has been an arrangement in force for many years. He keeps them in practice by surveying such parts as he thinks best, and we have had to send out five sections; we had to keep up three, but we had to send five. In administering the *personnel* of the Engineers, of course, we have had to indent everywhere. From the Ordnance Survey I took quite half their officers and they had to get along as they best could. Their hands are kept in during peace for the work they

will be required for in war. And it has been the same throughout; all the adjutants of Volunteers were taken away.

2114. Then your first call is on the Ordnance Survey if you want a Survey section in connection with war?—Yes, essentially. Each has an officer (sometimes it is two officers). The Director-General of the Ordnance Survey, of course, had his own difficulty in carrying on his work that he would have to settle with his own Department.

2115. (*To Sir Elliott Wood.*) Had you any civilian engineers serving in the field?—Yes, we had one or two who joined us out there. There was one officer who threw up a very important appointment in the Great Eastern Railway Company, Mr. Lyell, who eventually got a commission as local lieutenant, and was most useful. He is about the best instance I might give, and there were one or two who came later on in the War. That is quite a special matter; there is no organisation for that. It is only quite accidental. A gentleman comes out and he hopes to get employment, and we see whether he is useful, and if he proves useful we get him appointed, as we did get one or two appointed local lieutenants.

2116. (*To Major-General Salmond.*) I was rather referring to providing the *personnel*. You have not to go to the Civil Engineers; you provide everything from the military side?—Yes, these were for the units. They are all soldiers. A civilian engineer, if he wanted to come, would get himself appointed to a Volunteer unit, and work himself up in that way.

2117. But, I suppose, with the small force you had you might have been short of men and obliged to call upon civilians besides, but you had not to do so?—That would be local. The Commanding Royal Engineer has very large powers in any war; his powers are practically unlimited.

2118. Have you anything else to add on your branch of the matter?—I should like to emphasise what I have already said that the mobility of the Army in the field is intimately bound up with the efficiency of the Telegraph, the Railway, the Pontoon service, and the Bridging service, and it would pay this country well to keep those things in a good state of efficiency.

2119. (*Viscount Esher.*) Do you agree with what Sir Richard Harrison said as to Sir Percy Girouard's Memorandum? On the whole, do you agree with the principle of his proposal for a Railway Department of the Army?—I think it is a pity to overload us in peace with a large railway service. I think that with a small nucleus (we have three railway companies), the provisions of that book that I have handed in for the working of railways in foreign countries in war are sufficient. This was found good enough for South Africa, which has been a very large business, and I do not myself think that it is necessary to make a large peace railway organisation. I would look more, as I have said, to drawing in, in some way, aid from the commercial railway companies of the United Kingdom.

2120. You say his idea is rather to create a specialist Department, is not that so?—Yes.

2121. He says "it would be advisable that Royal Engineer officers once appointed to railways should continue as far as practicable on railway employment during their service." That rather tends, does it not, to the creation of a specialist reserve?—Yes. I think myself, in fact I am convinced, that to specialise the Engineers is wrong; it is to sacrifice your elasticity. What are the Engineers but tradesmen, mechanics; good tradesmen all round? Do not specialise them. Take them when you want them, have a certain number serving the railway companies. If you freeze down a man for ever into a railway company in England the recruiting will slack off; they want to go abroad, they want to do all sorts of things.

2122. Therefore you are not in agreement with him?—I am not in agreement with specialisation, and I am not in agreement with handing over the railways in the Isle of Wight, because the instant that occurred, if anybody lost a parcel, we should have the papers flooded with that literature of which I have seen a good deal, "Those Royal Engineers again!" and we should be very sorry for that. And it would do no good at all. We have in the commercial railway companies men in full blast; tap them a little more for the Reserves, including the highest officers. They will come fast enough.

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2123. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) How long have you left the War Office?—Since the 30th June.

2124. Up to the date when you left, had all the Reports that reached you from the field in connection with your Department been attended to so far as a reorganisation went, or a rearrangement?—Oh, yes.

2125. For instance, Sir Elliott Wood is very strong about some mounted corps of Engineers or some of the Engineers being mounted; has that point been especially attended to?—It was being attended to when I left. They were fully alive to it.

2126. In fact, so far as you saw, they were fully alive to taking advantage of all that has occurred in the field to rearrange or rectify where required?—Yes, certainly; the Mobilisation Branch was full of it; it is only a question of money.

2127. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Has the Deputy Adjutant-General, Royal Engineers, any connection with or control over the Recruiting Department for the Royal Engineers?—No; that all works perfectly correctly through the ordinary recruiting agents.

2128. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I am not quite clear as to the relations of these men that you referred to as being with the railway companies who got their 6d. a day?—It is in this way. There are a certain number (it was 50, I think, it is now more—I think it is 150, but I am not quite sure) who were allowed to receive 6d. a day. The railway companies have a classification of trades told off to them, and the one company nominates 11 or 12 men, an engine-driver, a boiler-maker, a rivetter, a platelayer, a fireman, those sort of men that work there, and they say, "These are men of good character, we recommend them in every way as fit to be posted to the Royal Engineer Reserve." They are medically examined, and they are posted to the Royal Engineer Reserve. The circumstances under which this came about were that Lord Wolseley himself proposed it, and with the help of Colonel Scott, who is now Chief Engineer to the Second Army Corps, and a great authority on railway matters, we worked out an arrangement, and finally considered that, as in the railway companies, these men were themselves in fact trained to discipline, it was unnecessary to take them and make them march about—one, two, right turn, left turn, and all that—that it was unnecessary for their future work. The question of their arms and their efficiency with the rifle was also considered, and it was decided to be unnecessary to train them to the use of the rifle, because in the ordinary course their avocation would not lead them to have to use the rifle, but we said, as a proviso, that as any war must be outside this country, the chances are that it would give sufficient time to train them on board ship by some drill so as to be fairly efficient. So that on the recommendation of the railway companies these men are named, they are recorded as Reservists, and they get their sixpence a day. And that is a very cheap way of doing it.

(*Major-General Salmond withdrew.*)

(*After a short adjournment.*)

2129. (*Chairman.*) (*To Sir Elliott Wood.*) You were Commanding Royal Engineer at Aldershot in 1899 until Sir Redvers Buller's force went out, and then you went out as Chief Engineer?—That is so.

2130. You remained there until the end of the hostilities?—I came back on August 20th; I left the country on that date.

2131. What post do you hold now?—I am Commanding Royal Engineer of the First Army Corps at Aldershot.

2132. You are able to speak to the general work of the Royal Engineers in the field?—Yes.

2133. I think you have had a part in drawing up this Special Report on the Organisation and Equipment of the Engineer Arm in South Africa (Confidential 079/3305)?—Yes; I called for all those Reports, and I weighed and made general observations on all the Reports in that Blue Book.

2134. You have been good enough to prepare a

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*precis** of the evidence you are willing to give, and I will follow the order of it, if that is convenient to you?—Might I preface that by saying that I could not be quite sure upon what points you wanted information.

2135. This Report covers most of the recommendations which you would wish to make?—Almost all; there are one or two of the later phases of the War which came more prominently to notice after the date of that Report.

2136. Which you can state?—For instance, there are searchlight motor-cars, which I added later, but that Report generally covers every recommendation I have to make.

2137. These recommendations are the result of very large experience?—Yes, it is a very large experience.

2138. The first point is about the position of the Royal Engineers on the Divisional Staff of Generals?—Many years ago they were on the Divisional Staff of Generals, and their position then enabled them to know what the General was going to do. They were, or should have been, at his right hand to give him every possible assistance, and to know what was in his mind, so that without troubling him they might go and direct all the labour that is available to carry out works in the field, whether in attack, defence, or in the way of roads, and from his great technical training and experience the Engineer officer might be able to suggest things at times which he cannot suggest if he has no position whatever on the staff. He also carries far more weight with all commanding officers and brigadier-generals if he is on the staff. At present he has no position and carries no weight. If he sees things going wrong he cannot put them right, except by going to the General and seeing if he thinks they are wrong, whereas if he had the weight of the General behind him, knowing what the General would wish, he could there and then suggest to the commanding officers that such and such things should be done, and they would be only too glad if he were in that position to follow his recommendation

2139. You say that was his position formerly?—Yes.

2140. What is his position now?—At the time I am speaking of his position was merely that of what is called Regimental Staff. It is no position as regards the General Staff of the Army, and he is only a regimental staff officer. He could not locate himself near the General necessarily, and as a rule he had to go with a field company, which is just one unit; and I may say that some work certainly that I saw done in the field by regiments and others would have been far better done if they had had from the first proper Engineer direction. Later on Lord Kitchener issued an Order, a circular memorandum, to the effect that he would hold Engineer officers responsible, as well as Generals and Commandants, for the efficiency of the defences. Well, that put the Royal Engineer in a proper position, and at once he said, "I must be consulted; I do not agree with this, that, and the other."

2141. When was the change made from the position on the Staff?—The position was not really changed; the only point that was changed was that it was stated that he would be held responsible; that is to say, not only the General but the Engineer officer.

2142. My question is when was the change made from the Staff to the Regimental Staff?—Some years ago; I cannot quite say how many, but I should think ten years ago probably.

2143. For what reason?—I cannot give you the reason; it is not known to me. I believe I am stating the opinion of a very large number of the Generals who served in South Africa when I say that they considered they ought to have a Commanding Royal Engineer on their staff. I believe that to be the opinion of a very large number of the Generals serving. Since my return I know that there has been a further change, and that instead of having a Commanding Royal Engineer with every division on the regimental staff, they have no Commanding Royal Engineer at all, unless the division is separated from the Army for independent work. How will they then get a staff? Where is the Commanding Royal Engineer to come from? Where is his brigade-major or staff officer, or whatever they like to call him, and his clerks and everything else? There is no provision made for such a case.

2144. Are you speaking of the new arrangement?—Yes, quite recently.

2145. As a result of the War?—Since the War; although I know of course that the Generals I speak of cannot have been consulted.

2146. That is in the face of this experience?—In the face of that Report. I mention only one General's opinion in that Report, General French, because he has personally put it forward in his Report. I know the views of a good number, either by inference or directly, and I think they would be strongly now in favour of a Commanding Royal Engineer being on the staff of these Generals, or at least attached to the staff.

2147. The position which an Engineer officer held at the beginning of the War was one which had been in the Regulations of the Army for a considerable time before?—Yes. May I say that the functions of an Engineer officer commanding Royal Engineers may be very large; he wants to have his mind free to look at what are the possibilities in the country for meeting all sorts of questions: the question of material, what he can get in the country; the question of labour and all that; and under the present idea the whole of that will be thrown upon the officer who commands the unit. That is to say, it will be thrown upon the major commanding a field company with the division, and, as General Salmond pointed out, there is only one field company for 10,000 men, and there is ample work for that officer to do in carrying out the work that is laid upon him without having to think over all the points of the compass how to meet all sorts of questions.

2148. If all that work was thrown on an officer commanding the unit, what would be left for the superior officer of Engineers to do?—The superior officer of Engineers would have to deal, as I say, with the brigadiers and the colonels; there is not nearly enough staff in one company of Engineers to supervise the laying out of important works of defence, and the Commanding Royal Engineer would be the man who would go round.

2149. Yes, if he had the position which you wish assigned to him?—Yes.

2150. I understood you to say that under the proposed organisation most of that work would be thrown on the man commanding the unit?—Who could not do it, and who would not have the position; he has no position, and he cannot go to the colonel and say, "I wish you would do this," and, in fact, show him what to do. The point is this, that the Commanding Royal Engineer, if he is on the General Staff, can never go beyond what he feels his General has authorised, or what his General has generally indicated to him as the lines upon which he wants to work, and then, with his experience and training, he is able to carry out his General's views without a lot of detailed instructions. In forming contracts in the country, directly we come to any halt there are large works to be done of all sorts as a rule, and then the Commanding Royal Engineer, such as a lieutenant-colonel, comes in; he has been doing the same sort of work upon barracks in England, and he sees at once how to deal with the situation. He can form contracts at once, and knows what to pay for this, that, and the other, and is in a position at once to help the troops to be comfortable or to be in a sanitary state directly they come to a camp or a big town.

2151. Did the forming of contracts fall under you?—Abroad, entirely; we called for tenders from any number of men whom we liked to call them from. All that work goes on, and it is done quickly in the field; there is no intervention of any Contract Department out there when you are actually in the field, and that is why the Commanding Royal Engineer with his previous training is so valuable.

2152. As Chief Engineer of the force, did all contracts come before you?—Not all, because in Cape Colony the delay would have been so great; but I was responsible for all the expenditure generally, and I had monthly returns made to me of everything that was expended. I got all big contracts referred to me.

2153. I do not want to misunderstand you, but were the contracts the whole contracts of the force in all branches?—Only for Royal Engineers, materials or work, and, of course, as to what was given in evidence

* The *précis* will be found on page 515 of this volume.

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this morning, the stores sent out from England did not in any way cover the stores that were used. For instance, we found by purchasing locally we could get things in very much shorter time when they were wanted, and sometimes cheaper on the spot.

2154. Special supplies like wood?—Timber chiefly and then corrugated iron and barbed wire, which you must have seen was used to an enormous extent. By watching the markets and letting the people know what our requirements were likely to be we were able really to deal with it much more satisfactorily than by the orders we sent home to England.

2155. Did you buy a large amount of barbed wire, for instance, in South Africa?—Yes.

2156. Where are the records of those purchases?—All in our books, and they have all been inspected. War Office Accountants were sent out, and they had the fullest opportunity of inspecting all our books. Two distinct inspections were made, and they found absolutely nothing that they could cavil at, and on the point which I have mentioned later about stores the only thing they could suggest was to order more things, possibly, from England. We did order a lot of things from England, but the delay in getting them generally was terrible. We ordered them from England and also locally.

2157. Those books are still in South Africa?—Yes, each Commanding Royal Engineer keeps his book; we kept them practically on the same system as we do in England with all the contractors' bills, and I might emphasise one point, that the Commanding Royal Engineer in Natal, Colonel Rawson, said it would have been impossible to have worked as the Army did in engineer matters with the civil people in Natal, if they had not been trained in public works by ex-Royal Engineers. The system in the Public Works Department of Natal was excellent, which was practically the outcome of one of our men going into that Department, and we were accordingly able to carry out, even under the extreme pressure of war, engineer works and supplies in the most easy way—easy to a degree.

2158. But the records are all still in South Africa?—All still in South Africa.

2159. You mentioned inspectors having come out to inspect; did they make any reports?—Yes, there was a War Office Inspector who came out, Mr. Fleetwood Wilson as he then was; he was the first, and he left his subordinate out behind him, and he was in the country some time, and had free access to all our books.

2160. All those Reports, I suppose, would be in the War Office here, and we could get them?—Yes. Then the Financial Adviser, Colonel Armstrong, also went into the matter as closely as he could, and there again there was no point. When it came to questions being asked us why we did not buy certain things from England we could prove that we could get them cheaper on the spot, and at all events, if we could not get them cheaper on the spot, in some cases we could get them much more quickly, and the question of time was all-important. It was no use getting a thing two months hence when we wanted it to-day. I think I should like to mention one thing as a typical case of the whole lot; there has been a great deal written about not getting things from foreign countries, and about always employing England, but in war you have to think how you can meet your needs with rapidity, and we could unquestionably get special stores occasionally from all sorts of foreign countries quicker than we could from England. On one or two occasions I authorised its being done direct. The Regulations for engineer services in war do not limit our power to order anything anywhere, but as a matter of fact we were asked questions, and it was directed that it was not convenient to do so in future, and that we ought to order things through the War Office. I wanted to start motor-car search-lights, a subject which has been touched upon here. The electrical engineers came out with traction engines to carry search-lights about the country, but later on it appeared absolutely evident that if we could only have motor-car searchlights, and illuminate the lines of blockhouses, we could see where the Boers were at night, or these motor-car searchlights could accompany the columns, and throw their beams across the lines of columns at night, and prevent the enemy breaking back unseen. Well, I had a most excellent offer for motor-cars, the very things that would have suited us, from a French firm and the prices were good, but it was considered more desirable that the order should go through the War Office, and the War Office did not take this offer, but considered it right to put it out to tender, and get offers in England. They said it would take them six months to supply them, and we never got the motor-cars; but in the meanwhile I, in the country, acting on the orders that I considered I had, started getting together motor-cars, the very things that were taking all this time to get from England. I only mention the fact that although the Regulations support one the pressure is considerable at times in keeping one to dealing through the War Office, more than, I think, is wise in the field, where time is so important. The War Office has to go through the contracts, and the Director of Contracts steps in; there are all the questions of transport; the Ordnance Department wait for a convenient ship, and part goes in one ship and part in another, making up in that way. Perhaps I have said as much as I should under that head.

2161. You did buy motor-cars in the country, then?—A few, but then we had to convert them in our own shops; we had to make them suitable for our purposes. They were just ready when the War ended, and they would have gone into the field, whereas the others from England would not have been ready for months.

2162. When would the French cars have been out?—They would have been out about two months earlier than we got the local ones ready, because they would have been already made. I mention that only as a type of what has occurred occasionally.

2163. That is not the only instance you could mention?—No; there are special telegraph stores that we had to purchase abroad. We might often go to America with advantage in time of great stress where we want a thing in a hurry, and I do not think there ought to be pressure put upon the General—I say the Commanding Royal Engineer, but it really is the General—in the field to confine him in his purchases, only subject to this that he must give a good account of what he does, and his books must show what he has bought, and, if it is a high price, why he gave it—because he could not spare the time to wait for a lower-priced article.

2164. I suppose it is, as you say, according to the Regulations, within the discretion of the General, if he chooses to take the responsibility?—It is; but when you get a War Office letter pointing out that it is desirable that this or that should be ordered through the War Office, the General naturally would be disposed to give a good deal of weight to that, and it requires a good stiff back for the Commanding Royal Engineer to say under certain circumstances, "I will still order from abroad and take the consequences."

2165. Is that all you wish to say about the position of the Royal Engineer?—Yes.

2166. The second point is the point of carrying the sappers on horse-back?—I was very sorry when General Salmond mentioned three units, three field troops, as being ear-marked for being suppressed. If there was one thing more important than another in that way it was the importance of having mounted sappers. We started what were called field troops for various columns; all the Mounted Infantry cried out for a field troop, and we had to organise it on the spot; we had to take men from the different field companies, denuding them of their numbers and of their best men very often, and we made up these field troops, some of whom, of course, could not ride very well, but they were all very valuable. As I have mentioned in connection with that point, it is impossible to expect a man to march on his legs and to work at a drift, or whatever it may be, and then make a forced march to get to the head of the column again on his own legs, and work again at another place. He cannot do it. Then they go into camp at the end, probably behind, or the bulk of them behind, the advanced troops, and all the water supply has to be looked after, and the sappers ought to be the first people there; but they cannot be there unless they are carried. So far was the principle of carrying men adhered to that the natives who were employed working to help the sappers in the drifts and on the roads, and who generally are very lightly clad and with no arms, were mounted; they got old crocks of the country that perhaps were not much use to other people, and they were put on

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them, and nearly all the columns had these mounted natives with the sappers.

2167. According to the Establishment given in this statement (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 200), in a Pontoon Troop, for instance, there are 40 mounted and 99 dismounted men for the Establishment in South Africa?—A Pontoon Troop generally would be confined to pontoon work; the men I am speaking of are the Field Companies that do the general work. Each division has a Field Company, whereas a whole Army Corps has only one Pontoon Troop.

2168. In a Field Company, I see, there were only 33 mounted out of 174?—Quite so; as a matter of fact, as I say, we took some of those sappers and we put them on horses, and formed other units called Field Troops from them. The Australians formed a Field Troop, and we called them Australian Mounted Pioneers; it was so necessary that we formed this troop for them.

2169. Are all in the Field Troops mounted?—Yes, practically.

2170. And you wish more men put in the same position as a Field Troop?—Exactly. I might say, perhaps it is worth mentioning, that one of the Attachés, or more than one, commented to me very much upon being surprised to see the sappers marching, working at the drifts, and then marching on. He commented on the hard strain it must be upon them when we were on the advance from Bloemfontein chiefly and afterwards.

2171. What would happen in the case of peace?—Those men in peace would be employed. I know the financial difficulties of getting what you want, and you must get what you can; and I would say, do not have any extra horses in peace, but have it recognised that in war they are to be mounted, and that a certain proportion of men in each Field Company are to draw horses in war. Then in peace we would look after the training of a certain proportion of the sappers, so that they could sit on a horse when war broke out. I would simply have it in the War Establishments that you are to have extra horses for carrying sappers in war, perhaps 40 to 50 horses extra, and I am sure it would pay over and over again.

2172. And you would make a certain amount of riding part of the training of the sapper?—Yes; I would make very elementary riding a part of the training of some of the sappers, not necessarily all.

2173. Then I think the next point you wished to speak to was the Pontoon Establishment?—Yes. Of course, it was an enormous demand to make, the amount of bridging that was required in that country, because we were separated in such an enormous district. Natal wanted a great many pontoons, and they got them. We did excellently on the whole. I do not think we wanted more than we had. but we might have had great trouble at the crossing of the Orange River, just below Norval's Pont, if we had not made provision with barrel piers, in case the old pontoons that were sent out failed, because we never tried them. We knew they were very old, and we left them to the last to be used. We used the best material first. These pontoons came from Chatham and Aldershot, and had been used for years as instructional pontoons, and when they were put into the river—it is a very fine bridge, the biggest bridge we have built since the Peninsular War, 266 yards, and it was made in a night practically under great difficulties—and before the bridge was used these old pontoons which were put in last began to sink, and we replaced them with barrel piers, and the Army crossed—or, rather, a division crossed—without any delay, because we were in advance of our time. I mention that to show the importance of having behind large reserves of pontoons. It is an admirable pattern.

2174. Would it not have been possible to have tested these old pontoons before they were sent out?—Well, hardly, perhaps; when they were sent out they were probably sufficient for standing in the water for some little time, but they had been out some time in extreme heat, lying at De Aar, in the hottest place you can imagine in South Africa, with dust and sun. A certain number of them did fail; but, on the whole, every need of the Army in the Field was met, and it was a very great need.

2175. As a result would you wish to have an increase on the Pontoon Reserve?—Yes, and some more carried with the unit. Colonel Irving has written very fully in that Report, and I consider that the Pontoon unit is too small in *personnel*, and there is too little bridging. I think it ought to carry certainly thirty pontoons instead of 16, because the 16 will only make a very short, what we call heavy bridge, which takes heavy guns. We have heavy guns now; we must deal with the 4·7 guns, or guns of a similar weight, and we know that we shall have such operations in the future, so that 55 yards of heavy bridging is altogether too little. If we carried 30 pontoons instead of 16 we should nearly double that length of bridging.

2176. And you would have nearly to double the *personnel*, would you not?—Not quite double it, but considerably increase it. They are very useful men; they are just as useful as the ordinary Field Company sapper in all entrenching work, they are powerful men, and bigger than the average men. They are not as good tradesmen, but in the field they are most useful for ordinary engineer work apart from the artisan work, which of course comes in.

2177. Was Norval's Pont the only case in which you had that particular difficulty?—Yes, the only case. We had to select the best for the more mobile part, and on Lord Methuen's advance we gave him good ones. On Lord Roberts' advance we had good pontoons, only they had to be left behind as there was no transport, and we were in great difficulties at Modder River after this owing to having no pontoons when the river rose. We got one or two up later with great difficulty.

2178. Where was that?—At Paardeberg; the need of the pontoons was felt very greatly there. We had them, but we could not bring them up. We got one or two later.

2179. What have you to say about telegraphs?—Of course that is a very large and technical subject, but I think it is going to be dealt with. There are improvements of the cable cart, and more than that we want more *personnel* and material there. What is called the cable cart section as an extra for the combined section is necessary, but it is all in that Report. As to telegraphs, I agree almost entirely with all that is in the Report.

2180. You want an increase in the *personnel*?—Yes.

2181. But I suppose it is a fine service as it stands?—Very fine, admirable, as it stands.

2182. You agree with what Major-General Salmond said about it?—I agree entirely with it as far as it goes, but we could have done more if we had had more to do with, that is if we had had a bigger *personnel*. If we had had this cable unit, for instance, we could have met needs of the Army which we were not able to meet. Sometimes a General would wish to go rapidly in a certain direction, and to have a cable the whole time. We might not always be able to do it with the present establishment, but it is a very good and efficient branch as it stands, although it might be improved.

2183. I see a question was raised whether it should stand as a separate Departmment of its own or be amalgamated with the railways?—It would be a mistake to put it with the railways, and I think almost everyone except Sir Percy Girouard would probably agree with that, that it should stand alone; but the point that Sir Percy Girouard made about the working of the telegraphs along with the railways is a very important point, and with that I believe a Committee has been dealing, namely, that the railway should have free use and maintenance of a portion of the telegraph lines right along their railways. I think that is now being made quite right, at least it has been taken up.

2184. You mean that they should have the use of the telegraphs for their own purposes?—Entirely, because without joint agreement between him and the Director of Telegraphs, or the Chief of the Staff overruling all objections, the telegraph people cannot interfere with those lines.

2185. That should be capable of adjustment?—It is, I believe, being adjusted now; we did adjust it out there with a little trouble.

2186. Then as to railways?—As regards railways, of course it is a very special thing; the report of Colonel Girouard I generally think a very valuable one, and I

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agree with a very great deal of it, but I do not think that it is desirable to have such a big staff as he proposes at headquarters here, because I think a very much smaller staff would suffice, as I think I state in my Report, very much on the lines of the Inspector of Submarine Mining Defences.

2187. What is that?—He has one staff officer at the War Office, who works it all out and to whom the Inspector-General of Fortifications refers. If we had a similar officer for Railways it would be his business to get into communication with all the different Railways for Home Defence we might say, and to work it all out as a sort of intelligence what should be done, and also thresh out in some detail, perhaps, what would be necessary for different countries where we might want to fight. That, no doubt, would be done in connection with the Intelligence branch of the Army. I heard something of General Salmond's evidence, and I quite agree with what he says about trying to get station-masters and traffic managers and all others to put their names down to serve in time of war. Our great need is not construction; all the Field Companies and all the Fortress Companies of Engineers can do construction as far as railway bridges and embankments go. As to plate-laying, that is a somewhat different affair, but as far as bridging goes, making deviations or repairing bridges, the ordinary engineers and field companies are practically just as competent to do it, or nearly so, as the railway companies. In traffic management we are very deficient as to the training you get on a civil line under traffic managers, and there I think there is a great deal to be said for Colonel Girouard's idea of taking over a small railway, if possible, and working it. As the telegraphs do—the telegraphs in the South of London—so we, in a similar way, would get training in the marshalling and shunting of trains, which is so important.

2188. Is there not this difference, that the Telegraph Department have the training as part of the general system of the Post Office?—That is so; there would be difficulties in the way, I know, of what I am proposing.

2189. It would be a very difficult thing to take over a short line, for instance in the Isle of Wight, and put it entirely in the hands of a separate staff; and even if that were done, would not the men be likely not to gain so much experience as if they were a part of some larger system?—That is possible, and so long as I got the training, I would rather spread them about if I could on the bigger lines. I would much sooner do that if the railway companies would take them on.

2190. General Salmond, I think, threw out this suggestion, that if possible, you should recruit your men from the great companies under arrangements with them; would not that give them a larger experience?—Yes, but you would want two or three units at once, ready to go out.

2191. Your railway companies?—Yes, you must have them, and I do think there is a great deal in putting them on a small line and letting them work it. We do something of the same sort, although it gives no experience of civil traffic, at Chatham, where we work a little line entirely by the Engineers.

2192. Is not that a narrow gauge line?—I forget the gauge, but it is a larger gauge than 2½ft.; I have no record of it, but I think it is more than that. If you had a small line joining on to another line there, you would have all the interchange of traffic.

2193. I think it is a 2ft. 6in. gauge; it is stated so in this Paper?—As I say, I am sure it does not give the training you want, nor does Woolwich. They have a company at Woolwich, but that is all Arsenal work.

2194. That is a 2ft. 6in. gauge?—Yes, and it is not the training that is necessary.

2195. A light line of that description would be useful where there was not a railway?—Quite.

2196. We heard from Sir Richard Harrison that there was a difficulty in South Africa, from there not being extra locomotives in stock; was not that so?—That was so. There was a great loss of locomotives. The number of locomotives we began to work upon was too few, and they were in a very bad state, and badly wanted overhauling, as they had been worked beyond their time. Every engine wants to go into the shops to be thoroughly cleaned and overhauled, and as this could not be done, they deteriorated a great deal. The strain in war was very much greater than the civil requirements had been before; and then we continually lost engines and rolling-stock by the Boers blowing up the line, apart from the fact that they destroyed a very large number at one time down at Komati-Poort.

2197. I see it is stated in this Return, on page 8 (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 211), that there were orders placed before June 5th, 1900, for 25 goods engines, and six tank locomotives?—Yes.

2198. Do you know when you received those locomotives?—I could not say when because practically the working of the railways was under the Director of Railways, who was Sir Percy Girouard. I would not know of those orders necessarily, and they had no necessity to apply to me beforehand, because he dealt straight with the Commander-in-Chief and with the Chief of the Staff. Occasionally I made suggestions to him, or now and then he might consult me, but very rarely, because he was a competent officer put to that job alone.

2199. But you would know if any number of locomotives came out, and the pressure on the railways was relieved, would you not?—Yes, I know when we got more locomotives the pressure was relieved in a way, but the pressure increased in other ways because we wanted to get more things up then.

2200. What date are you speaking of now?—The last year.

2201. 1901?—Yes, the pressure was always enormous, and we could never get up what we wanted.

2202. So that, until then, there was distinctly a deficiency in the locomotive stocks?—Distinctly, and there always has been a deficiency, I take it.

2203. Have you considered at all how that disadvantage of not having locomotives in stock could be met?—I do not think it would ever pay us to keep a supply in stock of locomotives. It would be in the first place a very large investment, not only for the locomotives, but for the shedding or housing of them and for the staff to overhaul them, and we should be having an obsolete pattern, because we do not go to war every year, and as years went by we should find that we were saddled with a lot of locomotives which were not of the best type, because they are always changing their locomotives as improvements come in.

2204. I quite agree, but would it not be possible in any way to rely on the great reserve of locomotive power that there is in the country, by some arrangement beforehand?—And I think that in all ordinary wars there would be no difficulty at all, if we were not at war in a country where the whole system was on a special gauge, 3ft. 6in.

2205. But you must always look forward to the possibility that the enemy would either remove or destroy the rolling stock?—Then in other countries we should find any number of makers who had engines on hand which they could supply to that particular line.

2206. If you could get them?—We should get them; whenever you have money you can always get them. There was no difficulty in getting anything you wanted in South Africa, and money will fetch what you want.

2207. There was no restriction of money in this case?—But the number of engines was restricted. The number of engines required for those lines was not so great as the number of engines on European lines.

2208. Surely you would wish if possible to have your reserve of locomotives up to a certain point available at the particular moment you wanted them, just like other reserves?—Yes, I should like it, but the practical point comes in, that if I had had a large reserve of 4ft. 8in., or 5ft., they would be no use to me in South Africa, and the same way in India, or where you have a metre gauge in parts.

2209. I am only putting it to you whether you have ever considered that it may not be possible by some arrangement with the railway companies, to have access to the great reserve of locomotive power that there is in the country, independent of the Govern

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ment ?—That would come rather to what I was saying that the Director of Railways would go straight to those firms and buy straight away.

2210. I am not speaking of manufacturing firms but of railway companies, the stock in use. You have not considered that point ?—No, I have not. I think money would fetch them at once. A railway company, if they could without dislocating their own traffic, would supply the locomotives, if you gave the price.

2211. Is there anything else on the railways you wish to say ?—No, I think that is all on the railways.

2212. Then steam road transport ?—That of course may come forward possibly under another branch of the service, because it has ceased to be particularly an Engineer service, but I am convinced that it is a most valuable one. Where it is used intelligently, there is no question about its economy, and more than that, the security it has against attack is very much greater than your great, long strung-out convoys. If you shoot one animal there is confusion, and the length of the convoy is so very much greater, and besides, this convoy, the steam road transport, will travel much faster as a rule.

2213. They are dependent, however, on fuel and water ?—Yes ; and I in my early reports stated those limits very clearly, but in practice I found we went farther from our bases than I ever expected we should. They were running distances of 40 and 50 and more miles from the bases, and after the first—when they got to understand more what steam road transport could do and what it could not do—they ran with great regularity. We never lost one by an attack of the enemy. It is curious that they did not seem to like to attack these. We could put steel plates upon them ; it is a very easy thing to make them bullet-proof, and on your engine you can have your bullet-proof steel plates, and on your trucks. We did that to some extent ; we had armoured trucks with the convoys, part of the engine armoured, and we had armoured trucks sent out from England, so that the men in the trucks would be safe from rifle fire. As compared with ox-transport, the economical result was something very great, because if you are not running you are not using any coal, whereas you must feed your animals whether they work or whether they do not work. That is something in its favour.

2214. You were always able to make arrangements for both fuel and water ?—The principle is that you must send an officer who understands steam road transport over the road first—if it is not an English road, if it is one of the veldt roads—in order to see whether they can cross the drifts, whether the sand is too deep, and so on. Then, if there is no coal to be got at the station, you take out one of your trucks full of coal. The engine will take its ordinary amount of coal, and then, if it is a long run, you will carry a truck full of coal, which enables you to run very much farther ; and as regards water, you simply stop to get it every 15 miles, or you might take again a certain number of tanks of water on a truck, and yet very often beat any other transport in the amount you can deliver, although you have to carry water and fuel some distance.

2215. You could still carry more supplies ?—Yes.

2216. They were used for guns too, were they not ?—Yes, we tried them for guns, and there is no question that the Artillery consider they will be very useful indeed in bringing big guns up. We took them up the most extraordinary places, the 6-in. gun up gradients of 1 in 6. You never get a gradient of 1 in 6 on any road in Great Britain—and not a very straight road either—so that their power is very great.

2217. As to the motor-car search lights, you have told us about that ?—That is a new thing I have touched upon, and I have put that forward in a special report now, that it was a new unit, or, at least, a new equipment which we should certainly go in for, because they can travel (we tried them over the veldt) across fields, and they are very compact; you can use them for both purposes if need be. You need not always run with your searchlight, but I am quite sure that the searchlight would be very valuable in that way if you could run it 100 miles in a few hours and then collect a number in one spot.

2218. Does the car carry a dynamo ?—There is a trailer behind ; either the car carries the dynamo or it is carried in the trailer.

2219. So that there is no difficulty about the motor power ?—None ; it will go across ordinary veldt country.

2220. Could the motor not be applied to transport also ?—It could be, but only for very light loads, something under a ton probably. I think the motor trolleys would be very useful no doubt. The motor-car could be used in that way, but for very light loads, and it could be used, of course, for the General officer to move about in, which is very useful, and also for any other officer on inspections.

2221. Then "Wireless Telegraphy" ?—I think that is, or ought to be, a most valuable thing. I might say that when we got to Cape Town in November we captured Kruger's equipment, which was a better equipment than ours, of wireless telegraphy in the field. The Marconi men we had out with us acknowledged that it was a better one—it was an admirable equipment, but in spite of that, and although I happened to be in command between Orange River Station and Modder River, and I pushed it to the best of my ability, they could make nothing of it. The signals were quite unreliable for any distance at all, and the men sent out by the firm themselves acknowledged that they failed ; they could not work it in the country. I think it very valuable, however, and I might say that how valuable it would have been is clear to everybody ; there were our columns marching at long intervals from one another, and with wireless telegraphy all day long each man could have told the other where he was, and where he was going to, and everything could have been settled from end to end by wireless telegraphy.

2222. Can you account for its not working ?—Well, I think it might be one of two reasons, I do not know which, but I may say it would be either the altitude (of course, it is high plateau) or the extreme dryness of the air ; or it may have been the amount of iron ore in the hills there, but it would require a little more scientific knowledge than mine to say what it was that caused it, because the representatives of the inventor themselves could not tell. They expected it to succeed, but it failed. Of course, near the sea and across the sea it is perfect.

2223. And the apparatus, as you say, was excellent ?—The apparatus was the best then known for field wireless telegraphy.

2224. So that it is a matter which wants further experiment ?—That is so.

2225. You have told us about the purchase of stores, and you do not want to say anything more about that ; you sum it up by saying that you hope effect may be given to the recommendations in this special report ?—Yes. I may say, generally, that the organisation and equipment, and the system by which we got stores, generally worked uncommonly well, as a general summary of everything, but there are points in which improvement clearly could be made.

2226. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Referring to those motor-cars for which you had French tenders, I think you said the War Office wanted six months to get theirs ready ?—Yes.

2227. I do not think you mentioned the exact time for the French tenders ; you said it would have been two months earlier than you got them locally ?—They would have put them on board either at Southampton or Liverpool on my telegraphic order ; they were ready.

2228. So that you would have gained practically six months by that as compared with the War Office ?—Yes, we should. No doubt the War Office, who have got a committee specially looking into the question, desired to get something that would meet the latest ideas, better than these, but those that we were prepared to take would have done for us, and were better than what we actually found on the spot.

2229. And time was of more importance than the latest improvements ?—Yes, and it generally is of importance.

2230. (*Sir John Edge.*) Did you inform the War Office that you could have got them from the French very much sooner ?—That is a very pertinent question ; we did afterwards, and we mentioned the firm later ; indeed, by mistake, the firm thought they had got the

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order, and so they communicated with the War Office. The War Office, therefore, were aware that this firm had the motor-cars. By the time possibly that the War Office knew that the firm had been in communication with us they were somewhat committed to their own, but I am not prepared to say. The fact remains, that if the General had not felt it necessary that we should apply through the War Office we should have ordered those straight away, and they would have been put on board on receipt of our telegraphic order.

2231. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie*). And as a matter of fact the order went to English firms ?—Yes, I suppose, I cannot say, through the Director of Contracts.

2232. I think you did not take part in the Egyptian campaign ?—No; not the later ones.

2233. But you remember the fact that the Sirdar had to get his Atbara bridge from America ?—Yes.

2234. At the time of this motor-car question in South Africa was Field-Marshal Roberts in command or General Kitchener ?—Lord Kitchener.

2235. So that there would not be any objection probably on Lord Kitchener's part to buy them from foreign firms ?—No. I cannot say whether that point would weigh very much with him or not, but he wished me at that time to carry out the views that the War Office had stated as far as possible.

2236. But he had himself ordered the Atbara bridge from an American firm ?—Yes.

2237. Going back to another part of your evidence as regards the time that the change took place in the position of Commanding Royal Engineers, which was a number of years ago, you were asked the reason for that change. Can you suggest what the reasons may have been for reducing the position of the Engineers in the field ?—The reason in my mind is one which I do not know that I should be quite justified in mentioning; I should have said possibly the general views of some officer who carried great weight. At the time of the Egyptian Campaign in 1882 the Commanding Royal Engineers were on the General Staff of Divisions.

2238. But you cannot think of any sound practical reason that could be advanced for the change ?—No. They might have said that the officer Commanding Royal Artillery should equally be on the General Staff, but his position is rather different; he commands a Brigade Division of Artillery, and he has nothing to do with all those questions, and has only to do with his own department, whereas the Engineer officer has to do with every branch of the Army. He has to work with every other branch in the field in order to get the best development of the Engineer work in the field, not necessarily done by the Engineers, but by the Infantry under the direction of the Engineers where it is necessary, and also in connection with labour, as I have said before, trying to use the civil labour of the country. In the Cape Colony the Commanding Royal Engineer used largely the contractors for putting up a lot of the works along the railway lines where it is comparatively safe, and in Natal similarly the Public Works Department worked through the Commanding Royal Engineer; and if those officers had not existed I think that we should have missed a very great deal of power.

2239. I think you said that practically the Commanding Royal Engineer got his old position again during the War by the responsibility being thrown upon him; is that now laid down in the Regulations ?—No, the Commanding Royal Engineer of a Division is abolished now practically by the Regulations unless the Division acts independenly, but if you send your army into the field with all the Divisions together, you constantly have to send one Division away, and you have got nobody on the Staff although you would have to have somebody in that case.

2240. And the man you send away somewhere would have no position ?—In that case you might give him the position.

2241. But not by the Regulation ?—No, unless you called him a staff officer.

2242. Take the Army Corps, would he now have the position he used to have ten years ago, or would he have the reduced position to which you have referred ?—I have not seen any change, but I have been on leave lately.

2243. I only ask you whether you know that the responsibility placed on the Engineer officer in the field during the South African War, which, of course, gave him that position irregularly, has been reduced into print by his being put on to the Regulations ?—No, it has not been reduced into print.

2244. You went out with Sir Redvers Buller ?—Yes.

2245. But you did not go to Natal ?—No.

2246. I will pass to another set of questions: you, of course, had under your control Militia Engineers, and Volunteer Engineers ?—Yes.

2247. Can you speak as to the efficiency of Militia Engineers as compared with Royal Engineers ?—They were very useful, but their trade qualifications are not as high as the Royal Engineers, and for the work of the later phases of the War they had not quite enough of the artizan class to do the special high work of the Engineers. Of course, for digging and field works they were excellent, but they had not got enough trade qualifications to work independently of the Royal Engineers as an Engineer unit.

2248. In any big scheme of defence for this country, we could not count on the Militia Engineers as being entirely up to the mark of the Royal Engineers ?—No, certainly not, because the class we get into the Royal Engineers is such a high class, and by the present system of employing them on works at barracks they keep improving in their technical acquirements, and those come in most usefully. It is not digging only.

2249. It might be, of course, just the other way, that the Militia Engineers might be drawn from artizans who, the better part of the year, are engaged in artizan work of considerable importance, and give a certain amount of the year to drill ?—The Militia regiment would not be quite up to the Regulars, certainly; they are very valuable and they came forward in a very fine way, but they are not equal to the Regulars.

2250. What about the Volunteers ?—The Volunteers have, I think, rather a better proportion of artizans amongst them, and they, too, are very useful, some of them just as good as the Regulars. We have to remember that it was a sort of a pick that we had; we did not take a whole regiment of Volunteer Engineers and send them out, but they only found a section of 25 men from a regiment.

2251. That might not give you the best artizans, although it might give you the most adventurous men ?—I cannot say that they showed what the general run of the regiment would be.

2252. It would not be an argument for saying that the general bulk were less skilled as artizans ?—No, but I think they are less skilled.

2253. You say that from your general knowledge ?—Yes, and I do not think the physique is quite as good, because the limit of measurements is not quite as high as in the Regulars. There is no doubt that neither the Militia nor the Volunteers, excellent as they are, are as good as the Regulars.

2254. When you were speaking just now of certain locomotives being bad when you took them over, were you referring to the Cape Government Railway or the Free State Railway ?—The Transvaal chiefly; they were sadly in want of overhauling.

2255. Those belonged to the Netherlands Company ?—Yes, they had been working them very freely, and their shops had not been left quite with their full staff probably. They had had so many men out with the engines, and they had not looked after them properly.

2256. I believe the gauge in South Africa is the same as that in Egypt and the Egyptian Soudan—3ft. 6in. ?—Yes.

2257. Do you know whether any locomotives or rolling stock were obtained from Egypt ?—I could not say; I should doubt very much whether they could spare it, but I do not know. Of course the gradients in South Africa are extraordinarily heavy and the engines they require are very heavy, so that anything like the conditions in the Delta of Egypt are very different to those of working in the Cape.

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2258. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) You stated you were well supplied with stores ?—Yes.

2259. Those are, of course, the stores you use professionally, and so on, but were you well supplied with food as a whole ?—Well, yes, as a whole; of course on the way to Bloemfontein, owing to an important convoy having been destroyed and lost, we were very badly supplied, and that could not be helped. The troops were then on less than half rations of biscuit and groceries.

2260. For some time ?—Yes, and in certain places where transport could not come, in the North-Eastern part of the Transvaal in the rainy season, a column was sometimes cut off by a swollen river and had to live on mealies, as the Boers did.

2261. As a rule, if the Commissariat had a fair chance, you were well supplied ?—Excellently as a rule.

2262. With regard to the Medical Department, as far as you saw, were they efficient, and had they the position which they ought to have occupied when an engagement took place ?—I have a high opinion of the way in which they worked and I saw a great deal of them, especially in the early stages of the War. I think they did all they possibly could with the means at their disposal, and I believe they would have done better at Bloemfontein, for instance, if transport had been available, because there were a number of things that the Medical Department asked us to do for them that we could not do because we could not get the stores up.

2263. Were you consulted when they pitched a camp for a permanency, in the way of throwing up, not entrenchments, but small defences for supporting the position, and so on ?—As a rule, each of the Divisional Generals would make their own arrangements, and I could only be at one spot at a time, but occasionally if I was on the spot I used to go about a good deal, and now and then I was sent down—in fact I used to go about the country and inspect, and if things wanted changing I saw that it was done. Generally speaking, every General with his own Engineer staff would do what was necessary for his own Division.

2264. (*Sir John Jackson.*) You spoke as to the purchase of materials at the theatre of war; do you suggest that a General having the power to order these materials direct, a man like Lord Kitchener, could ever in such a case be influenced by suggestions from the War Office such as you refer to ? If there came an urgent case, surely a man in that position would never hesitate unless he had direct instructions from the War Office not to purchase ?—I am sure they do hesitate sometimes, unless it is a very urgent question. Take the question of motor-cars, it would perhaps not be considered a question of paramount importance, as we had done without them for a long time

2265. But yet in that case—take a General in Lord Kitchener's position—if he came to the view that these motor-cars would be useful, do you suggest that he would hesitate to order them on ?—Well, he did hesitate most distinctly.

2266. Without distinct instructions from the War Office not to order ?—There had been distinct letters asking why certain things were ordered, in the case of ordering from abroad, and stating that it was desirable as far as possible to order things through the War Office. With wood and iron in the same way, but we did not follow that in the case of wood and iron; we sent orders home, but we ordered the bulk of it locally. There was a pressure put upon us, and that was a time when the Commander-in-Chief had a great deal to think of, and there were a great many things to worry him, and no doubt he was glad if he could fall in with the views expressed by the War Office.

2267. In point of fact, such pressure as you refer to would influence him even in cases of urgency ?—I think so, unless it was of paramount importance, and then I am sure it would not.

2268. I see you spoke of at one time 60 pontoons being requisitioned, and their only being able to supply you with 30; very roughly, what is about the value of a pontoon ?—I cannot say, because we generally make them in our own shops at home; it is not large, I suppose £100.

2269. Somewhere between £50 and £150 ?—They take a very long time to make.

2270. Therefore, if we put them at £100, it is a matter of £10,000 altogether, if you took 100 ?—Yes, the 30 that we sent were quite enough to carry out all that very large bridging operation that Sir Redvers Buller had to do crossing and re-crossing. He had just enough pontoons for his requirements.

2271. Among you Army men, is there not a tendency to see if you can do with 10 per cent. less than an estimated quantity, rather than to provide for 20 per cent. more, to make certain that you have enough ?—And why ? We generally ask for very much more than we get. We keep on asking year after year for years in the Engineer Service for an increase of the Pontoon train and so on, and we cannot get it. We get a little bit one year and a little bit another year, entirely owing to financial reasons. Our estimates are always cut down.

2272. If this occurs it is the fault of the Financia Department ?—It is nearly always a question of finance, and in the Engineers our estimates for what we call absolutely necessary services are continually cut down, year after year, to half or quarter what we put down; so that it comes at last to this, that we try to keep things low I suppose, and knowing we cannot possibly get what we should like, we rather aim a little lower hoping to get something.

2273. I suggest that it is rather a bad thing to have things kept low ?—I think we often find them suddenly jump up in time of war.

2274. What is Sir Percy Girouard's position ?—He was Director of Railways for the Army in the field; he is now the head man of the railways of the Transvaal Government.

2275. With regard to the manning of the railways in time of war. I suggest, would it not be decidedly better to draw from the regular workers in the big English railways so far as practicable, particularly if you could get those reserves I am speaking of who had had some little military training ?—I think it is an admirable thing to have a very large reserve of men employed on the railways—simply a list of them kept, men willing to serve in time of war.

2276. I suppose we may take it, it is generally admitted all the world over that the efficiency of the main English lines is really about the best in the world. I do not include those lines South of the Thames, as they do not come in, but take the main lines ?—And as General Salmond said, if we could get traffic managers and station masters and that class also to be registered and to serve——

2277. It would be a great advantage ?—A very great advantage.

2278. Has the idea ever occurred to you in certain cases of having a special provision of rolling stock that could be made to run on varying gauges ?—Well, as a rule it is not perhaps quite as good as the particular gauge that you want the engine to run on.

2279. That I quite admit ?—And therefore, I think that in any ordinary war we should find in the trade enough engines to meet our needs—certainly if we go to other countries like America.

2280. Say we were at war with some European Power, you would not find engines from the English factories in progress to suit the Continental gauges ?—I forget what the French gauge is.

2281. In a case of that kind, say in a war with some Continental Power that had a gauge different from ours, if they could do away with their rolling stock it would be a great advantage to us in certain events if we had a certain amount of rolling stock to which we could adjust their gauge ?—Yes, it would certainly; or of course (I think you asked that question) we could alter their gauge when one remembers what was done on the Great Western in the way of altering the gauge.

2282. In about three days the gauge was altered, but we must consider all the preliminary work that was done in that case just to get everything up to the point for making the alteration ?—Yes.

2283. Do you see any reason why there should not be an arrangement by the Government to have an

immediate call on any locomotives or rolling stock in the hands of the British railways, in the event of war, the same as they have a call on the ships for armed cruisers?—Yes; I see no reason why they should not be registered.

2284. And you think that would be a good plan?—I do.

2285. As I understood your evidence, you spoke of the chance of buying rolling stock in a country with which we were at war; I did not quite catch what you said?—I meant that the country may get some of its rolling stock from outside countries; for instance, France probably gets a certain number of her engines from Belgium.

2286. You mentioned that money could do anything, but it is quite obvious that if, unfortunately, we had war with Germany we would not expect any German makers to supply us with the materials of war?—I do not know.

2287. I venture to say no more than you would expect English makers to do it; but you mean that with the temptation of big sums it could be done from other countries than the one with which we were at war?—I do not suppose, if I might say so, we could expect to go a long distance into Germany unless we were in alliance with somebody else.

2288. (*Sir John Edge.*) Do you happen to know whether there is a uniform gauge for Europe up to the frontier of Russia?—I think every country safeguards itself by breaking the gauge.

2289. There is a break of the gauge on the frontiers of Russia?—Yes, and elsewhere. I think France breaks gauge at certain parts. Into Italy they break gauge.

2290. But not into Germany, surely?—I cannot say definitely.

2291. Do you happen to know what these gauges are—No, I do not know at all.

2292. If you do not know what the gauges are in Continental Europe, I do not quite see why you suggest that the Government should keep a stock of locomotives?—I do not recommend it; I recommend the opposite—not to keep a stock, because I say there would be not only the cost of the locomotives, but of the staff to look after them.

2293. I beg your pardon?—I am dead against keeping a stock, but I think that a certain number of the locomotives might be registered, so that in time of war they could be taken at a fixed price by the Government; but that is very different from storing them, doing nothing.

2294. There would not be much use even in registering them unless you could use them?—Then you would not take them unless they suited the line you wanted them for.

2295. There is one thing I do not quite understand. If you were a Commanding Royal Engineer on a Divisional Staff, I suppose you would interfere if you saw a regiment laying out its lines incorrectly, or anything of that kind?—Certainly I should, and probably the thing would be settled directly.

2296. If you were merely a commanding Engineer of a unit you would not interfere?—If I was merely a captain of a unit or a major of a unit, the officer commanding the regiment might beg me to attend to my own business.

2297. I suppose you would not offer any suggestion, it comes to that?—Sometimes you would get on very well with the commanding officer, and he would be very glad to have your advice, but if you have not got a position, and you have a man doing it one way who says, "I prefer this way," you are met with a difficulty.

2298. In the one case it would be part of your duty to interfere, and in the other case you would interfere at your own risk?—Yes, and in the one case you would interfere knowing that it was the wish of your General, and you would be quite prepared to take any responsibility with your General as you were expressing his views to a subordinate officer; on his staff you can practically act by order—you can practically say, "These are the General's orders."

2299. The Commanding Royal Engineer on the Divisional Staff would practically have the supervision of all engineering work that was going on?—Everywhere throughout the whole of the Division of 10,000 men.

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2300. And in the other case the officer commanding the unit would only have really charge of his own particular business?—Very little more; of course, practically he would do more than that, but he would want another man to do as much as I want to be done, and a man of more position.

2301. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I want to ascertain from you, if I can, how these Estimates for the stores required by the Royal Engineers were made up?—Before the War began?

2302. Yes?—We made a rough estimate, with nothing before us, of what we might want.

2303. First of all, who makes them up?—It is laid down in the Regulations for War for the Royal Engineers that it is the business of the Commanding Royal Engineer, as soon as he is appointed, to estimate what he wants in the way of special stores, that is to say, timber, iron, and everything of that kind. As the War goes on it is his business to foresee what he wants and to order from the best sources.

2304. I speak of the yearly Estimate, which in some way or another reaches Parliament when it gives its Vote; do you in sending forward your Estimate send forward items, or do you first of all simply put the amount down for your own satisfaction opposite the items and say, "I require so much, £6,000 or £8,000 for the year 1893–94."?—Are you asking as regards what we were doing in war or as regards peace?

2305. Take it in peace time?—Then you bring forward what is called Vote I., and large Votes like that would stand alone. I cannot tell you how the Inspector-General of Fortifications prepares the Estimates to go before the Secretary of State for War, but as a rule in the districts you put down the items and so much for every item you require.

2306. For instance, I see here, "For six months' supplies, 10 per section, pickaxes, and so on"; do you send items like that in?—No; and besides, we have nothing to do with that, as that is done by the Army Ordnance Department. We only call upon them to supply, and they make their big demands for what they want.

2307. They make a big demand to you?—They want money from the Secretary of State for War in a big lump for that work, and we have nothing to do with it.

2308. They calculate the cost of these and then send it in to you in one sum?—No, the Army Ordnance Department supplies the Royal Engineers with tools, and we have nothing to do with buying the tools; we demand them from the Army Ordnance Department.

2309. Take another instance; I see large quantities of oil, paraffin oil and so on; does that also come from the Ordnance Department?—I cannot say whether it does or not; we often buy it ourselves, but we should demand it from the Ordnance Department, and if they could not supply it we would purchase it ourselves.

2310. What I want to get at is this; you speak of your Estimates being cut down; how are they cut down?—These are Estimates for works required for troops, say new baths, new latrines, quarters for married soldiers, which are absolutely necessary—that is what I mean. Estimates for Engineer services, building works, are continually cut down. Sometimes we put in the Estimates that we want to increase a unit, some more telegraph men, and they are cut down.

2311. Who cuts that down?—It is cut down by the Council, I suppose. The Treasury says, "We cannot let you have more than a certain amount of money, we can only give you a million for such and such work, and you must cut out or make your requirements suit it," when we may have put down our requirements at two millions.

2312. As far as stores are concerned, they are not interfered with, and whatever representation you make for stores it is met?—I could not make that statement at all, because, as a rule, all those stores you are speaking of are not demanded by us, but by a different Branch altogether. They belong to the Ordnance Department, who are responsible for the stores you mention.

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2313. They must get the figures from some Department before they make the demand?—Yes.

2314. Supposing they sent for 1,000 gallons of a particular oil, might that be cut down?—It might, but I should think it very doubtful; in their Estimates it would never appear as 1,000 gallons of oil, but would be lumped up into so many hundreds of thousands of pounds, or a million of pounds, and that lump sum might be cut down by the Secretary of State from £1,000,000 to £800,000.

2315. And then they look to the Departments requiring the stores to cut down their demand for stores to meet the reduction of £200,000?—Yes. With us it occurs that requirements for building are cut down largely, and we omit the services that are of least importance, although they may be very important services.

2316. Who do you say is responsible for the cutting down? Is that the Cabinet?—I suppose entirely the Secretary of State in consultation with the Treasury. I suppose the Treasury say, "We cannot give more than a certain amount of money, we cannot increase your units by more than a certain number of *personnel*, because there is not money for it.

2317. So that the Secretary of State with the Treasury, who have no possible knowledge of these subjects, overrule the officers who have knowledge and who make the requirements?—It must be so. Of course, the Secretary of State has knowledge.

2318. Who would know certainly about what I am asking you just now?—The Inspector-General of Fortifications would know as far as we are concerned. I can remember years ago one of the Inspectors-General of Fortifications being very strongly taken to task for not having represented that he wanted so much money, but he pointed out that he had represented that he wanted two or three times as much money continually every year, and that it was always being cut down, and that he had to bear the burden eventually.

2319. I think I understood from you, to come to another subject, that the pontoon men were not composed of artizans?—They had not so large a proportion of artizans.

2320. From what class were they drawn?—From big able-bodied men, the labouring class more.

2321. Sailors?—Any class which comes up to the standard of size, which is very considerable, big men in order to handle these heavy pontoons and then they learn; some of them have a little elementary knowledge of carpentering and other things, and the longer they serve in the pontoon troop the more they learn. They are put to build these pontoons; they gradually see how others build them, and they get handy.

2322. Are the Volunteer Royal Engineers drawn from the regiments of the Line?—No, there are three or more regiments here in London of Volunteer Engineers, and they are supposed to enlist only tradesmen.

2323. In one of the papers before us here I see Volunteers: 1st Newcastle, 1 officer and 25 non-commissioned officers and men; East London, 1 officer and 25 non-commissioned officers and men," and so on. It is Appendix C of the Royal Engineer Units in the Boer War (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 205)?—Each of those sections was attached to a company of Engineers in South Africa, and became part and parcel, as it were, of that company. They do not work independently, but each section was attached to a company of Engineers, and so was able to take up the work.

2324. In fact, I think almost every regiment that was there did contribute, some more and some less?—But those are the Volunteer regiments serving here in England that contributed those sections. These are not Regulars; these are Volunteer sections, and each Engineer Volunteer regiment in Great Britain practically sent a section of one officer and 25 men to the Engineers in South Africa.

2325. With respect to the motor-cars, who recommended them? Did you recommend the purchase from the French firm?—The officer immediately under me in charge of the Searchlight Section, who is called the Officer Commanding Searchlight Section, recommended the purchase of those motor-cars direct.

2326. To whom did that recommendation go?—It came to me.

2327. What did you do?—As I say, I told them to prepare the firm for any order that might be given them, and that is all the action I took as regards that firm.

2328. Did you not send the recommendation for the motor-cars forward to the War Office?—They were informed later of it. I cannot say from memory whether I at once sent that. I do not think I did, and I think I suggested it in a letter. The main point was that we were shy of ordering direct. The firm that we were speaking of did write to the War Office and ask whether they were to get the order, and the War Office, of course, did not give it to them as they had made arrangements elsewhere.

2329. Was the recommendation for a motor-car for the use of the Force in South Africa put forward as a matter of urgency which should be attended to at once?—I considered it a matter of urgency because it was a scheme I had had very strongly in my mind, but, as I say, it is quite possible that the Commander-in-Chief did not recognise as much as I did that it would prove a success, perhaps. He may not have been as keenly impressed with the desirability of it.

2330. He may not have pressed it?—I know he did not press it. It was my business as Commanding Royal Engineer to be continually thinking of what I could do to help on the business of the Army, and it did not follow that my chief gave the same importance to the thing that I did.

2331. The fact of his not pressing it may have been the reason why the War Office were not very quick about sending it out?—Yes. I might say this, that the War Office took a month to reply in the first place.

2332. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I understand you to say that the system of having a Commanding Officer of Royal Engineers attached to each Division of the Army was in force up to the time of the War in Egypt in 1882?—It was in force in that war.

2333. You were in Egypt after that some time?—In 1884–5 at Suakim it was still in force.

2334. And you do not know quite why it was abolished?—No.

2335. You have not served in the field with the Army in India?—No.

2336. Perhaps you are aware that there was always, or certainly in all big campaigns, an officer who was called Field Engineer attached to each Division, who was on the Staff of the General Commanding that Division?—Yes.

2337. You will see in despatches in old days the general addressed him as one of his own staff, and thanked him or said something about him?—Yes.

2338. Is not that very much the same as the Commanding Officer?—Certainly; he used to be on the Staff of the General in India.

2339. As far as I know that practice is in force in India at the present day, and I have never heard of its being altered, but I do not quite understand the scope of the question which Sir John Edge addressed to you, and to which you replied about the functions of this Commanding Officer of Royal Engineers towards other Branches of the Service. I presume the Commanding Royal Engineer attached to a Division would only interfere with the regiments of another arm in a matter connected with engineering?—Entirely, engineering only; it has nothing to do with anything else.

2340. (*Chairman.*) Is there anything you wish to add?—I think upon the question of where the Estimates are cut down it is hardly my place, really, to say where that is done.

2341. That does not come under your notice?—That is not within my personal knowledge.

EIGHTH DAY.

Thursday, October 23rd, 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Hon. Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O
The Right Hon. Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

General Sir C. M. CLARKE, Bart., G.C.B., Quartermaster-General to the Forces, called and examined.

Colonel F. T. CLAYTON, C.B., Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters, and Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. COWANS, M.V.O., Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters, were also present.

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2342. (*Chairman.*) Sir Charles Clarke, you are Quartermaster-General to the Forces?—Yes.

2343. And you took up your office on the 16th September, 1899?—Yes.

2344. Therefore you have been in charge of the Department throughout the War?—From the 16th September, 1899.

2345. Before that date in any preparations for the War Sir George White was responsible?—He was responsible for the Branch.

2346. But, I suppose, you are in a position to give us the information with regard to those preparations from the records in the Office?—Quite so.

2347. So that we can, if we find it necessary, call upon Sir George White as to any personal share he has had in the matter, but you can put the official Statement forward?—Yes.

2348. The functions of your Department were regulated at that time by the Order in Council of March, 1899?—Yes.

2349. And that states that the Quartermaster-General "shall be charged with supplying the Army with food, forage, fuel and light, and quarters, with land and water transport and with remounts; with the movement of troops, and with the distribution of their stores and equipment; with administering the Army Service Corps, the Pay Department, and the establishments employed on the above Services; and with dealing with sanitary questions relating to the Army. He shall submit proposals for the Annual Estimates for the above Services, and shall advise the Secretary of State on all questions connected with the duties of his Department. He shall make such inspections as may be necessary to secure the efficiency of the Services under his control"?—Yes.

2350. Under that arrangement you came directly under the Secretary of State?—Yes.

2351. There has been an alteration in that?—There is a slight alteration on the Order in Council, dated 4th November, 1901, which introduces the words "under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief," and adds the Army Veterinary Department; that is practically the change.

2352. And removes the Sanitary?—And removes the Sanitary.

2353. But in other respects, in working, the Department remains the same?—It remains the same.

2354. We have received through the Director-General of Military Intelligence a series of papers which I suppose have been supplied by you. (*These papers are shown in Appendix Vol., page* 218)?—I sent them in to him. He was charged by the Secretary of State with the collection of the information for the Commission, and those papers were sent in to him by me.

2355. They embody a mass of details; I suppose that with regard to a good deal of that you would wish the other officers coming from your Department to speak?—I think so, as regards actual figures or numbers; any absolute information of detail that the Commission might want I think would better come from them, but generally I can answer for all the sub-divisions of this Department.

2356. Have you any general Statement you would like to make?—Perhaps I might read a short general Statement. I have not drawn it up at any length, because I did not know what line at all the Commission might take, but I have a short general Statement. Prior to the middle of September, 1899, preliminary discussions had taken place on the subject of sending reinforcements to South Africa, and a certain amount of action had been taken. The force contemplated in the discussions by the Army Board was an Army Corps and Cavalry Division (*Paragraphs* 5 *and* 57 *Proceedings of the Commander-in-Chief's Committee*). Nothing, however, of real importance was carried out until the 22nd of September, when it was notified that the Secretary of State had sanctioned the expenditure necessary to meet the most pressing portion of the preparations in connection with the despatch of an Army Corps and Cavalry Division (*Paragraph* 205 *Proceedings of Army Board*), and action was at once taken so far as I was concerned (*Paragraphs* 227 *and* 228). On the 29th September it was notified that the Secretary of State had authorised the full provision to be made to enable Army Corps, Cavalry Division, and Line of Communication troops to proceed to South Africa. Action was taken (*Paragraphs* 281, 283, *and* 284). On the 30th of September, after a meeting in the Secretary of State's room, preparations were put in hand for the embarkation of the Army Corps, commencing about 21st October. The order to mobilise was issued on the 7th October, and the embarkation actually commenced on the 20th October, and then proceeded without interruption. I should mention that a certain number of troops had left for South Africa prior to this, the actual numbers and detail of which will be given by Colonel Cowans, but they did not form part at that time of the Army Corps proper, although they were afterwards, of course, merged in the general force in South Africa.

I come now to my second sub-division, Water Transport. Water Transport is provided by the Admiralty on the demands of the Quartermaster-General. A conference as to sea transport requirements took place during April, May, and June, 1899, between representatives of the War Office and the Transport Branch of the Admiralty, which reported that the stock of horse fittings was insufficient and inadequate. The Naval Authorities estimated that if fitments were ready in advance, an Army Corps, Cavalry Brigade, and Line of Communication troops could be embarked in one month from the date of the issue of orders for mobilisation. On the 20th September (*Paragraph* 198, *Army Board*), I reported that the Admiralty were again asking for sanction for

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the purchase of 6,000 new pattern horse-fittings, and that they again called attention to the delay which would occur in preparing ships for the conveyance of horses if sanction were not given to the immediate purchase of those horse-fittings. The Board considered that authority for the provision of those fittings should again be asked for. Money for fitments other than the stock in hand was not provided until the 22nd of September, consequent upon the decision I mentioned before. The Admiralty had previously asked for sanction in July, but it was refused at that time. The Conference also recommended a simpler and less expensive form of fittings. These simpler fittings were practically used throughout the War. For many years past the point has been discussed whether it would not be preferable that the War Department should make its own arrangements for sea transport. There have been widely divergent opinions on the point, but I am convinced from the experience of the late War, that the provision of sea transport should remain with the Admiralty. Subject to the Quartermaster-General's Branch being represented at and being in close touch with the Naval Transport Department, a better arrangement cannot be devised. On this point I should like the Commission to see a Confidential Memorandum of June, 1899, and I hand it in to the Commission. (*The Paper was handed in.*)

With reference to my third sub-division, the Provision of Supplies, supplies are obtained by the Director of Contracts from the trade on the demand of the Quartermaster-General. The general position as regards supplies is shown by the Minute of 24th September, 1902, in possession of the Commission. (*Vide Appendix Vol., pages* 218 *and* 219.) Any further details that may be required can be prepared.

As regards Sub-division 4, Remounts, I can give no better statement than is contained in my evidence before the Remount Court of Inquiry and which has just been printed and issued.

See Q. 12908–13015.

2357. I think we informed you that we would propose to postpone the Remount question at present, chiefly because these Blue Books have just been issued, and we have not had time to investigate them ?—I have not had time to read more than two or three pages myself, but my own evidence is contained in that, and I do not think it would be possible for me to give any fuller information than is contained in that evidence, because I prepared the statement as carefully as I could, and dealt with all the points that arose. It would therefore be needless to repeat it.

2358. We no doubt shall wish to have some examination of the question further on, and if we find it necessary perhaps you would not mind returning ?—Quite so. As regards Sub-division 5, the Army Pay Department, I have nothing particularly to say, except that it is somewhat under-manned, and has been kept going with considerable difficulty; but upon that I think the Commission had better examine Colonel Kitson if they wish to do so.

As regards Sub-division 6, the administration of the Army Service Corps, it was agreed, before I took over the duties of Quartermaster-General, between the Director-General of Ordnance and the then Quartermaster-General, that the provision of waggons and harness for supply trains should be undertaken by the Quartermaster-General. Colonel Clayton is here, and he can speak from his own personal knowledge as to what occurred in South Africa and, generally, from office records as to what took place at home.

As regards the Army Veterinary Department, which was placed under the Quartermaster-General in November, 1901, the best evidence will be given by the late Director-General, Veterinary-Colonel Duck.

2359. Will that be conveniently taken without the Remount Department ?—It is entirely distinct; the administration of the Department is entirely distinct.

2360. But both deal with horses ?—He provides the medical attendance for horses, but he would provide for the medical attendance for the Remount Department in the same way as he would for a mounted unit.

2361. Is that all the general statement you wish to make ?—That is all the general statement. I thought a short opening statement would be best, and then the Commission could ask me any questions they desired.

2362. You mentioned that before the Army Corps was mobilised there were certain troops sent to South Africa ?—Yes.

2363. Statement No. II. (*Vide Appendix Vol., pages* 218 *and*) deals with supplies which were sent to South Africa prior to the outbreak of the War ?—Yes; as regards provisions.

2364. They were sent to South Africa prior to the outbreak of the War; it says so at the top of the page ?—This was the reserve in South Africa, some of which was procured locally, and some was sent from England.

2365. Then, was the provision of supplies that that refers to calculated entirely on the number of troops then in South Africa ?—Entirely.

2366. It did not look forward to any further number of troops ?—No, because we did not get authority for the necessary funds until 22nd September.

2367. But you stated that in June, I think it was, you had under consideration in your Department the possibility of further troops being required ?—Yes.

2368. How far did that consideration carry you to making any preparations at all ?—Well, I was not there then myself.

2369. And from the records there are none ?—From the records it appears they were anxious to make the preparations, but no money was provided until 22nd September.

2370. You also said, I think, that there was a conference with the Admiralty about transport as far back as April, May, and June ?—Yes, in April, May, and June.

2371. Was that with reference to the transport of the Army Corps ?—Yes. I can hand in the Proceedings of the Conference if the Commission wishes.

2372. I should like to see it ? (*The Proceedings were handed in.*)

2373. Is that a confidential document ?—Yes.

2374. Then, it must have been in contemplation as early as April, May, and June that an Army Corps might have to be sent to South Africa ?—That a force would have to be sent, and the strength of that force, as contemplated in the Proceedings of the Army Board, was, as I said before, an Army Corps and Cavalry Division.

2375. But although it was used for purposes of discussion, it was impossible to take any steps, because there were no funds ?—Quite.

2376. I think you said that further on the Admiralty represented that unless they got orders for certain horse fittings there must be delay when the order for mobilisation was given ?—Yes.

2377. When was that representation first made ?—In July; it is referred to in the proceedings at that conference, and they asked for sanction in July to enable them to proceed. I think possibly you could receive direct answers to any point you might like to put with reference to that conference from Colonel Cowans, who was the Secretary to it and a member of it; possibly that would be preferable, because I am only speaking, as it were, at second-hand.

2378. Then it was not until 22nd September, after you had assumed office, that authority was given to spend any money ?—Not until 22nd September.

2379. Is it your opinion that delay was caused in the despatch of the troops by there not having been authority given previously ?—Certainly; and, personally, as regards supplies I may say that I was exceedingly uneasy for some considerable time as to whether we should be able to feed the troops in South Africa, because it is needless to say that you cannot send supplies out instantly, it takes time. As a matter of practice, I may say it was found throughout the latter part of the War that from the date of a demand for supplies being received until the time these supplies were placed in South Africa a period of close upon three months elapsed.

2380. Is that all forms of supplies ?—I am talking of provisions and forage.

2381. In the case of provisions and forage are there any reserves which can be drawn upon on the sudden outbreak of a war ?—That is given in this paper relating to my Sub-division No. 3 (Q.M.G., 3) (*vide Appendix Vol.,*

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(*page* 219): "The reserve in England at Woolwich prior to the War, based on provision for a force of 40,000 men and 20,000 horses, consisted of" so and so.

2382. That is a reserve for the Peace Army, is it not?—No; it is a reserve to be used anywhere; it was established to meet any sudden emergency.

2383. Was the result that you found that an inadequate reserve?—Quite an inadequate reserve for the force that was ultimately sent out.

2384. But the fact that it was inadequate, I suppose, is what caused you your anxiety at the time of the outbreak of the war?—Certainly; I did not think we should be able to get the supplies there in time. I may say that the extent of a reserve of supplies is limited in great measure by the turn-over; that is to say, you cannot have too large a reserve, or it would be absolutely wasted, as you would not be able to turn it over.

2385. It is not the same as reserves of guns or ammunition?—No; supplies are nearly all perishable articles, or at any rate they deteriorate very much by keeping.

2386. And if you cannot keep a reserve beyond your turn-over, are there any alterations which could be made in the arrangements for ordering supplies quickly which would meet the case?—I think not; you must go to the trade, and when you have to deal with large amounts of supplies it must take time.

2387. The experience of the War does not induce you to put forward any suggestions in that direction?—No, I do not recommend a large reserve for the reason I have given, that the articles are perishable.

2388. Nor for any alterations in arrangements with the trade or otherwise?—No, I think not. I think we got our supplies, considering the enormous amount we asked for, in quite a reasonable time.

2389. And, as a matter of fact, you were always able to supply?—Yes.

2389*. Have you any cases in which there was a delay which caused inconvenience?—No, I cannot call them to mind.

2390. There were no Reports complaining of delays which came back from the Commander-in-Chief or the officers in command in South Africa?—No, I can call to mind no such Reports, and all the officers, I think, who have spoken to me about it have said they considered they were very well supplied.

2391. I do not suggest that there were any complaints, because Lord Kitchener has told us that the supplies were adequate?—I do not call to mind any, at any rate nothing of a serious nature. There may have been small things, but nothing of a serious nature. When once the authority was given for the reserve of 120 days and when once one got the current of supplies going out, there was no trouble, but I personally at first was very uneasy

2392. Of course you had only just come into the Department, but are you aware from the records if there was any representation made with regard to the inadequacy of the reserve, before the date in September when authority was given?—Generally, I think, because the proceedings of the Commander-in-Chief's Committee and the Army Board will show that my predecessor, in common with all the other heads of Departments, was pressing to be allowed to make the necessary arrangements.

2393. That appears from the Army Board Proceedings; can you say from what date?—The printed Proceedings commence from July.

2394. Is there anything with regard to the provision of supplies which you wish to add, or would you leave all the rest to be spoken to by other officers?—I have nothing much more to say about them, but I am ready to answer any questions about them.

2395. With regard to sea transport, I understand that the Admiralty provide the ships but you deal with the embarkations?—Entirely.

2396. As you have said that is a system which has worked well and which you desire to see continued?—I do not think the War Department could possibly undertake it in operations of any magnitude.

2397. The chartering of ships?—We should not have the expert staff; we should have to go either to the Mercantile Marine or the Admiralty for people to do the work for us, and therefore I think it very much better that you should deal with a Government Department, which has a large number of expert officers at its disposal for the work.

2398. Is this the way it works—that you know what your requirements will be, you intimate to the Admiralty, the Admiralty charters the ship and tells you when it will be available?—Yes, we say we want conveyance for so many men and so many horses on such and such a date, and throughout the War our demands have been most admirably met.

2399. Without any delays which were unavoidable?—I know of no delays; there was a certain impression that they might have been ready earlier at the beginning of the War, but I think they kept their promise.

2400. Subject to that difficulty about horse fittings?—Subject to that difficulty about horse fittings.

2401. As soon as the Admiralty intimates to you that a ship is at your disposal, your Department becomes responsible for any delay thereafter?—For any delay in putting the troops on board.

2402. Was there any question of delay in that matter?—No serious question that I can remember, so far as the embarkation of troops and horses was concerned. There has been considerable delay in the off-loading of supply ships in South Africa, and there have been large charges for demurrage in consequence, but the Admiralty were not responsible for that in any way.

2403. There was no difficulty in the embarkation of stores in this country?—None.

2404. Anything that occurred was in South Africa; was that because of deficient dock accommodation in South Africa?—You see these supply ships came from all parts of the world, and their arrival could not be absolutely timed; ships would arrive at one of the several ports which are not very large, and it was simply impossible to unload them.

2405. As I say it was from deficient accommodation in South Africa?—Deficient accommodation in South Africa, not from any fault of the Admiralty.

2406. If there was deficient accommodation in South Africa, did that result in any loss of supplies when landed?—The only great loss that I have heard of occurred about three months ago, when a large amount of supplies was burnt at Lourenço Marques. The value was roughly £200,000, and the fire is supposed to have been caused by an incendiary. By desire of the Secretary of State I wired out to ascertain why such a large amount of stores had been placed there, and the reply came that it was unavoidable because they could not work the supplies up from the other coast ports, and that therefore they had to send them to Lourenço Marques.

2407. But one has heard that even at Cape Town very large amounts of supplies were lying on the quays?—I should think a very large amount, but I have not heard of any loss from it.

2408. I mean damaged?—I have not heard of any damage, nothing more than the ordinary damage that occurs in handling large quantities of stores. There has been nothing specific reported as to any large amount of damage having been done.

2409. I suppose it is inevitable?—It is inevitable when you handle those extraordinary large amounts.

2410. The supplies which you deal with are, as the Order states, for the provisioning of the Army?—Provisions for the troops and medical comforts.

2411. What happens about the Ordnance Department stores? Do they go out in the same ships, or in separate ships?—The greater amount of our supplies of provisions were sent out in separate ships as it was found more convenient not to mix them up with other stores, but in the early part of the War they were mixed up.

2412. Are you responsible for shipping Ordnance stores?—No, the Admiralty ship them. I have had throughout the War an officer at the Transport Department of the Admiralty, and he was sent there purposely to be of assistance in the matter of the despatch of stores.

2413. What I meant was, does the Ordnance Depart-

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ment do the same thing or are you the representative of the War Office in the matter ?—We are the representatives for all demands on the Admiralty.

2414. And on the question of shipping or disembarking Ordnance stores the Ordnance Department is not responsible, but the Quartermaster-General's Department is ?—We work it through our transport officer at Woolwich; all the demands for transport of stores of all kinds go to him, and he makes, as my representative, demands on the Admiralty for shipping.

2415. That is how I intended to put it; that it all comes through your Department ?—It comes through it.

2416. Was there not some delay caused by the necessity of converting some of the transport to mule transport ?—I never heard of any; if you could give me a specific case I would look it up, but I do not remember any.

2417. I think a previous witness stated that it was necessary to convert some fittings of the wagons and so on for mule transport for South Africa ?—I beg your pardon, I thought you were talking of mule ships.

2418. I am going to land transport now. Was there not some delay caused by the necessity for converting the fittings of the wagons to mule transport ?—A certain amount no doubt, and possibly, as Colonel Clayton reminds me, by the necessity of the wagons being fitted with the South African brake, which is worked from the rear.

2419. That was another point that was mentioned to us; that was a case in which if authority had been given earlier there might have been less delay ?—Those conversions, of course, could have been made before.

2420. And were not made before ?—And were not made before, because I can remember perfectly well the Director General of Ordnance representing at the Army Board that there was delay on that account, and that he would not have a certain number of vehicles ready, because the conversion had not been carried out.

2421. The wagons come from his Department ?—He supplies them all except that, I understand (this is not within my personal knowledge), it was arranged between my predecessor and the Director-General of Ordnance that the provision of wagons for the supply parks in South Africa should be found by the Quartermaster-General, and, as the consequence of that, we hired ox wagons and mule wagons largely in South Africa, and we also procured from the trade in this country a large number of wagons to send out for supply purposes.

2422. Those are the contracts and arrangements mentioned in these Statements, No. 3, and No. 5 ?—It is numbered 3, in these Papers. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 220).

2423. And Statement No. 5 refers to contracts ?—Yes, and Statement No. 6. (*Vide Appendix Vol., pages* 223 and 224).

2424. In the end had you any difficulty in getting a sufficient amount of land transport ?—In the end it was all obtained.

2425. Without any serious difficulty ?—We had not it ready when it was wanted.

2426. I think we had it in evidence that some of the units went to South Africa without their regimental transport being complete ?—I think some of the units did, and it was sent out very shortly afterwards, but that was regimental transport such as water carts, ammunition carts, and what not, with which I had nothing to do. It was entirely an Ordnance supply, and I do not say that to throw blame upon the Ordnance, but I say I had nothing to do with the provision of those vehicles. We undertook to find the wagons for the supply parks in South Africa. I believe that was done, and again I am not speaking from my personal knowledge, to try and divide the work better, as it was putting too much on to the Ordnance Department.

2427. But your Department is responsible for seeing that a regiment goes with its proper amount of equipment, including transport ?—Yes. We procure all the ordinary wagons from the Ordnance Department.

2428. At the time that Lord Roberts went to South Africa, some of the units were sent out without the full amount of transport ?—Yes, there were some that went without the full amount.

2429. But soon after, that was made good ?—Yes.

2430. We have been told that when Lord Roberts arrived in South Africa, he reorganised the whole system ?—On that point I think you had better have Colonel Clayton's evidence, because he was out there at the time. He is an expert on that particular point, he can tell you exactly what was done, and I may say it has not yet been decided what the future organisation will be. It has been under discussion, and is now under discussion, and only two or three days ago, having worked the whole thing out, I sent a Minute on the subject to the Director-General of Military Intelligence, who is charged with the organisation of the Regular Forces, and asked him to submit the whole thing to the Commander-in-Chief for his orders. Speaking generally, there is no very great change, but as to the actual details of the organisation which Lord Roberts altered, and as to the change that was made Colonel Clayton will give you very much better evidence, than I can.

2431. Your view is that it does not mean a very large alteration ?—Not a very large alteration.

2432. On the face of it it seemed as if it might mean an entire alteration in the system ?—No, it is not a very great alteration.

2433. With regard to the contracts for ox wagons in Statement 5 (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 223), was that done locally ?—That was done locally.

2434. You knew nothing here about the terms before they were agreed to ?—The terms were necessarily arranged locally; of course the authorities in South Africa were instructed, as will be seen from the proceedings of the Army Board, to provide what local transport they could, but we at home had nothing to do with the actual contracts.

2435. Were you satisfied with those contracts specified in Statement No. 5, that they were reasonable ?—No doubt they were the best that the General Officer Commanding could make under the circumstances.

2436. But did they strike you as reasonable contracts or as expensive contracts ?—I think everything in South Africa, according to my personal experience of years ago, is expensive.

2437. And this was not more so than usual ?—No.

2438. Statement No. 6 (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 224) is a summary of the principal instructions ?—Yes.

2439. And I understand that, with regard to all the details of it, if we want any, you would rather leave them to others ?—I would leave the details to Colonel Clayton.

2440. In 1901 there was a change in the Order in Council affecting your Department, as you said at the beginning ?—Yes.

2441. But there have also been changes since then, have there not ?—I know of no later Order than that.

2442. No later Order, but have there not been changes with regard to the Administration of the War Office since the Report of Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee ?—There has been a change which has bothered me enormously, the change from Civil to Military Clerks, which the Dawkins' Committee did not recommend should be enforced where the head of the Department Q. thought it was desirable in any particular branch to retain Civil Clerks. I recommended it strongly in the case of two of my sub-divisions, the Transport Sub-Division (Q.M.G. 2.) and the Barrack Sub-Division (Q.M.G. 1). The change is however being enforced, and it is not three days ago I think that I had to send in a Paper again, about a change in the Q.M.G. 2, Sub-Division, to say that it was impossible, I thought, to carry on unless we were allowed to retain our Civil Clerks. That is the point that has most affected me, but in the ordinary conduct of business I am not aware of any great change as far as I am personally concerned.

2443. Is there not a change in the proceedings of the War Office Council ?—The War Office Council has met very regularly on Mondays, and a regular record has been kept of its proceedings.

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2444. Which used not to be the case?—Which used not to be the case. In fact, before the war the War Office Council, as far as I remember, very seldom assembled, and there were no regular records kept of its proceedings, as is done now. On the other hand, the Army Board, which was a very useful assembly, has been practically dropped. The Army Board sat whenever it was necessary, there was a very free discussion between its members on the points that came before it, everybody gave their opinion, and said honestly what they thought; if there was any great difference of opinion the late Commander-in-Chief would take a vote on whatever the subject might be, and action was taken on the result of that vote.

2445. The Secretary of State was not present?—The Secretary of State was not present; he was represented, after the change was made in 1899 from the Commander-in-Chief's Committee to the Army Board by the Assistant Under-Secretary of State and by the Accountant-General, and those discussions to my mind were of very great use, because it enabled us all to know what was going on, and very often one got valuable hints about one's own particular branch from the other members, and, personally, I am very sorry that it has fallen into abeyance.

2446. I understood that the Army Board was for the discussion of those practical points, but that the War Office Council was intended to be under the presidency of the Secretary of State, for the discussion of the more important subjects that would come before the War Office as a whole, and we also were informed that as a result of the change any member of the War Office Council could now bring before it any subject which he considered of importance, and get the opinion of the Council upon it?—Yes, he can.

2447. That was not the case formerly?—I do not remember more than two or three meetings of the old War Office Council.

2448. They then could only bring forward subjects which had the approval of the Secretary of State?—Yes.

2449. Now they can raise any subject for discussion; is not that so?—They can raise any subject for discussion, but obviously it is a Council that would only deal with matters of principle and not with matters of detail.

2450. But would it not deal with a matter such as that of Civil and Military Clerks to which you have referred?—I think not; a decision has been given; in fact, I have no doubt I shall get a rap over the knuckles for having brought it up again.

2451. The decision has been given by the Secretary of State?—Yes.

2452. After conference with the officers of the Department?—Well, no doubt he will have seen my representations to the contrary. I do not know whom he has consulted.

2453. Your representations were before the Committee?—No, my representations were to the Permanent Under Secretary. I said before Mr. Dawkins' Committee that I thought it was exceedingly undesirable to make the change in two of my Sub-Divisions, the Barrack Branch and the Transport and Embarkation Branch. The Committee, in paragraph 14, I think it is, of its Report rather accepted that view. However, it was ultimately decided that the change to the Military Clerks should be made throughout, and I begged and begged that it might be done as gradually as possible in the case of those particular two Sub-Divisions, or else I feared there would be a breakdown. I did not want to raise the general question again after it had been decided against me, but only, as I say, three or four days ago I was compelled to make another representation about it.

2454. Is it a General Order throughout the War Office?—Oh, yes. Five of my Sub-Divisions can perfectly well be worked by Military Clerks, but not these particular two.

2455. On that subject you have made representations, but not through the War Office Council?—No, not through the War Office Council; the matter has been decided.

2456. You consider that it is not a subject which you could raise before that Council?—I do not think I could raise it.

2457. (*Viscount Esher.*) What would happen if you did raise it? Supposing you raised it next Monday, what would happen? Would you be precluded from going on discussing it?—Well, it could not be raised unless notice had been given of it and the paper had been sent round; that is the procedure of the War Office Council, the agenda are sent round on the previous Saturday, as a rule, with a *precis* of each subject that is to be discussed on the agenda.

See Q. 21,616.

2458. (*Chairman.*) And if you put this subject on the agenda next Saturday would it not come up?—I do not think so, because a decision has been given about it. The agenda are prepared by the Secretary to the Council.

2459. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You think you could not appeal against that decision?—I have appealed against it over and over again, but without success.

2460. Not through the War Office Council?—Not through the War Office Council. I do not think I could bring it up.

2461. (*Viscount Esher.*) If you put it down on the paper, would it be struck out before the Monday morning by the Secretary of State or his representative?—That is more than I can say.

2462. (*Chairman.*) Is there any other point you would wish to speak to?—No, nothing particular occurs to me. I am perfectly ready to answer any question I can to the best of my ability.

2463. (*Viscount Esher.*) There is only one question I want to ask you; when would you have liked to have seen the orders given to enable you to make the necessary preparations for the War—in what month?—I think it would have been wise to have commenced generally three months before, if it had been possible.

2464. At the Army Board representations were made by the heads of the great Departments as early as June?—Yes, the first printed proceedings are dated 13th July.

2465. I think we have it in the middle of June; you had a meeting then of the Army Board?—I cannot speak from personal knowledge; the 13th July is the first date on the printed proceedings.

2466. It was then urged, was it not, that in view of the general situation in South Africa steps ought to be taken to enable the heads of the various Departments concerned to incur expenditure?—Yes.

2467. And you think if that had been done at that time there would have been considerable saving of delay in October?—I do not think there was much general delay in October; there was, of course, the delay that has been referred to as to certain vehicles not being ready, and the horse ships took their full time to fit instead of being ready. but otherwise I do not think there was very much delay. The result was this, that everything had to be done, when the money was given, necessarily in a very great hurry.

2468. Do you think that Sir Redvers Buller's advance from the Cape was delayed at all by want of transport or supplies?—Not by want of supplies; as to transport, perhaps you would ask Colonel Clayton, because he was on the spot.

2469. Really, the point is, as I understand you, that it involved a great strain on the Department?—An enormous strain.

2470. But that, in point of fact, it did not involve delay?—A certain amount of delay, but no great delay.

2471. Did your having to buy stores in a hurry increase their cost very materially?—Probably, but the Director of Contracts will tell you more about that.

2472. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You said that there were provisions kept in reserve at Woolwich for 40,000 men; for what period were these 40,000 men provided for with provisions?—The number of days is given in the Return (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 219). Preserved meat, 50 days; biscuit, 15; emergency rations, 2; groceries, 30; hospital comforts, 30; hay and compressed forage, 25½.

2473. Do you think with reference to the turnover that you have referred to that that is as much as ought to be kept?—I think so.

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2474. Is that kept now?—Yes; I will not say whether it is absolutely complete at the present moment, but it is being made up as fast as it is depleted.

2475. Do you not think that if the Government had sanctioned preparations in July, or about then, and they had been carried out, it might have had some important effect on the military operations, say at Ladysmith or on General Buller's advance?—I think it would have facilitated everything enormously.

2476. You were anxious at the time you took up office on account of the delay that had taken place; what office did you hold before?—I was on half-pay.

2477. And you had no real knowledge of what was going on?—I had been in command of the troops on Salisbury Plain during July and August; otherwise I had been on half-pay since I gave up the Southern command in India in the latter part of the year before.

2478. Of course, the command on Salisbury Plain would give you no information as to the preparations?—Absolutely none.

2479. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Your anxiety which you spoke of arose immediately after you became Quartermaster-General?—Yes, because then I found we were going to send out a large force within a very short time, and my fear was—of course, I had no special knowledge of what the amount of supplies in the trade in South Africa was—that, with this large number of men and animals going out, we might have great difficulty in keeping them fed. Until I got the authority to establish a large reserve and it began to go out, and until I knew it was arriving there, I was exceedingly anxious.

2480. Your opinion is that, seeing that this large body of men were to be sent away some time in October, at least two or three months before that provision ought to have been made for their supplies in South Africa?—Certainly, if it could possibly have been done, we ought to have prepared for it.

2481. In fact, as to these men of the Army Corps who were sent away in October, there was no provision made for their sustenance, except when they left?—Except when they began to leave, and what the local authorities had been able to arrange for.

2482. Was the decision as to the military superseding the civil clerks at the War Office arrived at after consultation with the heads of the Departments, such as you?—There was consultation on paper.

2483. There was no War Office Council meeting with reference to it?—No.

2484. I suppose, taking your own Department, the civil clerks there have been trained for years, and are thoroughly cognisant of the work?—Yes.

2485. And these gentlemen who supersede them will all have to learn their work?—The people who are superseding, or rather who are being brought in instead of them, are pensioners, and they are obviously to my mind not men with the necessary education and ability.

2486. Do they undergo any examination to show their fitness for the position?—They have all been non commissioned officers in their time when they were in the Army, and they have all had to undergo certain examinations before they were promoted to any particular rank, but independent of that I do not think there is any examination.

2487. But the examination which would fit them for a rank in the Army might not be at all the examination to show their fitness for a position as a clerk in your Department?—I do not think they are fit; I have no doubt we could get men from the active list, if we had the pick of them, who might possibly be fit for the work, but certainly not of the class we have to get them from—pensioners.

2488. (*Sir John Edge.*) Roughly speaking, what is the number of officers and men of which an Army Corps consists? May I take it as between 35,000 and 45,000?—With everybody I should think, roughly, 40,000.

2489. When did the subject of despatching an Army Corps to South Africa first come before the Army Board?—I think I referred to that beforehand. I find the first reference to it in the Army Board at Paragraph 5 on the 13th July (*exhibiting the entry in the Army Board proceedings*). I am not speaking from personal knowledge in connection with that date.

2490. Do you happen to know when it was first brought to the attention of the Government that an Army Corps, as apart from reinforcements, should be despatched to South Africa?—No, I have no personal knowledge.

2491. For the purpose simply of reinforcements, a long way short of an Army Corps, I suppose, there was no delay, was there?—A certain number of regiments were sent.

2492. There was no delay in sending them?—No, when once they were ordered to be sent off they were sent.

2493. A good deal has turned on sanction for expenses not having been given until the 22nd September, but before that reinforcements were going out?—Yes, a limited number.

2494. In the matter of ordinary course, who would bring before the Secretary of State for War the advisability of despatching an Army Corps to South Africa?—The Commander-in-Chief.

2495. Would he consult the Army Board before taking action of that kind?—It would be open to him to do so or not, I think, at his discretion.

2496. He might or might not?—He might or might not.

2497. You do not know whether he did or whether he did not consult the Army Board?—I do not.

2498. About the unloading in South Africa, did the delay arise from want of accommodation for the ships or the means of unloading?—There was not sufficient berthing accommodation for the ships that arrived. Mind you, there has been no delay in the disembarkation of troops or of horses, except to an inappreciable extent. I remember one horse ship that was delayed for a couple of days, and there may have been another for a day, but the delay I alluded to has been in the case of supply ships.

2499. I suppose it is delay in getting them alongside?—Delay in getting them alongside.

2500. That, of course, is a matter for which the War Office here could not be responsible?—I do not think that it was possible to arrange it; as I say, these ships came from all parts of the world, from North America, from Australia, and from New Zealand, chartered everywhere bringing out supplies of all sorts and kinds, and it would be manifestly impossible to arrange for their arrival in regular rotation.

2501. What I want to come at principally is this, that the delay in discharging cargo in South Africa was principally from physical causes, there being not sufficient quay room, for instance?—Not sufficient berthing accommodation for the number of vessels, and, as I daresay you know, it is not a nice coast.

2502. Most of it is open roadstead?—Port Elizabeth is practically an open roadstead; Durban has been very much improved, and ships have gone in there with a draught of water that could not have looked at the place twenty-two years ago, and it is the same at East London.

2503. (*Sir John Jackson.*) With regard to the water transport, I understand you are of opinion that the present arrangement, by which the Admiralty carries out that part of the work, is a good one?—It is my decided opinion that it is the best that can be arrived at because they have the best expert knowledge, and they have the expert persons to deal with the matter.

2504. It is, I take it, within your knowledge that the Government have arrangements by which they can call upon certain large vessels belonging to certain lines as armed cruisers on short notice?—Yes.

2505. Is it the fact that the Government has no such arrangement with these steamship lines, by which they can call promptly for such vessels, if they are at English ports, for the purpose of transport?—I think that is a question that had better be asked of the Director of Transports, because, as the Admiralty representative, he is the proper person to give evidence on that point.

2506. Sir John Edge referred to the fact of the very inadequate accommodation at Cape Town, mainly for

the discharge of cargoes, and that I take it applied to the ports on the East Coast as well?—Port Elizabeth is an open roadstead fairly protected from the south-west; of course, there is no question of the berthing there, and it is simply a question of the sufficiency of boats and so on for unloading the ships.

2507. The ships there discharge into barges?—They discharge into lighters.

2508. At Cape Town, during times when the weather was fairly quiet, was it the system to discharge into barges?—No.

2509. The ships always went to the quays?—To the docks, I believe.

2510. Was there any particular reason why, if they had a sufficient number of barges, while vessels were discharging at the quays, other vessels could not have lain in the bay and discharged into barges, such barges being unloaded, of course, at berths where there would be comparatively a small depth of water?—I do not think they had any organisation for that; I do not think it is the practice of the port from my own recollection, and I should say it was an exceedingly dangerous place to attempt it because it is exposed to very violent gales.

2511. With regard to the delay in unloading at Cape Town, was there not wharfage accommodation at the Admiralty Harbour at Simons Town, where the materials for war were being discharged and carried 20 miles by rail?—I do not think you would have saved much by that, because you would have had to come up on to your line at Cape Town.

2512. That is, of course, only 20 or 30 miles; it is a short run from Simons Town?—Yes, it is not long.

2513. If they had accommodation at Simons Town I take it that a great many of these large vessels could have discharged there?—I do not think you would have gained anything by it; you would not have eased your railway at all.

2514. No, you would not have eased your railway, but if you had, for instance, a dozen ships waiting to get a quay berth at Cape Town, and you could have sent half a dozen round to Simons Town, and there had been proper unloading jetties there, these ships could have unloaded at Simons Town?—I have never been at Simons Town; but as far as I know there is only the accommodation for the Naval Station.

2515. I believe the accommodation at present is very limited, but the question I put was that had there been proper accommodation there for discharging merchant vessels, that, to a great extent, would have got over the difficulty as regards Cape Town?—It might have diminished the demurrage.

2516. And would have got the material through on to the railway quicker?—Yes; but it would not have helped you in getting your stuff away from the base.

2517. Owing to the congested state of the railway?—That is so.

2518. Of course, it appears with regard to the delays at this end that any delays that occurred in your Department in getting things forward were mainly due to the delays in getting authority to spend the money?—Such delays as there were; but there were no great delays.

2519. With regard to supplies being arranged in South Africa, in the event of good opportunities occurring for the purchase of food stuffs there, could the senior officers in charge make contracts for such food stuffs without communicating with London?—Certainly, and they did so until the supply assumed the magnitude it did, and then we were obliged to take it into our own hands, because we might have been buying the one against the other. Before the War the troops in South Africa were supplied under purely local contracts, and these continued, as Colonel Clayton or Colonel Dunne will be able to explain to you, and were largely used; but I can call to mind several instances in the course of the War when we found that it did not answer to allow the officers in South Africa to make contracts. We found they were contracting for articles which the Government wished for specific reasons should not be bought from certain countries. I can give you a case in point. South Africa wanted potatoes, and they made a large local contract for potatoes, which the local contractor procured from Germany; it was objected to in the House of Commons that these potatoes should be obtained from a foreign country, and in consequence of that, I remember well, we had to tell them that they must not make any of these large local contracts for importation of over-sea goods without reference to the Contract Department in the War Office.

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2520. Where did the beef come from principally?—Do you mean the live or the preserved?

2521. The live?—The live was local.

2522. And the preserved?—From America, from Australia, and New Zealand, and all parts wherever it could be procured; but, again, that is only general evidence, and the Director of Contracts will tell you exactly where it was procured from. It was generally from America, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and so on.

2523. Going back to the question I put on this subject at first, even if there appeared to the officers out at the Cape a very favourable opportunity of buying preserved beef or flour out there, in practice they would not be able to make that contract without doing it through London?—They have to report all their contracts, but when the supplies that have been sent out during the War are exhausted the system of local contract will be returned to.

2524. During the War, I repeat again, if an officer there had the opportunity of getting a good, satisfactory supply and making a favourable contract, would it in practice be necessary for him not to take that opportunity, but to allow the matter to be dealt with entirely through London?—If he could make a favourable contract, he could make it and then report; but he was told not to do so for over-sea supplies.

2525. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) I think you told us that the Admiralty were pressing for the horse fittings, or, rather, I suppose, for money to purchase them or the order to make them, some time previously to the authority being given. Are not any of these horse fittings kept in store?—Not of the new horse fittings; there was a certain number of the old pattern, but the old pattern were very much more expensive, and took much longer to fit.

2526. In the case of a mobilisation outfit the horse fittings would naturally be part of it, I presume?—Yes.

2527. And, as far as you are aware at present, are any steps being taken for these horse fittings to be kept ready in the future?—Yes.

2528. To what extent, do you remember?—Only a comparatively few days after this Conference a recommendation was made as to a specific kind of horse fittings, but that has never been formally approved by the Secretary of State, although we have been using them practically throughout the War, because no more of the old class of fittings were made. When that is approved the Conference is to assemble again, just to say whether they can suggest any improvement on the class of fittings from the experience gained throughout the War. I do not think myself there will be any change on any material point, but when they send in their report I shall put a paper in for the final approval of the Secretary of State, and then we shall keep a reserve of those fitments in hand, as was done in the case of the old ones.

2529. And that reserve you think will be to the extent of an Army Corps?—I cannot say exactly what it will be, but it should certainly be at least that.

2530. In connection with the landing of stores in South Africa, under whose Department is that in the field? Does it belong to a branch of your Department in the field, for instance?—I had no Department in the field; it was carried out under officers of the General Staff.

2531. They are told off by the General in Command?—Yes; formerly, in fact quite recently, as you know, all our officers were educated in General Staff duties, and were allotted either to what are called the A duties or the B duties, the A duties being generally speaking those of discipline and administration, and the B duties those of supply and transport.

2532. In the mobilisation of an Army Corps for service in the field, does it follow that the necessary provisions and munitions of war and so on are supplied also at the same time to certain transports, or is that a

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separate order?—We send out large quantities in the large ships with the troops.

2533. And that is part and parcel of the mobilisation scheme?—Yes.

2534. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I think you told us that Colonel Clayton would give evidence as regards the transport in South Africa?—Yes.

2535. Was that in the Cape or in Natal?—In Cape Colony principally.

2536. Will there be anyone who can speak as to transport in Natal? Whom do you recommend?—I should recommend Sir Edward Ward, because he was the senior Army Service Officer Corps there, and was in Ladysmith, and no man can give you better information.

2537. And that would combine both the transport and the stacking of stores at Durban, and so on?—Yes.

2538. Passing for a moment to the old Army Board, of which you spoke just now, you said that it was attended by the Assistant Under Secretary and by the Accountant-General?—Yes.

2539. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary did not attend that, I think?—No.

2540. Never to your knowledge?—No.

2541. I suppose the Assistant Under-Secretary and the Accountant-General are the financial advisers of the Secretary of State?—The Accountant-General. The Assistant Under-Secretary is not a financial adviser.

2542. Who are the other financial advisers besides the Accountant-General?—The Financial Secretary is the head of it; he is the Parliamentary officer, and then there is the Accountant-General and the officers of his branch; they are the financial advisers. You might like to know that the change from the Commander-in-Chief's Committee to the Army Board was made on the 11th September; the Assistant Under-Secretary of State and the Accountant General were added then.

2543. Coming once more to this question of the Conference between the Admiralty and the War Office, I think £25,000, roughly, was the sum wanted to carry out the proposals as to fitments?—Yes, it is in the Proceedings of the Conference.

2544. What I want chiefly to know is, could that money have been expended on that object without any great publicity?—From the publicity that is given nowadays to everything, I almost doubt it.

2545. But a certain amount of preparation was made in July, 1899, soon afterwards?—Yes.

2546. And, following that same principle, there was publicity given to those preparations?—Yes.

2547. Then coming again to the 22nd September, when the more pressing portions of your wants were authorised, what proportion would that bear to the whole, roughly? Would it be a half, a quarter, or a third?—I will give you the proportion at once. I think it is about one-tenth, but I cannot at the moment find the reference. My impression is that the full amount was over six millions.

2548. Still, the spending of that amount involved publicity, of course?—I do not think it involved any great publicity as far as my department was concerned.

2549. But more, say, than the spending of £25,000 would have done in the previous June?—Yes, necessarily.

2550. I think, if I remember right, some of the Army Service Corps were sent out in August, were they not, or early in September?—A few.

2551. Can you remember the earliest date?——

2552. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Were not all arms sent out during July, August, and September up to the date of the 22nd September, when a large expenditure was allowed; I find that over 6,000 men, including six battalions of Infantry, had left before the 22nd of September?—Yes.

2553. There were Army Service Corps and Royal Engineers sent out; how were those provided for if no funds had been voted? The Manchester Regiment and others went out prior to the sanction of this expenditure?—Authority must have been given for that, but that represents a very limited amount; of course, we could not send them without paying for them. I alluded in my evidence to the fact that they had been proceeding prior to that date.

2554. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Whatever the reason may have been for only granting a portion on the 22nd September and not the remainder till the 29th, the desire to avoid publicity could not have been the reason?—I cannot say what the reason was, it is not within my knowledge.

2555. You had sent out Army Service Corps men before?—Yes, we had been sending some troops the whole time.

2556. You mentioned your anxiety soon after you took office at the outbreak of the war, but at that time it was not contemplated sending more than one Army Corps?—No.

2557. I believe the provision made by Parliament was that we should always be ready to send at short notice two Army Corps abroad, and a Cavalry Division?—For this war?

2558. No, under the old system?—You are referring to Mr. Stanhope's Memorandum?

2559. No, I am referring to the system which existed at the time of the Session of 1899?—If I recollect right, in the Memorandum of Mr. Stanhope, which is the general basis of what might be required abroad, I think it was stated that we were not likely to send a force abroad of a greater strength than two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division and the necessary Line of Communication troops.

2560. Then it was a standing consideration in the War Office that we might possibly have to send two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division?—Yes.

2561. But at the time you took office and at the time of the outbreak of war, it was not contemplated sending abroad more than one Army Corps?—Apparently not, from the proceedings of the Army Board.

2562. Might I ask from what your anxiety arose?—My anxiety arose as to whether we should be able to get the supplies for this force out to South Africa in sufficient time to keep the supplies going out there, because I did not know personally what the food reserves in the country were, and I knew it took time to get supplies there. I was exceedingly anxious that we should be able to feed them.

2563. In the case of a larger war—I do not mean larger than the war turned out to be, but a larger war than was anticipated then—a war that would have taken two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division, your anxiety would have been doubled?—Yes, with this exception, that in such a war my anxiety would have been in proportion to the food supply of the country they were going to, and the distance.

2564. Still there would have been a very much larger number of men and horses to feed?—Yes, but I think my anxiety would diminish according to the country, the distance from the base to which supplies would have to be sent and the numbers. As I have said in that Supply Statement, we were feeding on the 1st June, 1902, in South Africa, roughly, 330,000 men and 260,000 animals.

2565. I would thoroughly have understood your anxiety if you had known what the war was to develop into, but that was something very different from the anticipation?—I was anxious about it because I was suddenly pitchforked into the place and found all this going on, and you cannot pick up the threads of such an administration in a day or two.

2566. Taking your present position, are you satisfied with things as they are now for the future?—Yes.

2567. Under the present provisions made?—Yes.

2568. There is one question I would like to ask you about these contracts from over-sea. You said that the authorities in South Africa were requested not to make contracts for over-sea supplies?—Yes, because we might be bidding against each other.

2569. And also on account of political considerations?—Yes.

2570. Taking those political considerations, can you remember any case in which delay took place owing to

our refusing a tender from a foreign supplier and giving it instead to a British supplier—or a member of the Empire ?—I cannot at the moment; there may have been such a case. If you have any particular case which you can tell me of I can get up the details, but I cannot remember any particular one.

2571. Do you remember a question of motor-cars at all ?—No, because the motor-cars were supplied by the Inspector-General of Fortifications.

2572. You do not remember any case of delay ?—No, I cannot call one to mind; if there is any case you would wish to know about, if you can give me the name and approximately the date I can hunt it up.

2573. As regards this change from civilian clerks to military clerks, I quite understand that any sudden change must have been very inconvenient to you, and you wished the thing to be done gradually, but ultimately when the changes have been made and the men have shaken down into their places, will it not work as well ?—No, I would always wish to have civilian clerks in these two particular sub-divisions.

2574. Would you mind giving the ground for that ?—For instance, we get a better class of men; we sometimes want to send a man down with messages to Cook and Son or to the Admiralty, things that it is not necessary to send an officer for, and it is very much better to have a class of man who can do that properly and without giving offence or causing friction, and the old pensioner class do not understand that.

2575. I know instances to the contrary of very good men ?—I think we could get better men if we could get them from the Active List.

2576. It is from the Active List I mean ?—But we do not get them; it is from the pensioner class that we are supplied, I have said that all through. The class of men we are getting are entirely pensioners or disabled men. We have got most excellent men in the corps of staff clerks, but that is administered under the Army Service Corps; they are all employed in the active offices in districts and elsewhere. and we cannot get those clerks.

2577. You cannot get any of those men ?—No.

2578. There is only one other question I want to ask you. In reply to one question you used the phrase "consultation on paper" with regard to the War Office; what did that mean ?—I meant by that that I had put up a Minute to the Permanent Under Secretary.

2579. I suppose that is the only way really in which you, or any other head of a Department, can bring your views before anybody ?—I think you can always go and speak personally, and I have done so very largely.

2580. But in this particular case of the clerks you were asked whether you had made representations, and you said you had put in a paper ?—A paper, and also verbally.

2581. That was not in the answer ?—No; the paper remains.

2582. But very often an interview is more effective ?—I do not suppose anybody takes more advantage of personal interviews than I do.

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2583. Do you think that generally in the War Office, between the civil and military sides, and also with the Secretary of State, there is full facility for enforcing views by personal interviews ?—Absolute, and personally I wish to record my opinion that I have always met with the greatest assistance from the civil side of the War Office.

2584. Going a step further, when it comes to discussions with the Treasury as to what shall be allowed and what shall not be allowed in the way of money, are the heads of the Military Departments able to impress their views at all at the interviews that always take place before things are passed ?—Do you mean at the Treasury?

2585. Yes ?—No; personally I have never been to the Treasury, but I try to impress my view on the Financial Secretary.

2586. So that your view has to go second-hand to the Treasury; it has to pass through an intermediary ?—Yes.

2587. Supposing there is something you consider very important, involving a large amount, and yet which is a very urgent question, and it is refused first, and then it is pressed again by the Financial Secretary on behalf of the War Office at the interview that would take place at the end, you would not be present to put your views personally ?—No.

2588. (*Chairman.*) You mentioned at the beginning of your evidence your strong belief that the present arrangement with the Admiralty was most satisfactory ?—Yes.

2589. But I understand that has not always been the view at the War Office ?—No. I said in my evidence that there had been very divergent opinions on the subject.

2590. I did not understand from what you said that it had been raised so lately as 1899 acutely; was that not the case ?—I forget what the latest date is.

2591. Was it not the case that in June, 1899, the whole question was re-opened, and it formally came up for decision whether matters should be left as they stood or not ?—I have no personal knowledge of that.

2592. There is no record in the Department which you can give us ?—Yes, I can look it up and give you direct evidence upon it, but I have no personal knowledge of it.

2593. All I should like to know is whether, when the question was raised in 1899, it was so decided as to be finally decided then ?—It was left open at that time. I would like to emphasise my opinion with regard to the sea transport, that in a war of this magnitude, or anything like it, we must necessarily go to the Mercantile Marine or to the Navy to get the men to do the work for us, and, therefore, as I said in my evidence, why not go to a Government Department, the Admiralty, which has experts and people above suspicion to do the work for us?

2594. You have nothing else you wish to add ?—No.

Recalled at Q. 2807.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

Colonel F. T. Clayton, C.B.

Colonel F. T. Clayton, C.B. Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters, called and examined.

2595. You are Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters ?—Yes.

2596. When were you appointed ?—On the 7th of April last.

2597. And before that ?—Before that I was at Aldershot—immediately before that. Previous to that I was n South Africa.

2598. When did you go to South Africa ?—I left England on the 6th October, 1899.

2599. In what capacity did you go ?—I went out in command of the *personnel* of the Army Service Corps. I had charge of all the organisation of the *personnel* of the Army Service Corps.

2600. You were in command of the first detachment that was sent out ?—Yes, I took the bulk of the Army Service Corps from Aldershot to South Africa on the 6th October.

2601. That was before the declaration of war ?—Yes.

2602. What strength did you take with you at that time ?—I took 84 officers, 20 companies, and 995 non-commissioned officers and men.

2603. And were there reinforcements sent out afterwards ?—Yes, continually, right through the War. They are all detailed; on page 9 you will find all the Transport, and on page 10 all the Supply details that went to South Africa (*vide Appendix Vol., pages* 225 *and* 226).

2604. So that in the end what was the force of the Army Service Corps ?—The total force that went out altogether is shown in Statement 3 (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 220); there were 3,367 Transport *personnel* and 1,305 Supply. and 233 officers.

2605. And that was a very large proportion of the whole of the Army Service Corps ?—It was practically the whole, you might say. There were only 31 officers of the corps left for stations at home and abroad, and practically no men at all.

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2606. You practically used every man that was available?—Yes, every man.

2607. When you arrived in South Africa what was the position of affairs that you found then with regard to your duties?—A number of officers had been sent out before I arrived, and they had begun the organisation necessary to meet the requirements of the large force coming out. They had practically made preparations with regard to purchasing wagons and mules, so far as they could, in South Africa, and also hiring wagons.

2608. At what date, do you know, did they begin those preparations?—They had been going on for some months in a small way; ever since July they had been equipping the regiments as they landed with regimental transport. Each regiment, as it landed, was equipped as it went up country.

2609. Those regiments were sent out before the Army Corps?—Yes, every regiment was practically equipped with transport as it arrived in South Africa.

2610. With the whole of its regimental transport?—With the whole of its regimental transport so far as it could be made up out there; that is to say, ammunition carts you could not get out there, but then we improvised, we converted Scotch carts into ammunition carts.

2611. Did you also prepare mule transport and ox transport?—Not ox transport. The regimental transport was all mule.

2612. And was anything provided for those regiments outside the regimental transport?—I do not quite follow what you mean by anything outside the regimental transport.

2613. In a Field Army there is an addition to the regimental transport, is there not?—Certainly.

2614. But these regiments that were sent out before the declaration of war received their regimental transport but nothing else?—Not at the time.

2615. Were there no preparations made in South Africa for the collection of other transport beyond the regimental transport?—Yes.

2616. Do you know to what extent at the time you went out?—Yes, before I landed a contract was made for 700 ox-wagons.

2617. That was entirely outside the regimental transport?—Entirely outside the regimental transport.

2618. And when were those ox-wagons to be ready?—I think the ox-wagons were to be ready early in December.

2619. They would not have been ready then when the Army Corps first landed?—Some of them would have been, but they were all to be complete by early in December, I think. I am only speaking from memory, you know.

2620. The Army Corps started from England at the end of October?—Yes, it did.

2621. And the beginning of November?—Yes.

2622. When did it begin to arrive at Cape Town?—Somewhere about the middle of November, I think

2623. At that time would they have had any transport available besides the regimental transport?—Yes, a large quantity of transport was available then.

2624. Besides the regimental transport?—Besides the regimental transport. Our Transport Depôts were in full work on three different lines of advance.

2625. And was the regimental transport for those regiments that came out with the Army Corps provided locally, or did they bring it from England?—The only things that regiments were supposed to bring from England were water-carts and ammunition carts. Some regiments did not actually bring them in the ships they came in, but they came very soon afterwards, and for those regiments that had no water-carts or ammunition carts we improvised them out there. We gave them a Scotch cart fitted up as an ammunition cart according to a local pattern, and we improvised a water-cart for them.

2626. Did they not bring any mule wagons?—No, no mule wagons were sent with any units at all.

2627. Not from England?—Afterwards. The mule wagons did not begin to arrive till the beginning of December.

2628. For a force in South Africa are not mule wagons part of the regimental transport?—Yes, but we got local mule wagons; we bought up every mule wagon we could.

2629. Was that because they could not send them out from England?—Partly because they could not send them out from England in the time, and another reason is that the mule wagon in South Africa is, of course, adapted to the country, it is built out there, but you could not obtain them in the large quantities that we wanted. We bought every mule wagon that we could, but they could not manufacture them as quickly as they could in England.

2630. We have had some evidence that there was some delay in converting the wagons in England for mule draught, owing to delay in sanction being obtained for the expense?—Yes, but that only refers, I think, to wagons for the Artillery and to Engineer vehicles, that had to be fitted with the South African brake, and some of them had to be fitted for pole draught as well.

2631. They refer to those two things, the pole draught and the brake certainly. Does not that refer to regimental transport at all?—No, not at all, not so far as I understand regimental transport.

2632. A force in the field could not move without these mule-wagons?—No, but we had them ready. Every regiment was equipped the moment they landed at the Cape.

2633. That is your evidence, that every regiment was equipped the moment they landed at the Cape?—So far as Cape Colony was concerned, every regiment was equipped when it landed. There was absolutely not an hour's delay. Transport was waiting for them before they arrived at the Mobilisation Station, or rather the Concentration Station, in that country. There were three Concentration Stations in Cape Colony, viz., De Aar, Naauwpoort, and Queenstown.

2634. Both carts and animals?—Yes, everything was ready for them.

2635. For all the regiments of the Army Corps?—Every one as they landed. The only delay at all, and that was but a slight delay, was on the Natal side; but then that is accounted for easily.

2636. Then there were no obstacles thrown in your path, the Army Service Corps in South Africa, by any delay in obtaining sanction for expenditure there?—No, we were allowed to do what we liked; we were given a free hand to purchase anything we wanted.

2637. As soon as you arrived in the country?—The Director of Transport was in the country before I arrived, and he made large preparations before we came out with all the Army Service Corps.

2638. Yes, of course, you did not arrive until the 26th of October?—No.

2639. We have had it in evidence that sanction was given to expenditure before that?—Yes.

2640. You do not know how soon the Director of Transport got authority to spend money for extraordinary purchases in South Africa?—I think it is all in the telegrams which are attached to this statement. The different authorities that he got to spend money are given in those telegrams; that is at page 6 (*vide Appendix Vol*, *page* 224). On the 6th of October he was authorised to hire the 700 ox-wagons, and it was all completed on the 12th October.

2641. But to take a special date, before the 22nd of September, was any special provision made in South Africa outside the provision necessary for the regiments not belonging to the Army Corps which went out?—I do not think so. I am only speaking from hearsay. I do not think provision was made then.

2642. That is before your time?—Yes, there is a telegram on the 2nd of September. The Secretary of State wired to the General Officer Commanding at the Cape for probable estimate of transport required for an additional force of 15,500 men if sent to the Cape, and asked for information about obtaining what was required. The General Officer Commanding replied on the 4th of September that the ox-wagons and harness could probably be obtained in two months; 3,000 mules could only be counted on in two months.

2643. But that is only an estimate?—That is only n estimate.

2644. There is no authority to act on that estimate? —No, you could not make any preparations if you had ot the money for it.

2645. Quite so. Do you think that if there had een money to act on that estimate on the 2nd of September it would have put you in any more favourable osition later on?—I think it would have lessened our ifficulties, but we managed to do everything that vas required of us; in spite of everything we managed o get the transport; but it would have been very nuch better, of course, if we had been able to make reparations earlier.

2646. In what way would it have been better?—Our equipment, so to speak, would have been more omplete. We had to improvise. As I say with regard o the ammunition carts and water-carts we had to mprovise to do the best we could.

2647. And if you had had authority a month, or wo months, sooner that would not have been necessary, nd you would have had a proper equipment?—Yes.

2648. Was part of the transport that you collected t the Cape transferred to Natal when Sir Redvers Buller went there?—Very little; only mules, a few nules went round and mule-wagons, but in Natal hey equipped them with ox transport principally; t is an ox transport country, which the Cape is not.

2649. Those requirements of Sir Redvers Buller's orce were transferred to Natal on very immediate rders?—Yes.

2650. Did they find transport when they arrived n Natal?—No, there was a slight delay as I say, but I cannot speak to actual figures; there was a slight delay in Natal owing to a large portion of the force being transferred to Natal.

2651. Suddenly?—Yes, but it was a very slight one; they collected ox-wagons very quickly and equipped them, and sent them up—up the country.

2652. Were those 700 ox-wagons for which there was a contract partly for Natal as well?—No, entirely for Cape Colony.

2653. Then if these regiments which were transferred to Natal did not take with them the transport you had collected for them, I suppose you had reserves in Cape Colony?—Yes.

2654. And those reserves were available when the additional troops came out with Lord Roberts?—Yes.

2655. When Lord Roberts came out there was a reorganisation of the transport arrangements?—Yes.

2656. Could you describe to the Commission what took place?—When Lord Roberts arrived he objected to the system on which we supplied transport. The system briefly was this: That every regiment had its full complement of transport to enable it to move anywhere carrying one day's supply with it. With each Brigade was a Company of the Army Service Corps, which formed the supply column of that Brigade, carrying the extra day's supply, and also found all the artificers and mechanics necessary for the repair of all vehicles in the brigade, and all the farriers necessary for shoeing mules and horses in the Brigade.

2657. When you say an extra day's supply do you mean a second day's supply for each regiment?—A second day's supply for each regiment in the Brigade. Lord Roberts wished to withdraw regimental transport from units and form it into companies, as he considered that if a regiment had its transport you could not take it away from the regiment if you wanted to use it for some other purpose, when the regiment was halted, and did not want to use it. He thought it was necessary, therefore, to withdraw the regimental transport and form it into transport companies. These companies were formed of 49 wagons each, and they were practically sufficient to supply the transport to the Brigade. When a unit wanted its transport and had to move, it had to draw its transport from one of these transport companies; and when it halted it was supposed to give the transport back again to the transport company. That is practically what the difference was, instead of keeping it altogether it simply drew its transport from the transport company, and gave it back when it was halted for any length of time.

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2658. And was the organisation (for I suppose it required some organisation of these transport companies) quite a new thing?—No; we sent out 40 transport companies, and we had 40 transport companies there in the country.

2659. Then what was the change?—The change was simply that instead of having general supervision in the Brigade or Divisional Troops at headquarters, the transport companies took over in addition to their supply column wagons, all the wagons of the regiments or units belonging to the division or the brigade as well; they took them over and took them on charge as company wagons, and then issued them back again to each regiment or unit as required.

2660. That did not require any additional *personnel*? —An addition to the *personnel* was required generally, because we lost the services of the regimental transport officers.

2661. How did you supply their place?—We had Militia officers, Indian Staff Corps officers, Artillery officers—officers of every branch of the Service attached to the Army Service Corps.

2662. Attached for the special purpose?—Yes, for the transport.

2663. And men?—Extra Non-commissioned officers. Once we could not get men; we had to do without them. We used up every man we had got, and then we finally split the transport companies into two, made two transport companies out of one.

2664. In the first case you practically doubled the number of wagons which your transport company had under charge?—Yes, quite so.

2665. And that was done for the convenience, I suppose, of dividing again?—Yes.

2666. But still under general control?—Yes.

2667. What is your opinion of the working of that system?—Well, I certainly think that the organisation when we first started was best. The organisation as laid down when the Army Corps first left England.

2668. Regimental transport?—Yes, certainly.

2669. For what reason?—For this reason, that first of all you have a trained transport officer in each regiment. You give the transport to the regiment, and they take an interest in it and look after it, they look after their mules, and they look after their wagons, and they keep them efficient. If when a regiment moves it has not any transport, and it draws the wagons from any transport company for the particular march it is going on, it does not care anything about them, it takes no interest in them at all. After it finishes its march it gives them back to the transport company again. They do not belong to the regiment, and therefore the regiment do not take any interest in them.

2670. They do not necessarily have the same wagons or mules in each case?—No, not necessarily under the reorganisation system.

2671. And that would diminish their interest?—It did, undoubtedly.

2672. But you stated that the reason for it was in order to augment the powers of the brigade as a whole by, in case of the regiment halting, the transport becoming available?—Yes, that was the reason given for doing it, so that a regiment when it halted should not have transport with it which was practically no use to it. But, as regards that, I think there was a wrong impression, because the system we always work on in peace, and the system we always carry out in war, is that we have absolute control over all the transport whether it is regimental or otherwise, and if we want to withdraw regimental transport from any particular unit, when it is not using it, we can do it at once. And it was practically done in South Africa.

2673. Was that laid down in the regulations?—Yes, that is laid down in the regulations (*see the King's Regulations, Paragraph* 1435), and it is what we always carry out in peace. In peace time the small amount of regimental transport that every unit has in its possession is absolutely at the disposal of the Army Service Corps to do what they like with. That is carried out always in peace, and we always follow it in war.

2674. The necessity for the change did not arise

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from a deficiency in the general amount of transport available ?—No, not in my opinion.

2675. You think you had enough transport ?—We had plenty of transport.

2676. Even for a march like that to Bloemfontein ?—Yes, quite.

2677. Were there not inconveniences that arose on that march from deficiency of transport ?—Yes, but that I think was accounted for by the capture of 200 wagons at Waterval Drift; it was not the fault of the organisation. Unfortunately the enemy captured 200 wagons of the supply park.

2678. You think if that had not been done the inconveniences would not have arisen ?—I am certain they would not.

2679. In speaking of transport are you speaking simply of transport for supplies or for all purposes ?—For everything.

2680. I think we were told that at Paardeberg it was impossible to bring up pontoons which might have been of great use on that occasion owing to a deficiency of transport. Do you think that arose simply from the loss of the 200 wagons ?—No, I should not think so. I did not hear of that at all, out there, I must say. I did not hear of any difficulty in bringing up the pontoons. I do not see that there should have been any difficulty.

2681. Do you know whether, as a matter of fact, they had pontoons with them ?—Yes, there were pontoons out there.

2682. On the march, I mean ?—Do you mean at Paardeberg ?

2683. Yes ?—I could not tell you whether they actually had them there, but I do not see what difficulty there should have been in bringing up the pontoons to Paardeberg.

2684. The difficulty was (I am speaking from recollection of what the witness stated) that there was deficiency of transport ?—I have not any recollection that there was any demand for animals to bring up those pontoons.

2685. I suppose the strain on your transport was perhaps at its severest during that march ?—Certainly it was, and, of course, the loss of these 200 wagons at the beginning of the march was a terrible blow, and it had a very far-reaching effect.

2686. What was done to make good the loss of those wagons ?—We collected wagons wherever we could. We did our utmost to collect every wagon we could lay our hands upon.

2687. No doubt; but the loss, I suppose, would have had to be dealt with immediately; you had to make good the supplies which were lost on that occasion for the maintenance of the Army ?—Yes.

2688. Were some of those wagons retaken ?—Not until after the troops got to Bloemfontein, and they found some of the wagons. None of the 200, so far as I know, were recaptured at the time; they went clean away.

2689. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I was under the impression that a large number were found ?—Found afterwards; but it was after we got to Bloemfontein. They were no use to us then.

2690. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Were the cattle and wagons all taken ?—Yes, the cattle were captured first. The cattle went out to graze, and they practically drove the cattle away and then they had the wagons at their mercy.

2691. (*Chairman.*) Was this system of transport that was adopted on that occasion in force throughout the War ?—Yes, after that except in Natal. The system was not altered in Natal with Sir Redvers Buller's force; he stuck to the original organisation.

2692. It remained the same there ?—Yes.

2693. But you were not in Natal ?—No, I was not in Natal, although I was practically in touch with them all the time. I still had to look after all the *personnel* in Natal, the Army Service Corps *personnel*, as well as in Cape Colony, and everywhere else.

2694. Did you accompany the Army, or were you stationary ?—I was stationary most of the time, but I had to travel about. All the reorganisation of the transport on the Modder River line for Lord Roberts' advance to Bloemfontein I carried out personally myself. I went up the Modder River and reorganised the transport, that is to say, I withdrew the regimental transport and formed it into companies.

2695. After you got to Bloemfontein, of course you got the railway to help you ?—Yes.

2696. Then your work was more with the independent columns—the transport work ?—Yes.

2697. You had to send out from the railway ?—Yes, from the rail head wherever it was.

2698. Then your evidence is that the transport arrangements you consider were satisfactorily met throughout the War ?—Certainly. Of course, what we did suffer from was want of officers, want of non-commissioned officers and artificers; that we suffered from right through the War.

2699. But you took every available man you could get ?—Yes; but we had to take untrained men, and we could not find the artificers, and we could not find the non-commissioned officers.

2700. What I meant was that that would seem to point to the whole *personnel* of the Army Service Corps being insufficient ?—Quite so.

2701. Do you consider that for sending out an Army Corps or two Army Corps your strength ought to be increased ?—It has been increased.

2702. It has been increased ?—Yes, considerably; it was found quite inadequate to work with,

2703. With the Reserves, as shown on this Paper (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 220), the *personnel* was 4,419; what does it stand at now ?—That is the transport *personnel* calling up the Reserves. But now the transport *personnel* in peace is 4,447.

2704. Without the Reserves ?—Yes; and the reserve at the present rate would be 120 per cent. more than that, which would bring us up to about 10,000.

2705. That is a distinct augmentation that has been made in the Service ?—Yes, that was in 1900 they increased the Army Service Corps; but, of course, the increase is not complete yet.

2706. Is it a permanent increase ?—Yes.

2707. You said that is only transport *personnel*; does the same thing apply to the Army Service Corps as a whole ?—Yes, to the Supply, exactly the same. We were as short in Supply as we were in Transport.

2708. And it has been increased proportionately ?—Yes, to a certain extent; the Supply is not quite such a big increase as the Transport.

2709. In Statement 4, on page 6 (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 222), you give the vehicles and harness which were purchased. Have you anything to add as to the figures contained in that statement ?—No, I have nothing to add to that; that was taken from the records at the War Office.

2710. And with regard to Statement 5, were the ox wagons hired ?—Yes.

2711. That was done under the orders of the General Officer Commanding ?—Yes, the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications. The Director of Transport made all these contracts under his orders.

2712. I see the first is on the 12th of October ?—Yes.

2713. Were you consulted with regard to these contracts ?—No, the actual making of the contracts did not come into my office at all, but I know all about them, the reasons for them, and so on.

2714. Do you consider the rates satisfactory ?—Yes, under the conditions. The first contract, you must remember, was made under most extraordinary conditions.

2715. What were they ?—In the first place, the first contract was made just as the War broke out, and the whole of the ox wagon country, which is up by Bechuanaland and that district, was cut off completely by the siege of Kimberley, and all the wagons up there we could not touch; and then all the country we had to look to at all was the eastern part of the Colony, because all round Naauwpoort and De Aar we had nothing but the Karroo bush, which is practically a desert, and

although they worked to a certain extent with ox wagons, there is no very large number of them to be got. And, therefore, the price undoubtedly was high; as you see, it was reduced afterwards. But if we had been able to obtain wagons from Bechuanaland and that district, no doubt we should have got them cheaper to begin with. But, comparing the price with the prices paid in previous wars, I do not think it was out of the way.

2716. And did the contractor carry out his contract satisfactorily?—Yes. Julius Weil carried out his contracts well.

2717. He supplied good wagons and good animals?—Good animals and a splendid staff to supervise them. He never gave any trouble.

2718. Had you the whole 1,400 wagons mentioned here at one time in use?—Yes, and, counting wagons that were commandeered, far more than that. You see the commandeered wagons are not shown there.

2719. On what terms did you get commandeered wagons?—We commandeered them and paid a certain price for them; what their value was.

2720. You took possession of them?—We took possession.

2721. And how was the price fixed?—It was fixed according to the value of the wagon, what condition it was in; there was a certain scale laid down for that. I cannot tell you exactly from memory now what it was, but it was fixed at a very reasonable price.

2722. Who took them over, who was in charge of the commandeered wagons?—We had various officers out in the different districts commandeering who took these wagons over; and if they commandeered a wagon from a farmer he was given a receipt for it stating what he would be paid for it. They valued the wagon, and if there were oxen, they valued the oxen.

2723. What districts are you referring to?—That was in Cape Colony In the Orange Free State, of course, if they took possession of a wagon they gave a receipt for it just the same, but it was not settled until after the War, though they gave a receipt at the time.

2724. When you got into the Orange Free State you did take possession of anything that you wanted in that way?—Yes, wagons, forage, and so on.

2725. Statement 6 (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 224), is a summary of the principal instructions, which are set out in great detail; you would be better able, perhaps, if there is anything that ought to be noticed, to point it out to us?—They are simply copies of the principal telegrams which passed between the War Office and South Africa; I do not think there is anything particular for me to notice in them; they show, in fact, the steps that were taken to provide the additional troops as they were sent out from England with transport. Whenever an addition was made to the troops or any addition either of wagons or harness was sent from England, a telegram would be sent to the Cape asking if they could provide transport, and if they could provide it, it was done.

2726. Therefore they bear out the statement that you made at the beginning that you did provide sufficient transport for the troops as they came out?—Certainly; I know of no delay anywhere through want of transport.

2727. Are those the whole of the statements for which you are responsible?—Yes.

2728. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) In the first paragraph of Statement 3 (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 220), there is a reference to a certain number of officers and men being sent out; could you tell me approximately what force of troops those numbers correspond to?—Six companies; they were practically to complete two divisions; there are three companies to each division.

2729. Then a little lower down in the same paragraph, what would the number of wagons, mule wagons, ox wagons, and Scotch carts mentioned there correspond to; would they be for two divisions?—Those are the numbers actually in possession of the troops in South Africa on the 30th of September.

2730. But what number of troops would that be sufficient for, roughly?—Roughly speaking, about six brigades.

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2731. May we say two divisions again?—Rather more; three divisions.

2732. Then we will say nearly three divisions?—Yes, but that included a certain amount for supply columns; I suppose there were nearly three divisions, counting the Indian contingent, there.

2733. I think you said that later on, after you arrived, there was a difficulty in getting mule wagons in the Colony?—I could not say exactly a difficulty; you see they cannot manufacture them so quickly as they can at home.

2734. But I am speaking about the actual existing supply, not manufacture?—I do not think there was any delay.

2735. I did not take a note of your answer, but I thought you said that later on your Colonial source was exhausted?—Manufacturing sources I think I meant. We could have got plenty of wagons second-hand, and that sort of thing, and, in fact, we did have them later.

2736. On the whole, you do not disagree with the telegram from the General Officer Commanding at the Cape of the 27th of September that the supply of local wagons was practically inexhaustible?—No, I do not think I do.

2737. Do you agree with it?—Yes, I do, in a way. I think the supply would have been inexhaustible if we had taken anything we could have got hold of. The supply of new wagons was of course exhaustible.

2738. At any rate there was, you say, a sufficient supply of good wagons and carts?—Yes; you see we were never really pressed. It we had had to go out and commandeer everything to begin with we could have got any number, but we did not do that.

2739. When did you begin to do that?—Not until we got into the Free State, and after that we commandeered north of the Orange River; but that was principally so that they should not fall into the hands of the enemy.

2740. But north of Cape Colony did you not commandeer before that date?—I do not think we commandeered before April or May, 1900.

2741. You must have suffered some inconvenience from not doing so?—No, we did not.

2742. You had sufficient without?—Yes.

2743. I see you had 20 traction engines and 60 trucks sent out; perhaps you remember that?—Yes.

2744. Were they satisfactory?—To a certain extent; the coal and water was always a difficulty. They were very useful, very useful indeed in some of the places, but the coal and water stations are a difficulty.

2745. When you got into the Orange Free State you found a difficulty in obtaining fuel of course?—Not coal.

2746. You carried your coal up?—There are certain coal mines in the Free State in the north.

2747. I am not speaking of the north; I mean in the south of the Free State, after you crossed the Orange River?—Yes.

2748. Coming back to this question of regimental transport, it has been stated to us that under the system which you prefer the force could not leave the railway for any number of days; do you agree with that?—No, I entirely disagree with it.

2749. The regiment had only one day's supply with them?—Two days' practically; one day carried and one in wagons.

2750. Will you just explain how they could leave the railway for more than one day?—There was a supply column with them, and a supply park after that. The regiment carries its two days' supply, one day on the men and one in the wagons. The supply column carries one day, and then following the supply column comes the supply park, which carries from three to any number of days you like to make it.

2751. That is from six days onwards altogether?—Yes.

2752. During Lord Methuen's advance, was there not any difficulty found in leaving the railway at all?—None whatever. He practically refused to have ox transport with him. I think this might explain that. I have here

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an extract from the diary of one of the transport officers, Major Paul, who was organising the transport of Lord Methuen's force:—"13/11/99. Arrived at De Aar from Cape Town. Wire from Captain Foster, D.A.A.G., from Orange River. 'Lord Methuen requires following units completed in regimental transport by 17th: I. Brigade, IX. Brigade, 9th Lancers, two batteries, ammunition column, bearer company, one company R.E.; he must also have 120 additional mule wagons including what can be collected from other units on this line.' I repeated this to the Director of Transport, De Aar, and added:—'Including latter collections and 30 sets 10-span harness, advised ordnance Officer here after completing Northamptons and ammunition column will only have surplus of 48 buck wagons, 30 Scotch carts, 52 sets 10-span harness, 29 sets 6-span. No wagons or harness obtainable locally. Please advise me, and also communicate direct with Lord Methuen at Orange River as to whether it is possible to send wagons and harness in time. Water-carts and ambulances deficient in any case.—14/11/99, General Wauchope took letter for me to C.S.O., Orange River, giving results of calculations, &c.—15/11/99, went myself to Orange River, saw Lord Methuen in presence of Colonel Northcott, D.A.A.G. Lord Metheun said the (mule) transport already issued was, he now found, more than he would require, as he was going to make a dash on Kimberley, and the force he was taking would carry practically no baggage—each man one blanket and half W.P. sheet; each officer two blankets and one W.P. sheet. He asked me to calculate out with Major Warner, his D.A.A.G., how many mule wagons would, under such circumstances, be required, and we made it to be four. He said he would leave three mule wagons per battalion behind at Orange River till the force returned. He was satisfied as to my arrangements for equipping the Highland Brigade, &c., with mule transport. I informed him that I should have 230 ox-wagons in the neighbourhood of De Aar on 21st of the month, and asked for his instructions. He told me he wished them to be kept south of De Aar, and on no account wanted such slow transport. He stated that he intended to push along the railway line, mending it as he went, and expected rail head to catch him up each day so that he could get all his supplies of food and ammunition that way, and he was taking two supply column companies with him (19 and 26). 4/12/99, wired to C.S.O. Modder River: 'If Modder Bridge and permanent way from Modder to Kimberley are at present useless, suggest for consideration that 50 ox-wagons complete could be railed from here to nearest siding this side of Modder Bridge, loaded there with 300,000 lbs. supplies, and trek across river into Kimberley in 36 hours. The transport would require three trains of 113 trucks in all. 100 wagons available, 6/12/99, received reply to above:—'Your number 106, railway line will be all right for Kimberley. Ox transport as suggested by you not required; C.S.O. Modder River.' G.R.C.P., 16/10/02.'

See Q. 14154.

2753. You had that communication from Major Paul on the subject of transport for Lord Methuen's advance?—Yes, we had a communication from him to the effect that Lord Methuen had practically refused to have ox transport with him. We wished him to have ox transport as a reserve, in order that if he wanted to get away from the railway, he could have done so. He refused on two occasions to have ox transport with him; he said he did not want such slow moving transport.

See Q. 14155.

2754. He took mule transport instead?—He took mule wagons.

2755. And what diminution in quantity of supplies does that mean, supposing you have mule wagons instead of ox transport?—You see, for the supply park, we had always calculated on using ox wagons, and to use mule wagons for supply park, would, of course, make a tremendous difference.

2756. What percentage of diminution would it make?—You have to carry forage for the mules.

2757. Taking all that into consideration, taking it by percentage, what would be the percentage of diminution?—I should have to work it out.

2758. Have you not any rough idea at all; I do not want to pin you to ten per cent. or twenty per cent., if it is a large diminution?—You see, first of all a mule wagon could only take 3,000 lbs.; with an ox-wagon you can get 6,000 lbs.; and then out of that 3,000 lbs. for every day, that you are away from your base the mule-wagon would want to carry at least 100 lbs. of food for the ten mules—that is 10 lbs. per mule.

2759. Then in ten days it would be reducing it to 2,000 lbs.?—Yes, if you were five days going out, and five days coming back, that would reduce it to 2,000 lbs.

2760. So that five days out and five days back there would be only one-third of the transport?—You take off one-third.

2761. No, you take off two-thirds. You have first of all 6,000 lbs. for the ox-wagons?—Yes.

2762. You bring that down to 3,000 lbs.?—Yes.

2763. You have to take 1,000 lbs. off for five days out, and 1,000 lbs. off for five days back?—Yes.

2764. That gives a net result of 2,000 lbs. instead of 6,000 lbs.?—Yes.

2765. (*Chairman.*) Does the ox transport not require any forage carried with it?—No, they graze.

2766. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Lord Roberts' advance on Bloemfontein was considerably delayed on account of transport, was it not?—No, I should say not The reorganisation was, in my opinion, the most wonderful piece of work that we did out there, and if our organisation had not been absolutely perfect before we commenced we could not have done it; we should have broken down.

2767. When once the advance had commenced. I was speaking of?—I am speaking of before the advance commenced. The reorganisation was so rapid that I consider it was the most wonderful piece of work we have ever carried out; and if our organisation had not been perfect we could never have done it—we should have broken down.

2768. Then you say that in your opinion, there was no deficiency of transport which occasioned serious delay to Lord Roberts' advance from Cape Town?—No, I believe Lord Roberts advanced on the very day he wanted to.

2769. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) When you had those central depôts prepared for the troops as they were coming out, was everything ready then?—Yes.

2770. Food?—Yes, food and everything.

2771. Including tents?—Yes; that is not in my branch—that is in the Ordnance.

2772. But so far as you know the tents were ready?—Everything was ready.

2773. And on the march, was it part of your duty to carry tents for those also?—Yes; each unit has so many ox wagons told off for tents.

2774. And you provided those ox wagons?—Yes, but they never carried tents.

2775. Then, so far as you are aware, there was no hitch in the supply of food to the Army on the march from any laxity in your Department?—Oh no, absolutely none. The troops had never been so well fed in any previous campaign.

2776. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I think you stated that there were ample supplies of wagons to be got when they were required in the Colony?—Yes, that was my opinion.

2777. Then, as I understand, at this end you stated that certain ox wagons could not be got until December?—Mule wagons.

2778. How many were sent out in December, roughly speaking?—There is a statement showing the exact number. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 222.) There were 500 mule wagons dispatched from England by the 27th of November; they would take about from sixteen to eighteen days to get out; and there were 100 general service wagons; that is 600 wagons altogether.

2779. Had any large proportion of those 600 wagons been wagons in reserve, or had you to purchase them after receiving the instructions in September?—Five hundred of them were purchased; 100 only were what we call general service wagons; those are the wagons we keep in stock.

2780. What is about the value of a mule wagon at

this end ?—We had to pay £85, I think, for them here. They were £85 each, I see, purchased at home, and £65 in South Africa.

2781. Do you think it would be a good thing in the interest of the country if we had larger reserves kept of such materials as mule wagons, traction engines, and things of that kind, which are invariably required in the case of a war ? Take, for instance, your 500 mule wagons, even if you put them at £100 apiece, it is a question of sinking £50,000 for that item, which means only £1,500 a year. May I take it that you would rather agree with my suggestion that that, as a matter of insurance, is a sensible expenditure ?—Yes, it would be. You see, we had a reserve of wagons in England, but they were not the wagons we were going to use in South Africa.

2782. No, you cannot always tell exactly what you will require ?—That is the difficulty ; you do not know what wagons you are going to use ; you do not know in what country you are going to operate. If we were going to operate, for instance, on the Continent, we should use the wagons we had in store.

2783. But, still, for the purpose of providing for the contingency of having to go to countries where mule-wagons would be required, or traction engines would be required, does it appear to you that it would be a wise precaution to take to have larger reserves in the sense I have indicated ?—Yes, I think it would be a good thing.

2784. Sir George Taubman-Goldie was speaking of fuel for traction engines ; I take it that in South Africa, when traction engines have to be used, you could have traction engines for which it would not be necessary to have coal ; you could use wood fuel or coal ?—Wood is a greater difficulty than coal.

2785. I suppose you could use grass ?—There is not much that you could use in South Africa.

2786. I suppose not. So that you were really brought down to coal ?—Yes, there is no wood.

2787. You never use oil fuel for any of these things at the present time ?—Not in South Africa. We are trying experiments now with oil.

2788. (*Sir John Edge.*) Did you arrive in South Africa before any of the Army Corps arrived ?—Yes.

2789. So that you can speak to the fact that the Army Corps was not delayed for want of transport ?—Certainly, with the exception of a slight delay in Natal, but that was a mere nothing.

2790. Can you explain the delay in Natal ?—The delay in Natal was owing to the fact that the troops which were to have landed in the Cape were diverted to Natal, and Natal was not quite prepared for them. It was all done in a few hours.

2791. You threw more troops into Natal than was expected ?—Yes. The situation at Ladysmith, you see, when Ladysmith was cut off, so changed everything that then they had to send more troops to Natal, and there was a little delay in getting the ox wagons together—but it was nothing at all.

2792. We know, of course, that the troops were on short rations after the convoy was lost ?—Yes, at Paardeberg.

2793. That was from the loss of the convoy, not from the want of transport, which had been supplied ?—Entirely. If those 200 wagons had not been captured there would have been no short rations.

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2794. Now, as to the commandeering of wagons, I think I understood you to say that you principally commandeered to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy ?—Yes, and for our own use too, to a certain extent ; but the idea was to get them away so that they would not be able to fall into the hands of the enemy.

2795. Had you to commandeer in Cape Colony ?—In the Northern part of Cape Colony, but to a very small extent.

2795.* Was that a disaffected district ?—Yes, round by Aliwal North and that part.

2796. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Is it quite clear to your mind that the deficiency of rations at Bloemfontein or in the advance was entirely due to the loss of these 200 wagons ? Did they contain food for the men entirely ?—Yes, they contained food and forage. But there was no deficiency at Bloemfontein.

2797. Nor on the advance to Bloemfontein ?—Only on the advance just at Paardeberg for a time there was a shortage for a few days ; they were on half-rations of biscuit, but they had a double ration of meat in its place.

2798. Had they at all times the meat ration when they had a deficiency of biscuits ?—Yes. But you are going to have the evidence of Sir Wodehouse Richardson to-morrow, who was there at the time, and will explain everything with regard to that exactly, because he was on the spot.

2799. Was that convoy that was lost in rear of the Army or with it ; or was it under any protection ?—I was not there at the time, but I believe there was a small escort with it.

2800. I gather that you are entirely in favour of a sort of double transport system, that is to say, a regimental transport and a general transport ?—Yes.

2801. Are you aware that that is the general system in India, that the cattle attached to a regiment are really for the time being part of the regiment ?—Quite so ; and when they are not in use they should be used for other purposes.

2802. In your knowledge, did any transport come from India—any kind of transport ?—Not in Cape Colony, but a few mules came to Natal for pack transport. I believe.

2803. Then the regiments that came from India did not bring any transport with them ?—I cannot speak to Natal whether the regiments which came from India to Natal in the first place did not bring a certain amount of transport with them. I was not there. I believe they did bring a certain amount of pack transport.

2804. With power to man it ?—Yes.

2805. But you do not know practically anything about it ?—No, I do not. I think Sir Edward Ward would be able to give you some information as to that.

2806. (*Chairman.*) Is there anything you would like to add to what you have already said ?—Nothing, thank you.

General Sir C. M. Clarke, Bart., G.C.B., recalled and further examined.

General Sir C. M. Clarke, Bart., G.C.B.

2807. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I omitted to ask you before with respect to horse fittings. You said that you keep some in reserve ?—Yes.

2808. What proportion of horse fittings do you keep in reserve ?—The actual posts and planks between each horse, in short the whole fitment.

2809. Do they not vary almost in every ship ? For instance, take the height between decks ; you put the posts right up between the decks, do you not ?—Yes.

2810. Then they must vary according to the height between decks ?—Yes, but I do not think there was formerly in the old fittings, which were the only kind of which we had a reserve, so much difference in the size of the ship that there is now, and that was one of the reasons for these new fitments, that they are a very much cheaper kind.

2811. Now, there is another thing. I have seen a good number of these ships fitted out—fitted-out ships, I mean, I have not seen them being fitted out—and in many of these ships, which are large vessels, they carry the horses on each side of the vessel, and they also carry them in a separate compartment on the same deck amidships. For instance, they carry them with heads out along the side of the ship on each side, and then in the centre between those two sides there is a large space which is also fitted up for horses ; so that, in point of fact they have four tiers of horses, you understand ?—Yes.

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2812. What I want to know is how could you have fittings in reserve which would answer that purpose?—You could have the material in reserve.

2813. Yes, the material, but the material is rough timber?—Yes, a great deal of it too, it would be a convenience to have ready cut, because for the length of the boards, there is a specific length of a stall, and you could have the great mass of it all ready perfectly well.

2814. And, of course, you could have the horse-boxes, the feed boxes I mean, in store?—Yes, a great part of the fitments could be absolutely ready, and would merely want to fit into their slots and places.

2815. However, you have all those that we have been speaking of in store?—No, I said what we had in store were only some of the old fitments I think I said in my previous evidence that the question of the reserves is being taken up now, and it is almost certain, the thing has not been absolutely approved, but it is almost certain the fitments will be of the description that we have been practically using throughout the war, which are very much simpler and less expensive.

2816. I know we shipped great quantities of horses from Sydney, but there we had to fit up each ship as it came in?—Yes, quite so; because the ships were taken up by the Admiralty there as they arrived.

Lieut.-Colone J. S. Cowans, M.V.O.

Lieut.-Colonel J. S. Cowans, M.V.O., Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters, called and examined.

2817. (*Chairman.*) You have been in the Department since 1898?—Yes, I have.

2818. Throughout the War?—Throughout the War.

2819. And during the preparations for the War?—Yes, during the preparations.

2820. And your Sub-Division is for transport, embarkations, and disembarkations?—Yes, including all the train arrangements and everything connected with them.

2821. Has that been your duty throughout?—Yes, throughout.

2822. So that you have been in correspondence with the Admiralty on the subject?—Yes, the whole time.

2823. And in 1899 I suppose you were in correspondence with the Admiralty?—Yes, constantly.

2824. What time did you begin in 1899 to consider with the Admiralty the question of the possible transport requirements for South Africa?—In the Spring really of 1899, about the time when the report of a Conference on the despatch of two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division was under consideration.

2825. There was a conference between the War Office and the Admiralty—at what date?—I think it was about April or May.

2826. The first day's proceedings were on the 14th April, I see?—Yes.

2827. And at that conference one of the matters that was taken up was the question of the stock of fittings, bedding, and horse gear?—Yes.

2828. And was it represented by the Admiralty that the stock was quite inadequate even for one corps?—Yes, it was. We were all agreed as to that, I think.

2829. That was the opinion expressed by the Admiralty in a letter of the 4th April, 1898?—Yes. For many years they had been trying to get an adequate stock of fittings. There was always a feeling at the Admiralty that they had not got sufficient stock, I believe.

2830. And that letter was laid before the conference?—Yes.

2831. The opinion of the director and the naval assistant to the director of transports was that it was reasonable to predict that the embarkation of the first Army Corps, first Cavalry Brigade, and Line of Communication troops would be completed within a month if the fitments, etc., were ready in advance?—Yes.

2832. But they noted that in one Army Corps, one Cavalry Brigade, and one Line of Communication troops alone there are 15,338 horses, and they pointed out that at that time there were in store fittings for some 9,000 horses; also that the 2,362 water-tanks in store would only suffice for some 9,000 horses?—Yes, the stock was quite inadequate for the despatch of such a force.

2833. Was it also agreed that the expenditure which would probably be requisite for the First Army Corps, the First Cavalry Brigade and Line of Communication troops to provide fittings would be £25,100?—Yes.

2834. And £72,900 for the Second Army Corps?—Yes.

2835. Or £98,000 combined?—Yes.

2836. Of which £51,000 was for stalls, £34,500 for horse gear, and £12,500 for tanks?—Yes.

2837. You also had a sub-committee which enquired into a less expensive form of fittings?—Yes, the idea was that we should use the cattle trade ships more.

2838. And was this the finding of that Committee, "The Committee recommend the retention of the stock of horse fittings at present in use, as being well adapted for use between decks when a ship is carrying a small number of horses, and a large number of men. They consider that the above alluded-to stock should be always kept up for 10,000 horses, and that it should be supplemented by the cattle-trade fittings now recommended"?—Yes, that is quite so. The old fittings were very much more elaborate than the new ones that we proposed. They were practically strong horse boxes, and it takes a much longer time to fit up a ship with them, and we would have got much fewer horses on board.

2839. And then the unanimous finding of the Committee was that "the present stock of fittings, horse gear, etc., is dangerously insufficient and altogether inadequate to ensure the rapid despatch of even one Army Corps, one Cavalry Brigade, and Line of Communication troops"?—Yes.

2840. What delay was it supposed would result if steps were not taken to supplement those fittings?—I could not myself state that; I think if you are going to examine the Director of Transports he would be able to tell you better. But certainly it would take a considerable time to lay in a stock of those fittings, because they include such things as mangers and articles of that description which would have to be got from the trade.

2841. Was there not a statement that the largest contractors for the Admiralty could only promise within one month 500 horse-stalls alone?—Yes.

2842. So that it would evidently take more than that to bring it up to the requirements?—Certainly.

2843. What happened upon the Report of that Conference?—The Report of that Committee has been submitted, but it has not been approved yet, though I am bound to say we acted upon it. If we had not done so there would have been considerable delay.

2844. You acted upon it?—Yes, we acted upon our recommendations, but they have never been really approved yet.

2845. But at what date did you act upon them?—Directly ships were taken up in October.

2846. But not till then?—No.

2847. Was there delay in consequence?—No, I do not think there was delay really because it was pointed out to Sir Redvers Buller at the time when he was talking about the order of the despatch of the different units to South Africa that we would have a certain delay in getting Cavalry ships ready. The Admiralty have always come up to their promise in the preparation of ships.

2848. But if the present stock of fittings is insufficient and altogether inadequate to ensure rapid despatch ——?—Of the old fittings.

2849. Quite so?—But the old fittings we have used very little indeed.

2850. You mean that you were able to obtain the new fittings more rapidly?—Yes, more rapidly than we could have done the old; and we have practically

used the new fittings during the War with very small modifications.

2851. Then, in consequence of that, you say that there was not serious delay in the despatch of the First Army Corps ?—No, none. The first Infantry ships were despatched nineteen days after we had permission to take up any ships at all. We got permission to take up a few ships at the meeting in the Secretary of State's room, at which Mr. Goschen and the Admiralty officials were present and the financial authorities of the War Office; that was on Saturday, the 30th of September, and that was really the first occasion on which we got leave to make any preparations. The first troops of the Army Corps left on the 6th of October, and those were the Army Service Corps of the Army Corps who went by freight ships. They are all given in the tables—Volume I. of Embarkations.

2852. These tables in this red book enumerate the whole embarkation ?—Yes, Volumes I. and II. do.* The first troops embarked for the field for South Africa are shown on Page 1; that was in the "Braemar Castle"—the Army Service Corps and Army Ordnance Corps. That was within six days of our getting the order.

2853. Some arrangement must have been made about them before the 30th September ?—No, nothing whatever; those went out in a freight ship, not in a transport.

2854. As you have been in charge of this business throughout the War, will you tell us what was your form of procedure in carrying out an order to embark the troops ?—The actual procedure is that we get a requisition from the Adjutant-General's Department for the embarkation of certain troops, and on that we issue orders to the troops concerned. Naturally, the peace orders had to be considerably modified at a moment's notice. We at once inform the Admiralty of the number of troops we require conveyance for, and to what port or ports we require conveyance At that time we were not permitted to say in orders whether we were going to send them to East London or Port Elizabeth or Durban, and all the orders—I daresay you notice in the column headed "Destination"—show "Cape Town for orders." From Cape Town they were dispatched, according to Sir Redvers Buller's orders, to either East London, Port Elizabeth, or Durban. The Admiralty in reply to our requisition then give the name of the ship, the accommodation, and the probable date of dispatch. We had considerable trouble at that time—I will not say considerable trouble—but we were most desirous to give the troops some idea as to when they were going to embark, and the Admiralty were rather adverse to giving any *probable* date of embarkation, but that was always smoothed over by having meetings with their officials at the Admiralty. We tried it for a time, but went back to the old system of receiving the accommodation on each ship, whilst they gave us the *probable* date of embarkation.

2855. Under ordinary circumstances, you did not meet with the officials of the Admiralty ?—Yes, I went down almost every day; I have gone two or three times a day when necessary.

2856. What were the meetings you spoke of as having been tried ?—We had a meeting with Captain Pitt, Naval Assistant to the Director of Transports at the Admiralty, who fits up all the ships, the Director of Transports, and the Assistant Director of Transports, and we went into how many troops we could put on board each ship. Measures were at first really tentative; there had never been a dispatch of such a big force before, and, feeling our way, we used to have these meetings, as units had to be split up on various ships, so that the space might be fully occupied on all ships. We dropped them in the course of a few weeks, when we all became more conversant with the dispatch of such a force.

2857. What did you do then ?—They gave us the accommodation, and we simply filled it up; and when they gave us the probable date we transmitted it to the regiments, and gave the final orders for embarkation when they gave us the fixed date. So far as I can recollect, and I have been trying to recollect whether there have been any, there have been no really serious delays. When the ships have been ready we have had men ready to put on board. Our main difficulty at first (which was smoothed over by the Army Board really) was that we had a requisition from the Adjutant-General very often to embark troops, and it was not really clear whether all the units had their clothing and equipment ready; but the Army Board at their meetings in the Commander-in-Chief's room used to discuss this, and we all heard through the heads of our Departments whether the troops were ready or not. By that means we were able to keep back the unit that had not got, say, its clothing for three or four days, and to embark one that was complete. The Army Board was invaluable in that way.

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2858. It saved time ?—It was quite invaluable. There have been occasions when we were on the point of giving orders to troops to embark whom it would hardly have been possible to clothe and equip in the time. We got a requisition practically from the Adjutant-General for a whole Army Corps to embark, and we took them in the order as Sir Redvers Buller wished them, as far as possible, *i.e.*, by brigades and divisions. We kept some units which were not quite complete back for a later ship, and some went out without regimental transport, as a matter of fact.

2859. Yes, so we have heard. You also arranged for everything from the station ?—We arranged for everything from their station, and put them on board the ship, and warned them what the destination at which they were arriving would be.

2860. And there your responsibility ceases ?—Yes.

2861. And your evidence is that those arrangements with the Admiralty and otherwise worked satisfactorily ?—I do not think they could have worked better. I am bound to admit, as from the papers you will probably see, that I was one of those who prior to the War was keen, perhaps the keenest, that we should do our own transport. I am perfectly certain from the experience of this War that we cannot do it, not for a force such as we did dispatch, where we had over 100 transports to take up. We are not in touch with the Mercantile Marine as the Admiralty are, and I do not think we could have done it. During peace I think we could have done it probably more economically and just as well, but could not deal with a big war like this.

2862. And as you must be ready to deal with a big war, it is better to keep up the organisation ?—Quite so. I quite admit that prior to the War I think I took a wrong view, because your peace organization must be one fitted for war.

2863. Is Statement No. 14 (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 233), your Statement, showing the total number of troops embarked ?—I think so. I have given you all the details of the numbers embarked.

2864. This statement is the number of troops from all portions of the world, apparently ?—Yes.

2865. You had not to do with the transport, for instance, from India, had you ?—No; we initiated it, that is all. The troops that went from India early in September were embarked by the Indian authorities and the Naval Transport Department in Bombay.

2866. But this summary, which gives the numbers of men, horses, and mules, and so on, is a statement of the numbers complete ?—Complete up to the end of the War.

2867. Though you did not deal with the whole of that ?—We got the Embarkation Returns from each ship. We did not get the Embarkation Returns from India of the early ships, because they were sent out in such a hurry; but we got the reports from Bombay of the numbers embarked subsequently.

2868. What about the Colonial contingents ?—We got Embarkation Returns from them, and Disembarkation Returns. The return called "Voyage Report," dealing with the numbers on board and food supplies, and all the arrangements on board ship, is sent in by each Commanding Officer to us, through the General at the port of disembarkation.

2869. Who provides the transports and takes the place of the Admiralty in Colonies ?—The Admiralty have a Naval officer in Sydney, so far as Australia is concerned.

2870. And the Admiralty took up the transports ?—Yes, on advice of their Naval Transport Officer.

* It was not considered necessary for the purposes of the Commission to print Volumes I. and II. of the Embarkations.

B. H. Holland Secretary.

Lieut.-Colonel J. S. Cowans, M.V.O.

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2871. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Was that Captain Royd ?—Yes, I believe so.

2872. (*Chairman.*) And in Canada ?—A great many of the ships were taken up in England and sent out to Canada at first.

2873. Under the Admiralty's directions ?—Yes, under the Admiralty's directions.

2874. The transports in fact were taken under the Admiralty's directions ?—Yes, they fit up all transports; we had nothing to do with that.

2875. You had not, but I want to know whether any other agency except the Admiralty dealt with that matter ?—Yes, in the case of horse and mule ships, Houlder Brothers have fitted up some, I believe, but that has been done under arrangements with the Remount Department.

2876. They had separate arrangements ?—Yes, they gave the specifications, and these agents fitted them up. The specifications generally followed those new fittings that you find a picture of at the end of the Report of the Conference between the Admiralty and the War Office.

2877. But there were from Austria, America, Australasia, etc., some 63,000 horses, and 63,000 mules. The transport for those would not have been arranged under your arrangement at the Admiralty, but separately, or some of it at any rate ?—Some of it was done by the Admiralty and some of it was done by agents really; but the Quartermaster-General always had the form of contract submitted to him; we always saw the form of contract with these agents.

2878. The Quartermaster-General is responsible for the despatch of troops ?—Yes, quite. Of course, some of the embarkations—I mean in the early ships, when we were sending as many as 20,000 a week from Southampton—were governed by train services; we could not have got off any more than we did, there were about five ships a day. I think there were 23 or 25 special trains down to Southampton on the first day of the dispatch of the Army Corps

2879. Had you any difficulty at the ports in embarkation ?—None whatever, really. We mainly used Southampton, and there we have got our own shed in the dock, and we were using other sheds as well; the South Western Company's lines run straight alongside the ship; so we had no difficulty whatever.

2880. In that you are speaking of troops, I suppose ?—Troops and stores—and equipment accompanying troops. A great many stores were sent from the Albert Dock, being embarked from our office of Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General for Transport. Some 2,000,000 tons of stores were embarked by the Admiralty also; but the Director of Transports will tell you the arrangements for their dispatch. The Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General for Transport's office is in Woolwich Dockyard.

2881. At Woolwich ?—Yes.

2882. Where would they ship ?—The Albert Dock and Tilbury.

2883. In the Thames ?—Yes, from barges.

2884. Otherwise Southampton was the chief port ?—Southampton was the chief port, and the majority of the troops were embarked from Southampton.

2885. And what about disembarkation in South Africa ?—There have been no delays so far as the troops' disembarkation is concerned, but as Sir Charles Clarke said there have been considerable delays as regard stores, but that was entirely due to want of wharfage at Capetown. We have had meetings with representatives of the Capetown Harbour Board here about it to try and get matters improved, but their grievance was that we were already taking too much wharfage.

2886. Since then ?—And during the War too; but they have always been anxious to get the docks back from us. Practically we took priority in many cases, and kept the wharves.

2887. But the accommodation was quite deficient ?—Quite.

2888. Could it not have been strengthened before the War ?—I do not think so. Of course the Harbour Board is really a Civil body. We had no foot-hold really in Cape Town before the War.

2889. (*Sir John Jackson.*) They were extending the harbour at Cape Town, and have been for some years ?—Yes. They have no shed accommodation to speak of there.

2890. (*Chairman.*) Is there any other point to which you wish to call attention ?—I do not think there is. I have put in all the Returns of the numbers of troops who have been embarked for South Africa. I have a Return here of the numbers that have been withdrawn from South Africa up to the end of this month.

2891. Coming home ?—Yes, and Boer prisoners returning; it comes to about 350,000.

2892. Will you put it in ?—Yes. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 356). I certainly think we could not better the arrangement with the Admiralty, so far as War is concerned, than that we have at the present moment. I should like to support exactly what Sir Charles Clarke said about that. My Department is one of the Departments he was speaking of about as being quite impossible for us to work with Military clerks; we could never have carried out the arrangements for the War if we had had the Military clerks we have now.

2893. Because they have not sufficient intelligence or training ?—Yes, neither as a rule.

2894. (*Sir John Jackson.*) A soldier of that class, I take it, is too much of a machine ?——

2895. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You said that the embarkations at Bombay were conducted under the Embarkation officer there ?—Yes.

2896. Is that Embarkation officer an officer of the Indian Service, or an officer of the Royal Navy ?—His name is Captain Goodrich, but I think he is a Royal Navy officer. He is the Naval Transport Officer at Bombay.

2897. Under the Government of India ?—Yes, he is appointed under the Government of India, but he is an officer of the Royal Navy, called the Director of Indian Marine.

2898. And you say that the Naval officer at Sydney whom you named, I think, superintended all the embarkations from Australia ?—Yes.

2899. But I suppose there must have been somebody else in New Zealand ?—I could not say. I do not know whom the Admiralty appointed. There was not a very large number of embarkations from there. I presume it was the senior Naval officer on the station.

2900. Perhaps they did not appoint anybody ?—I do not know who it was at Wellington.

2901. I did not quite understand what your duties would be with respect to stores required by the troops, such as forage and provisions being put on board ship. Have you any responsibility for that ?—We have an officer called the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General for Transport at Woolwich, who resides in the Dockyard, and all requisitions for stores, whether Ordnance stores or supplies or ammunition, or anything of that sort, go to him. He is in touch with the Admiralty by telephone, and when he gets a requisition he in turn requisitions on the Admiralty. He is responsible for the barging of stores from the Arsenal and the Dockyard to the ship in the Thames.

2902. That is as regards stores ?—Yes, he is under the Quartermaster-General. He is not an officer of the Woolwich District Staff.

2903. How far would that apply to stores of food for the troops ?—The same thing applies; there are also some millions of tons of stores embarked under Admiralty arrangements.

2904. Or forage for the horses ?—It is all the same.

2905. Which must be embarked for the same ship ?—Yes, exactly. We tried to keep them separate as much as possible in different ships; the different supplies have been kept separate as far as possible.

2906. And does he send the provisions and forage from Woolwich to Southampton ?—No, most of those were embarked in the Thames, but he would send them to Southampton, too, by train when necessary.

2907. What was required by the troops on the voyage ?—The food on the voyage the Admiralty arrange for, but we embarked so many days' food with all the troops for use on arrival.

2908. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) With regard to the ships going from Australia, from Sydney, there the ship had to find everything of that kind ?—The owners did.

2909. The contract was so much per officer, so much per man, and so much per horse ?—Yes.

2910. Then the ship found it ?—Yes, the owners of the ship.

2911. All the stores ?—Yes.

2912. With respect to the horses, you were asked whether you had agents abroad who shipped the horses ?—We had.

2913. Are you aware that in many cases, at least in Australia, the horses there were purchased under a contract that they were to be delivered at the risk of the vendor in South Africa—Durban or wherever it was ?—Yes, in some cases.

2914. The horses were to be approved of by a Government officer in the Colony, and then they were shipped at the risk of the vendor ; he was to get so much per horse landed there ?—Yes.

2915. So that in that case the Government had nothing to say to the shipping ?—Nothing whatever, or to the forage either..

2916. The vendor provided his own ship, his own forage, his own stores, and his own fittings ?—Yes.

2917. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) You gave some evidence of accumulation of stores at the Cape ; had you communications also with regard to accumulation of stores at Durban—vast accumulations ?—No, we knew of it, but there were very few communications on the subject.

2918. Officially or unofficially did you know it ?—I think both officially and unofficially.

2919. Could you give evidence on that subject ?—Yes, I think I could. I will look it up. It was at the beginning of the War ; it was during Ladysmith. I will look up those papers. I know personally I heard of it, whether officially or unofficially.

2920. You made one remark which I should be glad if you will just give us some details about. You remarked about some communication being made with Sir Redvers Buller or by Sir Redvers Buller as to the order in which troops were to be sent ; the despatch of the Cavalry and Infantry and what was said to Sir Redvers Buller in reply. Can you tell me exactly what Sir Redvers Buller wanted ? Did he not want the Cavalry and Artillery sent out as early as possible ?—No. For a very long time we could not get any order of despatch at all from anybody, and Sir George White rather pressed him to give the order of despatch, and he gave it us.

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2921. Then do you say that no demands were made upon you to send Cavalry and Artillery out first to the front ?—No, no demand.

2922. Then the statement that has been repeatedly made, that there was delay in sending out Cavalry and Artillery owing to ships not being fitted for them is not in accordance with facts ?—No, the Admiralty have never said that they could fit up a Cavalry ship under about seventeen days.

2923. Would they have been able to do it sooner if they had had this £25,000 at an earlier date ?—I think probably they would. I would not like to say that for certain. I think probably the Director of Transports would tell you that better, but I think if they had had the fittings to hand they would have been quicker.

2924. In how much less time ; how much sooner ?—I could not say. I know nothing of the fitting up of a ship. Captain Pitt is the man to tell you that.

2925. I remember at the time there was a great outcry both in cablegrams from South Africa and also at home, as to Cavalry not having arrived, and I thought you might, perhaps, be able to give some evidence showing that it was not through any fault of the Admiralty ?—I think at first they were rather slow in fitting the first ships, but that was inevitable. Nobody had ever fitted a Cavalry ship since the Crimea.

2926. (*Chairman.*) You made no demand for ships for the Cavalry or Artillery on the Admiralty which they refused on the ground that they had not got the fittings ?—No, none whatever ; but it was done in this way. We made a demand on the Admiralty, and they would not naturally tell us that there was any delay ; they would simply say when the ship was ready.

2927. At any rate they did not make that allegation to you ?—They did not.

2928. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Just this one question on that point. Were there not two vessels among the earlier ones that broke down ?—Yes, those were very bad vessels, the "Zibenghla" and "Zayathla." I think, as I said, there had been no mounted troops practically sent from England for many years, and everybody was very anxious to take up cattle trade ships, I think. They were taking the Artillery to the Cape, and they were very indifferent. There were many delays with regard to them.

2929. The machinery broke down, I think, in both cases ?—Yes.

2930. (*Chairman.*) Is there anything else that you wish to add ?—Nothing at all.

NINTH DAY.

Friday, 24th October 1902.

PRESENT :

The Right Hon. The Earl of ELGIN AND KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Hon. Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Hon. Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

Colonel W. A. DUNNE, C.B., Assistant Quartermaster-General at Headquarters, called and examined.

Colonel W. A Dunne, C.B.

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2931. (*Chairman.*) You have been Assistant-Quartermaster-General at headquarters since the 1st of Janaury, 1900 ?—Yes.

2932. So that you have had cognisance of the greater part of the proceedings during the war ?—Yes.

2933. What are the particular duties of your office ?—Under the Quartermaster-General, I administer the supplies of food, forage, medical comforts, fuel, light, disinfectants and water for the Army.

2934. The Quartermaster-General suggested that we should hear you to-day in amplification of his evidence Have you any general statement that you wish to make ?—No, only what the Quartermaster-General has already put in.

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2935. You refer to the statements that the Quartermaster-General was speaking to yesterday?—Yes.

2936. Which is the statement which particularly refers to your duties?—It is the printed one, marked II., "Supplies (Q.M.G., 3)." (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 218).

2937. We have had explanations from the Quartermaster-General as to the meaning of page 2, the supplies which were sent out previous to the war. Those were supplies calculated for the force then in South Africa, were they not?—Yes.

2938. And you did not send out any further supplies till after the 22nd September?—There were some small amounts I think sent out. On the 20th of May, the General Officer Commanding in South Africa telegraphed for sufficient biscuit and preserved meat to make up those articles in the Cape and Natal for two months' supply for the troops under his command.

2939. I thought that was covered by what I said: that those supplies sent out before the 22nd of September were for the troops actually in South Africa?—Yes.

2940. Personally, of course, you had no cognisance of the matter at that time?—No, none.

2941. And you could not speak to the actual state of matters at the War Office immediately before or on the 22nd September, 1899?— Not from personal knowledge. I might from the records of the office of that date.

2942. As we have had that from the Quartermaster-General, who was there, it is perhaps unnecessary to repeat it?—I should say so.

2943. This statement, then, No. 3 (*Vide Appnedix Vol., page* 219), scarcely deals with the matter under your direct cognisance until quite the last paragraph?—That is so.

2944. And that is simply a general paragraph stating that the reserves of 120 days' supplies for men and animals throughout the war was adhered to as closely as possible?—Yes.

2945. Is there anything that you wish to say on that paragraph?—No, simply that as the troops were ordered to go out, we demanded the quantities necessary for them, and to make up the reserve. As soon as we heard that the troops were ordered to go, we made a demand on the Director of Contracts for the quantity of supplies required for their daily consumption, and for the four months' reserve, and that, of course, took a long time to get very often—I mean to say, to deliver in South Africa, so that we had to look ahead a long time.

2946. Four months' reserve for the troops going out?—Yes, as well, of course, as for those in the country. The numbers were included in those.

2947. You had to make up the reserves which had been depleted?—Yes.

2948. Does that mean, in the matter of contracts, going outside the ordinary procedure?—Yes. Of course, in peace time all the contracts are made by the generals of districts. They call for the tenders and decide which shall be accepted and completed, and report to the War Office what they have done. In war time, with these big demands, the Director of Contracts makes all those contracts.

2949. Does the Director of Contracts not make any of the contracts during peace time?—Yes, he does make some, but most of the peace contracts are made in the districts by the generals of the districts with their staff officers.

2950. And they have full control?—Full control.

2951. As to rates and everything else?—Yes.

2952. What would happen supposing a contract was reported on which the rates were considered unsatisfactory?—The Director of Contracts would call for a report from the general as to his reasons for his action.

2953. And then?—Then if he was not satisfied, he would refer the report to the Secretary of State for War, or express his views to the general himself, if it was a matter of no great importance.

2954. But the general would be held to be completely responsible?—Yes, the action would be acted upon, but perhaps he would be told that what he had done in that particular instance was not wise or desirable.

2955. But your department does not in any way relieve him of responsibility?—No.

2956. It would go direct to the Secretary of State for War?—We always concur in a matter of that sort in the Quartermaster-General's branch. If they have any remarks to make as to the action of the general they always refer it to the Quartermaster-General to ask if he concurs in their views and remarks.

2957. In this case during the war the contracts being so very large were made by the Director of Contracts direct?—Yes, the home contracts. Those in South Africa were made by the general out there.

2958. So we have been told. And what happens when the Director of Contracts makes the contract, does he get his instructions from your department?—Yes, we tell him the quantity and quality and description, and all the details of what is wanted, and then he provides them accordingly.

2959. Do you have anything to say with regard to the conditions of the contract?—Yes, we always concur. If we do not make the conditions ourselves we concur in them.

2960. And who is responsible for the actual sums paid and the rates?—The Director of Contracts.

2961. Not your department?—No.

2962. Was there a difficulty in getting the contracts for the large amount of supplies that you required?—As a rule, no; but there were some things that there were difficulties in getting, simply because the markets did not produce them, the quantities were not in existence.

2963. Can you name any of those articles?—For instance, we always like to get preserved meat for troops in the field in small-sized tins; that is to say, 1lb. or 2lbs.; but we could not get that description, so we had to get 6lb. tins, which are always objected to by the troops in the field because they are too heavy for the men to carry. But we had either to take the 6lb. tin or do without—at the time, I mean.

2964. Are they served out to each individual man in tins?—Yes, at times. For instance, if they are going out on a day's march the men have sometimes to carry a day's food on them, one day's supply or two days' supply, and if you wanted to give a man one day's preserved meat you could not, if you had not got the small 1lb. tin, so that one man had to carry for six in a case where there was only a 6lb. tin available, which was not always the case, but was sometimes.

2965. Was it only the size of the tin that you had the difficulty with?—Yes, only the size of the tin.

2966. You could get any amount of preserved meat?—No, I would not say that, because there was a time when we had a difficulty in getting the full quantity we wanted; that was just towards the end of the war, when there was a very big demand, and practically the quantity of preserved meat, I understood from the Director of Contracts, was not to be had, because in Australia they only can the meat at certain seasons of the year, and there were certain brands that we did not take, for various reasons, so the supply was limited. We had no actual difficulty—I mean, we got over the difficulty; but there was an appreciable difficulty then in getting that particular quantity.

2967. Does most of your meat come from Australia?—About half from Australia and about half from America.

2968. And was it shipped direct to the seat of war?—As a rule, yes. Some of it we got in England, and that was delivered at Woolwich, the supply depôt.

2969. Do you know whether the supplies of tinned meat at any place in the war were at any time in excess?—I could not say. The reserve was sometimes more and sometimes less than the four months, because it is impossible to keep it exactly stationary.

2970. Are there any precautions necessary in dealing with the reserve of tinned meat?—We always have to get rid of it within two years, because it will not keep very well after that; it begins to deteriorate.

2971. It will keep as long as that?—Yes.

2972. I do not suppose much of your tinned meat during the war was kept anything like that length of time?—It ought not to have been, and I have had no knowledge that it was, because in those things the old stock is supposed to be used first always. That is a Standing Order of the service.

2973. And were there any complaints that came back to you of the state of the tinned meat when it was served out?—Yes, there were complaints. I remember

there was a complaint about one particular brand; that it was too salt, that it made the men thirsty; and also as to the Canadian meat, the quality was complained of when it arrived from Canada.

2974. But not that the meat had gone bad from being improperly kept or too long kept?—Not that I know of.

2975. Any report of that kind would probably have come home to you, would it not?—Yes, I think so.

2976. Of course, the officer who could speak more directly to that would be the officer in charge of the supplies on the spot?—Yes.

2977. Is there any other article that you could name in which you had difficulties?—As to quality, do you mean?

2978. As to getting contracts?—At one time the hay was a little scarce, but the troops did not suffer in any way that I know of. There was a tremendous demand for hay, and I think at one time we practically denuded all the markets of the world of hay for the moment until the fresh crop came in. We were getting 30,000 tons of hay per month.

2979. You got it from all parts?—Yes, from all parts of the world.

2980. How was that done—by agents?—A good deal of it was done through the Colonial Governments, and they were responsible for the inspection at the ports of embarkation as to the quality and quantity, and so on.

2981. Which Governments do you refer to?—Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; those were the principal ones.

2982. And was there any difficulty about the quality in that case?—Only as regards the Canadian hay; there were considerable complaints as to the Canadian supplies.

2983. In what respect?—A good deal of the hay was found to have deteriorated. I do not know that it was bad originally, but the explanation, or supposed explanation, was that it may have been loaded in snowy weather, and that the snow falling on the hay may have melted on the voyage, and soaked through the hay. That was one thing I remember.

2984. Did it arrive musty?—In some cases I think it was musty, but it all deteriorated.

2985. It could not be used?—I do not know that the whole of it could not be used, but portions of it could not be used.

2986. Was there any large quantity that was in that category?—A considerable quantity, not a very large percentage of the whole supplies.

2987. But a large proportion of the shipments from Canada?—Yes, the complaints with regard to the shipments from Canada, I think, were more than those from anywhere else, as to all things we got from there; there were more complaints about Canadian supplies than any other. I remember the cheese was objected to. We got Canadian cheese very largely, and they complained that it did not keep properly out there.

2988. In the case of the hay, was it more than one shipment?—Yes, there were several.

2989. Were there any other cases of the quality being affected?—There were particular individual articles here and there objected to. There was one brand of preserved milk of which they complained. I remember a large proportion not keeping properly.

2990. Where did that come from?—That was sent from England.

2991. Was it of English manufacture?—I do not know if it was manufactured in England, but it was called the Viking brand. Of course, when we got those complaints we immediately stopped getting any more of that particular kind of article that was complained of.

2992. I think we should like to know cases of real complaint that did occur. If you have any others it would be as well that you should mention them?—Do you mean particular instances?

2993. Anything of importance enough to bring before the Commission?—There were complaints of the whiskey, and the port they complained of a good deal in South Africa.

2994. Whiskey and port?—Yes.

2995. In what respect?—They said the whiskey was raw; that was the objection, it tasted raw; and the port was not considered of good quality.

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2996. Was it investigated?—Yes.

2997. What was the result of the investigation?—In one case, the first complaint, the General of Communications, General Forestier-Walker, went into it himself on the spot at Cape Town, and he in forwarding the complaint which came from the medical authorities, said he had tasted the port and whiskey himself, and they were quite as good as he had in his own house. That was his official report on the first complaint. Then there were others after that.

2998. Were those articles supplied from England?—Yes.

2999. Under the Director of Contracts?—Yes.

3000. Then the contract, I suppose, can be seen?—Yes, no doubt.

3001. And it will contain the particulars as to the quality and prices?—Yes.

3002. Have you got them?—I have got what we call the specification which we give to the Director of Contracts in every instance. I have copies here.

3003. We will take this as an instance to assist us. Have you the specification of the whiskey?—This is the specification for Scotch whiskey: "The whiskey shall be purely malt whiskey, which shall have been kept in cask for at least seven years"—by the way, we had increased that: it was five years all through the war, and when they said it was rather raw we increased it to seven years—"and shall be about proof strength, the strength of the whiskey at the date of furnishing sample must be stated. To be delivered in accordance with approved sample, in properly secured and well-coopered casks. Only one sample (which is to be in duplicate) can be received from each firm." That is the specification which we sent to the Director of Contracts for that particular article.

3004. You mentioned several firms. Was it a tender open to offer?—Yes, there are always several tenders.

3005. Do you know what was paid for the whiskey?—I did know, but I cannot remember just now. I cannot tell you from memory. The contracts of course settle the prices, and although we know the prices I cannot remember exactly.

3006. At the time the contract was made you did not see any reason to doubt that they were getting a good article?—On the contrary, because we are responsible for the inspection. The Director of Contracts provides the article, but we have to inspect and satisfy ourselves as to the quality when we get it.

3007. Was the whiskey inspected at the War Office?—Not at the War Office; at Woolwich, by our representative there, who is an expert taster for whiskey, besides the Army Service Corps officers and the Medical Officer and the Analyst. We always have the whiskey analysed as well as inspected, and tasted.

3008. And all those proceedings were gone through in this case?—Yes, always, invariably.

3009. Was the whole of the whiskey supplied in one quantity?—No, every month there were fresh contracts made. There was a monthly demand, and there was a monthly contract; a fresh contract every time.

3010. And it might have been only one of the monthly contracts that was at fault?—Possibly.

3011. That you have not gone into?—It would be very difficult to know to what contract the particular article complained of out there belonged to; it would be very difficult to trace it.

3012. Was it a single case of complaint or were there more than one?—There were several complaints.

3013. Of the same article?—Yes. I remember there was a complaint also of the claret, and we got some of it sent home, so that we might see for ourselves what it was like. Apparently it had to some extent deteriorated, but the analyst said that it was still sound and good—the Somerset House analyst.

3014. For what purposes do you serve out these articles, whiskey, port and claret?—Only for hospitals, for the sick and wounded.

3015. Did the reports come from the patients or from the doctors?—They came from the doctors, but I rather think—I gather so from the correspondence—that a good

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many of the complaints came from sick officers or convalescent officers.

3016. Had you any complaints with regard to articles outside—articles of the general supply, not hospital articles?—I have been mentioning those before.

3017. But any others. Could you take a case like this that you have taken of whiskey, of a complaint?—We investigated some of the Canadian meat supplies. We had a case of that sent home which was sent to Woolwich, and there was a brand on the meat, and the officers of the Board, two more or less expert officers, considered that the meat was of inferior quality. Not bad, not unfit for consumption, but not up to the standard that we should like.

3018. A board sat at Woolwich?—Yes.

3019. And reported?—Yes.

3020. Could we have the report?—Oh, yes. (*The report was subsequently sent in.*)

3021. I am asking you these particulars because I think it will be of advantage to the Commission, if there are any outstanding cases, that we should have particulars. I suppose you agree with the evidence which we have already had, that, taking it as a whole, the complaints were not numerous during the war?—That was my impression and my experience, because after all, these are all perishable articles, food and wine, and so on, especially in war time, when they get knocked about under all sorts of conditions, and even if they were of the very best quality at starting, they may deteriorate by the time they reach the consumer, either on board ship or in transit up country.

3022. You speak from an experience of this sort of work in former campaigns, I think?—Yes, I have been in former campaigns myself, and I know that there is always a certain amount of food that deteriorates owing to one cause or another.

3023. What are the campaigns you took part in?—I have been in the Zulu War, the Boer War of 1881, the Egyptian Campaign of 1882, and the Suakim Campaign of 1885.

3024. And on all those occasions you were with the Field Army?—Yes.

3025. Were there more complaints, do you think, sent home on those occasions?—I think very many more, especially in 1882, much more serious complaints.

3026. And justifiable complaints?—Yes.

3027. You found the materials inadequate on those occasions?—The quality was not always satisfactory, but I do not know whether the articles deteriorated after arriving in the country or whether they were not satisfactory at the starting. I could not say that.

3028. On that occasion you speak from the other side?—Yes.

3029. But, putting your experience on both sides together, you say that the experience of this war was, on the whole, more favourable than on the other occasions?—Yes, I think so. I have asked officers who have been out there, and spoken to them about it when they came home, and the general opinion was that, on the whole, the supplies were very good.

3030. Are there any other parts of this statement which came under your particular cognisance?—Not that I know of.

3031. (*Viscount Esher.*) What is the object of having monthly contracts?—That is a contract question. I could only tell you what I think, not exactly what I know. It is a question really for the Director of Contracts to answer.

3032. What do you think?—I believe they make it because the market prices are always varying, and if you made a contract for the whole of the war at the beginning of the war you might have to pay a tremendously high price. Prices go up and down. I believe that is the reason so far as I know.

3033. Do you think it is a satisfactory system?—I do not think there is any serious objection to it, so far as I know. Of course, a certain amount of delay arises. That is the only objection I know of.

3034. Is there not also a difficulty in ascertaining, when the complaint comes home, from whom the particular article in question was obtained?—Certainly there would be.

3035. It increases the difficulty?—Yes, certainly.

3036. Does that system of monthly contracts apply to everything you supply?—Only in war time.

3037. I mean in war time?—Yes, practically. They did begin to have a sort of two-monthly contracts. When they found the contract was placed very often towards the end of the war to save time, they doubled it to make up for the next month's demand which they knew was coming on.

3038. Do I rightly understand that fresh tenders are asked for every month?—Yes.

3039. On the same specification?—Yes.

3040. Do you have to intervene, or is that all done by the Director of Contracts?—We only intervene so far as sending in the quantity and making the demand; and, of course, the representative at Woolwich intervenes in the recommendation as to acceptance, because the samples go to him.

3041. Then the idea is that in tendering for whiskey it is cheaper to obtain it by monthly contract than it would be if you asked for tenders for six months?—I should think so, but I do not feel qualified to answer that question myself.

3042. Did you supply the medical stores?—Food, but not stores.

3043. Who supplies the medical stores?—The Ordnance Department.

3044. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Did you find the tenders to vary very much per month—take, for instance, the item of whiskey?—I do not think so. The prices were all dealt with, of course, by the Director of Contracts, but I do not think, so far as I know, that they did vary very much.

3045. They remained pretty fairly stationary?—I think so.

3046. And, with respect to other articles, was it also the same?—I think so, speaking generally.

3047. So that practically there was really no advantage in these very short periods of tender?—I do not know that. I could not say that.

3048. The whiskey you say was complained of as being raw?—Yes.

3049. I did not quite catch the specification; what was the specification of whiskey—overproof?—About proof, but then we reduced it below proof at Woolwich.

3050. It would be reduced before sending out?—Yes.

3051. It would not be sent out about proof?—No.

3052. (*Sir John Edge.*) Do you know whether you would get a lower price for a larger quantity, supposing you asked for tenders for six months?—I should say you would not be able to get it at all probably. Some of the quantities were so enormous that I do not think anybody would undertake it.

3053. Do you mean to say that no firm would undertake to deliver a six months' consignment of whiskey?—I was thinking of other things. No doubt they would.

3054. Has it ever been tried for a period of four or six months?—Not that I know of in war time. I can only speak from my own personal knowledge.

3055. Do you know whether the whiskey all came from one firm or from different firms?—I know it did not come from one firm; it came from different firms.

3056. Roughly speaking, can you tell me about the number of firms that supplied whiskey on tenders during the war?—I cannot. There were not very many. I do not know how many. The contract people will tell you that.

3057. I understand you cannot earmark the whiskey that was complained of; you earmark the firm from which it came?—I could not say without reference, without looking up the correspondence. I do not know whether we did trace it in any particular instance as regards the whiskey. We did trace some of the other things to the contractors.

3058. You have mentioned port as having been complained of. You have not given us the specification for the port?—I have it here.

3059. It was the same specification throughout the war, I suppose?—No, whenever we found it was desirable, we varied it and improved it, and strengthened it from time to time. For instance, when a complaint arose, if we thought we could improve the quality by altering the specification, we did so.

3060. Can you give me your first specification after the outbreak of the war?—I cannot remember whether this is an altered one—they are practically the same. I have the latest here. I did not bring the other one.

3061. That is the latest one?—Yes.

3062. But I understand that you raised the specification?—In some instances; I cannot remember whether we did in the case of port.

3063. What is the specification?—"The wine to be a sound, genuine, rich, red wine of medium body and colour, containing not more than 38 per cent. of proof spirit, and in every respect equal to the sample; to be delivered in accordance with approved sample in properly secured and well-coopered casks. Only one sample (which is to be in duplicate) can be received from each firm." Then the tender form gave, I believe, if I remember right, about the price which the quality would be likely to cost.

3064. Was it the same firm that tendered; was it one firm that you contracted with throughout the war?—No, I do not think so.

3065. From a variety of firms?—From a variety of firms.

3066. Can you ear-mark the particular firm whose port was objected to?—I could not answer that without looking up the records.

3067. The cheese was complained of?—Yes.

3068. Does cheese deteriorate in a hot climate?—Yes, no doubt it does. The only cheese that we found kept really well out there was Dutch cheese, Edam and Gouda.

3069. Have you been in India?—No, I have not been in India.

3070. You cannot tell whether in India nearly all cheese deteriorates in hot weather?—I cannot answer for India.

3071. Now as to the milk, this Viking brand—the name sounds rather like Norway. Do you know whether it was made in Norway or made here?—I could not tell you that.

3072. Was it supplied by one particular firm?—Yes.

3073. Was it examined after the complaint was made?—I cannot remember in that particular instance whether we had any of it at Woolwich or not. I could tell by reference to records at the War Office.

3074. I suppose the original sample had passed the examination at Woolwich?—Yes.

3075. (*Sir John Jackson.*) You spoke of the Canadian hay having been found bad; was that hay inspected before shipment?—Yes.

3076. And I suppose it would be bought "f.o.b." the Canadian port?—Some of the contracts were "c.i.f."

3077. But not all?—As a rule, I think, they were "c.i.f."

3078. Then were they inspected again in South Africa on arriving there?—Yes.

3079. But in the event of any of the contracts having been made for the "f.o.b." price at the Canadian port, the responsibility, of course, of the contractor would cease on shipment at the Canadian port?—I believe that is the usual understanding.

3080. Then with whiskey, when it is bought on sample, where are the shipments tested; where are they compared with the sample?—At Woolwich.

3081. Then, of course, there is no further inspection after that?—There is an analysis by the Government analyst.

3082. Which is made in England?—Yes.

3083. Then with regard to the monthly contracts, any monthly contracts that you make, I take it, are for definite quantities?—Quite so.

3084. Do you think that for such articles as whiskey and wine, or even speaking generally, the department would have any difficulty in getting responsible people to offer to supply such quantities as might be required during, say, six months or a year? It is a very common plan in the commercial world?—I can only tell you my own personal opinion. I should not think so, but, of course, we could not tell them what the quantities would be. We did not know whether the war would last six months or one month.

3085. Clearly you could not tell them what the quantities would be; but do you think there would have been, as you say, any difficulty in getting people to offer to supply such quantities as you might require from time to time during the war?—My own opinion is that there would be no difficulty, but I do not profess to be a judge.

3086. Do you happen to know what is the arrangement that generally applies with coals? Are coals bought a shipload at the time, or under some such arrangement as I have indicated, such quantities as might be required during a long period?—You are speaking of foreign shipments, of course?

3087. Yes?—As a rule they are bought by the shipload.

3088. (*Sir John Edge.*) It has just struck me that if in South Africa they were accustomed to one brand of whiskey for some months, and the brand was changed to a brand of equally good whiskey, but from a different maker, that might account for some of the complaints?—Possibly; but I think myself it is a good deal due to the man recovering from illness; his tongue is not in good order, and he tastes the thing, and thinks it is bad, and says so.

3089. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Do you recollect having any complaint made about the biscuit?—No; I can only remember one complaint about biscuit, and that was some that arrived wet in South Africa; it appeared to have got wet in transit somehow or other, but it was a comparatively small matter. The biscuit, as a rule, seemed to be excellent, so far as the reports go.

3090. I heard from one of the individuals who was shut up in Kimberley that one sample of biscuit was so hard they could not bite it?—The question is where it came from. Was it from England? You never can tell.

3091. It may have been local?—You cannot tell unless you trace the article.

3092. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I see in your Statement No. 2 (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 219) in your table, you mention that the reserve in England obtainable prior to the war was 50 days' supply of preserved meat for 40,000 men; is that so?—Yes.

3093. Is the same reserve kept now, or a larger reserve?—We happen to have a very much larger stock after the war, of course.

3094. To what standard, then, are you going to work now?—That is not for me to say.

3095. It is not settled yet?—No.

3096. Has it not yet been laid down what the reserve will be?—No, the present standard still holds good.

3097. And during peace time is that preserved meat used up at all?—Yes, it has to be.

3098. How is it used up?—The troops have to eat it.

3099. And how long will it take with our force in England that we have now, and in the Colonies—we do send out preserved meat to the Colonies, I suppose, sometimes?—Yes.

3100. How long will it take to work off that reserve?—The order is that it must be turned over within from 18 months to two years.

3101. And is there any difficulty in turning it over in that time?—No difficulty whatever. It means, of course, giving the troops preserved meat instead of fresh once a week, fortnight, or month, as the case may be, at the various stations.

3102. Then it would not be a very serious matter if the reserve was kept double that?—Yes, I think it would.

3103. On account of having to double the number of days on which the troops would have to eat preserved meat?—Yes.

3104. Or, on the other hand, the loss of the preserved meat?—Yes.

3105. You allow only 18 months for the time that the preserved meat will last?—Eighteen months to two years; 18 months as a rule.

3106. I mention that because I have often found preserved meat extremely good after three years?—I daresay, but we do not think it wise to keep it longer.

3107. You said that the generals have full control over the contracts during peace time?—Yes, in their own districts.

3108. Was that the state of things before the war?—Yes.

3109. It is not due to the new regulations?—No, they have had it for some years.

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3110. There was a question of tenders having been made by foreign firms during the war to the military authorities in South Africa, and it was thought advisable, for political reasons and others, that these tenders should not be accepted in future without reference to home?—Yes.

3111. Can you remember any instance of delay occurring through foreign tenders being refused and the tenders coming back to British firms to be supplied by them?—No, I do not remember any instance of delay.

3112. In the case of a Board at Woolwich examining samples sent home which are supposed not to be up to the mark does the officer who passed those samples attend the Board himself?—Yes, if he did pass them; probably he did not. The Canadian supplies, of course, he never saw until they came home.

3113. Not in the case of Canadian, but in the case of anything that was examined at Woolwich he would, as a matter of course, attend the Board that examined the returned sample?—Yes.

3114. If available?—Yes.

3115. And he would be called upon to justify his having passed it, perhaps?—Well, you see, the difficulty would be to know in the case of the particular article, who was the individual officer who passed it. But from the system of monthly contracts it would be very difficult to say of a particular case of preserved meat sent home from South Africa that that particular case had been passed by an individual officer in England some months before.

3116. Then during the first period of the war there was not one officer responsible?—There was one officer responsible at the head, but, of course, he has several other officers under him.

3117. And the work is not divided up in such a way that it would be easy to trace which officer had passed it?—I should think it would be practically impossible.

3118. I suppose the difficulty of detecting the source from which we derived supplies that were found to be inferior would not arise so much in the case of canned or bottled articles?—No, the canned articles, of course, have marks on them that you recognise.

3119. And the bottle, too?—Not always the bottle. For instance, if it is bottled at Woolwich it has not got a private label on it, a firm's label.

3120. And no mark would be put on it at Woolwich to enable them afterwards to trace it?—I do not say it could not be done.

3121. It has been done elsewhere, that is why I ask that question?—We know there is a mark to show that they come from Woolwich.

3122. But not the source from which it came?—I do not think so. I think I am wrong. I think on the case there is.

3123. But not on the bottle?—No.

3124. But that would not matter, because they would know which case the bottle came from?—They ought to.

3125. I know a case, which I can instance, in which everything that was in cans, bottles, or tins, could be traced absolutely to the source from which it came and the person made responsible. I was wondering whether that was the system of the British Government or not?—I should say it was possible, by having some mark on the case.

3126. But you would not say that it was so during the war?—No, I would not, but I would not answer that definitely.

3127. (*Chairman.*) I just want to understand about the monthly contracts. If a contract after the first month has to be taken out again, is the whole procedure exactly the same as if there had not been the first contract?—Yes.

3128. Including the sending in of the sample and the testing of the sample?—Everything is exactly the same.

3129. Is not that in the case of some articles, in the case of the whiskey contract for instance, rather an unnecessary amount of labour?—Where you have a monthly contract you must have the procedure the same, I take it.

3130. Yes, if you advertise in the same way, but would it not be a satisfactory method of ordering supplies if you found the contract for the first month or the first two months satisfactory that you should renew the contract for the same article?—I see no objection myself; but that is a contract question.

3131. (*Viscount Esher.*) Was the principle of monthly contracts settled by the Contract Department?—Yes.

3132. It was not a suggestion of the Quartermaster-General?—No, on the contrary, I suggested once or twice that for some of the minor articles we might have a running contract.

3133. Oh, you have made that suggestion?—Yes.

3134. And they apply that principle throughout to all the contracts, do they?—Yes.

3135. Without exception, so far as you know?—I could not say without exception, because, as I explained, with some things they took two months towards the end of the war, but, I think, practically without exception.

3136. (*Chairman.*) Have you anything else you would like to add?—No.

3137. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) There are fresh tenders called for each month?—Yes.

3138. So that the man who supplies whiskey this month may not ever again supply whiskey?—Yes.

3139. That necessitates the sampling and analysing and so forth?—Yes.

3140. That is to say, if there is a different tender?—Yes.

3141. I think you said that the port wine was 28 per cent. of proof spirit. Who fixes that?—That is fixed at Woolwich by what we call the Deputy Adjutant-General for Supply Inspection.

3142. That is not fixed by the doctor, by medical advice?—No. They consult the medical people, as a rule, of course, about any medical supplies.

3143. But port wine is a medical supply, is it not?—Yes.

3144. It strikes me as being a very high rate of alcohol; 28 per cent.?—These things are not only drawn up by the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, as we call him, for Supply and Inspection, but also with the advice of a civilian expert in the wine trade.

3145. (*Sir John Edge.*) Was it 28 or 38?—38.

3146. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Is it possible: 38 per cent.?—That is the specification, "not more than 38 per cent."

Veterinary Colonel F. Duck, C.B., F.R.C.V.S.

Veterinary-Colonel F. Duck, C.B., F.R.C.V.S., called and examined.

3147. (*Chairman.*) You were Director-General of the Army Veterinary Department from 1897 till recently?—Till last week.

3148-9. Therefore you held that position all through the war?—All through the war.

3150. You did not go to South Africa; you were in this country?—At the time, yes. I have been in Africa.

3151. What is the position of the Veterinary Department? Is it a part of the Quartermaster-General's Department?—At the beginning of the war our administrator was the Adjutant-General. It was afterwards transferred to the Quartermaster-General's Department.

3152. You have been transferred lately, have you?—No, about a few months after the war began.

3153. What was the reason of that change?—I do not know.

3154. Did it alter in any way your position with regard to your duties?—No.

3155. Would you give us a definition of what your duties are?—I was responsible to the administrator of the department, for all veterinary matters in connection with the Army—for veterinary supplies in the field and at home, and for the due recruiting of the department, and generally for the efficiency of the department.

3156. What are veterinary supplies?—Medicines and so on for the field, medicine chests, hospitals, and everything connected with them.

3157. Then, except for those supplies, you chiefly deal with the *personnel* of the department?—Yes, and, of

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course, we have the general superintendence of diseases, that is to say, if there is any particular disease in any part it is reported to us, and we have to investigate and report upon it, and take what measures we think fit to counteract it.

3158. At any particular station?—Anywhere.

3159. Either at home or abroad?—Yes, excepting in India.

3160. And when there is a war, what is your duty with regard to the force at starting?—To send out as efficient a staff as possible to the seat of war, and also to send out, so far as we possibly can, proper material for the treatment and so on of sick and lame horses.

3161. Is a proportion of the veterinary service defined in proportion to the force that is being sent out?—There is no actual definition.

3162. Can you tell us what was the strength of the Veterinary Department that was sent out to South Africa?—Practically the strength of the Veterinary Department at home at the outbreak of the war should have been 66. At a matter of fact there had been great dis content both in the department and in the profession for some time, and at that time there were whisperings of a boycott, and instead of being up to our strength I am not quite sure whether we were five or six short, and we had not any candidates on the list.

3163. (*Sir John Edge.*) The 66 that you speak of were officers?—Yes, 66 veterinary surgeons, and we were either five or six short.

3164. (*Chairman.*) That left you with about 60 officers?—About 60.

3165. How many of those officers were detailed to South Africa?—Practically the whole department went to South Africa.

3166. And were they sufficient to provide for the necessities?—Not nearly.

3167. What steps did you take then?—Then we applied for permission to engage civilian veterinary surgeons.

3168. Could you get them?—At first, when the war was at its height, we had no difficulty in getting men. The procedure was that we would engage a veterinary surgeon, and, if possible, send him to Aldershot for a month to two months to instruct him as regards the care of animals on board ship, and generally to put him in the way of understanding and doing his work. This we carried out whenever possible, but we very seldom could do it, because the demand was so great.

3169. Under ordinary circumstances how are men appointed to the Veterinary Department?—Under ordinary conditions in peace time they send in their names, and then we inquire as fully as possible into everything we can connected with them. We want certificates from professors of colleges, and birth certificates, and moral certificates from those competent to give them, and then they come up for examination. We have a very high practical examination at Aldershot, and also a theoretical one. If they pass that they are then accepted on probation for six months, and further tested at Aldershot, and, as a rule, we keep them at Aldershot from one to two years before we put them in any independent charge.

3170. Are those periodical examinations?—They are held as often as we require them; but of course, being a small department as a rule, before the war broke out we only required from four to six recruits a year.

3171. Have you an examination each year?—Sometimes we have two examinations in a year, but generally one has sufficed.

3172. But are they fixed simply to meet the necessities of the department?—Yes, as vacancies occurred, we called for candidates. Up to within a few years ago we had a sufficiency of candidates on the list, and simply called them up as they were wanted.

3173. How was it that the department had fallen off in its popularity?—Some ten years ago the course at the colleges was increased by an extra year from three to four years, and a very stiff preliminary educational examination was required; in fact, the same as for the medical branch. As a consequence of that a much higher class of man was turned out, and we found, instead of getting the pick of the profession, the good men declared that the Army Department was not sufficiently attractive, and not good enough for them, and we did not get them to send in their names.

3174. You mean the examination at the veterinary colleges, not your examinations?—At the army examinations. This was reported officially some months before the war was thought of.

3175. Had any steps been taken to remedy the matter?—No.

3176. Have any steps been taken yet?—Yes. Shortly after the war I was asked to submit a scheme for the betterment of the veterinary officers, and I did so. I submitted four main points, three of them were granted, and the principal one was struck out.

3177. Can you tell us those points?—One was, speaking from memory, quicker promotion. The ordinary promotion was from veterinary lieutenant to veterinary captain in 10 years, and veterinary major in 20. We asked for it to be quickened in the proportion, as follows:—Veterinary lieutenant to captain in 7½ years, and to veterinary major in 15 years. That, of course, carried corresponding pay and allowances. We also asked for the benefit of a passage to India and back for the wives and families of veterinary surgeons, and we also asked for a slight increase in pension. And the fourth thing was, that we asked that we might be put on a footing of equality with other officers of the Army, and be given the same rank as other officers have. That was struck out.

3178. The last one was struck out?—Yes. The others. after a time, were granted.

3179. What is the exact difference at present?—At the present time we are the only department in the Army with a compound title, and this the profession and the department resent, because they say it implies social inferiority.

3180. Is it merely a question of title, or of position in the Service?—Well, I think the two go together. The men think more of a captain than they do of a veterinary-captain, for instance.

3181. The other three points have been adopted, have they?—They were granted after some considerable delay.

3182. Are the pay and allowances of the Veterinary Department on the same scale as the other officers?—No. We start as juniors fairly well on good pay, but there is very little improvement after that; there is very little improvement for long service.

3183. Do you mean less improvement than there is for the other officers of the Army?—Less, for instance, than the medical officers—much less.

3184. Do you anticipate from the adoption of the scheme, or part of the scheme, that you put forward, that there will be a supply of candidates in future?—At the time it was proposed I had good reason to report that if those terms were granted, the department and the profession would be satisfied; but there was a long delay about granting it, and in the meantime the new medical warrant was issued granting so much better terms to the medical officers, that now the department and the profession are not satisfied.

3185. For an Army Corps going to the field, what is the establishment of the Veterinary Department that goes with it?—There would be one principal veterinary surgeon in charge, and, roughly speaking—I will put it in this way—the idea is to give one veterinary surgeon to every 500 animals; that would be one veterinary surgeon to each cavalry regiment. and, roughly, one veterinary surgeon to each brigade of artillery.

3186. And of what rank; is the rank differentiated in any way?—No, except for the senior; he should be a veterinary lieutenant-colonel. It does not matter with the others; it does not matter whether the veterinary officer with a cavalry regiment is veterinary-captain or veterinary-major, or veterinary-lieutenant.

3187. He will have the same position as regards the regiment?—Yes, he has the same position, and does exactly the same work.

3188. The junior officers can do the work, can they?—Yes; the junior officers are, of course, more under the supervision of the veterinary lieutenant-colonel.

3189. Who was the chief veterinary officer during the war in South Africa?—Veterinary Colonel Matthews.

3190. Is he in this country now?—No, he is in Africa.

3191. Are there any senior officers of your department who are now in this country who have been serving through the war?—One; Veterinary Lieutenant-colonel Pringle, the senior officer in Ireland, was invalided

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home a short time ago, and volunteered to do temporary duty at home.

3192. What service did he see?—He came from Africa; I suppose he has had about 28 years' service.

3193. What part of the expedition did he accompany in South Africa?—I think for the greater part of the time he was in charge of a large veterinary hospital in the Free State.

3194. Is there not a representative of the Veterinary Department always accompanying the Commander-in-Chief or the principal force in the field?—No.

3195. I suppose you had reports sent home from South Africa?—Regularly.

3196. From whom did they come?—From the principal officer there, Veterinary Colonel Matthews.

3197. And were they received by you in the department?—Yes.

3198. And considered by you?—Yes.

3199. I suppose any question arising out of them you would report further?—Yes; we would at once try to remedy any small defects that were brought to notice.

3200. Were there any serious matters brought out in those reports?—No, not particularly. I may explain that we adopted the Indian scheme.

3201. By which you mean what?—I might explain that when I was principal veterinary officer in India, before taking up this appointment, at the time when your Lordship was Viceroy, I was called upon by the Indian Government to prepare a mobilisation scheme, and to prepare the Veterinary Department for war, to bring up all the equipment to date, and establish hospitals, mobile field chests, and so on; and we had the advantage of a practical trial of that system in the Chitral War, where it was very well reported on. When I came home fresh from that, I made it my business to inquire into the mobilisation arrangements at home, and to my mind they were woefully deficient. We only had at Woolwich at the time in the reserve (I am speaking from memory now) about thirty pairs of veterinary field panniers and about a score or so of old-fashioned field chests, which were quite out of date and too heavy and cumbersome. I consider the veterinary field panniers to be very useful for stationary depôts, but certainly not for active work, because although they were up-to-date in medical equipment, they were too heavy and too fragile to be knocked about. I thought the best thing I could do was to work at once upon the Indian system and try and introduce the mobile veterinary field chest to begin with.

3202. That was in 1897?—I applied for the money in 1897 to carry out experimental trials in the following year. As a result of that we got veterinary field chests sent from India.

3203. You got the money that you asked for?—Yes, in the following year.

3204. In 1898?—Yes. As a result of that we got veterinary field chests sent from India on those patterns, and we got others made at home, and we brought them up-to-date—that is, in the equipment. We wanted to reduce the weights as much as possible, and the idea was according to the Indian system, to produce a field chest of about 84lbs. weight, which is half a mule's load; so that the whole equipment could be either carried on the mule or in the wagon. On that we got several chests made by the contractors in England, and subjected them to various experimental trials at Aldershot and Woolwich, and we also took advantage of the Soudan War to send out six for further trial in the Soudan under Lord Kitchener; and on the receipt of reports upon these we finally adopted, on the plan we proposed, improved chests, and were getting them made when the war broke out.

3205. You had adopted your pattern, but had not filled up your numbers?—No; speaking from memory, I think we had only 100 made when the war broke out.

3206. But you were in process of getting more?—Yes.

3207. You do not mean to say that there was any delay in that respect in carrying out your views?—The delay when the war broke out was that the contractors could not carry them out quick enough.

3208. But before the war broke out your advice was taken, and preparations were in course of being made to satisfy your requirements?—That is so.

3209. But there was delay afterwards when the war broke out in getting a sufficient amount of equipment on the new pattern for the army in the field?—The contractors could not supply them, and to meet that we indented upon India for four complete field veterinary hospitals, and 100 field chests at the beginning of the war.

3210. And you got them?—Yes, we got them, and they proved most useful.

3211. Did that fully supply your requirements?—No, we sent out, I should think, 1,500 field chests after that.

3212. At the moment, I mean?—At the moment it did.

3213. And then you were able to send out the other numbers afterwards?—Yes, the War Office pushed the contractors on as much as possible. We also pointed out that it would be advisable to have a second contractor, and after a time we were allowed to deal with a second firm, so as to supply our increased demands; that is to say, we had two firms working for us preparing our field chests at the same time.

3214. So that there was not any unavoidable delay in the matter?—There was not. At the same time, at the beginning of the war we drew up a scheme of equipment for the use of the transport ships, and prepared a handbook for the general use of officers of all kinds in Africa dealing with the local conditions.

3215. Then subject to the observations which you made at the beginning of your evidence about the *personnel* of the department, your department was fairly well equipped at the beginning of the war, was it?—No, I cannot say that, because we had to apply to India for immediate help.

3216. But it was in course of preparation?—It was in course of preparation, and we frequently called for reports upon the equipment that we supplied, and as soon as we got any hint we tried to improve upon it in the next order that we gave.

3217. Then there is nothing in relation to the special business of the veterinary department in the field in these reports to which you would wish yourself to draw our attention?—No. We practically knew before the war what would be required in Africa. We knew, for instance, the class of horse that would be of use in Africa, and we knew the class of equipment that was required. I might say that I had already served six years in Africa myself.

3218. At what date?—I was employed in the Gaika and Galeka War, in the first Seccocoeni War, in the Zulu War, in the first Boer War, and afterwards in Bechuanaland, in the Bechuanaland Expedition, under Sir Charles Warren.

3219. Were you consulted as to the class of horse that was required in South Africa?—No, but I went to General Truman myself and explained to him at the outbreak of the war my experiences of the big English cavalry horses, Drury-Lowe's regiment, the Lancers, the King's Dragoon Guards, and the Inniskilling Dragoons in the first Boer War, pointing out to him that the big English cavalry horse was utterly unsuitable, and recommending him to buy a smaller, more compact, better bred horse. I also had frequent conversations with Colonel Tollner, the principal purchaser, pointing out to him what I considered was the right class of horse to send out, and he told me, "You may be right or wrong, but if I bought the class of horses you suggest they would all jeer at me."

3220. That class of horse was not adopted?—No.

3221. Did you warn them against any particular class of horse?—I warned them against the big English cavalry horse, so nice on parade in England, but utterly useless in Africa.

3222. And did you warn them against any foreign horses?—No, I suggested the class of horse generally that I thought would be suitable in Africa from my experience.

3223. You did not go into the question of where the supply of horses was to come from?—No, that does not touch me.

3224. Did you have any relations in your department with the Remount Department?—Yes, very unsatisfactory relations. We have been at variance on many points through the whole war nearly.

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3225. What is your relation to the Remount Department?—In ordinary times we supply them with three officers, and then they are supposed to work in the Remount Department; they are only indirectly under us. At the commencement of the war we had no control or supervision over the Remount depôts at all. When war broke out there was at once a grab made for officers of our own department by the Remount Department; they wanted all our officers they could possibly get hold of. I, of course, was responsible for my department, and I insisted upon having a sufficient staff to work in Africa. Moreover, when we engaged civilians we wanted them to work under our men; we found they were not competent at first to take separate charges, and we wanted to train them under our own men first, as it were. Then after a time we had to supply the Remount Department with civilians of a high class; they were men whom I had to recommend for their probity. I was very careful indeed about inquiring and getting to know all about them. They were supposed to be men of first class professional knowledge and men of honour and probity, and we gave them first class pay; that is to say, £3 a day and first-class travelling allowances wherever they were sent. It was, of course, exceedingly difficult to obtain these men, because they were men in constant practice—at work every day, and I could not do as General Truman wanted, keep half a dozen of them waiting outside his door for an appointment at any time; they would not do it.

3226. For what purposes were these officers required?—For assisting the Remount Department in examining and selecting horses abroad.

3227. Were all these officers recommended by you?—All the veterinary surgeons; I had to recommend everyone, and I took as much trouble as I could in getting to know all about them.

3228. The Remount Department looked to you for the recommendation of every veterinary surgeon whom they employed on that work?—Every one; but they were unreasonable in their demands. I will give you an instance:—Colonel de Burgh came into my office at seven o'clock one night and said, "General Truman wants six veterinary surgeons to be at different places to-morrow at 10 o'clock to assist the purchasing officers." It was impossible.

3229. You had not the officers at command?—These were civilians of the first class whom I was to employ.

3230. And you had not made arrangements with civilians for that?—Oh, no.

3231. What did you do in the case of civilian officers; did you give them an engagement to come when required, or did you permanently engage them?—I asked General Truman to give me as much time as he could, as I had to inquire and send round everywhere. This class of men is most difficult to obtain. I could only get men of this class from partners; that is to say, one man would go away and get an assistant to help his partner, and he would only engage probably for three or four months; he would say, "I cannot afford to leave my practice any longer."

3232. It was a temporary engagement?—Only temporary.

3233. It was quite different from the civilian officers that you spoke of before, whom you engaged to go out?—We engaged those men on a twelve months' agreement on the pay and allowances of a veterinary lieutenant.

3234. But those in the Remount Department were on a more temporary engagement?—Yes, shorter engagements.

3235. How did you say those who went out were paid?—£3 a day and first class travelling allowance wherever they went.

3236. In all cases?—Yes; and those employed for the Remount Department at home were paid at the rate of £2 per diem. Then we had another class of man solely engaged for transport duty on board ship. First of all we gave them an allowance of £50 for the trip out and back home. Afterwards we gave them head money to stimulate them to work more among the horses.

3237. What do you mean by head money?—We gave them head money on the number and condition of horses landed in this proportion: 3s. per head if the loss was under 2½ per cent., 2s. per head if the loss was under 5 per cent., and 1s. per head if the loss was under 7 per cent., and it was conditional on the horses landing in good condition and showing signs of fair and good treatment on the voyage, and we found that to answer very well.

3238. Have you been examined during the inquiries made into the Remount Department?—No. I may say that I was called upon once, but I happened to be on duty in Ireland at the time, inspecting, and my deputy was sent.

3239. We are postponing the examination into the Remount Department until we have had time to examine the evidence which has been already submitted. If we should wish to have any further information from you no doubt you would be willing to come back at that time?—I shall be very glad to do so. I should like to explain that when I said we were constantly at variance with the Remount people, it was not with a view of creating difficulty, but because we think it is a matter that ought to be remedied—that regulations ought to be provided in future so as to prevent anything of the kind.

3240. Can you suggest such regulations?—It is rather a long matter, but it really amounts to this: that the emergency ought to be provided for—and it was not.

3241. What do you mean exactly when you say that the emergency ought to be provided for?—That there ought to be regulations to define the proper connection of the two departments; that is chiefly what I mean.

3242. Have you put forward any proposition of that kind?—No, not yet.

3243. Now that you have left office, of course you would not be in a position to do so?—I have fully explained my views on the matter to the officer who succeeded me.

3244. But before you left office you did not put forward officially any statement?—No, I thought it was better to wait until the war was over. Then we want to reorganise the whole veterinary regulations, and everything; in fact, the whole thing wants reorganising, and our idea was to do the whole thing at one stroke.

3245. I think we had better, perhaps, postpone the consideration of the relations of the officers of the two departments until we go into the question of the Remount Department itself?—If you please.

3246. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I want to take you back to 1899. There is a certain *personnel* laid down in the Estimates for the Veterinary Department, is there not?—Yes.

3247. And in the Estimates they would provide for a sufficient *personnel*, of course, for the force that they contemplated either sending abroad or leaving at home?—They do.

3248. Were you satisfied—I am not asking about the actual numbers that you had, but as regards the numbers on paper—with the *personnel* provided in the Estimates for 1899?—No, I was not, but then I did not see any prospect of getting any increase. We have since got an increase.

3249. To what extent should you say that it was short; that is to say, if you had had the power of adding what you considered just absolutely necessary, what proportion would you have added to the total number of officers?—At that time I should have added between 40 and 50, but now it is double that.

3250. The total number on paper, then, being what?—The total establishment for the whole of the Army, including India, before the war was 137, and the home establishment 63.

3251. You have nothing to do with India?—No, but we have to provide men for India.

3252. Then the number you had to deal with was 137?—Yes.

3253. And you would like to have had 50 more?—Yes.

3254. Then, besides there not being enough on paper in the Estimates, I understand that you had not even the number for which the Estimates provided?—No.

3255. What was the actual number that you had?—The home establishment, before the war broke out, was 63, and I find my note says that we were five short; I think before I said six.

3256. Taking the whole total, including India, now many were there?—India was at full strength.

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3257. For how many years before the war had the difficulty of obtaining candidates existed?—I know there had been difficulties before, but I was in India at the time, and I am not prepared to say positively.

3258. Before you went to India had you been in the department in any other capacity?—I was comparatively a junior.

3259. You took up your duties in 1897, I think?—In June, 1897.

3260. How soon after you took up your duties did you begin to raise this question of 84lb. chests?—As I had come home rather hot upon the matter from India, I made it my duty to inquire into the state of affairs at Woolwich, where we have our store depôt; and then it struck me that something ought to be done.

3261. It was only a small amount of money that you wanted for the experiment, I suppose?—Yes, I can get to know how much. It was more with an idea of experimenting and trial, and settling upon what we wanted, than to provide the actual amount required for war at that time.

3262. In order to obtain the money for such experiments you would not have to wait for the Estimates of 1898, would you?—We did not get the money till 1898.

3263. Had you to wait many months after you put forward the application?—I think I put forward the application some time in December, if I remember rightly.

3264. And when did you get the money?—In April.

3265. After a lapse of four months?—Yes.

3266. Between the time that you got the money in April, 1898, and the outbreak of war, were you informed by the Adjutant-General that you were to make all the preparations you could for a possible war?—No.

3267. Or were you asked at any time whether your department was ready for war?—No.

3268. When was it first brought to your notice that you might have to take steps to bring your department up to a war position?—Of course, I read the papers, and from my previous knowledge of Africa some time before I thought it would be very wise to take precautionary measures.

3269. But officially you were not asked how you stood in your department?—No; at the same time the Administration knew that I was working up the department, that I was taking some steps.

3270. But having the knowledge that you had of South Africa, could you not have had more than a hundred of these chests ready at the time? I only want to know; I am not attaching any blame?—Well, yes, if I had known. It was only on my own conjecture that something might ensue that I took any steps at all, because I think I may remind you that at that time there was no anticipation of war until a month or two before it broke out.

3271. That is a question. But supposing it had been brought to your notice in April, 1899, that there was a considerable probability of war in the following months, you could have hurried on and got a larger number of chests made?—In that case I should not have carried out the experimental trials; I should have been satisfied with the Indian chest. But I knew that the equipment was not complete, because I elaborated it myself in India, and there were various points that I wanted to further improve upon.

3272. Would you have had the money to do that?—I should have pressed for the money.

3273. You could not have made them without money, of course, without authorisation?—No.

3274. (*Chairman.*) You would have required money outside your ordinary estimate?—Yes.

3275. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Did you supply veterinary officers for the transports that loaded horses in other countries than England; for instance, South America?—No, we did not. We supplied veterinary officers to ships loading from home, from Austria-Hungary, and occasionally from America and the States, but not always from America and the States.

3276. I suppose we shall get evidence as to that better from elsewhere. But were horses provided for the mounted infantry that were told off for the First Army Corps—that, perhaps, you would not know?—No, that would not come within my Department.

3277. (*Sir John Edge.*) You say that you advised Colonel Tollner that he should buy a smaller and better bred class of horse?—I advised General Truman generally about the cavalry horses and mounted infantry horses, and I also had several conversations with Colonel Tollner, because I knew him very well. I had served with him in the Remount Department myself before, and I recommended him to buy, consistent with the amount of weight required for the artillery, horses as close to the ground as he possibly could.

3278. But was there a market in which you could have bought those horses?—Yes.

3279. Where was the market where you could have bought those horses, required, say, for the First Army Corps and for the mounted infantry?—The market is in England. We have nothing to do with the provision of horses; we are not supposed to have anything to do with the provision of horses.

3280. What I want to come at is this: You made that recommendation, which I daresay was a perfectly justifiable one; but are you certain that there was a market in which horses of that quality and description could have been purchased?—I think I may say yes.

3281. Can you tell us where that was?—In England.

3282. Can you tell us whether a horse of that kind would have been a higher price or a lower price than the ordinary cavalry charger?—Are you talking about the cavalry horses now?

3283. Yes?—If you get them with quality, I do not think you could reduce them; the ordinary price would be a little lower, but if you get them with the necessary quality for cavalry, I do not think you could get them for less.

3284. Not at the same price?—Not with quality sufficient for cavalry; not at a smaller price.

3285. Have you ever considered whether there was the number of horses of that quality and description to be found in England for sale—age, description, and quality?—That is rather beyond my province.

3286. I only ask you because you suggested to Colonel Tollner that he should purchase that class of horse, and he said, if I remember rightly, he would be jeered at if he purchased them?—Yes.

3287. It is one thing, of course, to suggest to buy an animal of a certain height, and so on, and another thing to be certain that you have a market in which you can buy them?—Oh, they were to be got.

3288. Later in the war, when there was an enormous number of horses to be purchased, do you think that horses of that particular description could have been found?—Yes, in sufficient quantities.

3289. Where?—Well say, for instance, in Wales; they are a smaller class in Wales, the cob horse.

3290. Do you think there are in Wales a sufficient number of horses to have supplied the demand that had to be met by sending to Canada and the United States, Hungary, and all over the world?—Oh, no.

3291. Then I want to come to this: You cannot suggest where they could have gone on buying horses to supply the wastage in the war—horses of the description you mention?—I do not see why they should not have been just as easily obtainable as the larger ones, and at the same places.

3292. We will come at it in another way. Can you tell me the total number of horses that were purchased for the purposes of the cavalry and mounted infantry between the end of September, 1899, and the conclusion of the war?—I think those horses could have been obtained as readily in England as the larger ones.

3293. But you do not know the total number of horses?—No, I do not.

3294. Are horses of that description to be found in Hungary?—I have never been to Hungary, so I would not like to say anything about them.

3295. Are horses of that description to be found in Argentina?—My answer would be the same to that, I have never been there, but I have heard that the class of cob in Argentina is a good one provided he can be acclimatised.

3296. Were the horses that were purchased in Argentina of that class of cob?—Some were reported as being very good indeed, especially the small horses, supplied, I think, to the 10th Hussars; but generally they were (to use a horse expression) crabbed, as being soft and unreliable, knocking up easily.

3297. The Argentine horse, as a rule, did not answer in South Africa, did it?—I believe not.

3298. Did the Hungarian horses answer in South Africa?—No.

3299. I forget, we did draw upon the United States for horses?—Yes, very largely.

3300. Did they answer?—Yes.

3301. Were they of the description you suggested?—I believe so. I say I believe so because I have not been to the States or to Africa since, so that I can only say from what I heard that they were.

3302. That they were of the description you suggested?—Yes, smaller horses.

3303. And as to the breeding?—I heard that the Americans were fairly well bred generally.

3304. What other countries did we draw upon for horses?—Canada and Australia.

3305. Well, we know the Australian horse. Were the horses from Australia satisfactory, and of the description you refer to?—From the reports that I received they were not.

3306. Why?—The Australian horse is a very good horse for India after he has been acclimatised, but they generally allow in India one year for acclimatisation.

3307. I think we sent to Russia; did we draw horses from Russia?—Very largely.

3308. What class of horses did we draw from Russia?—Small cobs.

3309. Of the kind that answered your description?—Yes.

3310. How did they turn out in the war?—On the whole the reports are very satisfactory. A few at first I believe were reported upon as being slow and wanting in quality.

3311. The Hungarian horses did not answer, I think?—No, I believe not.

3312. What was their description, roughly?—They were said to be flashy, that is a good-looking horse, a good topped horse.

3313. But no bottom?—Light in the limb. But I should like to explain to you that the provision of horses and the selection of horses does not rest with the Veterinary Department.

3314. I quite understand that. I only wanted to understand where we were to get these horses that you thought the most advisable for South Africa, that is all.

3315. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Would the horse you recommended be 15 hands?—For the mounted infantry, do you mean?

3316. Yes?—Less than that; from 14.2 to 15; preferably under 15 hands.

3317. Were you able to get horses in Australia?—Yes, to a certain extent. They were the class of horse that you see in Silladat regiments in India for mounting the native commissioned officers. That is a little stronger and more compact than the general breed.

3318. I suppose you know nothing about the way the Australian horses were treated when they arrived in South Africa?—No.

3319. You say they were not quite satisfactory?—Generally.

3320. That might arise, might it not, from the way they were treated on their arrival?—I should think very likely.

3321. That would not be within your knowledge?—No.

3321*. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Is there a fixed establishment of veterinary surgeons at the present moment?—Yes. We have got an increase of 40 since the war broke out, and the present establishment would be about 177.

3322. That includes India?—That includes India.

3323. And is that complete?—No.

3324. So far as you know, is there any prospect of its being complete?—Not at present.

3325. You think that there is dissatisfaction as to the title?—Yes, and the general conditions of service.

3326. You think that the recent increase of pay given to the Medical Department should be extended in some way or other to the Veterinary Department?—Yes, and more facilities given for leave and study leave, that we might improve and keep up with the times.

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3327. Those facilities have been given to the Medical Department?—They have been.

3328. And, in fact, you think that the Veterinary Department should follow suit?—Yes.

3329. And you do attach importance to their having the dual title, that is to say, being called Veterinary-Captains, and so forth?—Yes, our people object to that; they think it implies social inferiority to the rest of the Army, and that irritates them very much.

3330. And they did not feel that before these double titles were taken away from the Medical Department?—No.

3331. That branch of discontent has all arisen from what has been conceded to the Medical Department?—Yes.

3332. (*Viscount Esher.*) What did you say your total establishment was now?—About 177.

3333. That includes India?—Yes.

3334. And exclusive of India, what is it?—The total we have not got. We are about now, speaking from memory, 53 or 54 short of that number.

3335. I see there is a Return signed by you in June of this year in which you say that the total is 77. You have got 61 in South Africa, 2 in the United States, and 1 in Australia, 8 at home, and 5 invalided. That is 77?—That would be 77 at home.

3336. No; the total number of Army veterinary surgeons amounted to 77?—Yes, but they are not counting the Indian Establishment.

3337. I say exclusive of India?—Yes.

3338. Then you had in June of this year 61 Army veterinary surgeons in South Africa, so your Return says?—Yes.

3339. Do you remember how many civil veterinary surgeons you had in South Africa at that time?—It would be very difficult to say how many at that time. I can tell you about how many we have at the present time.

3340. Your Return says 121?—Yes; but then that does not include everything, because there were numbers engaged by the local volunteer corps.

3341. Not employed by you?—They were raised by local volunteer corps, which were sometimes not enumerated in our strength, so that the report from Africa is not exactly accurate, that is to say, there might be others of whom at the time they had no cognisance.

3342. But in any case you had double the number of civilians?—Yes, much more than that.

3343. Have you ever thought of any scheme under which your department would expand in case of war?—We suggested a scheme sometime ago, and I may tell you this further, that when I sent in this scheme for improvement of the department, I asked for a liberal pension for 20 years' service, so that officers might be induced to retire, and so form a reserve.

3344. To whom did you send that scheme?—That scheme went to the Quartermaster-General.

3345. Before the war?—No.

3346. Since the war?—Since the war.

3347. You see the total number of veterinary surgeons employed in South Africa was about 10 per cent. of the whole profession, was not that so?—That included South Africa and those employed in America and Canada. We had at one time as many as 40 employed on remount duty in Hungary, South America, the States, and so on.

3348. Did your scheme that you sent in contemplate linking civilian veterinary surgeons to the army department?—In the scheme I sent in I pointed out that under ordinary conditions we could expect to get within a short period, say a month, from 50 to 60 civilians, under the arrangement that we have at the present time.

3349. What do you mean by the arrangement you have at the present time?—That is on the pay and emoluments of a veterinary lieutenant.

3350. But was there any report of yours previous to the war sent into the Adjutant-General as to the condition of the Veterinary Department?—Yes, we drew

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attention, I think, speaking from memory, in May, before the war broke out.

3351. May, 1899?—Yes.

3352. Have you a copy of that report?—I could get a copy. I have not one with me. (*The report was subsequently sent in. Vide Appendix Vol., page* 100.)

3353. Were your observations that you made to General Truman made in writing?—No, by word of mouth. I went to him as we were instructed, whenever possible, to confer together so as to obviate letters passing backwards and forwards. I may say that his office is next to mine.

3354. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I think you said that a part of the duties of your department was that on any outbreak of disease, either at home or abroad, you examined into the matter?—Yes.

3355. But during the war, at any rate, in South Africa would general questions as to the causes of disease (there was a tremendous outbreak of diseases amongst horses there) be referred to you for consideration and advice?—No, they would be settled on the spot.

3356. But as a good deal of the disease there was of a character very difficult to explore and determine, would not your department be called in to advise?—I may mention a case—for instance, horse sickness. We got some of the blood of an animal affected sent home, and got one of our best experts in England, Professor McFadyean, of the Royal Veterinary College, to analyse it and report, and carry on experimental trials; and as we got any evidence from him we communicated to South Africa what we learnt from him, and we sent his reports to South Africa. We did that, of course, because they had not the facilities or opportunities for carrying out that class of investigation which we have in our college in London.

3357. It would not come within your duties, then, to give special advice as to the treatment of those horses?—No; we advise generally. Whenever matters cropped up in Africa we always sent out advice, but not orders to act upon.

3358. But you did send out advice for consideration?—Yes, communications were constantly passing backwards and forwards on various matters.

3359. Has any report been drawn up as to horse sickness there from the veterinary point of view?—We have one report from Africa.

3360. Is it a short report or a lengthy one?—It is a short one

3361. Could we have a copy of it?—Yes. (*The report was subsequently sent in. Vide Appendix Vol., page* 101.)

3362. I take it that a very large proportion of the horses died, or were incapacitated, through horse sickness?—No; on the whole I think we were extremely fortunate. We anticipated much greater losses from horse sickness, but from actual horse sickness alone the loss has not been very great.

3363. What were the losses mainly—from what causes?—They were mainly from starvation, and hard work, and want of care.

3364. It was no business of yours to send out special recommendations as to the treatment of horses, and so on, in the way of care, or to give orders?—We could not give orders, but whenever anything struck us we advised our representative in Africa.

3365. You had no authority over him?—No, we did not presume to give him orders, because the circumstances might be quite different at the time he got them; so we gave it him more in the shape of advice. If I heard of a thing I would write what I thought about it and what I would recommend, but it was distinctly on the understanding that it was not an order—it was only for his consideration.

3366. (*Chairman.*) Is there anything more you wish to add?—No, I think I have said enough.

Colonel Sir W. D. Richardson, K.C.B.

Colonel Sir W. D. Richardson, K.C.B., called and examined.

3367. (*Chairman.*) You were appointed Deputy Adjutant-General for Supplies and Transport for South Africa in September, 1899?—Yes.

3368. When did you leave England?—On the 10th September, 1899, I heard that I was to leave England; on the 16th I embarked at Southampton for Natal, and I arrived in Cape Town (my destination was changed to Cape Town when I arrived by cablegram) on the 3rd of October.

3369. That is to say, a week before the war broke out?—Yes.

3370. And what were the duties you were sent out to assume?—I might perhaps hand in the letter I received from the War Office as to my duties, which were the administrative and executive control over all Army Service Corps' services (*handing in the same*).

3371. What did that include in October, 1899?—That would include supplies and transport by land and sea—by sea coastwise only—remounts, railway transport, barrack services, charge of buildings, hire of camp grounds, stores, and remount farms, also embarkations and disembarkations. The command of the Army Service Corps' *personnel* was included as well.

3372. And the organisation of any native or civilian supply in addition?—Yes, the organisation of the *personnel*.

3373. And of the transport?—And of the transport.

3374. What was the condition of matters that you found when you reached South Africa?—When I reached Cape Town I found they had a very small Army Service Corps establishment indeed, that the few supplies they had received had all been forwarded to the garrisons which had been sent to Mafeking, to the Orange River, to De Aar, to Naauwpoort, and to Stormberg, and that, owing to the large number of Uitlanders who were coming down from the Transvaal and from the Free State to the Cape ports, almost all local supplies were being rapidly consumed by the civil population, so that everything was at a famine price. The local merchants at Cape ports had for some months before the war foreseen that there were going to be troublous times, and had ceased buying or replenishing their reserves, so that they were very short of supplies, and when these 150,000 or so men women, and children came down from the Transvaal and the Free State they competed with the troops in putting up prices, so that everything went up to, I may say, war rates—to famine prices.

3375. Very much above the ordinary rates?—Very much indeed—double.

3376. And you did not at that time commandeer anything?—I tried to. I wrote a memorandum for my General, Sir Frederick Forestier-Walker, to His Excellency the Governor, asking that we might have power under the Local Burgher Act to commandeer. The matter was referred to the Attorney-General for the Cape Colony, and he said that the Act only referred to Colonial troops, and not to Imperial troops; it only referred to Colonial troops acting under the orders of the Cape Government. Therefore the Burgher Act was not put in force, and we were never allowed to commandeer anything until various portions of the Colony to the north were put under martial law. But by the time they were put under martial law almost everything had gone. We never could commandeer at Cape Town until after I left—that was after Lord Roberts came home.

3377. The ground of refusal, I understand, was that there was no legal authority?—It was referred to the Colonial Government, and the Attorney-General said that we had no authority without the Colonial Government's sanction.

3378. Because there was no legal authority?—Because there was no legal authority.

3379. Then if you had been able to commandeer, what is it you would have wished to have commandeered—transport, I suppose?—Transport and supplies and remounts. At Cape Town we could have horsed several cavalry regiments, and probably several batteries of artillery, which would have been a great thing at the commencement of the war.

3380. What did you do to meet that situation?—We telegraphed home for the supplies we wanted. We kept cabling home for the supplies, stores, and equipment we wanted and could not get locally. Of course we bought locally, but at famine prices.

3381. At the prices you could get the goods?—Yes: may I refer to my diary?

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3382-3. If you can give us illustrations from it?—This was written on the 11th of October, 1899:—"The situation in South Africa with regard to the supply of foodstuffs immediately previous to the outbreak of hostilities was briefly as follows"—these are extracts from the diary I wrote at the time; not the actual diary; I have the actual diary here, but it is rather more voluminous: "Owing to the uncertainty of the political aspect, merchants at Cape ports had, for some time past, been letting their stocks run down, whilst at the same time they had ceased to place orders abroad to replenish their depleted reserves. On the other hand, agents of the Governments of the Transvaal and Orange Free State had been making large purchases of the foodstuffs procurable in the Cape Colony and Natal. In addition, large numbers of Uitlanders with their wives and families began to pour into Natal and the Cape Colony, and to consume the already diminished stocks at the coast ports. The War Office had sent out a certain reserve of supplies for the small Imperial force in South Africa, but barely two months' food and forage for the troops then serving in Natal and the Cape Colony had reached the country before October, 1899. Early in September a month's provisions, medical comforts, and forage, for an additional force of 50,000 troops, 12,000 horses, and 15,000 mules had been ordered for shipment to South African ports, and during the last week in September a second month's supply for the same force was ordered; but on the 12th October, probably before any of these supplies could have been shipped, war was declared." I go on to say in my diary: "Horses are coming in very slowly. An Impressment Act would enable us to obtain any number, also forage, cattle, sheep, etc. It will save the home Government millions if such an Act is promulgated. I believe the Burgher Act includes the impressment of carriages, food, and forage, but I daresay the civil authorities fear that the Boer farmers, who are naturally not very friendly with us whilst we are at war with their countrymen in the Transvaal, might become actively hostile if we impressed their property, though I really do not see what hardship there could be if we paid a fair price, to be fixed by the resident magistrate or other civil authority."

3384. And it was on that representation that the opinion of the Attorney-General which you mentioned was got?—Yes, there was a correspondence; I think it is in the War Office; I believe it was forwarded home.

3385. Then you say that, not having got the right to commandeer, you began to buy?—We had to buy.

3386. Did you get much at the very high prices?—It was absolutely necessary to buy on the spot, so that we might be beforehand with the troops, because when once the troops landed we could not send up stores and troops at the same time, as there was only one single line of railway; therefore it was absolutely necessary that I should get stores up to De Aar and to the Orange River on the way to Kimberley before the troops came, so I bought virtually at any price I could.

3387. And the supplies which you mentioned were ordered from England at the beginning of September would not have been there in time?—They did not arrive until the first week in December.

3388. So that all the preparations that had to be made before the arrival of the First Army Corps troops had to be made by you on the spot?—They had to be made on the spot, and that of course put up prices to a very great extent. We were competing with a large civil population; when you once get prices up it is very difficult to get them down again.

3389. What did you do, for instance, in the case of meat?—I landed just a week before the war, and the very first thing I had to do was to make a contract for meat. The price of meat at Cape Town was one shilling a pound retail when I landed. I made a contract with the Cold Storage Company, but I think it would be better if I might read the memorandum I prepared. There was a discussion in Parliament last spring, and when I saw this discussion in the papers I wrote an explanatory memorandum to the Quartermaster-General—if you would allow me to read it.

3390. If you please?—I wrote this on the 11th of March last to the Quartermaster-General.

3391. After the discussion in Parliament?—Yes. "Quartermaster-General: As the officer responsible for making the contracts for meat with the Cold Storage Company in 1899-1900, contracts the prices of which have been taken exception to in Parliament, I venture to offer the following remarks which will, I trust, go to prove that instead of being extravagant, the terms of the contracts were, for supplying troops on active service in South Africa at the particular time, extremely favourable so far as the public purse was concerned. When I reached Cape Town on the 3rd October, 1899, I found war imminent. It was necessary to make immediate arrangements for a meat supply for the large number of troops who would shortly be taking the field. Now, the retail price of meat at Cape Town at this time was 1s. per lb., both for locally-killed and refrigerated meat. At Buluwayo the price reached as high as 2s. 6d. a lb. There was a duty on imported meat varying from 1d. to 2d. per lb., fixed no doubt with a view to keep up the price of locally-grown meat. This duty, though it tended to raise the price of cattle bred in the Colony, was not paid on meat supplied to the Army and Navy, and it was eventually taken off altogether by the Cape Ministry. The Navy at Simon's Bay, and the troops at Cape Town, were in 1899 supplied by the Cold Storage Company with refrigerated meat at something under 6d. per lb.; I do not know the exact price. The reason for the high price of meat at this time was, in my opinion, due partly to the duty, partly because a feeling of unrest had put up prices all round, meat in sympathy with other commodities, but principally because the rinderpest had in recent years killed off between 50 and 75 per cent. of the entire stock of cattle in South Africa. Another factor which was likely to keep up the price of meat when war broke out was that many of the Dutch population would be greatly disinclined to sell cattle, or indeed any supplies, if they knew they were intended for the use of the troops. I consequently suggested to my General the desirability from a supply point of view of proclaiming martial law, or of taking advantage of the Colonial Burgher Act, and commandeering cattle and supplies generally in the Cape Colony with the aid of the civil authorities. The High Commissioner was approached on the subject, but there were no doubt political reasons for not resorting to this expedient, which might have caused many of our difficulties in obtaining cattle, horses, and locally-grown produce to disappear. I had, therefore, to find a contractor without delay to carry out the service, and with this object I telegraphed to Natal, and sent notices to every important firm of meat contractors in the Cape Colony. I ascertained that in Natal the cattle available would barely suffice for their own wants; in fact, shortly after the war commenced, I was obliged, in order to prevent prices rising abnormally, to stop Natal buying milch cows in the Cape Colony. I was also aware that we should require a very large number of trek oxen for transport purposes, which would further increase our difficulties in obtaining slaughter cattle. My recollection is that during the first fifteen months of the war some 150,000 trek oxen had been employed in the military transport service in South Africa; of these, over 70,000 have either died from exhaustion, been killed or captured by the enemy, or had otherwise become inefficient through the waste incidental to military operations. Eventually, I received two firm offers, one from the Cold Storage Company, and the other from a Mr. Weil, to drive cattle with the troops, to feed, herd and slaughter them, and to issue dead meat whenever and wherever we might require it. As Mr. Weil had no connection with the meat trade, and was already in treaty for a large ox transport contract, I did not like to put all my eggs in one basket by giving two very important contracts to the same individual. I therefore cabled (through my General) to the War Office recommending the tender of the Cold Storage Company, which from inquiries I had made I considered the only firm in the Colony competent to carry out the service, and in due course War Office approval was received. The price originally demanded was, if I recollect rightly, 1s. 1d. per lb. for meat from live cattle; but I demurred to this price as too high, and, after several interviews with the general manager, I arranged that the company should be allowed at its own risk to supply imported—meaning refrigerated—meat, whenever possible to troops in the vicinity of the railway at the all-round price of 11d. per lb. for both local and imported meat. This first contract was for 2,000,000lbs. of meat, with the option of taking a further 2,000,000lbs. should we require it. I deemed it advisable to commence with a comparatively small contract until I could communicate by letter with the War Office authorities, who would have direct access to the world's markets. Meantime, the War Office had been placed in communication

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with Sir J. Sivewrght, a director of the company, who was in England, and eventually, after several cablegrams had passed, a contract was concluded for a twelve months' supply of meat at 11d. per lb. for meat from cattle, driven with the troops, and 9d. per lb. for refrigerated meat. The reduced price for the latter was to apply to any refrigerated meat supplied under the original contract for 4,000,000lbs., whilst the contract held by the company for the supply of the troops in the Cape Peninsula at a low rate was to remain unchanged. It must be borne in mind that the company was bound to supply all troops wherever they might be in the Cape Colony, the Free State, or the Transvaal, with meat of good quality. If they could supply refrigerated meat so much the better for the company, as their profit would be greater, whilst at the same time this meat was better for the troops, as not only was the price cheaper, but neither forage, water, guards, herds or butchers would be required, and there would be no offal to breed flies, and spread disease in the camps, as must be the case where cattle are slaughtered. When, however, troops moved at any distance from the railway it would of course be impossible to supply refrigerated meat, and live cattle would have to be driven. The quantity of refrigerated meat which was likely to be used was consequently very uncertain, and as this was the first time the issue of refrigerated meat to troops in the field had been tried on any large scale, it was extremely doubtful at first whether it would be possible to carry out such a supply satisfactorily. As soon as their tender was accepted the company were obliged to enlarge considerably their cold storage depôt at Cape Town, to build others inland, to construct or hire refrigerator cars, to manufacture ice in large quantities, as several tons were required to pack the meat in each refrigerator car. The company had, also, to pay to the railway administration the cost of the transit by rail of the refrigerator cars from the coast, where the meat was entrained, to the depôt at railhead, a distance often of over 600 miles. Seeing that the company had a virtual monopoly of the refrigerated meat trade in the Cape Colony at the time, and considering the expenses and risks which they must incur in undertaking such an extensive contract, and the losses from meat becoming tainted in transit, I thought at the time, and looking back I am still of opinion, that the contract was a most ecomomical one for the public. Had I attempted to import large quantities of live stock or frozen meat from America or Australia, to erect cold storage depôts, to construct refrigerator cars, to manufacture ice on a large scale, and to arrange for the transit of cattle and meat from the coast to railhead, I feel convinced the cost would have been considerably higher than it has been, whilst the troops would not have been so well served. Besides, to make all these arrangements would have taken time, and time was of the utmost importance. The War Office did, at our request, try the experiment of importing 1,000 head of cattle from South America, but when landed at Durban they were so wild that they had to be slaughtered at once, and the cost of the dead meat they produced was found to average 1s. 2d. a lb., which was a much higher price than we were paying. In Natal, where the local stock of cattle was larger proportionately than in the Cape Colony, and where the line of communication from the coast to railhead was much shorter, the contract price of home-grown and imported meat was 1d. or so cheaper than the Cold Storage Company's contract rate, but I have not the exact figures by me. I left South Africa shortly before the last contract with the Cold Storage Company was concluded, and before leaving I wrote to Lord Kitchener's Staff officer asking him to tell his lordship that the meat supply was the one thing I was still anxious about, as we were rapidly denuding the country of its stock of live cattle, that I thought it would be better to have one large contractor for our meat supply in the field than several small ones, who would be likely to compete with one another and raise the price of cattle all round (there was an idea at the time of having a separate meat contract in each of several small districts); that, as communication by rail with all South African ports had been restored, it might be possible to obtain more competition and thus reduce prices. but that, in my opinion, the Cold Storage Company and the De Beers Company, which had recently erected a cold storage plant at Cape Town, were the only two firms in South Africa who could safely be entrusted with the contract. On my reaching England I heard that the Cold Storage Company had again been successful in obtaining the contract, though at reduced prices. Quite recently, my anticipations have been verified, as only three firms have tendered for the contract to supply all the troops in the field, viz.—the Cold Storage Company, the Mr. Weil, to whom I have already referred, and the Imperial Meat Company, which, I understand, is connected with the De Beers Company, in whose buildings it has established its London office. In conclusion, I think it only right to say that if blame attaches to anyone for the meat contracts made with the Cold Storage Company, it must fall upon my shoulders, as I unreservedly accept the entire responsibility, both for having concluded the first two contracts with the company, and for having recommended the third, which was not, however, completed till after my departure." That was the letter I wrote to the Quartermaster General at the time. Since then I notice that the Cold Storage Company and the Imperial Meat Company, which has the present contract, have again amalgamated, so that the original company I made the contract with has, I believe, still either got the contract itself or is interested in it.

3392. And you maintain that the contract worked satisfactorily?—Of course it was a very large business, much larger than we anticipated at the beginning, when we were only to have 40,000 or 50,000 troops, and they were raised to 250,000. But the number was not so much the point. Nobody else could do it, nobody else had cold storage. And it was the first experiment in refrigerated meat I believe that has ever been made on active service.

3393. How did it turn out?—It saved South Africa. The quantity of meat, the millions, I think three hundred millions or four hundred millions of lbs. of refrigerated meat that we have used, and which was to be imported, would have had to be obtained from live cattle. There would not have been an ox or a sheep left in South Africa by this time if we had not used refrigerated meat. That is only the question of using refrigerated meat. I am not referring to refrigerated meat from the cold storage company solely, though at the time this company was the only company that had refrigerating stores in the Cape Colony.

3394. And you maintain that it was absolutely necessary to introduce the system of refrigerated meat?—I think it was one of the greatest successes of the war, because we have now proved that wherever an army goes by train, you can always issue refrigerated meat.

3395. That is what I meant when I asked if it was satisfactory, if the meat supply, the quality of the meat was satisfactory?—Excellent. There is nothing that gets so tough as an ox or a sheep that you drive, and sheep are most difficult to drive, too.

3396. And wild cattle, too?—Yes. An ox gets very tough indeed with bad grazing, and the sheep fall out on the march. If you have to drive anything like 10,000 sheep after troops you are always killing them as hard as you can, those that fall out.

3397. The system that you describe in that Memorandum, if I followed it, was a central depôt at Cape Town for storage, and cars to take the meat to the branch depôts?—Yes, with a small cold storage depôt with each large supply depôt. They had a depôt at Bloemfontein, they had a large depôt directly we got to Johannesburg, and they also had the use of one at Kimberley.

3398. You were able to supply all the troops within reach of the depôts?—And within reach of the railway. Directly the troops are away from the railway we cannot supply them; they have to use live meat, say, five miles from the railway.

3399. Must the meat be used as soon as it is taken out of the refrigerator?—Soon after it is taken out of the truck. For instance, we supplied Lord Methuen's force on the march every day; trucks full of refrigerated meat were run out daily, and it was eaten by the troops up to Modder River. But directly you went five miles away from the railway you could not carry it; you cannot carry refrigerated meat for any distance, as it soon goes bad, when once removed from the trucks.

3400. Were there complaints from the troops with regard to the meat?—There were complaints more or less about what we called the "trek" ox meat, the ox that had marched after the troops; also about the toughness of the sheep which were driven.

3401. There is often a prejudice against refrigerated meat we know?—Yes, but I do not think the troops knew whether it was refrigerated meat or not. I

remember a guardsman who came down sick telling me what splendid mutton they had up at Modder River, thinking it was mutton from Free State sheep; he said it was just like Welsh mutton. This was really New Zealand one-year-old sheep. I think there is a prejudice against it, but anybody who has eaten much of it soon gets over that.

3402. I only put it as a question of prejudice. Then had you a similar experience with regard to the other supplies as you had with regard to meat?—We had the greatest difficulty with regard to other supplies. We could obtain hardly any preserved supplies at all. We bought a certain amount of flour at a very high price, because of the heavy duties on all imported supplies, and we kept cabling and cabling home to the War Office to hurry out supplies. We did not really know what to think when no supplies arrived. But the War Office, no doubt, had great difficulties in getting ships loaded; that was really the difficulty I suppose. I was not behind the scenes, but I suppose the war came on rather suddenly, and the War Office had not foreseen the enormous quantity of supplies that would be wanted.

3403. We have heard from the Quartermaster-General's Department what steps they were able to take at the time you went out, but evidently from the time at which supplies were ordered at home there was from your evidence a period during which you were entirely dependent on the local supply?—From the 12th October, I should say, to the 1st of December, I had to buy locally everything. Whenever a ship touched at a Cape port I had to buy whatever supplies were on board. We had to buy every sort of food we could obtain locally to meet the demands upon the Army Service Corps.

3404. And what was the result when the Army Corps began to arrive? Had you made up your supplies?—The result was that I had accumulated a very large stock of supplies at the Orange River and at the Modder River which was supplying Lord Methuen's force, and eventually with those very supplies we had got up I was able to feed Lord Roberts' force during the march to Bloemfontein.

3405. In the first place, when the First Army Corps began to arrive under Sir Redvers Buller, you were ready with your supplies to meet them?—Yes. I was in a great state of mind for some time for fear the Boers would capture our Orange River supplies. We had about a mile and a half of ground covered with supplies at Orange River and De Aar, and very few troops to guard them, but I said to myself "it is worth the risk." So far as I was concerned it was worth while to risk the loss of, say, a quarter of a million or half a million's worth of supplies in order to be ready to ration the troops when they came out, without any fear of failure or delay.

3406. Because, as you explained just now, it was absolutely necessary to send them on in advance?—Yes, you could not send them with the troops; there was only a narrow gauge railway and a single line.

3407. What was Sir Redvers Buller's opinion when he arrived?—Sir Redvers Buller arrived on the 31st October, and he wrote a very strong cablegram and letter home—on the 31st October I think it was—complaining about the way he had been treated with regard to supplies, and blaming the War Office. He said he thought when he landed he should find two and half months' supplies, at any rate, either at Cape ports or on the sea, whereas when he arrived he found that there was virtually nothing except the fortnight's supplies which came out in the vessels with the troops, and he gave me orders that no matter what it cost I was to buy locally, and always keep up a four months' supply for all the troops in South Africa. "No matter," he said, "at what cost, you must keep up four months' supply. Every depôt to which the troops go has got to have four months' supply for the troops fed from that particular depôt."

3408. Was he under the impression that supplies had been sent out from England for the Army Corps before the end of September?—I would not like to say what his impression was, but the letter he wrote can be obtained at the War Office. It is a letter dated the 31st October or 1st November, 1899.

3409. A cablegram, I suppose?—A cablegram and a letter of the 31st October, or about that date; it may have been the following day.

3410. He arrived on the 31st October?—I think he landed on the 31st October, and directly I saw him, about an hour afterwards, his first question to me was "What supplies have you got?" I explained. He said: "What do you mean by not having them?" I explained that they had not come, and that I was absolutely helpless. I could only buy everything that arrived in the country, that the civil poulation were complaining to the Governor that we had put up prices. Of course, we might have complained in the same way that they had put up prices. He immediately cabled home, and he then sat down and wrote, and I copied the letter, I remember, myself.

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3411. Then you are acquainted with the purport of the letter?—Yes, I copied the letter out. It was in his own handwriting, but I had a fair copy made out, and it was sent from my office.

3412. It was sent from your office?—From my branch. My office was the particular office that would copy it.

3413. And that was a definite complaint that he had expected more?—Yes, it was what I should call a strong letter, a strongly worded letter.

3414. Because he must have been aware of the state of things when he left with regard to the despatch of supplies?—I should prefer that you saw his actual letter.

3415. Then he gave you the orders, as you have described, and what did you do to carry them out?—Here is an extract from my diary, dated the 7th of November; that was probably the date at which it went to the post, because I used to write up my diary from day to day, and at the end of the week I had a copy typed, and I put a date on, and sent it unofficially to a friend at the War Office. Of course, it was quite unofficial, it was not meant to be an official document, but simply to let the War Office know what was going on with regard to supply services.

3416. Was that also the date of Sir Redvers Buller's letter?—No, Sir Redvers Buller's letter would have been dated the 31st October, but I refer to Sir Redvers Buller's letter. I say "Sir Redvers was much annoyed when he arrived, as he expected two and a half months' reserve supply would have reached South Africa by the middle of October. As Natal sent their demands direct to England, I am not aware what they have demanded or what is on sea for them. I anxiously await the arrival of supplies, as Cape Town is well-nigh exhausted, and with large demands from Natal, just as I am endeavouring to prepare for the force to be sent to De Aar and Orange River Station, I am at my wit's end to know what to do. Natal is buying supplies largely, and this affects our local markets. I have wired to the General of Communications in Natal to consult the civil authorities, and requisition what is wanted at reasonable prices." They had martial law in Natal. Ladysmith was invested at that time, and owing to the colony being invaded, they were in a much worse position than we were so far as the civil population were concerned, so they had declared martial law.

3417. But I suppose you still calculated on getting the supplies out from England; you could not do much more than you had been doing before, buying up everything?—I am looking for the place in my diary. I say somewhere: "Directly a ship arrives I buy everything that is in it." I realised it was no good putting up the price of supplies merely to buy any small quantities; after we reached a certain price we could stop, because we knew that at that price we could get virtually everything there was in the market.

3418. Sir Redvers Buller separated supply and transport, did he not?—Yes. "When Sir Redvers Buller arrived," I say in my diary, "he decided that one man could not manage both supplies and transport for such a large business as this seems likely to be; consequently I have been turned into Director of Supplies, and Bridge into a Director of Transport. I think this arrangement a mistaken one, as Bridge and I must now work together as a kind of Siamese twins, and if one of us happens to disagree with the other, the troops will suffer. However, the great thing is to try and run the show with as little friction as possible. Sir Redvers Buller issued the following order: 'Pending the organisation and equipment of the field army, the following will be the distribution of staff duties in the Cape Colony: The Chief of the Staff, under the General Commanding-in-Chief, will supervise the organisation, distribution, and equipment of the units arriving from England. The Director of Supplies (Colonel Richardson) and of Transport (Colonel Bridge) will during this

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period act as officers of the Headquarters Staff, under the Chief of the Staff. N.B.—It is recognised that the duties of these two officers have no sharp dividing line. The above division is merely made for the adjustment of details. In a time such as the present, the duties of these officers must be mutually performed, and many minor points will be decided by the senior.'"

3419. That left a certain control to you?—It was a rather difficult control; it became so. It was making me responsible but without giving me authority, but still it worked all right.

3420. And on the 26th October the Army Service Corps' establishments arrived?—Yes, the Army Service Corps arrived in the "Braemar Castle." I think there were some 90 officers and 1,000 men on board, and their arrival virtually saved the situation, so far as the supply and transport services were concerned. If they had not come out when they did I think we must have broken down. They were going to be sent out with the troops, but, luckily, I heard of that before I left England, and I wrote at once to Sir Redvers Buller and told him that I heard the Army Service Corps establishments were coming out with the brigades and divisions to which they were attached, and I said if that were the case my career would soon be at an end anyway, as we must break down, and that I, as the senior officer, would be held responsible. Thereupon he wrote to the War Office, and I heard afterwards that Lord Wolseley gave orders for the Army Service Corps' establishments for an Army Corps and a cavalry division to be sent out at once, and they were sent out; they arrived some three weeks before the troops, and we were consequently able to organise the supply and transport services to a very large extent before the troops came out.

3421. That was under Colonel Clayton?—Colonel Clayton was my staff officer for the work.

3422. He came out with them?—Yes.

3423. We had evidence from him yesterday?—So I understand. He was one of my most able staff officers; he was what we call "officer commanding Army Service Corps' companies."

3424. Were you satisfied with their organisation?—If I might read from my diary, I wrote: "The Army Service Corps' supply establishments having been sent out from home without any organisation, the warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and men were, on reaching South Africa, formed into a company (No. 28), with its headquarters at Cape Town. The warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and men were formed into depôt units of clerks and butchers, and into bakery sections of bakers. The composition of these was:—Each depôt unit—clerks, one warrant officer, or staff quartermaster-sergeant, two staff sergeants, three corporals or privates. Butchers—five non-commissioned officers and men. Each bakery section—bakers, two master bakers, four foremen, four first hands, ten second and third hands. No. 28 Company eventually comprised nearly 2,000 of all ranks, widely distributed throughout South Africa. To pay them, the officers under whom the men were immediately serving obtained the necessary cash from the field paymasters, who entered the sums disbursed as imprests issued to the officer commanding No. 28 Company, to whom statements of the amounts paid, with the receipts of the men attached, were periodically forwarded by the Army Service Corps' officers. This organisation proved a satisfactory one, and the company, large as it ultimately became, was one of the few units which was able to regularly render its accounts and returns during the war."

3425. What do you exactly mean about their being no organisation?—I mean to say, simply that so many non-commissioned officers and men were sent out in bulk, and we were left to distribute them.

3426. But is there no provision in the regulations for the organisation of the Army Service Corps in war?—If I may read a further extract from my diary, these are extracts from notes made about June, 1900, by Colonel Clayton for my information. He prepared this for a report which I made to Lord Roberts.

3427. These are Colonel Clayton's notes incorporated in your diary?—Yes, incorporated in my diary at the time. I say: "By the beginnng of June, a total of 241 Army Service Corps' officers had been sent to South Africa. Of these, four had died and sixteen had been invalided. In addition to the above, 126 officers of other corps had been attached for supply and transport work. The want of sufficient number of properly-trained Army Service Corps' officers was severely felt. Fort transport companies in all were sent from England. The *personnel* of each company should have been that laid down in the war establishment, and as regards those companies which first came out, this was the case, except as regards artificers; but as the number of troops increased and more companies were required, the proportion of warrant officers and non-commissioned officers gradually decreased with each fresh company sent out since even when the whole of the Army Service Corps Reserves had been called up, there were still insufficient to meet requirements. There have never been sufficient artificers to bring the companies to their full establishment, and the want of men to repair vehicles and harness, and to shoe mules and horses, has caused considerable inconvenience to the Army and expense to the public. In future the establishment of warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and artificers for each company should be that laid down in the war establishments, and the Army Service Corps should have a sufficient *personnel* serving either with the colours or in the Reserve, to supply this for every company in the corps. The number of Army Service Corps' drivers sent to South Africa varied from 15 to 23 in each company according to its allotment for work with the field army or on the lines of communication. These drivers were engaged as bâtmen for Army Service Corps and medical officers, as cooks, as cold shoers, and as assistants in the artificers' shops. The number originally sent out was insufficient, no margin having been allowed for sickness, but eventually an additional 1,000 drivers arrived, and proved more than sufficient to meet all requirements, the men not being required to act as drivers. The number of supply men available for the field army and for the lines of communication" (this is more what we were talking about) "has been: Clerks 535, bakers 541, and butchers 220. In addition, 184 transport non-commissioned officers and men have been employed on supply work, as well as 293 civilian clerks and issuers, 59 civilian bakers, and 14 civilian butchers. Thus, a total of 1,846 soldiers and civilians have been employed. Some 2,000 natives have also been engaged as labourers at the different bases and at stations along the lines of communication. It has not been possible to adhere to the supply establishments laid down by the regulations for corps, divisional and brigade troops, there being an insufficient supply of non-commissioned officers and men in the corps to enable this to be done, and although endeavours were made to supplement the numbers available by utilising transport men and by engaging civilians, the want of sufficient properly trained supply non-commissioned officers and men has thrown a severe strain on the corps. The number of supply non-commissioned officers and men serving with the field army, which consisted of seven cavalry and mounted infantry brigades and 11 infantry divisions, has been 319, whereas, according to the war establishments, they should have numbered 644. This deficiency was partly made up with transport drivers and a few non-commissioned officers drawn from cavalry and infantry units. For the lines of communication endeavours were made to organise the *personnel* into depôt units, but it has been impossible to maintain the strength of each unit to that fixed upon. Once formed, each unit has been kept intact, and all movements of supply men from station to station on the lines of communication have been made by units. The organisation laid down for a bakery company has not been attempted, it being impracticable to organise a mobile field bakery which would have been of any utility with troops moving rapidly from place to place. The number of bakers was found to be insufficient, and in order to provide for a proper supply of fresh bread 40 bakers, or two sections, should be allowed for every 10,000 men. The organisation of the transport companies has not been carried out as laid down in the War Establishments. Instead of three companies, only two could be allotted to each division, and as these two were made up by dividing the *personnel* of a single company, the number of non-commissioned officers and artificers in each company was greatly reduced, and as the *personnel* became still further reduced by sickness, some of the companies have been very short indeed of non-commissioned officers and artificers. For instance, No. 10 Company, Army Service Corps, with the 12th Brigade, had at one time only two non-commissioned officers, the Company Quartermaster-Sergeant and a Corporal. In order to secure a proper supervision the transport establishment with each division

should never be less than three companies. The organisation of the supply branch was left to chance, the men being sent out in batches with no organisation whatever. The supply *personnel* for the field army should be organised before it leaves England. Each staff and each supply officer should come out with his clerks or his supply detachment complete, and ready to accompany the division or brigade to which he is attached. In the same way depôt units and bakery sections for the lines of communication should be organised and sent from home complete with stationery and equipment. In addition to the organised supply units, at least 15 per cent. spare of all ranks should be posted to a depôt company at the base, to meet demands caused by the mobilisation of fresh units at the seat of operations and to replace casualties. Every Army Service Corps officer and clerk should leave England with stationery sufficient to last him for at least a month. In the early stages of the war the greatest inconvenience was felt owing to the want of stationery in the various staff and departmental offices. The absence of sufficient stationery means the absence of proper accounts and, consequently, of a sufficient financial check on expenditure." That is what I thought. I explained that it was not so much any fault at home as it was the insufficiency of the men for a large force—the insufficiency of the number of the Army Service Corps. Of course, they sent out all they could, and we had to do the best we could, with the result that each man had really to do the work of two men.

3428. I understood the evidence yesterday to be that they sent all they could, and that they admitted that the *personnel* of the Army Service Corps was too small now?—It was so, no doubt.

3429. But I understood your evidence to go a little further; that is to say, that the organisation as described by the War Establishments was not carried out?—It is faulty, it is defective in many points; for instance, the bakery with our organisation is an Army Corps unit, so that some 35,000 men would always get their bread baked at the same bakery establishment. We found this impossible to work. All bread had to be baked on the line of communications near the railway, where you could get coal or wood sent up by train, but if you attempt to bake on the march in a country like South Africa, where there is next to no wood, you would never have sufficient transport to carry the fuel, so we always baked our bread as near as we could to the railway, and we formed small bakery units, or sections of so many men. I do not mean to say that the Field Service organisation was not carried out by the authorities at home, but it proved, I think, a faulty organisation.

3430. You made the remark, then, with regard to supply, that there was no supply organisation at all?—They simply lumped the supply men out. I do not mean to say that there was no organisation, but the War Office view was that we were to organise the supply *personnel* on the spot. The War Office threw out some 300 non-commissioned officers and men, and said: "There they are, there is a number of men; do your best with them."

3431. And you maintain that that is not the best way?—No, each officer ought to be sent out with his own clerks, whom he would know, and each clerk should have his own stationery sufficient to last him a month.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

3432. (*Chairman.*) I think as far as sea-transport was concerned all the arrangements with the Admiralty worked satisfactorily?—They worked most satisfactorily. I have been out in South Africa in several previous expeditions, and this time there was no trouble at all. We had an excellent Naval transport officer, Captain, now Rear-Admiral, Sir Edward Chichester.

3433. There were some difficulties as to the landing of supplies or the accommodation of the supplies when landed, were there not?—There were. I cannot find the exact place in my notes, but there was a great deal of trouble in landing stores, and it was principally due to the local Government, or whoever was the authority that controlled the docks, refusing to allow us priority. They refused to allow our storeships priority of berthing, and Sir Edward Chichester came to me one day and said: "You might think we were in a foreign port instead of here." He asked me to write a memorandum, and I did so for my General, Sir Frederick Forestier-Walker, to the Governor, and after this everything improved a great deal.

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3434. At what date was that?—I would be able to get you the date.

3435. Approximately?—I think it would be about December, 1899, or January, 1900, but I can get it exactly from my diary.

3436. Perhaps you would give it to us afterwards?—Yes. Another point was that all the steamers that were brought were partially freighted with Government stores, and they always managed to stow the Government stores at the bottom, and my view and Sir Edward's view was that this was in order to ensure that the other stores should be off-loaded first. Say that a ship had 500 tons of Government stores and 3,000 tons of other stores, they would carefully put the Government stores at the bottom, and then when the vessel was berthed you could not unload the Government stores first without getting all the other stores out, so that they were able to discharge their other cargo first.

3437. Were not most of the ships that came out with Government stores fully chartered for Government stores?—A great many were, but a very great quantity of stores came by mail and other steamers. The various shipping companies had their mail steamers, but, besides, they had smaller ships which would not be entitled to priority of berth.

3438. A large proportion of the stores must have come out in Government storeships?—Yes.

3439. Were those chartered storeships kept waiting outside the dock because they could not get in?—I did not quite understand your point before—a very large number were kept waiting, and sometimes the number rose till at one time there were over 90 at the four South African ports waiting to unload, simply because we could not unload fast enough. We cabled reporting that to the War Office. For the first two months of the war we were very short of supplies, and then there suddenly came a plethora of supplies, and they came out in such a hurry that we had more than we could off-load. There was only a certain amount of dock space, and we could not discharge except into lighters from more than the ships we could get alongside the dock, so that we begged them to stop supplies at home, but they were very difficult to stop, because they had made arrangements two or three months ahead from all parts of the world, and these ships still kept coming out.

3440. You would not have stopped them if you had been short of a particular article, so that you were fully supplied by that time, I suppose? The point is whether the delay in unloading in any way affected the operations?—Not in the least; it was only a question of increased demurrage.

3441. It did not delay the operations?—Not so far as the supplies went; I would not speak for other things.

3442. That was after the first week in December that the supplies had begun to come in freely?—There was not any real congestion until about March, 1900.

3443. After the first week in December you had plenty of supplies from home, and you were never short again?—That is so.

3444. As to what was sent out, were you dissatisfied with the harness and other equipment?—We never could get sufficient harness; we begged the War Office to send us harness. I think they had some idea that harness could be obtained locally, but the local harness was absolutely useless, and went to pieces at once. In my experience—and I have been out in South Africa four times before—we always found the Cape harness absolutely useless.

3445. That must have been on record in the department?—I was on a committee which dealt with the subject in 1886, and I have the report here, in which I am sure that that was specially noted. I have a report here, which I made to the War Office in 1885, when I was the senior commissariat officer of the Bechuanaland field force, in which I reported that the local harness is comparatively useless, and begged them to send it from England. Before I left England for the war I wrote: "Army Service Corps.—Mule Harness—This should all be sent from home; if obtained locally it is most inferior in every respect." I handed that to Sir Redvers Buller, and he sent it up to the War Office with other papers. It was on the 12th September, 1899, that I wrote that, before leaving England. I heard afterwards from people who came out unofficially that the War Office had ordered harness, and that there were great difficulties in getting it.

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3446. It seems to have been fully understood that harness would be ordered in South Africa, because we have it in the statement (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 220) which the War Office have put in that "as soon as war broke out, and funds were made available, large orders for mule wagons and harness were placed in England, and the General Officer Commanding in South Africa was allowed to purchase locally as many mule wagons and Scotch carts and as much harness as he required to meet his requirements"?—You see, it was useless to authorise purchase in South Africa, because you could not get the stuff.

3447. They seemed to have relied on his doing so, because that is the statement which they have submitted to us?—I should like you to get the correspondence that was sent to the War Office from the Cape at the time—the cablegrams between October and December, 1899, as to mule harness, and you would find that there were nothing but cablegrams; and I think I could show you an intimation from the War Office to a different effect.

3448. We are informed that there was purchased in South Africa: harness, 10-span sets, 712; and 6-span sets, 320. Was that purchased under your directions?—No; it is purchased as equipment, and has all to be purchased by the Ordnance Department; and we used constantly to complain, "What is the good of giving us harness that immediately you put the mules into it goes to pieces?" That is one of the things we want—authority to purchase locally our own harness in future.

3449. I suppose it is correct that you did receive about a thousand sets of harness purchased in South Africa?—I have no doubt we did; but one thousand sets were not much good for the number of animals we had, while of course, a thousand sets of bad harness are no good at all.

3450. As a matter of fact, the want of it put you into difficulties?—We were in the greatest difficulty for want of harness at the beginning of the campaign, and it could not be bought on the spot. Telegrams came out, I remember, telling us that we might purchase locally, and harness of sorts was purchased locally.

3451. Your supply equipment was also unsatisfactory—the bakery troughs, and so on?—In some instances the supply equipment was very unsatisfactory. I have before me the report of a committee that assembled in 1886, after the Egyptian and Bechuanaland campaigns, of which the late Assistant Permanent Under-Secretary for War, Mr. Lawson, was a member, and one of the suggestions of that committee was: "Baking troughs should be made to fold so as to economise space in wagons." That was one of the suggestions, but we had a large number of big baking troughs sent out to South Africa that would not fold, and, of course, it was practically impossible to transport them. At the same time I had written before I left England in October, 1899: "Army Service Corps.—Supply Equipment at Aldershot—This might be looked over, and brought up to date. The cumbersome baking troughs are obsolete, and could hardly ever be carried in an enemy's country, even if transport were unlimited. Dough-making machines and small folding troughs should be supplied." You must remember I handed that to Sir Redvers Buller, who, I understood, was going to send it to the War Office, and from other questions on the same paper which were settled I assume it did reach the War Office. We also asked for dough-making machines. When I got out to South Africa I found the bakers were so hard-worked, having to march all day and to bake at night, that they were going sick; in fact, we lost a large percentage of them by death and sickness. I cabled home then to say that a good baking machine would save a great deal of labour, and begging that some might be sent out that might be worked by coal or oil, and which might be sufficiently small to be carried on an ox wagon or in a railway truck. Eventually they sent out dough-making machines, but they were worked by hand, and we found on trying them that it took two men to make as much dough with them as it would take one man with his hands; so that they were useless.

3452. Was the improved equipment in use in England before you left?—In England there is very little Service equipment used; our abattoirs and bakeries are in buildings, and not out in the open, and we would have steam bakeries.

3453. Were any of the improved troughs sent out?—I should not like to say none were sent; I have no doubt some were. I think all that had not been changed were sent out.

3454. I think some of the evidence amounted to this: that they sent out as much of the new equipment as they had, but they had to supplement it with the old?—I have no doubt that is the case; I am not in the least blaming the War Office, because I am sure they did everything they could; but I am only saying that it was one of my recommendations in 1885, and when I was on the committee in 1886 at the War Office we also recommended this particular thing about the folding troughs, and, to my astonishment, 16 years afterwards I found them still coming out without being made to fold. That was because they had never been used since, I suppose.

3455. They had never had time to introduce the new troughs. Now we come to the period when Lord Roberts arrived on the 12th January, and I think an important step in your Department which was then taken was the reorganisation of the transport?—Yes. I will read from my diary about that: "Lord Roberts reached Cape Town on the 12th January. With the exception of ammunition carts, water carts, pack animals, and technical vehicles, Lord Roberts decided to withdraw all regimental transport from units, to organise it as General Army Transport, and place it under the Army Service Corps. Fourteen Army Service Corps' companies were accordingly formed into 28 mule transport companies, each comprising 49 buck wagons, four Scotch carts, and a water cart. On the 20th January these companies were distributed as follows"; and then the distribution follows. "Some of the above were not fully completed with mules and vehicles till some weeks later." Then I say: "Before the campaign commenced, the War Office authorities had decided that each unit mobilised for active service should be equipped with a complete regimental mule transport. For a single infantry battalion the transport comprised: 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 1 civil conductor, 30 native drivers, 10 privates, as drivers, 7 privates, as wagonmen, 2 riding horses, 111 draught mules, 9 pack mules, 12 spare mules, 15 vehicles (including a machine gun). In the above no transport for the conveyance of camp equipment was provided for. By each soldier a total weight of over 56lbs. was carried, yet only 369 rounds of small arm ammunition per man, with 4,000 rounds for the machine gun and 3½ days' rations, could be carried with a battalion, and to do this the men had to carry and the mules to pull very heavy loads. Such an organisation proved both extravagant and dangerous—extravagant because the transport was perforce idle when the unit to which it belonged was stationary, and dangerous owing to the length of the baggage column which such a system entailed. Moreover, regimental transport animals are, as a rule, indifferently fed, whilst the wagons they draw are usually overloaded. Again, it is a debatable question whether mule or ox draught should have been selected for the 'first' and 'second' lines of transport of the Army. While mule wagons can travel in South Africa with greater rapidity than ox transport, they carry much lighter loads, they require to be fed daily with a grain and often a hay ration, which, if it has to be carried, further lightens the load, they are comparatively useless over heavy ground in wet weather, and the services of teams of oxen are consequently required to help them over a bad piece of road or across a steep drift. Oxen, on the other hand, though moving at only half the pace of mules, can carry twice the load during the summer months when there is usually some grazing; they will keep their condition on grass alone; while owing to their strength they can be relied upon to bring their wagons safely through the heaviest ground and across the steepest drift. They are easily herded and not readily stampeded at night. For the reasons given, a lightly loaded mule transport is very suitable for working with mounted troops moving rapidly during dry weather, while ox transport appears to be admirably adapted to accompany infantry on long marches. Mule and ox transport should not be moved together in any numbers along the same road at the same time, as while mule wagons travel at a speed of 4 to 6 miles an hour, the pace of an ox wagon seldom exceeds 2½ miles. In a mixed convoy mule transport should therefore invariably precede ox transport. Whether ox or mule transport is employed, it should be formed in small sections of 10 or 12 wagons, and organised as general Army transport. In practice it was found impossible to keep together the large sections and companies which were formed after Lord Roberts arrived." Of course, I have given here my own views rather about mule and ox transport. I had been out in South Africa some nine years altogether before, and I had been in four expeditions out there before this war, and my experience was that mule transport was a great mistake,

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whereas the War Office had authorised nothing but mule transport for the "first" line. I still think mule transport a mistake; it is useful for mounted troops in dry weather, but I killed nearly half my oxen in pulling mule wagons out of drifts when I was on the march to Bloemfontein.

3456. We were told that Lord Methuen would not have ox transport?—When Lord Methuen started from the Orange River to Modder River all his "first" line transport—that is, all the regimental transport—was mule transport. Ox transport was ready behind the Orange River, but owing to the indifferent grazing, and the fear of lengthening his line when he had the railway at his disposal, he decided not to let any ox transport, except a few for the naval guns and artillery, come north of the Orange River. After the fight at Magersfontein I begged that his mule transport, which consisted of 4,500 odd animals, should be sent back to the Orange River, as he was ordered to remain at Modder, and a correspondence by telegram ensued, in which it was arranged that the mules were to remain at the Modder River. Of course, to enable them to remain at the Modder River I had to fill up with some 5,000 or 6,000 tons of forage for these mules, and the mules, notwithstanding that, as they very soon finished all the grazing round the camp at Modder River, fell off very considerably in condition, and when Lord Roberts came up he found these mules in very indifferent condition. They were a great proportion of the mules that we had to march on to Bloemfontein with.

3457. What about ox transport? Were you not anxious to send ox transport?—We had 800 ox wagons, which meant 2,400 tons of carrying power, south of the Orange River, but we had orders that we were on no account to send it north of the Orange River; we were not allowed to send it north until after Lord Roberts himself passed Orange River Station on his way to Bloemfontein.

3458. (*Viscount Esher.*) Whose orders were these to you?—My orders came from the Chief of the Staff.

3459. Before Lord Roberts got out there?—This was before Lord Roberts was out there.

3460. From whom did you receive those orders that you were not to send the ox transport up to the Modder?—When Lord Methuen crossed the Orange River he refused to take any oxen with him.

3461. (*Chairman.*) That is what we wanted to know. When he crossed the Orange River you offered him ox transport?—He knew that there were these 800 wagons.

3462. You wished to send it?—We had it ready; we were not told the strategical operations which were going to take place, but we had these wagons upon the best grazing grounds south of the Orange River ready for any forward move required.

3463. If you had been left to yourself you would have sent it on to carry his supplies?—Instead of that he put all his supplies on the train.

3464. If you had been left to yourself you would have sent on these wagons with Lord Methuen's advance, would you not?—No; it was unnecessary, because he had sufficient transport if he was not going to leave the railway, but the point arose afterwards.

3465. You said just now that you received orders from the Chief of the Staff not to send ox transport beyond the Orange River?—Yes.

3466. If you received those orders—you had asked for orders, I suppose, or what was the origin of your getting that particular order?—Because we wanted to load up; as the "first" line of transport was mule transport, we wanted to load up our ox transport with stores, and to be ready at a moment's notice to run them forward with whatever force there was, loaded with a large reserve of supplies; but I quite agree that so long as any force kept solely to the railway line it was unnecessary, because one railway train would take perhaps as much as 50 or more ox wagons.

3467. Then you agree with the orders?—I would not like to give an opinion; I do not think I should be right to give an opinion, because it is a question of strategy or tactics, and my business was confined to supply and transport. If we were never going to leave the railway it was all right, but if you wanted to leave the railway it was absolutely necessary to take ox wagons. The fact of having no ox wagons confines a force to the railway.

3468. I understood it to be the case that Lord Methuen had been urged to allow ox transport to be used, and that he definitely gave orders that it was not to cross the Orange River—indeed, you said just now that you had received those orders?—I know we had orders, I would not say from Lord Methuen, but we certainly had orders, that we were not to put an ox wagon north of the Orange River. That, I assumed, meant that the plan of campaign did not contemplate leaving the railway at the time.

3469. If there was any representation made to Lord Methuen to allow the ox transport, it did not come from you?—Oh, no.

3470. (*Viscount Esher.*) Did you not say just now that you had asked to have the mules sent back from the Modder River to the Orange River?—Yes.

3471. That was refused: who refused that?—Sir Redvers Buller, at Lord Methuen's request. Perhaps I am wrong, and I would not like to say, but I have the correspondence here. This was on the 16th December, and I think we are mixing up matters.

3472. (*Chairman.*) That is a later date you are speaking about with regard to the mules?—Before Magersfontein we were not allowed to send any oxen over the Orange River. I think that the reason very likely was because Lord Methuen thought possibly he would have an unnecessarily extended baggage column, and he had the railway, and was going to keep to it—I am only assuming this—and that therefore he could carry his supplies and equipment on the railway and on his mule wagons, but when he got up to the Modder River and was stopping there after Magersfontein, I believe—I do not know it for a fact, but I understood—that Sir Redvers Buller from Natal telegraphed that if he could not advance to Kimberley he was to remain at Modder River. I do not know this for a fact, but that was my impression at the time, and eventually this is what came to me: "From General Commanding-in-Chief, Frere Camp." (This is Sir Redvers Buller.) "To General, Cape Town," dated December 16th, 1899. "Tell Methuen to fill up with good provisions, especially forage, and arrange to hang on six weeks at Modder River." When I received that telegram, I wrote: "Chief of Staff. Please see telegram to Orange River to fill up to 42 days' reserve. If Lord Methuen could graze his mules he could economise his forage a great deal. Would you ask him about this. I hear the grass is good." That was dated the 17th December. "From Chief of Staff, Cape Town, to Lord Methuen, Modder River, December 17th, 1899. Adhere strictly to authorised scale of rations for men and animals, and economise forage by grazing mules when possible." I have not copied any more telegrams, but I have this note: "Chief of Staff wired to General Officer Commanding Modder River on the 18th December asking him whether, as his force would be stationary for some weeks, he could not send some of his mules back, and thus relieve the pressure on the railway from Orange River and De Aar, from which places some 4,000 tons of reserve forage would have to be sent, besides the 60 days' reserve provisions for the troops and the daily rations for man and horse." Then these telegrams follow: "From Methuen, Modder River, to Chief of Staff, Cape Town, 18th December. G. 40. Your 674. It is, in my opinion, not advisable to send back any of my transport animals to a supply depôt; the transport may be required at any moment." "From Methuen, to Chief of Staff, December 18th, 1899. As it is possible I may be cut off from my communications, and should provide for contingencies, I consider 45 days' reserve stores should be sent here immediately; and, on completion, it should be carefully considered whether reserve stores should not be increased to twice 30 days." . . . . "From Director of Supplies" (this is myself) "To Chief of Staff: If you think 60 days' food should be sent, there will be no difficulty if railway keeps open." That is dated December 19th, 1899. I have no doubt I got his assent, because I telegraphed on the 21st, two days afterwards, to Lord Methuen: "From Director of Supplies to Lord Methuen, Modder River. 21st December, R. 580. Your G. 42 of 18th instant. General approves of another 18 days." Those are the telegrams that passed at the time, and if I may read you my notes, I will give a short extract from my diary, dated Cape Town, 15th January, 1900, after Lord Roberts' arrival. From correspondence I got from home there seemed to have been an idea that his transport had been inefficient, and I understood that Lord Methuen, after Magersfontein, had sent a dispatch, which was cabled home no doubt, to say that

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he had "insufficient"—which I afterwards understood was cabled by mistake as "inefficient"—transport to make a flank move, and this was my comment when I heard this, when Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener came out: "There seems to have been an impression at home that Methuen's troops have been unable to move for want of transport. I explained to Lord Roberts that this was quite a mistake. After the reverse at Magersfontein Methuen was directed by Sir Redvers to retire to the Orange River if he could not relieve Kimberley. Lord Methuen decided that he was not strong enough to relieve Kimberley without reinforcements, but it was represented that if he left Modder River the Boers from Magersfontein would probably augment the forces against which Gatacre and French were operating. It was, therefore, decided that Lord Methuen's force should remain at Modder until reinforced by Sir C. Warren's division. Meantime the reverse at Colenso occurred, and Warren's division was sent to Natal instead of to the Modder, and Lord Methuen then asked for 60 days' reserve provisions, in case his communications might be cut. As his force was to sit still and do little or nothing, I pointed out that his enormous mule train might as well return to Orange River, or, at any rate, the greater part of it, until it was again required. Lord Methuen, however, decided to keep his transport train, consisting of some 4,500 mules, with him, so I had to lay in two months' reserve rations for those animals, besides the food for troops and horses. The total must have amounted to some 6,000 or 7,000 tons, and this accumulation of supplies has, of course, necessitated Lord Methuen remaining at the Modder River, whilst some 3,000 to 4,000 troops have been guarding his communications with the Orange River. The following is the correspondence which took place at the time"—what I have read. I go on to say: "Lord Methuen's mules have lately fallen off in condition, as the grazing of so many animals has completely exhausted all the grass near the Modder, and I still believe it would have been better to have sent his transport back. It is ludicrous, however, for anyone to think that Lord Methuen's force has been short of transport, and I fancy he himself would be the last person to say so. On the contrary, he had apparently more than he wanted, as he left some of his regimental transport south of the Orange River when he advanced, as his baggage column was too long, and he preferred, no doubt, to trust to the railway for the conveyance of his supplies, etc." The Army Service Corps officers felt rather deeply the suggestion that their transport, which they had organised, had broken down, and there was a great deal of talk about it at the time, and that is no doubt why I wrote so much in detail, putting the case from our point of view.

3473. At any rate you considered that it was necessary to make the change from regimental transport to the other system, which Lord Roberts' carried into effect?—I did not have anything to do with initiating it, but I absolutely agreed with it. I am sure that regimental transport is most wasteful and extravagant.

3474. Do you say that generally, or for that particular instance?—Always, I think, except for a very small force; if you have a small force, say a single brigade, operating against a native enemy, it would be convenient if you had plenty of room and good roads, to give each regiment its own transport.

3475. It is the recognised system?—It has been in vogue in our army for some time.

3476. But in your opinion it ought to be altered?—In my opinion Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener were quite justified in making the change.

3477. And it was necessary for the particular operation they had then in contemplation, namely, the march to Bloemfontein?—I think that if they had not done so we should never have got to Bloemfontein—that is to say, if Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener had not reorganised the regimental transport, we should never have got to Bloemfontein.

3478. Having reorganised it, had you enough transport for the march?—There is never enough transport on active service. No general ever had enough transport in war time. And the worst of it is, that you can only march a certain number of vehicles along a certain road in a given time, and, therefore, transport has to be limited, but no general I have ever served under has ever said that he had sufficient transport

3479. Perhaps not, but had you as much transport as you could send along the road?—I should say we had as much or more than we could send along the road; in fact, we lost 200 wagons.

3480. The march was not crippled by the want of transport, which could have been usefully employed?—My view is that so much mule transport was a mistake, they could not pull the wagons as the oxen do; ten mules cannot pull a South African wagon over heavy or sandy roads with 4,000lbs., and I think in that way the transport might have been greatly improved. I should have liked a larger quantity of the transport that went with the troops, what we call the first line of transport, to be ox transport.

3481. The loss of the 200 wagons was a serious matter?—It was a very serious loss, but Lord Roberts at once accepted the situation, and decided to abandon the wagons in rear, and instead of marching his force back, to march on and capture Jacobsdaal, which we did the next morning. At Jacobsdaal we were some five or six miles from the Modder River and Honingnest Kloof, where we had 100 loaded wagons, which we were able to get up the next day, and we sent those on to Lord Kitchener, who, with General French, had met Cronje, and had surrounded him at Paardeberg.

3482. That was when Sir William Nicholson was appointed Director of Transport?—Sir William Nicholson, the day after we arrived at Jacobsdaal, was appointed Director of Transport. This is from my diary: "On reaching Jacobsdaal Lord Roberts decided it was impossible for a single officer to efficiently supervise both the Transport and Supply Departments, and Colonel Sir William Nicholson, his military secretary, was appointed Director of Transport, with Major Furze, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, as his assistant. I had originally intended to place Colonel Bunbury in charge of the transport service with the force, but owing to the paucity of senior Army Service Corps officers I was compelled to leave him at the Modder River to ensure that the supplies so urgently needed were hurried forward. For the same reason Colonel Johnson had to be sent to Kimberley, and my staff was consequently reduced to a Quartermaster; thus I was unable to exercise as much personal supervision over the widely distributed and lately organised transport as I would have desired." That was what I wrote at the time.

3483. Were you relieved of those duties?—I was relieved of those duties; I do not know whether they thought I was to a certain extent responsible for the loss of the 200 wagons at Waterval, but perhaps it may have been so.

3484. That is not suggested?—Well, I was relieved from the administrative control over the transport.

3485. The reason given by Lord Roberts was different?—He wrote me a most kind letter about it, but we did lose the administration of our transport.

3486. Therefore, after that time you took up the question of supplies only?—Well, during the rest of the march I had still a great deal to do with transport; the fact is, to my mind, you cannot separate supply and transport.

3487. But Sir William Nicholson was responsible?—He was responsible.

3488. After Bloemfontein your work was a good deal simplified, when you got to the railway?—After Bloemfontein, on the 22nd March I left for Cape Town, and in April we re-opened communication by rail with the coast ports, and that made the work much simpler, because we had no longer to depend on mule or ox transport.

3489. I think you wanted to mention the supply of the force under General Carrington in March and April, 1900; there was some competition, was there not, in the Cape markets?—We heard that a force was to be sent out to Beira of some 5,000 or 6,000 men and animals under General Carrington. I was at Cape Town, and could not understand why the prices of things I was buying seemed to be going up. I found merchants coming to me and saying: "If you will not buy I can get a better price from somebody else." I then found that the somebody else was the Chartered Company, who were virtually bidding against me in the same market. I assume that the War Office had given authority to the Chartered Company to supply Carrington. I would like to read from my diary, where I say, on the 4th April: "I do not understand what is being done about the troops for Beira. The War Office have apparently told the Chartered Company to arrange for their supply, and the Chartered Company have, without

ny knowing anything about it till two days ago, been buying forage, mealies, mules, harness, wagons, etc., here, and competing with us in the local markets. It is quite wrong that two sets of people should be buying the same article in the same market for the same person, and that is what it seems is being done. I should like to know what, if any, responsibility we have regarding the supply of this force. Lord Roberts, I assume, commands it, and if he does he must be responsible for its supply, and we should be given full information on the subject, but at present we have none, except what we can pick up locally." On the 22nd May I wrote again in my diary: "The importation of slaughter cattle to Beira from Argentina by the Chartered Company on behalf of the War Office has not proved a great success. I hear that 400 of one consignment either died or had to be slaughtered on the voyage, foot and mouth disease having broken out amongst them. Cattle should be imported from Australia or Madagascar. Argentine cattle are so wild that they are only fit for slaughter immediately they land in this country; so, even if the cattle had not been diseased, they would have been of little use to us at the front. I have as yet taken no steps with regard to the supply of Carrington's force, but have wired him to let me know when he wants anything. As railway communication between the Cape Colony and Mafeking will be reopened in a week or ten days I may shortly expect heavy demands from Carrington, who will naturally prefer to obtain his supplies from the south instead of from the north, where everything has to be carted 270 miles by road from Salisbury to Buluwayo. He has lost a lot of horses and mules from horse sickness, as there have been no frosts in Matabeleland, yet, to stop the sickness." The War Office had sent, some months earlier, to Natal, a number of Argentine cattle which were so wild that we could not send them up country from Durban, and we had to slaughter them there. We found that the Chartered Company, without probably the War Office knowing anything about it, had brought a large number of Argentine cattle to Beira—I think there were two shiploads—and, owing to insufficient veterinary examination when shipped, these cattle died on the voyage. I noticed some months ago that an action was brought by the contractors, whose local agents I think were a Mr. White and a Mr. Furber, to recover the value of these cattle which had been shipped for the Chartered Company. The Chartered Company lost the action, and I assume that the War Office will have to pay.

3490. But the War Office, on being communicated with, arranged that the dual supply should be stopped?—They did.

3491. Did you undertake the supply after that?—I undertook the supply. I wrote again in my diary: "The official letter from the War Office about supplies for the troops in Rhodesia does not seem to me very clear. It will be a great mistake if the Chartered Company are to send up train loads of supplies from Cape Town to Buluwayo to feed Carrington's force, when the railway is opened through to Mafeking and beyond, which it will be, in a week or so. I am going into the question, and have cabled to Carrington for his views on the subject." I undertook the supply, but if you obtain the official communications from the War Office they would probably explain the matter better than these notes in my diary. The War Office eventually telegraphed out that we were to undertake the supply, and that they had finished with the Chartered Company. As far as the Chartered Company and their supplies go, I had nothing to do with them, and never saw them.

3492. (*Viscount Esher.*) At what date were you authorised to supply?—I could not tell you, but this letter is dated 22nd May, and between the 22nd May and the previous six weeks the whole of the correspondence will be obtainable from the War Office. When I wrote these letters you will understand that I was simply writing under the orders of the General at Cape Town, so that every letter would not be written as from myself, but all letters or cablegrams would be written from the General at Cape Town to the Secretary of State for War, and you will find either in the cablegrams or the letters the full information.

3493. I think you wish to represent that there were no deficiencies of supplies for hospital use?—In May and June, 1900, a great many letters appeared in the papers, and there was a deal of fuss about the sickness amongst the troops, and different people said that there was a want of supplies. Of course, they meant supplies generally, and hospital supplies include equipment, machines, instruments and appliances, as well as food supplies. The Army Service Corps had only to do with the "food" supply for the hospitals, the brandy, port wine, etc. I had largely increased the supply of medical comforts from time to time when I found the consumption was in excess of the scale that had been fixed by the Director-General before I went out, and that was done with the concurrence of the Principal Medical Officer. On the 9th June I wrote to the Principal Medical Officer, Lines of Communication: "Will you please let me know if any special kinds of supplies beyond those already in use or cabled for are required in the hospitals. We have cabled home for Brand's essence of beef, Benger's food and claret, also that the supplies of meat extracts, brandy, champagne and calf's foot jelly should be doubled, as the demands for these supplies are far in excess of the scale fixed by the Director-General Army Medical Service, and published in orders. Should, however, you consider any other articles of supply are wanted, we could write home by Wednesday's mail for them, cabling at the same time, if urgent." That is signed by myself, and this is the reply: "Director of Supplies,—I do not consider anything more than what has been asked for is likely to be required. (Signed) J. F. Supple, Colonel, R.A.M.C., P.M.O., Base, Cape Town, 11th June, 1900." I wrote that letter with the object of finding out whether there was anything in these complaints, and whether there was really anything more wanted than was supplied.

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3494. There may have been particular cases of some deficiency?—No doubt. You will find that doctors vary in their treatment. You have so much port wine and brandy per thousand sick men, and you fix a scale, as the Director-General in London did, but one doctor at a station says, "I never give anything but brandy to my patients," and you find a large quantity of surplus port wine at that station, with telegrams going down for more brandy. At another place the doctor will say, "I never give spirits; I always give port wine," and the patients get nothing but port wine, and there will be a run on the port wine. Another doctor will use nothing but essence of beef, and will not touch extract of beef.

3495. I suppose in a case like the march to Bloemfontein you could not carry these things?—We never run out, and I always had some supplies all through the march to Bloemfontein. I may have run out of, say, whiskey, but I am perfectly certain that when I got into Bloemfontein I still had some brandy, port wine, arrowroot, and essence of beef.

3496. And those were the main supplies you were responsible for?—Yes. The doctors supply themselves with medicines. I remember I made a full report, with supporting documents, to the Royal Commission appointed to consider and report upon the care and treatment of the sick and wounded in the South African campaign, and that report could be obtained, in which I showed that from the week we arrived at Bloemfontein straight on, the reserve of hospital supplies at Bloemfontein was constantly increased. Directly we got to Bloemfontein I took everything there was in the town; I commandeered everything at fair prices that we fixed, and we got everything we could. As far as my supplies went, the reserve quantity on which the medical officers could always draw was increasing instead of diminishing.

3497. As regards the supplies furnished by the War Office, had you any difficulties with regard to quantity or quality?—It must not be considered that I am making any complaint about the War Office, because I would like to point out that I said, writing in my diary towards the end of the war, "Taking everything into consideration, the War Office have done us very well in the matter of supplies and transport. The whole situation was saved when the 'Braemar Castle' in October, 1899, brought out the Army Service Corps' companies and officers, as we were able to get a good start of the troops. We also have had the advantage of finding docks and wharves at each of the four ports, which has helped Army Service Corps' work enormously. We should have had a far harder task had we been landing in an enemy's country, where we should have found no labour, clerical or otherwise." I have just read that because I have here a long list, which I made out from notes in my diary, of the complaints which we made with respect to various supplies.

3498. You will put that in, perhaps?—I will put it in, and you can read it. I do not know whether you wish to examine me about these complaints or not. Several ships were burned, as the hay on board caught fire. Ships arrived with supplies more or less useless,

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but this is the list, and it is a very considerable one. (*The List was handed in. Vide Appendix Vol., page* 250.)

3499. Is it very serious?—Some items are very serious.

3500. We can ask for the correspondence with regard to these matters?—Yes, you might get the War Office papers relating to them. Some of the complaints are insignificant, but some you might consider important. There is one point I should like particularly to mention in connection with some coal from the "Mascotte," because I have seen in the papers that I have been considered responsible for the quality of this coal. What absolutely happened was this: At Cape Town they asked me for house coal for use in the hospital. They had been accustomed to get it from England for many years past, but I said, "Well, it is no good getting a few hundred tons of coal when we are getting hundreds of thousands of tons of steam coal from the War Office; do not bother the War Office about such a petty question. What can we get it for locally?" They told me they could not get it locally under £5 10s. a ton, and I then said that I would not pay that ridiculous price, and cabled from my office to the War Office for 500 tons of household coal. When this coal came out I found that it was simply coal-dust, and as it was useless, I sold it for a few shillings, reporting the matter home to the War Office. As I reported that home to the War Office, it naturally had to come under the notice of the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee; attention was drawn to it, and eventually a question was asked in the House as to who was responsible. Certainly, as I read it in the "Times," I understood that I was held to be responsible, but I must say I do not consider I was responsible in any way. All I had done was to ask for house coal, and I naturally expected to get house coal which could stand a journey through the tropics, and when I found out the nature of the coal supplied I reported home that it was bad. If I had not reported home nothing would have been said or heard about it, but because I reported it home I was in the House of Commons—not by name—held up as the officer responsible, and it was said that I ought to have given further information when demanding this coal. Naturally I object to being gibbeted in the House of Commons as a fool, without having an opportunity of replying, and I have therefore drawn particular attention to the complaint about that coal from the "Mascotte."

3501. You have named a variety of points which merit attention. I suppose all you desire is to name them, and not to go into each one of them?—I prepared a note of the different points which I think in any future campaign it would be useful not to lose sight of from the experience gained in this campaign. I have put them down here, but I do not think the Commission would care to go through them all. Some of the things are very important indeed from the supply and transport point of view. For instance, if you take one of the points I have put down—soap—that is an Army Ordnance supply; but as the Army Ordnance Department have comparatively few depôts, the troops are often unable to obtain it, and it would be preferable to make soap an Army Service Corps supply, as wherever there are troops an Army Service Corps depôt will be near at hand, from which a supply could always be obtained. Owing to the absence of soap, or to the difficulty of getting soap in the field, half the force in South Africa became verminous, so that although it seems a petty thing, it is really most important, and if you will look at the report of that Committee which is now before you, you will see that there, sixteen years ago, it was laid down that soap should be an Army Service Corps supply. I only take that as one of the items. You will also find there a note about marking supplies. If you mark "Port wine, 12 bottles" on a dozen cases, and you put them in a wagon so that everybody can see these words, and then you march troops behind the wagon, they are bound to steal it; it is simply human nature; nobody could withstand the temptation. That is what happens, and if you will look in that Committee's report you will see that is referred to: The troops are exposed to undue temptation, and numerous robberies occur in consequence of cases of spirits, jams, etc., being fully marked with their contents, and there is a suggestion made as to marking them in such a way as to be quite easily understood by the authorities, while not exposing the men to the temptation of seeing too patent a description printed upon them

3502. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) In speaking of the famine prices at which supplies were to be obtained when you arrived, you used the word "double." It is very hard to give an average, but do you think, roughly, that would represent the fact, or would it be more than that?—When I said the prices were double the usual prices I was thinking for the moment of things like flour, which went up to 18s. or 19s.

3503. Supposing you took the average all round, what would you guess it to be, because it would only be a guess? Would double be fair, do you think?—Perhaps it would be a bit too much.

3504. You mentioned that it was the fact, as we all knew from public sources, that the Boer Governments had been purchasing supplies largely?—Perhaps I was wrong to state that as matter of fact, but the way I obtained that information was that I was the officer to whom all claims for compensation were referred at that time. I seized a considerable quantity of supplies from the railway trains which could not be delivered into the Free State, and amongst those supplies were supplies to various firms in the Free State. The consignees might not pay, and when the consignors claimed payment from me, I said: "Produce your books," and I had their books examined, and I found that in several cases they were sending enormous quantities, principally of flour, from Port Elizabeth to the Free State. These particular truckloads I seized were a portion of a very large consignment of flour that was being sent up to the Free State, and one of the clauses in the contract which had to be shown to me was: "In case of war I take no liability." I then said: "There you are, you take no liability; we have seized these articles; you claim against the purchaser as he takes all liability in case of war."

3505. As transport officer did it come to your knowledge that the Boer Governments had also been purchasing carts, wagons, and horses largely?—I do not think so; they all had their own transport.

3506. Not horses?—No. I think the difficulty would be to get horses out of them, as the Boers in the Colony wanted to keep their horses and their wagons.

3507. It was not a question of their purchasing horses in the colony?—No.

3508. With a view to commandeering transport and supplies, and also with a view to getting priority of berthing, did you suggest that martial law should be imposed to the General or to Lord Milner?—I would write a memorandum to the General; I would talk to the General, and he would say: "Write a memorandum."

3509. On what date was that?—October, 1899. I would prefer that you should get the original paper. It would be found at the War Office, no doubt. The correspondence with Lord Milner some time in October, 1899, with the Attorney-General's observations, was, no doubt, forwarded to the War Office.

3510. On questions of demurrage had you to give any certificate as to the number of days to the War Office at home?—That was done entirely by the Navy.

3511. We should not get that information, as to the amount of demurrage, from you at all?—No.

3512. Had you anything to do with the supply of farriers?—Only for the Army Service Corps.

3513. Had you a sufficient supply?—No, I think I read about that from my diary.

3514. I noticed you used the word "farriers," but I did not gather what you said about them?—We were very short of them.

3515. Just coming for the moment to the mule and ox transport, the Boers used both?—The Boers used both, but mule transport has come into use more during the last 10 or 15 years for short distances from the railway at places like Johannesburg and towns where there are good roads. The mule is absolutely useless over a bad drift or in wet weather.

3516. What distance from the railway would Lord Methuen have got with his mule transport without an ox transport at all?—I should not like to say.

3517. How many days? What would have been his limit?—It would be such a question for argument that I would not like to give an opinion.

3518. It is a question of transport entirely?—Yes, but it is a question of what you put into the transport—so many rounds of ammunition, and so on. If it

were simply a question of food it could be settled very easily, but when ammunition and equipment come in, and also medical supply, it is a different matter.

3519. The fact of his having only mule transport would make a great difference on the distance he would be able to go?—Yes.

3520. Coming to the useless Cape harness, you made a representation to Sir Redvers Buller on the 10th September?—Yes, about that date.

3521. That was the first time you made any representation on the subject I suppose?—You understand that was the day I heard from Sir Redvers. I was quartered at Plymouth, and I got a telegram from Sir Redvers, "Come and see me at once."

3522. That was the first time you knew you were going to South Africa?—Yes; I could not make out what was up, and I telegraphed back that I had heard nothing from the War Office. I did not know there was a likelihood of war at all. I went and saw him at Crediton a month or two before then, thinking there might be a war in South Africa. I had jotted down some points.

3523. You had only knowledge as to your going out in charge of the transport 29 days before the war broke out?—About that. There was a very able officer out there. The reason I was sent out was that Sir Redvers Buller knew that he was going out, and he had asked for me.

3524. Was the officer out there senior to you?—No. He joined the same day as I did, and he was three or four years older than I was.

3525. You took charge when you went out there?—I was senior when I got out there; he took transport, and I took supplies eventually.

3526. Did I understand you to say that you sailed on the 3rd October?—I landed at Cape Town on the 3rd October.

3527. You only had four days to consider your plans from the day you knew you were going to the time you sailed?—Yes.

3528. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) With the few exceptions you mentioned, the supply of food to the troops was in your opinion satisfactory?—I think the supply to the troops was entirely satisfactory.

3529. You mentioned a few exceptions where there were bad cases opened?—The troops did not feel that; in the supplies served out to the troops I do not think there was more than a very small percentage of articles you could complain about, when you consider the millions of tons of supplies we received altogether during all the time the war lasted. No doubt very large quantities could be complained about. The state of some of the supplies will be seen from the lists I have handed in. I think the supply service was extraordinarily good (without any reference to myself), and I put it entirely down to the improvement that has taken place in the Army Service Corps *personnel* during the past 15 or 16 years. The young officer is very much better trained than he used to be, and he takes a much more intelligent view of his work.

3530. Were you bothered at all by the large amount of stores there were on the beach at Cape Town that could not get away?—There were difficulties, but it was extraordinary how you could get rid of the stores. The way we got rid of the accumulations was that we stacked all the supplies on the spot. We obtained a vacant space of ground belonging to the Docks Administration, and we paid them for it, and we had streets of stacks of supplies there, and when we had railway accommodation sufficient, off it went up country. It used to go by hundreds of tons a day.

3531. Those were your storehouses, in fact?—Our storehouses were principally in the open; we covered them over with tarpaulins, and the great difficulty we had was to get sufficiently good tarpaulins. We wanted tarpaulins that you could tie heavy weights to, so as to prevent them being blown off in the gales, whereas we only had tarpaulins with eyelet holes. We were in a hurry, and for the first two or three months there was great difficulty in getting accessories to help us in our work.

3532. From all the duties that came under your observation, you have no doubt deduced certain points in which improvements could be made: are those formulated in the paper you have handed in?—Yes, I have put them together and handed them in. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 242.)

3533. (*Sir John Jackson.*) As to the supplies sent out from England, in the main are they purchased f.o.b. from England or c.i.f. Cape?—I think many of the supplies purchased in England will be purchased for examination, and will not be f.o.b. They will be delivered at Woolwich Dockyard or some port, and there I suppose they are very often repacked, and then put on board by the War Office and sent out. The supplies that came from England were almost invariably in good condition—what we call "Woolwich supplies," or supplies that had been accepted at the dockyard.

3534. When supplies were loaded at Woolwich and sent out to you, did you get with those cargoes the usual mercantile shipping documents? Did you get a bill of lading?—Yes, we got bills of lading, but I have pointed out, in the papers I have handed in, that sometimes the bill of lading did not at all agree with the supplies we received.

3535. And in the emergency you had to take what you got?—Sometimes the bill of lading came a month after the supplies. In the case where a ship is freighted by the month there is no doubt that there ought to be a supercargo on board, because the captain of the ship may say, "I have nothing to do with your supplies; you put them on board, and I have only to work this ship from port to port."

3536. Your suggestion is that there ought to be a proper person on board to take account of these things during the voyage?—For instance, you might have a ship at Cape Town which would off-load half its supplies, and then have to go to Durban and unload another 20 per cent. there. Nobody knows by that time how much is still on board.

3537. With regard to the delays in unloading ships at Cape Town, what was Sir Edward Chichester's position there?—He was the Senior Naval Transport Officer, and he delivered supplies to us at high water mark; he delivered everything, troops and stores, at high water mark.

3538. When you were so pushed in getting ships alongside the quays, did you ever discharge into barges?—Yes, we discharged into barges, but we found it very laborious work. When we could get four or five ships, as we usually had alongside, and off-loaded them as fast as we could, we could get quite as much——

3539. As you required?—As we could deal with; you could off-load the ships and have more accumulation than you could take away and stack.

3540. We all know that Cape Town is a very expensive place as regards its dock charges: did our Government pay the usual charges to the Cape Town Harbour Board, do you know, or were there special rates?—I think we paid special rates. We paid special rates for the hire of stores.

3541. We were told that for horses and mules they charged 10s. apiece for their just stepping ashore?—That was by the landing contractor at Durban.

3542. Did that not occur at Cape Town?—No; at Cape Town there were docks. At Durban there was a contract, and mules and stores very often had to be off-loaded outside, away from the docks.

3543. They have quays at Durban?—Yes, but I suppose all the ships cannot come in, and I remember Sir Edward Chichester made a complaint to me when he came down about the mules and horses, for which 10s. a head was paid.

3544. Would it have been any advantage to you in getting better delivery of the supplies if some of the ships could have discharged their cargoes at Simon's Town, and the goods had been taken along the Simon's Town and Cape Town Railway, or would the railway have been so congested that no real benefit would have been derived?—I do not think it would have made much difference. I do not know much about Simon's Bay, and I do not know how many ships you could off-load there at a time. It was simply a question of quay space with us; if we could get the ships into the docks, and sufficient quay space to unload the supplies at, we could deal with any quantity.

3545. But it appears to me they were never able to discharge quickly; it may have been that they were quite able to get as many ships alongside the quays at Cape Town as were needed to meet our requirements ashore?—I think the reason was this: that the War Office, when the war broke out, at once arranged, when they got Sir Redvers Buller's letter after he landed, for four months' supplies, for all troops, to be sent out and kept up. Meantime, I had been buying at Cape

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Town, and we had also bought at Durban everything we could get, and had bought six weeks' or perhaps two months' supplies, and the consequence was that when the War Office supplies began to arrive there was a plethora of supplies, and we could not get them landed and taken away as quickly as they arrived. These supply ships came from all parts of the world to Cape Town, and there were often 20 or 30 ships waiting to unload at one port, and at a place like East London there was great difficulty with the civil authorities in getting priority of berthing.

3546. Over the merchant ships?—Yes, there was the greatest difficulty in getting priority of berthing; in fact, I believe we never got it at Port Elizabeth and East London until there was martial law.

3547. Speaking generally, of course, it is clearly a very big business indeed to start suddenly and deal with these enormous quantities of materials that had to go out to the Cape, and I think we may take it that on the whole that service was done very well by the Department at this end so far as expedition went, once they got a fair start with it?—I think so; from the extracts from my diary you might think we were always making complaints, but nothing is said there about the things that went right.

3548. The few complaints you referred to form a very small proportion?—Yes. So far as the supply and transport were concerned, I think the War Office served us remarkably well, and I have said that two or three times in my diary.

3549. (*Sir John Edge.*) I think you said to Sir George Goldie that before you were sent out to South Africa there was already a good officer in your own Department there?—Yes, Colonel Bridge. I was sent out with the idea that Colonel Bridge was to be Director of transport under myself; I was to be Director of Supplies and Transport for the force, and Colonel Bridge was to be Director of Transport.

3550. But he was an officer of considerable experience, I presume?—He was a very good officer, and I should say he is one of the most experienced transport officers in the Army.

3551. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Did you pay duty to the Cape Government on the Government property?—We did not pay duty on the Government property, but they got duty on all stores we bought from the civil population—from merchants, for instance, if a merchant had landed any stores which had already paid duty.

3552. You were not able to buy them out of bond?—If we did we were all right, and did not have to pay, but we had to buy very large quantities of stores which had already been landed and passed through the Customs. Take the instance of flour: corn is landed and pays duty; it is then converted into flour, and we wanted to get back the duty on the corn, but they would not let us.

3553. You wanted to get back the duty on the corn off the flour?—Yes, and the Colonial Government would not give it to us.

3554. On the general Imperial stores landed there you did not pay?—No, we paid dock dues, and those kind of charges, but not duty.

3555. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You said that the rations and so on which were issued to the troops were of very good quality?—I consider the rations were excellent. I might hand in the scale of rations that were issued.

3556. I think we have got that in various ways, but they were of good quality?—Excellent quality.

3557. There has been a good deal said about the men's teeth being ruined and to my knowledge there have been hundreds of cases mentioned where that was said to be caused by the hardness of the biscuits; that is not your opinion?—I do not think so. I think it is entirely a question of liver or stomach. I think the men's stomachs get affected probably by the cold, and that acted on their teeth. I remember several men telling me that their gums ached, and they had to burn them with alum or caustic. Their teeth were loose, and I think it was probably more a kind of scurvy than anything else. My teeth kept all right. I have eaten lots of biscuits, and I have been ten years in South Africa, and in five expeditions there.

3558. You think it is a case of the men's digestion going?—Yes, I think the digestion goes first, and then the teeth go; not the other way about.

3559. You said you were greatly in favour of a general system of transport instead of having regimental transport and also general transport, and, I think, you said that the regimental cattle were in bad order and ill fed, but is that a necessary result of the system?—It is the difference between an untrained man and an expert; if you have a general army transport you put experts in charge of it, but if you attach transport to regiments, there may not be a single man in the regiment who has ever had anything to do with transport. Another thing with regard to regimental transport is that the inclination always is to overload; if it is your own wagon you can overload it and nobody can say anything to you, but if that wagon belongs to somebody else and he has control, he will complain if he finds the animals are being overworked.

3560. Of course, but that applies to regiments that have not been in the habit of using transport: can you not conceive a system by which, like in India, regiments will have transport and an officer of experience who will take a pride in having good cattle?—In India, I think it quite right; you have in India pack transport principally, I understand, for military purposes, but when you go to South Africa you get an absolutely different kind of transport to what the troops are accustomed to. My experience I must say is that regimental transport is always in bad order; the men do not understand it, and the wagons are not properly looked after, they are rackety, the wheels get shaky, the harness is badly cleaned, and the animals never show good coats.

3561. Those regiments in South Africa were regiments that had not been accustomed to have any sort of transport attached to them?—Every regiment at home for some time has had five animals given to it. I do not mean to say that the transport of all regiments is as I have described, but I speak of the average. At Aldershot you would probably find it very good, but if you went to an ordinary station and paraded the regimental transport animal you would find, as a rule, he was not in first class order. There is another thing: why take a man you have trained as a good shot and use him as the driver of a wagon?

3562. The soldier does not drive a wagon under the system I am thinking of?—No; but I think there were 20 soldiers told off from each infantry battalion at the Cape, either as wagonmen or drivers.

3563. That is a wrong system. You are aware that Lord Roberts in ordering the change of system did not at all give the view that he considered the regimental system was to be condemned; he said "under these circumstances," or something of that kind, he thought it better to alter the system?—I only gave my opinion. I was asked whether it was a good system, in my opinion, to have regimental transport or general transport, and I gave my opinion that I thought general transport was far the best. Another point is that in rear of the Army you might have 40 different units, say, with a couple of infantry divisions, each little unit of three, five, or ten wagons with an officer in command, and each struggling to get ahead of the others. You would no doubt have one officer, or two or three officers, to supervise the whole of the transport on the march, but it is very difficult when you have a large force like an Army Corps to do that; for instance, we must have had sometimes 15 or 16 miles of transport always on the march at the same time between Modder River and Bloemfontein.

3564. I do not want to argue the question, but I do not think what you have said altogether exhausts the whole subject, because there are a great many advantages on the other side?—There are.

3565. (*Viscount Esher.*) Does this document which you have handed in (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 242) give your suggestions as to the remedying of certain defects which you noticed in the system in South Africa?—I will not say defects; I would say that they are recommendations on points of importance for consideration.

3566. Have you been asked, since you have been back, by any of the authorities at the War Office to make any suggestions for improvement in the supply or transport system?—No, I have not; but before leaving South Africa I prepared for my General categorical replies to queries which had been put by the War Office.

3567. Do you remember who was the chairman of this committee in 1886?—Colonel Alleyne, who is dead now. was chairman, and Mr. Lawson, who was afterwards Assistant Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War, was a member.

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3568. What was the origin of the appointment of that committee?—I think it was a report I made after coming home from Bechuanaland, and also the report of the experience of the troops at Suakin.

3569. Was it not to give to the War Office the benefit of the extensive experience gained in these two campaigns? I think that was how the instructions ran?—Yes, the reference is, I think, on the first page.

3570. You made a great many recommendations?—Here is my report after the Bechuanaland campaign.

3571. But the committee reported to the War Office and made a great many recommendations?—Yes. My report was submitted to the committee, and the committee made various recommendations.

3572. You are familiar with these recommendations; have many of them been carried out?—I think I have marked several.

3573. You have marked a great many here; what does that denote?—I marked several there which I have referred to in the recommendations I have handed in.

3574. Are your marks against every recommendation which has not been carried out?—Which has not been carried out, I think.

3575. In fact, all those paragraphs in that report which you have marked are where the recommendations have not been carried out?—Yes; for instance, a large quantity of our meat was in 6lb. tins instead of 1lb. and 2lb. tins. No man can carry a 6lb. tin of meat, and he therefore throws it away.

3576. Your experience in the South African campaign corroborates your previous experiences which were referred to directly in this report?—Certainly; I am still very strongly of the same opinion. All the recommendations we made then I would accentuate now from my experience in the last campaign.

3577. (*Chairman.*) With regard to the 6lb. tins of meat, we had it in evidence to-day that the War Office were anxious to supply it in smaller tins, and they bought up all that were available?—That is what they said 16 years ago. My view is that if the War Office want 1lb. tins of preserved meat, which I think is the proper weight on active service, all they have to do is to say to the trade: "We shall never buy anything but 1lb. tins of preserved meat," and the trade would at once arrange to supply them; but it may cost 10 per cent. more.

3578. Their representation is that they bought up everything in the market in the shape of 1lb. tins?—Yes.

3579. (*Viscount Esher.*) You say that if they would let it be known beforehand that they would only use the 1lb. tins, the trade would have a larger supply?—I can only tell you that the American Consul-General at Cape Town used to come to my office, or ask me to go and see him about once every three weeks, and he would say: "Will you tell me anything you want done as regards the packing of flour, preserved meat, or anything, and I will send off to America and get it done—the shape of the tins, the shape of the cases, or the shape of any other package." He wanted his country to get the supply. I asked him that same question: "What about 1lb. tins?" and he said, "When you are buying things by the million, you have only to let it be known what you want." During the three years of the war we were not always eating three years old preserved meat, and they were still manufacturing preserved meat during the war.

3580. And making tins?—Yes, it is entirely a question of a little more percentage than you pay for the large tins. If you buy 6lb. tins, 5lbs. will be thrown away, and you lose over 80 per cent.

3581. (*Chairman.*) Was not the difficulty about the 1lb. tins a temporary one—that the supply failed at a particular moment, and they resumed it afterwards?—I can only speak for the first year up to December, 1900.

3582. No doubt the pressure for this particular article must have been extra severe at the time that the war broke out?—Of course, if you suddenly demand nothing but 1lb. tins you will not get them, but you say, "I am going to have nothing but 1lb. tins, and I will pay you an extra 20 per cent. for them," they will certainly be manufactured and supplied. We probably purchased the whole of the preserved meat in the world in the first three months of the war, and, therefore, other preserved meat was being made, and it would have been quite as easy to ask the manufacturers to put that preserved meat into 1lb. tins as into 6lb. tins.

3583. I am not clear, from the evidence, that that was not done?—I only know up to December, 1900, and while I was in South Africa, I had nothing but complaints about the large sized tins, and that there were no 1lb. tins available for the troops. The whole veldt was lined with tins with decomposing meat inside, because a man who was given a 4lb. or 6lb. tin just ate what he wanted at the time, and threw the rest away.

3584. (*Viscount Esher.*) The Chairman asked you whether after the first three months of the war, when we will assume all the preserved meat was exhausted, you still had a supply coming in of 6lb. tins?—Yes; my recollection is certainly that we had, and that we did not ever have a sufficient supply of 1lb. tins; but you could ascertain that by asking what they bought.

3585. The Director of Contracts could tell us that?—Yes, the Director of Contracts could tell you at once. In that War Office committee's report you will notice it lays down that everything was to be of 80lbs. weight, especially forage. We had forage coming out in 5cwt. bales, and you cannot deal with such large bales on service; they fall to pieces on board ship. When bales of hay were landed, 2cwt. and 3cwt. were common weights, and if you looked down into the hold of the ship it was full of loose oat straw and hay from bales which had burst.

3586. Whose fault was that?—I do not fix the fault, but the same principle applies as with the preserved meat. The machines made this heavier stuff, and the War Office took what was on the market. I assume they did not fix the specification of the weights they wanted. All I had to do was, when the stuff came, to receive it, and if it was very bad I reported that it was so, through my General. I have handed in a list of articles I specially reported upon as being badly packed, so that it can be referred to, and you will notice, in that War Office Committee's report, 16 years ago, we particularly drew attention to the fact that it was no good sending out enormous cases and enormous bales of stores for use on active service.

3587. When Lord Kitchener arrived in South Africa did he find much fault with the organisation of the Supply and Transport Department?—Oh, no. I have it here in my notes that Lord Roberts was kind enough to compliment me, and he said he had no fault whatever to find with the Army Service Corps' administration of the supply and transport. The Army Service Corps had nothing to do with regimental transport, and you might say that it was a compliment to the corps to have all the regimental transport handed over to them as well as the general army transport.

3588. Can the report of this committee be put in?—Yes. I would like to have it back if I can, if you can get another copy. You might want this further report as well. (*Handing in the Report upon the Commissariat and Transport with Bechuanaland Field Force,* 1884-5, *and War Office Committee Report dated March* 1887.)

TENTH DAY.

Tuesday, 28th October 1902.

PRESENT :

The Right Hon. the Earl of ELGIN AND KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Hon. Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Hon. Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

Surgeon-General Sir W. Wilson, M.B., K.C.M.G.

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Surgeon-General Sir WILLIAM WILSON, M.B., K.C.M.G., called and examined.

3589. (*Chairman.*) You were principal Medical Officer in South Africa?—I was.

3590. From the beginning?—From the beginning until the end.

3591. What appointment do you hold now?—I am at present on leave, but I believe I am nominated for the Third Army Corps.

3592. We have before us the Report of Evidence given before the Commission that went out to inquire into the care and treatment of the sick and wounded in South Africa, and, of course, we do not wish to repeat unnecessarily the evidence that was given before that Commission, and, therefore, we should be obliged if you and the other officers, who were examined before that Commission, in giving your evidence before us, if there are any questions which you answered before the other Commission, would refer us to that evidence, and content yourselves to-day with either amplifying or correcting the evidence given then, in any way which you think necessary?—Yes.

3593. In the *précis* which you have lodged with us you first wish to speak to the sufficiency of the officers and *personnel*, I suppose?—Yes.

3594. The first five divisions were complete?—Would you like me to make a statement or answer questions, as I did before the other Commission?

3595. We shall be very glad to have a statement from you, if you have any to make?—When I was going out I wanted 10 per cent. of beds for all the troops in South Africa—it did not matter whether the troops were on the lines of communication or in the field—and I was promised that, and they said they would make it good to me as soon as they could. The Army Corps went out all right, according to regulation, and the field units were particularly good, nothing ever appeared like them before; that is the bearer companies and field hospitals. The first few general hospitals were also good, but when we went on the Royal Army Medical Corps orderlies ended practically with the Fifth Division. After that, the bearer companies and field hospitals that went into the field only consisted of untrained or partially trained men, and probably one officer, and the rest civil surgeons. The later general hospitals were particularly poor in Royal Army Medical Corps, and they were Royal Army Medical Corps that were picked up last; they were not the men selected for good service to go out first, and they were rather poor.

3596. (*Sir John Edge.*) Are you speaking of the officers alone?—I mean the tail-end of the officers who went out with the last general hospitals. Up to the Fifth Division I would say I was all right, and the first blow I got was, that so many of these were sent to Natal. The Natal Army went complete as far as field hospital and bearer companies were concerned, and, in fact, when the Second Division, two brigades of the Third Division and the Fifth Division went to Natal, that took the half of the Royal Army Medical Corps from me; that is to say, about 40,000 men had about 1,000 non-commissioned officers and men attached to them (of course, it was not enough). They had, in dispatch, which was cabled home no doubt, to say that the Cape side with about 1,000 non-commissioned officers and men trained. I wanted 9,000 at least; I could have managed with more, but I wanted 9,000, so that on the Cape side the framework I had was very weak and very small. It was excellent, so far as it went, but it was very, very small. The first thing I did in Cape Town was to try and raise bearers, and I raised, I do not know the exact number, but, speaking from memory, about 800 of what we called Cape Medical Staff Corps. I raised those as bearers, and put them into companies, intending them to go into the field and take the place of the regular bearer companies, letting the regular bearer companies come back to me to do hospital work, as they were trained men. Any man with a little training will do for a bearer in the field, as he has only to carry the wounded. After a while, as the troops came out, when they came up to the Eighth Division, they stopped sending the troops in divisions. I do not know why, because the troops going into the field are always in divisions, and the others not in divisions are called line of communication troops. You will see later on that in South Africa they formed a great number of divisions. I only got a few days' notice of these divisions being formed—I think five days' notice—and I had then to provide bearer companies and field hospitals. That was a totally unexpected demand. In the ordinary course of events they should have been formed at home, but they were going into the field at Modder River, and I was called upon to get field hospitals and bearer companies for a new Third Division (the first Third Division had been broken up and sent with the bearer companies to Natal), and a Ninth and later on an Eleventh, then the Mounted Infantry, one brigade of Cavalry, and also a Colonial Division. I met this difficulty in the only way it could be met, at short notice—I had bearer companies enough, as I explained to you, by raising these Cape Medical Staff Corps, and I had a few extra field hospitals, and I supplied all the wants by taking the third field hospital away from each of the old divisions that were in the country. I could not touch the Natal Army, because they were in the field fighting, so that it left the troops on the Cape side with only two field hospitals, instead of three. That was the only way I could get out of it. I think that would have worked all right, but we had terrible difficulty with the transport, and I never got the whole of these medical units into the field together at one time. I never got the whole of my reduced units into the field at one time. It is acknowledged and well known that in the first advance on the Modder our reduced numbers were still further cut down, but in the advance from Bloemfontein on to Pretoria I could not get all my field hospitals or bearer companies on, and some were left standing in the streets, as the transport was not there. We got the transport as soon as we could, and sent the medical units after the troops, but they did not march out with the troops. These were some of our difficulties.

3597. (*Chairman.*) Were these difficulties brought before the former Commission?—They were, but I do not think they saw it; they asked me question and answer, and they stuck to the charges that were made against us. You can see in my evidence, and also in

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the evidence of my secretary, Major Bedford, who was one of the most important witnesses, that all this was brought out.

3598. It was all brought out?—Yes, he brought it out, but I do not think the Commission ever saw the significance of it.

3599. I may take it that at that time your difficulties arose in the first place from the want of officers, and in the second place from the want of efficient transport?—Yes.

3600. You supplied the subordinates in the way you have described?—I wanted transport mules and horses and everything else more than I could get. Of course, the framework of the regular service, upon which I had to build a system to look after an army of more than 200,000 men, was simply out of all proportion—too small.

3601. Are you speaking now of the ordinary establishment?—The ordinary establishment was far too small. It was big enough to build upon on the Natal side, and it was very fair there; they had a good, strong framework of regular service; but on the Cape side, where all the difficulties came in, and where we had to go away hundreds of miles from the lines of communication, and where our transport failed, it was a long way too small—out of all proportion.

3602. On the question of the establishment, the former Commission did report that there were great difficulties?—Oh, yes.

3603. So that they took up that point?—They did.

3604. And dealt with it to your satisfaction? You have, no doubt, read the report?—I have read some of it, not all; I have just read the findings of it; I had not time to read the whole of the evidence. I thought their remarks were wrong in saying I should have had more field hospitals and bearer companies, and I think anyone conversant with the Service would have known that the field hospitals and bearer companies are only made as they are ordered; they are never ready.

3605. Before we pass from the other point, on the question of the general establishment, it is stated on page 4 of the Report that "The Royal Army Medical Corps was wholly insufficient in staff and equipment for such a war, and it was not so constituted as to have the means provided by which its staff could be very materially enlarged, or its deficiencies promptly made good"?—I think that is correct.

3606. That represents your opinion?—It does.

3607. And then, with regard to the question of transport, is it not the case that, particularly at Bloemfontein, the military authorities did all they could to provide you with transport, subject to the military exigencies?—They did. Of course, food and ammunition must go first.

3608. You do not represent that you were in any way put on a siding, so to speak?—Not for a moment. If I happened to be in the same position as they were, I think I would do the same; I would put arms and ammunition and provisions first.

3609. Was it also the case that at the base you had all supplies ready if you had had transport to send them up?—I had.

3610. There was no deficiency of supplies?—I never had an insufficiency of medical supplies the whole time, and I had supplies of everything in the country, if I could only move it, but it was extremely difficult. There could be a statement made out, if necessary, as to what time the hospitals took to go up, and I think it took No. 2 hospital, for instance, over two months to go to Pretoria. The equipment was in the trucks all the time. The engines were short, particularly; the truckage was short, but the engines were worse.

3611. Do you mean the equipment of the hospitals?—Yes, I moved No. 2, that being the base hospital for a long time at Cape Town, up to Pretoria; at the end of May I put it on the trucks, and it came in bit by bit about July. I thought it was August when it reached Pretoria, but an officer here this morning told me that he thought it was July. I knew perfectly well that the railway authorities could not get it up; the food had to come up, and everything had to be carried.

3612. The evidence given was that extraordinarily good work was done by the railway and military authorities with a single line; you would not dissent from that?—I would not; they were like ourselves—they had to try to do an impossibility, as they were short-handed, or, at least, short in trucks and short in engines.

3613. As to these bearer companies you raised in South Africa, were you satisfied with their work afterwards?—They were very good as bearer companies, but there was always a difficulty to get them to do general work afterwards when they came in from the field. They were not useful when I attached them to a hospital, and they did as little as ever they could, but they were very good in the field. They failed in connection with doing any kind of work about a hospital camp.

3614. And there was great difficulty in getting anybody who could do it?—It was extremely difficult; not even natives, in some instances, could be got to do sanitary work about the camp. There were difficulties staring us in the face in connection with everything.

3615. You had a sufficient number of civil surgeons?—I had a sufficient number of civil-surgeons.

3616. As to the efficiency of the officers?—My own officers I, of course, valued the most, as they knew what we wanted, and, taking them all round, I looked on them as the best. Of course, some of them were better at one thing than another, but they were evener than the civil profession. Of the civil profession, I had some experts in surgery and some experts in medicine, but they were not general men, they were not all-round men that I could put anywhere. The officer was a more general man, and he went in for sanitation and for everything, so that he was a more useful man than the civilian, taking them all round. The civilian was useful when I could keep him strictly to his own line and not take him beyond.

3617. But you required a certain number of the Royal Army Medical Corps to carry on the organisation of the hospitals?—Yes, the civil profession rather swamped me, especially with so many untrained orderlies. You see, I got up the number of orderlies I wanted by the St. John Ambulance, and so on, and by regimental orderlies. I had my numbers, but there is no use saying they were trained, as they were not trained. I got my numbers, but, except my own men, these had all to be trained in South Africa during the war.

3618. I think the Commission thought that for sanitary work there ought to be a separate branch?—Yes, and I rather think so too; I think there ought to be a sanitary branch attached to the office of the Principal Medical Officer. There used to be a sanitary officer, and he was very useful, and at present, every medical officer is a sanitary officer, and that is quite right, but there ought to be experts attached to the Army as well, men whose opinion will have greater weight than that of the ordinary practitioner.

3619. When was the practice of having a sanitary officer discontinued?—It was discontinued immediately after the Egyptian War of 1882; that was the last time we had a sanitary officer in the field, if I remember.

3620. Do you know any reason for that system being discontinued?—I think the Commander-in-Chief, at that time, thought it was unnecessary, and thought that every medical officer ought to be an expert himself.

3621. Sanitary work has become rather a special subject since 1882?—Every day more so; of course, every Royal Army Medical Corps officer is a sanitary officer, and he is specially trained for it, and has to pass an examination in connection with it.

3622. Still, it might be possible to organise a corps so that a certain number of officers were sanitary authorities?—Yes, that is what we want—we want certain sanitary authorities, men of European reputation, and whose opinions cannot be set aside.

3623. Have you anything else to say about the efficiency of the officers, either military or civil?—I cannot speak too highly of my own officers and of a great number of the civil surgeons; I cannot forget what they did, and the way they worked.

3624. The next point mentioned in the *précis* is the sufficiency of supplies, to which you have already alluded?—Yes.

3625. You say that at Kimberley and at Ladysmith there was the greatest pressure?—Yes, they always had medicines, but they had to prescribe according to the medicines they had. That may seem a hard thing at

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first, but there is nothing wrong about it; for instance, if a man wants to be put asleep he can be put asleep with one thing almost as well as with another, but they always had enough. I inquired into that carefully after the sieges, and they said there was never any hardship or never anything approaching want—they wanted for no drug that could save a man's life. Of course, those two places were closed up very much quicker than any of us calculated upon; in fact, they were closed up just as soon as I got to the country. What was done was accomplished before my arrival, and the authorities out there did right; they placed the whole of the medical supplies into those places before my arrival.

3626. All that was available in Natal?—All that was available in Natal, and all that was available in Cape Town. I went into that question when I got to Cape Town, and I found that they had cleared out all the stores, and they had brought them in to Cape Town, and done everything right. They had the places ready for a big siege.

3627. And as the result, you are distinctly of the opinion that the sick did not suffer?—I am distinctly of that opinion. I was free from any blame about it myself, as it was done before I arrived, and I was able to inquire into it from a free standpoint, and I think the sick did not suffer from any want in that way. They ran out of some medicines, but that was quite immaterial.

3628. You are speaking now of medical and surgical stores?—Yes.

3629. The other two branches of stores are under the Army Service Corps and the Ordnance?—Yes.

3630. What have you to say about the Army Service Corps stores?—Of course, the troops were on very short rations, as they could not be had; they had laid in large quantities of milk, but they had not as much milk as we would have liked to have. Still, at the same time, I think they did very well, and they could not have done any more.

3631. What does the Army Service Corps supply to you—food?—Food entirely. The Army Ordnance Department supplies us with hospital equipment.

3632. As regards food, there again you say the sick did not suffer from any deficiency?—I think not; they were principally enteric cases, and the best treatment for enteric is starvation. I think more people are killed by enteric through over-feeding than from anything else.

3633. Questions were raised about the milk before the Commission?—Yes, they raised the question about having fresh milk during the siege, and, of course, that was ridiculous, but authorities had to count out the tins, and to be very careful of the number of tins they had. Then a question was raised as to why they had some tins of milk in Ladysmith when the siege was over. Of course, the medical officer could not settle the exact date on which the siege would end.

3634. There was a surplus at the end of the siege?—There was a surplus at the end of the siege, according to what I was told verbally, and I was told that there was fault found by outsiders about that surplus.

3635. Did you hear any complaints of the quality?—No, never.

3636. I think we had it from one witness that one brand had been complained of?—During the war there were a few tins; for instance, I put up chemists' laboratories in South Africa, and there were a few brands sent that were not up to the quality, but there were only a few boxes of those.

3637. (*Sir John Edge.*) The "Viking" brand was one that was mentioned?—A few boxes were sent for analysis, but there was nothing general; when a box was found to be bad, the tins in it were thrown away and others got; but that never troubled us at all. I did not hear of any brands being bad at Ladysmith or at Kimberley.

3638. (*Chairman.*) And at Bloemfontein it was more a question of whether they could get fresh milk or not?—It was a question of fresh milk entirely.

3639. I think the Commission reports somewhere that there may have been milk brought into Bloemfontein and sold privately, but that the military authorities, so far as they could, got it for the hospitals?—They commandeered everything; but no matter where you are, if you offer a big price for a bottle of milk you will get it. It may have been stolen from the hospital. I do not know where it came from, but a few visitors there did get bottles of milk in the morning—their servants got it—and they used to pay very high prices for it. How they got it I do not know. I never got a bottle of milk myself, nor did my servant; I could not. I never touched cow's milk when I was in Africa, as I could not get it; everything was taken for the hospitals. There was no squeamishness about it at all; it was commandeered.

3640. As to the Ordnance supplies?—As to the Ordnance supplies, the great difficulty was to get them up. The Ordnance, when I asked for anything, used generally to appeal to me to try to get them up for them. It was the same difficulty—transport by road and rail.

3641. The Commission state on page 11 of their Report: "The only general remark that we need make here is, that throughout the campaign (until quite recently) there was a deficiency of bedpans and commodes, the lack of which often caused considerable discomfort and even suffering on the part of the patients"?—That only occurred for a short time at Bloemfontein, and I think they made the most of it at one hospital—a hospital the staff of which did not get on well together. As a rule, the enteric cases did not require bedpans; the ordinary symptom of diarrhœa was absent in it, as a rule. We would have liked to have had more, and we should have had more, but we could not get them in the country. The general hospitals have a certain proportion, but then, when it turns out that the whole of the sick are enterics, it rather puts one out.

3642. You had the full equipment that was provided by the regulations?—We had, and not only that, but we added wherever we could; we seized on everything in every town, and bought everything, but we had the full equipment laid down by regulation, and approved by the War Office.

3643. When you found there were deficiencies, did you requisition home for more?—We did through the Ordnance, and we sent all over South Africa to every town that was behind us and purchased everything.

3644. Was there any delay in sending out additional supplies from home?—None whatever; they came out as quickly as possible.

3645. Is it your opinion, from the experience of the war, that the amount provided by the regulations is deficient?—I think, of these things, there should be an increased number, but at the same time it is very hard to dogmatise about what occurred in South Africa, as what occurred in South Africa would probably never occur in any other part of the world we would go to. Another thing is, that we had a certain number of bedpans, and so on, for a proportion of 500 patients in a hospital, but in every one of our hospitals we had to arrange for about 900 or 1,000 sick, or even more, for a short time in certain places. Then, probably, a few weeks afterwards, the whole thing would die down, and those hospitals would be comparatively empty.

3646. You say in your *précis* that you think the experience of the campaign will probably lead to some modifications?—It will, no doubt.

3647. What do you refer to there?—Well, to everything about it. I think the general hospitals will have to be a little more elaborate. I made them more elaborate out there. I purchased and did everything else a long way beyond the regulations. With regard to weight, there could be some diminution in weight made in bedsteads; the bedsteads are lovely at present, but I think they would do equally well if they were lighter. All the hospitals in South Africa were much more elaborate than anything you can get in the regulations; we put down huts for the administrative quarters, and stores, and so on, which are not in the regulations at all.

3648. The bedsteads are in the general hospitals?—Yes.

3649. Not in the field hospitals?—No, the field hospitals are on the move. The field hospitals will require a good deal of alteration.

3650. In what respect?—I think that one of the field hospitals—that is, the third field hospital—ought to have some light pattern beds. The third field hospital is what we call a divisional hospital, and I think it might be a slower moving hospital than the other two that are with the brigades; it should be better equipped, and I think it might have beds, and, of course, they all ought to have pyjamas. When a man

comes in, at present there are no clothes for him, although he may be deluged with blood, but according to the regulation there are no clothes to put him into. I remedied that very early by calling on the Red Cross to give me pyjamas, and they used to supply every one of these field hospitals with generally 100 pairs. After a short time the Ordnance did it for me as well, but in the first instance the Red Cross did it; I called on the Red Cross to give all the field hospitals pyjamas, and it was absolutely necessary. The men came in wounded, "dirty" was no name for them when they came in, as they were covered with lice; they had only one suit of clothes, and never getting out of it, they were covered with lice picked up on the veldt, and it was absolutely impossible to do anything for these men lying in their own clothes. I called on the Red Cross very early in the campaign to send me pyjamas, and the Red Cross complied.

3651. The hospitals, as a rule, were provided with pyjamas?—They were; the Ordnance took it up when they found what I was doing, and they supplied them, too.

3652. That seems rather to be a matter that had never been considered before?—I do not think it had ever been considered before; it is a very elementary matter, and it struck me early in the campaign.

3653. One would have thought that it would have struck somebody at home, and found its way into the regulations?—I do not think our men were ever so dirty as they were in South Africa; they were covered with lice.

3654. I understood you to say that in all cases where you found any deficiency, when you could not apply to the Red Cross as you did in this case, you had no hesitation in buying up what you wanted?—I had no hesitation. At first, I think medical officers were a little afraid to buy; you see, we are never allowed to spend a penny at home, and we cannot do anything ourselves, but in a short time the medical officers turned out very well, and they purchased freely.

3655. They did not hesitate to exercise that power?—No.

3656. And you yourself, personally, told them?—I told them to purchase and to send me the bills, and I would have them settled. I used simply to write across "Approved of," and the pay department passed them.

3657. No difficulty was raised?—No difficulty was raised at all. It was rather a new departure at the same time.

3658. All these matters of modifications of the regulations are, I suppose, being considered?—They are, I should think. I will bring them all out in my report. I have to write a report on the war at the end of the campaign, and I hope soon to commence that report.

3659. You have not sent it in yet?—No, the records are all on their way home, and I am on leave. The statistics also have not been made out, and, I suppose, they will take two years to make out.

3660. The next point is ambulance wagons?—Yes, we had a very good ambulance wagon called Mark 5, and it was the best wagon of any. There was a heavy wagon called the Natal wagon, and it was all very fine on a good road, but it was too heavy, and the animals were too poor to drag it. Of other light wagons there was the Bristol wagon, and another of the same type called the Irish wagon, which the Irish hospital took out, but they were all very bad. We bought the Irish wagons, but we were never able to use them; they fell to pieces, as they were badly constructed and too light as well. Mark 5 was a good wagon.

3661. Did the Irish wagons come from home?—They came from home with the Irish hospital. They did a fair amount of work in the early part, but they fell to pieces. The Bristol was not a good wagon, but Mark 5 stood the work across country, and it is a good wagon.

3662. But you could not always get them forward?—We could not always get them forward; in the first advance on the Modder, we were cut down from ten wagon bearer companies to two on account of transport. That was an Army Order, and that was all right. I was not cut down afterwards at Bloemfontein, but I could not get the wagons all round in time to accompany the Army; the railway was fully occupied, and I only got up a certain number. An increased number went with the Army on to Pretoria, but not the full number.

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3663. And so in some cases the wounded had to be removed in other conveyances?—Yes, we got a very useful thing there, and I believe it saved the situation, namely, we got a lot of Tongas from India, which were presented to us by an Indian gentleman, and he sent his ponies with them, and they were really good. They were two-wheeled, and that was an objection, but I think the objection to two wheels is more theoretical than practical. The objection to two wheels is, that if the horses are shot the thing falls down, but practically the same objection occurs if a wagon is hit with a round shot, because, of course, it goes down then, too. These did good work, and they did not fail, and I think they saved the situation as far as moving the wounded off the field is concerned.

3664. Had you a large number of them?—We had a good number, I forget exactly the number, but we got a lot more. The Yeomanry purchased some, and we purchased them again from the Yeomanry, and we put them all in the field. The troops captured a great number of what they called Cape carts. The Cape cart is a two-wheeled cart with a cover over it, and holds four, and we used these freely.

3665. You have said you would not use either the Tongas or the Cape carts if you could get a wagon?—Not on a roadway, but I would use them for following cavalry, or for going light across the country. For preference, I would put a man lying down in a four-wheeled vehicle if the roads were good, but I think you want the two kinds of conveyance always. You want the light one to gallop across the country to pick up a man, where you could not take a heavy lumbering wagon with from six to eight mules, which was the general number. You could not take a heavy wagon of that kind across country for a wounded man, but you could send one of these two-wheeled carts, and they would bring him in equally well with a little care. I think every bearer company ought to have both kinds of vehicle.

See Q. 12053.

3666. What do the regulations provide at present?—Only four-wheeled; ten ambulance wagons for each bearer company.

3667. And you think they ought to be supplemented with two-wheeled vehicles?—Yes, they ought either to have two-wheeled vehicles added, or the two-wheeled vehicles should be substituted for the four-wheeled. Then they would meet every difficulty we have to face.

3668. What about the removal of the sick by railway?—We had a number of hospital trains; they were capital, and there never was anything like them seen in any part of the world before. There was a regular staff of two medical officers with each train; they carried about 90 wounded men, and they had everything on board—cook, kitchen, and nurses, and they were used to bring down all the serious cases from the front. We often brought them away from the battle-field in trains.

3669. They were used in Lord Methuen's advance?—Yes, they were used very freely; we put them on to the field.

3670. But in the Orange Free State the men were brought down in trucks, were they not?—Yes, we could could not get the trains up quickly enough, or often enough. What was done at Bloemfontein was, that we had plenty of beds down at the base behind, and when a man got sick we moved him down, as in the early stages his movement can generally be carried out with safety; in the later stages of enteric you cannot move them at all. These men in the early stages were put in open trucks, which brought up troops; they were empty, and they had generally got hay or something else in them, and the men were put in those and sent down in the open trucks. I have travelled in an open truck myself, often to try and get over the ground, and there is no hardship in it in a lovely country with clear, bracing air, and the sun not too hot. It sounds badly, but when you go through it you do not mind it. The trucks do not go fast, and there was always a medical officer and a few attendants with a train, but they were only slight cases, men just reporting sick, and just as they broke down from the field they were put into these trucks and sent down; it was the only way to do it, and there was no difficulty about it.

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3671. I wanted to take it generally from you, because the former Commission specially inquired into the details: the number of sick and wounded, you say, you estimated at 10 per cent.?—Yes.

3672. What was the actual number?—From memory, I would put it down as 8.

3673. It was less than the estimated number?—It was less all round, but, of course, in some places it was often higher, in some little areas. It was higher in Bloemfontein for a time, but that was cleared off very much quicker than anyone would have thought; the pressure was not on there very long. In other places it was heavy, in this way, that a sweeping movement would take place across country, and would end up in one place, say at Kroonstad, and, of course, that raised the number of sick; the bearer companies and field hospitals were bringing all the sick into Kroonstad, and, of course, for that time it temporarily raised the average over 10 per cent. These instances we always met by hospital trains. When I knew of a sweeping movement across the country I would find out where the movement would end, and I would group all the empty hospital trains there, and they were as good as a general hospital, practically, as they had beds and everything. All the suitable cases were put into these hospital trains, and they were sent down to other general hospitals, while the general hospital, say at Kroonstad, took the ones that were unfit to move.

3674. What period of the war are you speaking of?—The latter part.

3675. After the advance from Bloemfontein?—After Pretoria.

3676. Of course, we are only inquiring up to Pretoria?—Really, up to Pretoria, I think it was only at Bloemfontein that it exceeded 10 per cent.

3677. And at Bloemfontein you could not use the system of hospital trains?—No, we used to have the hospital trains wherever I could get one up, and then they went up with any amount of stores.

3678. That was only after a considerable interval?—Yes, it took some time before the railway was opened. The bridge across the Orange River was broken down, and took some time to repair.

3679. Another difficulty you had was, that some inhabited areas were insanitary, to begin with?—Yes, the African is a very dirty individual. The Kaffir is very dirty, and the endemic disease from which he is suffering is, undoubtedly, enteric; he suffers from it in his own kraals. I have known that personally. The Kaffir attendants we had, and the men who were doing sanitary work, suffered very much from enteric; all the drivers suffered from enteric also, and we had to get up Kaffir hospitals for them, and enteric was their own disease. There is no doubt whatever about this, because I had post-mortems made of the Kaffirs, and I had doubtful cases examined, and they were all enteric. It is the disease of the country. I also know that the Boers suffered very much from it, and in every town that I ever went through and inquired about they have the enteric season; it ends generally in April or May up in Orange River Colony and the Transvaal.

3680. It was the enteric season when you arrived at Bloemfontein?—It was the height of it, and Cronje's force was suffering very much from enteric while they were watching Lord Methuen, and Lord Methuen was suffering too, although not so much.

3681. You represent that in the later stages of the war you were able to improve the conditions?—Yes, in the later stages of the war we were able to do everything for our own stations wherever the troops were permanently stationed, and in every camp and in every blockhouse (and I think there were about 7,000 of them) we had means of boiling water, and not only that, but we went to a tremendous lot of expense and trouble in boring to make wells. At Kroonstad, particularly, I would be afraid to say how many thousands of pounds the Engineers spent trying to get water from deep wells; they did get it after a while, but with tremendous labour, and in all those places the enteric practically disappeared. What used to get it up in some of those places, like Kroonstad and Middleburg, was the columns coming in; a column coming in comes in dead tired, and they squat themselves down wherever they are able to in camp, and they are careless of the ground. They used to bring in enteric with them, and no doubt disseminated it amongst the garrisons; but, taking it on the whole, all the garrisons and blockhouses were free from enteric in the last year, and anything they got could be traced to the columns, and the columns gave us great worry. I tried various ways, but I could not manage the columns; they were marching very rapidly; sometimes they used to leave their field hospitals and bearer companies behind them, or at least the medical units; they used to march very quickly, and the medical units used to pick them up as quickly as they could by going across country in the same direction, and then the men used to drink anything they could get hold of. The men themselves could not boil water, as they had not the means; there was no fuel in the country, no wood, nothing.

3682. Is there any other point you would wish to refer to?—I think I have gone over the whole thing. Of course, there are a great number of other things, but I do not know whether they would be relevant or not.

3683. As I said at the beginning, we do not want to repeat what was said before the former Commission; but if there is anything to amplify or correct we will be glad to hear it?—I would only like to repeat that the officers I had did everything that was possible; they were few in numbers. For instance, I had been supplied with *personnel* to look after two Army Corps, say, 80,000 men, and we had not enough to look after that number even; but instead of that, we had 250,000 men to look after, besides camp followers. The work was scattered all over half a continent, and I really do not think that anyone at home knows the amount or the greatness of the task.

3684. Attempts were made to reinforce your numbers?—Yes.

3685. I see it is reported by the Commission on page 10: "That in July there were remaining available for duty about 224,000 in the Army, and the Medical Staff consisted of about 1,000 medical officers (including civil surgeons), 7,000 hospital subordinates, and 900 nurses"?—Yes. There were about 350, or you may say 400 Royal Army Medical Corps trained officers in the country, and the rest were civil surgeons; a great number of them came out from home, and others were employed there, but the mass of attendants were not trained, and it is a mistake to say that they were. We trained them in the hospitals out there. Of course, we had any number of nurses.

3686. And that was rather a new departure?—Quite a new departure as far as employing them in large numbers.

3687. Do you approve of the use of nurses?—Well. I started them the moment I got out there, and I took every nurse I could lay my hands on and accommodate. I started them on my own initiative when I went to the Cape; I found we must have them. I engaged all the nurses I could get out there; some people say I did not engage all. I did not engage any women who had not been in a hospital before; I tried to avoid that, but I only wanted to know that she had a certificate, and I took her as soon as I could get accommodation for her. One of the greatest difficulties we had about these 800 nurses was to accommodate them, and to get servants for them, and that is one of the things that will always trouble us in the future. We can get any amount of good trained nurses. I think I could count the failures on my fingers. I had a long way over 900 altogether, but I had 800 or 900 at one time, and the great difficulty of it is to get accommodation for them. A woman or a lady will always require a certain amount of accommodation; she must have all the bedroom equipment and everything else, and she must have servants. It was absolutely impossible to get female servants in South Africa, as they were not to be had. I got Kaffirs, and finally hospital orderlies in some instances.

3688. Did you have hospital orderlies to act as servants?—Yes; the regulation lays down that each general hospital shall have nine lady nurses and one female servant—I am speaking from memory now—but, of course, I had to put that aside, and I generally put 25 into each general hospital. When a hospital got as large as No. 1, I had over 40 nurses, but the whole trouble I had was to get servants to look after these ladies, and I could not do it. That was my greatest difficulty, and there was no other difficulty with nurses that I know of, except to get accommodation for them.

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3689. And they are very valuable to the hospitals?—They are invaluable. I am quite on their side, and I took them from the first moment I went to South Africa, although I had no power at all by regulation. I took them, intending to get the authority afterwards, and, of course, I got the authority.

3690. You had no authority to go beyond the nine?—None; I took them at once, without any hesitation, and I let the General Officer Commanding know that I was taking them on. I had no trouble at all about it.

3691. (*Viscount Esher.*) Do hospital orderlies require a special training?—They do.

3692. Is there any system of training them in time of peace?—Yes, they are all trained at Aldershot, and at every hospital they go to—constant training. They are trained hospital attendants.

3693. Are there enough of them?—Nothing like enough; we always had just enough to carry on our peace establishment, and that was really all we ever had.

3694. Have you ever thought of any plan under which you could make your number of trained hospital orderlies a little more expansive?—Yes, we have followed the Army in having a Reserve, but really that is not enough, and we want a new system of our own.

3695. Have you got any suggestions to make—I do not want you to make them now—but are you considering suggestions for your report?—Yes, I am.

3696. I suppose the regulations lay down, do they not, what number of medical officers and what amount of stores and so on should be sent forward with, we will say, a brigade?—Yes, it lays down everything in the table of regulations.

3697. By the light of your experience, what do you think of those regulations now?—I think they would want to be altered very considerably; for instance, I would alter the whole thing, root and branch, about the bearer company and field hospital. The bearer company and field hospital should be one unit. I would not have the bearers trained men at all, as they do not want to be trained; a fortnight's training or so will do them; but I would have the two sections, the field hospital section and the bearer section, under the one commanding officer. I would have them divisible and so on, but I would not put a field hospital and bearer company into the field at the same time, quite independent of each other.

3698. These are all suggestions that you will make when you write your report?—Yes.

3699. Have the regulations been amended much in recent years?—I think they have; I am not prepared to say in what way exactly they have been altered, but they have been constantly trying to improve them. During the war we had to give up the bearer companies and field hospitals; we went in for a combined unit towards the end of the campaign, being forced to it, as the combined unit was the only unit that would work.

3700. And also with regard to the transport of stores, is it laid down exactly how your medical stores for a brigade are to be sent forward?—Well, the stores for a brigade are only just what the field hospital and bearer companies carry.

3701. But they have the advantage of Cape carts, or they had the advantage of Cape carts, or transport of some kind?—They have it laid down what wagons they have got, and everything is calculated for those wagons as to the amount of stores, and then it only remains for the transport to give them the means of carrying.

3702. Are the amount of the medical stores that you are to carry, and the form in which you are to carry them, also laid down?—Yes, strictly laid down.

3703. In what form did you carry your medicines—in liquid form?—For the field hospitals?

3704. Yes?—They were made up and ready for use—you could see them at Woolwich—according to regulation.

3705. In the most compact form possible?—Yes; we had a more compact form this time than ever we had before; we used compressed drugs as much as possible, and any amount of them.

3706. What is a compressed drug? Is it in a bottle?—They are tabloids generally made by Burroughs and Wellcome.

3707. Were your drugs mostly carried in that form with the field hospitals?—They were mostly carried in that form.

3708. And for the stationary hospitals?—We used the compressed drugs there principally, too; we used the compressed drugs in nearly every place, but in the stationary hospitals we had an unlimited supply of everything, and we had the best dressings that ever accompanied an army in the field.

3709. Therefore, you have no suggestion to make there, or, at least, you do not intend to make any suggestion there?—No; I would say that, as far as drugs and dressings were concerned—anything under our own immediate control and carried by ourselves—there is very little to alter, and it was never done so well.

3710. You cannot carry every kind of medicine?—No, and we do not want to; it is a mistake. Every medical officer and every medical man has his own drugs, curiously enough, and he uses very few. The only hitch comes in if a civil surgeon does not see the whole of the twenty drugs he uses, he thinks we have none at all. Some of the civil surgeons wanted some new drugs; there are always new things coming in, and they wanted to try those, and very often we got them for them to prevent grumbling.

3711. How about instruments?—The instruments were very good, as far as they went. We wanted more, and we bought them.

3712. When you say they were very good as far as they went, you have no suggested improvement to make as to the class of instrument which was carried by the medical officers?—No.

3713. Or the form in which they were carried?—No; all the new instruments bought were right.

3714. When you say that all the new instruments you bought were right, were the medical officers supplied, as a rule, with the most modern type of instrument?—They were as a rule.

3715. Are they carried in a case?—They are carried in cases. A new instrument differs more or less from the old instrument in simply the handle. The old handles were like the handles of pen-knives, and they were hard to clean, but the new instruments are all prepared for aseptic surgery, so that you can wash them and leave no crevices for any discharge to gather in.

3716. Has every instrument to be washed separately?—Every instrument has to be washed separately.

3717. Have you ever seen a case of instruments which could be washed or disinfected as a whole?—I do not think I have.

3718. Have you ever heard that such cases are supplied in the Russian and German Armies?—I have heard something about them, but I have not looked into them, and I prefer myself to have every instrument washed separately. They are all put together into the sterilising apparatus.

3719. In a case?—Yes, they are put in for disinfecting, to render them aseptic.

3720. How does the case stand that operation?—We do not put them in the wooden case; there is a tin tray, and they are all put in together.

3721. You mean that they have to be taken out of the wooden case and put into the other?—Yes.

3722. Would it not save a great deal of trouble and time if you could disinfect the instruments in the original case?—Yes, I suppose it would.

3723. Have you ever been in Germany or Russia?—Never.

3724. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You said there was a deficiency or a total absence of hospital clothing with the troops in advance?—Yes.

3725. And that you were able eventually to get pyjama suits for them?—Yes.

3726. I suppose you meant the whole suit?—Yes.

3727. Have you served in India?—Yes.

3728. In the field?—Yes.

3729. Is hospital clothing kept with the advanced troops there?—No, I have never seen it with the advanced troops; I was in Afghanistan, and it was never with the army in the field.

3730. No hospital clothing?—Only on the lines of communication. I have not looked at the Indian Regulations for some time, but I never saw it with the troops

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fighting. It is only on the lines of communication—at stationary hospitals.

3731. Was the hospital clothing there pyjamas or dressing-gowns, or both?—They had dressing-gowns and loose pyjamas; they were heavier than pyjama suits.

3732. Had you a supply of hospital clothing at all the base hospitals and stationary hospitals?—Yes.

3733. Before you got these pyjamas?—Yes, we had all the usual hospital clothing.

3734. Of course, when you cannot get wagons you must substitute something else, but a good deal of the medical stores are carried on pack animals, are they not?—We had no pack animals except towards the very end of the campaign, when they had some pack animals. That was late on in the war, not very long ago, but we had no pack animals in the early period.

3735. And there was no regulation for pannier equipment?—Yes, panniers are made to be carried on packs, but I have not seen them so carried in South Africa.

3736. In India is that not done?—In India they carry on pack saddles.

3737. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You have been asked about a sanitary authority, and I gather that you recommend that there should be a separate sanitary establishment from the Medical Corps?—Part of it; I recommend that it should be part of the Medical Corps.

3738. But being part of the Medical Corps, still separate from it?—No, part and parcel of it, but for that duty only. If I may remark, we are rather on unsafe ground there, because I think the question of having a sanitary corps is too big a one for me to enter into; but what I recommended was that there should be special sanitary officers attached to the Army in the field for advice. The question of a sanitary corps is too big a thing for me to enter into, because there would need to be a sanitary corps for every camp and every station. I draw the line there, as I think no army in the field could be hampered with such a thing as that.

3739. I think you said also that, in point of fact, all the doctors attached to the Army Medical Corps are sanitary authorities?—They are all trained sanitary officers.

3740. Thoroughly trained?—They are thoroughly trained.

3741. If they are all trained in that way and thoroughly trained, what is the exact necessity for having different officers to carry out these duties?—It is a great thing to have a few men going about who are of undoubted European authority, to say that such-and-such a thing ought to be done. It is just like sending out Sir William McCormac, who was an undoubted authority on military surgery; there were a great number of other officers out there who could do the thing just as well, but they were not recognised as the great authority that he was.

3742. But their names do not carry the same weight?—Exactly, they do not carry the same weight; what he would say about a thing would carry more weight, although the opinion of the other officers would be just as sound.

3743. I notice in your *précis* that you say that at first the only medical unit for the Colonial troops was the New South Wales Contingent, who brought half a field hospital?—Yes.

3744. Was not that immediately afterwards increased by another half field hospital?—Yes, as soon as they arrived, I told them to telegraph for another half, and they brought it.

3745. Were the officers attached to that field hospital thoroughly efficient men?—They were, and they had one great pull over everyone else, and that is, they brought their own transport with them. That put them on a different level from any of the others.

3746. What about their trained orderlies?—Their orderlies were not highly trained, but the great thing about it was their transport; their transport was the thing for us to imitate.

3747. It was very good, was it not?—Very good; they had their own horses, and they were never taken from them. We simply got whatever we could—it was taken away from us and given to us, and we just got what was left.

3748. You have mentioned one instance when, on the advance to Kroonstad, the New South Wales field hospital was the first in the field to the relief of the men?—Yes, it was because they had their transport.

3749. That was accounted for, because they had their own horses?—They had their own horses, and that was the great thing.

3750. Why should not you have your own horses?—Of course, transport is always the difficulty. I have been in many campaigns, and, of course, the General in the field wants food for his men, and he would want to have a very large establishment of transport if we could keep our horses and our mules as we ought to keep them. I quite see his point, but until we do get our own regular, steady-trained horses we will never be efficient, and we will not be able to move like the New South Wales hospital, who had theirs.

3751. I suppose in the recommendations you are to send in now you will include that?—It will be one of the things I will lay stress on, but at the same time I see the opposite view, and I see that the more economical view is that the General wants all his transport for general work, and to give it to us as he can.

3752. Do you think economy is a matter which ought to come into consideration in a case of this sort?—No, but still, at the same time, although there was no economy in South Africa, we could not do it, as the animals were dying by thousands.

3753. How do you account for the New South Wales unit being able to keep their horses apparently, judging from this report, in good condition?—They were with them, and they had the same men caring for them, whereas the other transport was, as a rule, under any drivers. These New South Wales men brought their own horses in the ship with them, and they always watched them, and took more care of them than an ordinary driver picked up anywhere would.

3754. They had their own drivers?—They had their own drivers, and they looked after their horses.

3755. Surely if that could be arranged in New South Wales it could be arranged here also?—If it could we would have a different story to tell.

3756. I suppose you knew the civil surgeons who came from New South Wales; you came across them?—I came across them all.

3757. Some of them were very able men?—Some of them were very good.

3758. With regard to clothing in hospital, do not some descriptions of wounds require special clothing at first; I mean an ordinary pyjama suit will not do?—Well, we can always split it up.

3759. It requires to be split up in certain cases?—Yes, and then we had plenty of the ordinary hospital clothing. Another thing about clothing is that there was a new departure made in South Africa, and every man going out of the stationary hospitals was supplied with an issue of new clothing free. His old clothing was generally destroyed; we generally had to burn it.

3760. You are referring to military clothing?—Yes; we were supplied with so many thousand suits of clothing, and when a man was discharged from hospital he drew a suit of this military clothing, and his other things were destroyed.

3761. Are you aware that a quantity of surgical clothing was sent from New South Wales to the front?—Yes, Colonel Williams was in charge, and he had a depôt of it at Bloemfontein. He had a lot of clothing there, I saw it, and he was giving it out freely. I looked upon it more as Red Cross work that he was doing.

3762. I notice in this report—I do not know whether your attention has been drawn to it, and I have no doubt it is capable of explanation—on page 56 it speaks of the total number of sick and wounded sent down from the front in ambulance trains, and the total number of sick and wounded sent down from the front in ordinary trains. The number sent down in ambulance trains was 11,865, and of these 14 died in transit and 20 died within two days after their arrival at the base. Now, 10,867, that is 1,000 less, were sent down in the ordinary trains, and of those none died in transit, and only one died within two days after; what is the explanation of that?—Only bad cases were sent in the hospital trains. As to the ordinary trains, we used to get a whole lot of empty trucks or carriages. They used to come up the line, and we seized on all those and put mild cases into them—men fairly well.

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3762*. Who were absolutely convalescent?—Yes, and that were on ordinary diet for some time; we put these men into those trains with a medical officer and a few attendants, and sent them down country. The ambulance trains, of course, were taking the wounded off the field, and I have seen them die in the ambulance train. That is the explanation.

3763. The explanation really is that the sick and wounded cases that went with the ambulance trains were serious cases, while the others were practically convalescent?—Those who went with the ordinary trains were fit to travel in any kind of conveyance.

3764. The first class were picked to travel in the ambulance trains as being unfit to travel in the ordinary trains?—The bad ones were picked for the ambulance train, and the others were picked for the passenger train.

3765. Have you seen the Recommendations of this Committee at page 69, Part IV.?—Yes.

3766. Do you approve of those Recommendations? Yes, I do generally.

3767. And you think that generally speaking they ought to be carried out?—Yes, generally.

3768. The only other matter is about these orderlies; are the orderlies in time of peace trained to the same extent as nurses are trained in the hospital?—We try to, on the same lines.

3769. I understand that a hospital nurse requires three years to get her training thoroughly?—Yes, that is what we insist upon; three years in an ordinary hospital.

3770. Is an orderly put through the same training?—He is practically always in training; he is never without it.

3771. Has he to pass an examination like the nurse?—Yes, he is trained, and we know when he is up to the work.

3772. Does he pass an examination?—He does.

3773. Is he employed as a nurse; for instance, in sterilising instruments and treating them antiseptically?—As a rule in the old times the medical officer did that; I always did it myself.

3774. A trained nurse is expected to do that, and to have the instruments ready for the surgeon?—Yes, but, personally, I always did it myself; I did not leave it to anyone else.

3775. (*Sir John Edge.*) Do you know whether the Royal Army Medical Corps was kept up in England to a state fit for three Army Corps?—Oh no, it was not anything like up to three Army Corps. It was never intended, I think, to keep it up for more than two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division.

3776. Was it kept up for two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division, besides providing for the ordinary work of the garrisons here?—Nothing like it; I think the numbers before the War were about 2,700 non-commissioned officers and men for all duties.

3777. That is for all duties in England?—Yes. You will get it from the other officers to be examined better than from me.

3778. What ought to be the staff of officers and men for three Army Corps mobilised?—A Division is about 40,000 men, and I would say a Division, allowing for 10 per cent. of sick, ought to have 1,800 non-commissioned officers and men.

3779. How many officers?—I do not know the numbers exactly, and it would take some time to calculate from the tables.

3780. You personally do not know what provision they had made in case of mobilisation for three Army Corps?—Yes, I have seen it and it is all down in the mobilisation tables, but I would not like from memory to give you the figures. This will be all published, and I would not like to give the exact figures. Besides, I am not the person to give you that information, and you will get it from Colonel Wilson.

3781. You say that you wanted 9,000 men on the Cape side; at what period of the War was that?—About February, 1900.

3782. At that time how many men were there in the field on the Cape side, I do not mean of your Corps?—It is very hard to say how many there were, but I should think there must have been 160,000 or 170,000 men.

3783. And your 9,000 was calculated on the basis of about 170,000 men?—Yes. I calculated on that number, that I wanted about 9,000.

3784. Does that include the hangers on, the bearers, and so on?—Yes, everything; it included the Field Army and the lines of communication.

3785. You said that what occurred in South Africa will probably never occur in any other part of the world. Are you there referring to the prevalence of typhoid or enteric?—Enteric will always occur, I think, in an Army, but I do not think we will ever get a country so prone to it as South Africa, and where there was no means whatever, locally, of providing any check. It is like a desert and everything had to be taken into it.

3786. Taken into the country?—Yes, we got nothing there; in fact we had to bring firewood from long distances, and so on. Out on the veldt itself you got nothing.

3787. In your experience, which is a very long one, have you ever known such an outbreak of enteric in an Army as occurred at Bloemfontein?—There were worse outbreaks than that in other Armies; in the American Cuban War there was a very bad outbreak, and that occurred just recently.

3788. As bad as this?—I should think so.

3789. Had we had any experience of such an outbreak?—Well, we had a bad outbreak in Egypt in 1882; the men contracted it there on the Canal at Ismailia, and the advance on to Cairo.

3790. Having those two cases before their minds, was there any special provision made for the chance of an outbreak of enteric in South Africa?—Yes, I always looked forward to it, and feared it. At first all that was done was that Pasteur-Chamberlain filters were sent with the troops, but the supply failed; every company was supposed on going out to carry its own filter, and the company officers were supposed to see that the men got filtered water from the Pasteur-Chamberlain filters, but so many troops went out that the trade was not able to supply them.

3791. It was necessary to send troops to the front who were not supplied with filters?—Yes.

3792. Would the Pasteur-Chamberlain filter in your opinion have been a protection?—It would if it had been used.

3793. Of course if they did not use it it would be no protection?—Yes, but the British soldier is very curious. I have known him have a pipe of good water and a pipe of bad water alongside each other, one of them being marked unfit for drinking and the other good, known to be good and probably sterilized, and yet he would just as likely take the bad.

3794. Do you mean from not paying any attention or wilfully?—If you ask him, he says he has seen the notice that the one is for drinking, but the other looks clear, and he does not see why he should not take it. I have known a soldier force a native sentry at Pretoria to drink out of a stream while there was a standpipe of good water alongside of him.

3795. In such a place as South Africa, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal, in your opinion you cannot rely upon boiling for the troops?—You can only rely upon boiling in the stations, but when the troops are moving you cannot boil. You have to watch the troops constantly that they do use the boiled water; they have a great objection to the boiled water as they say it is insipid and they do not like it.

3796. With regard to the open trucks, is there much difference between the day temperature and the night temperature in South Africa?—A tremendous difference, as soon as the sun sets the temperature falls down suddenly.

3797. What provision did you make in that case for the men travelling in open trucks?—They all had blankets; we came to that conclusion very quickly. They had blankets and greatcoats.

3798. And they had sufficient to keep them warm when the temperature fell?—I think so. Practically

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I think, we had an unlimited supply of blankets, and we used them freely.

3799. You have heavy rains there also at seasons ?—Very seldom.

3800. Was there any protection for the men in open trucks in case of rain ?—Sometimes they had, but as a rule we had all the movements in open trucks during the dry weather. I do not remember any case of rain. The rains came on at the end of the cold weather in our healthy season when we had no necessity for putting men into open trucks.

3801. So far as you remember there was practically no moving of men in open trucks in the rainy season ?—No, there was no necessity certainly.

3802. Were the civil surgeons placed in charge of your own Royal Army Medical Corps orderlies ?—Most of them were doing duty under a Royal Army Medical Corps; in the surgical division, for instance, there would be one Royal Army Medical Corps officer placed at the top and the civil surgeons would get so many patients under him.

3803. I gather from your evidence that the only complaint you make is, that you could not get your stores forward in time ?—That was one of the great complaints; we could not get our hospitals forward in time. Our medicines were forwarded; the medicines and the surgical instruments, the stores I am responsible for, went on. I got them to the front and I was never without medicines and surgical instruments at the front.

3804. What were the stores you say you could not get on ?—We could not get our Ordnance stores, our bedsteads and so on, up as quickly as we would have liked—the hospital equipment.

3805. What do you mean by "equipment" ?—Bedsteads, bed-pans, and all those things.

3806. I also gathered from what you stated that you did not blame the military authorities ?—Certainly not.

3807. As far as it was possible your stores were sent forward ?—Yes, I think everything was done that could have been done.

3808. (*Sir John Jackson.*) In the early part of your evidence it was stated that there were some necessary drugs that you wanted out in South Africa, but that you did not think the want of these drugs had caused loss of life ?—I think, if I remember right, I did not mean to say they were necessary drugs, but we have a great number of drugs which are never used; we had not every drug in these beleaguered cities.

3809. And those which you had not, were not what you would consider necessary drugs ?—We had, I think, all the necessary ones.

3810. You were speaking of milk at Bloemfontein, and you suggested that milk had been bought by the people there that possibly might have been stolen from the hospitals ?—It might be stolen on its way to the hospitals, because the Army Service Corps commandeered all the milch cows they could get within reach of our lines. There were no other cows, and no doubt some few people did buy a few bottles of milk; milk is always sold in bottles out in South Africa, and they did buy them and gave a good price for them, but I never knew how they got them.

3811. The suggestion is not that this milk for the hospitals was stolen by some of the troops ?—Oh, no, I think not. I think it was done before it was delivered, but I could not say. I know all the cows were commandeered, and the agents for the Army Service Corps milked them, and then made over the milk to the hospitals, but how these bottles of milk were got at I do not know.

3812. In the event of any special comforts being stolen on their way to the hospital, what would be the kind of punishment that would be given to a thief in such a case ? It is a very serious matter surely ?—A very serious matter, and if he was a soldier he would be tried by court martial.

3813. And shot ?—No.

3814. Not even if he stole special comforts going to a hospital full of wounded men ?—No, he would not be shot.

3815. With regard to the light ambulance wagons have you ever heard of any suggestion for having wagons of that kind in the form of motor-cars ?—Yes.

3816. Assuming that there were no practical mechanical difficulties about it, do you see any other objections ?—I see no objection at all.

3817. The motor might even be made shot-proof ?—I do not think they would have to be shot-proof; I do not think they need be cumbered at all in that way, but I think they must fly their flags a good deal better than they do, and have bigger flags.

3818. In the early part of your evidence, speaking of the two-wheeled carts, you said that in the event of the horses being shot the cart would fall down ?—That is the theoretical objection against two-wheeled carts.

3819. If there is a risk of a horse being shot down, there would be much less risk of damage to a motor-car ?—Very much less.

3820. You spoke of light bedsteads, as I understood, for the field hospitals ?—Yes, I said I would like to have one field hospital, that is the third field hospital of the Division, better equipped than it is at present.

3821. The field hospitals at present do not have beds ?—No.

3822. What are the bedsteads in the stationary hospitals made of ? Are they iron ?—They are made of tube iron with spring mattress, and they are very good; they are a little broader than they need be, I think.

3823. The bedsteads for the field hospitals no doubt could be made much lighter of steel tubes ?—Yes, or something that might act as stretchers as well.

3824. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Had you any carts belonging to your department constructed as they are in America of light hickory wood ?—We had the hickory carts that came with the Canadian Hospital.

3825. How did they answer ?—I saw them in the field, and they moved very well, but they were not long enough in the field to let us know whether they acted well or not. They were very light, and they were very easy going. I had men put into them and they moved very well, but they were not long enough in the field to enable me to say that they stood the work well. One objection I had to them was that they were too high on the wheels; an ambulance cart ought to be down lower, and I was always afraid of their upsetting as they were so high. They never did upset, and the Canadians laughed at the idea, but I thought they might upset being so high. There is no doubt they were light, and they were good and well built carts.

3826. I daresay you are aware that in Canada and in America generally they have these light hickory carts, which can practically go over any road and stand an immense amount of wear and tear, and do all the work with one half the weight of an ordinary cart ?—Yes, one-third of the weight I should think; they were good and did not break down as long as they were in the field.

3827. In connection with the transport of the Army Medical Department that is following a movable column, they are supplied with the horses to draw them by the transport department ?—Yes.

3828. And the transport department drive them ?—Yes.

3829. And are practically answerable on the march for them ?—Yes.

3830. And those transport officers, I presume, fall under the directions of the General Military Organisation ?—They do, and when they have done our work they are taken away at once from us, as a rule. On the Natal side they were not taken away; there was a difference there as they had any amount of transport in Natal. On the Cape side they were always taken away after they did our work.

3831. But the position on the march and in the field is laid down, I suppose, by the superior military officer present ?—It is.

3832. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) How long before the War were you appointed Principal Medical Officer in South Africa ?—I got my orders about a week before.

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3833 You sailed when ?—On the 14th of October, I think.

3834. And you got your orders about the 7th ?—About that date.

3835. Before that you had no knowledge that you were going there ?—I got a private intimation that I might have to go, but at the same time I was told that there would be no War; I was like everybody else in England.

3836. About what time did you get that intimation ?—I think it was some time in the first week in October.

3837. That was almost as late; so that you had no time between the date when you were appointed and the time you sailed to be consulted as to how to deal with the special circumstances of South Africa from the medical point of view ?—No; of course I knew all about the service generally, and it did not matter very much where I was thrown.

3838. Not as regards your own personal capacities, but as regards the providing of things specially for the country; you could not advise on that as you had not time ?—I had not time. It was laid down by the regulations.

3839. But that was a regulation applying to all parts of the world ?—Yes.

3840. What I want to get at is this. You told us, and we know from sad experience now, that South Africa has special conditions, especially that enteric is endemic there. Supposing that three months or six months before you had received a sort of provisional intimation that your services might be wanted, and you had been told to turn over in your mind what you would specially like to recommend should be sent out in view of the conditions of the country, do you not think you might have made a great many useful suggestions ?—I would.

3841. That is to say supposing the authorities had exercised in that one department the foresight which civilian men of business exercise in their businesses, some advantages might have been gained ?—I always thought that I could have made some suggestions.

3842. Of a valuable character ?—I believe so, but everybody else might think that they could make others.

3843. But any competent medical man could have made valuable suggestions ?—Yes.

3844. And as a matter of fact no suggestions were asked for ?—No.

3845. And no opportunity given for making suggestions ?—None; I was told:—"Here is the Army Corps and here is the number of bearer companies and field hospitals; here you are." I got it on paper.

3846. You have reminded us as, of course, we have heard frequently before, of the difficulty of getting the British soldier to be careful of the water he drinks ?—Yes.

3847. Of course, to some extent it is the duty of the officers to look after that ?—It is.

3848. I presume it is the business of the Army Medical Department to give advice and instructions on those subjects to British officers ?—Yes.

3849. How is that done ?—Well, it is done in the regiments; each regiment going into the field has a medical officer, and he advises what ought to be done to the colonel commanding the regiment. I have seen a great number of the Regimental Orders and Brigade Orders, and they are all teeming with sound advice. These are read out to the men on parade. There are very great differences between medical officers; for instance, some regiments were very healthy, and I put it down to the medical officer and the colonel seeing things with the same eye. In the case of other regiments which were not so well, I think it was very often the fault of the medical officer.

3850. In view of the fact which anyone who has lived in the tropics knows, that enteric and other diseases are very largely due to water, do you not think that some more systematic way might be adopted for impressing on subaltern officers and the captains of companies the importance of looking after the men in that respect ?—I think every regimental officer especially, in fact every officer in the British Army, ought to know the groundwork of hygiene.

3851. And you think it ought to be impressed on him as part of his positive duty ?—Yes, to tell the men.

3852. And to see that the men carry out the recommendation ?—Yes; there was the greatest difference between the men going home from us and the men coming out, and that was remarked very much by medical officers at home here, medical officers who never came to South Africa. They remarked and it was written about as to how the men came home from South Africa, knowing a good deal about sanitation, and it was mentioned how ignorant the men at home here were on the same subject. The others had learned by experience.

3853. When you spoke of the Royal Army Medical Corps being sent to Natal to complete the force there, was that at the time of Sir Redvers Buller going there in the middle of November, do you remember ?—It was when Sir Redvers Buller went there.

3854. But you would not then have been short of men in the Cape if the staff had been kept up in England to two Army Corps, and a Cavalry Division for foreign service, and an Army Corps in England also ?—We had to supply the wants of six Army Corps in South Africa.

3855. I speak of the time when Sir Redvers Buller went on the 22nd of November. You had not two Army Corps there then ?—No, but when the Sixth Division came out we had two Army Corps.

3856. At that time were you short ?—Very short.

3857. Even when the Fifth Division arrived ?—Yes; our whole force of trained Royal Army Medical Corps non-commissioned officers and men amounted to about 2,000 roughly speaking, and everyone who came after that was a recruit or untrained as a rule.

3858. And those 2,000 were sufficient for about five divisions; is that so ?—No, they were not. I wanted about 1,800 men for one Army Corps alone, and we had six to look after in South Africa.

3859. Coming for one moment to compressed drugs, tabloids, and so on, can you carry anæsthetics in a compressed form now ?—No; they have to be carried in the bottles.

3860. There are certain disinfectants which can be carried in a compressed form ?—Yes; there was perchloride of mercury, ammonia, and a few other things.

3861. Had you permanganate of potash in a compressed form ?—Yes.

3862. Had you all those ?—Yes, we had those in a compressed form.

3863. Do you think you had everything in a compressed form that could be had in that form ?—I think we had everything in a compressed form, and in that way we were well astride with the times. We were well up to the times in the medicines and drugs.

3864. You stated that you had not examined the Russian and German systems ?—I have known something about them; I was never in those countries, but at the same time I have read all I could lay my hand on about them.

3865. Is it the practice in the Army Medical Department for officers to be sent to study the medical improvements in the armies of foreign countries ?—Some of them do, but others do not.

3866. Is it a large number which follows that study ?—I think not a large number.

3867. Is encouragement given for that ?—There is no award or examination to pass in it.

3868. It is not like the way a reward is given to officers for learning foreign languages ?—They never ask if one has done it; but under the reorganisation they will be examined, I am told, in what is the custom of foreign armies.

3869. That is under the new system ?—Under the new system coming out now that is one of the things they will be examined in—the customs and regulations in foreign armies.

3870. That just brings me to the new arrangements

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You are aware that under the new Order in Council since 1901 the Director-General of the Army Medical Department has been given a very high position ?—Yes, a better position.

3871. That, one must assume, must have been done owing to the discovery that everything was not what it ought to have been ?—Yes; there is no other conclusion we can come to.

3872. I think that conclusion must have been based on reports of yours from the front ?—I think not; I never made any complaints about my own Department.

3873. I put it to you whether the waking up of the War Office to the fact that things were not quite right must not in some way have resulted from reports by you ?—No doubt I struck out a new line in various ways the very moment I got there.

3874. I do not think you quite grasp my point. I cannot imagine that a large change such as this would be made at the War Office unless the authorities had become satisfied that the previous system had been wanting as proved by the War, and I put it to you whether you did not write home reports pointing out defects in the Army Medical Department ?—I wrote home generally, and I sent a diary, and a great number of things might be got out of that.

3875. Can you remember sending home any special confidential reports in which you deplored the state of things as concerned the Army Medical Department out there ?—I think at various times I have deplored that I had so few.

3876. Any other points ? Have you your diary ?—I have not got it with me; it is in the War Office.

3877. Could you by consulting that find out when you sent home any statements showing the failure of the Army Medical Department in certain things ?—I do not think I ever sent home anything about a failure. I have reported that I wanted more officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, and I have been more or less swamped with the outside element.

3878. You see my point. It is that it seems improbable that a great change like this could be made in the organisation of the War Office unless there had been some failure ?—I am afraid I cannot help you.

3879. (*Chairman.*) You said that you would like to see your own transport in the hands of the Army Medical Corps ?—I do not want to have the driving of it, but I would like to have it allotted to us. It is a different way of putting it. I would like to have the transport allotted to our units and left there during the war. That is what I would like. I have been misunderstood before on the same question; I do not want, for instance, to have them handed over so that a medical officer would be the commanding officer of the drivers; but I want to have by some means the medical transport always there, so that we should not have trained horses one day and bad horses or vicious mules another day. I would like to have trained, steady animals always at the command of the hospitals.

3880. In the same way that each regiment used to have its regimental transport ?—Well, the regimental transport was taken away too.

3881. You would like to have your transport in the same way as the regimental transport was formerly attached to the regiments ?—I would; we could lend them, but the same animals should always come back to us.

3882. I wanted to know whether you extended that desire to the supply of stores which were now supplied by the Army Service Corps and the Ordnance ?—No; I would leave that as it is; that is working very well, and I do not think you could improve upon that; there is a good system at present.

3883. Was it ever said that the Boers had better ambulance wagons than we had ?—If it was, it was not true

3884. You do not think they had ?—No; I have seen them; I have seen everything.

3885. What sort of equipment had they before the War ?—I have only seen the Russian and French ambulances, and they were generally on the same lines as our own. I have seen the Netherlands ambulance also, but the Boers had no ambulances of their own.

3886. They had none of their own, and you saw the foreign ambulances ?—That is so; I have gone over all the foreign ambulances, and saw nothing to copy.

3887. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) What you have said about having transport permanently attached to the Medical Department is, no doubt, very true; but I suppose you would admit in case of urgent necessity the two things to the front must be food and ammunition ?—Food and ammunition must go first.

3888. And everything must give way to those ?—There are two sides to it, but food and ammunition must go first.

3889. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Were the New South Wales ambulance carts or wagons of a special pattern, or were they of the English pattern ?—They were rather light. I remember when Colonel Williams landed them at Cape Town he looked at them along with our Mark V., and he changed them, and took up a lot of Mark V. instead. He left his own wagons doing duty at Cape Town, because he thought they would not stand the country. They were light, and they stood Cape Town very well.

3890. But they were taken up afterwards ?—With the second hospital that came from New South Wales they brought their own wagons, and they worked very well; but I do not think they were as good as Mark V.

3891. Not so good as the ordinary military ambulance ?—That is so; our Mark V. is the only one that will stand the work.

3892. And they were satisfactory ?—They were satisfactory as a rough, good wagon. It is impossible to make a good wagon to carry wounded men, and I do not think such a thing will ever be made.

3893. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) With reference to your recommendations as to having a small number of expert sanitary officers, I daresay you are aware of the main argument that has been used against them by some high authorities ?—Yes; and I believe in that main argument.

3894. Would you mind stating the argument ?—The main argument is that these experts make some absurd recommendations They have done it, and I have had these absurd recommendations out in South Africa. For instance, an expert sent a memorandum to me that I should have a tube well at every post in South Africa, which would have meant for the blockhouses alone 7,000. I laughed over the suggestion when I got it, but I did not like to answer it myself, and passed it on to the Engineers. The Engineers sent it back to me, and said, "You might have answered this, as you know perfectly well it is impossible, the bulk of the ground being rock."

3895. Then there is a second objection raised by very high military authorities. They say that if you have your expert sanitary staff the regular medical officers when asked for an opinion on a sanitary subject will endeavour if possible to throw the onus on the expert ?—They will.

3896. Who will not be on the spot ?—Yes.

3897. How do you propose to meet that difficulty ?—As it was, I was looked on as the senior sanitary officer in the Army out there, and it will always work in that way if you put a sanitary expert on my staff.

3898. Do you not think that the ordinary medical officer would rather object to giving opinions when there is a special expert to deal with sanitary questions ?—I do not think he will object, but I do not think he will be as keen if he knows there is a regular sanitary service.

3899. How will you get the ordinary medical officer to act as a sanitary officer, as he does now, if he always feels that there is a bigger man behind him ?—I think as long as you have a Royal Army Medical Corps sanitary officer attached to the staff of the Principal Medical Officer that the difficulty will be met.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

Colonel W. L. GUBBINS, M.B., M.V.O., called and examined.

Colonel W. L. Gubbins, M.B., M.V.O.

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3900. (*Chairman.*) You were Assistant-Director of the Army Medical Service Corps from March, 1895, to December, 1899?—Yes.

3901. And after that you served in South Africa?—Yes.

3902. In what capacity?—I was Principal Medical Officer of the Sixth Division up to the 26th July, 1900, and when the Division was about to be broken up, being scattered all over the Orange River Colony, I was ordered up to Pretoria as Principal Medical Officer of the Pretoria District and the Northern Line of Communication.

3903. Then you took part in the preparations for the War in the War Office?—Yes.

3904. And I think you gave evidence on that subject before the Royal Commission which sat in South Africa?—Yes, I did.

3905. Is there anything that you wish to add to that evidence?—The only thing that I might remark about it is that there are several inaccuracies. I never had an opportunity of correcting it, and I am made to say nonsense in two or three places. That is the only thing that I have to say about it. I stand by everything that I said at the time.

3906. If there is anything that you wish to correct that is more than a verbal inaccuracy will you do so?—I think I have the report at home. If I might be allowed, I will send the corrections to the Secretary.

3907. With regard to the preparations for the War, they were carried out in accordance with the Regulations?—Yes.

3908. And I think you said when you were examined before that you never expected to be called upon to provide for more than 80,000 men?—Yes, about that. It was, roughly speaking, two Army Corps and two Cavalry Brigades, or the equivalent of a Cavalry Division; that would be about 80,000 men.

3909. And was the provision of the *personnel*, in the first place, sufficient for that?—I think so, ample.

3910. And you were able to equip the First Army Corps?—Easily. In fact, I think we could have done 100,000 men in South Africa with the greatest ease. It was a little more than the two Army Corps; it would be about two Army Corps, a Cavalry Division, and the necessary troops for the Lines of Communication. I think, judging from what we did afterwards, we could easily have done 100,000 men.

3911. With full equipment?—Yes, with full equipment.

3912. I think Sir William Wilson told us that the first five Divisions were complete?—They were complete. I would say that the Sixth and Seventh Divisions were also very complete except that in the Seventh Division and to a certain extent in the Sixth Division, we had supplemented the *personnel* by civil surgeons and St. John Ambulance men; but the first five Divisions certainly were quite complete with Regulars; I do not think we had to bring in any auxiliary *personnel*.

3913. But in the Sixth Division?—That was my own Division; we had a very small percentage of civilians.

3914. That was the last you were engaged in equipping?—I practically arranged for the Seventh Division before I left.

3915. And you had more civilians in that?—Yes, of course, the further on we got the more civilians we had to bring in.

3916. After you Colonel Johnston came on?—Yes. I was Assistant-Director up to the 21st December, when Colonel Johnston took it over, and I embarked on the 23rd, two days afterwards.

3917. Do the same observations apply to equipment?—I do not think there was ever any difficulty about equipment, even after I left. We always had plenty of medical equipment, and we also had plenty of ordnance equipment The orders for that, of course, rested with the Director-General of Ordnance; he simply went into the open market and bought what we wanted.

3918. They could always get a supply?—Yes, I think so. It was one of the things I made a note of. We had a great many pieces of bad luck as well as good; but one of the great pieces of good luck, if I may say so, of a senior officer, was in having Sir Henry Brackenbury as Director-General of Ordnance at that time; he was able to meet all our wants with the greatest possible ease by going into the open market.

3919. When you were speaking of the *personnel* you only spoke of the medical officers?—Yes.

3920. With regard to the subordinate *personnel*, does the same thing apply to them?—Yes. With the Sixth Division I should say three-fourths of our *personnel* were Army Medical Corps Regulars; but in order to get those we had to bring them home from Egypt, Malta, Gibraltar, Bermuda, and different places.

3921. And after that you had practically exhausted the supply?—We had practically exhausted the supply then, and my successor had to fall back on recruits. I may say that in my particular branch of the War Office, as Assistant Director, I did not deal with the men. Colonel Wilson, who will succeed me in giving evidence, dealt with the men. I dealt only with mobilisation, equipment, and medical supplies; and as regards officers acting under the Director-General's instructions I simply demanded them from another branch (A.M.D. 1), and they gave me all I wanted.

3922. Then you would rather not speak to the men?—I would rather not. I am not so well acquainted with them as Colonel Wilson is; that was his particular branch.

3923. As to difficulties with regard to men, from your experience in South Africa do you agree with what Sir William Wilson said?—In what way do you mean.

3924. That there were difficulties in supplying the troops with adequate hospital attendance?—Certainly, when the regular supply became exhausted we had to put up with recruits and anybody we could get hold of; for example, the St. John Ambulance men were a great help to us, but it took about three months to train them. When they were trained they were excellent.

3925. They are not part of the regular establishment of the Army?—No; they were only started as a part of our Field Medical organisation in 1899.

3926. Were a larger number of stationary and general hospitals sent to South Africa than under ordinary circumstances would be required?—Yes, very much larger. The fact is that stationary and general hospitals are units on the lines of communication, and entirely dependent upon the nature of the country, the distance of the lines of communication—it might be 100 miles, 600 miles, or 800 miles from the base—and also the character of the country and its healthiness or otherwise. You never can decide the number of general or stationary hospitals until you know where the campaign is going to be.

3927. But the regulations in force at the time did not provide for the expansion that was required for South Africa?—No, they did not. As a matter of fact we only had the equipment of one general hospital and two stationary hospitals stored at Southampton, and these were kept up more to provide for any sudden emergency and as a kind of type plan of what these units would require as regards equipment generally. I remember when I first went to the War Office in 1894, Sir Redvers Buller found fault with the cumbrous nature of the materiél of the general hospital, and he appointed a Committee of which Colonel Skinner was President, and the Assistant Quartermaster-General for Supplies, Colonel Boyd, and myself were the members; that was as far back as 1894, and we simplified, improved, and brought it up to date a good deal; that was really a kind of standard for general hospitals up to the time the War broke out.

3928. But you say as regards finding the equipment there was no difficulty?—Not the least.

3929. And no delay?—None whatever. I think

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Colonel Johnston will bear me out when I say that I think the way the equipment was got ready for the general hospitals, which I presume was purchased in London, was remarkable, and I wish to say, as I think I said in my evidence in Pretoria, that in my opinion it would be the greatest possible mistake to buy a lot of equipment in peace for general hospitals and store it up; it might lie ten or twenty years and then it would become obsolete. It is far better with large commercial houses in London, Birmingham, and all over the country to buy in the market when the time comes.

3930. It all depends on whether you can rely on getting the things in time?—Yes, I think you can, you have only to go to big firms like Maple and Co., and Thomas Wallace, who will always have what you want.

3931. But outside the equipment, there was no provision in the regulations for any expansion of the system?—I do not think there was anything laid down in black and white, but I think it was tacitly understood that we could always increase. We contemplated if we did send out two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division that we should require a great many more general hospitals. We fully contemplated at least half-a-dozen.

3932. Does not the *personnel* of the general hospital take away from the *personnel* that you have available for field hospitals?—In this little book which I have here, called "Mobilisation Instructions," dated 1899, we had the *personnel* laid down for three Army Corps, and that exhausted all our regular units. But when we sent abroad two Army Corps we contemplated that the regular units required for the third Army Corps could be utilised for the lines of communication; of course, three Army Corps would only be mobilised for home defence, and in this latter contingency the services of eight Volunteer medical units would be utilised—chiefly with the third Army Corps and the Cavalry Brigades.

3933. What does "Royal Army Corps details from the Colonies" mean, which you speak of in your *précis*? Is that part of the Army Medical Corps simply?—That refers to the men brought home from Egypt, Malta, Gibraltar, and other places which I have referred to.

3934. Are they part of the regular corps?—Yes, they are part of the regular corps.

3935. Is "Royal Army Medical Corps Militia," the same thing?—That is the Militia branch of the Royal Army Medical Corps.

3936. Is that a separate item?—Yes, it is a separate item. They are on the same footing as the ordinary Militia battalions in the country, only that we have them organised into different companies, which can be called up for service in case of war or other emergency.

3937. Is there anything else you wish to say about the mobilisation? Did it work easily and satisfactorily?—Very easily and very satisfactorily. The chief difficulty that I had personally was the constant change in the composition of the force that was going to be sent out. At one time it was decided to send out only 10,000 men, then 20,000 men, then an Army Corps, and we had to cut our cloth accordingly; but when once it was decided to mobilise an Army Corps and a Cavalry division, it worked with the greatest smoothness, and there was no difficulty whatever.

3938. And smaller numbers were sent out earlier under your directions?—Yes.

3939. In August?—Yes, they were sending them out by driblets.

3940. And you were sending out some men, too, were you?—Yes, before the Reserves were called up, or before the Army Corps started; besides small bodies of men, we sent out a field hospital and a stationary hospital in advance.

3941. I do not know that there is anything else that I wish to ask you unless, as I said, there is any matter in your previous evidence which you wish to amplify?—My evidence in South Africa dealt chiefly with answering criticisms about the 6th Division and the 6th Division hospitals. I do not think that point comes up to day. There are, however, one or two other things that I thought, perhaps, I might mention.

3942. If you please?—I think that the essence of all our difficulties in South Africa was the insufficient establishment for this immense force that was never contemplated. I was always told by Colonel Lyttelton, as he was then, and Colonel Stopford, that two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division were the utmost that we would ever have to send abroad. I remember the Commander-in-Chief at the time making a speech in which he said we could send them off as quickly as the ships could be brought to put them into, and there was a good deal of scepticism about our being able to do so. But he was right; we had them all absolutely ready, and as far as our branch was concerned we were quite ready in a week—there was no difficulty whatever. One thing that helped us very much was the Fashoda scare the year before; owing to that we were able to decentralise our equipment and make our arrangements to bring them up to date, so that when the time came for mobilisation of the Army Corps and Cavalry Division it worked with the greatest smoothness; and if we had only sufficient *personnel* we should have had no difficulty with double or treble the number.

3943. But you agree with the opinion that the Royal Army Medical Corps was wholly insufficient at the start in equipment for the War?—I will not say the equipment because the equipment could be got; but it was wholly insufficient as regards *personnel*, but as regards equipment, medical or otherwise, there never was the least difficulty. Then another point that I think we must not lose sight of is about field hospitals. When the War was started the number of beds, or so-called beds, were reckoned amongst the percentage of hospital beds laid down for the campaign. The War has taught us that is wrong; we cannot call them "beds" in the true sense of the word. I remember two days after the action at Talana, Lord Lansdowne telegraphed for the Director-General to come over and see him. He happened to be away inspecting, and I was sent over as the officer who knew most about the medical arrangements. I drew up a statement for Lord Lansdowne which was read afterwards in the House, giving the total number of beds, and it read very well; but 500 of these were field hospital beds, which by the light of recent experience I would not now dream of as beds.

3944. Why?—Because there is not such a thing as a bed; the man is simply put on the ground, and I do not think that anything ought to be reckoned as a bed except those in a general or stationary hospital. I think we are all pretty well agreed that the field hospital ought to be an exceedingly mobile unit which can follow the Army if they have to march, say 25 miles a day, and that it ought not to be encumbered with bedsteads or any heavy equipment.

3945. Which are only for temporary use?—Exactly. I remember at Paardeberg we had 300 wounded in a place that was meant for 100, and we looked after them by putting them under trees, and did all we could for them, but that field hospital had to march right away to Bloemfontein in a few days, which it could not have done if it had been encumbered with a lot of heavy equipment.

3946. Sir William Wilson suggested that light beds might be used in the third field hospital with advantage?—I do not agree with that. I think the tents might be improved. We had a lot of bell tents, which are altogether unsuitable for sick men; they were each supposed to hold five men. It would have been better to have had something in the shape of Tortoise tents to hold 16 or 18. They would be lighter also in the aggregate. The equipment of a field hospital might be very much improved. I quite agree with what Sir William Wilson said about having pyjama suits; that was a very great want, but the Red Cross people were able to help us at times. I remember after Paardeberg, when a lot of wounded came in, we had to cut their clothes off, being saturated with blood, and we had nothing to put the men into; we had to roll them up in blankets. That I have no doubt will be rectified.

3947. What is the next thing that you want to mention?—As regards the medical supplies there was a question; but we had not only ample medical supplies with which we were able to supply all our own people,

but, and this is a point which Sir William did not mention, we had to supply the Refugee Camps as well in South Africa; all their medicines came from us, and you know that there were nearly 100,000 people at one time in the Refugee Camps. That I know, as I was principal medical officer at Pretoria where we had a large depôt from which we supplied them with everything.

3948. Did you supply them with *personnel* also?—No, only with drugs. We lent them a few men, but then we struck them off our strength. Then mention has been made of the hospital equipment. My own experience was that the things we failed in most were bed-pans and urinals; for example, at Bloemfontein when we had that outbreak of enteric.

3949. That is what is mentioned by the Royal Commission?—Yes. I quite bear out the Commission there. I need hardly tell you that such preparations as we made for equipment were based on the experience gained in former campaigns, such as those in Egypt especially, and previous South African campaigns, the Gold Coast and others, we did what was considered best and gave the equipment we thought was suitable; but in certain articles we were under-equipped, and bed-pans certainly were one of these. I am very much—as the Medical Member of the Committee—responsible for the number, but if I were recasting the tables I would put three times the number of bed-pans in.

3950. What you say is that the numbers were based on the experience of former campaigns?—Yes, in former times, both in India, in Egypt, and in other places.

3951. It was not that they were unduly cut down?—Not at all; only I think we did not sufficiently provide for those tremendous outbreaks of both enteric and dysentery. The food was always excellent—I mean the food supplied by the Army Service Corps—nothing could have been better. The milk was always a difficulty everywhere, but my experience both in Bloemfontein and Pretoria was that the authorities did the best they possibly could; they collected all the milk into a central depôt and distributed it from there; and later on we had a sterilizing depôt where all the milk was collected, sterilized, and then distributed to the hospitals with excellent effects. There is another unit which this War has brought to notice which I have never seen mentioned before, and that is the Convalescent Camp—the half-way house, if I may call it so, between the general hospital and the fighting line. We had a large Convalescent Camp at Pretoria capable of holding 600 men, and when men were discharged from the general hospitals, of which we had four, with 2,700 beds, we found that for men who were not fit to return to the ranks or go out on trek, this Convalescent Camp of the greatest possible assistance. All that the men wanted, as a rule, was good food and rest; we gave them mattresses and plenty of extra food in the way of eggs, beef-tea, chocolate and that sort of thing, and fed them up in fact. The Convalescent Camps were the greatest success; not only did they form what I call a half-way house between the hospitals and the regimental units, but they supplied hospital orderlies to a large extent, clerks, servants, and men of that sort who have to be found in the Army, and in that way they relieved the fighting units.

3952. There was some criticism upon the employment of convalescents in that way, was there not?—I know it is wrong, but still it was a necessity, you could not get on without them. At Pretoria even, where the pressure was comparatively slight, when we had been established there several months, half the orderlies were convalescent soldiers.

3953. Did you find much objection yourself from that course being adopted?—No. They are not of course as good as our men, they have not the training, but still they have the discipline, and I would far rather have them than novices—people that you pick up anywhere. And some of them turned out very well indeed. But then in loyalty to the General, I had to go round personally, as his principal medical officer, once every fortnight or three weeks, and parade these men and turn them off when I saw them getting well and fit to go back to the ranks. That was an understanding with the General Officer Commanding. I arranged with him a fixed establishment for all these hospitals, but it was on the distinct understanding that, when a man was fit to go back to his unit, he was sent out, which I endeavoured to carry out as loyally as possible.

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3954. The men were inclined to hold on themselves, were they?—Yes, poor fellows, they came in worn out and in rags. One point about the convalescent camp which I want especially to emphasize, is that it should always be under the command of a medical officer, for this reason, that the medical officer in charge takes an interest in it, he lives amongst the men; he knows those that are fit to go out, and those that are not; whereas, if the Camp is under a military officer, he—the medical officer—comes over for half-an-hour, pays a casual visit, and cannot know the men. I think distinctly that it should be a semi-military unit, but under the command of a medical officer. I remember a case of a convalescent camp which was not under the medical officer, where the men who returned to duty were about fifty a week, whereas in this particular camp they were about thirty a day. That shows the difference where a medical officer has the men constantly under his eyes; and I think the authorities approved of it. There are other units which are apt to be lost sight of in a campaign that were brought out by the War, such as an officers' hospital. We were well off in South Africa, but I remember in Egypt in 1882, the men were looked after very well, but there was no provision for officers when we got into Cairo, and the consequence was, that many young officers had to go to hotels and pay 25s. a day, who wanted nursing and proper dieting, but of course they could not get the attention they would receive in a properly organized officers' hospital. In South Africa they were very well looked after.

3955. Were they always separate hospitals?—Yes. In Pretoria we had an aggregate in three different hospitals of 110 beds. Another unit that should not be forgotten is a Nursing Sisters' Hospital. We had a large number of nursing sisters; at this particular place we had 150; we found it necessary to establish a hospital for these ladies, and we had as many as 18 in once, chiefly down with enteric. I only mention this as a unit which ought not to be lost sight of in any future preparations for war.

3956. Were all these different matters provided for in the present case when you mobilised?—No, there was nothing of the sort, either as regards a nursing sisters' hospital, the convalescent camp, or two other units that I am going to mention, namely, an infectious diseases hospital and a native hospital. All these we found by experience were necessary in South Africa in large military centres.

3957. And there was no provision for them?—No, there is nothing in regard to them in this book here—"War Establishments"; they had all to be improvised in fact. Another point that I wish to mention is about ambulance wagons. Sir William Wilson in speaking of them seemed to lay great stress on our own Mark V.; it is a good ambulance wagon in its way, and it is one of the things that you were always told you would not break down—that it was, in fact, indestructible. That fallacy has been disposed of in South Africa; it broke down almost as much as any other. The best pattern of wagon that I have seen out there is the Australian.

3958. Do you agree with Sir William Wilson about the two wheeled carts?—Yes, for Cavalry or Horse Artillery, or any quickly moving units, but they are not comfortable for men who are very badly wounded or very ill. I found them answer very well with Cavalry Brigades and with Mounted Infantry.

3959. I do not suppose they would be used with men who were very ill?—Latterly, all our mobile forces were mounted, and you had to use them. I am afraid the poor fellows got very much shaken, but it could not be helped. Personally, the best place I should think in which to look for ambulance wagons is the United States, where they build their wagons largely of hickory.

3960. But you have had no experience of them?—None, except what I have learnt from officers whom I met, who had served in the American War, viz.;

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that in Virginia in 1863 and 1864, where they had very rough work and bad roads, they had an ambulance wagon that they called the "Rosenkranz" which only weighed 800 lbs., whereas our ambulance wagon weighs 2,000 lbs., and I think the Rosenkranz ambulance was built of hickory. I have never seen it. What I liked about the Australian wagons was that they were lower. I think they were quite as strong, they were lighter, and they could be drawn by six mules, whereas it took ten to draw ours. I thought them much the best pattern that I had seen out there. But I think that these are vehicles for which we ought to go into the open market, irrespective of any firm or any country, and get the best article possible.

3961. What is the next point?—The next point is about the regimental establishment. It was laid down in the mobilization regulations that every regimental unit should have a "medical cart," as is the case in Continental armies, and it was approved and decided that each regimental unit should have a Maltese cart, of which there were about 150 at Woolwich at the time, so that at no cost to the Government we provided every regimental unit with a Maltese cart; but when we started in South Africa, it was ruled that only mounted corps should have them, such as Cavalry and Horse Artillery. So far as the Infantry were concerned, they were in a very awkward situation; the stretchers would be in one cart, and the medical equipment in another, mixed up with the regimental baggage; and to remedy that, when we got to Bloemfontein for our division, we purchased carts locally and had them painted and marked as "medical carts." As regards the hospital trains, I have nothing but praise for them; I think they were admirable; they saved the situation many times, in fact. As Sir William Wilson said, they were movable general hospitals, and they were the greatest possible comfort. Whenever there was an action we could have one up at the shortest notice, and get the wounded away with the greatest expedition and ease. With regard to men going away in ordinary sick trains, I never saw any of them going in open trucks. I sent large convoys down in covered trucks, and I do not know of any bad result. They had generally bags filled with hay to lie upon, and we sent medical officers in charge, and I never heard any complaint. Altogether, we sent off 5,000 or 6,000 men from Pretoria in that way. It is all a question of sorting your cases.

3962. Were those bad cases?—No, bad cases would be sent by the hospital trains. It was a matter of sorting your cases. The men who could eat barrack rations, as we call them, were generally sent in these ordinary trains. The sanitation of the Army is also a point that was raised. Personally, I am in favour of having a sanitary officer at the headquarters of each Army Corps; I think it is a great thing to have a sanitary expert to turn to for advice. I know that at Bloemfontein, where we suffered heavily, it would have been a very great thing to have had a sanitary expert to turn to. But at the same time I do not think that should absolve either the medical or regimental officers, and, above all, the commanding officer from taking an interest in sanitation. Another point that I think the general public lose sight of is this: We often read in the papers that so many men died of disease in South Africa—I think 14,000. But they forget altogether that during the War there were 400,000 men in South Africa, not all at the same time, but at different times. How many of those men would have died at home or in the Colonies in time of peace? Exclusive of South Africa the death rate in the Army for 1900 was about 9 per 1,000, so that in common fairness the equivalent of the normal mortality should be deducted from the total number of casualties. I am talking about deaths from disease, of course. There are a few other points that I should like to mention. We had a great deal of bad luck, and I think we are bound to mention our good luck as well. First of all, the first piece of good fortune was the revision of the medical equipment. Our medical equipment was very obsolete, and some of it dated back to the Crimea. In 1897 the late Director-General appointed a committee of five members, of which the present Director-General, Sir William Taylor, was President, to report on the equipment, by whom it was thoroughly revised and brought up to date. Then it was tried at manœuvres at Salisbury Plain in 1898, and we found several defects, which were remedied, and I think I can honestly say we heard no complaints about it in South Africa; there were a few things that were superfluous and a few things that were deficient, but on the whole it stood the test admirably. That was one piece of good fortune.

3963. That would not have been so if steps had not been taken in 1897?—Certainly not. I think it would have been a perfect scandal if we had gone out with the equipment as it was before. The other piece of good fortune was the establishment of the Central British Red Cross Committee in good time, under the presidency of the late Lord Wantage. Before that all our Voluntary Societies, such the St. John Ambulance, the National Aid Society, and the Army Nursing Reserve were out of touch; but they are all now co-ordinated and brought under one committee. That was the greatest help to us both at home and abroad. So far as my personal experience goes, I cannot speak too highly of the aid that we got from that committee and their representatives in South Africa. Then we also formed the Army Nursing Reserve about three years before the War, which was also a great help; it gave us about 800 or 900 nursing sisters at a critical time, all of them, with very few exceptions, of a good stamp. The St. John Ambulance Brigade was also brought into line before the War broke out, and they were of great assistance to us; I think we had nearly 2,000 of their members altogether in South Africa. Then again you asked Sir William Wilson if he had any suggestions to make about utilising these people. I would suggest that the St. John Ambulance Brigade, or the men who served in South Africa, should be passed into a Reserve on the same principle as the Post Office adopt, where the men are given 6d. a day, and the Government have a lien on their services in case of war. Whether that is being taken up or not I do not know.

3964. Have you no Reserve now?—We have none except of our own men; that is to say, our own men enlist just like the rest of the Army for three or seven years, and then they pass into the Reserve. In fact, we are on the same footing as the Guards as regards terms of service.

3965. But they are not sent to any hospital work in the Reserve?—No, they go away to civil life.

3966. Do they not lose touch with hospital work?—Yes, they do, but they very soon pick it up again. At first they were not so good as the Colour Service men, but after a couple of months at it they were just as good, and in many instances better. The great thing, of course, is that they have not forgotten their habits of discipline. You were asking just now what was the total number of officers for the Army Corps. I see there are 122 medical officers and 729 non-commissioned officers and men laid down for one Army Corps.

3967. Is there anything else you wish to say?—I do not think there is anything else. Those are all the points that I wished personally to submit.

3968. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I do not wish to take you unnecessarily into questions of *personnel*; I understand that Colonel Wilson will deal with those?—Yes, as regards men. I can deal with officers.

3969. Did I understand you rightly to say that prior to the outbreak of war you could have provided for a force of 80,000 men—the number then contemplated?—Yes, easily.

3970. And I think you went on to say even for 100,000 men?—Yes, I think we could have provided for 100,000 men comfortably.

3971. How is that consistent with the fact that only the first five divisions were completely equipped, the sixth partly, and the seventh badly?—You must remember that there were at least 20,000 men in South Africa before the War for whom we had to provide; we sent out men in driblets constantly—both officers and men, long before that.

3972. There were 55,000 men in the first three divisions; add 22,000 sent out before, and that makes 77,000?—Yes.

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3973. Still well within your 80,000?—For the Fifth Division we provided comfortably; the Sixth Division, I should think, had 80 per cent. Regulars, and the Seventh Division I should say 60 per cent.

3974. Even allowing for 25,000 men in South Africa before, you ought to have been able to provide seven Divisions?—In addition to that we provided stationary and general hospitals, which are not reckoned.

3975. But the Seventh Division was partly provided by men from Malta, Gibraltar, Egypt, and so on?—To a certain extent. I daresay about 20 per cent.

3976. I will not take you further on that point. You said in your evidence that you cannot decide upon what stationary and general hospitals you will want until you know where the campaign is to be. When were you first notified that war was probable in South Africa?—I may say that I was notified as far back as June, 1899, confidentially that war was possible.

3977. Did you begin then to move as regards organisation?—Yes, I was in constant communication with Colonel Stopford, the head of the Mobilisation Branch.

3978. At the end of June?—After the Bloemfontein Conference broke up I think all sensible men looked upon war as a possible contingency.

3979. But before we went to Bloemfontein you were not notified at all?—Not at all. The Director-General sent out some things more as a precautionary measure; for instance, an X Ray apparatus to Maritzburg in Natal, and a couple of trained officers to work it. That was about the beginning of May. I remember two officers being sent out as a precautionary measure, but we really did nothing until after the Bloemfontein Conference.

3980. Have you any proper means of gaining information about the medical stores and medical equipment generally of foreign armies?—Occasionally one of our officers goes over and inspects them. I have seen the French Army myself and the Italian Army some years ago; the German Army I have not seen, but from what I have seen of the French Army I think we have very little to learn from them. A few things we copied. For instance, surgical saddlebags for Cavalry in the French Army; we bought a pattern and tried it at Aldershot, when we found it was a very unsuitable article; we, however, improved upon it and made it much better than the French one. These saddlebags were very useful in the late war.

3981. Did you go there on service or did you go of your own accord?—I went over to attend a Surgical Congress, and the military surgeons were very kind and showed me everything.

3982. But you went over, I understand, on your own account?—No, I was sent over by the Government, but I was not sent to inspect the military equipment of the hospitals or field army.

3983. Is there any regular system for our Medical Department studying the newest methods adopted by, say, the Russian, the German, the Austrian, and the French Armies?—I do not think so. Occasionally one of our officers goes over and writes a report.

3984. Do you not think that such a system would be a great advantage?—I think it would be an immense advantage. There is nothing that I would like better myself than to start off to-morrow for Berlin, say, and have a look round.

3985. You said just now, with regard to ambulance wagons, I think it was, that it would be an advantage to be able always to buy in the open market everywhere in the world?—Certainly.

3986. But we had some evidence the other day from another department to the effect that difficulties were raised as to purchases being made in South Africa without permission from home; it was partly on political grounds?—You have to reckon with that, of course. I daresay the carriage-builders in London might object to our buying ambulance wagons in the United States.

3987. But, as a matter of fact, before or during the War was your Department checked in any way in going into the open markets of the world to buy?—Not checked, but I will give you a case in point. I remember that General Boyce Combe commanded at the Curragh, and after the Cavalry Manœuvres, I think in 1897, he wrote a very sensible Report, pointing out the utterly ridiculous nature of our present ambulance wagon for accompanying Cavalry. We took the matter up, and I think we represented it to the Ordnance people, who said that they would start building an ambulance; but it took a long time, and I have never seen it. There may be, however, an improved pattern. So far as I am personally concerned, what I would like to see would be that the Adjutant-General should say to the Director-General, "Here is £1,000; go and buy two or three of the best ambulance wagons you can get anywhere." I may mention another case in point. I am now Principal Medical Officer for the Home District. I wanted two infectious diseases ambulances for the Home District, as I found existing arrangements very unsuitable. I went to General Trotter and saw him personally. He backed up my representations, and now I have two excellent and up-to-date ambulances which were bought in the open market.

3988. Were they of British make?—Yes, one was built at Redhill, the other in London.

3989. I am speaking rather of things built in other countries. Has there been any difficulty in your Department as to giving orders to foreign countries?—None that I am aware of. I never heard the question of a foreign country being brought in. I mentioned America because American officers that I have spoken to were talking about their own ambulances, and particularly about the hickory ones, their composition being so light; and if I were given £1,000 to-morrow to buy ambulances, I have no doubt that I should go to America for them.

3990. You do not know, as a matter of fact, of any case in which, on political or other grounds, there has been any restriction put upon your Department in buying?—None whatever; in fact, we are very seldom given a chance of buying anywhere as regards wagons. I do not remember that we ever were except those particular cases in my own instance which happened within the last four months.

3991. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Who makes the contracts for you as a rule, say, for medicines?—Medicines we purchase ourselves; there we have a free hand. I have not a word to say about that. We have Government contractors, who must be men of a certain status. We have one particular firm who contract for equipment, and another for medicines. The contracts are renewed every three years, and they are on the whole very fair. The only thing that we insist upon is that the firms must be respectable firms and of a certain status.

3992. And as regards equipment that is provided by the Ordnance Department?—There are two equipments, the medical equipment—medicines, instruments, and so on—and the Ordnance equipment, tents, bedsteads, bedding, and the rest of it.

3993. Who provides the surgical equipment?—We do; that comes under the head of medical supplies. As regards medical and surgical supplies, we have a free hand; we are only limited in ordinary times by money. The medical equipment that I mentioned just now that we tried at Salisbury Plain, which I may say worked with great success in South Africa, was entirely due to the engineers' strike, so that out of evil comes good sometimes. The Finance people saved so much in Admiralty and other work that they had a lot of money, and they said, "Here is £10,000 for you if you like to spend it," and we spent it upon new equipment. Otherwise we should not have had it when the War broke out.

3994. The tents are supplied by the Ordnance Department?—Yes.

3995. And had you a fairly good stock of reserve tents?—Yes, but I may say that I think that the present hospital tent is an atrocious pattern. I do not think it could be worse—the ordinary hospital marquee.

3996. You have made some very valuable suggestions, so far as we could gather, about certain points; do you know whether those points have been taken up at all by the War Office?—I do not know. There were a set

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of printed questions sent out to us in South Africa which I answered and sent in, and a good many of these points which I have mentioned are embodied in them, but I have no idea what they are doing. I am outside the War Office altogether now.

3997. (*Sir John Jackson.*) You take the view, I understand, that we need never anticipate any great difficulty in getting medical requirements promptly in the event of War breaking out?—It depends upon what you mean by requirements.

3998. I mean from the trade; I am speaking now of drugs and stores of that kind?—Not the smallest difficulty. I have been engaged upon, and I may say I am at present reconstructing, a scheme for the provision of a hospital with 20,000 beds in London in case of an invasion, and I have had to enquire all over London of different firms, both with regard to Ordnance and medical equipment, and I do not anticipate the smallest difficulty. We have the greatest city in the world at our back.

3999. What you would have to consider would be the special medical requirements?—The only thing that you cannot lay your hands on at once is field medical equipment, such as panniers; they take time to build, I think two or three months; the hides have to dry that they are made of.

4000. So that as regards articles of that kind it would be a wise thing always to keep a fairly good store?—Yes, but I think it would be the greatest mistake in the world to be storing up a huge amount of supplies, both medical and Ordnance. Medical supplies are perishable articles, and as to Ordnance supplies we might not go to war for 20 or 30 years, when they would be obsolete. I may mention as an instance that there was a pattern bedstead brought out in the time of the Crimea called the "Macdonald." We have got it in our hospitals still and we cannot get rid of it. I worked a table out some years ago to determine, judging by the normal waste, when we should get rid of it, and I think we found that it would take 1,100 years to work off the present stock.

4001. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You have read the Report of the Royal Hospitals Commission at the Cape upon the South African Campaign?—I read it when it came out, but I am afraid I have not refreshed my memory very recently about it. I remember the salient points.

4002. Officers who enter the Royal Army Medical Corps are generally gentlemen who have already received a degree at one of the different medical institutions?—Yes. They have to have two degrees—a medical degree and a surgical degree.

4003. Then they have to pass an examination?—Yes, then they have to pass a competitive examination.

See Q. 11221.

4004. After they have joined the Royal Army Medical Corps what opportunity have they of following out their profession?—I can tell you what is the course at present, since the last Warrant was published about five or six months ago. They come to London and go through what is called the Medical Staff College on the Embankment, where they are taught hygiene, bacteriology, and different things. Then they go down to Aldershot where they go through what is called the "Aldershot course," equitation, company drill, field medical training, building field kitchens, and military law. Then they are posted to station hospitals all over the country.

See Q. 11223.

4005. Still, with the exception of the Medical Staff College here, that would not give them any professional education?—No, it teaches them what they are supposed not to have been taught before; it gives them a start in military life as it were.

4006. I understand now that each regiment has not its own medical officers as it used to have?—No, in war they have officers attached, but not in peace.

4007. Formerly there was a surgeon and an assistant-surgeon?—Exactly.

4008. But when medical officers are attached now, for instance, at Colchester, where there is a large military force, what number of officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps would there be there?—I happened to be stationed at Colchester myself at one time. There is a principal medical officer who holds the same position that I do in the Home District; he is an administrative officer; then there is a senior lieutenant-colonel, and I should think about eight other officers in the station hospital.

4009. Would they be junior officers?—Majors, captains, and lieutenants.

4010. Those gentlemen, of course, could not get very much experience in attending merely sick soldiers?—No, they would do the ordinary routine work. You must remember that dealing with soldiers and dealing with civilians are two very different things. In civil hospitals you often have men who are chronic invalids, but we do not keep chronic invalids in the Army.

4011. But there would be very few operations for instance among a body of soldiers?—I think there are many mistakes about that. There are a good many operations done in military hospitals, a great many more than you would think.

4012. Do you mean important operations?—Some major and a great many minor operations. Naturally, of course, from the nature of a soldier's life you do not get the chance of doing many operations such as you do in civil life. What I mean is that wherever there is a chance of doing an operation it is done; it is not shirked.

4013. Do you not think it is very important that these gentlemen, I do not mean of the rank of major or lieutenant-colonel, but the young captains and lieutenants in the Royal Army Medical Corps, should "walk the hospitals," as it is called?—Yes, I do, and I think it is the intention of the present Warrant which Mr. Brodrick brought out six months ago that every facility should be given to them to do so.

4014. Do you not think it should be part of their duty to do so?—Yes, I would go so far as to say that it should be part of their duty—part of the routine. You must remember that under the terms of the new Warrant an officer has to pass a series of examinations, and if he shows marked proficiency at those examinations he can get a jump in promotion.

4015. But you must know that although those examinations are very important perhaps, they give you very little idea of what a man's skill will be in a professional operation?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with the new régime as yet, but I think they are intended to be practical as well as theoretical. They are certainly a step in the right direction, and I know that the intention of the Secretary of State and the present Director-General is to give young officers the very thing that you mention and lay stress upon, that is every opportunity of going to large hospitals. I may say that one of my contentions as Principal Medical Officer of the Home District is that all half-pay appointments of this district, which are now held by retired officers under 65 years of age, who have nothing as a rule to look forward to, ought to be filled by young officers who can run up to London and visit the great civil hospitals in the afternoon.

4016. As part of their duty?—As part of their duty.

4017. They would then see the operations skilfully performed by the ablest men in the profession?—Yes. I consider also that the transfer of the Medical Staff College from Netley to London has been a step in the right direction; it brings the young officers and professors and everybody connected with it in touch with the intellectual heart of the Empire.

4018. I am asking you these questions because I know the importance that is attached in the Navy by even senior officers to attending hospitals. I remember that one senior officer, every time he came to Sydney spent two or three hours every day in a hospital?—I think I am safe in saying that nearly all our officers, 90 per cent. of them, would gladly avail themselves of that if they had the opportunity. There are two things which, in my opinion, have militated against that hitherto. One is shortness of numbers, with the difficulty of getting leave, and the other is the perpetual foreign service; but I think we might mitigate that now that the War is over, by posting officers on the active list to appointments within 50 miles of London, from

which they could run up to visit the hospitals. Bedford, for instance, which is a half-pay station, ought to be a full pay one, also Kingston-on-Thames, Guildford, and Oxford. The principle I think ought not to be lost sight of in regard to every place which is within reasonable distance of a large centre. There are very good hospitals, for instance, at Birmingham, Leeds, and Manchester.

4019. With respect to orderlies, what training do they get?—The orderlies hitherto, in my opinion, have not been sufficiently trained. Theoretically they are supposed to go into the wards and be trained by the medical officers and the nursing sisters, but under the new Regulations, which have only appeared this morning, I see there are going to be great changes, and the nursing service is going to be more select as regards the whole of the nursing. I had command of a company at Woolwich some years ago, of 120 or 130 men, all colour service men, but I found the great object of every man was to get away from the wards to any other job; canteen waiter, pack store, or anything rather than be a nurse. That is the tendency. These new rules which are now being brought out are to encourage good men as nurses. The men will be allowed to elect for different sections; one for the cooks' section, another the general duty section, but the best men will go to the nursing section, and get the greatest reward there, which I think is quite right. Very few men are born to be nurses. The best born nurse I ever met in my life was a regimental orderly; if that man had been trained he would have been invaluable. But I think this new system which is coming out will attract the best men, and give them a wish to nurse and make it their profession.

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4020. Are these orderlies expected to attend or do they attend at the operations which you have spoken of, to aid the surgeon performing the operation?—Only about two or three of them, what you call the theatre orderlies; but it is only latterly that we have had operating theatres or rooms to any extent throughout the country.

4021. But ought not all orderlies to be able to assist in the ordinary way that a nurse assists the surgeon in an operation?—You do not want the theatre crammed with a lot of orderlies; they are not called on to perform operations.

4022. But in an ordinary hospital every trained nurse is supposed to be able to assist if called upon?—It is so long since I have been in a Civil hospital that I am not acquainted with their practice now, but I am under the impression that only a small proportion of nurses attend in the operating theatre.

4023. But every nurse is supposed to be capable of assisting the surgeon if required to do so?—I speak subject to correction. You fill the operating theatre with medical students because they are there to see the operation and learn how to operate, but I do not see any object in filling it with orderlies, because they are not likely ever to be called upon to operate.

Colonel W. Johnston, Army Medical Service, called and examined.

Colonel W. Johnston.

4024. (*Chairman.*) You were Assistant-Director of the Army Medical Service, in succession to Colonel Gubbins?—Yes.

4025. Until the 31st May, 1901?—Yes.

4026. You also were examined before the Royal Commission on the treatment of the sick and wounded in South Africa?—Yes, I gave evidence principally explaining the way in which the mobilisation of the medical branch was carried out.

4027. Then it is not necessary, I imagine, to go through that again?—I do not think so.

4028. You had to do with the mobilisation of the 8th Division, the 4th Cavalry Brigade, and the seven general hospitals?—Yes, besides all the private hospitals, and Princess Christian's hospital train, and one or two other details previous to June, 1900, which is the limit of the period within the scope of this Royal Commission, I understand.

4029. And also for 30 Militia battalions?—Yes, as well as drafts of officers and men.

4030. You did not find any difficulty in keeping up with the demands?—The only difficulty we had was to get thoroughly suitable officers and thoroughly suitable men, because we had sent all our best officers and all our best men before. At the time when the expedition first went out, it was never expected that more than an Army Corps would be required, and therefore we spread our butter too thickly; we put all our best men to the front, and so I had not such a good lot to select from as my predecessor had; we were just obliged to take anyone we could get.

4031. And you had also to take Civil surgeons?—Yes, we took a much larger proportion of Civil surgeons to fill these tactical units than formerly. That was on account of there not being a sufficient number of officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps to meet the demands.

4032. You always had a certain number of the Army Medical Corps?—Yes, we always had a few. As a matter of fact we had to place one of our general hospitals in charge of a Militia medical officer, and another I recollect we placed in charge of a retired medical officer. We were very much pinched.

4033. Had you a difficulty in making your selection of Civil surgeons?—No, I think there was no difficulty in getting Civil surgeons.

4034. As to quality?—So far as I know we could get plenty of them. It did not come under my ken to examine their testimonials and so on, but I was told that as a rule they were of a good class. Of course there were mistakes made.

4035. And of course you had difficulty with the subordinate *personnel* of which we have had evidence?—Yes, exactly as Surgeon-General Wilson stated.

4036. It fell more to your Department, I suppose, to send out the nurses?—Yes, I sent out a large number of nurses. We increased the number of nurses very much; when we found we had so few skilled male nurses, we sent out female nurses in a larger proportion. We got our nurses from the Army Nursing Service Reserve. I do not know in fact what we would have done without it. That was an organisation most useful to us, and it supplied us with really capital nurses. A great deal of trouble was taken in choosing them. Her Royal Highness Princess Christian used personally to interview every candidate, and took the greatest trouble, and as a matter of fact we had very few of them who turned out badly, scarcely any.

4037. I see 650 nurses were provided, of whom 380 had been dispatched to South Africa; does that mean before your time?—No, most of the 380 I think were dispatched by me; I must have dispatched about that number, I cannot exactly remember now. I was responsible for the employment of nearly the whole of those.

4038. The 650?—Yes, at home or abroad.

4039. Then your evidence is that the mobilisation, subject to these remarks, worked satisfactorily?—Yes, it worked satisfactorily. The mistake was that the Estimates were too small. For instance, as regards medical officers, the Estimate on which we had gone was practically one that was decided on in 1888, when it was estimated then that 514 medical officers plus 99 civilians were sufficient for the medical wants of the Colonies, of two Army Corps, and two Cavalry Brigades, leaving very few for the Lines of Communication. That was the principle on which the estimate for the officers was made, and it was then contemplated that if two Army Corps and two brigades of Cavalry were sent abroad the Home stations would be filled by civilians and by retired medical officers. Then, curiously enough (it is only really a historical survival) the estimate for the non-commissioned officers and men is done on quite a different principle; the non-commissioned officers and men are estimated for the requirements of the Home and Colonial stations; they are not estimated for on any war footing, although, as I have pointed out, the officers are.

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4040. Not at all?—Not at all. You will see that paragraph 2 in the "Mobilisation Instructions for the Army Medical Services," says: "The general principle which obtains in the case of other branches of the service, by which units quartered at specific stations are allotted to duties on mobilisation according to the stations they occupy, cannot be followed in the case of the Army Medical Services, since the various medical units required by the field army are non-existent in peace" (that is a very important fact) "and the peace organisation of the corps is based on the distribution of the *personnel* among the various military districts, according to the peace requirements of the troops normally quartered therein." That is to say, if I have made myself clear, that the estimate for our officers is on a war footing, as it were, and the estimate for the men is for peace requirements. As I said, it is a historical survival; it is simply a remnant of the old system when the medical officers were quite apart from what was then called the Army Hospital Corps, and not until June 1898 were the officers and men amalgamated by a Royal Warrant, which Lord Lansdowne, when he was Secretary of State, prepared. It appears to me to be now very necessary that this obsolete system should terminate, and that we should make our estimates upon a proper system in conformity with the unification that has now taken place. I think if we were to estimate the number of officers and men, based on the medical requirements of three Army Corps and three Cavalry Brigades, we would have a sufficient number for any possible war that is likely to arise. I do not mean to say that it is at all necessary to fill in all these men, to have them all; but we ought to have *cadres* showing exactly what we would require for that number of troops, and let those *cadres* be filled in to a certain extent by civilians when it was necessary. I do not mean to say that we require to have all these men actually enlisted, or all these officers appointed, but that there should be skeleton *cadres*, so that we should know exactly what we could fill in from reservists, &c.

4041. As I understand, your scheme for mobilisation was rather defective at the time?—Yes, I consider that in the sense I have referred to it was defective. If we had such a system as I speak of, it is the only way that I can see of making it possible to have the necessary expansion when required.

4042. Has anything been done in that matter, do you know?—I believe the medical authorities are fully alive to its importance. Then you will observe that we had really no provision for what Surgeon-General Wilson spoke of, that is to say, the Lines of Communication; that all our hospitals were for what are called tactical units, units in the field, and that the Lines of Communication are not considered in the field. In any new scheme I would embody a certain *cadre* for the Lines of Communication, which could be expanded when necessary. It is perfectly true that you cannot tell how long your Lines of Communication will be, and therefore you must expand them; but I do not think it is right to ignore the existence of the Lines of Communication.

4043. Are there any other points to which you wish to draw attention?—No. I do not think there is anything particular.

4044. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I notice that in the Statement of your Evidence you say that the great difficulty to cope with was in providing trained *personnel* of officers and men, and that that was really insuperable, for while civil surgeons could be found in considerable numbers, they could not replace the Royal Army Medical Corps officers. Why could they not replace them?—They could not replace them in certain positions; they could not replace them in charge of hospitals or bearer companies; a civilian could not take charge of a military hospital about the organisation of which he would know nothing.

4045. He would know nothing of the discipline?—He would know nothing of the discipline or the mode of procedure. A military hospital is absolutely different from a civil hospital. In a military hospital the medical officer in charge is responsible not only for the treatment of the sick, but also for seeing that the men get their equipment, their clothes, their food, and everything else; and he is also in disciplinary charge of the *personnel*.

4046. But could there not be at the head of the hospital a trained surgeon, that is, a Royal Army Medical Corps officer, and all the work of the hospital be done by civil surgeons?—A great part of it could be done, but you would require to have more than one Royal Army Medical officer in the hospital; it would require another as second-in-command. It would never do to have only one; one man might go sick, and then there would be nobody left. You require a certain number of them. In a large hospital you require a Royal Army Medical Corps officer in charge of each division of the hospital.

4047. I can quite understand, say, that you should even have six or seven Royal Army Medical Corps officers in a large hospital?—That would probably be quite sufficient.

4048. You might then have 20 or 30 civil surgeons?—Yes, quite so. We were so hampered that as a matter of fact, as I said, we had to put a large hospital in charge of a Militia officer, because we had not a Regular military officer to send.

4049. Were you present when Colonel Gubbins answered some questions which I put to him with reference to the training of young Army medical officers?—Yes.

4050. Do you agree with his answers that it would be useful for them to be compelled as part of their duty to walk the hospitals?—I think it would be most useful for them to be encouraged in every way to enlarge their professional experience, and under the present scheme it is hoped that the establishment will be so much increased that it will be possible for officers to get leave of absence for purposes of study. That is a thing which I think you may rest assured is being considered very carefully; it is a thing that the medical service has asked as a right for a long time; but the answer has always been, "We have not enough men, we cannot spare you."

4051. I see in the Report of the Royal Commission who were enquiring into the care taken of the sick and wounded in the campaign, reference is made to a certain feeling of distrust among military officers of the skill and professional experience of doctors of the Royal Army Medical Corps as compared with civil doctors. It is stated on page 11: "To a great extent we believe this mistrust to be ill-founded. That it is not wholly unfounded is to be explained by the difficulties under which the officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps have hitherto laboured." If these gentleman, the junior officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps, had the advantage that civil surgeons have of studying in hospitals there would not be that feeling of distrust?—No, there should not. But I am afraid that the feeling that is referred to exists because, by some, the medical officer in the Army is expected to be a Treves in operative surgery or an expert in some other branch of the very first class. I am quite certain that the Army medical officer is, as a rule, superior to the general practitioner, but what they compare the poor Army doctors with are the most specialised and experienced men. Of course, we cannot expect to have the same opportunities as those men who are operating every day of their lives, but we must recollect that these men never do anyhing else.

4052. If the opinion, that distrust exists, is correct, it is very detrimental to the corps?—It is very detrimental, and it is very painful to every member of the medical service.

4053. And the sooner that feeling of distrust is got rid of the better it will be for the whole of the Service and also for the Royal Army Medical Corps?—Distinctly, and as a matter of fact, under this new system, every endeavour is being made to encourage our officers to qualify as specialists.

4054. (*Sir John Edge.*) Do you find that that distrust is general?—Well, I do not know. I think it exists, perhaps, in certain corps more than in others, and I think there is a little bit of fashion in it. But I may say that I am not very much in touch with the Service now. I retired ten years ago. I came back to the War Office because of the War. I was invited to come

back because I had been in office before, and they were so hard up for men that they asked the retired officers to come back and do work. I can assure you that this distrust used not to exist, but I know that in some quarters it has grown up.

4055. An Army doctor, of course, has got to practise every branch of his profession ?—Yes; that is to say, he is a general practitioner in the full sense of the word.

4056. In a place like London you get specialist surgeons, specialists for the eyes, or anything else, or doctors from the medical point of view for particular diseases ?—Yes, that is what I say is, I think, an unfair thing; that they choose to compare us with these specialists.

4057. I agree with you. Is it your experience that the medical men in the Army keep up their reading ?—I think they do; I am sure they read. Of course, there are men who do not read, but there are a great many men who do read. I think they read quite as much as the busy practitioner, if not more.

4058. (*Sir John Jackson.*) What proportion of the medical men employed in the War were civilians, roughly ?—There were 9 consulting surgeons, 476 medical officers, and 385 civil surgeons; that is, 394 to 476.

4059. About 75 per cent. ?—Yes.

4060. Then, of course, the civil surgeons were taken out because there was a scarcity of Army surgeons ?—Quite so.

4061. But do you think, speaking generally, that it was of advantage to the medical work out there that you had this admixture of civil and military ?—I think it was a necessity; I do not see how otherwise we could ever carry on a big war; the country could never afford to have all the medical officers that would be necessary. I think it was a necessity to have civilians. I daresay sometimes there may have been faults on both sides, perhaps a little jealousy between the two branches which is rather inevitable, but I should think that was only occasionally. Some of the hospitals, if you read the evidence, were most comfortable; in others they were not so comfortable.

Colonel W. Johnston. 28 Oct. 1902.

4062. You are aware, of course, of the fact that an Army man has to be an all-round practitioner ?—Yes, that is so.

4063. Whereas the civil surgeon more or less does his work in a particular groove ?—Yes.

4064. So that from that point of view the admixture must be rather bad ?—But that would only refer to the bigger men—to the consultants. Of course, the civil surgeons whom we employed were mostly young doctors who had only just begun practice.

4065. Practically they were just as much used to all round work as your men ?—Yes, or perhaps less so, because probably they were younger men, and a great many were very young, and had not much experience.

4066. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) I see you state that 380 were dispatched out of 650 nurses, who belonged to the Army Nursing Service ?—Yes.

4067. Would you have had any difficulty in providing more than those had they been required ?—No, I think we could have got even more. In Princess Christian's Army Nursing Service Reserve there were a tremendous number of candidates for us. There is a paper, I do not know whether the Commission have seen it, showing that a great number were not taken, and really we picked out the very best. As I said, Her Royal Highness took the greatest possible trouble.

4068. Then practically you do not anticipate any difficulty about nursing sisters ?—I do not anticipate any difficulty about getting female nurses. I think there will always be plenty.

ELEVENTH DAY.

Wednesday, 29th October 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E. *Chairman.*

The Right Hon. Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Hon. Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

(V.C.) General Sir EVELYN WOOD, G.C.B., G.C.M.G. General Officer Commanding 2nd Army Corps called and examined.

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4069. (*Chairman.*) You were Adjutant-General from 1897 to 1901 ?—Yes. I became Adjutant-General on the 1st October, 1897, and I vacated that post on the 1st October, 1901.

4070. Therefore, you were in charge of your department at the time of the preparations for the war, and during the greater part of the war ?—I was, but it is only fair that I should say, although it does not come into this inquiry, that I had been Quartermaster-General for four years previously, and so I know something of what was being done there, although not officially.

4071. You have been for a long time connected with the administration of the War Office ?—For eight years. I was never there till 1893.

4072. You mention in the *précis* of your evidence the position which the department of the Adjutant-General held at that time. Will you state what it was? — The position at the outbreak of the war was that defined by the Order in Council of 1895, which put the heads of the great departments in a position of *quasi* independence, by giving them the power, at the option of the Secretary of State, of dealing directly with him; but that power could not be exercised by the Adjutant-General himself unless he was so instructed by the Secretary of State or by the Commander-in-Chief. In fact, it did not become operative except with the assent of those two people.

4073. Was there not a War Office Council at that time ?—Yes.

4074. And you were a member of that Council ?—Yes.

4075. But you had no independent position there ?—Absolutely none.

4076. Nothing could be done except by the previous sanction of the Secretary of State at that time ?—No; I had no responsibility on any one point, as might be inferred if you read only the instructions laid down for

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the Adjutant-General, without reading the paragraph which applies to the Commander-in-Chief. I have got them here, if you care to refer to them.

4077. That is in the Order in Council?—That is in the Order in Council.

4078. We have had that?—But the Commander-in-Chief was supreme over all the headquarters staff, although what would have been improper previously was then made a matter of routine; if the Secretary of State desired, he could send for them. I may say, I think the intention of that was to rather legalise what had crept in of late years—namely, the Secretary of State sometimes sending for the staff, and then omitting, accidentally no doubt, to tell the Commander-in-Chief. That was, I think, the idea of the Order in Council of 1895, to some extent.

4079. But at any rate, if there was any matter which you deemed of importance, in order to bring it up, you had to get the previous consent of the Commander-in-Chief or of the Secretary of State?—Yes; but I go further, and say that when the Secretary of State minuted a paper to me "Adjutant-General," I, by instructions, answered: "Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary of State says so-and-so; will you represent?" I have papers here in this file which will show you what was the common procedure. I am not saying whether it was correct or not.

4080. But that was the common procedure?—Yes, that was the every day procedure by the Commander-in-Chief's instructions to me. Perhaps you would allow me to add that I think it applied more to the Adjutant-General than it did to the Quartermaster-General. The Quartermaster-General having to deal with finance, there was not, probably, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, the same inconvenience in the Quartermaster-General talking to the Secretary of State as the Commander-in-Chief thought there would be in the Adjutant-General doing so.

4081. I think it has always been recognised that the Adjutant-General was more distinctly in connection with the Commander-in-Chief?—I think it was until 1895; and I think it is only in recent years, I should say in the last 10 or 15 years, that the Quartermaster-General, in the time of Sir Redvers Buller and myself, saw more of the Secretary of State, in proportion as the military portion of the house were entrusted more, if not with spending power, at all events with advice on spending power. I think that is the explanation why it was so.

4082. But you mentioned that in consequence of that position of the Adjutant-General you are not in a position to speak so much to the existence of plans for defence in South Africa?—That is a very gentle way of putting it, of course. I affirm that as Adjutant-General I never knew of any one plan as to military operations. I think that really arose after the Hartington Commission, when the Ministry would not appoint a general staff, which has been talked about as the brains of the Army for the last year or two. That was refused on the dissent of a Cabinet Minister who was Secretary of State, and who reported his dissent in the Blue Book from which I quote, and which I read yesterday after I had written my *précis*, when I found that my quotation was quite accurate.

4083. Your quotation was from the Report of the Hartington Commission, 1890 (C 5979), page xxix.?—That is it. Yesterday afternoon, after I dictated my *précis*, which I dictated from memory, I sent for the paper, and got it out of the library.

4084. As it is in the Blue Book, you might, perhaps, tell us what it was?—I will tell you exactly what it was. The Hartington Commission recommended that there should be a general staff on the same principle, in a smaller degree, as has obtained in Germany, and, indeed, in all the continental nations—that is to say, a staff engaged only in assimilating information and preparing plans for possible contingencies; but the Secretary of State whom I have quoted objected. I remember his argument was that it would lead to ambitious soldiers bringing on wars. I do not think he used the word "ambitious"—but I read this some years ago—but that it would lead to pressure and inducement to war, and he did not believe in it. Accordingly, the compromise was then made of appointing a Director-General of Military Intelligence, who worked directly under the Commander-in-Chief, and was relieved of all executive duties. He became the brains of the Army, and the Commander-in-Chief consulted him, and him only, so far as I know, as to the possibility of doing various things in South Africa.

4085. And the reports of the Director of Military Intelligence were not known to the Adjutant-General?—No; they were not.

4086. Were you acquainted with this book which I have in my hand, entitled "Military Notes"?—Yes.

4087. We have it in evidence that the book was compiled on memoranda prepared by the Director of Military Intelligence?—I think so.

4088. But you never saw those memoranda?—I never saw the data, but that book is sure to have been shown to me.

4089. But not the memoranda?—No, I think not—certainly not; they were not circulated. I should like to emphasise the point that the Director of Military Intelligence is the confidential staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief.

4090. But still, the existence of the War Office Council seems to indicate the possibility of the members seeing important documents of that kind?—So far as my knowledge goes, the practice has been for the Secretary of State to consult the Commander-in-Chief. I do not think those questions were ever discussed at a War Office Council. If they were, by summoning the Secretary before you, you would have it. But my memory is retentive, and I do not think they ever were discussed.

4091. Then you are not prepared to speak of the preparations for the war from that point of view?—Of plan, no. I repudiate all responsibility on the part of the Adjutant-General for that.

4092. But you are prepared to speak to the question of the provision actually made in men and supplies?—Yes, quite, as regards officers and men; not touching supplies either *de guerre* or *de bouche*.

4093. Would you say what you wish to say with regard to the supplies of officers and men?—I should say that the question as regards the officers and men may be summed up as follows:—That within my knowledge we have never had sufficient officers, and that on the outbreak of a war we set to work to form a staff and to form Colonial levies, which in the late war amounted to 50,000 men, and although the bulk of the Colonial levies found their own subordinate officers, yet the leaders and commanders were nearly always Imperial officers. When you see the name of a prominent Colonial officer who was in command, you will find in nearly every case that he has got an Imperial staff officer alongside of him, assisting him in matters upon which he would probably not have any previous knowledge, he being a layman. The whole of the staff of the expedition has to be taken out of a regiment or of regiments. The numbers of people who are required you can get, but they would startle you as to the amount. We then formed bodies of Mounted Infantry. I think during the war they amounted to about 20,000 Regular Mounted Infantry—that is to say, red or green-jacketed soldiers on horses. For every Mounted Infantry company you require five officers. In a Foot company, from which the Mounted Infantry officers are always taken, you have only two and a half officers per company, and consequently you bleed the Foot regiments for the sake of the mounted people. The mounted people, of course, are much more useful in a country in which the operations extended as far as from, say, Madrid to Bucharest. Lord Roberts's line was at one time 1,200 miles by 1,500 miles of country over which he was operating—you may say from here to Constantinople, nearly; and Foot men in that country are lost, naturally. All these causes help to take away the officers. And even in peace time, out of every 20 officers in a battalion, four are legally, inside the King's Regulations, taken away from the training of the men whom they should be teaching how to kill the enemy, to do what we call regimental staff work: assistant-adjutant, signalling officer, mounted infantry, and transport officer—all these are taken out of the officers who are supposed to be teaching the young soldier how to prepare himself for war. So much for the officers.

4094. How are the staff officers appointed—how is the staff appointed?—By the Commander-in-Chief absolutely, in war. From the time the war began I personally, as Adjutant-General, did not know who was going to South Africa. In peace time the Military Secretary and the Commander-in-Chief appointed all the subordinates—that is to say, captains and brevet-

majors; but the higher appointments were all discussed by the Army Board (not the War Office Council), the Army Board not necessarily accepting the Commander-in-Chief's view at all. He only sat then as the first, among five equals; they put up the names through the Commander-in-Chief, and he might, if he liked, dissent from what his colleagues had recommended. I have known that done, obviously for good reasons, as he thought, and the Secretary of State then approved of the appointment. But when the war broke out that procedure came to an end.

4095. In peace time, then, the higher appointments all come eventually from the Secretary of State?—The command of the Army is from the Cabinet, we understand.

4096. Yes?—But the other leaders are, I think—certainly in the time I have known—at the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.

4097. But approved by the Secretary of State?—Yes, as everything is. Since the days of Mr. Cardwell, the Commander-in-Chief has been absolutely under the Secretary of State. The question has never arisen since Mr. Cardwell's days.

4098. And for the appointment of the staff of the Army in war, when you say that the Commander-in-Chief is entirely responsible, that is the Commander-in-Chief at home?—Yes, the Commander-in-Chief at home. He appointed them in the late war. I think in many cases that he would—in fact, I know he did—allow the officer who was going out practically a free hand in selecting.

4099. But that was by his own motion?—I should think so. I am telling you what I will not say is legalised, but from what I know of the Army, I think practically since Lord Wolseley went to West Africa in 1873, that has been the custom. He carried his point of selecting his own staff, and I think generally—I do not mean to say it is done always—the man going out has a free hand.

4100. The man going out with the expedition has a free hand in choosing his own staff?—Yes. It does not follow that he would get everyone he asked for, but he would not be obliged to take anyone he did not ask for.

4101. I suppose they are not selected from any particular body of officers, but from the whole Army?—From the whole Army. We have had a standing instruction that we would never put forward anyone, unless he had merits of his own, who had not been through the Staff College, all things being equal, I mean. The late Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley, not once, but a dozen times, sent for me, and said, "I want a man to do so-and-so; tell me"; and I have said to him, "I know, sir, three men, 10, 8, and 7 in value; the 10 value man is not Staff College"; and Lord Wolseley was so impressed with the importance of encouraging officers to go to the Staff College that he has said, "Well, if you are satisfied that 8 will do, give me his name." I am talking now of before this war. The case I have in my mind was that of Bruce Hamilton, whose name I suggested twice over, and the Commander-in-Chief said, "Why, if this man has just been to Ashanti, do you run him again for Benin?" I said, "Because he is the only man who does not get fever, and Benin is a feverish place." And that is the way in which he has jumped about 20 years in about two. He is a man of capacity and decision, but it is his immunity from fever which at first stood him in stead.

4102. You also mention that four officers are taken away in peace time for regimental staff?—Yes; but then I was moderate in my statement, because there are always six; but there are four legislated for in the King's Regulations to be taken away.

4103. Then is it your contention that there ought to be a definite addition of that number of officers to the staff of the regiment, in order to make it complete?—Yes, absolutely.

4104. Then as regards non-commissioned officers, what have you to say?—There are 24 duty sergeants in a battalion; there are eight companies, with three duty sergeants in each, four, counting the colour-sergeant, but the colour-sergeant's time is taken up in payments of men and their clothing accounts, which is the most complicated business ever devised by the thought of any central administrator. Unlike the Americans, who say, "Here are your clothes for the year; you have to make them last," in our Army the colour-sergeant per company, and 24 duty sergeants in a battalion, to teach the young just-caught soldier, the recruit, how to fight, and to do the many other duties which come every day, and the fight only comes once a year. But 13 of those duty sergeants are always away.

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4105. Why?—You can see it in the list which I have here. I will give you a striking case in point. I have been working at it for 30 years; but when I went to Aldershot in 1889 there were still 22 sergeants walking backwards and forwards to the post four times a day. Knowing the Postmaster-General and his secretary, I altered that. I got the soldiers' letters delivered in barracks, like any other householders', and those 22 sergeants are now at duty. But when I went to the Second Army Corps last year I found that the Aldershot system had not permeated to the district. The Army is a conservative institution; it takes a very long time to change it. I gave you an extreme case because it is so absurd—I mean it makes one wonder why it is. But there is a provost-sergeant, who has to take charge of the men in the prison. There is a signalling sergeant, who will teach them to wave flags. There is also a police sergeant. You will be rather startled if you look at my statement that there are only 24 duty sergeants, because you will see in the list 48, and you will ask what I have done with all the rest; but they are all provided for; they have all got something to do other than teaching the soldier how to fight.

4106. But they are necessary duties, and somebody must do them?—I have said so. I have been at it a good deal, and a good deal this last year; but our system is so bad that in the last year, since I have been in the Second Army Corps, within two months of my going to Salisbury Plain, and during the war, I found 52 men all under a year's service who have since gone to the seat of war—the war happily came to an end—who for four and a half months had done nothing but clean windows, prevent patients straying outside a given line (this is in a great hospital), and carry coals. All these men were under a year's service; there was not one of them who had been 12 months in the Army, and they had not done a day's duty for four and a half months. I am happy to say, after about eight months' application—supplication I may say—I have got it changed now, and we have now got some Army Reserve men and civilians who are doing those duties. But, as I say, it takes a long time; you have to make out a very strong case, such as I have given you there. I think that is a strong case during war time, that they were doing this and civil work. I also found 62 young soldiers in hospital, who had never been drilled, nursing the patients who had come home from the war.

4107. And you have represented these matters several times?—Again and again.

4108. As Adjutant-General?—As Adjutant-General.

4109. And did anything result?—It is coming, we hope.

4110. But I mean, when you have made a representation, what happened to it?—When the Adjutant-General makes a representation it goes to the Finance side. The Finance side show how much it would cost in our administration. The paper is then battled over; occasionally the correspondence lasts a very long time. I think one fault in our administration (and I mention it here because I have said so officially) is that the man who gets the last word with the Secretary of State has been up to the present time a civilian; and what is worse than that, in one point of view, the man who was the Permanent Assistant-Secretary of State had been the Accountant-General, whose duty for years had been to try and save money, and so the training was not likely to make him sympathetic with the demands of eager, worrying soldiers who wanted to train the Army.

4111. But when the Finance people have reported upon it, then it goes to the Secretary of State, does it?—Yes, it goes to the Secretary of State, and it is only fair to say, on the other side, that the Secretary of State will hear the Adjutant-General, and see him, but when he replied to my remonstrance, I said, "But the Permanent Under-Secretary has the last word with you," and anyone who has been much in court as a lawyer would know that the last word influences considerably the deciding party.

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4112. But would a matter like this not have come before the War Office Council in your time?—Yes, it would have come before the War Office Council, but practically it is so technical that each member, the head of a department, goes in and fights for his own hand. The Adjutant-General strives for the efficiency of the fighting forces; he argues in favour of them, and the other members will vote with him, but they will leave it to him, naturally. I have a file of these papers; I cannot recall whether they were ever before the Council, but it would be decided by the Secretary of State after listening to the Adjutant-General, who would be allowed to make up his case and say his level best.

4113. But it might be discussed at the War Office Council, and the opinion of the members generally taken?—Yes; that sort of thing would have been discussed first at the Army Board. The War Office Council—civilians a good many of them, I mean practically civilians—might not have any knowledge, and would not be able to check the Adjutant-General, whether his facts were accurate and would bear verifying. But the Army Board did prepare those things.

4114. But I understood that the War Office Council was the superior council of the two?—It is.

4115. And, therefore, had an authority which the Army Board would not possess?—Yes.

4116. And a question of that kind might be discussed at the War Office Council?—Yes. I cannot call to mind whether it was, but I think I was more intent on gaining the ear of the Secretary of State and the Finance official than I was on persuading the War Office Council. I knew that the soldiers, on this point which I have been dealing with, would all be with me.

4117. And if a proposition of that kind was objected to purely on financial grounds, what happened then?—That the soldiers would not get it unless the pressure brought to bear on the Secretary of State was sufficient to make him grant it.

4118. And supposing that the objection on financial grounds was not taken in the War Office, and the matter was put forward?—Then it would depend on people from the Treasury, who are more critical than the War Office.

4119. Then supposing that it was put forward from the War Office, with the assent of the Financial Department there, was it then ever objected to by the Treasury?—Perhaps that is going a little beyond my depth, but I should certainly say yes, very often.

4120. When you say beyond your depth, does that mean that the Adjutant-General had nothing to do with it in the argument with the Treasury?—Nothing; he is never heard, he is never seen.

4121. Who does argue the question, then?—Officially the Secretary of State; I think unofficially the Financial Secretary. I have found in every way that it is very desirable, if you can, to persuade the Financial Secretary of the desirability of what you wish to get.

4122. The Financial Secretary is your advocate with the Treasury in this matter?—I think so.

4123. But it is your business to persuade the Financial Secretary and the Secretary of State, and there your function ends?—Yes; and I have no further voice if my demand is rejected.

4124. Except, I suppose, that you can protest?—One does that very often; but I think most soldiers, especially during war time, would think it very wrong, because they could not carry their views, to resign, which is the only resource left to them.

4125. That is the only effectual resource, there is no doubt?—If you will allow me to revert for one moment to the shortage of officers, my remedy will be very costly. I quite understand "more officers, more money." But think of what happens in war. As I have stated here, I know one officer who has tried to pay—I cannot say he did try to drill the men, for he could not—but he had 850 men under his command during the war, of whom half were in Hounslow Barracks and half were in Aldershot.

4126. Cavalry?—Cavalry; and he had to flit backwards and forwards between Aldershot and Hounslow, and of course he had to trust very much to the pay sergeant. We are forbidden to give him more than one day's pay at a time for the men, but practically that rule, I think, was not adhered to during the war, or very little; and one of those reserve squadrons went to over 1,070 men. Obviously, that is very much more than any one officer can influence—I will not say control.

4127. But that was during the stress of the war?—Yes.

4128. That could never happen under ordinary circumstances?—No; it only happens when three squadrons having gone to war, leave one squadron behind, and the leader of the one squadron left behind is generally not the most capable man. The man going to war claims to take his most efficient men, but the man who is left behind is very often taken for the staff, or for some other billet.

4129. And you had a similar experience with regard to the artillery?—It is very striking about the artillery. I desire to say less about the artillery, because during the war, for reasons which a gentleman who has been in the Government might appreciate, we raised the artillery, and that intensified our troubles about artillerymen; but during the war I saw a statement which I cut out of a newspaper and I tried to verify, and I think it was substantially accurate, that during the war, at Woolwich, with 4,500 artillerymen, there were only 17 doing-duty officers there, of whom 10 were second lieutenants—young fellows who had just joined.

4130. Is there anything else that you would like to add with regard to the officers and men?—With regard to the officers, I would like to add one word. The Adjutant-General is not responsible for obtaining the officers. He does not even reward them; he helps to punish them when they do wrong. Neither does he train them before they come into the Army; they are trained under the Military Secretary, and the Military Secretary hands over the officers to the Adjutant-General, and says, "Now, you deal with them, and you can show them as much as you can in the Army." But the Adjutant-General has no function at all in the educational training of the officers, as I will show you presently. I mean that the Adjutant-General cannot himself select the officers; the Military Secretary provides them.

4131. Then what is your evidence as to the capacity of the country to meet that emergency?—By the capacity of the country, do you mean the Army of England?

4132. I think my meaning was rather more general than the Army; but the Army is, of course, the instrument?—I think it is quite clear that the country was not prepared for the emergency, because no War Minister has ever assented to the idea of England having more than a cavalry division; that is, two brigades, two batteries of Horse Artillery, and two Army Corps; that is the outside that any War Minister has ever agreed to provide. Mr. Stanhope, I remember, put it as 63,000 men.

4133. For service abroad, you mean?—For service abroad. I may go further and say that the idea then was to have the balance of the Regulars in England, who would remain behind, and the unfits with the auxiliary forces left to defend England. I may add that there would have been next to no artillery for them. Well, Mr. Stanhope put them at 63,000 men, and it is only right to say that Lord Wolseley, who has been the regenerator of the Army in these things, had got ready practically 85,000 men, exactly two Army Corps and a cavalry division. They were practically ready, with some small deductions; so that the soldiers had provided many more than the Secretary of State and the country had agreed to pay for as prepared for foreign service, and the cavalry embarked with more horses, 10 per cent. more horses, than the actual strength they required. And five days after the first lot embarked I put under orders the first drafts to fill up the gaps which must inevitably occur. I would like to say here why the country was not prepared. Each successive War Minister has, in the House of Commons or the House of Lords, accepted and endorsed the Cardwell system of having an equal number of battalions at home to the battalions abroad, the battalions at home training for the battalions abroad; but the theory only has been accepted—we have never got to the practice of it; and when I became Adjutant-General on the 1st of October, 1897, I called attention to a fact, which was very well known, that we had in the Mediterranean three battalions of boy soldiers who were supposed to be at Aldershot. They were supposed to be at home, according to our theory I mean, but they had to train soldiers, as well as you can train on the Rock of Gibraltar, which is not an ideal training ground, for

outpost duty, for the link battalion in India, so they sent the best of their men every year out to India, and for the rest of the year we risked the safety of that fortress in case of war. On the 1st of October, 1897, when I became Adjutant-General, I began to represent this weakness. I dated my paper that day, and I made a very strong remonstrance, pointing out how unwise it was, and since then battalions have been added. We began in 1898.

4134. You began to add battalions in 1898?—Yes, and we have added 16 battalions to the Line since that time. I do not say that they would have been ready for war. As to the preparation, we had about 100,000 men in the country drawing Army pay when we were told that we were going to war. At the time when we got the first troops under orders we had 100,000 men drawing pay, and about 80,000 (you can get the exact details from the Adjutant-General's office) in the Army Reserve, but they were not all available at first. In the following year we had 150,000 Line soldiers serving in South Africa, making (I have not counted tens or even hundreds) a grand total of 266,000 men under arms in South Africa, and our 150,000 Line soldiers show very well against the two Army Corps of the 85,000 for which we had authority to prepare for war. I should like to mention, because I think it is only fair to the Secretary of State, that when Lord Kitchener sent us the list of regiments which were under 600 strong, we had no difficulty—in fact, I dictated the answer to the telegram without going to book—in showing that in two battalions of a regiment, for he had both battalions in the country, he had 2,500 odd men. But in a large extent of country, say, from here to Constantinople, if you come to put down 260,000 men between Constantinople and here, the men get away into all sorts of places; and perhaps the best picture of that, which is inevitable in war over a large area, is a quaint advertisement from an adjutant, which I have seen in a Cape Town newspaper, asking any of his men to communicate with him as to their whereabouts. That indicates how the men get away, and is an answer to the senseless cry about these Yeomen not being settled with up to date. There is nothing that man cannot devise to account for absence when you stretch people out a thousand miles. One man goes sick, and does not come back again; he turns up about six months afterwards, and is very fat and well; he says he has been very ill all the time, and there is nobody to contradict him.

4135. And the regiments were very much broken up?—Yes. I thought you might ask me why we could only send out comparatively few in the first instance. Out of the 100,000 for whom we were drawing pay there were between 35,000 and 40,000 non-effectives.

4136. For what reason?—They were too young to go—lads who had just enlisted. We started by not sending anyone to war under 20 years of age and a year's service, and we stuck to that practically to the end of the war for foot soldiers, but for the men who could ride horses, and drivers and horse-keepers generally (as we call them in India) they were taken at 19 after the first six months, when the pressure for them became greater; but for the infantry soldiers who had to march we stuck to 20 years, and sent nobody except men who were 20 years old.

4137. Then most of your men who were left at home were what you call ineffectives?—Yes.

4138. And that is what you have to say about the provision of the men?—Did you mean in your second question as to the organisation of the military strength, the administration in the Office, or by the people out in the district?

4139. I meant the Army, both in the Office and outside?—Well, I do not think that its warmest friends will say that the organisation at the War Office is perfect, but it has been discussed so often that I do not think possibly you would care for my view.

4140. Oh, I think we should very much care for your view?—I do not think myself that the administration can be called good, for those reasons which I gave before—that in peace time we have the greatest precautions with an Army Board. They discussed every officer who was put up for a superior staff appointment—that is to say, lieutenant-colonels—but when we went to war that dropped, and the Army Board were not asked at all. So that I do not think that is good administration. And I believe nearly everyone admits in the War Office now that the members of the War Office ought to do more talking together—more meeting and less writing. I do not suppose that there is any department which writes so much to one another. I do not know whether it is now lessening or not.

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4141. Was anything done to lessen it?—I think insisting on more meetings would lessen it. The late Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley, did away with what was called the Adjutant-General's Board. Sir Redvers Buller instituted this as an informal meeting of the heads of the different departments in his room once a week, or oftener if need be, and I think it was productive of certainly a quickening up of all business. Every man knew then what the other was doing. But the Commander-in-Chief abolished that, and the Army Board took its place; but the Army Board was a big board, and I daresay you have found in business that big boards do not expedite business. I think—and I have said it officially—that a reconstitution of the Adjutant-General's Board would be a good thing. I do not know what they are now doing, because I left the Office 12 months ago.

4142. But was the Adjutant-General's Board a meeting of the heads of other departments, or only of the Adjutant-General's department?—All the other departments; and when you wanted the Inspector-General of Cavalry, they all came and talked. It had no power, and it was only a consultation, as in a big business the heads of the different branches meet and talk.

4143. But was not the Commander-in-Chief's Committee (which became the Army Board) practically the same thing; it was a meeting of the heads of departments?—But great bodies move slowly.

4144. But was it very much larger?—Yes. There were only three or four at the Adjutant-General's Board, and each man retained his own responsibility for putting forward his own things, but then he was certain of having the subject thoroughly threshed out and discussed by the military heads before it came before the Secretary of State.

4145. And it was a private discussion?—That is it—a private informal discussion. The administration of the Army at home, outside and apart from the War Office, practically ceased in the war because we had no officers left. We called up many men against their will, and some men used to come, or send piteous appeals that they were in business of various kinds, and they had been called back and were being ruined. Those men are not likely to work well. We have only just let some of them go now.

4146. What duties were they employed in?—They were supposed to drill soldiers, train them in outpost duties, and, in fact, fit them for war; and many of them had not been to war for a great number of years.

4147. You mean men from the reserve of officers?—Yes.

4148. Who came to take the place of the ordinary regimental officers?—Yes, only they had been disused for many years.

4149. But that was simply due to the emergency of the war?—Yes, because practically there were no subalterns in the Reserve, only captains and majors.

4150. That is almost necessary from the conditions, is it not?—Yes. It has been proposed that every officer on entering the Army shall accept the obligation to serve a certain number of years: "Whether you like the Army or not, if you serve in it for three years, say, then if you like to leave you must serve in the Reserve till 30 years of age." That has been proposed.

4151. You mean that he must keep up his knowledge of his duties in the Reserve?—I only meant to accept the liability. I see your point. It was suggested at the same time (I was the author of it) that he should come back for a few days every year.

4152. But you say that as soon as the war began you knew nothing about the promotions and appointments?—No, nothing.

4153. But how was that? How were they made then?—The Commander-in-Chief reverted to the former system which existed before 1895 of the Commander-in-Chief and the Military Secretary making them.

4154. They were done from home; they were not made in South Africa?—After Lord Roberts got to South Africa nobody was ever sent, as far as I know, to South Africa without Lord Roberts being asked as the General. He was not asked about captains and majors, but no general, even of a brigade, was ever sent to South Africa without Lord Roberts being asked whether he approved of him. I have no official knowledge of this except that the telegrams, not all of

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them, but all except the secret ones, are passed round to the heads of departments, and so I practically know that officers were offered and not accepted by Lord Roberts.

4155. But the appointments came from the Commander-in-Chief at home; they were actually made by the Commander-in-Chief at home?—The appointments to the Army in South Africa were made by the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief there, and the Commander-in-Chief at home did not promote people except in a perfunctory way; that is to say, when they came up to the top of the list; and even in those cases the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa was always asked: "Major ——, second in command of the So-and-so Regiment, is now up. How has he done? Would you like him to be Lieutenant-Colonel?" So far as my experience went, and I have no direct knowledge as Adjutant-General, though I have as Evelyn Wood, he was always asked: "Would you like Major So-and-so to be promoted?" In fact, the people on the spot were a very great assistance in trying to get the best men. Sometimes they said "Yes," and sometimes they said "No."

4156. But nothing was done without the Commander-in-Chief at home?—No; as regards anyone in Africa, the three Commanders in Chief—Sir Redvers Buller, Lord Roberts, and Lord Kitchener—have been really supreme.

4157. Have you anything else to say under that head?—I think not. I have told you incidentally just now as to the next question, viz., the supply of men. I have mentioned that 65 per cent. or so only of the men drawing pay were fit to go to war. I have spoken as to the quality of the men; as to their physical efficiency, about 65 in every 100 were fit to go. And as to the training, the artillery, so far as I can make out, shot well, but they were in the peculiar position of having with field artillery to fight against guns of a fortress, you may call them siege guns, throwing shell over ranges for which our guns were not sighted. We might have got over that difficulty, but our fuses were not long enough; that is to say, that the fuse would not burn long enough to reach the distance. But we were short of men there; we had to take Army Service Corps drivers for the artillery, and we had to take garrison gunners (of whom we are always short) for the Field Artillery men.

4158. You do not mention the shooting of the infantry?—The shooting of the infantry, I think, cannot have been satisfactory, for this reason, that they had never shot at unknown distances. When I say "Never," some had done field firing at Bisley, but the number was very small. The Army has only been trained in the last few years, and it has now no adequate training ground, and the only people who can do field firing practically are those quartered at Aldershot, and that is only 20 battalions, you see, out of 110.

4159. Can you suggest any way in which the men can be taught to shoot?—I have done so, and Lord Roberts fully approves of what I have been doing; that is to say, that you must acquire larger spaces. You have a space now at Salisbury Plain where we can do it very well, and the Army of the future, I hope, will be very much better. But we have not trained our men to firing at unknown ranges, and even recently the results of field firing indicate that considerable practice is required.

4160. What is your opinion with regard to the marching?—As regards the marching of the soldiers and of the infantry, I think it is better than it has ever been. I have read of nearly every march since the days of Napoleon, and I think that the marching power of the soldier has been very good. I do not speak officially, but I may say that I have had three sons out in South Africa, all serving in regiments.

4161. And would you say the same of the mounted branches, too?—In the mounted branches the horsemanship, I think, has been quite good enough for anything. I believe our cavalry soldiers and artillery ride better than those of any other nation in the world, and I have not forgotten the Hungarians even in that, who are about at the head; but we are not pre-eminent as horse masters, that is to say, in the care of the horse. I put that in my *précis* very gently when I say that it was not always good, but everyone who has been in South Africa will know what that means.

4162. What would you say about the instruction in entrenching?—I think the instruction in entrenching is good enough; but our men had not nearly sufficient outpost duties, reconnoitring or night marches. Our men were certainly insufficiently trained in night marching.

4163. Then, the next point is as to the quality of officers?—As regards the quality of officers, everyone in our Service knows that in spite of our boasted regimental system, which has enormous advantages in it, and which has carried us through so many difficulties, we have, except in a few special regiments, been too much dependent upon the commanding officer and the adjutant, who have not allowed sufficient initiative to their company officers. When I came away from Aldershot, and could no longer exercise any personal influence in that direction, which I endeavoured to do there for four years, I asked Sir John Ardagh to help me, and he got an epitome made of the Continental manœuvres reports, from which we found (and I have looked at it only this last day or two) that all the continental nations do the same, except one; one allows the greatest latitude to its company commanders, but the other three are as bad as we are. I asked Lord Wolseley to allow me to go on in that direction, and he approved, but it takes a very long time now to make any change in the Army. I hope, however, that we shall make a change, unless we sink back again.

4164. Could we see that epitome?—Yes, I think so; it is dated 1897.

4165. Has it been published?—No; it is not my paper, but you can ask the Director of Military Intelligence for it. Sir John Ardagh made it out for me.

4166. It was made out in the Intelligence Division?—Yes. The promotion of the regimental officer up to the rank of major was automatic; it was seniority, tempered by rejection in very bad cases, but they had to be very bad. The case had to be such that if the Commander-in-Chief rejected, a paper had to go to the Secretary of State, and he had to be satisfied that the case was so decisive that he could answer any question in Parliament arising from pressure, which the members of the family of the aggrieved officer in the great majority of cases would bring to bear. You may assume, therefore, that it was seniority tempered by rejection in very bad cases. But that was not the only difficulty, because all the senior officers of the Army had been brought up with the idea of seniority, and they clung naturally to it; so that when the Army Board, who in peace time were doing that work, objected, and said that they heard that so-and-so was not satisfactory, general officers would come forward and get men promoted, and then, when two or three general officers said that they knew the individual, and he would make an excellent officer, could not be set aside, and the Commander-in-Chief had to accept that report, because he can only go on reports. The confidential reports up to recently have not been sufficiently drastic and straight; it is only in recent years that the man making the report has understood that his own character is also at stake for fairness and for telling the facts as they really are.

4167. In that answer you are speaking of the promotion of senior officers, I gather?—At present I have only dealt with the regimental promotion. I am instancing that because even a Cabinet Minister does not understand it. He thinks a woman can do it. All I can say is, I have never found her; I wish I had. I have had three sons in South Africa, all mentioned in despatches, and they are captains still—not one of them promoted. But the fact is that the Army, until recently, has not taken kindly to the idea of selection. Whether it is right or wrong is another point.

4168. But you say that the young officers were as good as it was possible to have under the system?—The young officers are, I think, under the existing system, which takes away five out of every twenty from their regimental duties, which I think does not teach them nearly enough, and I think does not work them hard enough.

4169. But when you mentioned that the check was rejection in very bad cases, you were speaking, as I understand, of young officers?—There is not the same difficulty, I must say, in rejecting the idle and incompetent subalterns, for it is after they become captains and majors that their friends intervene.

4170. I understood that in mentioning the rejection in bad cases you were referring to young officers; but I gather that you meant the senior officers?—Yes, the promotion of senior officers was discussed by the Army Board, and a case had to be made out so strong that it

would bear adverse criticism in the House of Commons if it was proposed to reject a man.

4171. Then with whom rests the selection of officers commanding brigades?—The Commander-in-Chief did that.

4172. You had nothing to do with it?—No.

4173. But you think that there has been a great advance in the performance of staff duties?—Yes, very great.

4174. Is that looking to the experience in the Crimea?—In the Crimea, India, Ashantee, and South Africa 20 years ago. There has been a decided advance in our military knowledge; it is much more diffused than it was, but you cannot expect either the staff or the Line regimental officers (and they all come out of the same place—Sandhurst) to be really good unless they are started well. Sandhurst has been in existence for 80 years, and until December, 1900, when I was acting Commander-in-Chief for a month, Sandhurst was never inspected in anything except the bayonet exercise, which was something appropriate to the Alhambra or the Empire Theatre, but is no use for war, and has been given up now. Sandhurst has done that, and marching past (what Frederick the Great did at Potsdam), and has never been inspected until December, 1900, in one of the things which make for use in war. I think, therefore, that considering all these drawbacks, the young officer has done well. He is now, I hope, going to be taught better.

4175. You hope that there will be reforms in the training?—Yes, but not so long as, when a young officer gets to his battalion, his men are away cleaning windows, carrying coal, and doing such things, which are all done in the most extravagant way. We fall in 240 men in the afternoon to carry coal round the barracks, instead of putting it into a cart with one man to lead the horse and another man to shovel it out.

4176. You also think that there ought to be a large proportion of Staff College officers on the staff?—Yes. I think if you take the number of men who have been through the Staff College in proportion to the whole Army, you will find that, roughly, there are about 300 men serving who have been through the Staff College, and you will find that they formed a very large portion of the younger men who got commands of columns. It is obvious that all officers in command of brigades were not satisfactory, because each Commander-in-Chief has sent several of them home, or sent them into temporary retirement at a Cape watering-place.

4177. Would there be any way of increasing the number of men who have either passed through the Staff College, or otherwise qualified themselves for the staff?—There is no such great qualification as war itself; it teaches more than the Staff College can ever teach; but the Staff College is improving our men. You could not add to the numbers materially without increasing the building, and heretofore we have never allowed an officer to be seconded; that is to say, replaced in his regiment when he went to the Staff College, with the consequence that most of the regiments would put pressure on their officers not to go.

4178. But has there not been a tendency for an officer who got on the staff to remain on the staff, and not to go back to his regiment?—There has been. I think it is not so now that Lord Roberts has enforced the rule by which, after a man has done a time on the staff, he shall go back to his regiment for a time.

4179. Obviously, if the staff is filled up by men who remain on it for a considerable number of years, a smaller proportion of officers of the Army can pass through staff employment?—I am very anxious to see the Staff College increased, but I must honestly say that I believe in Lord Wolseley's dictum, that he has found more places to fill than trained men to fill them. There is plenty of room, I mean, for men who like to work in the Army. I should say that it opens as fine a career as it is possible to have, if you are content with a small income.

4180. But it was suggested that a man who was given staff employment should, after a time, be sent back to his regiment with promotion, if he had done well; that there should be an inducement to him to go back?—Until this war, the Army would not accept it, and Commanders-in-Chief and Secretaries of State have not been strong enough, because there has to be promotion somewhere, and if a man comes from the "Slashers" and promoted into the "Crashers," you offend all the "Crashers" at once. Heretofore that has never been done. It has been done in this war, as you can see in the last "Gazette."

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4181. And do you think that is a good system?—Yes, I do. I would promote the fittest men, from wherever I got them.

4182. Then I see you think that there has been too much attention to ceremonial parade hitherto?—There has been, but it is ceasing now. I only give that as a reason for what happened at the war.

4183. Will there have to be changes in the drill-book in consequence of the war?—There have been great changes. The drill-book has been altered almost out of recognition, and for good.

4184. It has been already altered, has it?—Yes.

4185. When was that done?—It was begun three or four years ago, but there has been a steady progression onwards. A new drill-book was in type when the war began, and it has since been re-written in a still more liberal sense.

4186. And has it to be re-written again?—It has been re-written in a sense more for war and less for grand parade.

4187. But it may be still further revised, may it?—I think we have gone far away in advance of any other European nation, so far as we know.

4188. Are you satisfied with it now as it stands?—Practically.

4189. Then is there any other point that you wish to mention?—No, I think not.

4190. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Would you mind glancing at those two marked extracts from the report of the debate in the House of Lords on the 30th of January, 1900 (*handing the same to the witness*)?—That has nothing to do with the Adjutant-General.

4191. I wanted to know that fact. In what Lord Lansdowne says there, he draws a clear distinction between what would be necessary to defend the colonies against aggression by the Boers, and what would be necessary for an advance against the Boers; and he says that he was advised by his military advisers that the forces that they sent out before the war would be sufficient to defend the colonies against aggression. I want to ask you who were those advisers?—I should say that the question must be put to the Secretary of State for War. I do not know that he ever asked me at the Council; but I should like to say, especially after what I stated just now, that he did ask me, as Evelyn Wood, as to the numbers that I thought, and I made a very bad shot; I said about 60,000.

4192. That is exactly what I wanted to get. Was that for defence or attack?—I was never asked that. I was asked alone one day, to the best of my recollection, by Lord Lansdowne, what I thought of the numbers.

4193. The numbers for what?—To go in the first lot that were going out—the expeditionary force that was going to South Africa.

4194. Was that for the advance to Pretoria?—No, when the expedition was started under Sir Redvers Buller.

4195. You mean when the First Army Corps was going out?—Yes. I said that I did not think that an Army Corps would be enough, but I thought about 60,000 men would be enough.

4196. The question may perhaps be asked of the Secretary of State, but it is only fair to you to ask you the question first?—I cannot recall that I was ever asked officially by the Secretary of State as to the numbers which should be sent; and I go further: I say that it would not have come within the scope of the Adjutant-Generals' duties as laid down. The expression, "My military advisers," there means the Commander-in-Chief and the Director-General of Military Intelligence.

4197. It means those two, does it?—Yes.

4198. I did not know that the Secretary of State would recognise the Director-General of Military Intelligence, he being only on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, as one of his military advisers?—As I said in the earlier part of my evidence, the Commander-in-Chief and the Director-General of Military Intelligence are the two people whom the Secretary of State would under the present arrangement consult.

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4199. He would consult the Director-General of Military Intelligence direct?—Yes.

4200. Not through the Commander-in-Chief?—No; he would consult Lord Roberts and Sir William Nicholson under the existing arrangement.

4201. And that would have been the case, too, with Lord Lansdowne?—Yes.

4202. He would have consulted Lord Wolseley and Sir John Ardagh?—I understand that the Secretary of State meant by the expression "military advisers," as regards the forces or the preparations for the force to be sent to South Africa, the Commander-in-Chief and the Director-General of Military Intelligence.

4203. You have told us, and Lord Lansdowne has told us, and, of course, we know that we had a paper Army to a large extent, that only 65 per cent. of the men at home were effective. Do you not think that it would be more satisfactory to the nation if they could have smaller and an effective Army always?—I am certain it would be much more satisfactory to the nation, even if they paid much more, to have a really efficient Army, instead of the make-believe that we have now, but as to whether the nation ought to have a smaller one, considering the territory that we have acquired in the last few years, I am not prepared to say that there should be one man less. Indeed, when I asked on the 1st October, 1897, the day on which my responsibility began, for a larger force, I pointed out that we were practically stretching up to the Zambezi, and I forecasted the war which came afterwards, my actual words being, "I could not look to any diminution of the wants of a military force in South Africa." That was written on the 1st October, 1897.

4204. I am not arguing for a smaller army. I am assuming that the nation puts aside a certain fixed sum, however large it may be, for its army. Having that fixed sum, I gather from what you say that you would rather expend that sum on a really efficient Army than on a still larger Army that is ineffective?—Much rather; there cannot be a question about that. But I have said this officially for the last four or five years, urging that we should adopt the American principle of so much a day and "all found." I took the opportunity last week, on meeting some Americans, to ask, "Do you still get generally satisfactory men?" and they said they still get the pick of their nation in their army. "At your existing rates of pay?" They said, "Yes." But I believe the great attraction is (and I have said this in season, and I am afraid until successive War Ministers are sick of hearing me) "all found." "All found" is the keynote; so much pay and no stoppages at all. At present we do not give the soldier his socks, except a pair which are supposed to last him, if he serves, 21 years. And I say as much underlinen as the soldier requires yearly he should have given him, as much as you would give your footman. Some people do not give it their footmen, others do. That is my idea of an army, and I am quite certain it would be found to be a cheaper army than that we have at present. When the Army is worth stopping in, then we shall not want prisons for deserters, and we shall then send men away much more readily when they misbehave.

4205. There is a large wastage through desertion already annually?—The wastage of the Army is something enormous, which will be to a great extent cured by better terms.

4206. Do you include actual increased pay also?—I have not been so anxious for an increase of pay as I have been for an increase of pay in another way, by doing away with the stoppages, my argument being that the soldier is told that he is going to get so much a day when he joins, and he finds he does not get it. I calculated, when I was Adjutant-General, that something between twopence and threepence would do away with all the stoppages, library, washing, barrack damages, everything except wilful damage. You see, the soldier is now charged for the wear and tear of his barracks. The sums are not great, and they vary in proportion as the officers are careful of the interests of their men; but they are irritating in their effect, and they cause a great quantity of clerking. The colour-sergeant is always writing out, and the men's accounts are complicated, and I want to simplify them all. You never go into details with your own servants; you give them so much a year, and never stop their wages.

4207. But do you think that these comparatively small changes would be sufficient to enable us to tap a higher stratum, and compete in the labour market of the country?—No, I do not think that you will get a much higher stratum at once, at all events, but in the last two or three years a larger proportion of respectable men have entered the Army. I have not a doubt about it from seeing the men. I have not looked at the return, but I take great interest in the recruiting in my own district, and it is a grief to me to see that the Navy get more recruits than we do; but the Navy catch them young, when they are boys, and the mothers favour their sons going into the Navy, because the boys send more money home than they do when they are men; so the Navy gets the pick. It is brought before me more than anywhere else, because the Second Army Corps district extends from Dover to Portsmouth, to Plymouth, and Pembroke Dock, all the South Coast indeed; and so I see it there.

4208. But may I not take it that, supposing the country could afford an extra 6d. a day in addition to your changes, we should then tap a superior class, and compete with the labour market of the country?—I do not think 6d., that is £9 a year, would be enough.

4209. In addition to your changes?—I do not know. You might get a slightly better class; but I was thinking of the men I saw yesterday beating a wood. It was on my brother's farm. His labourers are better housed than my married soldiers are now. The comforts in the life from which our recruits used to come, and still a large number do come, from the agricultural population, have gone up enormously, even in the last 10 years.

4210. Then what do you think it would be necessary to add to the pay to bring them on a level with the agricultural labourer, allowing for the fact that the soldier is taken care of in sickness?—I understand that you rather wish me to say definitely whether, if the Secretary of State would give us another sixpence and abolish all the stoppages, I would promise at once a higher stratum?

4211. You say no?—No.

4212. Now I ask what must we give?—I go further than your question foreshadows. I say it would be cheaper, because we shall be saved prisons. When to be put out of the Army is a punishment, then you will find that we shall save a lot of money. I am certain of the soundness of your argument, absolutely.

4213. There are one or two points that you mentioned. One was about Sandhurst and the inspections and the bayonet exercise question, and another was about night marching and reconnoitring and outpost duty; and I think there were one or two others. From 1895 to 1899 had not the Commander-in-Chief and the Adjutant-General practically a free hand in things that did not concern finance?—As to night marches, they had a free hand.

4214. Then, you see, you have put in your evidence something about night marches; the country will want to know where the obstruction was?—I am most anxious to speak fairly. I should say that from 1895 to 1899 as regards ceremonial and night marches, but not as regards field firing, which is perhaps the most important of all. Although you can make a good night march, if you cannot hit the enemy when you see him you have failed to attain the great object of the night march. Yet the Commander-in-Chief and the Adjutant-General under him from 1895 had a free hand, and I think the result has shown, if my statement is correct, that the younger officers were better trained. My adverse criticism about the ceremonial was that the older officers had been accustomed through a series of years to look to the day of inspection as a day on which they would march past, and their men should "wheel like a wall" and "swing like a gate"; and I went even further, and said that the younger boys of whom I was speaking had been in a more satisfactory state of military knowledge. They had to learn it after they joined the Army, because at Sandhurst, up to December, 1900, nothing was taught at our military academy on these all-important subjects which you have enumerated.

4215. And who was responsible for that at the War Office?—I am only speaking as Adjutant-General. The Adjutant-General had nothing to do with the Military College; he was not allowed to interfere.

4216. But may I take it from you that in your opinion, from 1895 to 1899, the younger officers were given sufficient training?—No, not sufficient, I cannot

admit that, but they got much better training than they ever got before.

4217. I mean sufficient so far as the money went?—No, not nearly sufficient so far as money would go because there were not enough men for them to drill. There were 80 men away from every battalion on enforced duties inside the King's Regulations, and the young officer had not enough men to try his 'prentice hand on. Many companies would come on parade with eight or ten men; and the keynote of what I have been saying in the War Office, since I have had the power of saying it, since 1897, is an increase to the men and to the non-commissioned officers for the purpose of teaching them. So I cannot admit that since 1895. That would admit that Lord Wolseley had not done all he could. I think he did.

4218. Then I would put the question in that way: That you think from 1895 to 1899 that everything was done by the military authorities that could be done with a view of training the young officers; would you say that?—I think so.

4219. You remember a celebrated despatch, or telegram rather, "Infantry preferred"?—Yes, honestly I have never seen it.

4220. That is all I want to ask you?—I may tell you that I believe it emanated from South Africa, but I have never seen the telegram.

4221. When did you first know who was going to South Africa as Commander-in-Chief, because you said in your evidence that you absolutely did not know who was going to South Africa as Commander-in-Chief?—No, I did not.

4222. When did you first know who was going? How long before the war?—I think when Sir Redvers Buller came into my office, shortly after he had been nominated, he told me he was going.

4223. Then you took no part in any consultation as to his appointment?—When Sir Redvers Buller came I did talk to him about various things.

4224. But not as to his appointment?—No, I did not know that he was going.

4225. There is one point in your evidence that I want to get quite clear. Although the Secretary of State has an ultimate voice in everything, of course, and I am referring now to the appointment of senior officers in time of peace, practically the Commander-in-Chief has a free hand?—I think practically.

4226. Was that so in the 1895 to 1899 period?—I think from 1895 to 1899, up to the beginning of the war, the Commander-in-Chief had, if he could carry the Army Board with him.

4227. But practically did he not always carry the Army Board with him?—Not always; but the Army Board and the Commander-in-Chief had the responsibility of all Army appointments.

4228. So that practically the Secretary of State had merely a formal voice?—In nine cases out of ten the Army Board were unanimous, or nobody dissented.

4229. And then again practically, in the field, once war had begun, the local Commander-in-Chief had a free hand?—After he got out.

4230. I say in the field?—Yes.

4231. Now, you were a P.S.C., were you not?—Yes.

4232. But I have just been looking at the Army List, and I have made a list of some of the most distinguished names in Africa and in China who have not been P.S.C. men?—I have not looked.

4233-4. For instance, Sir George White, Sir Henry Brackenbury, Lord Kitchener, Sir Forestier-Walker, Sir Francis Grenfell, Lord Methuen, Sir Neville Lyttleton, Sir John French, Sir Ian Hamilton, General Baden-Powell (who is very well known, at any rate), and Sir Alfred Gazelee; but I have found some difficulty in finding an equal number of men lately distinguished with P.S.C. after their names?—My answer is that if you refer to my evidence I said to the command of columns.

4235. We have not got a list yet of the commanders of columns. Is Bruce Hamilton a P.S.C. man, do you remember?—Bruce Hamilton is.

4236. And De Lisle?—I think he is too.

4237. Are you satisfied with the education given to officers at the Staff College?—Quite. It has been improved lately; there has been a great improvement since I was there. I was set as a mature man (for I left school before I was 14 to go to the Navy) to copy plans, which is an absolute waste of time. The Staff College had one of our best men, Hildyard, at the head of it for four or five years, and I think it is now eminently practical. I think it is a very good institution. It will be difficult to improve on it.

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4238. You told us that the regulation that staff officers should return to their regiments after a term of office was now being carried out as far as you know?—Yes, I know it is in the case of my sons.

4239. Can you tell me why it was not carried out from 1895 to 1899?—I can only assume that it was because the men were thought to be the best men—that the Commander-in-Chief thought to be the best man for the place.

4240. And it would be the Commander-in-Chief alone who would decide?—All the minor appointments never came to the Army Board, captain, brevet-major, deputy assistant adjutant-general never came: they went entirely to the Commander-in-Chief and the military secretary.

4241. In 1898 they began adding to the number of battalions did they not?—Yes.

4242. And, I suppose by degrees we might have hoped that we should have had the number of battalions necessary?—We should never have had the number of battalions if the war had not come.

4243. Not the whole number that we have now?—I am not sanguine that my demands would have been met.

4244. Not the eight?—But I wanted 14. Very few people understand what the loss was through the Guards coming home. The Guards coming home from Gibraltar really cost us six battalions, although there were only three, because, as they work in pairs, as long as we had three Guards battalions there, which do nothing in India and the colonies for us in peace time, that made a difference of six battalions. So I wanted fourteen, and I am not sanguine that they would have been given.

4245. About promotion by selection; I understand you to be in favour of that?—Yes.

4246. A great many people are, but how are you going then to prevent promotion by nepotism?—I quite admit that the difficulties are enormous, but I can give you my views upon it in a written form. I wrote this to the Military Secretary towards the end of the year 1900:—"As a new Commander-in-Chief has been nominated, I suppose Lord Wolseley will prefer not to make any drastic changes, but I should like you to ask him to record an opinion on the following suggestions. In spite of your endeavours and of the Commander-in-Chief's strong desire to promote none except good officers, we have not really been able to carry out the principle of selection in promotion, mainly on the grounds of the inadequacy of confidential reports. Nobody who has had much insight as to the working of our office, can avoid noticing the failure of a very large number of commanding officers who have been wafted up into command simply because 'there is nothing known against them.' Lord Roberts has recently removed several officers from their commands, and General Sir Redvers Buller, in advocating the promotion of a captain and brevet-major to the command of a battalion" (that is going over four or five) "dilates on the failure of many who have come to his notice. It seems to me that officers can generally be divided into the three following categories: (a) Those whose fitness for advancement is undoubted; (b) colourless men against whom 'nothing is known'; (c) men who have a bad record, or whose unfitness is apparent. There is little alternative in dealing with classes (a) and (c), but class (b), which necessarily represents the bulk of officers, presents many difficulties. Although promotion to second in command, and to command, is ostensibly by 'selection,' it would be more accurate to describe our procedure as one for the elimination of class (c). In reality, promotions of officers under class (b) are carried out generally because 'nothing is known against them,' whereas I contend that they should only be promoted if something is known in their favour. The burden of proving a case for refusing promotion at present rests with the Commander-in-Chief, and unless a strong case is made out which will stand the test of questions in the House of Commons, made by interested parties, it is difficult to refuse promotion, while confi-

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dential reports are made by the present class of colonels and generals on full pay, whose early impressions were vitiated. In result, comparatively few officers are refused promotion on the grounds of inefficiency only, and some specific act of neglect of duty, or often worse, must be proved against them. This, of course, is the outcome of our traditional system. Promotion by seniority was maintained officially as long as possible, and amongst the seniors is still desired. I submit that the time is come when it might be possible to reverse the process, and to arrange that no officer will be promoted unless qualified. The retention of young officers in the service is probationary for three years. I submit that commanding officers who now frequently record a subaltern's skill at polo, with rifle or gun, or his success in society, should be called upon to report annually on the three senior subalterns" (I did not want to go down below three), "showing whether they are likely in every respect to perform all the duties of a captain in a satisfactory manner. Their power of instructing men and getting work well and cheerfully performed should be noted. I urge, further, that no captain be promoted to field rank unless a case is made out for his promotion. This would shift the *onus probandi* on to the officer, who would have to prove that he has so far raised himself above his fellows as to merit promotion. An officer seldom reaches the top of the list of captains in the cavalry in less than 12 years, the artillery in less than 18 years, and in the infantry in less than 15 years, in which time, I think, it would not be too much to expect that an officer of from 12 to 15 years' service, if of any value, ought to have done something in that time to show his worth. He may have been an adjutant; have passed through the Staff College; he may have rescued a squadron, battery, or company, or a garrison or regimental institute from chaos, and placed it on a sound footing. He may have successfully trained his squadron, battery, or company in service work or in musketry, have excelled in fire discipline, observation of fire, tactical handling, and in administration of a unit or in cavalry or Horse Artillery in rapidity of decision for two or more years. All mounted officers of mounted branches should in that time be known as good, indifferent, or bad horse-masters" (which is our greatest failing of all). "An officer may have shown himself remarkable in signalling work, in recruiting, or he may have shown fitness for command as an explorer in unknown countries" (so that my sympathies are wide enough). "He may have done well on active service, done good staff work, or some other specific act indicative of character. If, after 12 years, there is nothing to distinguish him from the remainder of his brother officers, he must be singularly unlucky or unfit for promotion, and I recommend that unless he can be recognised amongst his fellows as being better than the average officer, his automatic promotion should cease. It would, of course, be necessary to take steps to safeguard the interests of officers. Special stress should be laid on the necessity of bringing forward in an officer's confidential report any matter in which he had particularly excelled since last inspection. It should be recorded whether he had worked in such a manner as to entitle him to special consideration, and an addition would have to be made to the confidential report forms to allow of this being done. An officer would have the power of appeal, which he at present enjoys, but no so-called right of promotion should be admitted." That is the keynote. That answers your question. I have been striving for that for 30 years, and we have got a little nearer.

4247. But you do not answer my question; how are you going to avoid selection by favouritism?—I would say by penalising, punishing, the man who does it; that is the only way.

4248. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Is the Army Corps at Salisbury in process of being made fit in every respect to send abroad for war service, or is it already fit?—The Second Army Corps is practically complete in artillery, and could go abroad before the ships could be got ready, so far as the artillery is concerned. It has one cavalry regiment, which has just returned from the war, and is to be looked at next week by its colonel-in-chief. There is a provisional cavalry regiment in the Second Army Corps, which is an amalgamation of different regiments, that is in the process of dissolution. That accounts for the existing cavalry. I should state that beyond one cavalry regiment, an Army Corps as such, does not possess cavalry. The cavalry division is outside it; it is never sent out without a cavalry division. I should like you to understand that, because my statement otherwise would seem confusing. The infantry consists of about, speaking without having looked at the return during the last day or two, ten battalions instead of 25, I think they are, but it has only got about one-eighth of the strength, say, in infantry; but it has got six battalions, which have come home in the last week, who, after they have had their furlough, would be available. In other words, the Second Army Corps, as regards the infantry, is only filling up now, and is unlikely to be full for some time; that is to say, in three months it would have four brigades out of its six, but the bulk of the men would be quite unfit for service, and we should no longer have the Reserve men, because they have been finishing out their time in South Africa.

4249. Are you satisfied with the present service rifle and the service field gun?—I think the service field rifle is good enough, and it is about equal to any Continental pattern but one, which is now being introduced, and is practically very much the same rifle shortened. It is a handier weapon, and enables you to do what we call snap-shooting quicker. As to the field gun, it is a very good gun indeed, whether you take the breech-loading gun or the quick-firer; but improvements are now being made in that. I am satisfied that the country is doing everything it can as regards its material for artillery and infantry. I stop short about the cavalry because I do not like their saddle; it is too heavy and cumbersome.

4250. Are you satisfied with the equipment generally, such as lances for the Lancers, short rifles for the heavy cavalry, swords for the officers, etc.?—If I seem to be answering offhand, it is because I have been thinking of these things all my life, and so I can answer. I think I would retain the bamboo lance for the Lancers in the front rank. The rifle for the cavalry will be now universal, shorter than the infantry have been carrying and larger than the cavalry carbine.

4251. Is it equal in range to the long carbine?—There is practically no difference. After 1,400 yards the shortened rifle does not shoot quite so well, but the difference is not of such importance as to make it worth talking about much. I would sooner not express an opinion about swords, because the Commander-in-Chief has ordered us not to wear them.

4252. (*Viscount Esher.*) How do you think the rifle should be carried by the cavalry soldier? Slung or in bucket?—I think that the last plan which has been approved of carrying the rifle is as near perfection as it can be got. I have recommended to Lord Roberts that all the Yeomanry (I have inspected 13 regiments of them this year) should carry it in that way, which is practically across the man's back, with the weight of it taken in a pocket on the right side. The objection to carrying it across the back is that the men say that it constricted their chest and tired them, but with this pocket a great deal of the weight is taken off.

4253. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Do you consider the latest issue of clothing for wear in the field quite efficient?—I think that the patterns of the coat, pantaloons, and putties and gaiters for the mounted troops are as good as can be devised if human vanity will leave them as devised; but I have never yet seen any soldier or commanding officer who did not want to take in his men's coats at the waist, or if I have ever seen him he is so rare as not to be appreciable. But the pattern as designed, a loose Norfolk jacket, is as good as you can have. With regard to the hat, I am not satisfied that we have got yet a thoroughly good pattern. The slouch, which we have fallen in love with lately, is all right in South Africa, where it only rains for three months in the year, but in a European climate I am not certain it would answer. When sodden with rain I am told it is very unpleasant.

4254. Is the material of which it is composed right in your opinion?—I am afraid it is a question of material really.

4255-6. It should be woollen, I presume?—I am not sufficiently at home with materials to say that; but I think we have got our soldiers very well dressed now, except their hats—I mean for service conditions.

4257. Have you any strong opinions about feeding an army in the field, such as baking bread, cooking, the size of meat tins, or any improvement in the details generally?—I have seen many soldiers of all ranks, from colonel to private, and there is a consensus of opinion that no army was ever fed so well, except at

some short periods when convoys have been captured—and in one particular force in the north-east corner of the Orange River Colony, where food was very short. The bakery and abbatoir arrangements were all satisfactory so far as I have heard. I think there our arrangements leave us in front of other nations.

4258. Would you like to have a sanitary expert with an army corps in the field?—Yes. I am greatly in favour of having such a man. I have used them on every occasion when I have been in command myself, and I am now deriving the greatest assistance from one in the Second Army Corps district.

4259. (*Sir John Jackson.*) With regard to the soldier's pay, in what percentage do you suppose that the pay of the soldier has increased, say, during the last 20 years?—It has been put up by twopences. I am afraid I do not remember, but speaking roughly, I should say that 20 years ago the soldier cleared from 5d. to 7d. a day, and I should think he clears now 9d. to 11d. I am putting the case of a careful man who is not put down for stoppages for clumsiness. But that does not quite exhaust the advantages that the soldier has now over his predecessors, because they used to make a soldier pay absurd sums; if he dropped his rifle he was charged very high sums for repairing it, and now the charges we put on the soldier are commensurate with the pay he is receiving.

4260. You think, then, generally that he is 50 per cent. better off in regard to pay than he was 20 years ago. The point I am driving at is this, that the labourer in civil life certainly receives more than 50 per cent. in pay, and is much more than 50 per cent. better off, because food generally is cheaper, and I want to see whether the soldier has made as much progress in that direction in his pay as the civil man?—I do not think we have made as much progress as we have in civil life.

4261. Then if, as I think it is taken that the Army would be better if it secured a higher grade, the remedy is to increase its pay?—I think so; but before that, if you are only going to give me a certain amount, I would first cut off all the stoppages, and go on the American principle of "all found."

4262. You said in your evidence that the soldier was told he would get a shilling a day, and then he found that he had certain deductions, which one can easily see must be very irritating?—That is so no doubt.

4263. Is it your opinion that with the class of people in England from whom the ranks are mostly recruited, providing the pay were better, there would be a general love for soldiering?—Yes, I am a strong advocate for improving the monetary conditions of the soldier, but I ought to explain that I believe I was the first advocate of the altered conditions of his life which Lord Roberts published some month or two ago—I daresay you saw them in the paper, that we should abolish roll calls except at reveille. Those are things I started about a year and a half a year ago; in fact, the keynote of what I have written and said during the last 10 years is to make the soldier more like a civilian when he is off duty. I never want to lock him into barracks, I want to lock him out if he does not come in by 11 o'clock, because he disturbs other men.

4264. And I take it that you would be rather down on the proprietor of an inn who turned a sergeant out because he was in uniform?—Yes, I have fought that myself. I fought a case and we won it.

4265. You are in favour of respect to the uniform, or rather, not disrespect?—Yes.

4266. Now with regard to the shooting of the troops; is it found that, as a rule, the Auxiliary Forces shoot better, more accurately, than the Regulars?—Oh, no, the Auxiliary Forces are nowhere in comparison with the soldiers of the line. There are in the Auxiliary Forces soldiers who can shoot incomparably better than any soldiers in the line; but if you were to take 5,000 men, or take a whole battalion out, and tell them to shoot at a target the soldiers of the line would be a long way ahead. The shooting of the Volunteers is poor. The bulk of them shoot very little, and they shoot at a very easy target. Our line shooting leaves much to be desired, but as to the shooting of the Volunteers, all the people would tell you who have gone into it much that there are only a few shots in the Volunteers, and that it is impossible with the instruction that they have for the bulk of the men to be so well instructed.

4267. Are prizes for shooting put up for competition to any great extent for Regulars, as is common in the Auxiliary Forces?—In what way?

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4268. In any way, whatever it might be, money or cups. Is there much of that for target shooting?—I think the best way of improving the shooting of the Army is what I have reported officially to Lord Roberts, and that is the individual instruction of every recruit by his own officers. And that comes back to what I was saying earlier in my examination, that the officer should be taught that at Sandhurst; he should be taught how to teach his men to kill an enemy by shooting him. But that he never has been taught up to the present. That is my answer. But I think every individual soldier when he comes into the Army should be taught to shoot carefully, and his idiosyncracies studied. I have said this officially.

4269. Now, with regard to the question of the selection of the officers, particularly for the senior ranks, and the idea of not promoting purely by seniority, and the question raised by Sir George Taubman-Goldie as to the risk of selection by favouritism, would that not be to a great extent got over if the selection were made by a board instead of an individual?—I think so, and that was the object of what I was trying to say (perhaps with rather less point than your question), that while all senior commands were made after discussion by a board of officers of five people, it was almost impossible for any one person, male or female, to influence those five individuals in favour of any one person; in fact, it is outside, I think, the range of possibility for anyone, and I can honestly affirm that in the years in which I sat on the Army Board I did not think when my candidate was promoted or rejected that any unfair influence obtained. I think that the promotions and appointments have been made justly, according to the lights of the people that made them.

4270. I think we may take it that in any other groove of work in this country (perhaps with the exception of the Navy) all important appointments are made by selection?—I have said so again and again. I have said that we ought to approximate our procedure to that of business men. I have said again and again that we ought not to take a man because he is a senior and put him up.

4271. Let us take the case of a large railway company. It does not make its chief officers, because they have been in the employ a long time, but from their fitness?—That is so.

4272. And I understand from your evidence that you are quite of the opinion, with regard to the management of the War Office, that more could be done by meetings of the heads of departments?—Certainly.

4273. In other words, that if an arrangement were made by which you had something, shall we say, analogous to a railway board, where you have the chairman corresponding to the Secretary of State for War, you would get better practical results out of carrying on the business in that way?—I think that I can best answer your question there by saying that what I endeavoured to speak in favour of just now (the Adjutant-General's meeting) had about as much similarity to the railway people as the Clearing House meeting of the managing directors; and instead of that we have an Army Board and a War Office Council, which can only be likened to not perhaps a meeting of the shareholders, but a very big meeting indeed, in which the despatch of business is not so feasible.

4274. I see from the *précis* of your evidence that you have made many suggestions for improvements, but these all meant the spending of money?—Yes, all of them.

4275. And that appears to have been the chief difficulty; the disinclination of the Secretary of State to incur the expense?—Yes, absolutely; but my view is that it would be cheap to do it.

4276. In point of fact, I suggest that if we had sent out the 50,000 or 60,000 troops to South Africa three or four months before the war, the war might never have occurred?—Not in this generation.

4277. I understand you said that there are difficulties in getting officers for the Army; what is the chief caus?—So long as you insist that a man coming into a line regiment shall have a minimum of £120 a year, preferably £150, and to go into a cavalry regiment he shall not have less than £500 a year private income, so long you will have a dearth of officers. My observations applied rather to the fact that the country has

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never paid enough. I did not mean to individuals, but that they have never authorised a sufficient establishment; that having said there were 20 officers they then took away always five, and generally seven, and said "Now go on and do the work of the 20," and it was muddled through; but when the crisis came the officers could not be in the two places.

4278. May I take it that it is your opinion that if the pay of the officers were increased materially that would make much difference?—I should prefer in the first instance, before asking the country to pay more money, that we should insist on simplifying the obligatory expenses in a regiment.

4279. Now, in this *précis* of your evidence as regards the administration of the Army apart from the War Office, you say, "It must be borne in mind that the administration of the Army at home has been carried on by people with very little military training, called up in many cases against their will to uncongenial duties." I do not quite understand that. Will you explain it?—Well, we had an establishment of the Army, and when we went to war we had not enough officers, and so we left in each cavalry regiment sometimes one, sometimes two. I have given you cases when we left one cavalry officer who was the sole person left at home, and he had to control what is called a reserve squadron. Now a nominal squadron is 150, but the unfit men (all the officers having been practically fit) and the reservists called up amounted instead of 150 to 850 in my friend's case, and in another case I have quoted to over 1,070 men, the officers having gone to South Africa, an excess number of officers having gone in that regiment; but say in that regiment somebody had taken an officer as Assistant Adjutant-General.

4280. With regard to the preparations for the war, I understood you to say that you had stated that 60,000 men should have been sent out. Were there any recommendations from the commanding officer in South Africa as to the necessity for 50,000 or 60,000 men?—That would be Sir William Butler.

4281. I suppose it would be?—I really do not know, because for war and the preparation for war despatches are written to and received by the Secretary of State, and it does not necessarily follow that the Commander-in-Chief will see them all. But as Adjutant-General, his subordinate, I certainly did not see them.

4282. That is information that we can get from Sir William Butler if he is called, or otherwise from the despatches?—Yes.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

4283. (*Viscount Esher.*) (*To the Witness.*) You referred to the report of the Hartington Commission, and the suggestion as to the creation of a general staff, but you did not tell us whether you approved of that proposal or not—the proposal of a staff on the lines of the German Staff?—Very much. I think we can do what is wanted without spending as much money as Germany is doing, by amplifying Sir William Nicholson's Staff, and until you think that he is satisfied reasonably. I think we have got it now, but the staff under him has been so starved that it was never sufficient, and the staff under Sir John Ardagh was regarded as being absolutely that of the Commander-in-Chief.

4284. It was in a much more subordinate position than it would be if you followed the German model?—Yes; that is to say if you put the brains beyond the practice teaching, but the Adjutant-General has heretofore been the chief man; he commanded the Army in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, and was looked upon as the second Army officer.

4285. That is no longer the case?—No, he is now equal to all the others, but the present holder has got an important addition. He has a duty with regard to the general welfare of the Army, which has been put in in 1901, which gives him the power, I will not say of interfering, but of expressing an opinion which the former Adjutant-General had not got, in spite of his increased emoluments.

4286. Do you think Sir William Nicholson's staff requires an increase?—I cannot say; I have no practical knowledge.

4287. Anyhow, that change which was recommended by the Hartington Commission was objected to by a Secretary of State; is not that so?—Yes, the Hartington Commission recommended the chief of the staff to make the man who is now doing Sir William Nicholson's work the top man after the Commander-in-Chief. I think Commanders-in-Chief up to quite recently have rather looked askance on that project.

4288. Then you told us that when you made a suggestion of some reform it was generally referred in the first instance to the finance branch?—Yes.

4289. Did that branch express an opinion upon the merits of the change?—They did so until immediately before I left the Office, when I objected to a permanent Under-Secretary expressing military opinions. I said his duty should be merely that of collating the expressions of the War Office Council.

4290. Did the Financial Secretary or the Accountant-General also express opinions upon the merits of a scheme or a proposal?—I think they did.

4291. They did not limit themselves to merely stating what such a change or proposal would cost?—I have protested officially against a Permanent Under-Secretary—a civilian—criticising my military propositions.

4292. That Army Board which you have been telling us about used to sit for the purpose of discussing promotions?—Not quite that; it had to deal with any question on which the Secretary of State required the general opinion of his principal military officers, and amongst the other duties they took up that of advising on promotions.

4293. Did they advise as to the promotion of an officer to the command of a regiment?—They did.

4294. Did they meet often?—The officer who had the subject to be discussed asked for a Board, and the Military Secretary asked for a Board whenever he wanted to Gazette so many promotions; he generally worked a month or two in advance; he took a list of those coming up, and got an expression of opinion from the Army Board in those cases.

4295. You think that is a satisfactory way, do you, of making appointments?—I think that a Board of five senior officers of the Army advising as to the fitness of an officer is likely to meet the difficulty foreshadowed by Sir George Taubman-Goldie of favouritism.

4296. The brigadiers in the war were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief in the first instance?—All of them, yes.

4297. Lord Roberts had four brigades of cavalry under him when he arrived in Africa, and I think he removed all four brigadiers?—I had forgotten that.

4298. Those brigadiers were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief without reference to the Board: is that so?—They were appointed without reference to the Board.

4299. Did not Lord Roberts also have to remove a very large number of officers in command of cavalry regiments, something like 11 out of 14?—He certainly removed several, and that was the point on which I based my minute to the Military Secretary trying to get a better procedure

4300. Those officers, at any rate, had been appointed not by the Commander-in-Chief but by the Board or on the advice of the Board?—No—on the contrary. I told you the Army Board did not nominate brigadiers for the expedition; but even in peace time you cannot separate the Commander-in-Chief from the Board, because he is the chairman; but, as I showed in my minute to the Military Secretary, being without the personal knowledge of an individual, the Board was obliged to depend on written reports extending over the whole of a man's career, and those were generally of an optimistic nature.

4301. In any case, the procedure of appointing to the commands of these cavalry regiments by the Board was not wholly satisfactory?—It could scarcely be tested in peace, but, if so, that failure was not due to the composition of the Board, but rather to the material on which the Board had to act.

4302. With regard to the training of young officers for the Army, what suggestions have you made there, in your capacity as Adjutant-General, for the training of young officers after they join their regiments?—I was very decidedly of opinion that the young officers should be trained to the practical duties of a soldier before they joined their regiments. The words I actually used were that when a cadet of 19½ years of age leaves Sandhurst he should be able to take part in the company training of the battalion to which he belongs as a second assistant to his captain, and that he should not have to do the

recruit's work himself—that he should have done all that prior to his joining—and that was the bone of contention between the Military Secretary and myself on Mr. Akers Douglas' Committee, and the Committee decided according to my views.

4303. You would not say that a young officer's education was finished when he joined his regiment?—Not at all; he is only beginning.

4304. Do you think under the existing system the young officer's training is satisfactory after he joins his regiment?—I do not think it possible that his training should be satisfactory when the moment he joins he is very often put in command of a company because officers of his regiment are away. The week after my eldest son joined the Army he was in command of a company, and he commanded that, I think, throughout the training period of the year.

4305. Does the young officer have much to do when he joins his regiment, compared with what a young man in almost any other sphere of life has got to do?—It depends very much on the regiment; in a good regiment I think a young officer's time is like a recruit's—pretty well taken up.

4306. I suppose a good many days in a week a young officer hardly gets into uniform at all?—In a great many regiments the young officer never gets a day's leave until he has finished all his recruit drill, say in five or six months.

4307. And after that?—And after that he certainly leads an easier time than any young man of his age at business in the City or anywhere else does.

4308. Are you making any changes in that respect in your own district?—It is rather early yet to say.

4309. Would it be within your power to make an Order that no young officer was to be out of uniform before one o'clock, we will say?—I think so. It is quite within my power, but as at Salisbury, where there are no soldiers, every officer since I have been there wears uniform as long as he is doing duty, and no officer ever dines with me except in uniform. It has never been necessary for me to give an order; I could give it, but they understand that everyone with me has to wear uniform.

4310. There is only one other point about the Staff College: what is the advantage of competition to enter the Staff College?—We found that for one reason competition was a panacea against favouritism; selection was the first idea at starting; but there is a decided advantage, if not in competition, in having a qualifying examination and pitching it sufficiently high, because otherwise we get men into a class who cannot do a rule-of-three sum, and are so hopelessly behind all the others that combined teaching is impossible. That does not necessitate a competitive, only a qualifying examination, but some examination is necessary; then, if a sufficient number of people go through that examination, be it qualifying or competitive, those who have done best in it must be taken.

4311. I suppose, according to your view, the larger the number of officers that pass through the Staff College the better?—Oh, yes.

4312. Your system of competition surely interferes with that: would you not be likely to get a very much larger number of officers passing through the Staff College if you were to substitute a qualifying examination?—The Staff College is always full; until the war there were always as many officers in the building as the bedrooms and the teaching staff would permit, and they were calculated in an equal ratio. I myself as far back as 1880 got introduced the principle of nomination for adjutants of regiments; that has since been extended very widely, and we now allow freely nominations for active service which gets a man in on a qualifying examination without competition. Practically since the war began the College shut up one year or two years altogether, but anyone who had any education, who could read and write decently, could get into the Staff College if he had done well on service.

4313. If you were going to command an Army in the field, would you prefer to select an officer who had had no practical experience of staff work, but who had passed through the Staff College?—Staff work, or regimental, or command?

4314. Staff work, or an officer who had had practical experience of staff work and who had not passed through the Staff College?—I think of the two I would sooner have the officer who had had practical experience—oh, yes.

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See Q. 9333; 21429.

4315. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Did I understand you to say that in the period between 1895 and 1900, though you were supposed to be more or less free, as a staff officer holding a very high appointment, to go to the Secretary of State, you did not feel yourself able to go except with the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief?—I was told not to go by the Commander-in-Chief.

4316. Does not that seem one way of getting round an order?—I said so in my earlier evidence—that an Order in Council only became operative on Army Staff when the Commander-in-Chief gave instructions for certain things to be done.

4317. I gathered from an answer of yours to a question that you thought the establishment of officers of regiments was too low: do you mean that you would increase it if you could?—Yes.

4318. In peace as well as in war?—Certainly in peace as in war.

4319. To what extent would you increase the establishment of officers of an infantry regiment, if money was not to be considered?—I consider it is absolutely necessary for the efficient training of the Army in peace to have more officers.

4320. In India many years ago every regiment of infantry had two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, a captain for each company, and three subalterns on the Indian establishment, and that of course provided for many absentee officers, as in those days passages to England and from England were very long, and if an officer went away on sick leave he was probably away for two years. Would you increase it to three subalterns per company?—I have made a specific recommendation; it is in these papers, and I will give it to the secretary presently. I think it may be shorter if I say, although I do not know it officially, that Lord Roberts has supported my recommendation in that respect for the increase of subalterns.

4321. And you will put that in as an answer?—Yes.

4322. You mentioned an officer who had sole charge of 850 men in a cavalry regiment divided between Aldershot and Hounslow?—Yes.

4323. Had that officer no other officer of any standing available. Absolutely nobody. I will give you the name—Captain Ogilvy, of the 13th Hussars.

4324. I suppose he had some young, inexperienced officers?—None; at the time I speak of he had not one.

4325. Do you think that was at all a common instance? You said some had over a thousand?—1,070 in one reserve squadron. I do not happen to know how many officers there were; but the point is that the establishment for the reserve squadron has not been pitched sufficiently high. We thought of an establishment of 150 men, and nobody, I think, could have foreseen that these were going to run ordinarily to 400 and 500, and in the cases I mean, which I have quoted, which are not exceptional, there are many cases of squadrons 700 and 800. I cannot call any man to name who had 850 except this one man, but I know 1,000 is altogether too much for one officer, say, of ten or twelve years' experience, and one or two boys just joined, which must be the normal state of the reserve squadron. You have to bear in mind that on account of the expense of cavalry regiments all our cavalry regiments have been under establishment of officers for a number of years.

4326. And you think the establishment of the cavalry regiments in officers is quite as insufficient as in the infantry?—I think that if you are going to draw on the cavalry for staff and for mounted infantry, then your establishment as now approved will never be enough. We have steadily declined to face the expense of having any officers in the Army for the staff. We have a large number of officers on the staff, but we have hitherto paid for them by taking them out of the regiments to a very great extent. My statement is not absolutely correct, but it is substantially; it is only indeed since the war began that we have been liberal in seconding officers—that is to say in finding a duplicate officer where a man goes away from his regiment.

4327. Then I gather from your evidence that the system of having a reserve of officers who can be called back up to certain periods of their age is not altogether satisfactory, and that what you want in a reserve of officers, as I understand it, is a very good proportion, if you could get it, of young officers who

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have had sufficient instruction, and could soon resume all their duties?—I should explain that the reserve of officers was absolutely voluntary; some few people joined the Reserve in order to have a uniform to go to Court, and some joined because they thought it was a patriotic thing, but I am certain, from a mass of correspondence I had, that the reserve of officers never contemplated being taken away from business in the city, and from business in the country, and made to serve at a depôt or in a provisional regiment for three years to their great detriment in monetary considerations. We never had a reserve except a voluntary arrangement of officers who put their names into the Reserve for various motives, but there were no subalterns in it.

4328. But you could have called officers back, could you not, up to a certain age who had retired?—You could not call them back if they had not got a pension. You could say to a man: "Now, you have got a pension, and if you do not come back I will stop your pension" and we did so in one or two cases where a man said he would not come, and when that became known the others came. A pension presupposes a right to the Crown to exact service so long as the pensioner is not decrepit, to order him to come back and serve, but the greater number of our officers had left, having deceived a monetary gratuity; they had got that and spent it, and so we could not make them come back by force.

4329. I think there is some idea of altering that system?—My proposition was that everyone who serves their king and country, say, for three years, should tie himself after three years to serve for a certain definite period, say, until he is 30 years of age.

4330. You mentioned what has been mentioned before here, that a large number of drivers of the Army Service Corps were taken away from their own corps and sent to the artillery as drivers?—Yes.

4331. Do you know whether that succeeded at all? Were they efficient?—Yes, Lord Roberts commended them. I only go now on what I saw in the paper—he commended them only four days ago in an Army Order for very good conduct and for the success they were. I ought to say that they were not very much wanted as Army Service Corps drivers there, because the ox and the mule are rather better driven by Cape boys, but still, before the war, I had got leave when I was Quartermaster-General to buy some mules, and the Army Service Corps drivers were being taught to drive teams of ten at Aldershot in 1895, so that the subject had been started.

4332. You said a good deal about the promotion by selection; do you think there is really sufficient opportunity for a Board in London to be always quite certain as to the relative merits of officers, a large proportion of whom are serving abroad, who perhaps have not been in England for years, and may not have had the opportunity of seeing field service?—I can tell you what took place in the Board, and that is that the officer who had it in charge—it might have been the Military Secretary, but more generally the Adjutant-General would read out, or perhaps the Commander-in-Chief would read out the character of the officer, and the question always was: "Who said it?" and there were certain men as to whom if they said that Brown or Jones was a good man it would be accepted at once, but there were others with regard to whom you would not accept it, and you looked further and said: "Who reported on him the year before?" I do not think I ever saw in eight years any disposition to slur over or to try to do anything, but to get at the back of every officer's character. The mistakes I saw made were because we were not drastic enough.

4333. Who composed that Board?—The Commander-in-Chief, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Director-General of Ordnance, and the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and I do not know whether he was on it *de jure* or *de facto*, the Military Secretary.

4334. Was the Commander of the Forces in Ireland a member of this Board?—There was an Army Promotion Board, which, while not dealing with the immediate promotion of any one individual at a given time, yet prepared lists, some way in advance, of the people who, in the opinion of that Army Promotion Board, ought to be promoted when their turn came, and when the Army Board subsequently was considering the matter one of the members who had the file in front of him would read out: "Army Promotion Board recommends" or "Army Promotion Board doubts"; and as to that Army Promotion Board there was nobody on the War Office allowed to have anything to say. The president was generally the officer commanding the troops in Ireland, and the members of it were the general officers commanding at Aldershot, and two other stations, cavalry, artillery, and engineers being specially joined when the claims of officers of those branches were being considered.

4335. I gather that you consider there has been a great improvement of late years in the system of education at the Staff College?—Yes.

4336. It is more practical than it used to be?—Yes, very much more.

4337. And you think in the Army generally the value of a Staff College education is more acknowledged than it used to be, and I say "That it used to be," because in old days one heard them sometimes jeered at as being Staff College officers?—Yes, and I can quite understand that the Staff College was discredited by the vast number of failures, but that was entirely due to the incompetence of the commanding officers who recommended them to be allowed to go there, and it is now about 10 or 12 years ago that one of us laid down the condition, which the commanding officer has to sign, that "the commanding officer recommends him as one of his best officers, who is likely to do credit not only to the Army but to his own battalion," and from the date of that we have had less misfits sent to the Staff College.

4338-9. You were saying, which, of course, everyone admits, how very much more effective an efficient army of a somewhat smaller size is than an inefficient army; but, do you think that, supposing the Army had been brought to a state of efficiency as high as it is possible to conceive, we will say, that sort of army of, say 100,000 or 80,000 men, would have been able to subdue the Boers in that immense tract of country?—I think if we had had a greater number of mounted men in the first instance the Boers would have been subdued at least a year or so before they were. I believe I am not singular in that opinion.

4340. Now to go back to the system of promotion by selection, suppose it was honestly worked out, and taking the B class supposed to be the great body of the Army officers who have no particular merit and no particular defects, say that the third captain, because a major, and on the next vacancy the fifth or sixth captain became a major; would you keep all those captains who had been passed over as captains senior to the men who had been put over their heads until they were retired by reason of age?—I would follow generally the German rule: pass over a man once, and say to him, "Look out"; pass over him twice, and say, "Go and seek another profession, you will not do for us."

4341. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You spoke of one nation in Europe which allows its company commander to take the initiative. Is he trained to take the initiative from the time he joins the Army until he becomes a company commander?—They are trained by their predecessors in the position of company commanders; from the time a young subaltern joins in the German Army, and his company commander gets him he keeps him, and he does not, as in our Service, send him away to every part of the world. The German Army is a stay-at-home army, and the company officer's promotion in the German Army depends a good deal, not only on how he trains the private soldier, but also on how he trains his officers. He is for ever an instructor of those under him; whereas, until recently, we divorced instruction and command. The people who were instructors at Sandhurst and the Staff College were always looked on as people who were no use for fighting, and until we change that we shall never have a satisfactory army. When I was offered the command of the Staff College in 1877, I wished that Sir George Colley, who was a wonderful instructor, would take it, because he knew so much more than I did. I urged that it should be offered to him, and it was, but he did not take it, and a previous Adjutant-General had said to me, "You want to be commandant? You are much too good." I give you that as an instance of what the feeling was, and, in my opinion, the commandant of the Staff College ought to be one of our most gifted people, because he has the training of 40 or 50 of what are presumably the best of the officers.

4342. Is there any ground in the United Kingdom

where artillery field firing can be carried out?—I have had 20,000 rounds fired this year under my command.

4343. Where is that?—Salisbury Plain. The day before yesterday we fired at 5,000 yards some new howitzer shells. I do not say we did it all day, but out of 480 bullets fired out of a howitzer shell 476 penetrated the target.

4344. Is there scope there for moving targets for artillery fire?—Oh, yes.

4345. Do these targets represent squadrons of men?—Yes.

4346. Are these moving targets made so that they can approach the guns?—So much so that this year within a month or so I have seen an artillery officer so taken by surprise that he has said: "1,600 yards, 1,200 yards, 1,400 yards. As you were"; and the target escaped. We are doing what we can in that way, but the artillery are more generously treated in the question of ammunition, and in the question of targets than the infantry.

4347. You were asked about a reserve of officers. When officers are called upon to join the reserve may they be promoted?—They have never hitherto been called upon to join the reserve.

4348. I meant to say, called up from the reserve?—They had to come then whether they liked it or not.

4349. Can they be promoted after they have come up?—They have recently. I have been out of the War Office for a year or more, but I saw in one of the newspapers a list of men who had been promoted recently.

4350. It would be an inducement to them to come up if they knew they might be promoted?—To some people; it does not give them any more pay, and that is what some of them like myself look to most.

4351. Are young officers trained in entrenching?—In the infantry, yes; but I think not sufficiently, and as you put the question to me I will say that heretofore the field training of our companies, except at Aldershot, has been limited to 24 days in the year, when they do what is called company training, and that and 12 to 14 days musketry now focuses their useful Service training for the year.

4352. Do you know whether subaltern officers are called upon to train their companies in entrenching?—I have seen them do it.

4353. Then they are called upon to do it?—Yes, they are, and within the last month I have seen young officers training their men in throwing bridges over a stream as part of the regular 24 days' course, and I think it is done fairly.

4354. Is that 24 days' course sufficient in the year?—I think not.

4355. Are you aware that in Germany the training goes on all the year round?—Yes, not quite so much as you might think on the face of it, and the German soldier does not serve as long as ours does. He comes up on the 1st of February, and he goes down on the 15th of September of the following year. Although I advocate great attention being paid to the training of our men it is not possible to add a great deal to it with our men whom you have to coax into the service, as they would not come at all. They would say, "Oh, no, if this is military training I would sooner be a civilian," and our desires with regard to the training of the men are strictly limited by what the recruiting officer tells us is the character of training which would be agreeable to the population, which we hope will come into the Army.

4356. (*Sir John Edge.*) I understood from your evidence that you interested yourself in the night marching and field firing, and the general improvement of firing, from 1897 to 1900. To take field firing, are there many places in England where you can practice?—Very few, unless you acquire Government land.

4357. Except Bisley or Aldershot, and Salisbury Plain?—Yes.

4358. Those are the only two?—Those are at present the only two places where you can have field firing, for, strange to say, although we can do it very well on Dartmoor, where we fire artillery, for some occult reason the Duchy of Cornwall has refused to allow us to do field firing with rifles on Dartmoor. Dartmoor exists, and we hire it, but we do not fire rifles on it.

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4359. What extent from your firing base do you require for field firing with rifles with safety?—I should be very sorry to do any field firing with less than four miles; if you stand at the south point, say, on the Thames, and look up north towards Hampstead, I should be sorry to have anything less than four miles, and you lose the great use of field firing if you walk up to a given spot, and then begin to fire. The great use of field firing, as I was explaining earlier, is to take people to a spot, and show them the target, and say, "There it is, say how far it is off, and shoot it."

4360. You would really require more than five miles from the base?—Yes, I have two pieces of land at Salisbury, one 5¼ miles from north to south, and the other eight miles, and practically we have not yet ventured to do field firing within the five miles area. There was great hesitation as to shooting with artillery, and it is only after much solicitation that Lord Lansdowne allowed me to do it on Salisbury Plain.

4361. And, of course, you would require a longer range for artillery?—Yes, but we have never had an accident yet, and we have now shot four years on it. Each battery there has fired 600 rounds, and there have been thirty batteries there this year.

4362. What is your range at Aldershot?—There is no field firing possible—well, it is possible, but it is difficult—at Aldershot, except on the ranges. Along the Ash ranges we have got targets all the way, and there all the ranges are known.

4363. I was coming to that, that at Aldershot you can really have no practice at field firing, as any man who has been there knows practically what the range is when he sees the target?—I think it is only fair to say you can do some field firing from the canal up the Hungry Hill, only it has the great disadvantage of stopping all the other tactical training of any corps which would be in the way.

4364. Can you tell me what number of rounds were allowed per man for practice in 1895?—We had 200 some time ago, and I think it is higher now; it is a thing which is constantly varying; but we can get that information for you.

4365. Do you know how many rounds were allowed in 1895?—I think 120.

4366. As to night marching between 1895 and 1900, were orders issued from the War Office directing night marching to take place?—Previously in the War Office we allowed initiative to generals and the generals began the night marching in the Army, and it continued long before anything appeared in the War Office, as far as I remember about it.

4367. But my question is, were any orders issued from the War Office between 1895 and 1900?—Night marching was an established practice at Aldershot beginning in 1889 up to 1894, so that I should think it would probably be in the Drill Book by that time.

4368. But there are other places besides Aldershot where night marching might be useful?—I do not think very much night marching has been done throughout the Kingdom, if you ask me that.

4369. May I take it that there were no general directions for night marching to be practised where possible?—I think it was in the drill-book, speaking roughly, but there is not very much to be learned in marching on a road. The difficult thing in marching is going over broken ground and finding your way, and, above all, finding your way without ever raising your voice.

4370. You cannot point, at any rate, unless it is in the drill-book, to any Army directions directing officers commanding to exercise their men in night marching?—Colonel Robb may produce the drill-book of 1896.

4371. There may be general directions as to what you should do in night marching, but my point is, were any directions given that night marching should be practised?—I think I gave you an instance.

4372. Were any orders issued from the War Office during the time you were Adjutant-General that night marching should be practised?—I cannot remember whether I issued any orders for night marching, but I know from reports and from attending them myself that they were being practised at Aldershot.

4373. But do you know whether they were practised elsewhere?—I cannot remember.

4374. Do you know whether they were practised at the Curragh?—I think you put it rather personally to

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me; the Adjutant-General could not give any directions unless the Commander-in-Chief told him to give them.

4375. I only put it personally to you because it was during your time as Adjutant-General; I put it between 1897 and 1900, when you happened to be Adjutant-General?—I cannot recall, but I know of my personal knowledge that night marching was being done at Colchester and at Aldershot, two stations where I had initiated it many years previously, and during that time it was still being done.

4376. But you do not know whether it was being practised at any place where you had not initiated it?—No, I do not know, but it is expressly enjoined in the drill-book of 1896, by Lord Wolseley.

4377. You told us that the wastage of the Army was enormous, but you did not give us the causes for the wastage?—First of all, the immature, unfit men.

4378. They broke down?—They are rejected after enlistment to a large number, and then I do not know that so many broke down, but there are a great many men, fradulent enlisters, who have been in other corps, and have got found out, or have got tired and confessed, and go to prison for two months and then start afresh. Men get sick of it; men do not want to go abroad, although, generally speaking, that is a small number, and we must not attribute much to that, because, strange to say, we can generally get volunteers to go anywhere, especially if they are in an unpopular station at home. I think anyone would go from Salisbury Plain to anywhere nearly.

4379. Is there any other general cause?—I think that the restrictions, a great part of which have now been removed, were a cause which induced men to go, and what the men called being humbugged about; that is to say, wasting time.

4380. Do you mean that that induced men to desert?—I think it disgusted them; as a rule, men do not at all object to doing work for which they see any use, or in connection with which they are intelligently handled.

4381. You do not know the percentage of desertions?—No; another witness will give that to you, but it is serious.

4382. Who was responsible for the appointments to the divisions and brigades before the Army Corps was sent out?—Before there was any question of war?

4383. No, in contemplation of the war. We sent out an Army Corps, and then you had to appoint your commanders of divisions and brigades?—The Commander-in-Chief is responsible.

4384. Did he do it without consultation?—I never knew who was going.

4385. That might be?—But I am not responsible; if I knew who was going, I might be responsible.

4386. Did the Commander-in-Chief make these appointments without consulting anyone, so far as you are aware?—No doubt he consults the officer whose special business it is to keep the records of every officer, and that is the Military Secretary.

4387. He would not consult you, for instance?—He did not consult the Adjutant-General.

4388. You say, then, that the only person he consults is the Military Secretary?—I should not like to assume that knowledge; you are asking me what the Commander-in-Chief did, and I can only tell you he did not consult me.

Colonel F. S. Robb, M.V.O.

Colonel F. S. Robb, M.V.O., Assistant Adjutant-General, called and examined.

4389. (*Chairman.*) You were Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General at Army Headquarters at the time of the outbreak of the war?—Yes.

4390. And retained the appointment until 31st December, 1901?—Yes.

4391. After that you became Assistant Adjutant-General?—Yes.

4392. Will you say what your particular sub-division of the Adjutant-General's Department is?—My sub-division of the Adjutant-General's Department is practically the large administrative sub-division marked A G 1 in the War Office list, and the duties are contained in that list. I do not know whether the members of the Commission have got a copy of the War Office list, because that would show exactly the functions.

4393. As we have not got a copy before us, you had better read out the description of your duties?—"Preparation of units and detachments for embarkation, detailing officers for embarkation, notification of staff and other appointments, posting of non-commissioned officers and men to battalions and depôts to permanent staff of Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, mounted infantry, married soldiers, the word, election orders, leave of absence, furloughs, regimental and garrison institutes, canteens; all questions on the above subjects relating to the Militia Yeomanry, and Volunteers; arrangements attendant on movements of the Sovereign, guards of honour, State ceremonials, regimental and district confidential reports, roster of Sovereign's aides-de-camp, leave and training of Army Reserve, Army registry system, miscellaneous general questions, posting of officers to artillery and infantry units and depôts, transfers and exchanges between batteries, companies, and battalions, promotions to warrant rank, master gunners, armament pay returns, military clerks, records of service of artillery officers, Militia and Yeomanry training arrangements, regimental establishments, distinctions and historical records, statistical returns." But I should explain that although that is entirely the work of my sub-division, the work of the sub-division is, to a certain extent, shared by the Deputy-Adjutant-General of the Forces, who is in control of more than one sub-division, and consequently some of the more important of those subjects which I have enumerated were not actually dealt with by me. Practically at the time of the outbreak of the war my functions were limited as far as warrant officers, and I did not deal with any questions relating to officers.

4394. Has the Deputy-Adjutant-General a separate sub-division?—No, he has not; he controls A G 1 and A G 4 chiefly, but he has occasionally a say in questions relating to A G 2. He is above the sub-divisions, and therefore a certain amount of the work of my sub-division goes to him direct; it does not go through me as the head of the sub-division.

4395. When you say he has not a sub-division, does he stand by himself without any officers under him?—He stands by himself in the distribution of work.

4396. You, therefore, from that list of subjects, had not very much to do with the preparations for the war?—I had very little indeed to do with the actual preparations; occasionally they would refer to me for statistical returns as regards the strength of the Reserve, and whether we had sufficient men to carry out one thing or another, but in the actual preparations I had practically little to do, and it was done by the mobilisation section.

4397. You mean the preparations up to the time of the mobilisation order issuing?—Exactly, up to the 7th October, the date when the order for mobilisation was issued.

4398. Then the mobilisation section told us that after that point the Adjutant-General's Department took up the work?—Yes, after that we had the executing of it when once the order was issued.

4399. Have you anything to say with regard to the work that had to be done at that time, October 7th?—As far as the smooth working of the preparations is concerned, I think I may say that I have never known such an absolutely quiet time at the War Office as immediately after the issue of the mobilisation orders. Of course, mobilisation on such a large scale as that was an absolute experiment, and we quite anticipated that there would be a very large number of questions asked, and that we should be inundated by telegrams asking how this worked and that worked, but I can say from experience, and a lot of us noticed it, that we were perfectly surprised at the calmness and quietness with which every detail worked out, and it was also noticeable as subsequent Divisions went out. It gave us less trouble to mobilise a whole Division than to raise a comparatively small body of odd troops that we had to, as it were, organise *ab initio*, and the mobili-

sation regulations worked extremely smoothly as regards the formed bodies of men who were supposed to be mobilised under them.

4400. Both in the first instance and also in the other divisions?—Both in the case of the original force that went out and in any subsequent Divisions or cavalry Brigades, or Brigade Divisions or artillery that embarked right up to the last, the Eighth Division.

4401. What happened with regard to what you call emergency corps?—Emergency corps, of course, gave us an enormous amount of trouble, because they were mostly formed from perfectly inexperienced people, and we had to start them absolutely *ab initio*. We had to frame warrants under which they could be raised, and prepare instructions on those warrants, and, as is usual in a case like that, although we decentralised as far as possible, still everything was referred to the War Office. That is the result of working with inexperienced people. The first thing that happens with inexperienced people is that they imagine that everything is centralised in Pall Mall, they refer everything to the War Office, and we had to deal with all sorts of trivial matters that ought to have been dealt with locally.

4402. The three classes you mention are the Imperial Yeomanry, City of London Volunteers, and the Volunteer Service Companies?—Yes, I have omitted the Colonial corps, because they were raised in the Colonies, and we had comparatively little to do with them until the men began to come home, when they were invalided home—when we had to take them up; they gave us a good deal of trouble when they got home, owing to their want of knowledge of administration, but the raising of them we had practically nothing to do with.

4403. With regard to those three classes, have you anything you desire to say with regard to the administration of the Imperial Yeomanry?—The City of London Volunteers was one single corps raised in London, and some of the officers, at any rate, were Regular officers of considerable experience. They were all picked men, and they only lasted for a very short time, as they all came home within a year, were not, as far as I know, broken up while in South Africa, and they gave us comparatively little trouble. The Volunteer Service Companies gave us a certain amount of trouble in raising them, but they also gave us comparatively little trouble afterwards, as they constantly worked with Regulars, and so always had advice ready at hand, if they required it.

4404. I should have thought that with regard to the Volunteer Service Companies you had the organisation in the Volunteer regiments to some extent?—No, I am afraid we had not. They were not formed from one Volunteer unit, but one Volunteer company would be formed from a whole district, and the district might have four or five Volunteer battalions, all of whom would furnish a quota towards this one company. In no case that I know of did a whole company go as it was originally organised, as part of a battalion of Volunteers, existing as such in peace time.

4405. No, but they were different from the City of London Volunteers in that they did come from recognised units, Volunteer regiments?—They all came from Volunteer regiments, but they did not come in from recognised units.

4406. But they came from recognised districts?—Each district formed its own company.

4407. In connection with the territorial regiment?—In connection with its own territorial regiments.

4408. I should have thought that would have given you a basis to work upon?—It gave us a certain basis to work upon, but we had to get an organisation to work them into, and we had absolutely no arranged plan for enlisting Volunteers for the purpose.

4409. That was entirely a new departure?—Entirely.

4410. What is your opinion of it now that it has been put into operation?—I cannot say how they behaved in South Africa, or what value they were, because I was not there.

4411. I am speaking of it as a matter of organisation from the War Office point of view?—I think it was a good move as a purely emergency measure.

4412. Was it a measure which you would look to repeating if another emergency occurred?—As an emergency measure I think it could be repeated.

4413-4. And the experience you have now had would enable you to repeat it with greater ease?—Most certainly; we have certainly learnt experience in raising emergency corps.

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4415. It is not proposed to formulate that in any way, so as to prepare for an emergency?—I have not heard of any proposal to make it permanent.

4416. That might be done?—There are proposals on foot to create a Volunteer Reserve for men who would undertake such a liability in future, and it is quite possible that the men who do accept that liability might be formed into Volunteer companies in the way we did it; but, on the other hand, it is also possible, I think, that the Volunteer Reserve could, on being called out, be distributed among the existing companies of a regular battalion so as not to have one company wholly and entirely Volunteers, but to have them scattered about among the different companies line. The Volunteers would then be leavened by Regulars in the same way as were the Militia Reserve, which is now non-existent.

4417. You were going to say something about the Imperial Yeomanry?—The Imperial Yeomanry gave us most trouble from the purely administrative point of view. They were given a very large percentage of officers in order to give them more officers for administrative purposes, because we understood their difficulties, but even then the administration failed chiefly, I think, because they had an insufficient number of trained regular officers with them, and no properly organised body at hand to refer to. In the case of the Volunteer Service Companies, of course, they were tacked on to a regular unit, and if they wanted advice they could go to another company and ask it. In the case of the Imperial Yeomanry they worked to a great extent as individual bodies, and they had nobody to go to for instruction, and as Army administration is not a thing which is learned in a day, I am afraid that in a great many cases it was not very satisfactorily carried out.

4418. Has anything been done in that case to make a more permanent arrangement?—There is also an idea on foot to form a Yeomanry Reserve, but no regulations have as yet been framed, because we really have not legal authority to create such a Reserve, and the Bill has only recently been framed—in fact, it only came into my hands yesterday—which forms the basis of any Reserve force of that nature. I cannot say yet what form that Reserve will take.

4419. The Yeomanry regiments have been formed as a result of the services of the Yeomanry in the war, as permanent corps?—They were formed long before the war; additional regiments have been formed during the war, but none, as far as I know, have been formed for service abroad. The South African Imperial Yeomanry was formed for service abroad.

4420. The Yeomanry regiments have taken a stride since the war, and been increased in numbers?—Yes, there has been an increase.

4421. And they probably would take a place in any large campaign, would they not?—We have no power to send them on a campaign. We can only either get them to accept the liability in peace time, and give them a retaining fee to go abroad in exactly the same way as we did with the Militia, or else we can organise them, as we did on this occasion, as emergency corps, but we have got no power at present to send them abroad.

4422. Quite so; and I did not imply that you had; but still you might look forward, I should have thought, with some confidence, to their being willing to serve, and therefore that you might prepare some organisation to put you in a better position than you were this time to deal with that voluntary action?—I think we have got the organisation so far that we can easily raise them in a moment on the lines on which we have raised them this time. We can easily call on them to volunteer on the same terms again, but I doubt very much whether, in the case of an enterprising enemy, we should have time to do that. I do not think we should gain by formulating anything more than we have formulated, because it depends on the will of the man at the very last moment whether he comes forward or not.

4423. I do not quite understand; surely if you are ready with regulations and organisation you would be in a better position to deal with them than you were this time?—We are so far in a better position to deal with them that we should not have to thresh out the regulations, but I do not think that that took very long to do. It is the actual raising of them that takes the time.

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4424. But now, I imagine, you would have a greater nucleus to work upon?—Well, I do not think that such a very large proportion of the Imperial Yeomanry that went to South Africa were from the home Yeomanry units at home to justify our thinking that this addition to the Yeomanry forces at home would give us much more material to draw upon. A very large number of them were Volunteers, and some had never been in the Service at all. I do not know that we can expect any very large increase of numbers in consequence of the increase to the home Yeomanry.

4425. I happen to know one regiment, at any rate, which was a regiment of Light Horse, and which has now become a regiment of Imperial Yeomanry, with very largely increased numbers, and I should have imagined that would certainly be a better nucleus than such a force as we had to send out on this occasion. I was only asking whether the experience in the war would not have put you into a position, on the occurrence of a similar emergency, to take advantage of that force more quickly and more easily than you did on the last occasion?—I think to the extent of our knowing better on what lines to raise the corps, but not more.

4426. Your mobilisation of the Regular Army, as you describe it, went off without a hitch, because you had everything ready in the Mobilisation Division. Is it not a natural supposition, therefore, that if you had some scheme for mobilisation of voluntary or emergency forces it also might go off with greater facility?—I think that we have learned a certain amount; in fact, I think if you look up the successive Orders we issued as to raising the Imperial Yeomanry you will find we did improve as we went on; we gained in experience, and no doubt our regulations would be better in future. But I do not think the two instances you give are exactly parallel, for in one case we know exactly how many men we have got and whom to call out, and the power to call them out, but in the other case we shall have to rely on whoever likes to come forward at the last moment.

4427. Certainly; but I am only anxious that the experience which you gained in connection with the voluntary forces on this occasion should not be lost on a future occasion?—It will certainly not be lost, and we have got a record of everything that has been done.

4428. You also mentioned mounted infantry. Had you any difficulty with them?—Well, we had a sufficiency of mounted infantry required by the field force ready, but when the supply was exhausted, we had to raise and send out mounted infantry units as we could train them, and I should have to look up the actual number we sent out; we sent them out as fast as we could, and finally we came to the end of the material that we could train, and so we could send out no more. There again the experience of this war has shown us that we require more men trained as mounted infantry, and steps are being taken to train a very much larger number during peace time, with a view to having more material to draw upon in case of a future war.

4429. Then I think you wished to draw attention to the number of miscellaneous matters which are dealt with in your sub-division which bring the military side of the War Office and the public into connection. Would you amplify that?—Well, in the first place I think I ought to bring to the notice of the Commission the extraordinary centralising tendency of the public. The public in dealing with any matter connected with the Army invariably send it to the fountain head. They have an idea that it is seen to much more quickly, and that they get more attention by sending it to us. However much we may decentralise, and however much we may give generals and other officers the power, the public never appeal to them for anything, but always come to us, and the result is that they congest us with an enormous number of questions which they could as easily find out for themselves locally. For instance, if a person living at Halifax, say, wishes to know something about a soldier in the West Riding Regiment, he merely has to go to the barrack gate, and he would be told the last information which is known about that soldier, but that is the very last thing he thinks about doing, and he writes up to the War Office to ask for information, although the only place we can get it from ourselves is Halifax. The amount of extra work which all that sort of thing gives to us is very great. It is work thrown away, because the man who asks the question only has his answer delayed, when he could get it at the barrack gate close to him. Right through the whole nation the public invariably centralise everything connected with the Army in us.

4430. I think it is not very unnatural in connection with a war?—I think it is not unnatural, but all I wish to point out is the enormous amount of extra work it gives us at a time of very considerable pressure, when every moment is of importance.

4431. You have a list of various matters, but I suppose they are really included in the list you read out of the book?—No. The list I read out of the book contains this heading, "Miscellaneous General Questions," and I think it is rather unfortunate that the nature of these questions is not a little bit more clearly specified. Under "Miscellaneous General Questions" I think I can sum up more than half of my work, because I never know from one day to another what may come up under that heading, and as these questions come from every portion of the world it is rather a large subject to have to deal with.

4432. Perhaps you had better just give us these headings?—I have spoken about the notification of casualties. We have decentralised the notification of casualties as much as possible to all the districts—that is to say, we do not keep the addresses of relatives and notify to each from the War Office any casualty which has occurred, but we notify the casualties to the distircts, as they can deal with them far more expeditiously than we can. As I have pointed out, that measure of decentralisation is defeated to a very great extent by the public insisting in writing to us about such matters, instead of to the local offices. Then again, I do not think the public realises quite the difficulties one has in getting information about casualties from the front. I remember one case, and this is not at all an unusual case, where it took us something like five weeks before we got into communication of any sort with anybody who could give us any information about the casualty. The case was taken up by a Member of Parliament, who wrote and asked why such a delay should have occurred in notifying a casualty to an officer. We took it up as a test case, and we found that the unit from which alone we could get the information had been absolutely cut off from all outside correspondence for six weeks, and that no doubt explained the delay for which we got the blame and much abuse; but there were hundreds and hundreds of cases of that sort where people at home were clamouring to get information from us, while we ourselves were absolutely unable to get the information from the units in South Africa. Wherever we had any reason to suppose that anything had happened to a man which had not been reported, or whenever there was anything in the slightest degree wrong in the report of a casualty so as to lead us to suppose that a mistake might have occurred, we invariably telegraphed out; but it was not at all an unusual thing for us to have to wait four weeks for a reply. Meanwhile, as you can imagine, the relatives at home were sending us daily letters to know why answers had not been received, and they quite failed to understand the extraordinary difficulty of communicating with units, constantly on the move, covering some hundred thousands of square miles of country out in South Africa. The amount of correspondence which mounted up in each case threw much extra work on the department. Then as regards the postal arrangements, at one time the military post office officials in South Africa were so few that, in order to give the Commission some idea of the work they had to perform, I will say that their numbers amounted to what in proportion would have been eight postal officials for the whole of Wales; and under those circumstances I think it is perfectly extraordinary the way that the letters got to their destinations at all when you think that anywhere else, here in England, say, letters are delivered at fixed addresses, while out there were no fixed addresses at all, and when letters arrived at one place for a unit they had to be sent on elsewhere. The complaints we got were almost incessant, and the pubilc seemed to think that when they sent out registered letters the receipts could be taken and kept in a perfectly formal manner in exactly the same way as obtains at home, and that the receipts would be duly filed and that parcels could be traced in the same methodical manner as they could be by the General Post Office here working quietly at home.

4433. Was there much lost?—I am afraid there was a great deal lost; I do not think it could possibly have been obviated, and the complaints we got were innumerable; they were constantly coming in. Then, again, there is the question of winding up the

effects of deceased soldiers. The relations of deceased soldiers seem to think that the moment a soldier is dead we know at once what his estate is worth, and that we can hand over at once to his next-of-kin anything which is over. We have, of course, in the first place to make very careful inquiries to find out whether he has left a will or not; that will may have been left at the base, or in store at home, or at an intermediate depôt, or it may be contained in a letter to the person who inherits his estate, or it may have been on the soldier's person. It is not like the case of an ordinary citizen whose will is known to be in somebody's keeping, and most careful inquiries have to be made, and yet if we do not pay over the effects at once, we are bombarded with innumerable inquiries, and the public cannot understand why the matter is not completed at once. That again is the source of an enormous amount of extra work being thrown on my branch in war time. Then there are the applications for employment in a military capacity. In a great many cases the Press used to put in absolutely baseless notifications that the War Office were calling for men for certain employment—it might be for cyclists, or it might be for telegraphists—when we had no intention of calling for them at all, and we used to be inundated with applications from men who wanted employment, when really we did not want them at all. That, again, threw an enormous amount of unnecessary work on the branch.

4434. (*Sir John Edge.*) You ought to have kept a common form?—We tried the introduction of printed forms, but a number of the public would not accept the form, and wrote demanding a letter properly signed. Then, again, there were applications for the return of soldiers from South Africa; those were practically ceaseless, and almost from the very beginning of the war we were constantly receiving applications of that nature, applications for soldiers to go back to civil life, and there again, if we did send a form, as a rule there came a request to send a proper answer, as the applicants would not accept anything that was not vouched for by a written signature. And if they are not satisfied, they at once refer to a member of Parliament, and that gives more work which takes us away from our proper duties.

4435. (*Chairman.*) Were those from people who were serving in South Africa?—No, those were relations at home, and employers wanting soldiers to be sent back, and unless we sent them something to show that we had gone personally and carefully into each case they would not accept it as a reply.

4436. We can quite see that all those points must have thrown a very heavy strain on your sub-division during the war, but the extra strain was all special to the war?—Certainly; but the ignorance of the nation at large as to what war meant and what disorganisation it necessarily entails came to me as a surprise.

4437. And you are trying to decentralise?—We are trying to decentralise, but I am afraid, as regards the public, it is impossible to do it. We have so far failed in getting the public to decentralise, and they will come to the head for their information on any matter connected with the Army which they choose to take up.

4438. I think you wish to say that some of the recommendations of Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee have been dealt with with regard to your branch?—I do not know whether you propose to take up the question of reorganisation of the branch?

4439. We do not want to go through what Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee did, but we should be glad to know how far you have adopted the recommendations of his committee?—The actual recommendations for the re-organisation of any sub-division, put forward by Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee, were drafted by myself, and accepted by the Adjutant-General, and they were recommended by Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee for adoption *in toto;* but so far they have not given me quite the whole staff that I asked for. Although they have temporarily allowed me the actual number of officers, two of them are not yet made permanent, and I am pressing to have the remaining two made permanent, so that we can reorganise the branch on the lines I suggested. The chief fault I had to find with it was that the responsibility was divided; the senior civilians on the military side were partially responsible for the administration, while I was the only person in the branch who could give a decision or even sign a paper to go outside the office. Consequently there was a good deal of wasted power; these civilians were very highly placed civil servants of considerable attainments, they were drawing very high salaries, and had they been in the position to give decisions they would, of course, have had far more value from an executive point of view. As it was, their functions were a good deal clipped by their not being able to give decisions or convey orders to the military authorities in the districts, and there was a good deal of waste of money and power, because a much less valuable man could have done the work they had to do, whilst if staff officers had been in their place we should have had additional power for executive functions, the power to give decisions, sign papers, and act generally. That formed the basis of my recommendations, and, as I have stated, they have been practically accepted.

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4440. Then you are satisfied?—I am so far satisfied when we get the whole staff asked for and the subdivision in working order, but, of course, it takes some time. All the clerks are being changed, and it will take some time before we settle down. I am satisfied that the increase of staff which I asked for and the division of the work which it will allow is one of the solutions of the great difficulties we have had to work with in my branch.

4441. Do you use military clerks in your office?—They are all going to be pensioners now; hitherto we had a certain number of military clerks and a certain number of civilians, and I was strongly in favour of retaining the second division civilian clerks, but I have not been allowed to do that, and I am to have pensioner clerks entirely to replace them.

4442. Do you find any inconvenience from that?—Well, I would rather have the second division clerks for some parts of the work I have to do, but still I think there is one great advantage in having pensioner clerks, that it gives employment to old soldiers, and no doubt when we get a proper demand and a proper supply we shall be able to get good men. At the present moment, when we have to replace a very large number, when the demand is very great and the supply limited, it is not quite so satisfactory as we hope it will eventually be.

4443. You hope in the end to be able to carry on the work without damage from that change?—I hope so, but I did not recommend the change myself.

4444. Have you any other point you wish to mention?—There was a memorandum on the question of drafts which I prepared.

4445. Have you put it in?—Yes. I put in a printed memorandum, and I do not know whether you have any questions to ask upon it. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 81.)

4446. This memorandum you have given us gives us the whole information that you had at your disposal with regard to these drafts?—Yes.

4447. Is there any portion of it you wish to refer to specially?—The summary at the end shows what we should have been in a position to do had the force in South Africa been limited to the numbers which it was the function of the office to put into the field; by that I mean the two Army Corps and one cavalry division, which was the total number we were supposed by Parliament to be able to put into the field.

4448. How do you mean that it shows what you would have been able to do?—It shows the number of drafts which would have been required to keep that force up to strength, and the actual numbers which we did put into the field. My calculations of the strength which we were supposed to put in the field are based on the highest proposals that I have seen.

4449. The draft requirements would amount to about 6,244 cavalry, 8,669 artillery, and 75,788 infantry, as against 13,370 cavalry, 4,870 artillery, and 71,799 infantry actually sent?—Yes, that is it for a war of similar nature and duration.

4450. Or a total of about 90,701 as against 90,039 sent; do you mean you would have had more to send?—I think if you will read on you will find that that does not include a large number of militia reserve, and consequently we should have had actually more to send than would have been required, assuming the very liberal proportion of drafts which I have enumerated in a preceding paragraph.

4451. Is there any other point in the paper you wish to refer to?—No, I think it practically explains itself.

4452. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) With regard to the first paragraph of your memorandum, Sir John

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Ardagh made an estimate of wastage, and Surgeon-General Jameson made an estimate; how were these estimates found to compare with the actual wastage?—I think you will find that is summed up on the last page of the report, but it is a very rough estimate, because we have not yet got evidence from South Africa to enable us to find out whether the units were actually kept up to strength there.

4453. Do you remember what the wastage was?—I think I put it down as 60 per cent. for the infantry, 50 per cent. for the cavalry, and 40 per cent. for the artillery.

4454. That is per annum?—Yes.

4455. Whereas Sir John Ardagh put his down at 120, and Surgeon-General Jameson put his at 40?—Yes.

4456. (*Chairman.*) Is there any other point?—I was told that I was going to be asked a question as regards the number of men who on the 1st October, 1899, were unfit to leave the country; there were some statements that had appeared in the Press to the effect that 92,000 were unfit.

4457. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Lord Lansdowne used a rather ambiguous expression in a speech which he made, and this is what was quoted in the Press: "Lord Lansdowne said he had been reminded of a speech he delivered at the beginning of the 1900 session, in which he told the House that they had about 100,000 regular soldiers left in this country" (that, of course, is after the beginning of 1900), "and it was said, why is it if you have so many regulars at home that you are obliged to fall back on the Militia, and send out Militia battalions to South Africa?" Lord Lansdowne goes on to say: "I think the answer is obvious; these men, they number not 100,000 but 92,000, are of course in no sense a field army; they include a large number of young soldiers, men who have not yet reached the age of 20, and who are not yet fit to leave the country on foreign service"; and that was taken by the critics to imply that as Militia regiments had to go out instead, no portion of that 92,000 could be sent out of the country, but that was not so?—Certainly not.

4458. Out of that 92,000 left in the country in May, 1900, what proportion were effective soldiers?—It would be very difficult indeed to get at that. I could make out a rough statement, but I did not know that that was the question I was to be asked. I thought the point I was to be asked was this: it had been stated that 92,000 men were unfit to be sent to South Africa, and I have a paper here that shows that of the Regular troops in England on the 1st October, 1899, only 37,000 were unfit to go to South Africa, and in case the members of the Commission wanted it I had copies typed for distribution. (*The Statement was handed in. Vide Appendix Vol., page* 119.)

4459. (*Chairman.*) Does that come to the same thing?—Not quite; those 92,000 are the residue after the whole Reserve had been called out, but that 103,000 we had on the 1st October, 1899, was before the Reserve was called out. I should have to look very carefully into it, but I can give you one reason for so many being in England in May, 1900; we had raised something like 56 batteries of artillery since the 1st October, 1899.

4460. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) The implication from the previous speeches was that we had sent Militia battalions abroad because we had no Regulars to go, and then Lord Lansdowne said in a rather ambiguous phrase, "These men, they number not 100,000 but 92,000, are, of course, in no sense a field army"?—Taking the paper I have prepared, that shows 37,000 unfit on the 1st October, 1899. We called up the Reserve, amounting to about 80,000 men, and 10 per cent. of the Reserve were unfit, and consequently if we add those in the Reserve who were unfit to those in the Regular Army who were unfit it would make 45,000, and if you take the 45,000 out of the 92,000 you will get a rough proportion of those who would be unfit, but there were the recruits enlisted since the 1st October, 1899, who should also be added in.

4461. That would be about half?—Yes.

4462. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Were these men under 20 considered unfit at that time?—That 37,000 included men under 20. There was also the question which Sir Evelyn Wood referred to about the wastage, and I can show you a table here in the General Annual Return about the wastage. That shows the wastage, giving all the causes.

4663. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) What became of the 37,000 men who were unfit?—They gradually came on; some were only fit for home service and never went out; but "unfit" does not mean that they were medically unfit; it meant that their services were required at home, or that they had not attained the proper age or service. There were many reasons for their being retained, but as they became fit they were sent out.

4464. (*Chairman.*) This wastage appears to be, roughly, 10 per cent.?—In the first three months of the recruit's service.

4465. There is one heading, "Claimed discharge under Section 81 of the Army Act, 1881"?—That is claiming discharge within three months of enlistment.

4466. Is that a privilege?—Yes, they may claim discharge within three months of enlistment on payment of £10; they may also be allowed to purchase at any time on payment of £18, but that is an indulgence and not a privilege.

4467. There are no less than 1,668 who seem to have claimed discharge?—Yes.

4468. That is a large proportion?—It is a very large number.

4469. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) I suppose the indulgence was stopped during the war?—Not only the indulgence, but the right is stopped by the Army Act; it ceases on the declaration of war.

4470. (*Chairman.*) Can that be taken as an average?—I think Colonel Crutchley, who does recruiting, will be able to give you more information than I can about that.

4471. Have you any other point you wish to refer to?—There is no point I can suggest.

TWELFTH DAY.

Thursday, 30th October 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Hon. Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Hon. The Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Hon. Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq. *Secretary.*

Lieutenant-General Sir THOMAS KELLY-KENNY, K.C.B., Adjutant-General to the Forces, called and examined.

Lieut.-General Sir T. Kelly-Kenny, K.C.B.

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4472. (*Chairman.*) You are Adjutant-General to the Forces?—Yes.

4473. And have held that appointment since last year?—Since last year.

4474. You have been good enough to send in a statement showing your services, which extend over a long period at home and abroad?—Yes.

4475. And in the War Office as well as in South Africa?—Yes.

4476. You took the appointment of Adjutant-General under the Order in Council of last year, I presume?—I took up the appointment of Adjutant-General on the 1st October of last year.

4477. That was before the last Order in Council was issued?—No, the Order in Council was all arranged just before I took over the office, but it was in connection with my appointment that it was re-drafted, I think.

4478. I think it is dated in November?—Yes.

4479. But you have held office under that Order in Council?—Yes, under the last Order in Council.

4480. You are, however, conversant with the procedure at the War Office under former Orders in Council?—Yes.

4481. Would you say if and in what respect you think the present arrangement is preferable?—The present arrangement to the last?

4482. Yes?—I think it is preferable, inasmuch as the Commander-in-Chief, as head of the Adjutant-General's Department, is responsible for the whole control of it; he was not before. The Adjutant-General formerly worked directly with the Secretary of State, and I think the alteration is an improvement.

4483. It is desirable that the Adjutant-General's Department should be directly under the Commander-in-Chief?—It is directly under the Commander-in-Chief now.

4484. And that is desirable?—That is an improvement.

4485. Of course, all the departments are under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes, but the Adjutant-General, as well as the Director of Military Intelligence, is under the supervision and under the control of the Commander-in-Chief. I think that was the principal change that was made.

4486. We have had evidence as to the nature of the changes, and I do not think I need trouble you to go through them, but does that change of putting the Adjutant-General's Department under the control as well as under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief, interfere with your direct access to the Secretary of State?—Oh, yes, I have no access to the Secretary of State.

4487. If you have any representation you wish to make with regard to your department it must go through the Commander-in-Chief?—It must go through the Commander-in-Chief, and I like it; to get his support, I think it advisable that it should.

4488. Have you no independent method of expressing your opinion?—Independently of the Commander-in-Chief?

4489. Yes?—Yes, at the War Office Council I can express my opinion, or I can write a memorandum or a minute to him, and whether he concurs in it or not, if it is of importance it is registered, and it would go to the Secretary of State, if the Commander-in-Chief so desired.

4490. That you can claim as a right?—I do not know about a right, but a question like that has never arisen. The Commander-in-Chief would always send on important matters, that I had represented to him, to the Secretary of State; I think the more so if he did not concur.

4491. In the War Office Council you could bring up a matter of your own motion?—No.

4492. What is the restriction?—There is an agenda paper sent round, and the discussions in the War Office Council are confined to the matters on the agenda and questions arising out of them, but no one ever raises a point that we are not prepared to discuss.

4493. But would you not have the right to ask that a subject which you wish to put forward should be put on the agenda?—No, the Secretary of State decides what should be brought before the War Office Council, what he should refuse, and what he can consent to, and even at the War Office Council his decision is final, irrespective of the votes or the opinions of the members of the War Office Council.

4494. I quite understand that the Secretary of State has an over-riding authority, but we were informed that the difference between the War Office Council before and after the last Order in Council was, that now the members were entitled to have put on the agenda any subject which they deemed of importance, and that it was freely discussed at the War Office Council?—If the power exists, I do not know that it is ever exercised.

4495. I only mention to you what we were told?—I do not know of it.

4496. That has not come within your experience?—The procedure is that we put forward proposals either to the Secretary of State or to the Commander-in-Chief, and then it is decided by the Secretary of State whether they should be discussed or not—whether he wants advice from the Council or whether he refuses it, or whether he assents to it. That is the position.

4497. That, as I understood, was the position before the Order in Council of 1901?—No, that is the position now.

4498. Do you think it is not desirable that an officer in charge of so large a department as the Adjutant-General's should be able to put forward of his own motion at the War Office Council some matter he considers of great importance, and get a decision thereon?—I think as subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief it would not be proper for him to put forward any question that he had not discussed with the Commander-in-Chief.

4499. That deals with the relations between the Adjutant-General and the Commander-in-Chief personally?—Yes. I may say that although I have never known any of the other members of the Council exercise this authority, the Commander-in-Chief has occasionally,

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if something very pressing had just happened, perhaps the day before, mentioned it—questions which were not on the agenda, but these were small things.

4500. I do not want to be misunderstood; it is not a question of mentioning things not on the agenda, but the right of having put on the agenda a subject of your own motion?—No, we have no authority, as far as I know.

4501. (*Sir John Edge.*) Can a member of the War Office Council suggest that a subject should be put on the agenda?—The Commander-in-Chief has frequently told me, "I will ask the Secretary of State to bring this forward at a War Office Council," and it has been put on the agenda, and I have often suggested this to the Commander-in-Chief.

4502. (*Chairman.*) Quite so; I imagine that happened under the former Order in Council?—Yes.

4503. But as I say, we were told that the constitution was altered?—It is not so. I knew them both, because although I was not a member of the old War Office Council, I was frequently called in, and I see no difference in the procedure, nor in the usages.

4504. Here was a question which Sir William Nicholson was asked: "(Q.) Just to revert for a minute to the evidence that you gave at the beginning. The War Office Council, I think you said, considered subjects which were submitted to them by the Secretary of State?—(A.) Yes, that is so; but it is open to any member of the War Office Council to send to the secretary of that Council any question that he wishes to be brought up for discussion, and if the Secretary of State approves of it, a précis is prepared of that matter and submitted to the Council"?—I am not aware of that, and neither Sir William Nicholson nor the Adjutant-General could possibly or properly do it except through the Commander-in-Chief. I never had any difficulty, and when I have asked the Commanderin-Chief to bring a matter before the War Office Council he has done it.

See Q. 47.

4505. I did not want to suggest that there was ever any difficulty between you and the Commander-in-Chief; I only wanted to get at what the constitution of the War Office Council was?—That is my knowledge of it—that there was no such power.

4506. And you think that would apply also to other members who are not under the Commander-in-Chief in the same way?—Quite so. Copies of the War Office Council reports will show you.

4507. For instance, to the Quartermaster-General?—I have never known any large question brought up by the Quartermaster-General at the War Office Council except it was on the agenda; whether he suggested to the Secretary of State that it should be on the agenda or not I do not know.

4508. But you do not think he would have, according to the present constitution, a right if he chose to exercise it?—No, certainly not; it is not done.

4509. Because that is what is implied by Sir William Nicholson's evidence?—I am not aware of it.

4510. And I think it was confirmed by Sir Edward Ward, speaking from memory?—I am not aware of it, but copies of the War Office reports will elucidate it.

4511. I take it you are satisfied with the present position of the Adjutant-General's Department in the War Office?—I am satisfied with its position internally so far as my dealings with the Commander-in-Chief go. I cannot say that I am able to make much impression with regard to the efficiency of the Army.

4512. What does that mean when you say you are satisfied internally?—I am satisfied because it goes out of my hands to the Commander-in-Chief, and he has to do the rest; my work is done when I write to the Commander-in-Chief what my opinion is.

4513. But you think you ought to be able to bring more influence to bear on the condition of the Army?—I think the Commander-in-Chief ought to be.

4514. It is more the position of the Commander-in-Chief you are referring to than your own position?—Yes, the Adjutant-General is a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief.

4515 Would you explain how that affects the general organisation of the War Office?—His being a subordinate?

4516. No, you say the position of the Commander-in-Chief is the matter to which you specially refer as not satisfactory?—Yes. I think his representations do not meet with sufficient compliance.

4517. In what way?—With regard to efficiency and training of the men, manœuvres, ground, and increase of establishments, but particularly the training. I put them originally forward to him, and he supports them. I now speak as to the last year's Estimates, when we made a very large demand tending towards the efficiency of the Army, and it was all taken out of the Estimates. I do not think he has sufficient power to enforce his opinions.

4518. Is it a question of money chiefly?—Money—oh, yes.

4519. How would you wish him to enforce his opinions?—I should like the Secretary of State to listen to them, and to act on them, where they are questions connected with the efficiency, including discipline, and training of the Army.

4520. Of course, the Secretary of State has a definite position not only with regard to the organisation of the War Office, but in the Parliamentary government of the country, and he must be governed by those rules, must he not?—Quite so, but I should think he would be able to impress his opinions on the Cabinet and on the country. I may put my meaning clearer in this way: that when we are at peace the whole of the tendency is for the military heads of the War Office to press on the efficiency of the Army, and we think we are not met, but the very moment war is declared we are met, and, in fact, the political side of the War Office then, I think, outsteps us in lavish expenditure. Then peace is declared, and the old thing begins again, and either the Chancellor of the Exchequer or some other interest interferes, and it goes back again to the old rule.

4521. In what way would you counteract that tendency?—That is a large political question that I am not able to answer, how far the Commander-in-Chief's views should prevail with the Cabinet; it is beyond me.

4522. Without going so far as the Cabinet, how far do you wish the Commander-in-Chief's views to prevail at the War Office?—With the Secretary of State?

4523. Yes, I am including the Secretary of State in the War Office?—Well, it is a very complex machine, because there is finance involved. I think his views ought to prevail a great deal more than they do.

4524. But I suppose you admit that under the present government of the country the Secretary of State must have a position assigned to him, namely, an overriding veto?—Yes, he must according to the present conditions; the Secretary of State must be responsible to Parliament.

4525. Then, subject to that, how could you give the Commander-in-Chief a greater position and authority in the organisation of the War Office than he has at present?—I think that is a question I could not answer; that is where the block comes, and where our difficulties begin.

4526. At present he has the right and the duty of putting forward his own opinions and your opinions before the Secretary of State in the most authoritative way he can?—Yes, certainly he has the right to put the opinions forward, but he has not a right to enforce them, or to take action against the Secretary of State's opinion or decision.

4527. I do not quite see how you could do that?—I do not see it either; perhaps the Commission might suggest something.

4528. I was going to say that I do not see how that is possible to be done if you preserve the overriding authority of the Secretary of State?—No, I do not see it; but I say perhaps you may be able to suggest something; I cannot.

4529. (*Viscount Esher.*) How would it do if the Commander-in-Chief were empowered to publish or lay before Parliament any remonstrance against the action of the Secretary of State?—I think it would be an excellent plan.

4530. (*Chairman.*) That might bring him into political conflicts, might it not?—Yes, it might; but for the sake of the Army—I am thinking of the efficiency of the Army—nothing but good could come out of such an arrangement.

4531. At present the Commander-in-Chief stands entirely apart from the political parties; he is the head of the Army whatever Party is in the War Office?—He

is the head of the Army in a very restricted sense; he is the head of the Army as far as the Order in Council defines his duties.

4532. But I mean he is the executive head under the Order in Council apart from any question of political action?—Yes, quite.

4533. And that is a very strong position, is it not?—It ought to be, but yet in practice it has not been found to be a very strong position.

4534. It is a reasonable contention that it would be undesirable to disturb that position?—I would not like to say; I think some way ought to be found out of it, to give the Commander-in-Chief more power.

4535. We will take that as your opinion. Is there anything else with regard to the present organisation of the department, either the department as a whole or your own department, which you wish to say?—Yes, it is a very complex machine, as you will understand; with a great many departments, we sometimes overlap each other, and I think that cannot be avoided. To explain it, I may say that I am not allowed to answer a letter from any member of Parliament, or Government office, or municipal body. I am allowed to answer a letter from private people, but in the case of any letter that comes to my department, and any inquiry from a member of Parliament, the answer has to go to the political branch to be signed, and we are not allowed to decide any question, no matter how trivial it is, that might afterwards be the subject of discussion in Parliament, or of a question in Parliament; and it is so very difficult for us to tell what little trivial things must go to the political side to be signed. We prepare the answer very often, but we cannot correspond, and we have no responsibiity with regard to any politician.

4536. Which do you call the political side?—The political side comprises the Secretary of State, the Financial Secretary, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary; it is in contradistinction to the military side.

4537. How does that interfere with the working of the Army?—It clogs the work; it makes it very cumbersome.

4538. You are asked for the answer to the question, but it must not issue from your department; is that the position?—Yes.

4539. But, I suppose, the answer which is given by your department is adopted by the political side?—Oh, no, occasionally it is, and sometimes it is not.

4540. On matters of fact of which you are the judge, it must be adopted, surely?—Not always, and not even in answers to questions in the House are my answers always taken.

4541. Of course, in connection with answers which the Secretary of State has himself to give in the House of Commons, he must naturally have a discretion?—Of course.

4542. You said you would be ready to answer any question with regard to the state of the Army before the war?—Yes, as far as my responsibilities gave me knowledge.

4543. What have you to say with regard to the men under training?—I was Inspector-General of Recruiting in 1897 and 1898, and up to the time that I relieved Sir Redvers Buller at Aldershot in 1899, and in August, 1898, I felt the state of the Army was such that I addressed a memorandum to the Adjutant-General.

4544. Could you give us that memorandum?—Yes, but I had better give you the history of it. It was considered very interesting by all the people concerned, but there was no action taken on it, and I felt it so much, and I was so much in accord with Lord Wolseley in his views on it, that I consulted him, and the result of it was that I brought it forward again as an appendix to my annual report on recruiting in 1898. That memorandum, of which I have a copy, described my views about the state of the Army then and our position, and with very little difference the state of the Army to-day is something about the same, only with regard to the principal features of it, or one of the principal features, it is rather worse—that is, the state of the Reserves.

4545. Would you read us that memorandum?—I must tell you that this memorandum was never published. The date of the memorandum itself was 12th August, 1898, and the date of the recruiting report in which I republished it was February, 1899. Lord Lansdowne thought that as he could not act on this it would not be wise to publish it, and so it was struck out, and it was never published with the remainder of my report. It is in Appendix J of my report on recruiting in 1898:—

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"Adjutant-General: I discussed this question with you and the Commander-in-Chief, and in accordance with your suggestion I offer some observations thereon. I do not confine my remarks to the present state of recruiting as regards numbers—indeed, I may say that in comparison with recent years the present number of recruits (such as they are) offering themselves is satisfactory. On the other hand, compared with our requirements, we are badly off even as regards numbers, and also as regards standard conditions. It is unnecessary to go minutely into the position in which we would find ourselves in the event of our having to keep two Army Corps in the field during a European campaign, to form two Army Corps at home, and to garrison India, Ireland, and the Colonies. Suffice it to say that in this condition the numbers required to keep our forces full will be far beyond anything our present inducements will procure. It must be remembered that some of our sources of supply are either cut off or seriously impaired. We can no longer depend on foreign legions, the supply from Ireland and Scotland is inadequate, so that we have to fall back for numbers on the waifs and strays in the populous districts of England. The question I ask you to consider is a more vital one than mere numbers—it is the class from which we should try to fill up the ranks of our Army. We as a nation have no actual experience of war under modern European conditions, but we learn from that of others that the individuals of an army in a battle sense are no longer the parts of a machine; on the contrary, European war at present requires to ensure success a high measure of individual intelligence and training, patriotism, and self-respect. We recognise that war is a progressive art, inasmuch as we spare no expenditure on the improvement of our armament equipment and training, yet we leave undealt with an improvement in the chief factor—the soldier. I have never been satisfied with the recruits in our Army. Many other officers share my views, though naturally we make the best of what is provided, relying almost entirely on regimental spirit and tradition. I have no faults to find with the training, except those which are inherent in and always check training and organisation in a voluntary army. I would ask: (1) Do the recruits we get into the Army come up to the standard of modern European war requirements? (2) Is it possible in a voluntary army such as ours to induce the required class to join it? (3) What are the inducements likely to succeed? (1) I have already given my opinion? (2) I think it is possible, but at a large expenditure and sacrifice on the part of the taxpayer. (3) The pay must be largely increased, larger than ever yet proposed. I am aware that the Commander-in-Chief, supported unanimously by the Army Board, proposed an increase greater than superior authority thought necessary. I was very doubtful whether even that increase, if sanctioned, would produce the results required. I am now convinced it would not. No less than 2s. a day, with free rations and groceries, will be sufficient. I go further; I say that so necessary is it to induce the right men to come into the ranks that it may be necessary to bid higher and higher till we get them. I have so often pressed the matter of provision of civil employment for ex-soldiers that I will not repeat now its importance, except to note that the improvement in the class will sensibly remove difficulties and prejudices in this connection. In present condition, partly owing to prejudice, and it must be admitted a good deal owing to the soldier himself, with all our efforts we only get at the fringe of our desire to see all ex-soldiers well employed. I annex an instructive table showing that in comparison with naval expenditure the Army practically stands still. It may be argued that at present the soldier is well paid, but on the other hand it will be admitted that the chief person concerned does not think so, otherwise he would come to us. I advise that this question be considered and pressed on the authorities, and pressed with persistency. If we are to take the field in the immediate future, and if the disregard of our warnings brings us face to face with the possibility of having to succumb to an enemy, it will be but a poor consolation to us military officers to know that we appreciated our own defects. It is not very easy to define what is intended by an improvement in the class of our recruits, but it will give an idea of what I have in my mind when I say that I believe the end would be attained if we could get into the Army the class of men now serving in the Volunteer ranks. These men possess

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all the desired characteristics, but unfortunately they are untrained. In the Army the soldiers are trained, partially so in the Militia, but they lack the other conditions. If it were only a question of an army for home defence it might be considered that we might largely add to the expenditure on the Volunteers, and require a larger degree of efficiency, but we still must provide a force to take the field outside the United Kingdom.—T. K. Kenny, Inspector-General of Recruiting, War Office, 12th August, 1898."

TABLE referred to in the foregoing Minute.

T. K. KENNY, Inspector-General of Recruiting, War Office, 12th August 1898.

Comparison between the Army and Naval Expenditure to amount of Imperial Revenue from 1883 to 1897.
(Compiled from the Official Statistical Abstract.)

Years ended 31st March.	Amount of Imperial Revenue (Exchequer Receipts).	Army Expenditure.	Naval Expenditure.	Percentage of Army Expenditure to Imperial Revenue.	Percentage of Naval Expenditure to Imperial Revenue.
	£.	£.	£.		
1883 - - -	87,386,505	15,133,451	10,259,853	17	11
1884 - - - -	86,160,184	16,135,326	10,728,781	19	12
1885 - - -	87,988,110	18,600,338	11,427,064	21	13
1886 - - - -	89,581,301	17,177,084	12,660,509	19	14
1887 - - - -	90,772,758	18,653,138	13,265,401	21	15
1888 - - - -	89,802,254	18,433,330	12,325,357	21	14
1889 - - - -	88,472,812	16,107,738	12,999,895	18	15
1890 - - -	89,304,316	17,510,912	15,270,812	20	17
1891 - - - -	89,489,112	17,935,032	15,553,929	20	17
1892 - - - -	90,994,786	17,734,000	15,578,571	19	17
1893 - - - -	90,395,377	17,692,000	15,830,571	19	15
1894 - - - -	91,133,410	18,090,000	15,476,571	20	17
1895 - - - -	94,683,762	18,050,000	17,545,000	19	18
1896 - - - -	101,973,829	18,610,000	19,724,000	18	19
1897 - - - -	103,949,885	18,485,000	22,170,000	18	21

4546. I suppose you have no hesitation in putting in the memorandum?—Not the slightest, as in a great measure those remarks would apply now, except that my demands are greater. I am very much afraid that even the new inducements will not get the class of men we want into the Army. We will not get the class I suggested, and I think I made a very moderate suggestion in asking for that, but I now believe we want even a higher class of men, and I am perfectly sure that what we are holding out to them now will not produce that class. We will get more of the same class.

4547. You speak of the inducements which are now offered. Could you tell us exactly what that means?—From the 1st April, 1902, we are now taking everybody only for three years, but any man that extends after two years' service will get 6d. extra; in fact, the pay is coming up very nearly to what I suggested then—not quite, but very nearly.

4548. Two shillings?—I said two shillings and everything free.

4549. Is it approaching that now?—No, it is not now, and at once will not be; there will be nothing extra given until 1904, except the 2d. for stoppages.

4550. That is what we want to know: what will it be in 1904?—In 1904 a soldier that has enlisted and served two years will be allowed to extend his service with the colours up to a total of 8 years, and he will get 6d. extra in addition to his present pay.

4551. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Which is?—One shilling and the 3d. for messing, and 2d. stoppage moneys.

4552. That is 1s. 11d.?—Well-conducted men will make it up to 2s. after five years.

4553. (*Chairman.*) It is chiefly the monetary inducements you speak of, but there are others, are there not?—I think we will get more of the same class, and we will keep them, they will not desert as they do at present, but I do not think we will be able to improve the class of the men, not only by that pay, but anything within reason. I am afraid we will not be able to do it.

4554. You think you cannot look to getting a better class?—You cannot look to getting a different class for reasonable pay, and I doubt very much if 3s. or 4s. would do it.

4555. If you cannot get the class you wish, can you get the numbers that you want?—Yes, I think we will get the numbers, and I think we will keep the numbers; there will not be such waste.

4556. Of the same sort of class as you are getting at present?—Yes.

4557. Not worse at any rate?—Not worse.

4558. In the last two Reports of the Inspector-General of Recruiting for 1900 and 1901 there are a considerable number of financial concessions alluded to?—Yes.

4559. All of which, I suppose, would tend to improve the position of the soldier?—Oh, it does—it all helps. As to our soldier, I would say that his mental qualifications are not up to the general run of European soldiers, and the reason of it is, that we get them mostly from a class where education is not looked to as much as it is in Germany and in France.

4560. And with physical defects?—Physical defects, owing to a very large proportion of our enlistments being in very crowded places, towns—particularly in Lancashire. I think that would account for it.

4561. And the difficulties in training them?—The difficulty in training them, inasmuch as it is a volun-

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tary Army. If you train them as continental nations do, either they will not come to you at all, or if they do come they will leave you—they will either purchase their discharge or desert. We find we have very great difficulty; we cannot press the training as they do on the continent, and then there is the expense. Except twice or three times within the last 20 or 30 years, we have had no manœuvres on a large scale—we have had small manœuvres, and there is the difficulty about money always, but I think the chief difficulty is, that we dare not train the soldier to his fullest extent.

4562. Because the Force is a voluntary Force?—Yes, because it is a voluntary Force. Again, another reason for the want of training is—and I have frequently brought it forward, even this year and last year—that, if you take a battalion of infantry, about one-third of it are constantly employed in work that is not a soldier's work at all, and they practically get no training. That, with the three years enlistment, to my mind, will lead to something very serious; it will lead to disaster if it is continued, and if something is not done to have a regular system of training in the Reserve for the men who leave the ranks after three years.

4563. We had from Sir Evelyn Wood yesterday some statements about the employment of soldiers in carrying coals and other duties about the barracks?—That is just what I say, and as to a great many of these men, more than one-third in an infantry battalion, we really do not get at them: we cannot train them, and they are employed on duties that are not soldiers' duties.

4564. He said that was going to be altered; is that the case?—I have heard for a great many years that it was going to be altered, but it never has been; and I doubt very much if it will be altered. I admit that the expenditure is very large.

4565. That is what I was going to ask, because since he gave his evidence, I happened to notice a question answered in the House, in which it was pointed out that the expenditure would be very large?—Yes, very large, and when the Estimates come in, I doubt if there will be very much done; they may do a little.

4566. That is a matter which would come up through your Department?—I press it frequently.

4567. You have put it forward recently?—Yes, I might say constantly.

4568. As a substantive proposal?—As a substantive proposal; I put it in the Estimates.

4569. In the Estimates last year?—This year and last year. I prepared the Estimates last year, and I think I scarcely ever write a Paper that I do not bring this question forward in when it is applicable.

4570. In the Estimates last year, was it cut out?—Yes, all fresh proposals of this nature.

4571. At what stage was it cut out?—The Army Board were all in favour of it; the Army Board met to consider the Estimates, and they were all in favour of it, but then the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief, and I suppose some of the other heads, including, very likely, the Financial Secretary, met, and the Commander-in-Chief came back to the Army Board, and said it had been cut out. That is all I know about it.

4572. But it was done after a consultation between the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief?—Well, I do not know about a consultation; I do not know what happened—whether it was a consultation or not; but the Commander-in-Chief conveyed to us the decision of the Secretary of State that it was to be cut out; he placed before us a memorandum by the Secretary of State.

4573. Do you know what the amount of it was?—No, I do not, but it was a very serious sum.

4574. However, you have renewed that matter again?—I have represented it again.

4575. And that has still to be discussed?—The matter will be discussed again by the Army Board when we discuss my Estimates.

4576. That has not taken place yet?—No.

4577. Are those sort of matters ever discussed in the War Office Council?—No, the Secretary of State has separate meetings with the heads of the Office and the Financial Secretary, as to anything there is any doubt about. He sends for them and questions them, or the Quartermaster-General, about artillery or transport, and on *personnel* he deals with the Commander-in-Chief.

4578. Not with the Adjutant-General?—No, except inasmuch as my opinions go forward to him. He would send for me if there was any question the Commander-in-Chief desired me to discuss.

4579. But on this particular question to which you refer you had no meeting with him?—Not with the Secretary of State.

4580. If we assume, as I suppose we are bound to assume, that the Army will continue a voluntary one, you would rely upon what to maintain its efficiency or to increase its efficiency?—Well, what I have been saying now helps, and the more we employ soldiers when they go to the Reserve, the better it will be for us, but it only gets to the fringe of it. We cannot really get good situations for all of them, but there is not very much done with regard to getting situations for them in the different Government offices, and I represented that in my Report of 1898. In the War Office nearly all the messengers are ex-soldiers, but in the other great offices of the State there are very few, and I can tell you what the numbers were then.

4581. I think you said, in that Report, that it was a good deal due to the soldier himself?—It is so; and that all comes back to what I was saying before—the class from which we get the men. It is a good deal due to the soldier.

4582. He does not care to take that class of employment?—He is enlisted when he has practically never done a day's work, and in the Army the life is not a life conducive to steady work. It is not real work, the drill and the routine and marching, so that when they leave a great many of them do not fall in to regular work. Of course there are a great many men very well spoken of in the railway companies and in other civil employment, and they do very well, but they are particularly suited for this class of employment that they do not get, namely as messengers in the Government offices. In 1898 in the British Museum, the Charity Commission, the House of Commons, the Foreign Office, the Friendly Societies' Registry, the Home Office, the Inland Revenue, the Land Registry Office, the Local Government Board, the London University, the House of Lords, the Lunacy Commission, the National Debt Office, the National Gallery, the Patent Office, the Privy Council, the Public Works Loan Board, the Science and Art Department, and the Supreme Court of Judicature, had offered no appointments at all as messengers through the War Office to ex-soldiers. In some of these offices they may have got a few appointments, but we know of no soldier who had been employed in any of these offices. In Scotland and Ireland it was the same; I need not repeat the principal offices, but we were in the same position there, namely, that we could not induce these Government offices to employ soldiers. On the other hand, the War Office and the Customs did employ them. The War Office had 35 and the customs 22, the India Office had one, the Colonial Office had three, and the Treasury had three, but we could not make any impression on them to employ soldiers generally.

4583. (*Viscount Esher.*) There has been a new regulation since then?—We get a little better treatment now, but I do not think they will ever do anything until there is an Order in Council making it compulsory to employ only soldiers or sailors in all these Government departments.

4584. (*Chairman.*) You register the number of men who wish to apply for appointments?—Yes.

4585. And if a man does not choose to register himself, you cannot be complained of, at any rate?—Oh, no; but we do get a great deal of employment, for instance, on the London and North-Western Railway, and the Great Western Railway, and Midland.

4586. I have before me in the report of 1901 the heading, "Employment Registers in Regimental and other Recruiting Districts," and in 1901 I find the number who registered for employment during the year was 4,962, and the total for whom employment was found and accepted was 3,082, namely, 62 per cent.?—Yes, that was registered in the War Office, but there are registrars in the districts as well.

4587. No; this is, "Employment Registers in Regimental and other Recruiting Districts"?—Well, they get employment, but there are other sources of employment; what I advocated was that they should be employed in these Government offices.

4588. This includes everything?—Yes, it includes everything, and very likely includes the docks at Hull; but what I advocated was that the Government should

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employ in every single one of these employments nothing but soldiers or sailors. The Inspector-General of Recruiting, whom you are going to examine, will tell you perhaps more in detail about that.

4589. (*Viscount Esher.*) I can tell you that at the Office of Works they have been in the habit of employing for the last few years soldiers in the parks as park-keepers, which seems a very suitable employment for them?—Yes.

4590. But I can also tell you that there was the very greatest difficulty in getting them?—In getting suitable men?

4591. Exactly?—Perhaps your conditions are very high. There is an examination, is there not?

4592. There is no examination; it is entirely nomination, and non-commissioned officers of good character are naturally preferred; but it was with the greatest difficulty that from the War Department or any other source we could get the names of men who would take those places. You must remember all discharges have been suspended during the war?—What is the pay?

4593. I think it begins at 24s. a week?——

4593.* (*Chairman.*) Shall we pass on to the question of mobilisation?—Yes

4594. Will you say what you have got to say about the mobilisation?—The mobilisation was very successful as far as my knowledge went. I had a good deal to do with it, because I went down to relieve Sir Redvers Buller, and most of the original Army that went to Africa was mobilised under my control. Most of the infantry regiments filled up very well, and the mobilisation went without a hitch; there was no fault whatever with the mobilisation from the time the proclamation to mobilise was issued. All the arrangements fell into the hands of the Adjutant-General, and everything went perfectly smoothly. The great flaw that I remember was shortness of officers in the cavalry. On mobilsation a higher establishment cavalry regiment requires eight officers, a lower establishment regiment eleven, and we had very great difficulty in providing those, and such a difficulty was it that young lads straight from school and college in plain clothes were in the ranks when they were mobilised. That was the only difficulty that I remember. Some of the infantry regiments which belonged to districts where the population was sparse had not enough Reservists to fill up, such as the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, but at this stage Section D was not called out, it being illegal to do so. Generally speaking, the infantry regiments went out fairly full, and the mobilisation went on like clockwork. I have had no complaint whatever.

4595. But there was a shortness of officers from the Reserve to fill up the demands?—Yes, there was a shortness of officers, and there, I might say, that I am afraid I cannot see any remedy for that; and the only remedy is to keep the cadres of the regiments up to their war establishments, and even then no provision is made for depôts and details at home. We have not the same system as exists abroad as we cannot employ our officers when they leave the Army; they are not employed as foreign officers are. In the German or the Austrian Embassy here, I think every single officer, except the Ambassadors, is a reservist—every single person that is employed in the Embassy. I noticed at two or three functions that all the Diplomats from these Embassies were soldiers. We do not employ our officers in that way, and that is a great difficulty.

4596. I think a witness told us that there would at any rate be a difficulty in getting subalterns?—Yes, that is so.

4597. Because you cannot keep them in reserve very well?—No, we cannot; the ones we get are generally captains and field officers, the very people we do not want. The men we want are the youngsters, and we have not got them.

4598. And you do not know how to suggest getting them?—No, in this country I am afraid there is nothing but increasing and keeping up the peace establishments higher. That was my proposition last year, and it is again my proposition for the Estimates this year. It was struck out last year, but they are not struck out this year yet, because the Estimates have not been checked. I proposed a large increase of six officers for the infantry, and three for the cavalry to keep them up, so that they would be ready to a certain extent.

4599. Six or seven to each regiment?—Yes, we are eight short on mobilisation, and 11 in lower establishment regiments.

4600. Eight short of the authorised establishment?—Yes, of the cavalry.

4601. Is that because they are on a peace footing?—Yes,

4602. They have the full number for a peace footing?—Oh, yes.

4603. It is not that they are actually short of the peace establishment?—No, we have got the peace establishment.

4604. Because sometimes there is a difficulty in having officers to fill up the establishment of the cavalry?—Yes, the expense is a passing trouble; but, as a rule, we keep up our establishment of officers.

4605. Is the question of expense in cavalry regiments a passing trouble?—It is, but we are dealing with it now in a very liberal spirit; in fact, it is the first time I have ever seen liberality in the War Office when we are at peace. We are going to give them horses free, and we are going to give them officers' furniture, and there is a very liberal spirit abroad just now in this matter.

4606. In the Estimates?—Well, the Estimates have not been passed, but the Secretary of State has approved of it, which is much more important than the Estimates. I do not know whether it has passed the Chancellor of the Exchequer or not, but I think it has.

4607. As to horses?—The horses were good, but they were untrained; they were the reserve horses, and they were good horses of their sort that came down to Aldershot with the cavalry—very good indeed.

4608. But they were untrained?—They were untrained, but they came on all right in Africa. Sometimes there was a month's marching on a poor feed, and that helps to train them, so that there was not much difficulty.

4609. Those were the horses that the regiments took out with them?—Yes, a great many of them were what they call the registered horses, the horses that the Remount Department had registered.

4610. And that was a good class of horse?—Yes, they were—the ones that came to Aldershot certainly, because when the Cavalry Brigade was mobilised it was very good, and there were no complaints from the colonels of regiments.

4611. Did they get a sufficient supply of horses in that way to fill up the war establishments?—Yes, at Aldershot they were all up to strength. The artillery were particularly good.

4612. I think it has been mentioned to you that if it is convenient to you we would prefer to take your evidence with regard to events in South Africa at a later stage, when we take up that part of the inquiry; so that I will pass on to the question of anything you have to say after you took up your present position on the 1st October. You then took up the state of the Army?—Yes. When I went to the War Office in October I immediately went into the question of the state of the Army in South Africa; it was the first thing I took up, and it was with a view to sending out drafts. I may say that I knew very well the requirements of a system of blockhouses, as I had myself worked on that system when I was commanding in the Orange River Colony, and I established blockhouses—they were not called blockhouses, but they were small fortified huts—all the way down, and I had found the enormous number of men it required to occupy them. I also knew it required the very highest disciplined troops, and I assumed that the mounted troops were wanted elsewhere, such as the Colonials, who were all mounted. I saw the necessity of pressing out drafts, and I did so to the best of my ability. I sent out an enormous number of drafts; I think I sent out about 20,000 in the first eight months of the year that I was Adjutant-General of drafts, in addition to several units that were at home. I sent out two cavalry regiments, and when I say "I sent out," I recommended it, and after a good deal of difficulty it was done. The Commander-in-Chief supported me always in every proposition to increase the Army in Africa.

4613. Were those Militia regiments?—Yes, we sent out some Militia Regiments in relief and drafts too, but not very many. We sent out a very large number of Guards. I found when I became Adjutant-General there had been no Guards sent for a very considerable time.

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and I put them under orders with the Commander-in-Chief's consent. I went into the whole question of the provision of drafts, and I based my action a good deal on a minute that Lord Wolseley wrote at the end of 1899, two years earlier. He was questioned, and his proposals criticised, about pushing out so many troops to Africa, and he said in his minute that as long as he was Commander-in-Chief he would insist on keeping up the Army in South Africa to its full establishment. That closed the discussion, and so I assumed that it was quite right to push them out, and I sent out all these drafts. Lord Kitchener did ask for more infantry in March, but they were not sent out till August, and as soon as I became Adjutant-General I telegraphed to him, and he said he wanted infantry more than ever. Then we had exhaused all our drafts; we had exhausted all our cavalry, and we had only one regiment left. We sent two corps, the Bays and the 7th Hussars; we had three cavalry regiments left in England when I became Adjutant-General, and out of these two were sent out, so that we were left with one cavalry regiment in the kingdom. In addition to that we sent out two more battalions, one of the Rifle Brigade and one of the King's Royal Rifles, and when all the drafts were exhausted, Lord Kitchener, pressing for more infantry, I proposed sending 7,000 men that were not quite up to the age. The men should be 20 to go to Africa, but I thought these men were better than a great many of the Militia, who were much younger, and who were doing the same work, and I proposed this, and the Commander-in-Chief supported it, but it was not allowed by the Secretary of State. I could not get my way about it until the Tweebosch disaster, and then it was permitted, and they were sent out.

4614. In that way the numbers were kept up in South Africa?—Yes, they were kept up as far as we could, and were allowed by the Secretary of State.

4615. Adequately?—The Commander-in-Chief never ceased to advocate sending out drafts. He concurred with me about these 7,000 men, but it was not done for a long time, as our joint recommendations were insufficient, and I do not think it would ever have been done but for the disaster at Tweebosch.

4616. What did you make the minimum age when you began to send them out under 20?—We sent them out at 19. The militiamen enlist at 17, and they all go out when they have done their musketry drill, and are 18 years of age if they volunteer. Of course it would be better if we could wait till they were 20, and the reason given for not sending them was the fear of enteric, but I argued that the great hardships of the campaign were not realised, that they did not feel them so much in these blockhouses, where they were fairly regularly fed, and they had not these long marches, and, as a matter of fact, enteric was very much reduced. However, they got out, and Lord Kitchener was delighted to have them; I heard from him both officially and privately.

4617. I see from a paper before me that your proposition to send out these men with the lower age standard was put forward on the 4th February?—Yes.

4618. And it was about March 12th that Lord Kitchener was applied to, and he accepted them?—Yes.

4619. So that there was about a month's delay?—About five weeks, I think, but every day was of very great importance to us then.

4620. Will you state the present condition of the *personnel* of the Army and Reserves?—It is very difficult to tell exactly what our deficit is in the different branches of the Army. My own opinion is, from the papers we got from Africa, that we will be very largely in excess in the cavalry—we are now. I think we are 3,000 or 4,000 over and above in the cavalry, but we are deficient in artillery, merely on account of the large increase in artillery, particularly Garrison Artillery. We are very much deficient, I should think, 2,000 or 3,000 in the medical services, and I think we will be from 17,000 to 20,000 deficient in the infantry of the line, and in addition there is a fictitious strength owing to the large extensions of service in India.

4621. When you say "deficient" what do you mean?—In establishment?

4622. In peace establishment?—Yes, that is what we are working on now. Then with regard to the Reserve, we are in a very bad way, and I do not see any great chance of an improvement in it. I should think, as far as we can calculate, our Reserve is now about 20,000, and I think for three Army Corps we require 150,000, at least; indeed, it has been estimated much higher.

4623. What was the Reserve at the beginning of the war?—The Reserve at the beginning of the war was about 80,000, but it was not at all sufficient.

4624. And now it has dropped to 20,000?—It has dropped to 20,000; of course, we have used it up, but that Reserve at the beginning of the war included 18,000 Section D Reserve, and there were also 30,000 Militia, and at one stroke of the pen they have been cleared out, they have been taken off; we cannot utilise them in future, they are no longer to be kept on the strength of the Army Reserve, and we will not be able to utilise them, as they are to be replaced by what is called a Reserve for the Militia. They will not be liable to be sent abroad.

4625. That is with the object of strengthening the Militia?—Yes, so that we lose for the Reserve of the Regular Army 30,000 men.

4626. Deducting that 30,000 from the 80,000 or 90,000 you mentioned at the beginning of the war, that would leave 50,000 or 60,000; what has become of the 50,000 in excess of the 20,000 you can still calculate upon?—I can explain it to you better in this way: We calculate that when an army, organised like ours, takes the field, if it is 100,000, out of that 100,000 we require from the Reserve 50,000, or about half.

4627. From the Reserve?—From the Reserve. Then during the next year—taking that period—if there are no very severe actions (in South Africa we had some relatively severe, but there was no very great loss in Africa compared to what we suffered in the Peninsula War) we want 50,000 more. That would make 100,000 in the six months' campaigning, and that would be about equal in percentage to what we sent out the first year. Some of the old men, of course, never come to anything, and there are the sick that are weeded out, but the youngsters are coming on that are sent to the depôt. It would never do to have anything less than one and a half times the strength we are supposed to send into the field. It would not be safe, I think, to keep an army in the field for a year unless we had one and a half times the strength of the fighting force in the Reserve.

4628. That is not quite the point I was putting. You spoke of having used up your reserve, which was 80,000 or 90,000 at the beginning of the war, or we had better say 60,000, so as to strike off these militiamen?—I must not mislead you. Although we had those 30,000 Militia, the whole of them were not called to the ranks, I think about 14,000 were called into the Army, and the remainder available went out with their Militia units.

4629. At any rate, you had as a reserve 80,000 or 90,000 at the beginning of the war?—Yes, 80,000, and the 30,000 Militia Reserve. It is now 20,000; it will probably be 40,000 in January, when the furlough men go to it.

4630. You say you have so much used it up that there will only be in January 20,000. What has become of the balance outside the Militiamen?—Well, a number were unfit, a great many were not medically fit, and there are still men serving abroad who are due to go to the Reserve.

4631. Were they struck off the Reserve in consequence?—Yes, they were struck off when they were examined and found not to be fit.

4632. I suppose a pretty large proportion of the 80,000 or 90,000 at least of those that were called up went out to the war?—Yes, they did; in the Guards we had more, and, as a matter of fact, in the Grenadiers we never used up the whole of their reserve.

4633. As to those men that went out, if they came home again they would revert to the Reserve?—They would if they had not completed their service, if they had not done the whole of their 12 years.

4634. That would not happen suddenly?—Oh, yes, two years might do it; say a man goes to the Reserve for five years when he has done his seven years' service, he is in the Reserve five years, and after three he is called out and does two, the war is over then, and he is done.

4635. Perhaps this is the explanation that during the war you could not send anybody to the Reserve?—It was stopped; there was no one to send into the Reserve.

4636. Now you will have to begin again and build up

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the Reserve in the same way as before?—We have to build it up, and we are relying, of course, on this three years' system that we have inaugurated, but as far as I can see we are not in a very safe position with regard to the Reserve, because to find the drafts for India and the Colonies we cannot make use of the three years' men, that is clear to everyone, so that the men must extend, and we require in order to be sure of filling up the drafts that about 75 per cent. of the men who enlist will extend, and we will only have the remainder. The remainder will be three years' men, and they will go to the Reserve, but it is not at all certain that we will have the Reserve that we want, and for that reason I was very averse to the abolition of the Militia Reserve till we could prove that we could get up a reserve. I myself am very doubtful about it, owing to the enormous number we want to find for drafts.

4637. I suppose the arrangement about the Militia Reserve is in order to keep up the efficiency of the Militia?—To please the Militia; the Militia colonels are very influential people, and I think it was done a good deal to please them. It was not done, in my judgment, for the good of the Army. We would find ourselves in a very difficult position if we had to mobilise now at the expense of those 30,000 men.

4638. The Militia proved itself a useful force during the war?—Excellent.

4639. So that anything which goes to their efficiency would be to the good?—It would; but you must weigh in all military questions for and against, and if it improves the Militia, which is not obliged to go abroad, it hurts the Army, which is obliged and must go abroad. If we declared war to-morrow, I suppose the first thing we would do would be to send an Army to attack some of the enemy's possessions, and I do not know where we would find it.

4640. Your point is that while it is of advantage to strengthen the Militia, it has been done by weakening the Reserves for the regular Army?—Yes.

4641. (*Viscount Esher.*) Was that change in the Militia Reserve approved by the Army Board?—I do not think it was a question that was discussed; I do not think the Army Board discussed it, but it was a question that certainly was not approved by myself or the Commander-in-Chief.

4642. It was decided against you?—It was discussed at the War Office Council, and I did all I could to prevent it being done, and I am afraid that I have written a good deal about it since; but, as a matter of fact, it is done.

4643. Was a majority of the War Office Council in favour of it?—As to the military members, I do not think there is any military member who has not the views I have about it.

4644. (*Chairman.*) Have you anything further to add about the Reserve?—About the Reserve I would like to add that we are weakening it again now further. When a man has served five years in the Reserve, after seven years with the colours, he can, if he wishes, under the present system go into what is called Section D for four years more. The decision of the Secretary of State now is to lessen that to two years, and in future he will only be two years, and I daresay it was done in a measure because Section D was not very highly reported upon during the war, but, as I said, I think that was not quite the fault of Section D so much as it was of the State not training them. Then it may be that they think there will be enough Reserve without them. Well, I have just given my opinion about that, that it is very questionable whether it will, and the real reason, in my opinion, why it was done, was to fill up the ranks of the garrison regiments, and these men, after they have done 14 years, that is, five with the colours, seven with the First Reserve, and then two in Section D, which is also the First Reserve, will not be allowed to go on any more, but they will be taken into the garrison regiments.

4645. After that?—Yes. You know the garrison regiments are regiments that are meant for the defence of the fortresses, and they will be allowed to serve in these.

4646. Until what age?—They enlist up to 40, and then they go on for two years; they are allowed to extend for one year, but they will not be taken after 40. These men will average 33 years when they have done with Section D the two years.

4647. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) That is assuming they join at 20?—Assuming they join between 18 and 20.

4648. (*Chairman.*) Was that point brought before the War Office Council?—Yes, it was up before the War Office Council.

4649. And approved by it?—It was not discussed except by myself and the Secretary of State, and he decided it was to be done. I put my views forward then, and I have written since; the Commander-in-Chief was not present that day, and for that reason I have written.

4650. The next question you mention is the Yeomanry?—Yes.

4651. There was a large expenditure in the Yeomanry?—And there is an enormous expenditure now; I think it is £19 or £20 a man.

4652. What is the exact position of the Yeomanry? Is it not now under conditions of service similar to those of the Militia?—Yes. I am not quite sure that the Bill has passed, but practically the Secretary of State is bringing a Bill before the House.

4653. I think it has passed?—They will be under a Militia Bill.

4654. It is part of the organisation of the home Army now?—It is part of the organisation of the home Army, but it is part of the organisation without any liabilities out of the kingdom. You cannot send a Yeoman abroad, and you must fall back on Volunteers as we did before. In a European war I cannot imagine anything more fatal than to depend on such a system. I do not mean a war like the Boer war, but a war that would be very sudden in its inception and execution, and to depend upon Volunteers would, I think, be fatal.

4655. But the Yeomanry are not exactly in the position of Volunteers now?—Oh, yes, you cannot send a single man of it out of the kingdom. You cannot send a militiaman.

4656. Exactly; they are in the position of the Militia?—Yes.

4657. There are provisions for the mobilisation of the Militia, are there not?—Yes, by proclamation you can call out the Militia.

4658. We were told yesterday that there were no provisions for the mobilisation of the Yeomanry?—We now call them out only in a case of national emergency, and when they come to call out the Volunteers they can call out the Yeomanry, but now every year the law allows us to call up the Militia for a certain training, for a month.

4659. And the Yeomanry?—Yes, but we cannot call out the Volunteers.

4660. I am confining you to the Yeomanry just now. With regard to the Yeomanry we were told yesterday that while there was a scheme for mobilisation of the Militia there was no scheme in the War Office for the mobilisation of the Yeomanry?—No, I believe that is so. The mobilisation schemes that I have had to do with were when I was Assistant Adjutant-General in the North of England, and the Yeomanry were not provided for.

4661. Of course, they could not be provided for until they were put into the same position?—No.

4662. But that is so now?—That is so now.

4663. We were informed that the War Office were not taking up the question of the preparation of any scheme for the mobilisation of the Yeomanry?—At present?

4664. No?—The mobilisation schemes are under the Director-General of Military Intelligence, and they do not come under me except to work them when war is declared.

4665. But you are not aware of any steps being taken?—No, I am not; but I may say on the whole question of the increase of the Yeomanry, I never saw that it was a useful expenditure compared to money being spent on the Regular Army, for the reason that we cannot make any use of them to go abroad. Their training first, even at the best, if we have them up for a fortnight (it used to be a week, but now it is to be a fortnight's training) is very, very imperfect. They are intelligent men, and the first lot of Yeomanry did very well in Africa owing to their intelligence, and owing also to the time, as they had a very long time to prepare; but for a European war, as I say, if we were

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to send an army out of the kingdom, first of all we would have to appeal to the Yeomanry to come, and secondly I do not think they would be very much use when they got with the Regular Army.

4666. Abroad?—They would not be of use to fight in line against European troops.

4667. Abroad?—Abroad.

4668. What about home defence?—For home defence they would be very useful as scouts, as they know the country, and a great many of them ride very well, and they would be very useful, particularly if we trained them as mounted infantry.

4669. That is the scheme, is it not?—It is very difficult to say; it has been changed two or three times.

4670. The scheme of training would come under your department, would it not?—Yes. At present the difficulty is that the Yeomanry do not like it as a rule. We want it, but there again the difficulty is to satisfy both sides, and make the Yeomanry popular with the men, and there is no doubt a very strong feeling against being considered, and not only considered, but trained as mounted infantry. There is a strong feeling in the Yeomanry in that direction, and to what extent that feeling will overcome the military wishes, namely, to train them as mounted infantry, it is very difficult to say.

4671. The alternative being to train them as cavalry as they used to be?—Yes. I suppose the Commission thoroughly understand that we cannot make any use of them to go abroad.

4672. We quite understand the position, and I think we must recognise it?—Quite so.

4673. It is part of the general complex nature of the Army system to which you allude?—Yes, the very complex system, so complex that I do not think there is any man in Europe who could administer it as it is; it gets more complex every day.

4674. You have no suggestions to make at all to meet that state of affairs?—Well, in some small ways. I think the military requirements and necessities should be the first conditions, and that is scarcely recognised. Very often in a small way the nephew of a constituent or somebody steps in, and something is done which, without one knowing it, causes serious complications afterwards—some favour given, some yielding on a point which causes fresh concessions to be asked for—that makes it so complex. There are very complex enlistments, garrison regiments, etc. I need not tell you the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers are all under different conditions, and that brings home to you what a complex machine it is.

4675. But that is inevitable with a voluntary system, is it not?—I am afraid it is inevitable in present conditions.

4676. (*Viscount Esher.*) As to the change that was made with regard to the Militia Reserve, who brought that matter before the War Office Council?—The Secretary of State, I think.

4677. He brought it up?—Yes, I think it possibly originated, as far as I know, with Lord Raglan. Lord Raglan, I am sure, had a very great voice in it because he was a very strong Militia officer, and he put it forward in the interests of the Militia; but, as far as I know, it was the Secretary of State who brought it forward at the Council.

4678. You discussed it at the Council?—Oh, yes.

4679. Did the Commander-in-Chief express an opinion at the War Office Council?—I cannot remember that, but I know, on the papers, he is against the procedure as far as I can remember.

4680. Did the Quartermaster-General express an opinion?—I do not think he was asked, as far as I can recollect.

4681. At the War Office Council he could have expressed an opinion if he had wished, could he not?—I think one could do it, but the usage is to wait until you are asked, except it is about something you are responsible for yourself; for instance, if they were discussing questions of establishment and training, neither the Director-General of Ordnance nor the Quartermaster-General would make any observations, except they were asked about them.

4682. You can hardly call what takes place at the War Office Council a discussion?—No; practically most of it is settled before the Council takes place at all, or after it.

4683. Then the War Office Council is nothing but a formal meeting at which certain statements are made?—And advice is given, which can be taken or not.

4684. Advice by whom?—If it is about this question that I am just speaking about, the question of the 30,000 Militia Reserve.

4685. Supposing Sir William Nicholson had held strong opinions upon that subject, could he have expressed them?—Yes, he would be asked, because mobilisation has a great deal to do with it.

4686. Take the Quartermaster-General, he might hold a very strong opinion upon that point, and he would not express it, as I understand?—I do not say he could not, but it is not the custom or usage, which is to wait until you are invited. Very often everybody is asked for an opinion, and there is a vote.

4687. There is no voting at the War Office Council, is there?—There is no voting, inasmuch as the majority do not carry it, but the Secretary of State might find that the whole of the opinion was contrary to his own.

4688. During the war there were Minutes of the Army Board printed; are the Minutes of the War Office Council printed now?—Yes, they are.

4689. Are the opinions recorded in the Minutes?—Yes, they are, in a short way; it says: "The Adjutant-General said so and so"; the opinions of those who give opinions are recorded in a brief manner, not very full, but quite sufficient to show that one was against the measure or for it.

4690. But you have never stated your opinion at the War Office Council unless you were asked?—I would not like to say that, because nearly every question that comes up before the War Office Council in some way or another is mixed up with the Adjutant-General. In the many questions that come up there is scarcely anything, whether it be clothing or training, but what is connected with my knowledge or responsibility, and therefore I do speak.

4691. Are we to understand that this question with regard to the Militia Reserve was decided by the Secretary of State against the advice of his military advisers?—Against the advice of the people who are mostly responsible, and that is against the advice of the Adjutant-General.

4692. And the Commander-in-Chief?—I do not know what the Commander-in-Chief wrote; I cannot remember that, but I have a very strong recollection that he supported me about it.

4693. Do you know what Sir William Nicholson's ideas are upon that subject?—Sir William Nicholson also, as far as I can remember, was against the abolition of the Militia Reserve.

4694. You attended the German manœuvres, did you not?—Yes.

4695. Did you form a very high opinion of the physical standard of the German soldier?—When you say the "physical standard," their ordinary infantry were not very much taller than ours, but I formed a very high opinion of their healthy, even appearance—that is, the ordinary infantry of the Army Corps. I am not now speaking of the Guards or the Third Army Corps, which is about Berlin and Potsdam, but I am speaking of one on the frontier of Poland and Russia, the Fifth Army Corps, whom you would not expect to be so good; I formed a very high opinion of their evenness and health; they were healthy lads. I do not think they were taller than ours.

4696. Do you think they compared favourably with our regular troops?—Certainly.

4697. Do you see any alternative, except a conscript army in some shape or form, to our present system?—No, I do not see any alternative.

4698. You can make no suggestion?—I see a very great difficulty, even if Parliament would consent to it, in having a conscription army, inasmuch as there is the difficulty of expatriating citizens, and I do not think we could do it; but what I think we might have is two armies—an army for home and to take the field in any part of the world in case of a war. The home army would be the conscription army, and I think the other army would have to be a highly paid army to go to India and to coaling stations and abroad.

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4699. Do you think that system would be less complex than the existing system?—Certainly, much less. I think the system would be less complex and the training would be better, and I think it would be better for everyone—certainly for the efficiency of the Army. For the State itself, that is not a question for me.

4700. Do you believe in raising the pay of the soldier to something like 2s. per day?—I have given my opinion that it will get us a few more—some more, or perhaps I may say a good many more—of the same class of men, but it will not give us the men I would like to have, and it will not admit of our training them as I would like to train them.

4701. You do not think that that will solve the problem of getting a sufficient number of men, and also solve the problem of the Reserve?—No, it will solve neither problem.

4702. It comes back to this—that you think something in the nature of a conscript army is the only solution?—It is the only solution if we are to be made secure. If we could keep out of foreign complications—if we could make perfectly certain of that—I think we might go on as we are, but if there is the slightest chance of our ever having to make an attack and to fight a European army, I think we must have a conscription army.

4703. With regard to the War Office, you talked about the interference of the civil side?—No, I do not say of the civil side—I would call it the political side. As to the officers belonging to the civil branch of the War Office, I think they are very far from interfering.

4704. We will call it the political side; they interfere and over-rule you on all questions where finance comes in?—Yes.

4705. That one can understand, but do you meet with the same interference upon purely military questions where finance does not come in?—Well, I daresay there is scarcely any military question which is not more or less mixed up with finance; I scarcely know any question; training a regiment on Salisbury Plain is mixed up with finance; it is a question of expenditure. In the same way with manœuvres, or the purchase of ground for manœuvres, purchase of ground for ranges, establishments of officers and non-commissioned officers and men—they are all finance; it is a great deal of training, but it is a very great deal of finance.

4706. Are there any regulations issued by the Commander-in-Chief and Adjutant-General for the Army which are not referred to the Secretary of State, or to the political side?—Yes, the Secretary of State would never think of interfering if we said that instead of drawing back the right foot when you faced to the right, you ought to draw back the left foot, or how you ought to do the sword exercise; but if it was a question of whether you should shoot 100 rounds or 110, then the Financial Secretary and the Secretary of State come in, and I may say there, I do not want to put it on them, because the Chancellor of the Exchequer rules them to a great extent.

4707. Yesterday we heard some criticisms as to the annual inspection at Sandhurst. I only give you this as an illustration: Supposing the inspections by the General Officer have not been satisfactory, and required altering in some way, is not that a question which could be decided by the military side without any reference to the Secretary of State?—Certainly, unless it became a matter of public notoriety. If it was a question of an officer being got rid of, then it would have to go to the Secretary of State, because it will have to go to the King, and the only one that can present that to the King is the Secretary of State.

4708. Take, again, the training of a young officer when he joins his regiment, it is considered by some people that too much leave is granted, for example, to officers, and that the young officers are not kept hard enough at work. All that is within the competence of the military side of the War Office?—All that was within the competence of the military authority; but, again, we had not got the machine to work with. As I told you, over one-third of the men are away, so that there is a captain and a couple of subalterns, with about 30 men to train, instead of their full establishment of 80 or 90. These men are always away from them. There is a great deal of slack time in the Army at small stations, because we have not the machine, and at the same time we must keep the quota of officers, or we may have the difficulties I have just explained to you about filling up the establishment of officers when we mobilise.

4709. Yes, but I am specially on the point of the War Office administration?—Yes, we can do anything like that; we can do anything that does not cost money, if of small importance.

4710. Do you consider you have to refer to the Secretary of State more papers and more questions than you need refer?—When I came back to the War Office, having been away in South Africa since 1899, nothing struck me more than the congestion of the work and the number of things that have to go up to the Secretary of State that formerly did not.

4711. Some of them trivial?—Trivial things and answers to questions and little notes about things, instead of being sent down to be dealt with, have all to go up to him; he is the only man who decides most things, and the work becomes congested.

4712. I have only one more question: Have you ever been called before the Defence Committee of the Cabinet?—Never; I do not know anything about it.

4713. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You alluded to the alteration made in 1899 or 1900, by which the Adjutant-General became again a sort of staff officer to the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes, that was in 1901.

4714. He was so before 1895, was he not? He was considered the staff officer to the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes, he was, but he was both; he was the staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief, but he also dealt directly with the Secretary of State. He occupied then the same position as the Quartermaster-General does now or the Director-General of Ordnance; the Director-General of Ordnance and the Quartermaster-General have practically two masters, the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief. They tell the latter what they like; they consult the Commander-in-Chief when they wish, or have direct access to the Secretary of State.

4715. In the old days did the Adjutant-General have direct access to the Secretary of State, say, 20 years ago?—No.

4716. When did he first have access to the Secretary of State?—When I first joined the War Office he had not; the Commander-in-Chief was the military adviser to the Secretary of State, but the Secretary of State frequently sent for them. I myself, although I was only a colonel—a subordinate—was often sent for by Mr. Campbell-Bannerman when he was Secretary of State; in those days the Secretary of State consulted a good many, although they had no access to him.

4717. But you do not think that was the case in former days, say in the Duke of Cambridge's time, 20 years ago?—I am talking of the Duke of Cambridge's time—in 1893.

4718. But 20 years ago?—I do not know; I was not in the War Office, but I do not think it was, and then he only sent for you to get first information. In those days I was in charge of A. G. 4, that is the discipline branch of the Army, and there used to be questions before the House of Commons that the Secretary of State wished to have information first hand about, not through a number of channels.

4719. We had it in evidence yesterday that even in those days, when the Adjutant-General was supposed to have access to the Secretary of State direct, he was not allowed to go there; the Commander-in-Chief did not approve of his going there unless he was sent for, and then he used to tell the Commander-in-Chief?—Well, that was against the Order in Council, or my reading of the Order in Council. I do not know if it took place.

4720. Do you think the men of the British Army are worse now than they were in the early days of your service in point of physique?—No, they are about the same. Of course, we see now, owing to the short service system, more of the youths than we did, but I think, practically, we get the same sort of men, the same class and the same physique. I do not know much difference in it.

4721. And you are alluding to a time when long service was in force?—Yes.

4722. You do not think they have fallen off much?—No.

4723. Do you know whether the wastage was as great

in those days, 30 years ago, as it is now?—I do not think the wastage was so great.

4724. Apart from short service, I mean?—I have not got the statistics, and I should not like to give a statement. I will get any statistics you like, but it had not struck me that you would ask me about the wastage of the old army. I would be able to bring you or send you any statistics if you told me what you wished.

4725. You were talking of the large number of men employed away from duties as soldiers in every regiment?—Yes.

4726. Are you aware whether a similar system attains in the German and French armies, of having a number of men on fatigue, to carry coal, and so on?—Yes, but I think in addition to that they train them more—in addition to their doing fatigue. As I say, with a voluntary army you cannot do both, as they would not stand it. The German men who do their work, say, in the morning, are drilled in the afternoon.

4727. Do you know anything about the United States Army?—I do. I have never been there, but I have been in constant communication with American officers and with our own military attachés.

4728. Have they been very well trained? Have they had much training?—No.

4729. Are you aware that they have a great deal more fatigue duties than the men in the British Army?—No, I am not aware of that; very possibly they have, but, I suppose, they are paid for it. If they have, it points to their not being trained.

4730. Do you think it would be possible to start a good and practicable system of giving the men in the Reserve a certain amount of training every year?—I think there will be two difficulties you will have to meet; there will be the political difficulty and the financial difficulty. I do not think they will like it. I do not mind the men who serve seven years with the colours. I do not think they will require very much training in the Reserve, but the men who only serve three years certainly ought to be trained every year for at least 10 days.

4731. May that not operate against their obtaining employment—their employers not liking it?—Yes, it will hurt them; it will be a financial difficulty, as I say; and there will be the economical difficulty, as it will interfere with their employment.

4732. I think you said that the system of reserving to the Army registered horses in case of war, the system introduced some time ago, was successful?—Well, I only speak of the mobilisation of the Army at Aldershot when I mobilised the Cavalry Brigade, and certainly the horses were excellent, and the commanding officers were absolutely satisfied with them, but the question of the remounts afterwards I am quite ready to speak about. I suppose you will examine me about that in connection with my South African experience, although I am quite ready to answer now.

4733. I think that will come later, but if it was successful at Aldershot I think we may assume—you had a considerable body of artillery and cavalry there—it must probably have been successful at other places?—Yes; all the artillery and the cavalry at Aldershot, when they were mobilised, were splendidly mounted, in my opinion.

4734. You mentioned that you thought the losses in action in South Africa were not at all equal in proportion to the losses in action in the Peninsula?—I do not think so.

4735. Was not that probably made up by the excessive amount of enteric and perhaps dysentery that the troops had in Africa which disabled so many?—There again it is a question of statistics.

4736. But there were an enormous number of men who suffered from enteric?—Enormous; I had in my own hospitals at Bloemfontein at one time 3,000 men down with enteric. I gave evidence before the Hospitals Commission that went out to Africa on the medical question. When we get the men they are not healthy men. I do not think they are a strong class of men. I have said that in my evidence before the South African Hospitals Commission.

4737. Did you notice that the officers were more exempt from enteric than the men?—Yes, it was very striking; I think nothing struck me so much as the physical advantages of the officers and their strength. On the other hand, they had not the enormous weights; they did not carry the amount of ammunition that the men did; and, generally speaking, they were better fed. At first during my march they were not; they all had the same, but the officers stood out remarkably well compared with the men with regard to their physique and strength and their freedom from disease. I daresay the medical people would be able to tell you more about it from the hospital statistics than I can, as I only know it with reference to my own commands.

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4738. Were these officers, do you think, living in much the same way as the soldiers were—with the same food, and so on?—When they got on to the line of the railway and into towns the officers were better off, but from the time my force left the Modder until we got to Bloemfontein there was no difference whatever between the men's food and the officers', and still the officers, I think, showed up favourably.

4739. (*Chairman.*) They would be more careful about water, and that sort of thing?—More sensible, yes; they had more self-control.

4740. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) There was some mention of Section D of the Reserve, and apparently some people think that they were inferior to the other classes. I understand from you that the period of service in the D Section is intended to be reduced?—Yes, it is to be reduced by half.

4741. Do you not think that is partly due to the expense arising from D men being employed; a great number of cases have come before me at Chelsea, a very great number, and these D men, if they break down on service, or as a consequence of service, are allowed to count their reserve service for pension?—Yes.

4742. They may have had several years' reserve service and then have gone out and lost an arm or got enteric, and they are pensioned, and all that service they pass in the Reserve counts for pension, which is a special privilege given to the D Section, and I was under the impression that there was rather a desire, therefore, to get rid of them?—No; my impression is that the cutting down of the Reserve service in Section D is meant to fill the ranks of the garrison regiments.

4743. Do you think the garrison regiments are intended to be kept up as a permanent institution?—I am sorry to say they are to be; there again I have written and recommended that it should not be a permanent institution, but I am afraid it is to be considered a permanent institution. There are now five of them, and of course they are nearly all married, and I represented that even the public would very soon find fault when they knew the truth about these garrison regiments; there are 2,700 wives and families separated from them and living in England, while their husbands are in Malta, Gibraltar, Bermuda, and Halifax.

4744. And there is no possibility of the wives going there?—There is no possibility of providing quarters for them, and even if there were, a fortress is the worst place on earth to have a lot of women and children, as the very moment war was declared you would have to turn them out.

4745. You were speaking of the possible necessity of some form of conscription, and you seemed quite to realise the great difficulty there would be in carrying that out; but supposing you did carry it out, would there not be another difficulty that very possibly Parliament might upset it after a short time and revert to a voluntary army? There would be great opposition to the carrying of it out, and there would be constant opposition after it had been carried out?—Of course, that is a political question, but I should say that it would be quite the reverse, and that the people in the country and Parliament would be astonished that they had not done it before.

4746. You think it would be received almost gratefully by the people?—I think very gratefully, particularly so if we escaped from some disaster throughout.

4747. I suppose when you think they would receive it gratefully you assume that the foreign army would not be included in the conscription?—The Indian Army certainly not, except to fight; I suppose if we had a war on the frontier of Russia we would have to send out an army, and of course that would be an army from home. That would be calling up the Reserves and sending out an army wherever we liked as long as there was war.

4748. But for all ordinary service and small wars, such as we are constantly having in India and in Africa now, you would not employ the conscription army?—I should

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not certainly to begin with; I would aim at it in the end, but I think it would help us, it would make it more palatable, to avoid taking those liabilities at first.

4749. Would you keep the non-conscripted army always on foreign service, or would you let them have a turn at home?—The voluntary army would all be for foreign service.

4750. Entirely?—All.

4751. Do you think troops would remain as efficient if they knew they were local Indian troops, or local troops in some colony or another, and had not their turn at home as an Army which serves all over the world and takes service in England?—I would rather have it the other way, but it is a choice of evils.

4752. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Do you find that the troops who have returned from the war have become more intelligent than they were previous to the war?—I have no experience, because since I came home from the war I have mostly been in the office, where the intelligence of the men would not come before me, but it would be reasonable to expect that they were, and that they had learned a good deal.

4753. Did you while in the field find that the war improved the men as to their intelligence—that they became more intelligent as they served?—Yes, it has improved the men that were shot at, but I do not think it improved much the man who was not shot at—the new lot coming out, we will say, or the men who had not the experience.

4754. Had you command of any of the over-sea troops—the Colonial over-sea troops?—Yes.

4755. Australians, New Zealanders, and Canadians?—Yes.

4756. Were they under your command?—Yes, they were not actually with me in the fights at Klip Drift, Paardeberg, and Driefontein. There were no Colonials with me.

4757. The Canadians were?—The Canadians were with me in the fight, but they were not in my division.

4758. Had you any opportunity of seeing the class of men they were, as to intelligence and mental power?—Yes, I think they were superior to our men, not perhaps in discipline and training, but in intelligence.

4759. You could not expect them to be in discipline and training equal to your men?—No.

4760. But they were intelligent men?—Yes, and they are healthy.

4761. Is it not possible to get the same class of men in England?—Well, we had; our Yeoman were; that is to say, the first lot of Yeomanry that went out. Those were what I would call the men who went out through patriotism in the end of 1899 and beginning of 1900; but as to the other lots of Yeomanry, and also the other lots of Colonials, for I do not think there is very much difference, I think we had to buy them, and rather dearly, too. With the first lot it was not a question of buying, and they came with a rush through patriotism, but after that it was a question of buying.

4762. You had to pay a high wage?—Yes, we purchased.

4763. Do you know about what quantity of Regular troops remain in South Africa now?—Yes, roughly, about 40,000.

4764. Will any of these return, or will they be a permanent force there?—Yes, they are returning every day now. Do you mean units or individuals?

4765. I mean what force of Regulars will be kept in South Africa?—At present it has been arranged to keep between 38,000 and 40,000, and up to the present that is the fixed garrison; but it is merely a temporary garrison. Next year, perhaps, Lord Milner and the Secretary of State for the Colonies may decide that 12,000 will do, but at present we are to keep between 38,000 and 40,000 men there.

4766. To go to another subject, you were asked in reference to the Commander-in-Chief having more power and as to his right to protest against adverse decision of the Secretary of State; does it not occur to you that that would bring about considerable friction between these two high officials?—Very great; in fact, one of them would have to go, I suppose.

4767. It would be very undesirable that there should be such a power of protest against the Secretary of State's decision?—It would be very desirable, and that the thing should be known by some other authority, say the Cabinet.

4768. They could not remain; one must go?—One must go.

4769. You might have that frequently occurring?—Well, I think good might come out of it if one or two went one after another.

4770. The one who would go would probably be the Commander-in-Chief?—I do not know, but I suppose he naturally would.

4771. Would the Secretary of State take any important course over-ruling the Commander-in-Chief without a decision of the Cabinet?—I do not know whom the Secretary of State consults. All I know is that the Commander-in-Chief's recommendations are over-ruled, but I cannot tell who suggests it, or whether the Secretary of State consults the Cabinet, his secretary, or anybody else.

4772. Would not the better course be, as the Commander-in-Chief has got the confidence of the King, of the Cabinet, and of the people, that his recommendations as to what is necessary for the efficiency of the Army should be decisive and final, and that he should not be over-ruled?—Well, of course it might happen that the Chancellor of the Exchequer could not possibly find the money; Parliament comes in a good deal there and the Exchequer. I do not think you could make it final, because then there would be not much use of the Secretary of State, but if it was known, even if the Cabinet knew, and if the Commander-in-Chief had the right——

4773. I am only speaking of the efficiency of the Army?—The efficiency of the Army, of course, means the increase of material and *personnel*, and an enormous expenditure, and I do not know that the Commander-in-Chief's fiat under our Constitution should be final, and I do not think it could.

4774. You spoke about the officers, perhaps a captain and three subalterns, having only 30 men to teach or drill; is not that equally bad for the officers as for the men? Ought not the officers to have a larger number than that to teach?—Yes, but you see the men are employed on these duties that I have mentioned.

4775. Is it not the fact that having so small a number of men to teach is bad for the officers also?—It is not the officers' fault.

4776. I know it is not, but is it not bad for them so far as they themselves require teaching?—Oh, yes; the more they get within certain limits the better they are. I should not like to make actual machines of them, and to eliminate all the initiative and sporting instincts out of them.

4777. But if they had a whole company or a whole squadron to teach, you think it would be far better for them?—If they had more opportunity for useful work—certainly.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

4778. (*Sir John Edge.*) With regard to matters that you wish to bring before the War Office Council, I suppose you are not precluded from expressing a wish that a matter should come before the War Office Council. When you send forward a memorandum—I mean to the Commander-in-Chief—you can state that you desire it to be brought before the War Office Council?—I think it would not be quite proper for me to do that. I could suggest to him when handing the memorandum to him that the subject should be brought before the War Office Council, but I should leave the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether that was the case.

4779. You mean, that there is nothing to preclude your suggesting it to him, though you would not put it on the face of the memorandum itself?—Yes, I frequently have suggested it to the Commander-in-Chief, and he always concurs with it; there is no difficulty in getting the Commander-in-Chief to suggest that it should be brought before the War Office Council. As a matter of fact, the questions that I have asked him to bring before the War Office Council are brought before the War Office Council.

4780. That has been your experience?—Yes.

4781. You told us that in the Embassies here the officers in the Embassies were all Reserve officers; in

the German Embassy, for instance, they are Reserve officers of the German Army?—And the Austrian.

4782. Would not that naturally follow? Has not everyone in Germany to go through the army—every able-bodied man?—That is so. I was endeavouring to explain how it was that we had a great difficulty in finding officers for the Reserve. But our diplomats and our secretaries in the Legations abroad are not officers in the Reserve.

4783. But, of course, they would be officers in the Reserve if we have universal conscription?—Certainly.

4784. Because they would be liable if they were physically capable?—Yes, it is part of the whole machine.

4785. As I understand you, you are anxious that the British Army should be composed of men from all strata of society?—Yes.

4786. And not from the lower stratum alone?—No.

4787. And that, in your opinion, would tend to strengthen the Army as a fighting body?—It is our only safety.

4788. Have you had much experience of the French Army?—I have been several times in France. The year before last I spent a good part of the winter in the South of France, and I saw a good deal of the Army Corps in the Maritime Alps.

4789. Do you happen to know whether the lower orders of the French are better educated than our lower orders? Do you know what the system of education is? Is it compulsory education?—I do not know much about their system of education.

4790. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I think you told us that, as Adjutant-General, you are now under the control of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

4791. Not merely under his supervision?—No.

4792. And that any suggestions you wished to put forward to the Secretary of State would have to go through the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

4793. You also indicated that you found that many good suggestions of the Commander-in-Chief had not been treated by the Secretary-of-State with the respect that one might have expected?—I do not know that I said respect. They were not carried out.

4794. They did not receive the attention they ought to have had?—I do not even say attention; they may have received a good deal of attention. The result was that they were not carried out.

4795. They were not adopted?—No.

4796. Now, in your opinion, would it have better results if the War Office business were conducted more on the lines of the Admiralty—by a Board?—I am not thoroughly acquainted with the Admiralty system; but I think that the idea of the Army Board and the War Office Council and a Selection Board were all provided for with the view of working up to that Admiralty system.

4797. But we were told the other day that the Army Board rarely meet?—No. I do not think it has met since the last Estimates. We very rarely meet.

4798. I take it that matters of importance in the ordinary way of your work at the War Office go through the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State, and are at once dealt with by him?—I must say that there are a great many small financial points that I do not trouble the Commander-in-Chief with; they go straight to the Accountant-General and the Financial Secretary.

4799. Quite so, but matters, I say, in the regular way of business, but still matters of importance, would go to the Secretary of State without coming before either the Army Board or the War Office Council?—Yes, certainly.

4800. What I suggest is whether matters of that kind would not be better dealt with if they were dealt with by a board, with the Secretary of State, of course, having his veto on anything that was decided by that board, which is really, as I understand it, much on the same lines as the Admiralty?—But it would come to the same thing, that in the end they must all go to the Secretary of State. As I explained, that very question may be the subject of a discussion in Parliament. It has eventually to go to the Secretary of State, so that whether the Army Board or the Adjutant-General or the Commander-in-Chief had the initiative in it, in the end it all goes up to him.

4801. Take a case now. Supposing that you, through the Commander-in-Chief, put forward some very valuable suggestion, but the Secretary of State does not take to it, and it is at once shelved, if that matter were brought before a board of officers and men, say, although the Secretary of State could have his veto, he yet would not act until he heard the opinions of the members of that particular board. There is where I suggest the advantage would come in?—You mean that, in addition to the Adjutant-General recommending it, the Army Board should recommend it?

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4802. No, in other words, as I understand, you have referred to the Army Board mainly questions of appointments?—The Selection Board deals with appointments practically; the Army Board, as I say, has not sat since last year's Estimates.

4803. Then you have referred them to the War Office Council?—Yes, to the War Office Council.

4804. I understand that the War Office Council does not deal with the ordinary routine business in the Office. If you have something to put forward, you pass it to the Commander-in-Chief, and it goes to the Secretary of State for his approval, and is settled?—If the Secretary of State likes to settle it he can, but if he wishes to consult the War Office Council he consults them.

4805. That is just my point. He can settle the matter right away, and if he has a decided opinion no doubt he does, without consulting the War Office Council. I suggest whether it would not have better business results if those points, instead of being put direct from the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State, were put to a board?—I think that it might delay matters very much. What might be done is that if the Secretary of State did not wish to take my advice and the Commander-in-Chief's upon any particular question, I think it would help if, instead of deciding against it, he was to send it back to the Army Board for their opinion.

4806. But I put it, rather, whether in your opinion it would not be better if, instead of going direct to the Secretary of State, these matters went to a board sitting every day, if you like, to decide the ordinary questions that turn up, and transact the ordinary business of importance in the department?—I do not think that would help, because the personal responsibility would be eliminated; and everything that the Adjutant-General recommends he ought to be prepared to bear the responsibility of, and not shelter himself under the opinion of a board.

4807. But in that case I suggest that the Adjutant-General would still be responsible for the suggestion, whether it was approved by the board or not?—I do not think it would do any good; I think it would delay matters very much. But I think it would do good if the Secretary of State, before he absolutely refused anything, sent it back, not to me or the Commander-in-Chief, but for advice to the Army Board. But that is just what in theory is supposed to be done now with regard to the War Office Council.

4808. But which in practice is apparently not done?—No.

4809. With regard to recruits, you state that we are badly off for recruits of the proper class, and that you really had to fall back upon the waifs and strays. In point of fact, in your opinion, we require a better type of man, a man better physically and better intellectually than the class of man we get from the lowest classes of the large towns to a great extent?—Yes, I think, as I have said often in the course of my examination, that we would do better to get them from the general class of the population—a mixture of the population—than from the present class. We fail to tap the middle class.

4810. I think you indicated that you thought that even an increase of pay up to 3s. or 4s. a day would not attract the right men?—Yes. I think, so far as one can judge, that the ordinary British men of the lower middle classes, say, do not care about military life. I think 3s. or 4s. a day would not reconcile them to be sentries over, say, the officers' house at Portsmouth. I do not think they would care for that long. They do not dislike war, but I do not think they like the ordinary routine military life.

4811. It would go just a shade lower. At the present time, as you said, you are getting recruits mostly from, shall we say, the lowest stratum of the working classes in the large towns?—Put it the idle classes; I think that would do; they are really classes generally without regular work.

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4812. I suggest that the class from which the Army is largely recruited at the present time is a class of men who find a difficulty in earning a living, men with a lack of independence, who look upon the Army as a place of safety, where they know they will get, at any rate, their bread and butter, and therefore they enlist?—Yes, the great body of them.

4813. You agree that that is the style of men you get?—Yes.

4814. Well, now, if you went a little higher, and you wish to attract the man who either becomes a thoroughly respectable labourer or a mechanic, take the case of what we might term a thoroughly respectable labourer, a man who has probably been better fed than these lower class men, and who earns, as a rule, in England something between 25s. and 30s. a week; do not you think, particularly amongst the younger men of that class, there would be a great liking for soldiering, provided they could get even a little less, as a certainty than the 24s. or 25s. a week, supposing that the Army pay came up to something like 3s. a day, or 2s. 6d. a day?—We do get that class nearly in the Engineers at present.

4815. Yes, the Engineers are better paid men?—Yes, and we do get that class, but there is a limit to it, I think. I do not think even if we gave that pay that we could get up to the Army Establishment from that class of men.

4816. I take it that you would be better if you got the class of the good agriculturist type into the Army?—Well, the townsmen of a good education and good surroundings are quite as good as the agriculturist, in fact I think they are rather sharper.

4817. It does appear that to a great extent, at any rate, it is a question of pay, and if the pay could be increased sufficiently I suggest that there would be little doubt that you would get a better type of man?—Yes, the more you increase the pay, of course, the better it will be, but as I said before, to fill the Army, to fill the ranks, I do not see any reasonable amount. I think 5s. a day would be an unreasonable amount to give. I think the country will have to judge, and the Commission will have to judge, when the breaking point comes in, whether you can go on increasing the pay or beginning conscription.

4818. And I take it that it is your opinion, as you stated in your evidence, that you must have your soldier not a mere part of a machine, but he must be an intelligent man?—Yes.

4819. Now with regard to what you have suggested about conscription; do you not think that it is a very fine thing for this country to feel that its Army is a voluntary army. I think we do not see that in any other country, do we?—I do not know whether you call it a voluntary army when you suggest yourself that men are enlisted because they have no means of livelihood. I should not say that that was a voluntary army.

4820. If you got your men of good physique, your well-fed men, your better class labourer, enlisting simply for his liking for soldiering, do you not think he would make a much better soldier than a man brought into the ranks under conscription?—You see we get them now, but in limited numbers; we get a certain number, as the conditions of service are very attractive.

4821. Then do you find those men specially good men?—Yes, they are especially good men, but the class is limited, the numbers are limited.

4822. How does the pay in the American Army compare with the pay in our Army?—It is much better.

4823. To what extent. Is it 50 per cent. better?—Their rations are better, they get a great deal more food, and as to the pay, I should not think it was 50 per cent. better, but it is difficult to say; I doubt if it is quite up to 50 per cent. better. But they have no Reserve; they have no further liabilities; after they have done their three years they are not called upon to fight in the Reserve. Their food, their clothing, their barracks, all that is much better than ours.

4824. But for the English soldier who goes in at 1s. or 1s. 3d. a day is it?—Yes, and in prospective it will be more again; our men will be able to get 1s. 11d.

4825. But at the present time it is 1s. to 1s. 3d. a day?—Yes, with the extra 2d. for up-keep of kit to meet stoppages.

4826. Has he much to pay out of that; what does it come to net?—No, he has not much to pay now. Something is constantly being done towards lessening the soldiers' expenses. There used to be a lot of small charges, but now they are practically done away with. He gets his food free and his messing free, he gets clothes, barrack accommodation, he gets a great deal; but still he does not jump at it.

4827. I suggest that even if he got the full 1s. a day without any deductions, to a man of good physique, who could go out anywhere and earn his 25s. a week, it is not a very attractive profession at that rate?—Two shillings a day?

4828. No; I mean that in very good employment he would earn his 24s. or 25s. a week as a first class labourer, so that the Army, even if he got 1s. a day net, is not a very attractive profession to him?—No, they certainly do not think it so. But you see we have it in our power, if the men come, to make the conditions anything we like. If we find that these new conditions of pay take, and that the men come, we can alter the standard and alter the qualifications. We can go so far as to say we will not take any man who does not speak Greek: we can keep on altering the conditions.

4829. Then you referred to the difficulty in inducing people to give employment to Reservists?—Not people; I have no fault to find with the public.

4830. But the Government departments?—Yes, I have had great difficulty.

4831. We had it in evidence a few days ago that some of the Reservists who had been put into the work of civil clerks had shown that they were thoroughly incapable of dealing with that kind of work?—Possibly.

4832. Do you see any particular reason why you do not find the average soldier, the Reservist, good for much else but soldiering?—You yourself suggested the reason. We get them because they cannot get a livelihood; we get them before they have ever done a day's work, the great body of them.

4833. Now I personally have employed Reservists, pensioners from both the Army and the Navy, but we find a great difficulty; we do not find it applicable to the Navy pensioners so much. Can you explain how it is that a man from the same class who has got into the Army, when he leaves it is not useful, while the Navy pensioner is really in many cases a very useful man?—I hear that, and I believe there is a great deal in it; and I think I can account for it from the fact that the Navy get their men when they are boys, and they train them up and educate them themselves—a very high class of education comparatively; and they are fed from the time they are children, and their physique is good and their training is good. We could not afford to do that in the Army. The question of recruiting the Army from boys in schools has been often thought of and discussed. I think it was discussed by two or three Commissions, and it has been found to be so enormously expensive, and there were other difficulties connected with it. In the Navy they make use of a boy on board ship—a boy can do almost as much as a man; but in the Army we could not get the same work out of him. He could not carry his rifle and his pack and his ammunition about like a man, but I think in the Navy they find that the boys can do a great deal.

4834. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) You returned to the War Office in October, 1901, as Adjutant-General. Were any demands for troops for South Africa made after that upon your department, or had they ceased; because you say in the *précis* of your evidence, "large drafts, including 1,200 Guards, were placed under orders, and I urged the continuance of drafts being sent out"?—Yes, that is so.

4835. Were any demands made upon you after that?—Looking back to the papers, I find that in March, 1901, Lord Kitchener made a demand, and it was not immediately met, in fact that their despatch was deprecated; so that his requirements were not met until August; but in the minutes on the papers the Military side of the War Office were prepared to send a considerable number; but they were not sent until August.

4836. And you had no difficulty in preparing drafts—you had sufficient men?—Well, there appeared to have been sufficient; there were a great many that I was able to send when I became Adjutant-General.

4837. In fact, you had not come to the end of your resources in troops?—We had these men as they matured, but they would not have done if we had not

had all these odds and ends in addition. For example, there was an enormous force of Yeomanry sent out about the same time, and then there were Colonials constantly going. We would have come to the end of our tether if we had not had extraneous aid.

4838. You spoke of the mobilisation being promptly made in every respect. Did that refer also to your 6th Division, which you mobilised?—Yes. One of my infantry battalions was under establishment; it came from one of the districts where the population is not very great, and they had not the Reservists, so we went out weak; but otherwise my battalions were fairly strong, nearly up to establishment.

4839. Were your stores and equipment all right?—Yes.

4840. In fact, in mobilising the 6th Division you had very little to complain of except shortage of officers, and so on?—I had nothing to complain of beyond what I have said. The division was mobilised without any trouble. So far as it went it was equipped properly.

4841. Was your 6th Division part of the 2nd Army Corps?—There were no such things as Army Corps except nominally for mobilisation; the organisation did not provide for one Army Corps or two Army Corps. My 6th Division was first mobilised as reinforcements to Sir Redvers Buller.

4842. I ask the question, because we have heard of the rule that was laid down for two Army Corps being kept ready for mobilisation?—Yes, that was the idea in those days.

4843. But it was not worked up to?—No, it was not provided for.

4844. You speak of the unnecessary numbers of Yeomanry for home defence; do you happen to know what the total number of Yeomanry is, or should be?—I think at present it is about 22,000, but it is intended to have it 35,000.

4845. And I think you told us before that they are an expensive corps?—They are expensive in comparison to their military value.

4846. In the South African War, did the initiative for sending more troops rest with the War Office, or did it belong really to the General in the field to ask for them?—With the War Office. The General in the field, so far as I can gather from the papers, asked for them twice. I think it was after Paardeberg that Lord Roberts telegraphed for troops, and then Lord Kitchener afterwards asked for them. But we know the wastage, and it practically is not necessary for anyone to ask; we have to keep pushing them out.

4847. Putting conscription for the moment on one side as impracticable, do you think that the Militia, made up to 200,000 men by ballot, would be practicable and useful?—It would be both practicable and useful, but it would not supply an army to take the field, and it would not be highly enough trained; neither would it assist the Adjutant-General in finding garrisons for India and the coaling stations. I could not send one of them out.

4848. No, I was rather in my mind going beyond the question of the Regular Army, which is fixed at a certain amount, which is a Cabinet question, of course; but outside of that, if you could have some reserve at your back which would help you in case of an invasion, it would be a good thing?—It would be a good thing.

4849. And would, say 200,000 Militia, instead of the present number, aid you in that event?—And there again the Army, you see, will suffer a little; a great many, in fact, I think most, of our recruits come through the Militia.

4850. You see you would get a great many by ballot that would not come in the ordinary way into the Militia?—It would be a very useful force, except that there are two things which would suggest themselves to me against it; one is that we could not send them abroad, and the other is, their training would not be sufficient.

4851. In the ordinary regimental work, where one-third of the men are doing other duties, that third, I presume, come in at one time and another for drills and exercises?—They come in for their musketry—they nearly all do their musketry; but they do not get very much for drill; they get some, but a very small amount. Of course no one would be put to any work like that who had not done his recruits' drill, but they do not get sufficient.

4852. Would it not be possible to arrange that, so that the third of the regiment, required for that sort of work, should do it, say after the middle of the day, when the stress of the drills was over, and so on?—Do the fatigues, do you mean?

4853. Yes?—They would very soon leave. They will not stay if you work them like that. They will not do both. You will not get them, or if you get them they will leave.

4854. In fact, they will not be overworked?—No.

4855. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I will not take you again into the question of any form of compulsion for military service, because you have said a good deal about it already; let us assume for the moment that that is impossible, and that we have to continue somewhat on the same lines as we have done in the past. You will agree that on that system there must be some limit of money spent by the nation?—Yes.

4856. When that limit is reached, would you prefer that that sum of money was spent on having, as we have had in the past, a large paper army or a small effective army?—I would prefer the small and effective army.

4857. I think before the war we had a very large paper army, had we not?—Yes.

4858. Our forces at home, in India, and abroad?—Yes.

4859. And our Militia and Yeomanry?—Yes.

4860. And I think our Volunteers were always before Parliament, too?—Yes.

4861. Do you not think that tends to give the nation a sense of confidence which is not justified?—Yes, false confidence.

4862. False security?—Quite.

4863. Do you not think, perhaps, the first military reform wanted until some form of compulsory service can be produced, is that the Estimates should be based solely on an absolutely effective army?—Yes, I think that is the first point to settle—that the Regular Army must be made perfect before we spend much money on the others.

4864. And that we shall not have put forward large numbers of ineffective troops, untrained troops, and troops without transport or equipment?—Certainly.

4865. I wish to ask you about the Volunteers. Have they at present transport for war to any large extent?—There has been a good deal done, and as they are not supposed to go abroad, I think we would manage to put them into the field in this country with the aid of the transport that exists, for the civil population, our railways and carriers, and other means. It would be better of course if we could organise it more, but there has been a great deal done, and I think they are not quite so helpless with regard to transport as is generally thought.

4866. And as regards equipment?—The reserve of equipment I am not quite sure about, but the equipment itself that they have, their personal eqipment, their armament, appears to me to be good enough.

4867. And as regards training?—The training is deficient. We are trying now under great difficulties to get a little more, but the Volunteers in some parts of the country do not like it, and in other parts of the country they like it. In the Metropolitan area, these new regulations are not at all liked.

4868. And as regards officers of the Volunteers?—The officers are the very weak spot; they are not sufficiently trained.

4869. Then to a considerable extent the Volunteer force is a paper force?—To a great extent.

4870. Now as regards the Militia; you had, of course, only volunteer Militia in South Africa?—Yes.

4871. You had probably the pick, the most adventurous men?—Well, it was very extraordinary the influence that, say, half of a Militia regiment had over the others. If half or three-fourths of them wished to go, the others joined them, although they were not really keen about it originally, but they all went.

4872. But there were cases in which Militia regiments were asked to go and refused to go, were there not?—There were a few cases, but very few; I think only two. The Militia showed a splendid spirit.

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4873. I know they did; but would you say, on the whole, that the Militia Force was a thoroughly trained force for home defence?—No, I would not say it was a thoroughly trained force for home defence. There also the officers are a weak spot.

4874. Would you say that the Yeomanry was a thoroughly trained force for home defence?—No.

4875. Then, as a matter of fact, when the estimates are brought forward every year we have presented to the country a very large body of hundreds of thousands of men who do not really constitute an Army at all?—Those we put down in the estimates as the Army, do you mean?

4876. I include everything in the Army; I am speaking of the whole number—Volunteers, Yeomanry, Militia, Regulars, and all?—I think that the country has an impression that this paper army is an effective army; but it is not.

4877. Coming to the question of the increased pay which will come into effect in 1903, you said that that would not tap, in your opinion, the higher class that you wish to see tapped?—No, I do not think it will.

4878. But, surely, we shall get better physical conditions?—If we get sufficient numbers we can make our physical conditions what we like.

4879. You said that you would get larger numbers under that increased pay, probably?—I think we shall.

4880. And that means getting better physical conditions, does it not?—Yes, we will be able to do that; except that at first the pay will not do much to make a reserve. I do not think we can be more particular than we are now about physical conditions.

4881. But that is a temporary state of things, as the result of a great war?—Yes.

4882. The war has depleted your reserve?—Yes.

4883. Can you tell us whether you experience any difficulty in finding a sufficient number of men for the Royal Engineers?—I think the Engineers have come up to strength. I think we get sufficient.

4884. Has there been any difference really in the conditions of the infantry soldier and those of the Royal Engineer, the sapper, excepting the difference of pay?—Do you mean in their physical conditions?

4885. No, I mean in the terms of their enlistment?—No. I do not think they have such a rough life as the ordinary soldier has; they have a pleasanter life.

4886. They have a great deal of work to do?—Yes, and they are paid for it. I think that, and the fact that they are keeping up their trades is what makes the life so pleasant.

4887. That is just my point. I do not see how you can arrive at your conclusion that a considerable rise in pay would not attract a better class of men, when we see that it does attract a better class of men into the Engineers?—I think we have almost tapped the number that we can get.

4888. On what do you ground that opinion?—On my experience, and from talking to different Engineer officers and recruiters.

4889. But, still, any Engineer officer will tell you that they have a sufficient supply of good artisans?—They are fair artisans.

4890. I will amend my question, then, and say fair artisans—if you could get that class of men into the Army?—But you cannot.

4891. But is that more than a surmise? Has it ever been tried?—Much of my evidence is surmise.

4892. Then you might hold perhaps that it would be well to try that experiment before we proceed to the more drastic measure of conscription?—Yes, that is exactly what I said; it is a question for the country to judge where the strain breaks.

4892*. There is one more point on that subject that I wish to put to you. You were referring to the fact that men enlisting, and getting the same pay as they would get perhaps in civil life, did not like doing sentry go and military duties?—Yes, and that is just what the Engineers do not do.

4893. How do you reconcile that view of yours with your view that conscription would be popular in this country?—Because I think conscription will improve the education of the people.

4894. No; I think you will remember that you said—at all events, the idea that you gave to us, was that you thought it would be popular in the country?—That is a surmise, too; it is derived only from the class of people whom I meet, who are all in favour of it.

4895. I ask you how is that surmise consistent with the unpopularity of such services as sentry-go and such military duties as you speak of?—Because I think we shall get, as I say, a better class of men, and that the men will get better educated, and will submit to military training, which will finally affect the physique of the whole nation.

4896. They will have to submit to military training under conscription, of course, but, as to its popularity, if they do not like it now, why should they like it then?—They will like it when something good comes out of it. I think the men themselves will like being well educated, and they will like being associated with a better class of men.

4897. I am only trying to give you an opportunity of answering what I see is a weak point in your argument. I hope you understand that?—Quite so; but, as I have said, their superior education will bring home to them the national obligation.

4898. I suppose there is no harm in saying—in fact, it has been said already—that our recruits now come from a class who have not had the advantage, as a rule, of good food in their childhood, of careful bringing up, careful nursing and doctoring, and so on?—That is so.

4899. And, I suppose, it is also a notorious fact that in consequence of all those conditions, they have been, on the whole, from a class that is more addicted to drink, or with more tendency to drink?—Of course, the lower down you go the more tendency there is to drink.

4900. May I take it that that is one of the things that you alluded to generally just now as one of the difficulties?—Do you mean when they go into the Reserve?

4901. No, I mean before they enter the Service, when they enter the Service, and when they are in it?—Of course, the lower the type of man the more easily he yields to temptation.

4902. I want to touch very lightly on a suggestion that was made to you this morning, as regards the possibility of the Commander-in-Chief having the power, when he found that his recommendations were not attended to, to lay some remonstrance before Parliament, or before the public in some way; and at a later period of the morning the subject was recurred to, not in that exact form, but, I think, you made the remark that either the Commander-in-Chief or the Secretary of State would have to go. That would inevitably be the case, would it not?—I only put myself in the place of the Commander-in-Chief. That is a surmise, too. It might be possible for both of them to hold on.

4903. But it is unlikely, is it not?—I should say so.

4904. I only want to put it to you, as you have expressed these views this morning, whether that would not lead to our having what some other countries have had, or at any rate one other country has had, a political army—an army of politicians?—I did not say it was a political army.

4905. No; I am asking you whether, in your opinion, it would not lead to that. You were advocating a certain course, and I ask you whether that course, viz., of soldiers being able to put their case before the public in any way would not lead to our having a political army?—I do not know. I think the wisest thing would be to put it before the Cabinet.

4906. Then I am quite satisfied, if you will say that; but you were asked this morning whether it might not be an advantage that the Commander-in-Chief should be able to put his views, in the last resort, before Parliament, as has been advocated in many quarters?—I think one of them would have to go, I say.

4907. If you modify it by suggesting that it shall only be put before the Cabinet I will not ask you any further questions upon the point?—What I meant was that if it went before the public I think one of them would have to go, and I am not quite certain, if it went before the Cabinet and the Commander-in-Chief was overruled, that his place would be tenable.

4908. That may be, but if it came before the public one of the two must go?—Yes.

4909. (*Viscount Esher.*) Do you not think it would be possible for the Commander-in-Chief to record his dissent from a decision of the Secretary of State, with-

out necessarily bringing himself into such conflict with the Secretary of State that one of them would have to go?—But I think it is done on many a paper.

4910. But then, under the existing system, his dissent is not made public, but if that dissent was made public, do you think then it would necessarily involve either the Secretary of State or the Commander in Chief retiring?—I think it would become a very awkward position. Of course, there may be some people constituted so that they would not go, but I think the position would be very awkward for any ordinary man.

4911. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) But you are aware that the Commander-in-Chief in India is often overruled, very frequently overruled, by what I may call the civil power, the Governor-General and the other members of Council, and for many years, at all events, he has never resigned?—No, but I do not think there is the same public opinion in India that there is here. If it was made public in India, it would not have had the same effect as it would if made public here.

4912. There are not two political parties in India?—No, there is no party government in India.

4913. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) And no evening papers?—No.

4914. (*Viscount Esher.*) Still, there have been Indian questions that have agitated the people of this country very much, such as the retirement after Kandahar. There were dissents in the Government of India then?—Yes.

4915. And those dissents were published, but it did not lead to the retirement of officers who dissented from the Governor-General or the Secretary of State on that occasion?—But I suppose, perhaps, the Commander-in-Chief was on service in the field, when no one could resign. You could not leave, no matter how you were set aside, from service in the field.

4916. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) You told us just now what is being done to reduce the expenses of cavalry officers, but cavalry regiments will still be extremely expensive institutions, will they not?—Very expensive.

4917. The present Secretary of State for War made some sort of promise that that should be looked into, and the expenses reduced?—Yes, it has been looked into.

4918. Has anything been done?—Yes. You see, up to within a very short time ago we have had only one cavalry regiment in the country.

4919. You have not had time?—No. We have had several provisional regiments, and there the expenditure has been checked very carefully. There is no very heavy expenditure there except what is necessary towards their kit and accoutrements, but the living is not expensive. It is not more expensive in a provisional regiment than in an ordinary infantry regiment.

4920. But everybody knows that a man without an income cannot live in the cavalry?—It is so; but these new measures that we are taking we hope might do some good. But it is a very difficult question to interfere with the liberty of the subject how he should spend his money.

4921. I quite recognise that. I only want to get from you whether to some extent you are going to interfere with the liberty of the subject?—We are not going to interfere with the individual liberty, but we are going to enable a poor man to live, and then if he is led away by the example of rich men next him we cannot provide for that.

4922. Will you make it so that he will be able to remain in the regiment?—Certainly.

4923. That must rest largely with the colonels?—We will reduce the expenses. I think that in most cavalry regiments now a young officer should have, in order to live, £400 or £500 a year. I feel perfectly certain that we will so arrange it that an officer with £200 a year will be able to live in a cavalry regiment, and if he supports us we will support him, and see him through it, so that he will be able to live in it.

4924-6. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) I think you mentioned that the first drafts sent out of the Regular Army were men of greater intelligence and of more training than those who followed, and that that was the case also with the Yeomanry—that the first body of Yeomanry sent out were superior to the others?—Yes, Yeomanry, but not the Regular Army.

4927. Those that were first sent out were men perhaps of superior intelligence, or, at any rate, of greater training than those that went out afterwards?—Yes, they were, as regards training; it was only with the Seventh Division Section D was sent out.

4928-30. And, as I understood, the Yeomanry who went out in the first instance were also superior to those that were sent out afterwards?—Yes, quite so.

4931. I think you mentioned that you considered the Colonial troops to be men of greater intelligence than the ordinary soldier of the line?—They struck me to be so.

4932-4. Not that they were braver; each and all were equal in bravery, but from their greater intelligence they were able on certain occasions to do better work than the others?—Yes.

4935. So that they make better soldiers, in fact. Then you spoke of the better pay, and in support of that you are aware, I have no doubt, that the Colonials (I will speak now of Canada that I know) besides the pay that they got from the War Office, the shilling a day or 1s. 3d. that they had, were paid by their own Governments double that amount, and were continued that payment throughout the course of the war?—Yes.

4936. Of course, in the first instance, those troops from the Colonies were eager to go without regard to pay, but their Government felt that it was wiser that they should have more pay than was given by the Imperial Government, so that throughout the whole time they had at least double as much pay as the others. You believe that with increased pay you then will be able to get a better class of men here to enlist in England?—I think you cannot judge from what happened during the campaign; you cannot compare the two conditions together. I think you might get them during a war, as they are a very warlike people, but I do not know whether you could do it in peace. I do not think you could, not that way.

4937. If there was an inducement for men of education, respectable men, to enter the Army, and they could look forward to promotion, would not that, with a reasonable pay, induce a great many to go into the Army who do not go into it now?—That depends on the amount of pay; not double the pay, not the 2s.; I do not think that would do it.

4938. Say 3s. then?—Yes, that would improve it; that would help us. But I should be sorry to say that we could train the Army efficiently even then—they are still so voluntary; the man has power to come or to go just as he likes. We would make them content and happy if they came to us till we began to work them, and then I am afraid of a voluntary army ever being a success.

4939. At the present moment there are a certain number of educated men, and men in every way highly respectable, who enter the Army?—Yes, there are a fair number.

4940. Would it not be a much greater inducement to them to enter the Army if they had a greater prospect before them of promotion than they have now—that is, educated men?—You see you cannot have a greater prospect of promotion. You can only have a certain amount of warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, and you cannot make more; you cannot make them all non-commissioned officers.

4941. I do not mean non-commissioned officers?—You cannot make more than the one you want. You cannot make every man a sergeant, for example. Some men must be in the ranks.

4942. I speak of promotion to the position of commissioned officers. If there were educated men who have had a good education, a higher education, then those men would be better fitted for promotion to officers. Is not that the case?—I do not think they ever will be such good leaders as the officers that we have now. I see no fault whatever with the regimental officer as regards the material. I do not think that anything we can do will make him a better leader than he is. We hope to make him a better trainer. I think he is a splendid leader, and I do not think we will improve our position by going to another class. There will be great social difficulties in it, and, as I say, for instance, in the cavalry it would be out of the question, and even in the infantry I think scarcely any officer can live comfortably without £100 a year.

4943. I do not for a moment mean to infer that the officers at present are not all that they ought to be. I have a very great respect for officers of the Army,

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and I think that they are most fitting in every respect for their positions, but I thought that, having more highly educated men, men of a better class, in the ranks, there would be a greater affinity, so to speak, between the men and the officers than there is or can be at present, and that it would be an easier step from the ranks or a non-commissioned position to a commission in the Army; not at all that they should be substituted altogether for the present officers, but only that, being equal to them, commissions might be given to them?—I think there are a very large number of commissions given; I do not know that there is any lack of inducement to young men of good education to come into the Army from want of getting commissions. I think the commissions are very liberally given, and that any young well-educated and well-conducted man has his commission in his own pocket if he likes.

4944. Only that you have so comparatively few of them, I suppose?—Yes, from that reason, that we have not got them and they are not there. You see, they are not very anxious themselves; they like to be quartermasters and riding masters; the greater body of them do not aspire to be anything more than that.

4945. The expense is too great to begin with?—Yes; and then it is so easy now for well-educated men to get into the Army that there is very little difficulty about it. It is hard to understand why they should go into the ranks; they can get their commissions without it.

4946. Still, we know that a great many of them are very desirous to go into the Army who do not get commissions?—Well, they ought to go, and they will get commissions; if they are worthy of them I am sure they would. But I deprecate any general system. You go further and you will fare worse than you do now with regard to our officers. I deprecate any general system of promotion from the ranks. I like to single out these men, and we always do mark them out. I have got several of them commissions myself.

4947-8. I do not mean that you should look for other sources for your officers than the present; I believe the training of officers at present is admirable, but that if possible more encouragement should be given to those going into the Army, educated young men, respectable young men, in the hope of getting commissions?—Well, I think they do. I think they get fair chances of promotion.

4949. I think you said that the registered horses turned out to be very good and useful animals as a whole?—I limited myself to my own experience when I mobilised the Army that went out first, but that was limited to the cavalry and artillery. All the horses that were found for the transport and purchased outside England did not come to Aldershot. My experience was only at Aldershot of the cavalry and artillery. And I was perfectly satisfied with the horses, and the commanding officers were—that is, the first lot that went out; the subsequent lots must be dealt with by some other officers, and I will be glad to go into that question so far as my own efforts and experience go when you wish to examine me upon it.

(*Chairman.*) Quite so.

4950. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) There is no system of registration in Canada; but if, for instance, say, any of the Colonial Governments or the Canadian Government were to say that they would keep up remount depôts without any responsibility on the part of the Imperial Government other than an understanding that so many horses would be taken from them yearly, say a thousand or a couple of thousand, and at ordinary fair prices, would it not be an advantage?—That is the whole point.

4951. And at an ordinary fair price—do you think it would be a desirable thing, then, to have such an arrangement without cost to the Government here? All that they would have to do would be to give a promise that a certain number would be taken yearly, and at an ordinary reasonable price, so as to be an inducement to people there to breed that description of horse?—I think it has often been thought of, but, speaking for myself, I should be inclined to advocate an open market, not to bolster up any institution of any sort, but to go into the open market for the remount authorities to buy the best horses wherever they could get them.

4952. I do not mean that it should be dependent upon the Government there to supply horses?—No, but we would have to guarantee from here that the Army authorities would buy a certain number every year; and as regards what we now call a reasonable price, it would be very difficult to adhere to that; very likely in the end the price would be about double what you could get them for in England. I do not think you would find you would do any good by that.

4953. I understood you to say that you looked upon it as almost hopeless to have an efficient and effective army both to meet the requirements abroad in case of war and for the protection of the country here without having conscription for home and a better pay for the Volunteer Army going abroad?—Yes, for home and foreign expeditions and foreign wars. I said that, and I adhere to it.

4954. You cannot point to anything else?—I cannot see any other solution of the difficulty.

4955. Otherwise it is really hopeless, you think?—Yes, I think so.

4956. (*Sir John Edge.*) You mentioned that about one-third of an infantry regiment is insufficiently drilled because the men are used for different duties. Could you tell us what is the nature of those different duties?—Yes; there are fatigue duties at Ordnance Stores, and assisting the Engineers with fatigue parties; sometimes making ranges; then there are the different grounds to be kept up, and there are men told off to canteens and different institutions like that, libraries, waiters at messes, officers' servants, and all staff servants. They are not all in my mind, but I could send you an exact statement of an infantry regiment at an ordinary station, its establishment, the number of men employed and the number that were available, so as to give you an actual and accurate description.

4957. Would you suggest that men outside the regiment should be found for most of that work?—Yes, I have suggested in the Estimates that we should employ Reservists and pensioners a great deal for these appointments, and allow us to train the men.

4958. The Reservists could be employed as officers' servants, for instance?—The officer's servant, I think, is a little different. I am afraid we always have to have them on the establishment of a regiment; they would have to go in the field with them. But there are a great many other men looking after libraries, and, as I said, canteens and coffee shops, and at all the works of Ordnance, where I would put Reservists and pensioners, but I am not quite prepared to say that officers' servants should not be soldiers serving under the colours.

4959. It strikes me that if that scheme were carried out which you have suggested, it would help you to deal with the Reservists, and finding employment for Reservists?—Yes, it would help us to deal with Reservists, and in getting employment for them.

4960. So that it would have the advantage of sending these men to drill, belonging to the regiment, on the strength of the regiment, to attend to their duties, and you would find employment for your Reservists?—Yes, it would help both, except that it would not help the taxpayer.

4961. (*Chairman.*) It has the disadvantage of costing a lot of money?—Yes.

4962. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Does the same thing hold good with respect to the cavalry regiments as to infantry regiments; are one-third of the men there always taken off?—The infantry man is a sort of maid of all work for the Army; he does all the fatigues. The cavalry are not employed to such an extent. The infantry does all the fatigue work.

4963 So that the same thing does not hold good with respect to cavalry regiments—the same number, the one-third, are not taken off?—No.

THIRTEENTH DAY.

Friday, October 31st, 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The Earl of ELGIN AND KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E. (*Chairman*).

The Right Hon. The Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Hon. The Lord STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Hon. Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

Major-General Sir JOHN C. ARDAGH, K.C.I.E., C.B., LL.D., R.E., called and examined.

Major-General Sir J. C. Ardagh, K.C.I.E., C.B., LL.D., R.E.

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4964. (*Chairman.*) You were appointed Director of Military Intelligence, I think, in 1896?—Yes.

4965. And you held that office till when?—1901.

4966. We have had, as you are aware, evidence from the Division, and from the present Director of Military Intelligence, and I do not think it will be necessary for us to trouble you with the details of the office work, but I think we should like in the first place to know your opinion as to the sufficiency of the office, particularly in regard to its position and in regard to its staff?—The leading impression in my mind as regards the Intelligence Department is that it should be brought as far as possible to resemble, and perform the functions of, and to have that influence on the military policy of the country which is attributed, very properly and correctly to, the body known in Germany as the Great General staff. I think the Intelligence Department, although it has grown up gradually and increased in influence since its first creation, has not now, and has not for many years had, the influence on the military policy of the country that it ought to have. I should very much like to see the Intelligence Department improved or modified or expanded so as to resemble in some degree that institution known as the Great General Staff. In its present size it is quite impossible that the work appertaining to the General Staff could possibly be done by the number of officers and men employed in it. A very large increase would be necessary; and above that, a very pronounced recognition that the recommendations of the Intelligence Department were to carry a definite weight in the councils of the military authorities of the country. I do not think they have done so hitherto. During my occupation of the position of Director of Military Intelligence my position was very subordinate indeed to the influence exercised by the great military officers at the War Office, the Commander-in-Chief, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, the Director of Artillery, and so forth; they were, as a rule, Lieutenant-Generals or of higher rank, while I was a Major-General, and rank goes for a good deal in confabulations of military people. I am very glad to see that my successor Sir William Nicholson, has been appointed a Lieutenant-General *ex-officio*; that that rank is now attached to the head of the Intelligence Department. I think that is a great step in the right direction.

4967. His whole position has been altered?—His whole position has been altered. There is a point with reference to his position to which I may allude. In 1887 I was brought back from Egypt to the Intelligence Department for the purpose of organising and starting what was then called the Mobilization Division, and I did so start it in that year. The Intelligence Department then, as now, was undermanned, and Sir Henry Brackenbury, who was then the head of the Intelligence Department, found that it was more than he could do to take charge of the Mobilization Division in addition to the other work of the Department. And further than that, the mobilization business in general was very intimately connected with all the different branches of the War Office which are located in Pall Mall, and it was extremely inconvenient that the Mobilization Division, which should be in very constant communication with all these branches, should have its offices in Queen Anne's Gate, where the Intelligence Department was then situated. In order to remedy that state of things the Mobilization Department was separated from the Intelligence Department and moved over to Pall Mall. Well, as long as I was the head of the Mobilization Department, from my very long connection with the Intelligence Department, that practically made no difference whatever. The Intelligence Department and the Mobilization Department worked entirely together; but I think afterwards, when that tradition had become a little obscured, there was a tendency for the Mobilization and Defence Department to drift away a little from the Intelligence Department; and one of the last things which I did before leaving my appointment was to suggest to Mr. Brodrick that the two should be reunited, which was done, and is now the recognised mode of carrying them on. That I entirely approve of.

4968. The present position is that the officer who succeeded you is the Director of Military Intelligence and Mobilization?—Yes.

4969. And he has a distinct position among the great officers of the Department in the Order in Council?—Yes.

4970. And that you consider satisfactory?—That I consider very satisfactory. I should even like to see his weight still further increased.

4971. In what direction?—In the direction of a general adviser on the general military policy of the country. I will give particular instances of that; in the military policy of the country may be included the education of officers and the enlistment and training of men. I should like to see the Intelligence Department have a bigger voice in that matter.

4972. You mentioned the comparison with the General Staff in Germany, which has been referred to by previous witnesses, and the discrepancy, I think, is very large. I think it was stated that there were 150 officers in the General Staff in Germany, whereas in your office there were about 20 officers?—Speaking from memory I should say that the General Staff in Germany was about 250, and that our officers in the Intelligence Department amount to between 20 and 25.

4972.* When I said 150 that was the distinction made by Sir William Nicholson. He said there were 250 officers on the general staff, but 100 were occupied, he thought, with business that did not come in the category of business of the Intelligence Department?—Quite so.

4973. So that the comparison was between 150 and 20 or 25?—Yes.

4974. Did you ever make representations for an increase of the staff in your Department?—Frequently. Your Lordship must bear in mind that the Director of Military Intelligence in the ordinary performance of his duties saw the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary

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of State almost every day, and a great many of these representations were conversational; and if it became clear that it was perfectly useless to put forward any proposition involving expenditure, then naturally and properly a subordinate in my position abstained from causing inconvenience to his superiors by putting forward an impossible proposition.

4975. Your official position was that of an officer under the Commander-in-Chief?—Directly under the Commander-in-Chief. To a certain extent also directly under the Secretary of State. That was not recognised in the warrant, but that was practically the case.

4976. That is exactly what I wanted to know. According to the Order in Council you were distinctly under the Commander-in-Chief, but as a matter of practice you had frequent access to the Secretary of State direct, —Yes, and amongst the attributions of the Director of Military Intelligence was an authority to communicate directly with the heads of all public departments on matters connected with the Intelligence Department.

4977. You mean other departments than the War Office?—Other Departments than the War Office, particularly the Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office, for whom the Intelligence Department has always done a great deal of work.

4978. Did you never put forward officially any representation with regard to the insufficiency of the office?—I think every year we put forward an increase in the usual manner for the Annual Estimates.

4979. What sort of an increase did you ask for?—Small increases, not a wholesale increase.

4980. But then a small increase (and I think your successor told us that he was also asking for a moderate increase) would still leave a great disproportion between the Intelligence Division and the German General Staff. —A very large disproportion. The conception, in my mind, of what the Intelligence Department ought to develop into is something very much larger than would be represented by any moderate increase.

4981. You say it would have to develop; that means to say it would have to take further duties than it now has given to it?—I should rather say that it should have a larger staff in order to perform more properly the duties which are now attributed to it, and which it is absolutely impossible for the Department properly to perform.

4982. Do you mean that it would require a staff something approaching to the German General Staff to do it properly?—I should think the development of the Intelligence Department ought to be a gradual one; that it might reasonably be doubled now, but that the doubling would not be the eventual limit—that it ought still to go on increasing.

4983. And with a double staff you think it could perform in some degree the same class of work that the General Staff in Germany requires 150 officers for?—Yes, I think so: within, as I said, the duties now attributed to it. Our position in England is in some respects very different from that which is occupied by the great General Staff in Germany.

4984. That is what I wanted to get out?—We have not merely to deal with the possibility of mobilising our Army for a European war, which is the essential and simple fact which is always before the minds of the great General Staff in all European States, but we have to think of the defence and the interests and possibilities of the whole of the British Empire all over the world. A great country like Germany, although it has colonies, has nothing like the enormous responsibility that is entailed upon us by our naval position, in the maintenance, for instance, of coaling stations and defended ports abroad.

4985. But that would rather mean an increase in work in the British Intelligence Department as compared with the German?—In some respects it would be a distinct increase; the more so that the organisation of the German military system is and can be a very regular one. What is good for one Army Corps is good for the whole.

4986. Quite so. But that does not explain what I was endeavouring to get an explanation of, namely, how you could do the work fairly satisfactorily in the meantime with a staff of about 50 officers, that is double the present staff, whereas the German Military Staff for the restricted duties that you have described requires 150?—I only suggest a moderate and gradual alteration with the view of preventing anything in the shape of a *bouleversement* by making an enormous addition to a particular branch. I should prefer to make the addition gradually, and let the development go on quietly.

4987. Yes; but what is an adequate comparison between the two countries?—I think we ought to have about 100 officers altogether when the development is complete.

4988. To do the same work as the German General Staff?—And our own special colonial work, too.

4989. You do not omit any of the work that the German General Staff does?—No; I mean that a good many things will come into the Intelligence Department in its new position as a great general staff which are not attended to by the Intelligence Department at all. Take, for instance, recruiting. I think the principles of recruiting, the manner of recruiting, and the detail of the organisations which depend on recruiting, ought all to be considered by the Intelligence Department, and not left to the chance of the particular officer who happens to be Inspector-General of Recruiting or Adjutant-General for the moment.

4990. But is that a subject which comes before the German General Staff?—Yes.

4991. Because it strikes me that if you say that 100 officers for the Intelligence Division in England would sufficiently carry on the same duties as the German General Staff, either they must have too many with 150, or we should still have too few with 100?—Of course, our Army is very much smaller than the German Army. The administrative business to be attended to by our people would be vastly less than that in a country which has to deal with a number of contiguous States and 30 Army Corps.

4992. That would make up for the addition to our work in the Colonies, and so on?—Yes.

4993. There is only one other matter in connection with the branch which I should just like to ask one question about, and that is with regard to mapping. We have had estimates submitted to us for what would be required to do mapping on a comprehensive scale. Is it your opinion that it is necessary to very largely increase the work of that branch of the Intelligence Division?—I am sure it would be not merely advantageous to the Army, but it would be advantageous to the whole Empire. Our mapping, except in the United Kingdom and perhaps in Canada, is at a very low ebb indeed.

4994. But for the purposes of the Intelligence Division what you want are war maps?—Yes.

4995. And those war maps would be, if not wholly, specially required at the points at which there was danger of a conflict with some other Power?—Yes.

4996. Therefore would it not be putting it too high to say that you want maps on the same scale for the whole of Africa, for instance?—I think the question of making a map of the whole of Africa is rather a question of international scientific work, and can hardly be connected with the military work of any country.

4997. I did not mean the whole of Africa, but the whole of British Africa—British possessions?—I think that for military purposes it is very desirable that we should have maps of the whole of British Africa; and, further than that, I think it would be a very great economy to the civil administration of the various colonies that such maps should be made. They have not good maps in any part of South Africa now.

4998. That was very clearly brought out by witnesses from the Division but, of course, to do that means arrangements with the Colonies, for instance?—It is part of the right and the duty of a self-governing colony to look after its own mapping; there is no reason why the Mother Country should pay for the mapping of Cape Colony and Natal.

4999. But I rather think an instance was given us of an attempt you made to get a map made in Natal through the Colonial Government which did not succeed?—I have been struggling to get maps made in

South Africa for many years, but the only person whom I found at all inclined to get money for the purpose was the late Premier of Natal, Sir Harry Escombe. He promised to undertake the survey of Natal below the point up to which we had had it surveyed, that is to say, the Ladysmith line. He died shortly afterwards, and little or nothing was done.

5000. That shows the difficulty of making those arrangements, does it not?—Yes. In the Cape it would have been still more difficult; it would have been perfectly vain to ask for money for a survey in the Cape, because they had already a system which they considered to be sufficient for their own purposes, a system of farm surveys in connection with their land registry.

5001. But still you think that if the work has to be done it ought to be done by the Colonial Governments?—I think it ought to be paid for by the Colonial Governments; but I think that a competent staff is only to be found in the United Kingdom and in India.

5002. But, of course, the question of payment is an essential one, is it not?—It is the essential one. At this present moment the Cape Government is actually undertaking something, a very small beginning; and it is doing that in concert with such support as Lord Milner is able to give it, and eventually their efforts, we hope, will arrive at a topographical map which will extend over Cape Colony and the two new Colonies and Rhodesia.

5003. Then if the work in the Colonies is to be undertaken by the Colonies themselves (assuming that is the proper position), the work directly undertaken by the Intelligence Division would be for other parts of the Empire?—Yes, other than the self-governing Colonies.

5004. And then I suppose the Intelligence Division would select the points at which there was the greatest need in proceeding with any work of that kind?—Their natural process would be to take each scale of importance and endeavour to take each district, or country, or colony in the order of importance.

5005. Did you ever make an estimate of the amount of money that would be required annually for a purpose of that kind?—I made two estimates. One for the extension of surveying in South Africa, which, speaking from my memory, I think amounted to £18,000 a year, for ten years; and the other was for Egypt. There I did not specify any particular sum or time because it was a matter entirely dependent on Lord Cromer, who gave me a verbal undertaking that as soon as funds were available he would begin.

5006. Do you remember when you made the estimate for South Africa?—About four years ago.

5007. And you put it forward officially?—Yes, I put it forward in the first instance in connection with an agitation which the scientific people all over the world are now interested in, and that is the extension of a great geodetic arc, which was begun by the Russians on the Polar Sea, as a matter of fact just at the very junction of Norway and Russia, and which extends down to Odessa. The view of the scientific people (the Royal Society amongst others) was that this arc should be extended through Africa. We got in Egypt a set of the most highly refined base-measuring instruments, and a part of the essence of the proposal was that the triangulation should be commenced in Egypt and should be carried up the Nile. That would get on into Uganda. And at the other end Sir David Gill, the Astronomer Royal at the Cape, has already a triangulation extending over a very large part of South Africa, and that triangulation dates from the days of Sir Thomas Maclear as Astronomer Royal about sixty years ago. But Sir David Gill and I desired that this geodetic triangulation already existing should be extended through the Orange River Colony, the Transvaal, and Rhodesia, and up to Tanganyika to meet the other triangulation, which would have its start in Egypt; and that would satisfy the scientific aspirations of the astronomers as regards the measurement of the geodetic area. That project did not go further than the actual geodetic triangulation, but that geodetic triangulation would form the basis for an accurate topographical survey of the whole of the countries through which it passed, practically the whole of Africa.

5008. And that you say was put forward officially?—It was put forward. I think I had it printed.

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5009. And what happened to it?—It was considered by Mr. Chamberlain and by Lord Milner, and it has so far begun its development that Sir David Gill is now collecting a survey party in Cape Colony to commence the further development of the great triangulation of South Africa, which extends from Natal through Cape Colony and up almost to the Orange River.

5010. Then that was a piece of work which the Colonies were to take up through the Colonial Office?—Really the support upon which it was mainly dependent was whatever the new Colonies could afford. The Cape Colony is not very warm about any development of any scientific kind.

5011. What I rather meant in my former question was whether you ever put forward an estimate for a grant, an increased grant, from the Treasury here, for the purposes of your Department in the matter of mapping in South Africa?—I put forward an official application to the War Office, but it received so much cold water from the financial point of view that it came to nothing. The end of my proposal of £18,000 a year for 10 years was an offer of £100. *See* Q. 21729.

5012. Did the cold water come from the War Office financial tap or the Treasury?—It never got as far as the Treasury. The practical fact which had to be dealt with by the War Office was, that the War Office wanted so much money for so many different purposes, that they would not put forward a Survey in the claim for further grants when there were so many other matters which they considered of more importance, and which they desired to press first.

5013. Did you ever form any opinion as to the amount of money that ought to be added to your Department's estimates to carry out the mapping work?—I am sorry to say that mapping work is a very much more expensive matter than the War Office or public departments in general, except those who have had to deal with the Ordnance Survey, and the Survey of India, have any conception of. I think the Survey of India costs very nearly a quarter of a million a year; and as regards the Ordnance Survey, I cannot recollect the exact figures, but it certainly must run to considerably over £100,000. The sum which I should be disposed to ask for for the Intelligence Department now would be a modest sum, not all that I think should be eventually granted, but something to build up a real and efficient Survey Department, suitable for Colonial and Imperial Military surveying; but £20,000 a year is such a very large sum in comparison with what is now spent on the Intelligence Department, that I had a feeling that if we were to ask for it, it would be scoffed at in the War Office before it ever got to the Treasury.

5014. And therefore it would be difficult for the Director of Military Intelligence to put it forward?—It would be very difficult for him to put it forward. I think there are, perhaps, other things, which, if he had an offer of £20,000 a year, he would be disposed to expend that sum upon before starting a survey section.

5015. We had this answer given to us: "For possible theatres of war in various parts of the Empire, it is an exceedingly desirable thing to do, and if the Treasury would be prepared to let us have say £80,000 a year to do it, I should be very glad to undertake it"?—Was that Major Hills? *See* Q. 135.

5016. No, it was from Sir William Nicholson?—No doubt if the £80,000 a year were placed in Sir William Nicholson's hands, ear-marked for that particular object, he would be very glad indeed to profit by the advantages which the military knowledge of the topography of very many countries would afford.

5017. But you think it would be rather a hopeless request?—I feel that it would be hopeless.

5018. Major Hills told us that a reasonable staff for a Topographical Department would be 13 officers and 53 subordinates, costing about £17,000 a year. That I suppose is pretty much what you were referring to when you said £20,000?—That is the sort of feeling that I have. *See* Q. 888.

5019. On the other hand he said he thought it would cost £150,000 a year to place the Department on a sound basis, and to make a topographical survey of the Empire?—Yes, no doubt it would. It is a longer *See* Q. 881.

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and more costly, and more tedious process than most people imagine.

5020. Is there anything else with regard to the organisation of the Department that you would like to add ?—The leading feature of my recommendation is that the Intelligence Department should be developed into something like the Great General Staff in Germany. That answer practically includes all the rest.

5021. Then passing on to the special question of South Africa which is immediately before us, we have had handed in by the Intelligence Division a statement which you have no doubt seen ?—I am cognisant of it.

5022. And in dealing with that Sir William Nicholson eferred us to you for a statement of the action which you thought it necessary to take in regard to matters in South Africa in the performance of your duties from the time of your assumption of office in 1896 ?—I took over the Intelligence Department a few months after the Jameson Raid, so that a good deal of attention was directed at that moment on the condition of feeling existing in the Transvaal, and particularly in Johannesburg. Of course the differences of opinion between the Uitlanders and President Kruger's Government had been going on and increasing and ripening for a good many years, but they came to a head at that time in consequence of the Jameson Raid and the Johannesburg Revolution, and it became evident to a good many people that there must be a struggle sooner or later. I thought and hoped myself in 1896, that if the actual outbreak of the struggle was procrastinated, the necessity for it might die away altogether, because at that time the mines were increasing in their production by leaps and bounds, and as the mines increased, the Uitlander element, and particularly the British speaking element, went on also increasing. I should say that in 1896 there were probably 100,000 white Uitlanders in the Transvaal, and if the mines were to go on at the same rate, that 100,000 would go on constantly increasing ; and I hoped that a time might arrive when the Uitlander element would be so enormously powerful in the country, and so overwhelmingly superior to the Boers in numbers and in organisation and intelligence, that the revolution would be a tranquil one. I expressed that view several times to my superiors in the War Office in the course of 1896, but I still urged that we ought to prepare for what possibly might happen any day, which was that the Boers having become so powerful, and having armed themselves, and having the great support which the creation of the Bond in Cape Colony had given them, might make up their minds that they were strong enough to face the British and force us into war—which actually happened.

5023. But at that time, in spite of these preparations, and the whole menacing attitude of the Boers, you thought that in the immediate present there was a reasonable prospect of avoiding war ?—That there was a reasonable prospect, and there was a very great prize in reach by promoting the avoidance of war as much as possible, because time was entirely in our favour, time brought a constant increase in the number of the Uitlanders, who are mainly British, and when it came to the fact that for every able-bodied Boer there were half a dozen Uitlanders, it would have been impossible to prevent the Uitlanders getting possession of the country.

5024. And that you think might have taken place without any rupture between that country and ourselves ?—I think if we had been able to stave off war it is not at all unlikely that it would have happened say about this year or next year.

5025. Without our interference ?—Yes.

5026. And, therefore, was the nature of your representations meant to be that everything should be avoided which could bring on a rupture from our side ?—Yes, the essence of my recommendation was that we should prepare for a rupture, but that if possible we should avoid it.

5027. Then the question is what nature of preparations you thought could be made without bringing on a rupture ?—I saw no reason why we should not keep large garrisons in the places which were most liable to be attacked by the Boers if they did bring on a rupture, and the feeling which I had was that if they were sensible what they would try for would be a seaport.

5028. Was it not the case that before the Jameson Raid, the idea in this country had been that any advance would have been made by us and not by the Boers ?—Yes, I think the result of the Zulu Wars and the Sikukuni Expedition and the War of 1881, the Majuba campaign, left in the minds of the British public an idea that whatever the Boers did, they could not really do anything outside their own country ; and it took a very long time to impress on the public the fact that the whole position of the Boers had entirely changed between 1881 and 1895.

5029. And that was the base from which you started, that the position had changed ?—Yes. Until the discovery of gold the Boers could not possibly have got the money to arm themselves. The moment that they began to profit by the gains of the gold producers at Johannesburg, then they got a war fund, which they immediately proceeded to devote to arming themselves for an eventual conflict. I do not think there is any doubt at all that the Dopper Boers of the Bond from their first start always looked forward to the day when the Africanders in South Africa should be sufficiently powerful to kick out the British.

5030. And the position being changed by these large armaments of the Boers, and the nature of the operations becoming on our side, perhaps, more of a defensive nature, at any rate at the commencement, what was the advice that you gave to your superiors on that state of matters ?—The general advice was that we should invade the country, that is to say that our military policy should be a policy of active operations against the Boers once war had broken out. But there was an interregnum which was absolutely inevitable from the moment that the Boers made up their minds to fight us, until the moment that we could land in South Africa a sufficient force to invade their country, and that was a very critical period for the frontiers of both Cape Colony and Natal, but particularly Natal, because in Cape Colony the Boers knew perfectly well that they had across the frontier an enormous number of sympathisers. In Natal that was not the case. And further than that, Natal had the temptation that it contained an excellent seaport, and that the people from whom they would obtain possession of the country were the British rather than the Dutch inhabitants of Cape Colony, whom they looked upon as a section of their own party.

5031. Then during that period of interval before the troops could come out as you describe, it would have been necessary to act entirely on the defensive ?—It would have been necessary to act entirely on the defensive ; and there were considerable difficulties about it. The force that we had in Natal and Cape Colony was very small, preposterously small, when regarded from the point of view of resisting an invasion, and quite insufficient to oppose even a modest attack from the Transvaal Boers. It was proposed at that time to send out reinforcements.

5032. In 1896 and 1897, looking to the situation that you have been describing, did you make representations that the garrisons ought to be increased in South Africa ?—Yes.

5033. Officially ?—I was in daily communication with the Commander-in-Chief, but what I said, was, perhaps, not so far as the Commander-in-Chief was willing to go. The Commander-in-Chief would, I believe, have recommended much more comprehensive military steps being taken.

5034. Then the Commander-in-Chief would have had more comprehensive preparations ?—Yes.

5035. Were they for defence only or to prepare for the attack which you considered the best policy ?—To prepare for the attack.

5036. But for defence alone did you form any estimate at that time of what addition ought to be made to the garrisons ?—I think the only figures that I mentioned were 20,000 men.

5037. Would that have been sufficient to defend Natal ?—I think it would.

5038. Did you contemplate at that time that the attack upon Natal would have been made in the manner

in which it was eventually made in force?—No, we thought that they would have come over by Laing's Nek and come down by Newcastle, the main line, and that the other columns would be subsidiary ones. As a matter of fact I think that the three lines of advance of the Boers were about equal; that is to sav that one-third of them came down by the main road from Laing's Nek, another third came over from the Utrecht Vryheid district, and another third from the Free State by Harrismith.

5039. But may I take it that what you rather anticipated at hat time was that they might make a raid down even as far as Durban?—Yes. That Durban would be their objective.

5040. But rather in the nature of a raid than of an invasion on the scale that they eventually did?—The Boers have been so accustomed to proceedings of that kind in increasing their territory, that a raid would have meant for them taking possession, much in the same way as the Stellaland and Swaziland and Griqualand and Rhodesian expeditions of the Boers were undertaken.

5041. And for the purpose of preventing that you thought 20,000 men might be effectual during the interval?—About 10,000 in Natal and about 10,000 in the Cape.

5042. Twenty thousand men added to the existing garrison?—Yes. I should point out to the Commission that under our system, sending 20,000 men or sending any number of men short of an Army Corps, was a very embarrassing thing, for this reason: that we had got our units at home, which are not very numerous, all ear-marked for particular places in the two Army Corps which we should have been able to produce, and if you took any of those units and sent them off as mere reinforcements or for petty expeditions, you dislocated the whole manner of mobilising your Army Corps.

5043. I suppose a great deal depended so far as the plans of the Boers were concerned upon the action of the Free State?—No doubt. What was the action of the Free State had become tolerably clear by that time. In the War of 1881, although we were never ostensibly fighting with the Free State, there is not the slightest doubt that a great number of Free State Burghers took part with the Boers in the operations about Laing's Nek and Majuba; and whether we were actually at war or nominally at peace, there is not the slightest doubt that the Free State Burghers would have taken up arms whenever the Transvaal went to war.

5044. Your idea was that the preferable line of advance depended very much upon that matter?—It depended a good deal upon it. In the olden days the ordinary line of advance into the Transvaal was accepted, as a matter of course, to be through Natal, because it was the shortest distance from the seaport; you had a thousand miles to go from the Cape, and five hundred from Natal; therefore, for that reason, when in the days of trek wagons, you had a large quantity of transport, it was perfectly clear that the only way you could get all your supples up there, would be by Durban, and the main road through Natal. By the time of the Jameson Raid things had entirely altered. There is a railway through Natal, and the railway from Cape Town had actually got up to Johannesburg and Pretoria, and once you put your stuff on to the railway, it was only a question of a few more tons of coal getting it into the Transvaal by Cape Town to what it was from Durban. And there is another and very strong reason which led us at the Intelligence Department to throw overboard altogether the idea of marching through Natal, and that is, that Natal is a very difficult country, much more mountainous than the Free State, and the roads and the railway inclines were much more severe in gradients than the longer route we would have taken through Cape Colony and the Free State. Therefore we came to the conclusion that for Regular troops, the Free State would present considerable advantages. The railway ran up through the centre of it, there are no mountains, and very few hills, and it was a country which was favourable for civilised troops, and particularly for our Cavalry to work in, and it was not as advantageous to the Boers as the broken country was. Then we decided to recommend the line of advance through the Free State, following the railway.

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5045. I quite understand what you say, that a good many of your communications were made personally, both to the Commander-in-Chief and to the Secretary of State; but to sum up the matter, you did in your official position as Director of Military Intelligence bring officially before both the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State your views on all these points that you have just mentioned to us?—Yes, I wrote at considerable length in 1896 on the point, and, I think, pretty exhaustively.

5046. And I think we had it in the statement from the Intelligence Division that the Secretary of State for the Colonies having had reports communicated to him, expressed his acknowledgments of their value on two occasions in 1897?—Yes, the Intelligence Department was in very constant communication with the Colonial Office. In fact, it always is, but at that time more so than usual.

5047. So that the Government, so far as your responsibility is concerned, were fully informed of the view that you took of the position in South Africa?—I think I may say that they were quite fully informed.

5048. Then the ordinary way of proceeding for providing for defence, I think, is that the General Officer Commanding in the locality is called upon to put in local defence schemes, is he not?—In 1887 we introduced a system of calling on the General Officer Commanding at every important Foreign Military Station, as well as the Home Stations, first of all when it was initiated, to compile a defence scheme for his district. Those schemes were originally compiled in the few years immediately following 1887, and they were revised, and are still revised annually, by the General Officer, and then his criticisms and proposals and so on are considered in the Intelligence and Mobilisation Departments, and the scheme, as approved, is then printed, and sent to him to govern his movements until the next revision.

5049. I think we were told that the rule for him is that he must proceed on the basis of the Forces at the time under his orders?—That is the standing rule. We recognised that there is no good making proposals which were based on troops which did not really exist under the orders of the local General, that he must start, at any rate, with what he had got in hand.

5050. We were told in the statement of the Intelligence Department, which Sir William Nicholson put in, that there were defence schemes prepared, several of them in 1896 and 1897 by the General Officers Commanding?—Several, both in Cape Colony and Natal.

5051. The General Officer Commanding in Cape Colony was responsible for Natal too, was he not?—He was in a supervisory degree; he did not draw up the defence schemes, but they were sent in through him.

5052. It is not mentioned, I think, in the statement that there was any separate scheme for Natal, but they were probably sent in together?—As a matter of fact, the Natal scheme was drawn up separately, and sent in through the General Officer Commanding in South Africa at Cape Town.

5053. And he would express an opinion?—He would make any observations which occurred to him on the Natal scheme before sending it in.

5054. Who was the General Officer Commanding in Natal in 1896 and 1897?—I think it was Colonel Cox.

5055. The General Officer Commanding at Cape Town was General Goodenough, I think?—General Goodenough.

5056. And then Sir William Butler?—Yes.

5057. Those schemes, we have been told, were all based upon the actual garrisons then in South Africa?—All based upon the actual garrisons then in South Africa.

5058. Was there any scheme of defence based on the addition of 20,000 men, or 10,000 men?—No.

5059. One other question about the defence schemes. At what time did Ladysmith assume the position that it afterwards occupied in those schemes?—After the Jameson Raid it began to be more looked into, and it was gradually developed into a fairly large cantonment

See Q. 21277.

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5060. Was that consistent with a scheme for the defence of Natal under the circumstances which you have described as probable ?—Yes.

5061. You think it was ?—I am sure it was.

5062. Was it not a very difficult place to hold ?—It was an objectionable place ; it was merely looked upon as a suitable place for a cantonment, not a suitable place for a fortress.

See Q. 21276.

5063. But then there was a great collection of stores there ?—Yes ; a very large collection of stores at Ladysmith. It was not at all suitable for defence purposes.

5064. But there was a large collection of stores, and, as it turned out, it was necessary to defend it in order to preserve the stores ?—Our idea at home was that the stores would be withdrawn to a defensible position, which, from our point of view, would naturally have been the line of the Tugela.

5065. That was your distinct idea at home ?—Yes.

See Q. 21278.

5066. Was that formulated in any way ?—I have no doubt that it will be found in the various minor reports about defensive positions, and the places to be occupied in the event of operations coming down towards Ladysmith.

5067. But when you say minor reports, are those reports which go to the General Officers ?—Minor reports of the nature of reconnaissance reports and descriptions of positions.

5068. Are they available to the General Officers in the country ?—Yes, they have all passed through the hands of the General Officers in the country originally, and printed copies of them when they are prepared used to be sent out. I have no doubt that in the Intelligence Department there are abundance of those papers.

5069. Was the nature of these reconnaissance reports rather to show how the place could be held ?—Yes.

5070. And pointing out the best positions, the water, with a sketch and detail of the garrison, and particulars of that sort ?—Yes, and generally they are accompanied by sketches or maps if the places are of a special nature.

5071. And if a scheme for Ladysmith of that nature showed a garrison of 200 Infantry, and 150 Cavalry, and four guns, would that meet at all the circumstances at the outbreak of the War ?—By the time of the outbreak of the War there were something like 12,000 troops at Ladysmith ; it was rather a Field Army than a garrison.

5072. I am quite aware of that, but I am talking of a scheme. You say these reconnaissance schemes suggested that stores should be withdrawn from Ladysmith, and that the line of defence should be on the Tugela ?—Yes.

5073. But that is not quite consistent with the idea that Ladysmith might be held with a garrison of 250 Infantry ?—The whole position of Ladysmith changed from day to day from the moment of its first being made a military station. When the officer commanding in Natal had only his handful of men, then he was obliged to allocate to Ladysmith a mere petty garrison. It was then a case of, perhaps, making one little fort and holding out there, whereas in later times, as the number of the garrisons increased, or the number of troops stationed in Ladysmith increased, the projects for its defence would naturally increase in magnitude.

5074. But I was looking at it more from the point of view of stores ?—But the stores belonging to 200 men would be insignificant. It would not be a question of moving stores then, or even defending them.

5075. But the stores stored in Ladysmith in the summer of 1899 were far larger than those required for 250 men ?—Vastly larger ; they were large enough for 6,000 or 7,000 men, I should think.

5076. And eventually they were much larger than that ?—They were much larger than that because all the troops which came up to reinforce the Army in Natal brought their stores to Ladysmith.

5077. Then was it the view of the Intelligence Division that all those stores in the event of a real invasion by the Boers should have been withdrawn from Ladysmith, and that Ladysmith would not have been held as it was held eventually ?—We never thought for a moment of Ladysmith being a defensive place.

5078. Then I do not quite see what you were going to do with the vast accumulation of stores there ?—It had become a cantonment and they had erected tin barracks at Ladysmith, and it was practically the centre of the whole of the military establishment in Natal.

5079. But the stores are what I am speaking of ; the military stores and stores for the whole Army were concentrated in Ladysmith ?—Yes.

5080. And they either had to be withdrawn in the way you speak of or defended or lost ?—Yes. Well, no doubt the general officer commanding in Natal at the beginning of the War looked rather to offence than defence ; he dispersed the small force in Natal in three different parts ; he kept a certain quantity at Ladysmith and sent up some of them to Dundee, and sent down others to Maritzburg to comfort the people of Maritzburg.

5081. There may be another way of putting it, but was it really in contemplation, when the garrison of Natal was increased by the troops sent out during the summer of 1899 before the declaration of war, that on the declaration of war those troops should withdraw to the Tugela ?—That was left to the general on the spot, but our view here was that the stores should be withdrawn.

5082. And was that view communicated to the general ?—It certainly was when the times became critical.

5083. After the declaration of war ?—After the declaration of war.

5084. But was there time to withdraw all those stores in that case ?—It would have been a difficulty.

5085. Besides the question of reinforcing the garrisons, did you also at any time draw the attention of the Secretary of State and of the Commander-in-Chief to the necessity of increasing the transport and other supplies ?—The question of transport was gone into in 1897 pretty carefully on the basis of an advance through the Free State ; it was practically cut and dry then.

5086. And you advised that the transport should be increased ?—The question of the transport was settled in this way. It is almost impossible for us to lay down a perfectly normal transport for a military force or an Army Corps or a division which will suit all countries, and therefore a Special Committee sat in, I think, 1897, which made recommendations on the basis of the nature of the country which a force was to advance through, that is to say, through comparatively flat country like the Free State, and in the vicinity of a railway which we relied upon holding ourselves.

5087. I think it was represented to us by some witnesses that there was a certain amount of delay in sending out the Army Corps because of the necessity of providing mule transport ?—In the time antecedent to the War the provision of transport, not merely animals, but wagons also, was a constant subject of discussion. It was mainly a question of money, whether we could get a sufficient amount of money to put out orders for building wagons and carts and for buying mules and horses.

5088. Was it proposed that a standing contract should be negotiated at the Cape for the provision of sufficient transport for a large force, and is it the fact that that step was not sanctioned ?—Yes.

5089. Do you remember when that proposition was made ?—It was very early in 1899.

5090. Was it not in 1898 ?—It might have been in 1898.

5091. And it was made by the Intelligence Division ?—Made by the Intelligence Division.

5092. In the way you have described, that is to say, it was brought before the notice of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Secretary of State ?—Yes.

5093. I should just like to ask, when you came into the office were there any reports on the state of South Africa showing that your predecessors had considered the matter from the same standpoint ?—Yes, there were two excellent reports when I came in, dating, I should

think, from 1890 and a year or two after that—Major Northcott, I know, made one, and Captain Wemyss, the other. His report was a very good and comprehensive one. Both Captain Wemyss and Major Northcott had actually travelled over most of the country.

5094. And they were officers of the Department?—Yes.

5095. Who was your predecessor?—My predecessor was General Chapman.

5096. That was principally before the Jameson Raid?—Yes, that was before the Jameson Raid.

5097. And I suppose, from what you said before, that the Jameson Raid altered the circumstances?—The Jameson Raid altered the circumstances very much. It increased the open antagonism between the Transvaal Government and the British Government. Before the Jameson Raid the tension was between the Uitlanders and the Transvaal Government, but it became a national matter after the Jameson Raid.

5098. But even before the Jameson Raid, when Captain Wemyss and Major Northcott reported, you felt in the Department that there were dangers in the situation?—Yes.

5099. And those were brought under the notice of the Government at that time?—These reports of Captain Wemyss and Major Northcott were brought under the notice of the Government in the respective years which I mentioned.

5100. And did they draw attention to the increase of armament of the Boers and other matters of that kind?—The increase of armament had not commenced in 1891.

5101. So that the reasons for taking special precautions really began on your accession to office?—Yes, the increase of armament began before 1896; it began about 1894, when the Uitlanders commenced to be clamorous.

5102. And it would at once be noticed by your Department, and attention called to it?—Yes, as a matter of fact, from information that we received, we always knew the number of cannons, Maxims, guns, ammunition, powder, and everything else, that were being supplied to anyone that we were interested in.

5103. A good deal of that armament came from abroad, did it not?—A good deal came from Krupp and Creuzot, but we practically had very little difficulty in getting at that. We kept a watch on those establishments and also on the shipments, so that we really got the whole of the information as to what was ordered from Krupp and Creuzot. The only mistake that we made was that the Boers ordered 16 of the guns which have since acquired the name of "Long Tom," and they only got four of them; the other 12, I believe, are still at Creuzot's; they were made, but they were never delivered.

5104. The only other question that I want to put to you arises out of the previous questions. In the book called "Military Notes," which was drawn up and afterwards issued from these various sources of information, you made various estimates of the forces of the Boers, their armament, and so on, and Colonel Altham, when he was examined before us, drew attention to the correctness of these estimates. Do you agree with that evidence?—Yes, my impression is that we a little over-estimated the total strength of the Transvaal and Free State. I do not think we shall know for many years what the actual numbers were, but the conviction remaining in my mind is that all through we have over-estimated the number of our enemies.

5105. And as regards armament, it was brought out that with the exception of the big guns that you spoke of, in which again you over-estimated, you were almost absolutely accurate, and the same as regards the ammunition?—I think so. There is no reason to suppose that any considerable shipment of guns or rifles or ammunition took place without our being aware of it.

5106. But it is more than that; the actual stocks in hand of the Boers you had pretty accurately?—The fact is the stock was not so large but what we could put our hands on the invoices.

5107. These "Military Notes" were first prepared, I think, in 1899, was it?—The "Military Notes" gradually developed from the various reports which were made by Captain Wemyss and Major Northcott and Colonel Altham, and a good many others, from the memoranda which I had frequently written myself about it, and the constant information which came dribbling in. We had many revises of the "Military Notes" before they were finally issued. They were finally issued in the summer of 1899: about June, 1899.

5108. This is what we are told: "This handbook was first printed and issued as a secret publication in April, 1898. It was revised and brought up to date in June, 1899, and a large number of copies were issued to officers sent to South Africa. Copies were presented to Parliament in the Autumn Session of 1900." So that no doubt is accurate?—That is exactly correct. They were not issued on a large scale to the Army until June, 1899, and all the surplus copies we had in hand were sent to the two Houses of Parliament when they were asked for later. I do not think it is extant now; the type has been broken up.

5109. We had some difficulty in getting copies; but I mean to say that in June, 1899, the handbook in its present form was issued largely, and in April, 1898, practically the whole of the information was at the disposal of the Government?—Yes.

5110. Is there anything else you would wish to say before I ask the other Commissioners to put their questions?—No, I do not think there is. I may mention that the "Notes" were issued as a "secret" publication. A copy, however, fell into the hands of the Boers by capture very early in the war, and was quoted in foreign newspapers.

5111. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I am not very well acquainted with the working of the interior of the German War Office. Is there anyone there who corresponds to the Commander-in-Chief here?—The Emperor is Commander-in-Chief.

5112. I am aware of that fact, but under him is there anybody who is in a position corresponding to our Commander-in-Chief?—No.

5113. Then if you were to establish a great General Staff, corresponding to the German General Staff, would that involve the abolition of the office of Commander-in-Chief?—No, I think it would necessitate the Commander-in-Chief conforming to the orders which he received from the War Minister in a more formal way than at present. At present the Commander-in-Chief is the authority in the Army.

5114. In Great Britain?—He is the ultimate authority in Great Britain.

5115. What I mean is that, supposing that the scheme that you approve of could be carried out, and that we could have a great General Staff in this country, as they have in Germany, it would practically include the duties now performed by the Commander-in-Chief?—A great many of them; certainly not the lesser duties of actual executive command, and the issue of executive orders to the troops.

5116. In whose hands are those matters left in Germany?—To the Generals Commanding Corps.

5117. Then assuming that we had a great General Staff in this country it would probably result in the same thing here, that those details would be left to the Generals Commanding Corps, especially under the present system of devolution that is going on?—I should say so; that is the natural sequence.

5118-19. Then it comes practically to the abolition of the position of Commander-in-Chief, which has been one of the solutions put forward by, among others, the Hartington Commission?—That is not a part of my conception. You may have Commanders-in-Chief who may have different powers and attributes. The position of Commander-in-Chief when the Duke of Wellington was Commander-in-Chief was infinitely more powerful than that which it has now dropped to. In the Report of the Hartington Commission you will recollect the position of Commander-in-Chief was to be a very restricted one.

5120. But that would result practically in the General Staff absorbing all the more important functions of the War Office?—I think so.

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5121. You mentioned that you made proposals on a small scale for an increase of your staff, and that your idea would have been to have made gradual proposals on a much larger scale if it had been possible ?—Yes.

5122. But that you did not feel that it would be desirable that there should be a sudden *bouleversement* in the system of our Army ?—That is so.

5123. And in any case, I want to take it from you precisely, am I right in supposing that it would not have been your business as a Major-General in a subordinate position to bring forward or insist on any such scheme: it was not expected of you ?—No, it practically would be impossible for a man in my position to have put forward a scheme of that kind, which practically was criticising the attributes of my superiors.

5124. That is what I want to get clearly on the notes. It would have been outside your sphere ?—It would.

5125. I wish just to take you for one moment to the expenditure on Intelligence in Great Britain and in the South African Republic. I see in the "Military Notes" laid before Parliament that the sum spent on Secret Service by the Transvaal Government during the three years previous to the war amounted to £286,000. Do you endorse that ?—It is not likely to be under the mark.

5126. The total spent on our Intelligence Department, which then did not include mobilisation, was £16,000 per annum; we have a Return to that effect ?—Yes, I think as a matter of fact that £16,000 would be a little under the mark, because there are some charges, such as travelling expenses, the purchase of books and maps, and various other things, which would not be included; I should say £20,000 would be fairer.

5127. Of that £20,000 what proportion roughly would you say was allotted to work connected with South Africa: a quarter of it, or an eighth ?—I should say about £6,000. At that particular time we had great pressure, and we had more men in the South African section, and we had officers sent out there to look about and to survey, and all that made an extra expenditure on South Africa.

5128. I am speaking of the three years prior to the war ?—No, before the war it would not be so much.

5129. Would you mind telling me roughly, during those three years before the War, what you think it would have been out of the £20,000 a year ?—Say £2,000.

5130. £2,000 per annum ?—Yes, that would be the outside, because you should observe that the Colonial section which dealt with South Africa dealt with all the rest of the Colonies all over the world.

5131. I quite understand that you have to cover the whole world, but the proportion allocated to South African work during the three years preceding the War would be as an outside estimate, about £2,000 a year ?—Yes.

5132. That is 1-47th of the amount expended by the South African Republic annually during that period, and no doubt you are aware that the revenue of Great Britain is 23 times more than the Transvaal revenue was at that time ?—Yes.

5133. How did that question of £100 arise: you mentioned £100 being allotted to some particular purpose ?—Other objects were considered to be of more pressing importance than surveying.

5134. Perhaps I misunderstood your answer before. The sum was not actually allocated ?—No.

5135. You spoke just now of having advocated an increase of our forces in South Africa for purely defensive purposes to the extent of 20,000 men. I think the standard before that was about 9,000 or 10,000 ?—I think it was under 10,000 for both Natal and Cape Colony together.

5136. That would have given us roughly a total of about 30,000 men there. If your suggestion had been adopted of sending a reinforcement of 20,000 we should have had a total of 30,000 men there ?—Yes.

5137. Then we know that later on, when negotiations were going on, we were able to hurry 10,000 men into the country before war broke out ?—Yes.

5138. That would have given us really a possibility of having 40,000 men on the spot before war broke out, if things had gone on in other respects as you had recommended ?—With regard to the addition of the 10,000 men who were sent immediately before the outbreak of the war, we must not forget that they would have formed part of the 20,000 men in question, or any other reinforcements which were sent previously.

5139. But I should like a little more explanation on that. The 10,000 men who were thrown in during the critical part of the negotiations just before the war, were drawn half from India and half from the fortresses—from the Mediterranean generally; there was one regiment that had just arrived home, the Northumberland Fusiliers, which was sent out as it was, complete. Surely, if any scheme of Colonial defence at an earlier period, say 1896 or 1897, had been adopted, they would not have drawn men from India and from the Mediterranean fortresses to make up 20,000 men to be a permanent garrison in South Africa ?—This is all a part of our exiguous military system. We only have enough troops to make up two Army Corps at home, and to fill up the Colonial and Indian garrisons; and if you want to mobilise your two Army Corps you must not touch any unit which is ear-marked for them; you must go outside. The only place to go to outside is to the Colonial and Indian garrisons; they are the only surplus that we have got.

5140. That is the answer I wanted to get from you. I want to put it clearly to you: Is it a fact that we cannot send an expedition of 20,000 men to any part of the world without drawing them from India or depleting our fortresses ?—Twenty thousand men would hardly be the figure; it would be a larger figure than that.

5141. No; the question was, was it not, that you recommended that 20,000 men should be added to the garrison in South Africa, thereby bringing up the total to 30,000 men ?—Yes.

5142. The question I want to get clear is this: Is the military system in this country such that we cannot add 20,000 men to the garrison of any particular part of the world where there is danger except by drawing men from India and depleting our fortresses in the Mediterranean and elsewhere ?—Would you put it in this way: without dislocating our ordinary military arrangements ?

5143. No, I cannot put it in that way, because it may become necessary to dislocate them. I will put it in this way: Cannot our arrangements be dislocated for a time so as to do that ?—You can only get your men by withdrawing them from the Colonial garrisons and India.

5144. That is your answer ?—Yes.

5145. But could we not dislocate our system for a time in order to get 20,000 men at once ?—Perfectly well, in accordance with my opinion.

5146. Quite so, I only want your opinion. You said just now that we only had men at home for two Army Corps, but I think you ought to have said three, ought you not, that is to say, two ready to go on foreign service and one Army Corps for home service; is not that right ?—Yes.

5147. But if you have men at home for two Army Corps ready to go on foreign service, where is the difficulty in finding 20,000 men to go to South Africa ?—The difficulty arises from the desire of keeping the Army Corps units complete.

5148. It is a paper difficulty ?—Yes.

5149. It is a matter of theory ?—Purely a matter of theory; the men were there. But I will tell you where the gist really lies; it is that in order to mobilise our Army Corps we must have an Order in Council.

5150. For calling out the Reserves ?—Yes.

5151. That is just the point I wanted to get at. Is there any way really of sending regiments abroad or filling up regiments for doing something on the spur of the moment without the necessity of having an Order in Council and calling out the Reserves—which instantly creates an uproar throughout Europe ?—I am afraid the House of Commons is not willing to create such a way. It does not exist; you cannot do it.

5152. But with the means given them by the House of Commons, could not the War Office create such a

way ?—Certainly. All we want is to have sufficient money and sufficient power to call out the necessary number of Reserves. The plan is in operation on a small scale.

5153. I am not speaking of calling out the Reserves at all. I am speaking of the possibility which may arise any day of our having to send 20,000 men out of this country suddenly, to Somaliland or anywhere else. Is it not possible for the War Office, with the money that has been given to them by the House of Commons, to send out those 20,000 men without having to call up the Reserves at all ?—I should say that it would be a very undesirable experiment to make ; you would leave nothing but skeletons behind.

5154. Surely you could do it by welding regiments together for the time ?—Then you dislocate the whole of your military offensive and defensive schemes. In order to get 20,000 men you sacrifice 60,000.

5155. In what way do you sacrifice them, to what extent ?—You break up the whole of your little units in order to get your 20,000 men, and then if you have to mobilise the whole of your available forces you have neither the officers nor the men to form a nucleus, you have nothing but the Reserves to fall back upon

5156. I want to put it to you whether, without asking for another penny from the House of Commons, some more efficient system could not be devised which would leave this country, with its enormous colonial area scattered round the world, free to send 20,000 men to any part of the Empire ?—Yes, there is not the slightest doubt about it.

5157. Without more money ?—Without more money.

5158. The gist seems to be this : Whether the present Army Corps system is or is not one that will give us 20,000 men to send away on an emergency ?—To begin with, the Army Corps system is a mistake. The largest units that we ever want are Divisions.

5159. And that was proved in the South African War, where everything was worked by Divisions, I believe ?—There never has been an Army Corps together anywhere except on paper

5160. Then, coming back to the figures which I was giving you before, having—as we had—a garrison of 10,000 men in South Africa, if at any time prior to presenting the Bloemfontein terms to the Boers in May, 1899, we had had an addition of 20,000 men in South Africa, which would have given us 30,000 men, and had sent, as we did ultimately, 10,000 men from India and the fortresses in a hurry, we should then have had 40,000 men in South Africa. Would that 40,000 men, if they could have been got there before war broke out, have been sufficient in your opinion to defend Natal from the Tugela to the sea, to hold the Orange River, and from the Orange River to the sea, and to garrison Kimberley ?—Yes, I think they would.

5161. You feel pretty confident of that, do you not ? —Yes.

5162. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) I was going to ask you about those Army Corps, but now I will only ask you about one Division of them : Would it not be possible for the War Office to have sanction to mobilise a Division of the Army Corps which might be effectively put into the field in connection with the number of men wanted for a smaller expedition than the 40,000 ?—I think it would be quite easy to make an arrangement of the kind that you suggest.

5163. We had it from Lord Kitchener in evidence that in his opinion during the whole war the Boers had 95,000 men out in the field altogether, and that his rough estimate of the Boers in the field ordinarily was from 65,000 to 70,000 ; that, of course, is nearly double what the Intelligence Department estimated the Boers to be capable of putting in the field. Have you any reason to think that his view is an over-statement of the case ?—I should be inclined to think it was a very large over-statement. We shall have an opportunity, sooner or later, when the Census is taken, and the whole of the Boer prisoners are back, of finding out what the numbers really were, and I think it will then be apparent that if you were to take every Boer from 16 to 60 years of age you could not produce anything like that number—they do not exist in the country.

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5164. Was it not, in your opinion, an initial error to place all those stores at Ladysmith when hostilities to a certain extent were imminent ?—I think Ladysmith was a very unfortunate place at which to accumulate either men or stores.

5165. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Were you connected with the Intelligence Department as far back as 1880 ?—I was connected with the Intelligence Department pretty constantly from 1872 on.

5166. Then in 1880, when the Boers defeated our small force, were preparations then made such as could easily have defeated them ; after their defeat of us were preparations immediately made with a view of turning the scale ?—I think our general belief was that after Majuba, Sir Evelyn Wood had in his hand a sufficient number of men to have insured the conquest of the Boers.

5167. Then at that time the Home Government gave them their independence ?—Yes.

5168. Did you in 1896 point out the possibility of war with the Boers ?—Yes.

5169. Did you ever suggest that secret instructions should be prepared and sent to the General Officer Commanding in South Africa for his guidance in the event of war breaking out ?—Yes.

5170. Do you know if those suggestions were acted upon ?—I believe not ; there was a constant interchange of communications between the General Officer Commanding in South Africa and the Military authorities at home, but anything in the shape of specific instructions I do not think was sent out.

5171. Who was the General Officer Commanding in 1896 ?—Sir William Goodenough.

5172. From what you know of the intention of the Boers and their hopes and fears with regard to the question, do you think if we had had 30.000 or 40,000 troops in South Africa six months before war was declared the Boers would have attacked us ?—No, there would have been no war.

5173. Now with regard to maps ; do you consider that what we have heard spoken of as rough sketch war maps are practically enough for military purposes in a country such as we had to deal with in South Africa ?—No, I do not. I have a very strong opinion that they are not sufficient, and that they are misleading, and worse, almost, than no maps at all. I think that if you put maps in the hands of troops they ought to be good maps.

5174. Thoroughly first-rate surveys made by triangulation ?—Yes, accurately made and well turned out. I will give you an example of the sort of maps which exist in Cape Colony. When you get several sheets of the farm maps, and endeavour to fit them together, you arrive at such a state of things that when two sheets are put alongside one another, a railway which runs through one sheet ends at the margin of that sheet, two or three inches from where it begins on the other sheet.

5175. They remind you of the case of the early French engineers when they started their first tunnel from each end, and came out and made two tunnels ?—Yes.

5176. Have you any difficulty in procuring frontier maps from foreign countries with whom we might possibly be at war ?—As a rule almost all civilised foreign nations publish such admirable maps of the interior of their own countries that we can procure them from the trade.

5177. Would that apply to such a case as the northern frontier of India on the Russian side ?—So far as the Russian surveys go, and are published. Of course the surveying and the elementary maps generally go far ahead of the publications. I take it it would be much more difficult for an outsider to get a British map of the British frontier of the Northern Provinces than it would be to get a Russian map.

5178. (*Sir John Edge.*) Can you tell me when first it was put forward that the Tugela was our proper line of defence in Natal ? I will tell you the reason I ask you. I think it was Colonel Grant (who made a map of Northern Natal) who told us that his directions were only to map from Ladysmith north. He mapped in 1896 ?—The impression then was that if any invasion

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took place in Natal it would be limited to the northern triangle.

5179. That it would not come down so far as Ladysmith?—That it would not come down beyond Ladysmith. And when Major Grant was sent out, he was sent out with that limitation, but the limitation really depended on money. We could spare a certain amount of money for sending him out, and for paying his expenses, and the question was how should we employ him best. We thought we should get from the garrison of Ladysmith, and from Sir Harry Escombe, a survey taken in hand over Southern Natal.

5180. That is south of Ladysmith?—South of Ladysmith.

5181. I am very anxious to be certain that I understand your evidence on some points. As I understand it, you contemplated from the armament of the Boers and their feeling that ultimately there was a risk of war being declared by them?—I felt confident that nothing but successful procrastination would prevent their fighting with us, that they wanted to fight.

5182. That is to say, if it was impossible to procrastinate until the Uitlanders became so enormously in excess of the Boer population, the Boers would fight?—Yes, and that there was always a risk of their seizing on our embarrassments. If we happened to have been embarrassed by differences tending to create a state of considerable tension with any of the Great Powers, there was the moment; they would seize it at once.

5183. You considered that our best policy was to temporise and wait?—Yes, temporise and wait, and prepare at the same time.

5184. I also gather that your opinion was and probably is still, that if a crisis came, our policy was to invade, and not wait for them?—Certainly.

5185. As I understand, you did not suggest that we should take the aggressive until the crisis came?—No.

5186. I mean by the crisis the declaration of war?—No; not that we should adopt the aggressive attitude, but that we should look forward to being forced into war, whether we would or no.

5187. And then when it came that we ought to move forward?—Yes, take the first step and invade them. In fact, if you look at what really occurred, it was only the action of the Boers in scattering all their forces in investing Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking which saved us.

5188. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You say that the German Emperor is Commander-in-Chief of the German Army?—Yes.

5189. Then come the General Staff?—Well, the General Staff does not really appear in the actual command. What the General Staff does is to devise plans of campaign and draft the orders.

5190. Does the General Staff include such officers as our Quartermaster-General, or Adjutant-General?—The Quartermaster-General, yes; the Adjutant-General, no.

5191. Is the Adjutant-General in a different Department than the General Staff?—Yes, the Adjutant-General in the German Army is an executive officer. Beginning at the top, the Emperor's Adjutant-General issues all the orders of the Emperor to the Corps Commanders.

5192. But it does include the Quartermaster-General?—The Quartermaster-General is included in that General Staff.

5193. Taking the other high departments, as, for instance, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, or the equivalent officer, is he included in the General Staff?—No, he has a separate branch from the great General Staff.

5194. And so with respect to the Director-General of Ordnance, or the equivalent officer?—He is also outside the General Staff.

5195. Then has the General Staff anything to say to the Finance Department of the Army?—No, except in so far as it is advisory. If a remodelling were to take place in the system of the pay, or the accountability of the Army, the General Staff would be consulted about it, but it would have nothing to do with the actual execution; that would be directly under the War Minister.

5196. The Intelligence Branch is, of course, in the General Staff?—Yes.

5197. And by the Intelligence Branch you understand, at least I understand, that means the obtaining of information?—The obtaining and collation of information, and the formation of projects based on that information.

5198. If the General Staff includes the Quartermaster-General's Staff, can you say how many of the Staff are employed in obtaining information; in other words, how many are there in the Intelligence Department?—I should say none. The Quartermaster-General's Department now has drifted into a very peculiar position; it is practically the head of the Army Service Corps.

5199. I beg your pardon, I am speaking of the Quartermaster-General in Germany. Taking his Department away from the General Staff, how many of the General Staff in the German Army are confined to the Intelligence Branch that is obtaining information?—But the Quartermaster-General in the German Army is very much what an Intelligence Officer is here in a great many things. The Quartermaster-General in the German Army has not the same duties as our present Quartermaster-General. We abolished all the subordinates of the Quartermaster-General's Department a good many years ago, and now they are in course of being revised, but the bulk of the officers that we have in the Quartermaster-General's Department are practically Army Service Corps officers who do the supply, transport, provisioning, and everything of that kind connected with the Army.

5200. Then are we to understand that there are about 150 officers on the General Staff whose time is devoted to the obtaining of information, and of course the preparation of plans of operations and so forth?—Yes.

5201. And that we have for the same purpose about 25 at present?—Yes, about 25.

5202. And we have 25 who have the additional duties of mobilisation attached to them?—With mobilisation it would be about 28. I daresay there are about 30 now, but Sir William Nicholson, no doubt, will have given the Commission the statistics upon that point.

5203. I just want to contrast that. We have about 30 now altogether, including those attached to the Mobilisation Department, who do the duty of the 150 on the German General Staff?—Yes.

5204. Have the 150 officers the mobilisation?—The whole essence of the mobilisation is worked out by the General Staff.

5205. But these 150 told off for the Intelligence Department?—They are the soul of the whole thing.

5206. They have the mobilisation too?—Yes, they have the mobilisation, but the mobilisation is so arranged in Germany, and it is practically so arranged here, that all you have to say is "mobilise." The whole system ought to be so arranged that you merely touch the button and then everything ought to go of itself.

5207. To come to another point. You say that in 1897 you made representations recommending certain preparations, and the Commander-in-Chief you believed approved of them; you are not certain, but you believe?—I believe that he suggested larger measures, not specifically what I mentioned.

5208. But did what you advised include sending out quantities of troops there in 1897?—Yes, sending out troops, certainly.

5209. And you think if troops had been sent in 1897 the probability is that there would have been no war?—I think it is very likely. But I also felt in 1897 that it was perfectly useless to propose sending out troops, that the British public did not yet begin to imbibe anything about South Africa, and that the whole of the country was either indifferent or ill-informed or opposed to taking any further trouble about the military con-

dition of South Africa. They did not wake up for two years afterwards.

5210. The public were not prepared for it?—No

5211. I do not ask you, of course, to mention any names; but Ladysmith having been chosen for the deposit of stores, who were the officers responsible for that? Were the officers responsible for the selection of Ladysmith at home or abroad?—Ladysmith was selected by the local officers and with the concurrence undoubtedly of the people at home. The reason that it was selected is that it was a railway junction; the only railway junction at that time in Natal.

5212. That was the reason for the selection of Ladysmith?—That was the chief reason for the selection There were subordinate reasons, such as there being a nice site for a cantonment and good water and good ground for artillery and rifle ranges.

5213. About what time was it that the stores first commenced to be sent there in quantities?—I should say not until 1897, perhaps even 1898. There was no large quantity there in 1897.

5214. Then inasmuch as it was a railway junction, and for the other reasons that you have given, do you not think that it would have been well in 1897 to have taken some means to have fortified Ladysmith?—I can only say that I more than once asked the officers commanding at Ladysmith to have the country round Ladysmith surveyed, and that it was never surveyed except that Major Grant brought down the survey of Northern Natal as far as Ladysmith. With that exception there was no survey of Ladysmith at all.

5215. Of course that would have been preparatory to defensive preparations?—Of course; the first step you take in arranging to fortify a place would be to have a proper map of it on which you could design your fortifications.

5216. (*Sir John Edge.*) As a matter of fact had you information in March or April, 1897, that the Boers were preparing for war, and would advance in three directions on or before the outbreak of war, namely, on Mafeking and Rhodesia, on Kimberley, and on the railway lines favourable for cutting Warrenton, Colesberg and Aliwal?—Yes, we used to receive very frequent information about what the Boers were proposing to do. They were singularly talkative, and they were not at all particular whom they spoke to, so that up to the last we generally had no difficulty in finding out what they really meant to do, about the invasion of Natal, for instance.

5217. Then you had no doubt at any rate that they intended to attack us even so far back as March, 1897?—Yes, and we had begun already making preparations at Kimberley, which was the most important place of the three.

5218. I think I am correct in saying that the intention of the Boers that was indicated to you early in 1897 was subsequently carried out?—Yes.

5219. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I think we may take it that no sort of attempt was made to construct any defensive works at all in Natal; I do not mean on the sea coast, but as regards hindering the advance of the Boers?—No, none. We made projects for the defence of some places more here in the Intelligence Department than in South Africa, but in South Africa the general idea was offensive. They paid no attention to defences of any kind.

5220. And there was no prospect of making works to cover this great quantity of stores and ammunition which had been collected at Ladysmith?—No.

5221. Is there a project for the defence of Natal as prepared in the eighties, or whenever they began to prepare these schemes, and corrected up to date, up to the time of the beginning of the War?—There is one. The defence project will, of course, be in the Defence and Mobilization section now.

5222. And that was prepared and has been regularly kept up?—That has been regularly kept up. But Ladysmith, you must remember, had not been created in the eighties.

5223. But it had been created some time before the War?—It did not begin to be a possible or suitable place until the railway was completed.

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5224. I think from what we have heard from other witnesses it would have been rather difficult to satisfactorily have a work which would have covered all the stores at Ladysmith?—It would have been quite impossible, because what would suit for 200 would not suit for 2,000 or for 10,000.

5225. And with regard to the withdrawal of those stores when War seemed imminent, or about to commence, it was almost impossible to do it; I take it it would have taken weeks to do it?—It would have taken weeks with that limited single line to do it.

5226. And it might have created a panic in the country; an indication of a sort of general intention to retire?—Yes, no doubt.

5227. You thought that by the gradual influx of Uitlanders and so on, they would be so powerful that they would be capable of tackling the Boers. But was there not also some notion that possibly the Uitlanders and the Boers might in time join together to form a sort of Republic independent of Great Britain?—The Boers would have been a very small component in that Republic. But there is no doubt that the Uitlanders were not to be regarded as necessarily loyal to the British; they were very far from it. The majority of the Uitlanders were English people, and a still larger majority were English-speaking people, Americans, Australians, and so on, but they were all men who were playing for their own hand together with the Germans, the Russians, the Austrians, and others who had joined in exploiting the gold mines of the Rand. What they wanted was a fair Republican Government, and did not care who was President of it—whether Mr. Kruger was the President, or whether it was a self-governing colony under England. They were not at all strong from a British point of view. That was the rock, in point of fact, on which Rhodes and Jameson split: that Rhodes in his secret heart desired it all to be British, and the influential people on the Rand were quite content with having a good government, no matter who the nominal head was.

5228. I suppose those foreigners were being reinforced in quite equal proportion to the British?—No, the British were gradually absorbing them.

5229. Were not the Germans and others increasing?—The Germans and Russians were in considerable numbers there, but they are all being absorbed into the British and American societies. To this day all the Germans and French and Russians who are at Johannesberg connected with the mines are all closely connected English.

5230. And probably they are not very friendly disposed towards England?—They are not altogether friendly disposed, but they are quite ready to accept English as the dominant language, and the dominant system, and the dominant financial interest.

5231. I gather from what you have said that you do not think very highly of the present British Army Corps system?—I do not.

5232. Do you not think it is making almost a fetish of it, that is to say that if we cannot send 5,000 or 6,000, or 10,000 men abroad for some foreign expedition because it would dislocate the Army Corps system, which has never been a great success, in the United Kingdom?—Yes, it is a very great drawback, but at the particular time when that argument was strongest and most valuable, we had immediately in front of us the proximate necessity of mobilising on a large scale, and no doubt it would then have been a very great mistake to spoil the larger mobilization for the sake of effecting a smaller one with greater convenience.

5233. Notwithstanding that some people thought it was an urgent necessity to do so?—Yes, certainly some people thought there was a very great necessity for mobilising without loss of time.

5234. (*Viscount Esher.*) Sir George White was appointed on the 11th of September, and he left England on the 16th of September. How often did you see him between the 11th of September and the 16th of September. Do you remember?—I cannot call to mind, but very seldom.

5235. Did you have any conversation about the defence of Natal with him?—No.

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5236. Sir Redvers Buller left England on the 14th of October, I think. Do you remember how often you saw him before he left ?—I saw him very frequently.

5237. Did you have any discussions with him as to the line of advance ?—Yes, some. I differed with him in opinion.

5238. However, he did discuss the matter with you ?—Yes.

5239. And you placed all the information you had at his disposal, I suppose ?—Yes, certainly.

5240. Verbally as well as on paper ?—Yes.

5241. (*Chairman.*) There is a statement in the "Military Notes" in chapter vii., from which I will just quote four lines, "The great diminution of game in the Transvaal has deprived the young Boers of that perfect training enjoyed by their fathers; while apart from the increased care with which our battalions are trained in musketry, the flat trajectory of the small-bore rifle has much diminished the advantage conferred by accuracy in judging distances." Has the experience of the War modified that opinion at all ?—I do not think that the Boers could have had any practice arising from the pursuit of game. Practically, game just about the time of the War had almost entirely disappeared; there are very few game now in the Transvaal. Whereas 20 years ago a farmer would tell his son to take a rifle, and give him one or two cartridges, and go and shoot a buck.

5242. But speaking generally, I understood that passage to mean that you thought the superiority of the Boers in shooting would not be so marked; do you think that is the lesson drawn from the War ?—I think they immensely failed in their shooting.

5243. You think the difference between them and our troops is not so marked as it would have been formerly ?—No, not so marked as it would have been formerly. I think they are still very much better than our troops.

5244. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I may mention that that was not the impression formed by the Australian soldiers in the field; they thought the Boers very bad shots indeed ?—I would not put the Boers against the Australians. When I was speaking of our troops I was thinking of our own British troops. I think the Boers, no doubt, are not anything like as good as the average Australian shot. I called attention in a Report which I wrote in 1896 to their decay of shooting power, because up to 1870, or even up to 1880, the Boers were in constant war with the natives, and had the practice which game shooting afforded.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

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Major-General H. C. Borrett, C.B., Inspector-General of Recruiting; Colonel C. Crutchley, M.V.O., Assistant Adjutant-General for Recruiting, called and examined.

5245. (*Chairman.*) General Borrett, you wish to be examined in the first instance in your capacity as Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces ?—If you please, my Lord.

5246. That position was at one time combined with that of Inspector-General of Recruiting ?—Yes.

5247. You were appointed on the 9th October, 1899 ?—Yes, to relieve Sir Thomas Kelly-Kenny, who went to Aldershot.

5248. In 1900 Major-General Turner succeeded you as Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces ?—Yes, on the 26th March.

5249. But you remained in the Recruiting Branch ?—I remained in the Recruiting alone.

5250. As Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces you had to do with the mobilization of the Militia for the War ?—Yes.

5251. There were various Army Orders for the embodiment of the Militia ?—Yes.

5252. And the total number of battalions that were embodied was how many ?—Eventually they were all embodied, but that was after my time. There were 38 embodied up to the time I left.

5253. Would you state the principle which was followed in the embodiment ?—When the order was given that the Militia might be embodied, we had a free hand, and could call them up as we wanted them. In normal times every regiment ought to be represented in England by a home battalion—one at home and one abroad.

5254. That is of the Regulars ?—Yes. When the War broke out the Home Battalions had to be sent abroad to South Africa, and then there was no representative of that regiment left at home. On the Home battalion being ordered out I called out a Militia battalion. If it was the 1st Battalion that ought to be at home, and that had gone to South Africa, I called up the 3rd Battalion of Militia, and if it was the 2nd Battalion, I called up the 4th. I did that in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. He said to me: "Hit on a plan, call them up whatever way you like, but have a plan, so that everybody will know what you are doing, and they will understand why you call up the 3rd or 4th Battalions." So I adhered to this plan all through, with the exception of two cases, when it did not suit me to call up the battalions that ought to have been called up. In one case the regiment happened to be so short of officers that I called up the corresponding battalion, and in the other case it was for a disciplinary reason, as I thought the battalion was not in very good order. Otherwise I followed that rule all through. I received personal orders from the Commander-in-Chief every now and then to send a battalion wanted abroad, and I selected those battalions, and if there was another corresponding Militia battalion in that regiment I called it up to replace the Militia battalion of the same regiment that had gone abroad, so that there was always a representative of the regiment in England. If there was no Militia battalion to call up, as happened in some cases, because some of the battalions have not got two Militia battalions, I called up one from an adjacent county as near as I could, so as not to break through the rule more than I could possibly help.

5255. How were you guided in selecting battalions for foreign service ?—I tried to treat everybody equally, and, first of all, I had to be guided by the strength; it was obvious that it was no use calling up a battalion that was not of sufficient strength to send it abroad. I may mention the Devons, the Exeter Battalion, the Colonel of which came to see me a great many times, asking if it was not time for calling up his regiment, but I could not do it, as they were not strong enough to go to South Africa. The second thing was that I tried to make everything fair; I did not then know how long the War was going on, and I thought in the meantime I ought to treat everybody fairly, and I always tried to call up a fair proportion of English, of Scotch, and of Irish. In the first instance, when I was told to get regiments ready for South Africa, the order I got was for nine battalions for foreign service, and I then called up seven English, one Irish, and one Scotch. The Scotch Battalion would not go, so I selected another Scotch to make it fair. I was also guided by another fact, that I did not like to take too many Militia battalions from the same county. The best Militia battalions, as far as strength go, are in Lancashire, and I called up a good many Lancashire regiments and sent them abroad, and there were a good many more Lancashire Militia battalions which I should have been very glad to send abroad, but I did not send them because I thought it was hardly fair on the county of Lancashire. For instance, there are the Manchesters, two very good strong battalions, that I did not send out, because I had already sent out the Lancasters, the South Lancashire, and the Lancashire Fusiliers, and so many others, that I thought it would rather dislocate trade if I took everybody from one county and nobody from another. I wanted to give all England a fair chance, and I wanted to spread the opportunity of volunteering all over England, Ireland, and Scotland as much as I could. That is what guided me in the selection. With regard to the age, the Secretary of State for War was

anxious, in the first instance, that we should not send any Militiaman out unless he was 19 years of age. No Line soldier was allowed to go and fight the Boers until he was 20. Looking over the ages of the Militia, I was obliged to tell Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary of State, that if he adhered to 19 I should lose one-third of the men. He agreed with me that that would not do, and he said that we should allow Militiamen to go out at 18; they enlist at 17. By taking them at 18 we only lost one-tenth of the men, whereas, had we gone to 19, we should have lost one-third of them, so that the order was given that Militiamen of 18 were to be available to go, and, of course, it was all done by volunteering. Those orders that the Commander-in-Chief personally gave me were very strict, and very strict orders were given to Generals to the effect that in every district where a regiment was going abroad the General should personally see it on parade, and ask the men whether they quite understood the terms, that there was no compulsion, that everything was quite voluntary, and that if any man did not wish to go no questions would be asked. It was entirely voluntary, and that was all carried out right through. In the whole of my time, one Scotch and three Irish said "No," and the whole of the English said "Yes," and I could have got a great many more.

5256. I think there were 35 battalions embarked by the 2nd April?—Yes.

5257. And in order to get those 35 battalions you had been in communication with 40 battalions?—Yes.

5258. How do the Militia battalions stand in respect of officers?—At the time the War broke out they were very short of officers, and, according to the Rules then in force, it took a very long time to get an officer for the Militia, as the Lord Lieutenant had a great say in the matter, and he was allowed a month in which he could select a man, and if he did not select an officer for the regiment the nomination was passed on to the officer commanding the Regimental District. When the Commander-in-Chief (then Lord Wolseley) sent for me in the first instance and told me that this matter was urgent, almost the first thing he said was, "How long will it take for you to get a regiment ready to go?" I had to make a suggestion, and I said, "A fortnight." I thought a fortnight was a very good time, and, as a matter of fact, I did get them all off in a fortnight, but I saw at once that I could not get the officers through the Lords-Lieutenant of the counties, because they were allowed a fortnight to choose.

5259. I think you are not quite right; a new Regulation came out about two years ago, by which it lies with the Commanding Officer to intimate to the Lord-Lieutenant, and the period is abolished altogether?—That Order came out in the early part of 1900, while I was with the Auxiliary Forces, in consequence of what I did. The regiments were very short of officers. Take the Royal Lancasters, both Militia battalions went abroad, and they had only eight subaltern officers, when they ought to have had 24. I was determined that no regiment should go out short, either of men or officers, and I proceeded to fill them up in conjunction with the officers commanding regiments. When a regiment was put under orders I used to write to the Colonel and say: "I have got a long list of young gentlemen who want commissions; are you prepared to receive them on my recommendation?" I must say that I was in a position as Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces to have good men on my list, because at that time a good many young gentlemen wanted to join the Militia in the hope that they would eventually join the Line, and I may say that the Secretary of State sent me the names of some gentlemen, as did the Commander-in-Chief, the Quartermaster General, and other officers at the War Office, and, of course, I was prepared to take their recommendations. I used to see nearly all the young officers myself, and they were all ordinary educated young gentlemen, and, in conjunction with the Colonels of the regiments, I filled up the vacancies in the ranks of the officers; some Colonels gave me a free hand to fill up their regiments with anybody I liked, whereas some Colonels living in London said they would rather see the young gentlemen and speak to them themselves, but we worked in a friendly way, and in no case did a Militia battalion go out to South Africa short of officers. Some of them certainly went out with officers who had not been gazetted; we put them in at the last moment, and I had not time to gazette them, but I sent them out, and out they went.

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5260. And they had no training?—No, I said I could not train them; I had nothing to do with training. My business was to find the men and the officers. I thought they were better than nothing, and I had this great point, that all these officers, I knew, went out hoping to get Line commissions. As I have said already, I saw all the young officers, and in speaking to them I said, "A great many of you will get Line commissions, perhaps one-fourth, or perhaps one-third, but certainly not all, and it therefore all depends upon you to work your hardest, to do your best, so as to be recommended by your Colonels and Generals for these commissions that are to be given." That was the great thing I had at my back, and I felt certain it was an incentive to them all to work; they went out knowing nothing, but with the best incentive a man could have. They went out, probably, every one of them hoping they would get a commission. Eventually what happened was that Colonels, and Generals too, were asked to recommend a certain number of officers, and we presume that the Colonels and Generals picked out the officers who did their best, and they got commissions.

5261. You would not put that forward as an ideal system of appointment to Militia regiments?—No, I only say what I had to do after the War broke out, as I found them very short of officers. In the Lancasters, both Battalions had only eight subaltern officers, and I sent them out with the whole 24.

5262. (*Viscount Esher.*) How many did you appoint altogether?—I have not the remotest idea.

5263. Could you say approximately?—No.

5264. (*Chairman.*) Was there no other source from which officers with some training could have been appointed to any of these vacancies?—No, I do not think there was. Volunteer Adjutants were very anxious to go out, but at that time I said, "No, your duty in England has to be done, and you must stick to your posts," and they were not allowed to go.

5265. You do not represent that as a satisfactory system if we had to do the same thing again?—No, certainly not; of course, a satisfactory system is that every Militia battalion should be properly officered in peace time, but sometimes we cannot have that, as the young gentlemen do not come forward. I had to take it as I found it, and to do my best.

5266. You have no suggestion to make whereby that difficulty might be avoided in the future?—No.

5267. Could you have a Return made out of the number of officers who were appointed?—Yes; I will try to get it.

5268. (*Viscount Esher.*) What was the date when you first sent out a Militia battalion?—On the 4th January, 1900, the first battalion embarked.

5269. How many young officers were appointed from the 7th October, 1899, to the end of the War?—I will find it out and send it in to you; it will be a long list, as I suppose there never have been such Gazettes before, and the "Gazette" at that time, instead of being a short thing, was pages long.

5270. (*Chairman.*) We do not want the names?—Quite so, but the numbers will be high.*

5271. With regard to these officers, was it not possible to get young officers who had had some training at

* The following statement was subsequently received from Major-General Borrett:—"The number of young gentlemen given commissions in the Militia infantry between the 9th October 1899 and the 30th April 1900 was 407. Of these, 208 were appointed to the 35 battalions sent abroad while I was Inspector-General of the Auxiliary Forces, averaging nearly six per battalion. The two Militia Battalions of the Royal Lancaster had 17 of these young officers. The Welsh (only one battalion), had 14. The 4th Battalion Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders and the 3rd Battalion East Lancashire had 10 each. The 4th Battalion Bedfordshire had 11. The 3rd Battalion West Riding and the 3rd Battalion South Wales Borderers had nine each. Practically all these young officers went abroad with their Militia battalions."

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all events, from the Volunteers?—I do not see why we should denude one part of the Army to help another; we did require officers of Volunteers to go out with their Volunteer Service Companies, and that went on at the same time.

5272. Certainly, but there were Militia Battalions volunteering to go on foreign service; would it not have been a natural thing to take candidates from the other branch if they offered themselves?—I may say I did if they offered themselves; we do take officers from the Volunteers, but as a matter of fact they do not offer themselves. They are not quite the same class of officer.

5273. Did you ask any Volunteer regiments if they had young officers who would be inclined to volunteer?—No, I did not.

5274. You did not look upon the Volunteers as a source from which you could get candidates?—No, unless they came forward themselves; if they did I was glad to take them, and if they gave a certain service in the Volunteers, instead of putting them in at the bottom of the regiment, I put them in as lieutenants, and sometimes as captains.

5275. Did you subject these young officers you sent out without training to any tests?—No.

5276. Were you satisfied as to their physical fitness?—They all had to pass the ordinary test as in peace time; they had to send me in a certificate of moral character, and they had to pass the doctor the same as previously.

5277. They passed the same tests as they would have had to pass if they had been appointed in peace time to the same battalions?—Exactly the same tests. I think I may say that they have been a success by the numbers of Commissions to the Regular Army that have been given to them.

5278. With regard to the Militia Artillery Companies, that began on the 1st March, 1900, did it not?—Yes. Of course there was not that difficulty with the Artillery, because they were only a very small portion.

5279. What was sent out in the way of Militia Artillery companies?—I am afraid I have not got the numbers with me.

5280. Were they companies of separate regiments, or in what way were they sent out?—The Donegal, Durham, and Edinburgh Artillery each sent out a company.

5281. Three companies?—Yes.

5282. Was that all?—That was all in my time.

5283. And Engineers?—The Royal Monmouthshire and the Royal Anglesea, two sections.

5284. And on the 5th February, the Volunteer Medical Staff Corps and bearer companies; were those Volunteers or Militia?—Those were Volunteers, I think.

5285. That is all you wish to say with regard to the history of the embodiment and sending abroad of the Militia while you were Inspector-General?—Yes. I can hand in this Paper giving a list of the regiments I called up to go abroad, and what became of them. (*Handing in the same. Vide Appendix, Vol., page* 160).

5286. This Paper you have handed in comprises the details of your evidence, really?—Yes.

5287. With regard to the Volunteers proper, in the Army Order 2, of 1900, the City Imperial Volunteers went out?—Yes, they went out under Colonel, now Major-General Mackinnon.

5288. Had you to do with the embodiment of that regiment?—The only thing I had to do with it was that as they were Volunteers I was asked about it, and I helped to draft the Army Order. You understand that having enlisted they became Regular soldiers and passed out of my hands, and I had nothing more to do with them. The Militia went out as Militia, but everybody else who went out to the War, that is all Volunteers, and everybody else who went out, were enlisted as soldiers, and having enlisted as soldiers, they passed out of my hands, and no longer belonged to the Auxiliary Forces. I drafted the Order, and arranged all about the enlistment of the men.

5289. How was the enlistment carried out?—It was carried out by the Lord Mayor to a great extent and a special committee; I think Major-General Mackinnon could tell you all about the City Imperial Volunteers.

5290. You said you had made all the arrangements, and that is why I asked?—One thing we were very particular about was that every volunteer that went out should fulfil the conditions of the infantry soldier, The War Office realised the fact that these service companies of Volunteers and the City Imperial Volunteers (anyhow the service companies of Volunteers) were going straight out to South Africa to join their comrades who had been fighting in South Africa for a long time, and in plain English were as hard as nails. It appeared to me that the case was this, that if we had sent out a Volunteer battalion as a whole, as we sent out a Militia battalion, on the arrival of the Volunteer battalion in South Africa the Commander-in-Chief there would naturally have said: "Oh, here is a Volunteer battalion sent out to me, and I do not suppose they are quite up to the mark yet"; and he would keep them in the background and give them some training before sending them up to the front. But instead of that it was decided to send out a service company of Volunteers to every Line battalion serving at the War in South Africa. This we were able to do with the exception of the Irish regiments, and we could not do that with them because there are no Irish Volunteer battalions in Ireland, and we could not therefore send out any to their affiliated regiments. In every other case we sent them out to affiliated regiments: the Lancashire Volunteer service companies to the Lancashires and the Berkshire to the Berkshires, and so on all through. As these men were going straight out to join their comrades in the field it was arranged that they should be men of the same physique as the comrades they were going to fight with, otherwise instead of being a help to their battalion they would have been a great encumbrance. That was the principle on which the Orders principally went. I may say that I had a great many requests to relax the Order and to allow men of inferior physique to go out, but we stuck to our guns, and no man was allowed to go out who did not fulfil the requirements of an infantry soldier.

5291. You were very strict in the matter?—We were; we were pressed to let men go who did not fulfil the conditions, but the Adjutant-General, then Sir Evelyn Wood, said: "Stick to your guns and do not relax," and I did not relax in any way.

5292. As to the City Imperial Volunteers, were the conditions as strict in their case?—They were just the same. They were the same age, and we fixed the age at 20, because we allowed no regular soldier to go and fight the Boers until he was 20. All these men enlisted, and therefore became regular soldiers. It was the same also with the chest measurement, which was then 33 inches for the regular soldier, and we allowed no man to go out who was under 34. It was the same also with the 115 lbs. weight and the same standard.

5293. Although you could not get Volunteers from Ireland you did get some Volunteers for the Irish Line battalions?—Yes, because it so happens that there is an Irish battalion in Liverpool and an Irish battalion in London, and so I was able to get companies from them and to attach them to Irish regiments, but all the other Irish regiments had to go without. They were all enlisted for one year or the War, and if the War was over in less than a year they had the option of going at once or completing their year.

5294. You had nothing to do with the Imperial Yeomanry?—The second lot of Imperial Yeomanry were raised entirely apart from me, and I had nothing to do with their medical examination, or anything else. They were raised by a Committee of their own.

5295. What about the first lot?—The first contingent of Imperial Yeomanry was raised under Army Order 1 of 1900, which gives the conditions, and they were very much the same conditions namely, that we did not take any man under 20, and that they must be of the infantry height and the cavalry chest measurement.

5296. Was that under your superintendence in any way?—Yes, the first lot were. The only relaxation

which was made in connection with them was that as they were only enlisting for the War medical officers were told that they need not subject them to such a strict examination as that to which we subject the ordinary soldier who enlists for 12 years. When an ordinary soldier goes before the doctor, the doctor has to recognise that he has to last us 12 years, and he has to bear that in his mind when examining him. As we did not think this War was to last 12 years the medical officers were told in examining these Yeomanry that they might examine them with the idea that they would only be required for this War and not afterwards. That was the only relaxation that was made; it was also applied to the City Imperial Volunteers.

5297. Did it say how long the doctor was to take into account?—The Order is to this effect: "In carrying out the medical examination of candidates it should be borne in mind that it is unnecessary that they should fulfil all the conditions of fitness required of a recruit enlisting for the full term of service in the Regular Army. It is sufficient that the candidate should be free from organic disease or other defect likely to prevent him doing his work during the duration of the present War." As a matter of fact we always supposed it would be about a year, and we always enlisted everybody for a year. That we adhered to with the exception of the last lot of Imperial Yeomanry, when we had very good reason to think that the War was at last coming to an end, and so instead of enlisting them for a year, or the War, we said nothing about the War, but enlisted them for a year, because we thought that if we enlisted them for a year or the War, with the option of taking their discharge when the War was over, we might have them only for perhaps a month or two after having spent a lot of money upon them. It was also realised that we would like to have these men after the War to form part of the army of occupation, and I think I am right in saying that some of these men are still out in South Africa forming part of the army of occupation. That was the only difference we made about the attestations of the men, namely, that in the case of the last lot of Imperial Yeomanry we enlisted them for a year without reference to the War at all. Everybody else, artificers, Volunteer service companies, City Imperial Volunteers, the first two lots of Imperial Yeomanry, and all the drafts of men for the Army Medical Corps were enlisted for one year or the War.

5298. Is there anything you want to add about the Auxiliary forces?—No. My whole time was taken up at the War Office, and I had no time to go round and inspect, or anything of that kind, so that I cannot tell you anything about the requirements. I had the great pleasure to receive, unsolicited, from Embarking Officers and from General Officers, from Sir Baker Russell at Portsmouth, from the Embarking Officer at Queenstown, whose name I forget, and from Colonel Stacpole, the Embarking Officer at Southampton, letters telling me of the very good embarkations that a great many of these Militia battalions had made. I had the pleasure of reading these letters to the Commander-in-Chief, and I then said: "As far as I am concerned, I have done; I have sent them out and started them well; what happens to them now has nothing to do with me."

5299. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You mentioned one instance of a Militia regiment that had only eight subaltern officers and required 24?—That was the Royal Lancaster Regiment; I sent out both battalions of that regiment.

5300. Did you appoint 16 officers to that regiment?—I must have, at least.

5301. Of what rank were they?—They would be all second lieutenants, unless any of them had previous service. I cannot remember about that in this particular case, but as I mentioned before, there were one or two Volunteer officers, or officers who had served in the Militia previously, coming forward a second time, and if they had previous training I did not put them in as second lieutenants; they were older men, and I realised the position, and I put them in sometimes as lieutenants, and sometimes as high as captains, in consultation with the colonel of the regiment.

5301.* If they had no previous training they were all put in as sub-lieutenants?—Everyone as a second lieutenant

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5302. (*Sir John Jackson.*) You state that the best of the Militia came from Lancashire?—As far as numbers go.

5303. What about quality?—I belonged to the Lancashire Regiment myself. They are very good men indeed, but I do not say they are so big as the men of Norfolk, the agricultural labourers.

5304. They are not so big, but as regards the fighting qualities, do you think the Yorkshire man, for instance, is a better man for a Militiaman than the men from other parts of England?—I do not say that. My experience of the Yorkshire and Lancashire men is (and I was 35 years in the Lancashire Regiment) that they are harder to get on with at first, and are rougher, but having got them into order, they are quite as good as any others, if not better.

5305. Notwithstanding the fact that the majority of these men are drawn from the operative classes in the factories?—With regard to the Lancashire Militia, I may tell the Commission that all through the War I went on one principle, in which the Adjutant-General and Commander-in-Chief backed me up, and that was on no occasion whatever to refuse a good man; I never refused a man who passed the doctor and passed the approving officer. If he would not go to the regiment I wanted him to go to I took him for the regiment he would go to. The consequence of that was that the Militia of Lancashire are thousands over their proper establishment. I am only allowed a certain number of Militiamen, but if you take my own regiment, the Royal Lancasters, at one time they were 1,500 over strength; I sent out both battalions of that regiment to South Africa, and I could have sent out another two without sending out the same man twice. The South Lancashire was 600 over strength, and so on. I was able to do that because in Devonshire and a great number of the agricultural counties, Lincoln and a great many places in the South, the Militia are so much under strength that although I had these Lancashire battalions so much over strength, I was still always a good deal under what the estimates allowed me to have.

5306. What were the special inducements offered to the Militia for volunteering for Foreign Serivce?—None at all except getting their medals, and they were told that if they went they would be treated exactly like the regular soldier, and if they were wounded they would come under the Pension Acts. They also received their £5 gratuity, and were treated just the same as the Regulars.

5307. I think you told us that no English regiment declined?—Not one.

5308. And not one Irish?—Three Irish and one Scotch.

5309. What part of Scotland did the one Scotch regiment belong to?—The Scotch regiment was the Cameron Highlanders. I believe the great reason is that they are fishermen, and are very much wedded to their homes. They are a very peculiar regiment.

5310. What district do they come from?—Inverness and the Islands. As Inspector-General of Recruiting, the men I like best are the young soldiers; that is my experience of the whole thing; I like a man who is 18. I find that if you get a man of 20 or 21, as a rule he comes into the Army with something the matter with him. He may be a fraud—that is to say, a man who has been in the Army before and deserted, or else he is a man out of work, and the question then comes in, Why is he out of work at the age of 21, because the class from which we enlist our men cannot be idle at the age of 21, and they must take to work before that. If they are idle it is very likely that they are so because they have been lazy or something of that sort; but I like the young man of 18, and the men I like best of all are the men who join the Militia at 17, and do their 49 days' drill at the depôt, and then pass into the Line. These men join the Army simply because they have tried the life and like it. It is only a sort of common sense. A man off the streets at the age of 20 does not find the Army what he anticipated, and he deserts, but for the Militiaman there is no excuse, as he has tried the depôt and has liked the food and surroundings, and he says, "I will go the whole way now; I will go to the Line." The Cameron Highlanders are extraordinary in that they

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never went to the Line at all. They are very fond of the Militia, but they are very much wedded to their homes; they are all fishermen, and, as a rule, they never go to the Line. I said, in answer to a remark that somebody made to me, that I could not believe any regiment would not go to South Africa, as it was such a chance for them to see the world.

5311. I was just anxious to know where this one exception came from?—I have given the reason, they are very much wedded to their homes, and they never give anybody to the Line. They are a magnificent regiment to look at.

5312. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Can you account for the shortness of officers in Militia regiments?—I can only say that it gets shorter every year, and I do not think gentlemen's sons have so much money as they had in the old days, perhaps.

5313. Has it anything to do with the examination?—No, I should say nothing at all.

5314. It is simply that it is not professional enough?—They have not the time to do it; the young gentlemen have perhaps to go to work more than in the old days, and they cannot afford the time.

5315. Do you see any means of bettering that, because it is a blot undoubtedly?—It is going back again now. I was looking at the Army List this morning, and I see that in my regiment, the Royal Lancasters, they are as short now as they were before the War—before I filled them up.

5316. You cannot suggest any way to improve it?—No, I cannot say that I can.

5317. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Is there less readiness on the part of the men in the West of Scotland than in other parts of it to enter the Army?—Yes, there is.

5318. Much less?—In the north I get hardly any recruits; my worst recruiting district in the whole of the United Kingdom is Inverness, and my second worst, perhaps, is Fort George, 10 miles off—that is the Seaforth Highlanders.

5319. There is a Militia regiment in connection with the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders—was it asked?—Yes; when the Cameron Highlanders said "No," the Argyll and Sutherland were the ones I selected in their place; they said "Yes," and went.

5320. Are there Volunteer battalions of the same regiment?—In sending out the first lot of Volunteers I got them with the very greatest ease. I have a table here which shows that. I not only got every company I wanted to go out to South Africa, but in a great many cases I got what I called waiting companies. When we wanted drafts to go out to replace these companies the second time I had more difficulty in getting them to go, and did not quite succeed in getting all I wanted, and the third time I had very great difficulty, and did not get half enough. That is what happened with the service companies of Volunteers.

5321. I notice you say in your *précis*, "Of course, the junior subalterns were quite untrained." Why "of course"?—Because I got them straight from school or their families; I sent them out without even Gazetting them.

5322. They had no training connected with any Volunteer or Militia regiment?—No, none whatever; I saw some of them perhaps one day, and they embarked two days afterwards for South Africa, and they were Gazetted afterwards as fast as I could with no training at all.

5323. (*Sir John Edge.*) Three Irish Militia regiments refused to go?—They did. When I say refused it means this—that when they sent me the numbers who volunteered they were not sufficient for me to make it worth while their going.

5324. One of those was the 18th Royal Irish?—Yes, they were at Aldershot.

5325. Do you know where their recruiting station is?—Clonmel; and now I may tell you since the war is over Clonmel has doubled its number of recruits. Only yesterday I was looking at the returns from Clonmel, and they are getting a tremendously increased number of recruits. The war was not popular in Ireland.

5326. Clonmel is in Tipperary, is it not?—It is.

5327. Another was the Connaught Rangers?—They were right on the West Coast.

5328. On the Galway side?—The very worst of all, and there was great opposition to soldiering there during the war.

5329. There was one other, the 6th Battalion of the Royal Irish Rifles?—That is up in the north, and I do not wish to offend anybody, but they were a Roman Catholic regiment.

5330. Donegal, or whereabouts?—That is Dundalk. I may say with regard to the 18th Royal Irish that two days after they declined to go I was bombarded with telegrams from the Colonel and everybody, saying they would, but it was too late; I had selected another regiment in their place, and I could not give them another chance.

5331. Within two days they changed their minds and volunteered?—Yes.

5332. All the other Militia regiments of Ireland that you asked went?—Yes.

5333. The Dublin Fusiliers?—Yes, and the Munsters and Leinsters.

5334. Any other?—The North Cork.

5335. As to where these regiments come from, the Dublin Fusiliers speak for themselves, and the Munsters were a Cork regiment?—Tralee. The Leinsters were recruited at Birr, and they were embodied at Chatham.

5336. (*Chairman.*) Do you approve of officers for the Army getting a preliminary training in the Militia?—Yes, I do; my experience as an officer commanding a regiment was that I would just as soon have a man from the Militia as from Sandhurst. I know people have different opinions about it, but I found them just as good the one way as the other.

5337. I was asking you because that seems a way in which the quota of officers for the Militia would be kept up?—Yes, but that would be treating the officers much as we treat the men—that is to say, we look to the Militia to pass their men on to the line; in your way you would look to the Militia officers to pass on to the line in the same way.

5338. Was not that done?—It is already done to a great extent; they have competitive examinations.

5339. I wanted to know your opinion of the system?—I think it is a very good system. I like the Sandhurst system just as well.

5340. Looking at it from the point of view of the Militia officers, would it not be a way of keeping up the numbers?—I do not think a Militia officer who is hoping to leave that regiment and to get into the line is of very much advantage to that regiment, as his one idea is to get out of it. He is only in it as a stepping-stone.

5341. Still, if you had a number of these officers taking the two years' training in the Militia, as they have to do, you would not send them out to South Africa absolutely untrained and within two days of leaving school?—No.

5342. Would not that be a better position for the Militia battalions?—Yes, it would be better for the Militia battalions, but I am not prepared to say it would be better for the Army.

5343. I understood you to say that you had no objection to it?—I have no objection to it. I must say I like the mixture.

5344. You said just now that the difficulty of getting young men as subalterns in the Militia was because people had to go to work, and had not the same opportunity of spending their time in the Militia?—I think that must be the reason.

5345. This would give you a class of men who would take it as a part of their career?—That is so, but only for two years.

5346. From that point of view you think it would be of advantage to push that system?—Yes.

5347. We have also got to hear you on the question of recruiting. I understand you still remain Inspector-General of Recruiting?—Yes.

5348. And you appear with Colonel Crutchley on that matter?—Yes. I have a good many tables to refer to, and I would ask you to allow him to come beside me, as he will help me with these.

5349. The first point you wish to mention is the composition of the branch at headquarters?—The Recruiting

Branch is a branch of the Adjutant-General's Department at the War Office; I am entirely under him, and I do all my dealings with the Commander-in-Chief through the Adjutant-General. He is entirely my chief, and the man I recognise at the War Office.

5350. The Adjutant-General? — Yes. I have one Assistant Adjutant-General and a Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General to help me; the latter is at present a temporary appointment.

5351. Two officers to help you?—Yes, and at the present time I have a third, because in addition to my recruiting work I am head of the Medal Department. I cannot exactly tell you why, because medals is hardly recruiting, but somebody has to do it, and my department does it.

5352. That is the composition of the branch at Army headquarters?—Yes, as far as officers are concerned. Then with regard to recruiting all over the country, every regimental district has a headquarters and a recruiting area for that county; for instance, the Colonel at the 9th Regimental District at Norwich is responsible for recruiting in the whole of Norfolk, and so on all through. He is the man that has the recruiting, and under him he has a recruiting officer and adjutants of Militia, and adjutants of Volunteers, by virtue of their appointment as adjutants, are recruiting officers. In large towns, such as Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield, Edinburgh, and London, where we have to make special arrangements owing to the size of the place, we have recruiting staff officers. I have 12 of those employed, and they are responsible to the generals of the districts, who send all their returns to me.

5353. That decentralisation was carried out in 1899?—We put it much more under the generals; all these recruiting staff officers and colonels of regimental districts now make their reports to the generals instead of direct to me, and the general therefore knows exactly what recruiting is going on in his district, and I always write to him with my suggestions.

5354. I believe the war dislocated all these arrangements?—It dislocated the arrangements to a great extent. Almost the majority of my recruiters are the permanent staff of the Militia, who in non-training time are certainly not overworked, and if they had not recruiting to do they would have a very easy time of it. When these Militia battalions are embodied and go abroad there are no recruiters left, and we must go for the men as the men will not come to us. You must go after the men if you want them; the more we advertise the more men we get. When all these recruiters were taken away I was, of course, at a great disadvantage.

5355. You also lost medical officers?—Yes, the Director-General came forward and helped me, and appointed civilian medical officers at all these places. Of course it is a rough and ready sort of work. During the time I was Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces and Recruiting I had no time to leave my room at the War Office, but since the offices were split I have had sufficient time, and I am continually round inspecting all these areas, and I used to make it a point to go round and see all the civilian doctors, and try to work the thing in with them. To most of them it was perfectly new, and I used to go and see them, and have long talks with them, and tell them exactly what we wanted, and on the whole they have done most wonderfully well.

5356. In 1901 the General Officers Commanding were asked their views on this state of matters, were they not?—Yes, and they all said they thought it was most necessary that there should be a man at the headquarters of every regimental district, which is the headquarters of every recruiting area, who was not liable to be changed in war time, so as to keep up the continuity. My experience is, that if the colonel is hampered by what we call his orderly-room work, and things are going wrong there he cannot do his work properly. Especially during this mobilisation the colonels ought to have been here, there, and everywhere, but they were so denuded of their officers, and so denuded of their clerks and everybody else that it was frightfully uphill work, and some never went out of their barracks for months together. Even to the present time the clerks in the headquarters of the regimental districts are working up to 10 and half past 10 o'clock every night.

5357. What they wanted was to take the duty away from the Militia adjutants and to have a special officer?—Yes, and a special clerk, so that the colonel would feel that anyhow the writing work is safe. It is a great thing for the colonel always to feel that his orderly-room is safe, and then he can devote himself to the practical working.

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5358. In 1899 for the first three-quarters of the year recruiting was less, but afterwards it became more numerous?—That was owing to the war, probably.

5359. That was what happened?—Yes.

5360. What about the quality?—As to the quality, I do not think there has been much difference; taking it all round, I would call it fair.

5361. How far do you think the numbers and quality of the recruits were affected by the war?—Taking the time from the first shot fired in the war until peace was declared, the result of recruiting for the Regular Army was that we got 13,500 more men than if there had been no war. These men would have been required in any case to meet increased establishments. In addition to that I raised about 90,000, what I call one-year men for purely war services, and I have handed in a statement to that effect. (*Vide Appendix Vol., pages* 137 *and* 138.)

5362. But still, I think in both years, 1900 and 1901, you make the remark that the recruiting for the infantry continues to be unsatisfactory?—Yes, it was; although I got all these extra men, as I say, 13,500, during the war, yet recruiting for the infantry was not satisfactory. The men like the more showy arms, such as the artillery and the cavalry. With regard to the cavalry, it was only to-day that I was making out a paper, and it is very hard to judge yet until we get proper figures from South Africa, but I have every reason to believe that when every man in the cavalry has been mobilised, and the whole waste has been struck off, the cavalry will be a great deal over its proper strength.

5363. As to the infantry?—The infantry is not. I can always get men for the cavalry, especially for the Hussars and Lancers.

5364. You reported in 1900, page 7, "In spite of the impetus given to recruiting by the war, the actual number of recruits for the infantry of the line is 241 less than in 1899"?—Yes; they went to the artillery and the cavalry.

5365. And in 1901, the decrease was 352?—Yes.

5366. Besides that, it has to be borne in mind that there are a large number of new battalions to be supplied?—Yes.

5367. That is rather a grave matter altogether, is it not?—Yes, it is.

5368. Have you any remarks to make upon it?—All I can say about it is, that up to the present time, that is up to the end of October, 1902, compared with the like period last year, as far as regards recruiting, we have got 3,500 more regular recruits, and about the same number more Militia. Of course, since April 1st, the men are getting this extra 2d. a day for the up-keep of kit, and, as we enlist every man now for only three years, we want a great many more men than we did when we enlisted them for longer. I do not think we shall know what Mr. Brodrick's last new scheme will produce until we arrive at April, 1904, and you know that that scheme is that we enlist everybody for three years, and on extending his service with the colours, he gets an extra 6d. a day. There is no doubt that the private soldier will be better off than he ever was before, as he will get about 2s. a day and all found; but I do not think until the men are actually drawing this money, by April, 1904, we shall see very much result from it as regards recruiting. It is rather in the air at present.

5369. Considerable extra inducements have been offered during the last two years?—Tremendous, both to the Militia and to the Line, particularly to the Line. I can mention the Militia first. The Militia recruiting this year, although there is no war, is about 3,500 ahead of last year, and the chief inducement for that is that we give a man what we call a non-training bounty, which he never had before, of £3, namely, £1 at three separate periods during the winter, I think on the 1st October, 1st December, and 1st February. That is a new thing altogether, which we never did before. I think it is answering very well, and I think there is a great deal of common sense in it. It keeps the man in touch with the regiment he belongs to; it gives him £1 on three separate occasions instead of all at once, when he might waste it, and just in winter, when probably he is most hard up. I cannot say that that is what is bringing in these extra men, but I can only say that they are coming in, and that I have asked a lot of men on going round on my inspection, and they all tell me that they like this new system very much.

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5370. And the Line?—Of course at present they are only getting the extra 2d. a day, and their great inducement is that they need only go for three years; in fact, they cannot go for more, during which they get their shilling a day pay, threepence a day for messing, and twopence a day for up-keep of kit. With regard to that 2d. a day, I think it is the fairest thing the country has ever done. I always considered it a disgrace that we should enlist a man, and give him two pairs of trousers, two shirts, and three pairs of socks, and say, "Here you are enlisted for seven years, these three pairs of socks, two shirts, and two pairs of trousers have to last you seven years, and, if not, you have to pay for the additional ones yourself." I have always thought it a very wrong thing; however, that is all knocked on the head by every soldier on reaching the age of 19, and becoming efficient, getting twopence a day for up-keep of kit, and from inquiries I have made I am perfectly satisfied that in the case of a careful soldier, and we have a right to expect them to be careful, that twopence a day will repay him for keeping up his kit. Then, on re-engaging, every man will get another sixpence a day, and after five years' service he also gets a penny good conduct pay.

5371. I think you said that, in your opinion, that rate of pay ought to be sufficient?—It ought to be.

5372. You ought to get the men you want?—I do not see the use of offering any more; I think it is excellent pay that a private soldier should get 2s. a day; and when I have spoken to non-commissioned officers on going round, they have said to me, "When I was a civilian I never got anything like it, 2s. a day, a certain home, a certain hospital if I am ill, always my food, and never out of work." I consider the pay of the British soldier now very good.

5373. Do you think you should get a better class than those you have got hitherto?—I hope we shall, and I think we ought to. I think the pay now of a sergeant ought to be sufficient to attract decent men to the Army—it is a very well paid position now.

5374. I suppose you agree that you have not been getting a very good class of men for the Army hitherto?—I do not say that we get, as I have heard people say, the dregs of the population—I deny that—but we get them from the labouring class. The men you see now at the depôt are generally young healthy-looking lads of the labouring class, and if you look at their defaulter-sheets you never see a case of drunkenness amongst them; and if you go into the canteen you will hear that the only complaint is that they never drink any beer. I am speaking of England now, and not of Ireland and Scotland. They are not ruffians, they are not the dregs of the population; they are the labouring class.

5375. I see you mention in your Report of 1901, page 9, that "there is no doubt that the better class of recruit is deterring from enlisting if he is obliged to attend at a house situated in some low quarter of his native town"?—I was referring there to my recruiting houses in London, Edinburgh, Sheffield, Dublin, and Leeds, and I have been trying to get all these places up to the mark. In some places they are not quite up to the mark. For instance, in Liverpool I do not consider our recruiting house at all up to the mark. All these things more or less are advertisements, and I want a good up-to-date place; that is what I was really thinking of when I wrote that report, and I have received orders now from the Secretary of State to consult with the Quartermaster-General and Inspector-General of Fortifications about starting a really good up-to-date recruiting office at Liverpool.

5376. Do you think that would have a distinct effect?—I think it would. I saw a letter in the "Times" the other day, written by somebody who said the whole of our recruiting offices were in places where no respectable people could be seen, but that I consider a lie from beginning to end. That is going too far; but, still, you must keep pace with the times, and I want these places up to date. I have seen it stated in a paper that St. George's Barracks, where we recruit in London, is in the slums, and my answer to that is that if St. George's Barracks is in the slums, then the National Gallery is in the slums. I want to go on improving, and as one place falls in I hope to get another. I got a new place at Bradford the other day, a place where no gentleman's son need be ashamed to be seen going into; it is opposite one of the best banks in the whole town of Bradford, with a garden in front, and the flag flying.

5377. If you have had a decrease in the numbers you have got it is not because you have not reduced the physique?—During the war we reduced the height of the infantry soldier by half an inch, but we have never reduced the chest measurement.

5378. And you think the chest measurement is more important?—Everything; I do not care twopence about the height myself. At the present time we are enlisting men specially, as an experiment, of 5ft. and over; the height for infantry is 5ft. 3in., but we are enlisting men of 5ft. and over, and I have got about a thousand of them since I was allowed to do this, and I have just received reports from all the general officers, every one in favour of it.

5379. What about the supply of men? Was it adequate for the emergency?—Not the infantry; I would have been glad to get more. I fancy on the question of the supply of men you mean the men we sent to South Africa?

5380. I am taking your own *précis*?—We wanted more men for the infantry, but I do not say we wanted more for the cavalry. I could have taken more for the Militia, notwithstanding that the Lancashire Militia were so much over strength, had more recruits offered. I think, on the whole, in the Militia we are about 20,000 under strength, and had it not been for the Lancashire Militia we should have been probably another 5,000 under strength.

5381. Would you speak to the desirability of any changes in recruiting as regards system, standards, and so on?—As regards the standards, lately a Commission sat by order of the Secretary of State, composed of, I think, three civilian medical gentlemen of very high rank, and three military medical men. They were asked one or two very simple questions, such as: "Do you consider that the standard and the way we examine men for the Army now is a good one, and, if you do not, have you any suggestions to make?" and they drew up a suggestion altering the system a good deal. Under the old system we always took a man's minimum chest, but they have proposed that we should take a man's maximum chest, and they go a great deal by chest expansion, a thing which in the old days we never laid down a standard for, but I suppose the doctors get wiser as they grow older, and I must say that for some time past a great many of the medical officers have said to me: "Why do you not knock all this system on the head, and have chest expansion?" This committee of experts have now recommended it, and since 1st April of last year we started it in the Army, and are now going on it. Under that system I take no man who was in the old class called a special as far as regards chest, unless he fulfils the conditions of chest that these experts have laid down as that which a soldier ought to fill; I will not have anything to say to him. In the old days there was a great outcry about specials; we had certain standards, but I always had the power to take men who were under these standards, provided the medical officers certified that they would make efficient soldiers. The percentage of specials in the old days sometimes went up to 34 or 32, but at present the percentage of specials is only about 10, because I do not take any unless they fulfil the chest conditions. These specials were a great nuisance to us; they were the source of a great many questions in the Houses of Parliament and letters in the newspapers, saying that our Army was composed of specials. However, I am glad to say that now, under the new system, I do not take them. The only specials I take now are as regards height or men who are slightly under age, but unless a man fulfils the conditions as to chest expansion I do not take him. I believe it is the proper system, and the Director-General and all the medical officers will tell you the same. It is a great advance on the old system of judging a man's physical capability of being a soldier.

5382. Until the effect of these recent changes has been felt you would prefer that the present system should continue?—Oh, yes.

5383. The next point you mention is the Yeomanry Committee; that was abolished in 1900?—Yes; and then when they raised the second lot of Yeomanry they were raised in a hurry, and I must say they were not raised in a satisfactory way, as I have learnt to my cost. Hundreds of them have been sent back from South

Africa, because it was found that there was no likelihood of their becoming efficient soldiers; they were not strict enough with them.

5384. They were not raised under your superintendence?—No, and not inspected by my medical officers; I had nothing to do with them. They were not a success, as a whole, in that way. The medical officers who examined them I do not suppose had experience enough; judging a man is very much like judging a horse, and requires practice and training.

5385. The Volunteer Service Companies you have already spoken of?—Yes, they were made to fulfil the physical conditions of the line soldier because they were going to join line soldiers.

5386. At the outbreak of the war there was a deficiency of skilled men, was there not—farriers and so on?—Yes, artificers.

5387. And you had to give special bounties and inducements?—£10 for an artificer; I recommended that myself. I pointed out to the Adjutant-General that they were skilled men, and that we ought to pay for skilled work, and my proposal went on to the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State, and it was agreed that we should pay for skilled labour.

5388. How was it that there was a deficiency? Was it that the numbers provided for in the mobilisation were not sufficient?—We never expected to send out such a tremendous number of troops to South Africa.

5389. Did you not provide for two Army Corps?—Yes; but a good deal more than that went out.

5390. Your *précis* refers to "Immediately on the outbreak of war." At that time you were only sending out an Army Corps?—Yes, they must have been called for.

5391. All I wanted to know from you was whether that experience induced you to think that you ought to have at hand, if another emergency arose, a larger supply of these men?—I think we ought. We got 856 artificers in all, extra men; they were all one year or the war men.

5392. Another way in which you lessened the strain on your recruiting was by getting men in India to extend their service?—We offered bounties to the men in India. I say this in my report, that on the outbreak of war men of a special trade were required for service with units, such as ammunition columns and remount companies. Now these do not exist in time of peace, and I was immediately told that artificers were wanted. That is why I was told just at once.

5393. Theirs are services which are bound to be wanted on the outbreak of war?—Yes, they are wanted directly a war begins.

5394. And ought not some provision, therefore, to be made so that you could lay your hands on these men?—There ought to be.

5395. But there is not any at present?—No.

5396. About the troops in India, your return (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 138) says there were 16,612?—These were men in India who were asked to extend their services to complete 12 years. That, I may say, was a very great success, and I think it was because we took the men into our confidence, and treated them fairly, and offered them two things. We had always been in the habit of offering men bounties to extend, but in that case you simply offer the man one thing, and say: "If you like to extend there is £10 for you, and if you do not like it leave it." On this occasion we offered the men two things, and the result was so successful that we got 16,000. We said to every man: "There are two things you can have; you can either have a bounty of £10 and a further premium of two months' furlough, or if you like you can have your £10 and what it will cost to take you to England." Then, the men, seeing the two things put in front of them, saw we meant to deal fairly with them, and went and talked it over in the barrack-rooms, and the result was, we got 16,000 men.

5397. The greater number of them remained in India?—More than three-fourths took the bounty and the money for the passage. Of course, in all these war services in a voluntary army you can only suggest things that you think will take on, and some are successes, and some are not. If you look at my return here, one thing I proposed was that time-expired men in South Africa should extend for one year for £5, and I only got 13. It was a complete failure. The next thing that I proposed was the bounties in India, and I got 16,000. It must be so under our system. We can only think what will take on with the men, and one thing will be more successful than another. It was the same with what we did with the Volunteers; the first time we asked for them we got 10,000, the second time we only got 4,000, and the third time we only got 2,400.

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5398. These men in India may cause you some difficulties hereafter?—We see, of course, that eventually those men will have to go and be replaced by recruits, but in the meantime this is a war service, and we had to stave it off during the war. When the war was on the proper course to follow was: "Do everything for the war, and never mind what happens; but finish the war," and that was the plan I worked on always. After I gave up the auxiliary forces and the Militia regiments had to be embodied, and my recruiters were taken away, when the present Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces came to me and said: "I want to embody so-and-so regiment; do you object?" I would say: "Is it a war service?" and when he said, "Yes," I said, "Certainly not; we will finish this war, and get back to our normal state afterwards"; and eventually we will have to find recruits to replace these 16,000 men for India.

5399. You have also had some strain put on your recruiting by the South African Constabulary, by the raising of the Royal Reserve Regiments, and the Royal Garrison Regiments?—That has given a great deal of hard work to the recruiters and the officers of regimental districts. With regard to the South African Constabulary, the Colonial Office first tried to get the recruits themselves, but they found they could not do it, as they had not the machinery. Their officer came over to me, and asked me to open recruiting in one or two places, and I did that; however, within a week he came to me and said: "We have not got the machinery. Will you do the whole show for us?" I then opened recruiting all over England for them, and I think I got them about 7,000 men, and having got them I stopped. Now the only recruiting in London is at their own headquarters. All that gave tremendously increased work to all my recruiting officers, the colonels of districts and medical officers.

5400. You have made a remark, in the *précis* of your evidence here, that some of the financial concessions mentioned in your two reports are only to be regarded as temporary. What does that mean?—That is mostly from the fact that a great many of them, when the war is over, die out as a matter of course. They are only war services.

5401. Any concessions which have been made to them to raise the pay will be permanent?—Yes, they are all permanent. I may say with regard to the last lot of Volunteer Service Companies, which only amounted to 2,413 against 10,500 in the first lot, that, I think, one reason why we got so few the last time was that at that time the Yeomanry were getting 5s. a day, and I am quite certain that the Volunteer private did not see why he should go out for 1s. in the Volunteer Service Companies, when he could go out for 5s. as a Yeoman, and when I got my numbers I found a great many of the Yeomen who went out were old Volunteers.

5402. I think you have spoken in the course of your observations to most of the other points in your *précis*. Perhaps you would just give us the figures you have given in Table A (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 137) about recruiting, as it may be as well to have them on the notes; or if you will hand them in, that will do?—As regards what I call part of the war recruiting services, that is practically the men raised who would not have been raised if we had not been at war, the one year or two war men, I raised 92,224, and in addition to that, to help us, 16,625 men took bounties to extend, making a grand total of war services of 108,849; and in addition to that of ordinary recruits (that has nothing to do with the war services) during the war 13,500 more men were enlisted than probably would have enlisted if there had not been a war. I got those numbers by seeing how the recruiting was going in the seven years back.

5403. There are three tables annexed to your report which you will just hand in?—Yes.

(*The tables were handed in, vide Appendix Vol., pages* 137, 138 and 139.)

5404. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) What is your opinion as to the intelligence of the present class of recruits, speaking generally of them?—I would call it fair.

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5405. They are fairly intelligent?—They can all read and write, thanks to the Board school. I take it that intelligence goes more by education, and that the more educated he is the more intelligent he is.

5406. You think, speaking generally of the recruit of the present day, that he is a fairly intelligent man?—He is not so intelligent as the Volunteers.

5407. Will the increased pay, do you think, get a more intelligent man than the present men?—I hope so.

5408. You look forward to that?—Yes, I do; I shall be disappointed if we do not, and I think the State will, too.

5409. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I think you said that under the new scheme the infantry soldier when he extends his service would get 2s. a day, all found?—He will get a shilling a day pay, 3d. messing, 2d. up-keep of kit, 1d. good conduct pay, and 6d. for extending. When I say "all found," I mean he gets his barracks and food.

5410. 5d. out of that really goes for up-keep of kit and messing?—And with regard to that 2d. for up-keep of kit, of course it is far better that the soldier should receive that 2d. a day for keeping up his own kit than that he should have the things given to him.

5411. What pension does he get?—A man does not get a pension until he does 21 years' service, unless he is invalided, and then he comes before the Chelsea Commissioners, and gets pension according to a certain scale.

5412. That pay when you deduct the messing and kit leaves him about 10s. a week?—I thought he ought to get 10s. 6d.

5413. You think that is a sufficient inducement to attract the class of labourer who in the ordinary way would get his 24s. or 25s. a week?—I think it ought.

5414. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) What reason do you give for the statement made that the Imperial Yeomanry of 1901 were not equal to those raised in 1900?—I know they were not so good, because complaints came from South Africa, and it was part of my business to inquire into these complaints, and several hundred men were sent home as not likely to become efficient soldiers.

5415. Were they a different class of man from the first body of Yeomanry?—They were not such a good class; in the first body there were a lot of Yeomen, but the second body were more of the class of ordinary recruit.

5416. You give a cause, of course, for their being better in 1902, because there was stricter examination?—Yes. I think the second lot were a very mixed lot.

5417-20. Was there any medical examination on the arrival of the drafts in Africa?—I am not in a position to say that, as I was not there; I know from experience that there always is before they go up country, but I was not there myself to see it.

5421. All the men were, of course, medically examined in this country?—They were.

5422. But not found equal to the work out there?—That is so.

5423. Of the South African Constabulary was there not a very considerable number from the Colonies?—I had nothing to do with them.

5424. I thought you spoke about having raised a number of them?—They were, of course, a different class altogether; they were men who had really made up their minds to emigrate; they wanted to live there—farmers' sons, and so on—and they were a superior class.

5425. I think you said that perhaps some 7,000 were raised?—I know nothing about what was raised in the Colonies.

5426. There were some 10,000 altogether?—Yes.

5427. And some 7,000 were raised here?—Yes.

5428. Then it follows, I suppose, that some 3,000 came from the Colonies?—That is so, but I do not know what the strength of the South African Constabulary is. I was asked to get 5,000 in the first instance, and then it went on to 6,000, and I was told to stop, but when I stopped I found that a lot of men had received notices, and I thought it was only fair to go on with the men who had received notices and been passed, so I sent an order round: "Although we are overstocked, any man you are in communication with you can go on with, but do not put yourself in communication with any fresh man," and the result was that I got a thousand more men than I wanted.

5429. We are informed that they have the full complement now of 10,000, and some 3,000 of them will be from the Colonies?—I daresay some of them would be discharged Yeomen or discharged soldiers out there.

5430. In fact, I believe from Canada there are some 1,200 or 1,500?—I am not prepared to say.

5431. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) It was stated in evidence that the class of men who enlisted in the Army now were to a great extent men not only of poor physique, but of poor constitution; they have been brought up in slums, and places which are not good for health, and it was said that was one of the reasons why so many of them went down with enteric as compared with the officers. Do you think that of the men who are enlisted many are not of good constitution?—I am not prepared to say that. I know a certain number did break down, but it stands to reason, I think, that if you take a thousand officers and a thousand men the percentage of men who break down amongst the soldiers will be more than amongst the officers, because the officers have probably been brought up amongst more healthy surroundings, and are as a body a more healthy lot. I think that is only natural, but I am not prepared to say they come from the slums.

5432. Well, from unhealthy portions of cities?—Even take my own regiment, the Lancaster Regiment—men in that regiment are usually enlisted in Manchester, and probably come out of a factory; that is not a healthy life, not so healthy as an officer leads out of doors. Of course, when you come to recruits enlisted in Norfolk and Suffolk, they are more healthy; but I am sorry to say that every year we get more recruits from the towns and less from the country, because we know that the towns keep getting bigger every year, while the population in the country is getting smaller, and that is rather an unfortunate thing for us.

5433. (*Chairman.*) Colonel Crutchley, do you wish to say anything?—(*Colonel Crutchley.*) I think it is only fair to say about that second lot of Yeomanry that a great many of them were sent back because they were not considered fit for soldiers, but the stipulation when they were enlisted in this country was that they were not to be drilled here at all, and that as soon as they were enrolled and clothed they were to be sent out, and they were all to have been drilled in South Africa. As a matter of fact, a considerable number of them went straight on trek without any drill whatever.

5434. And did their duty well?—When we went into the case of the ones that had been sent back, some of them complained bitterly; they said they had been three months on trek, and were suddenly told they were no use and were sent home; 5,427 were enlisted from ex-Regulars, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, out of 16,431.

5435. After they had been three months there?—Yes; they did not have the same chance the others had. It seemed to be entirely forgotten in South Africa that the request from South Africa had been that those men should be trained there. (*Major-General Borrett.*) I may say that I quite agree with what Colonel Crutchley says, and I remember now that a tremendous lot of these men were sent back and discharged as not likely to become efficient soldiers. These men objected very much to that, and they said, "We have been on trek a month or two after the Boers, or longer even, and then discharged as not being efficient soldiers." I thought they were very hardly treated, and in my position of Inspector-General of Recruiting I altered the cause of their discharge in a great many cases to "Services no longer required during the South African campaign," which the men preferred, just to show that it was not through inefficiency.

5436. In those cases it was not a question of health, but a question of training?—That is so, but still a lot were sent back. (*Colonel Crutchley.*) For Sir Reginald Gipps' Committee, which sat in the War Office on the conduct of the Yeomanry especially, and other matters, we prepared tabulated statements of all those Yeomanry of the second lot who were sent back, and we showed their professions, and what class of life they came from, and everything else. There was a considerable number of Volunteers amongst them, for instance, and these men were sent back as not being likely to become efficient soldiers. These men had previous training, but

the moment they got out there they were utilised instead of being trained.

5437. I had rather understood that a large proportion of them were sent back because they did not pass in South Africa a proper medical examination?—That applied to a certain number, but a certain number were sent back as not likely to become efficient.

5438. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) It still stands, however, that a large number, not only of these, but of the drafts sent out generally, were not found fit there?—I am speaking entirely of the Yeomen. (*Major-General Borrett.*) I heard no complaints of the drafts to the regular forces—none whatever. (*Colonel Crutchley.*) As regards the dislocation of recruiting, we had actually cases where in some regimental districts the officer commanding for some time was the only officer there at all. The Militia adjutant is always our recruiting officer, and of course he disappeared with his battalion; the permanent staff of the Militia disappeared with their battalions. The adjutant of Volunteers and his instructors were busy in camp, because the strength of the Volunteers was considerably raised as well, and we even lost that class of recruiter, and really we were left with next to nothing.

5439-40. (*Chairman.*) I suppose the commanding officer could not do very much himself?—He could not do the whole thing; every now and then a Volunteer officer was put to the depôt. (*Major-General Borrett.*) As far as the depôts and officers are concerned, it was muddling on—that is what I used to call it. I used to say, "You must muddle on as best you can." At Oxford I went to inspect, and there was only one officer there besides the colonel; and at Belfast I know the colonel was left entirely alone to do everything—quartermaster, mess president, adjutant, and everything—and he had not a single officer.

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(*Colonel Crutchley.*) As regards your point about the farriers and skilled tradesmen, of course for ammunition columns, and those sections that sprang into existence in the war, naturally they required skilled farriers and skilled smiths, wheelwrights, and everything, and we want a reserve of these, and it is a great blot not to have it, but the difficulty is that those are skilled men you cannot employ during peace time. You have your proper quota of artificers with the different units, and it is this extra lot that are required that make the difficulty. We want a reserve of civilian artificers who, for a retaining fee, would come forward.

5441. I can give you a parallel; men in the telegraph service and the Post Office—they are employed in the Post Office, and their services are available as soon as war breaks out, and also, we were teld, men in the railway service?—Yes.

5442. Could you not devise some means of meeting that with these other classes?—I think that will have to be done.

5443. Is that all you wish to speak to?—Yes.

FOURTEENTH DAY.

Tuesday, 18*th November* 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The Earl of ELGIN AND KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Hon. The Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Hon. Lord STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Hon. Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Hon. Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

Colonel Sir C. E. HOWARD VINCENT, K.C.M.G., C.B., V.D., M.P., A.D.C., called and examined.

5444. (*Chairman.*) You are a Member of Parliament, and have taken a great interest in the Volunteers for a long time?—That is so.

5445. You are Colonel Commandant of the Queen's Westminster Volunteers and an aide-de-camp to the King?—Yes.

5446. You have also studied military subjects?—Yes, I was trained for the Army at Sandhurst, and was in the Army for several years, then in the Royal Berks Militia, and I have had experience of every Army in Europe.

5447. You have been good enough to send us some notes* of the evidence you are prepared to give. The particular point which we wish to have your evidence upon is as to the steps taken for using the Volunteers when that became necessary in the course of the war?—I do not know whether it would be the most convenient plan to the Commission if I were just to read over the steps which I took, or would that be encroaching too much upon your time? It would perhaps be the simplest way of doing it.

5448. Yes?—I may say that from the very beginning, at the first appearance of the likelihood of war, I thought it highly probable that a larger number of men would be required than the Regular Army could furnish.

5449. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Of what date are you speaking?—In August, 1899, after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, and I made a definite offer to the War Office to raise a battalion for active service of unmarried men between 20 and 30 years of age, each of two years' service, and every man to be a marksman, and at the same time a battalion for garrison duty at home. That offer was sent to the Under-Secretary of State for War, according to my reading of the Regulations, which provide that offers as regards new corps are to be sent direct to the War Office; but the answer came back that it had reached the War Office "through the wrong channel," and no further notice was taken of it. At the same time Colonel Eustace Balfour, of the London Scottish, verbally offered a service company to the Gordon Highlanders, which is the affiliated regiment of the line to his regiment of Volunteers. We now come to the outbreak of war, on the 11th October, 1899, and then the offer of August was renewed through the General Officer Commanding the Home District, who strongly recommended its acceptance.

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5450. (*Chairman.*) Was that the regular channel?—That was certainly the regular channel, if there was doubt about the other having also been a regular channel. The proper course was no doubt through the General Officer Commanding the Home District.

5451. What date was that?—That would be, I think, the 16th October; however, it was within a few days of the outbreak of war on the 11th October. No answer at all was made to that offer, either official or unofficial. Then on the 31st October, that is, 20 days after the declaration of war, having had no answer, and having received many hundreds of letters from Volunteers, officers and men, eager to go to the war, from all parts

* The notes will be found on page 516 of this volume

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of the country, I wrote to the War Office on the matter, and said that I had had no answer, and then the reply of the War Office was to the effect that: "The Secretary of State fully appreciates the patriotic spirit which has led to so many offers of service by the Volunteers, and will not hesitate to avail himself of the powers given by the Volunteer Act of 1895 should the occasion arise; but that Act gives no powers to send Volunteers abroad." I should perhaps mention, my Lord, that under the Volunteer Act of 1863 the Volunteers can only be mobilised in the event of actual or apprehended invasion, and for a long series of years I have always called attention to the fact in Parliament that that would be altogether too late to mobilise the Volunteers, when the enemy was off the coast or had actually landed, and Mr. Secretary Stanhope made an effort about 1889 to remedy this, and to obtain power to call out and mobilise the Volunteers in the event of imminent national danger. For certain reasons, which I do not quite remember, it was not very acceptable at the time to some portion of the House of Commons or to some members of the Volunteer Force, and it had to be dropped; but in 1895 the then Secretary of State brought in a similar Bill and passed it; that is, giving power to mobilise the Volunteers, or for the authorities to avail themselves of the service of collective bodies or of individual members of the Volunteer Force in the event of imminent national danger. Then Lord Lansdowne's letter to me went on: "That Act gives no power to send Volunteers abroad. It is meant to facilitate the preparations for home defence. If any crisis arises in which a large increase in the home garrison is required (of which there is at present no sign), the Volunteers would be the appropriate force to use. As to enlistment, the Army Act only lays down that enlistment must not be for more than 12 years, but it allows enlistment for any shorter term. The Army Regulations, however, only allow it for terms of three, seven, or twelve years with the colours. If it is decided to accept the offers of service from individual Volunteers to fill gaps, Regulations will be published allowing enlistment for a shorter time, and giving directions." That, of course, was the finale for the time; but as things were going badly in South Africa, on the 24th November, 1899, I wrote again to the Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Wyndham, for the consideration of Lord Lansdowne, that I ventured "to make one more appeal before going abroad. Let the conditions be what they may, I suggest two years' efficient Volunteer service, age between 21 and 28, marksmanship this year, recommendation by the Commanding Officer and Adjutant, medical examination, and celibacy. I cannot believe that while the Volunteers of Cape Colony, Natal, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia are being given an opportunity, advantage is not to be taken of the occasion to see what reserves might be forthcoming from the Volunteers of Great Britain to cement the tie between the Regulars and the Volunteers, to improve the tone of Army recruits, to get them otherwise than at street corners, and to draw Volunteers into the Army." I do not think I need trouble the Commission with the rest of the letter; it was only argument reinforcing my appeal to make ready. The answer of the War Office was: "It would be a great mistake to issue Regulations for the special enlistment of Volunteers until there is some prospect of their services being required. There is at present no probability of this"; and then on the 29th November, three days afterwards, Lord Wolseley, then Commander-in-Chief, wrote himself to me, and said: "The idea is a good one, though many and serious difficulties stand in the way. There are many officers in the Volunteer Force who are admirable, and who have studied the military profession as closely as many of our good officers in the Regular Army. There are some corps, like the Westminsters, who have first-rate men in command of them, and who have been in the Regular Army. But there is not that evenness of efficiency in any Volunteer battalion that would bring it up to the level of an ordinary line regiment. However, the day may come when we shall be only too glad to employ Volunteer corps on active service, and I shall rejoice to see it." Now I would call your Lordship's attention to the fact that my offer was never for one battalion of Volunteers to be taken—any individual battalion *quâ* a battalion; it was always to raise a battalion in the way which had often been done for Aldershot, and so on, called a provisional battalion; that is, selecting your officers, non-commissioned officers, and men with the greatest care from a group of regiments or the whole Force.

5452. Was your battalion, which you suggested, originally to be raised from corps all throughout the kingdom?—Yes; throughout the kingdom, not from my own corps at all. That would never have answered. It was to raise a battalion of picked men from the whole Volunteer Force—the whole 220,000—that was most clearly expressed.

5453. I asked the question because was it not the forerunner of the City Imperial Volunteers?—I will trace that. I submitted to the War Office the whole of the detailed plan by which I should get the best men from every corps in the country, and I could submit that to the Commission, but that would perhaps enter too much into detail; at all events, I submitted to the War Office the plan showing the way in which I proposed to raise these men. I did so in vain, and so, for personal and family reasons, had to go to the Mediterranean, yet within a fortnight of this the serious reverses of Colenso, Magersfontein, and Stormberg took place, and then my proposals were sent for. I was abroad at that time, having been seriously unwell. My detail was sent for, and then the Lord Mayor came forward with the offer of the City Imperial Volunteers, and practically that was taken; but what was done very rapidly, very hurriedly, extravagantly, and, to some extent, badly, might have been done economically and leisurely, and getting the very best officers and men from the whole force ready for the field. I should not like it to be thought that I have any feeling whatever in the matter, and I tender these observations entirely as a matter of public duty; it is my misfortune to have to do so. The City Imperial Volunteers were formed. The Lord Mayor Newton's offer came on the 16th or 17th of December, 1899, the authority was given on the 20th of December, 1899, and on the 13th of January following the first detachment left—that is, the mounted infantry of the City Imperial Volunteers. All praise is due for the speed with which it was done; but to show how impossible it is to equip men hurriedly together in a way like that, I had to strip the whole of my regiment to give them any belts at all, and practically they went into the campaign with the old belts of my own corps, of which some were good and some were bad. Of course, that was an exceedingly defective way of equipping a regiment for the field. I am bound also, candidly, to say that General Mackinnon, Colonel Cholmondeley, and myself sat at a table and selected the officers, but it was rather like seeing footmen; only one made much less inquiry than one would have done when taking people into one's own service. It was impossible to do it; the pace was too severe. It was quite impossible really to examine carefully into the qualifications of individuals, and it had to be done as best it could be done, and that was very hurriedly and perfunctorily indeed.

5454. No doubt it was a period of great stress at that time?—There was great stress at that moment. My only contention is that, if time had been taken by the forelock, and authority had been given three or four months earlier, the Volunteers would have been sent out absolutely fit for the field, and the very best men in the country would have been selected.

5455. Still, the first answers from the War Office were based really not on the existing state of the law, but on the existing regulations?—They could be read in that way; but I think there is ample power—certainly there was from October ample power—under the Volunteer Act of 1895 to form these provisional battalions.

5456. There might have been power, but the whole idea of the Army organisation was that the Regulars should be employed on active service?—No doubt that was the case—"we must do it all, and no one else."

5457. And it was only when the emergency arose that it was found necessary to employ the Volunteers?—Quite so.

5458. I only mean that there may have been a reason for the answers you did receive?—Quite so.

5459. But what you would like to point out really comes to this, that some alteration should take place so that if the emergency arose again there would not be the same delay?—Exactly; everything really should be in readiness for the rapid expansion of the Regular Army from Volunteers, including Yeomanry; that is, to have the cadres as far as possible ready, so that everything may be in readiness for the augmentation by men who undoubtedly will always be forthcoming if taken the right way.

5460. Is it your wish that that should be on the basis of forming what you call provisional battalions of Volunteers?—I am strongly opposed in a regiment of Volunteers to allowing them to have two different sets of men; that is to say, organised differently, and on a different basis of service—one for those willing to go abroad in case of war, and one for those who stay at home, because that might lead to a good deal of trouble and friction; but still I do not see that there is the slightest difficulty in commanding officers and adjutants forming lists, and revising them from time to time, of eligible men of suitable age and suitable qualifications for field service, and more especially officers and non-commissioned officers. If you have those ready, then the men are easily formed and trained, but if you have not got your officers and non-commissioned officers—that is, your cadre—you can do nothing at all.

5461. But you would agree with Lord Wolseley that no individual Volunteer regiment could be relied upon?—Entirely, that is absolutely undoubted until after some weeks of training; but the City Imperial Volunteers and the whole of the Yeomanry were all provisional battalions, and, indeed, the line regiments with service companies added, and the whole of the colonial troops were provisional battalions, formed together for the purpose, not like the Dragoon Guards or the Grenadier Guards, which are permanent regiments.

5462. But there was the other source in the case of the Volunteers, that they sent service companies to their territorial regiments?—Yes; but on the other hand, although it is an excellent way of augmenting the Army, you lose a great deal of the moral effect, a great deal of the enthusiasm, by mixing them up so much as that. I think it was one of the greatest benefits of the City Imperial Volunteers that it lifted the whole tone of the Volunteer Force, and gave them a distinct interest in a particular unit. It would have done so still more had it been formed, as I suggested, from the whole force, and not from London corps alone.

5463. You prefer that of the two?—Not of the two. I think the service companies an excellent thing, and perhaps the best of all, but I should not exclude the other. I would work the two together, because, I may point out this, that no officer above the rank of captain can possibly go with a service company; so that it would exclude all field officers and all colonels commanding regiments, and I do not think it would be a good thing to exclude them absolutely in that way. You might only take a very few of them, but you should not exclude them absolutely.

5464. Have you anything else to say about that time of organisation in December and January?—I may say, as I have full knowledge of the fact, that there was no obstruction, but there was not a desire to make it all so thoroughly successful as there ought to have been. It is difficult to describe rather; there was a great deal of bustle and confusion—no absolutely definite obstruction, but a great many minor difficulties were put in the way which, if they had not been raised, would very much have facilitated the running of the machine.

5465. It was a new experiment?—Yes; and, of course, I quite admit it was an exceedingly difficult time of great excitement and great emergency.

5466. Everybody had their hands full?—That is so; but, of course, that is the way in which disasters occur.

5467. I think you saw the men in South Africa?—Yes, I was abroad; I had had an attack of acute displacement of the heart, on account of which the doctors would not let me continue in the City Imperial Volunteer command offered me, but I went at once to South Africa to prepare for them, and I had the opportunity of viewing the operations prior to the relief of Ladysmith, and also at the surrender of Paardeberg, so that I saw both sides, and when I went out the second time I went to every column, and whenever a Volunteer service company was to be seen I went to see the company and to speak to the captains, colonels, and generals under whom they were serving.

5468. Did you receive good reports of the men on these occasions?—Absolutely, uniformly, without a single exception; the reports which were sent to me officially were very warm indeed, and in every case I found that the men had conducted themselves in the most exemplary way, and were being constantly put in detached posts requiring special vigilance and intelligence. For instance, the York and Lancaster is a strong case in point; it was quartered at Volksrust, near Majuba, and the Volunteer Company of the Hallamshire Rifles was given the whole of the watching of the passes by Majuba Hill and Laing's Nek, which was really a post of extreme difficulty and importance.

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5469. No doubt the class of men you would get from the Volunteers is probably a more intelligent class than goes into the Regulars?—A more intelligent class, and their heart is very much more in their work, or they would not be Volunteers.

5470. You said you received these reports officially: in what capacity?—As contributing three drafts from my own regiment to the King's Royal Rifles, from the officer commanding the King's Royal Rifles.

5471. Those were only regarding your own men?—Yes.

5472. Had you no official position in the other visits you paid to the columns?—No, I had no directly official position; I was concerned in different matters connected with the campaign, and had general authority from the Commander-in-Chief to go anywhere, but I had no directly official position.

5473. To proceed with the organisation, there were further service companies called out in 1901 and 1902, were there not?—Yes, there were 66 companies called out in February, 1900, and then in 1901 a further appeal was made for service companies, and in 1902 for further companies; but the second and third appeals were not successful, that is to say, the number of men was very much shorter than was anticipated, but the reason was very obvious indeed, that the Yeomanry were getting 5s. a day and that for the service companies two years' service, marksmanship, and celibacy were conditions precedent, whereas for the Yeomanry there was practically no condition precedent at all. Besides, as you very likely saw when being enlisted for the Yeomanry, the men stood in the streets, and the Volunteers got no advantage over anybody else, until, perhaps, they got before the Selecting Board, when very likely the chairman or the committee gave weight to their having been in the Volunteers; but it would have been very much easier to have formed the Yeomanry, and you would have got very much better men by sending to the commanding officers for men they recommended, instead of recruiting them in the street. That led to a considerable amount of feeling, and therefore the second and third appeals were not successful on that ground.

5474. You mean not successful in getting the numbers required?—That is so; I do not know exactly the number, but there was a very considerable shortage, because, of course, the Yeomanry were getting 5s. a day without qualifications, and the service companies were getting 1s. a day with a very high qualification.

5475. It was entirely service companies in 1901 and 1902?—Entirely service companies. The City Imperial Volunteers was the only distinct unit, and even they were never, as you are aware, employed together. The mounted infantry was distinct from the infantry, and the artillery distinct from the infantry and mounted infantry.

5476. I think you say here that 589 officers of Volunteers and 19,161 Volunteers served?—Yes, from the Volunteer Force; those are the official figures.

5477. That is in the three years?—In the three years: that is, with the three calls for service companies and with the City Imperial Volunteer, and then, of course, among the 1,398 officers and 34,192 men of the Imperial Yeomanry a very large number were Volunteers, although the Volunteers had not received any special advantage.

5478. I have an official return before me of Volunteer service companies and drafts in 1900, which gives 247 officers and 8,249 men. I suppose that is exclusive of the City Imperial Volunteers?—My own figures are from the War Office. I calculate there were about 30,000 Volunteers altogether.

5479. From the Volunteer Force?—Yes. That may not have been the exact number, but it is not far out in round figures. If it errs it is not on the side of exaggeration, but the contrary, for many Volunteers enlisted in the Regular Army.

5480. What do you think has been the effect upon the Volunteer Force?—I am sorry to say that there was opportunity to make a great deal of it, but, unfortunately, it seems to have been missed. I cannot help

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thinking, if with deference I may say so, that the teaching of the war was that you want to get the maximum of men with some training to arms with the minimum of trouble to individuals; but since the war the Volunteer service has been made very much more exacting and much more difficult to carry out, and although I have put as good a face upon it as possible, there has been great difficulty in stemming the tide of resignations from the Volunteer Force, and we have only about one-tenth of the number of recruits in this month of November, which we have had in other Novembers before the war. I may say that the Volunteer year ends on the 31st October in every year, and the active recruiting begins on the 1st of November, and resignations are coming in, I hear, from other commanding officers all over the country, in very much greater numbers than hitherto, and recruits are almost nil, because of the increased difficulty which the Service is subjected to. In my opinion, that is a most unfortunate result. I think perhaps the difficulties have been exaggerated by the Press, and that would-be recruits have been rather deterred from coming in, the fact being that the Regulations which were issued on the 1st November, 1901, were quite impossible, but the Secretary of State withdrew them after the difficulties were pointed out to him, and the new Regulations of April, 1902, framed the Report of a hurried Committee, are very much more elastic, and give the Secretary of State considerable latitude in dispensing with this and that provision, but I am afraid the harm has been done to a great extent. What I cannot help thinking, if I may venture the suggestion, is that a very large number of the Volunteer Force might be attracted to the Army, and you would get their intelligence, and it would improve the tone altogether, if they were allowed to go to the Army at home, say, for one year. A large number of men in the country are extremely anxious to see something of military life, and to learn all they can, and, of course, they would have no right to pension or anything of that sort, and then very likely you would be able by that means to attract a higher class of non-commissioned officers than is possible under the present system. If not, they would revert to the Volunteers, and having been their year in the Regular Army would do good to the entire force, but whether it would be successful or not it is impossible to say. I have just returned now from the Russian Army, for instance, and I must say that although there is no country in which bureaucracy is so extreme as in Russia, they ease the path in every possible way they can to attract the best non-commissioned officers, and give every possible advantage and facility; and the same is the case in Germany.

5481. Is there anything else in your *précis* that you have sent in that you would wish to call attention to?—I think not, my lord; I think I have said everything. But the point I should earnestly urge upon your Commission would be that everything should be done in time of peace to admit the great expansion which will be necessary in any future war we have, with the least possible trouble at the time of the emergency, and that can only be done by the readiness of the cadres of officers and non-commissioned officers; they cannot be improvised; the men can be to a large extent.

5482. You were good enough to give us some papers which show that you have formed opinions upon the war, and I only wanted to ask a question on two points. During your visits to South Africa were you satisfied that there always was a sufficiency of supplies?—I had special opportunity for judging, both in Natal and on Lord Roberts' march to Bloemfontein, and subsequently with all the independent columns, and it is impossible to exaggerate the wonderful way in which the supplies of the Army were kept up, and the way in which the men were fed. Practically—of course I do not mean literally, but practically—a meal was scarcely missed, and from all sides I heard the same report. Of course, being in an unofficial position, I had more opportunity of speaking with individuals, going all over the theatre of war as I did, than would have been the case if I had been in high command, and from my knowledge of the German campaign in France and the Russian campaign in Turkey, I do not believe any army in the field has ever been supplied like it.

5483. That is quite in accord with the evidence we have already had, and especially was that so with regard to hospital comforts?—I was before the Royal Commission upon Hospitals, and, so far as I saw, and I visited whenever I had opportunity all the different hospitals, their system was extraordinarily good, and the supplies were perfectly wonderful. The doctors repeatedly told me, in quite out-of-the-way stations, that they had only to indent, and they received even the most rare medical comforts—port wine, Brand's Jelly, and so on.

5484. Of course, there was that particular period of stress at Bloemfontein, owing to the difficulty of communication?—Yes, and, of course, due to the capture of the million rations in the advance to the eastward. A great deal of the difficulty arose from the capture of that convoy.

5485. You were present at Paardeberg?—I was.

5486. And you did not see anything there or at Bloemfontein which was not one of those things we must expect to happen in war?—Well, one was astonished every day, and almost every hour of the day, at the extraordinary success of the supply train and the work of the Army Service Corps; I mean even on the days of actions, when there had been fighting all day long, the wonderful way in which the midday meal was got up was quite extraordinary.

5487. As to the class of the men, have you formed an opinion with regard to them—the ordinary soldier?—So far as spirit goes, there can be no question it was excellent, and the conduct was extremely good. One hesitates rather to give an opinion, but as your lordship asks me the question I will reply: the knowledge and intelligence which you see, for instance, in the German Army were not present, and the individual rarely grasped, or frequently did not grasp, the situation.

5488. He was quite full of zeal, pluck, and endurance?—He was all for fight rather by arms than by head; I do not know whether that is a fair way of putting it or not, and I say it with all deference. I should wish that to be recorded, for I would not like it to be construed into any animadversion or criticism upon the Army in the field.

5489. I mentioned it rather because you spoke of the intelligence of the Volunteers, and I suppose that is because you get a different class of men from what they can reach in the meantime in the Regular Army?—That is exactly the case, my lord; and I do not think it would be at all difficult to get men for the Army of that superior class if it was made as easy as possible; I think there would be no difficulty at all, and it would really popularise the Army, for any man who was anxious to go away for a year, but they will not go away for seven years; they cannot do it, because they are freed from the Army just at the moment that they have unlearned anything they had learned in civil life, and they have learned nothing fresh.

5490. It is three years now, is it not?—For the Guards only; and that is why recruiting for the Guards is so good, but for the Line—it is so constantly changing, however, that I may have made a mistake. Nobody can remember the incessant changes and differences of services off hand. They are a source of great confusion.

5491. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) In prospect, it is to be three years?—If it is going to be changed under the new system, that will, of course, improve things; but still I think even with three years I should make it very easy indeed to let men go away for a year. There is many a man with whom things perhaps are not going altogether well; he is out of employment, and he would go away for a year. What you want is to get all the men you possibly can trained to arms, especially with voluntary services such as we have.

5492. (*Chairman.*) Would not that make difficulties in keeping up the different regiments if you had men coming for a year and leaving then?—There are, and would be, difficulties, but none such as could not be overcome. It could not be done with foreign service battalions, but the home service battalions are, as a whole, far below their strength; in fact, there are scarcely ever any men, or I should say boys, on parade. That is the difficulty which all commanding officers have found. I do not speak from practical experience, but from what I see and know, and the difficulty is not in having the parades, but in having the men to attend them, the duties are so numerous. It is only a difficulty of account; they would come and go, and it would make exceedingly little difference. The military knowledge that can be put into a man within a year is perfectly amazing, and you see it in the Volunteers with a man of intelligence. You see it in the case of the Germans, and, of course, their full service is only two years.

5493. Do you think you would have efficient battalions at home if you relied much on one-year men?—I

think . .t is a thing which is the strong point both with the Germans and the Russians—the one-year Volunteer men—and what they learn is perfectly amazing. Anybody who has commanded provisional battalions, as I have for many years, will tell you that the change which a month or even a fortnight, or even a week, produces is perfectly astounding. Of course, they are not men fit for the first line instantly, and I do not pretend that at all, but men who are willing and anxious to learn can do a great deal in a comparatively short time in training, especially nowadays, when it is not precision of movement that is wanted, but individual intelligence. Of course, with our people, to be correct is line in marching past, which is a difficult matter to acquire in a short time; but in connection with individual intelligence, seeking cover, and the essential individual knowledge, a great deal more might be done theoretically than is done.

5494. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I think you said that three companies of Volunteers were supplied by the Queen's Westminsters?—When I say three companies, I do not mean three full companies, but sections of three companies, the first very large and the second and third small, because at that time my men all went to the Yeomanry.

5495. But with a full staff of officers and non-commissioned officers?—Oh, dear, no! The organisation is this, that every regiment in the Army has a certain number of regiments of Militia and Volunteers attached to it, and the King's Royal Rifles has, for instance, nearly all the Metropolitan corps, and they formed a company between them. If I remember right, for the second company there were only 21 Volunteers—I would not pledge myself to the exact figure, but I think it was 21—from the whole of the regiments of Volunteer battalions affiliated to the King's Royal Rifles, and to these my own regiment contributed 12. That is to show how bad the response was, but there was no attempt to get officers and non-commissioned officers used to the men at all, and it was entirely improvised.

5496. That was on the second and third occasions?—Yes.

5497. On the first occasion did you send a complete company as laid down?—No, not a full company; I should think about 60 or 70.

5498. And others did not come forward whom you thought fit?—No, they did not come forward to the same extent.

5499. Yours is a strong regiment?—Yes, mine is the strongest of all in the country—or very nearly in the country, certainly in London; and consisting of two battalions of infantry, with a mounted company, 160 strong, and 120 cyclists. It contributed more officers and non-commissioned officers and men than any other to the Field Army, about 300 altogether.

5500. Taking the whole of the Volunteer regiments throughout the country, some of which are of very much lower establishments than yours, do you think it would be easy for every Volunteer battalion to furnish a company with 115 men?—Oh, no; that would not be possible, but every Volunteer battalion would be able to furnish a good proportion of its men—I should say from 5 to 10 per cent. It would be necessary to be very careful in this matter, because parents would very soon object to the men entering the Volunteer Force if they thought any pressure, moral or otherwise, was being brought to bear upon them either to join the Army or to take the field. It would be necessary to be exceedingly careful and watchful of it. The Volunteer force is a very delicate machine, requiring tact and experience in its management, very economical, £6 only per head a year, and half of this for Regular adjutants and sergeant instructors.

5501. I suppose you had some good grounds for saying you could raise 1,000 men of the class you describe, if permission had been given at the time?—I am perfectly certain that I could have raised 2,000 or 3,000 with the greatest ease.

5502. Do you think you could have got experienced and useful officers in sufficient numbers to officer these battalions?—I should have had too many, and I should have had many who would have had to go into the ranks, but I should have had to change many, no doubt, after trial. My idea never was to take them on board ship the instant I had got their names, as in the case of the City Imperial Volunteers, but to take them to Aldershot and train them there for two or three months, and then to weed out those who proved undesirable or physically ineligible; even they could pass the stethoscope.

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5503. And, of course, you could not have done that without a considerable period of time being given to you to do it?—No, that is what I always felt, that it ought to have been done in October and not in December, and the gain in economy and efficiency would have been very great indeed.

5504. As to this proposal or suggestion of yours, that as many men as possible should go for a year's training in the Army, would you have them put on the establishment of the regiments or in excess?—In excess, as supernumeraries.

5505. Do you not think that there would be some difficulty, as all home battalions are called upon every year to furnish a large number of trained men to go on foreign service and join the battalion that is there?—Quite so.

5506. Do you not think, having a considerable number of men, or even 100 men, who were to come for a year and remain a year only, would rather make the system very awkward?—I do not think so; they would not be men for foreign service, and they would only be in augmentation, as you said, as supernumeraries to the regular establishment. No difficulty was found in the case of the Volunteer Service Companies.

5507. In point of fact, they would be in excess of the Army?—Yes, they would really be men going into the Army as an experiment, and by that means you would be able to get, in my opinion, I do not say a very large number at first, but a considerable number, and if they elected to continue in the Army, liking the military life, and seeing the prospect of advancement, their year should be allowed to count towards pension or towards whatever facilities were offered, and especially it ought to count towards Government employment in civil life, which is at the root of the whole question. Of course, every Government, with the exception of ours, makes that its principal and cardinal basis for the popularisation of the Army—that every post which can be given in Government offices or civil life—I do not mean clerical work—or in the police, as messengers, tax-collectors, and so on, is invariably given to the best retired non-commissioned officers of the Army.

5508. They would have to be paid during this training?—You would pay them soldiers' rates.

5509. Do you not think that would create a considerable addition to the expense?—No doubt it would; if the response was small the expense would be small, but £59 is the total expense of the regular soldier, and that is a very small sum for paying a man for such complete training as a year would give him.

5510. You have given very favourable evidence as to the excellent way in which the troops were supplied throughout the war, but there were some exceptions in consequence either of our troops pushing on rapidly, as to the relief of Kimberley, or of the loss of one or two rather large convoys. Were you present on any occasion when the men were put to difficulties owing to the rations not being up?—No, I was not; I was present at nominal difficulties, but they did not strike me as being very serious.

5511. According to your evidence, they appeared almost always to have received their rations regularly, and they got their meals pretty regularly?—More regularly than I have ever seen with any foreign army even in peace manœuvres. I have been with the peace manœuvres of most of the foreign armies, and I have never seen even the Germans having their meals with such regularity in peace manœuvres as our troops did, taking them as a whole, in war. With everything coming 6,000 miles by sea, and up to a thousand or two by land on a single line of rails, and no roads.

5512. Of course, that is most creditable to the Army Service Corps. Do you think the supply of other articles was equally good? You have said that of hospital comforts, medicines, and so forth, there was an abundant supply; and there was never any difficulty as to ammunition, according to the evidence we have had already; did you ever hear of any difficulty?—I should think there was not, because the waste of ammunition on many occasions was great. I saw that myself, and that showed, I hope, a knowledge of ample supplies being behind.

5513. That applies to the Artillery, too, I suppose?—

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I am rather being drawn out of my province there, but I saw on many occasions great waste of artillery ammunition, firing at nothing at all.

5514. They had plenty of supply?—No doubt they had, because they were so eager to fire. One of the most curious things was to see how the Boers saved every round, and never fired except at a definite object, whereas our people, I am afraid, often fired at an impossible range, so to say, to make a noise.

5515. There is a great desire, is there not, on the part of the authorities to bring the Volunteers into camp and shake them together more than has hitherto been the case?—Yes.

5516. Is not that at the bottom of some of the difficulties that have arisen?—That is at the bottom of the great difficulty; camp is a good thing, and every commanding officer wishes to bring his regiment as much as possible into camp; but to make it an absolute condition that a man should have his six days free at a particular arbitrary period, irrespective of his own employment, is absolutely fatal. There are some employments in which the employer would not tolerate a man going away, and it would be quite impossible for him to do so, and it is not reasonable to suppose that he should give up the whole of his holiday. Fix any standard of efficiency you like, but how it is arrived at is a matter of comparative unimportance; for instance, working men, artisans, can get away to camp, because they are hourly servants, they are not even weekly servants, and they are in such demand, as a rule, that they can say: "I am not coming to-morrow," or "I am not coming for a week"; but no clerk—nobody in any intellectual employment—could ever go to his employer and say: "I am going to shoot with my Volunteer musketry class this fine afternoon," or "I am going to camp next week." He would be instantly dismissed, and would have no possibility of getting employment again.

5517. Are you not aware that some firms in the City, directly this order was brought out, issued an order that every clerk was to be allowed a portion of his leave at that time at which his battalion was in camp?—That may have been so; but I have not heard of it, and I think it would be extremely difficult to do; some individual firm may have been able to do it, but they would be very exceptional, because Volunteers are generally the young men in the office, and the leave is regulated in all insurance offices and banks among the clerks themselves, and the seniors strongly object to the juniors going away at the time at which they, the seniors, want to go away, which is the best time of the year, and leave is regulated in large offices and banks five or six months ahead. Therefore, very great difficulty arises in that direction, and it really is not the employer who can regulate it, but the heads of departments or foremen. This is the case also in Government Departments even in the War Office. They give no facilities to Volunteers.

5518. I think you will find it has been done, and I should say it is more easy perhaps than you think, because it is only a very small proportion of the clerks in many employments who do belong to Volunteer corps?—My own experience is very great in the matter, because the whole of my regiment is practically composed of clerks, and I am in touch with all the leading houses, and, with the exception of Shoolbred's Company, maintained by Messrs. James Shoolbred and Co., of Tottenham House, who insist on nearly every man in their employ going through the Volunteer company, and give every possible facility the regiment, as a whole, which is 1,600 strong now (it was 2,000), is entirely composed of bank clerks, Government clerks, law clerks, and so on, and they are the men who have the great difficulty as to camp.

5519. Perhaps you are aware that in Australia something like the system which apparently is endeavoured to be introduced here is in force, and they do generally, except their finances do not admit of it, have camps to which the men go, to their great benefit, for perhaps four or five days within a week about Easter; if certain men cannot go they stop away, but, as a rule, the corps turn out pretty well?—I am acquainted with that, but Australia is more fortunate in the matter of climate than we are. The camp weeks—not months as in Australia—here are really limited, and you cannot put men into camp before May or after September, and even May and September are risky months for canvas in this country. The really practical months for canvas are June, July, and August.

5520. Is there a difficulty in men getting out at that time more than at other times?—No employee in London, practically—I am speaking in general terms, of course—can leave, as a rule, until after the London season in shops, which is, say, the end of July, or until the half-yearly bank books are made up; that is to say, the holiday months are August and September. I may say that Easter is now taken away from us. Easter was a very favourable time, because there is no obstructing influence at work, and men could always get away from the Thursday to the Monday at Easter, but that is no longer recognised, and there are no barrack camps going on at Easter, which is a great pity in my opinion.

5521. Easter was sometimes rather bad as regards weather?—Yes, very often terrible; but, as a matter of fact, for 20 years it has been better at Easter than at Whitsuntide, yet I am afraid there is no way of laying down any rule as regards the experience of English weather.

5522. You mentioned that you thought the English private soldier was rather deficient in intelligence, and I think you said you thought the Germans were probably more intelligent?—I am afraid I can have no doubt upon the point.

5523. Do you ascribe that in any measure to the fact that the German private is taken from the whole population—all classes—whereas the British private soldier is taken from a lower class?—Yes, very largely; but I think greater earnestness is implanted into the German soldier from the very first—greater earnestness in his profession. The theoretical instruction, of course, is immeasurably superior in the German Army. The theoretical instruction with us is on a very inferior basis—the theoretical instruction, that is to say, of the private soldier and non-commissioned officer, and a great deal can be done by theoretical instruction, especially in bad weather and in long winters. The Germans and Russians omit nothing which can possibly implant that intelligence, which we leave rather to accident, and even repress, and one must honestly admit that the ordinary British or Irish recruit does not join for earnestness or great love of the military profession. He joins by force of temporary circumstances.

5524. Sometimes by love of adventure?—Occasionally, and I think it would be much more so if recruiting was made more easy; the street corner recruiting sergeant is a bad method. If you stand at Charing Cross for half an hour near the recruiting sergeant you will see at once what I mean. See the men who come up and speak to him, and hear the way he talks to them. You can stand and listen to what he says, and the arguments he adduces, and go to St. George's Barracks and see the men strip; there is no indignity, but there are disagreeables which would repel any man of a good class who was desirous of joining the Army.

5525. Men of refinement?—Yes.

5526. Would those remarks applying to the superior intelligence of the soldier apply equally to the French as to the German?—The French, of course, is of a very different standard again; the French standard is not so good, and things are not done to improve the morale and tone so much as one would expect.

5527. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You spoke about the Volunteers possibly joining, if allowed to do so, for one year; are you aware that in the German service there are a number of men who only serve for a year?—Quite so, and in the Russian and Austrian.

5528. They are called *freiwillige*?—Yes.

5529. These men do not receive pay?—Well, they receive allowances of different sorts; but I would not be quite sure at the moment whether the German receives hard cash or not. If you take the Russian service, as to which I have just written a long report, that is fresh in my mind, and these are matters of detail which have to be looked up for accuracy—in the Guards he finds himself and can live at home, but the one year volunteer in all the Russian cavalry or infantry of the line is found in quarters, food, and clothing.

5530. But they have to dress themselves, have they not—to supply their own clothes?—It varies according to the arm of the service, both in Germany and in Russia; in the Guards in Russia, for instance, the one year volunteer finds his own clothes, but all through the line and the scientific corps—the Artillery and Engineers—they are dressed.

5531. But in the line I think you will find that in Germany the *freiwillige* receive no pay?—That may be so, but he gets privileges.

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5532. And he has to find his own clothing?—Yes; but they are not at a loss.

5533. Are there certain marks on his clothing which indicate that he is a *freiwilliger*?—Yes, that is clear; but whether he receives pay or whether it is in the form of allowances and privileges I do not remember for the moment.

5534. Do you think if that course was adopted in the English service, volunteers would join without receiving pay for the sake of military education?—No, I do not think that would be possible; I think they ought to be paid. The financial arrangements of a conscript country are not on the same footing at all, and you could not compare the two. He does not join as a volunteer in the German, Russian, or Austrian service for love of the Army by any means at all, but he joins to avoid having to serve for the full period. He is, in fact, only a volunteer in name, and not in our sense of giving free unrecognised and unpaid military service to his country in his leisure and holiday hours from motives of patriotism.

5535. You do not think any sufficient quantity of our Volunteers would, for the sake of the military education they would receive, join for a year?—Some might, but I do not think it would be desirable. I think he ought to be paid, and especially at that period of life. If he is not paid he must be attending at the expense of his father, and his father, unless he was a man of means, or anxious to get rid of him, would resent his son at 18 or 19 years of age earning nothing at all. He must keep himself at least.

5536. The German *freiwilliger* has to receive a certificate at the end of the year that he is an efficient soldier?—Yes, and he passes an examination if he is to receive the full privileges attaching to it.

5537. You spoke of certain minor difficulties being put in the way of the equipment of the Volunteers: do you mean that they were purposely put in the way, or that there were difficulties there which might have been relieved, and which were not relieved?—I have an adverb which I ought to have employed if I could do so respectfully; they were "stupidly" put in the way; they were not put in the way deliberately of *malice prepense*, but they were interposed by red tape from want of appreciation of the situation. When I use the word "stupidly," I do not mean anything disrespectful.

5538. You mean that they were not wilfully put in the way, but there were difficulties there which might have been removed?—Which might have been removed with a little common sense; the whole thing is a matter of common sense and largeness of mind. You want your men with the minimum of trouble, and by putting employers and parents to as little trouble as possible.

5539. (*Sir John Edge.*) When you were suggesting that men should be enlisted for one year's service, you were not confining that to enlistment from the Volunteers?—Not at all.

5540. It was general enlistment for the Army?—Yes, we want men, and we want men of intelligence; it might not answer, but it possibly would.

5541. I suppose they would receive the same pay as the seven years' service men would?—I should give them the pay of their service and rank, and I should make no distinction whatever between them and the men in the Army. I should make a distinction certainly in the barrack-room. The German Volunteer or the Russian is never put into the barrack-room with the other men, and they are always apart—they live apart.

5542. Do you suggest that it would be advisable to put the one year service men into different quarters from the seven years' service men?—I would give them a room not to themselves, but by themselves.

5543. Do you not think that would create a very awkward feeling in the regiment?—It is not found to do so in the foreign armies. The service companies in South Africa were kept together.

5544. But these Volunteers, I understand, in the foreign armies, such as in Germany, are generally a better class of men?—Yes, and so ours would be too, I think, but that is rather a detail, if you will allow me to say so. The barrack-room deters many from joining, and Major-General Mackinnon's suggestion of the cubical system is likely to be a great improvement, but the barrack-room, as can be well understood without "dotting the i's," is a disagreeable incident in the soldier's life, and would prevent many men of intelligence and ability joining the Army. It is ruining the best youth of France.

5545. I quite understand what you mean, but do you think it would be practically possible to give the one year men cubical accommodation, and not to give the seven years' men cubical accommodation without creating unfortunate feelings in the regiment?—I think so, undoubtedly. Different classes of passengers in the same train have no ill will towards each other.

5546. Do you think it would not interfere with men enlisting for seven years?—I am far from thinking that—it might have that effect—that they would say: "I will go for a year and see how I like it," and they would not join for seven years; but I think you would get a higher tone in the whole Army, and what is more important more men to go through it.

5547. Is it not reasonable to expect that if the one year service man had cubical accommodation to himself, and, in fact, better accommodation than the seven years' service man, that would put him on a higher level?—Yes.

5548. And is it not reasonable to suppose that most men would enlist for one year instead of seven?—That is quite possible.

5549. And that all the better class men would go in for one year's service?—Yes, that is so.

5550. Will you tell me how you would suggest that the seven years' foreign service men would be provided for?—Exactly as we do at the present time.

5551. My suggestion to you is this, that if you make a distinction between the one year's service man and the seven years' service man, the one year's service man having an opportunity of again enlisting if he likes, you will find them all going in as one year service men, with no seven years' service men, or you would have only the worst form of recruit going in as a seven years' service man?—I quite see the view you take about it, and I think there is a good deal in it; but it is one of those things that can only be tested by experience and common sense.

5552. Do you not think that if my suggestion is well founded it is a very serious obstacle to your plan?—Yes, I think it may be, but now when there are varying terms of service for the Guards, the line, and the cavalry, I do not think that serious practical difficulties are found in these different services.

5553. But the Guards are not sent to India, for instance?—Well, that is a privilege.

5554. We require a large number of seven years' men for the garrison of India?—That is quite true.

5555. And you would not suggest that we should have the very worst class as soldiers for that service in India, and keep the best class at home with one year's service?—No, I quite see your point, but I must honestly say that when men of the better class do join they too often buy themselves out afterwards.

5556. You would require for the Army in India, I suppose, men of as much intelligence as you would require for the Army at home?—Even more, certainly.

5557. So that any system that would tend to throw into the service for India the inferior men would not be an improvement?—That is quite true; but if I might venture to recall it to your recollection, my answer to the Chairman rather was that the one year system would improve the Volunteer Force, as well as get the better stratum you want in the Army; it was not so much in connection with Army recruiting.

5558. I gathered from what you said that you were not going to limit the one year men to recruits from the Volunteers?—No, and perhaps in practice it might be better to do something of that sort, but my object was to improve the Volunteer Force rather, and I did not really come prepared to go into the whole question of the recruiting of the Army. That is a very big question.

5559. With regard to the Volunteers, as to the men who volunteered on the first call for service companies, you had special limits of qualification, I suppose?—Very strict; that is to say, first of all, good temper, which I was very particular about, two years' service, marksmanship in that year, and not being married.

5560. The number of Volunteers you obtained on the first call, I assume, did not represent the number of really efficient Volunteers in the country?—Nothing

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like it, of course—in round numbers, only perhaps about 6 per cent.

5561. And on the second and third calls, you say that the advantage given to the Yeomanry, as they were enlisted in the street, prevented the Volunteers volunteering for the service companies?—Yes, very much.

5562. If there had not been that strong line of advantage in favour of men enlisting for the Yeomanry, do you think you could have raised the number of men required for the Volunteer service companies on the second and third calls?—No, I rather doubt that; I do not think so. I think the great war fever has passed its meridian. In all voluntary systems you must use the popular arts.

5563. You must take the tide at its flood?—Yes, you cannot lay it down strictly beforehand; but you must use common sense, and hold out the advantages of patriotism.

5564. Do you know whether many Volunteers actually went into the Yeomanry?—That I know; for instance, my own regiment would not have had under 150 in the Yeomanry, and very nearly the whole of those whom I sent were made non-commissioned officers at once, and a very large proportion became commissioned officers.

5565. Those men, if they had gone out with the service companies, would have drawn their shilling a day?—Yes, and would have had no chance of advancement.

5566. In going to the Yeomanry they had 5s. a day?—Yes, and great prospect of promotion, besides riding a horse or learning to ride a horse.

5567. You have told us that the changes in the recent Regulations with regard to the Volunteers have thrown difficulties in the way of recruiting for the Volunteers; what are the changes that make the difficulties?—There is a great deal of change as regards training; there are the difficulties as to the number of company trainings which have to be done before camp, and then there is the attendance at camp, and the musketry has been made more difficult, and is about to be made still more difficult. For instance, under the proposed Regulations—they are not absolutely confirmed—every man firing his class at Bisley would have to make three and probably four journeys to Bisley in the course of the year, and each journey to Bisley means an afternoon away from employment or away from the Saturday half-holiday.

5568. To shoot the whole class?—To shoot the class, and four journeys to Bisley, with all the efforts which the South-Western Railway Company makes to facilitate the service, is a matter involving two hours going there and two hours coming back.

5569. Do you speak of the whole course for the Volunteer for the year, or the class?—Only the musketry.

5570. How many classes of musketry are there?—There are four classes, third, second, first, and marksmanship. Half my regiment are marksmen. None third class shots.

5571. In saying it would require four journeys to Bisley, you mean to complete the whole course of the four classes?—To complete the whole course of the four classes.

5572. I think with the Volunteers in old days it was necessary for them to shoot through the whole three courses, as it was in those days, and they got their marksmanship in the third course?—It is constantly being varied, but it is made much more difficult, whatever the exact point is which makes it so.

5573. Does not the difficulty arise from the difficulty of finding ranges?—There is very great difficulty indeed.

5574. Is not the difficulty in finding the range, and not from the Regulations?—Not wholly; it is the two combined.

5575. What was the range of the Queen's Westminsters 10 years ago? Where was it situated?—We shot at Bisley, and we had five or six different ranges in different parts of the Home District.

5576. What was the nearest range to Westminster?—About five or six miles, and Wormwood Scrubbs would be the nearest, but the ranges have been shut up from time to time.

5577. Is not that the difficulty, and is not that the reason why all your men have to go to Bisley at this present moment—that you cannot get a range nearer? That is one of the difficulties.

5578. It is a difficulty of the situation, and not a difficulty of the Regulation?—But the difficulties of the Regulation also come in, for the Regulations are not fitted to the situation, because when you get to Bisley you have great crowds of men there, men, for instance, firing at 200 yards, and it is obvious that you cannot go back to the 300 yards range while men are at the 200 yards butt, because you would be shooting into their backs, and therefore the men who come for the 300 yards have to wait until the 200 yards men have finished, and there is a good deal of difficulty in that way, of detail.

5579. Again, it is the difficulty of the situation, and not the difficulty of the Regulations. It is the difficulty of the situation that causes different corps now to go to Bisley which had their own ranges in old days?—Yes, I quite agree that a Scotch corps having a range outside their village or town does not meet with these difficulties.

5580. What other difficulties are there?—There is the great difficulty of camp, which says that no man is efficient unless he is able, except under certain conditions, to have those seven days at a particular time of the year, and a particular week, free to go into camp.

5581. I gathered from what you said that power would be taken to relieve men from them who could not go to camp?—Yes.

5582. And it would not be absolutely essential to earning the capitation grant to attend the camp?—It will be rather difficult, I expect, to get exemption; I am going to try to work it, but it is anticipated that it will be exceedingly difficult to carry out.

5583. It may be extremely difficult to get the number of men to the camp, but will it be more difficult to earn your capitation grant?—Undoubtedly, if the camp is made a condition of efficiency.

5584. But I understood, from what you said just now, that the power would be reserved to waive that?—It is made much more elastic than it was by the absurd Regulations of November 1st, 1901; but still the word "obligatory" is introduced into the regulations—"attendance at the camp is obligatory." For the first time you bring the word "obligatory" into a voluntary service.

5585. But you do not contemplate that the capitation grant would be reduced because men from necessity are unable to attend the camp?—Yes, I do; I think I might get it in respect of some men with regard to whom, after very patient inquiry, I should be able to put forward sufficient excuse, but I anticipate a very considerable number will have it reduced.

5586. I presume it will be sufficient excuse if their employers do not give them liberty to go?—I do not think that would be accepted as an excuse; I think it must be on the ground of ill-health, or some other very urgent excuse, such as going out of the country on matters of business. If a man was in France or Russia, he could not attend camp at Aldershot, but I do not think the employers being unwilling to allow him to go would be accepted as an excuse. I do not read it at all in that way.

5587. Then you contemplate that that would not be an excuse which would be accepted?—I contemplate that, certainly.

5588. Do you mean that no man would be excused from camp who was absent on the sole ground that his permanent employer would not give him leave to go?—I am clear about that.

5589. He will not earn the capitation grant?—I am clear about that, under the present regulation. I ought perhaps to explain, My Lord, that these new rules do not apply till 1904 for men who joined prior to the 1st November, 1901, and that is why it is affecting recruiting so very much indeed. As to the men who joined under one system, it does not come into force until after the period of their engagement. Most Volunteers are engaged for three or four years by Civil contract with their commanding officers, who, in consideration of their becoming efficient in each year, provide them with uniform and equipment.

5590. What other difficulties are there? There is the difficulty about attending camp?—Yes, there is the difficulty about attending camp, and there is the difficulty about musketry, and there is the difficulty of the number of drills in the first year—the 40 drills—which, of course, frightens a good many men.

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5591. Up to five years ago what was the number of drills for recruits?—It was less than it is now; I cannot remember exactly, as they are constantly changing.

5592. I am under the impression that it was either 30 or 40, as I have been a recruit myself?—Yes, in two years; but now it is 40 in one year.

5593. My impression was that it was 30 drills in the first year?—Then that is 10 in addition now.

5594. You do not think 10 additional drills unsatisfactory from the point of view of efficiency?—No; but whether it is an absolute essential or not is, I think, questionable.

5595. But from the point of view of efficiency you would not say the 10 extra drills were not necessary?—I do not think they are absolutely necessary at all.

5596. Do you think you could turn out a recruit as well after 30 drills as after 40?—Yes, I think there are many recruits you can turn out as well in 20 as in 40.

5597. Taking the general body of recruits, do you suggest you could make as good a man out of a recruit in 30 drills as in 40?—You cannot lay down hard and fast rules as regards that.

5598. You might get a Napoleon amongst them, but take the ordinary class of recruit, the man you get in one of the Metropolitan Volunteer regiments, and I have been in a very good one myself at one time—do you tell me that in your opinion you could make him as valuable a Volunteer in 30 drills as you could in 40?—Of course, three years' experience is better than two, and 40 drills are better than 30, but that the extra year, or the extra 10 drills, is essential is what I venture to differ upon.

5599. We will not quarrel over the term "essential," but is it not likely to add to the efficiency of the Volunteer?—No doubt it is; that is absolutely unquestioned; but the gain will not balance the harm if there is a great loss in numbers and classification.

5600. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) But you think the extra drills might prevent some men joining the Volunteers?—I hope it will not be thought that I have ventured to make these observations with a view to saying that the extra drills are not valuable as tending to make a man more efficient, but the country wants the maximum of men with the minimum of interference with their civil life, not a few men, worked up to a theoretical level, which disappears the moment rifles and bullets come.

5601. (*Sir John Edge.*) Do you think the addition of these drills is what prevents the men coming in?—We can only take the facts as we find them; we find the regulations more exacting and the recruiting deficient, the resignations increasing over normal, not war, times.

5602. The difficulty may be misunderstood?—But you can only deal with the matter as it stands; the Army and the War Office are greatly misunderstood.

5603. After a man has passed through his recruit service, is the number of drills requisite every year increased?—No, that is not increased, but there is the difficulty of the training. It is not now a question of drills, which is quite right—I do not say it is wrong in any form—but the training must take place in the country instead of in the drill hall or on barrack square.

5604. But a good deal of the training can be done on barrack square?—But that is forbidden.

5605. Training of what description is forbidden?—The 10 company trainings must be in the country and not on barrack square or in the drill hall.

5606. You are prohibited from having company drill in barrack square?—The men must be taken away to the open country.

5607. Are you prohibited from having company training in barrack square?—It is distinctly laid down—I have not the words with me, but it is intended that it should take place in open country, which is perfectly right.

5608. Perfectly right for certain classes of training?—Yes.

5609. But a great deal of the training of the company can be done on the barrack square, and is done there?—Yes, that is one of the difficulties.

5610. What kind of training are you referring to when you say it must be done in the country?—What is called company training, which is perfectly right.

5611. Tell me what it is?—It consists in very extended order drill, a great deal of outpost and a great deal of skirmishing, and it ought to consist of practical field fortification.

5612. I thought outpost, skirmishing, and practical field fortification was drill you never could teach in the barrack square at any time?—That is so.

5613. Then that is no additional difficulty?—But it is a great deal of additional difficulty to be compelled to get the men away to the country, and a great deal of additional expense.

5614. If you trained the men according to the regulations in force in 1896, say, you would train them in these very subjects?—Quite.

5615. You did take them out into the country, then?—Yes.

5616. Which was either of advantage or not?—I think, if I may venture to say so, I am being drawn into an argument as to the efficiency or the desirability of the present regulations, or how they might be improved or modified, but I can only state as the result of practical experience that they are increasing the difficulty—it may be wise to increase it. Thereon I differ.

5617. I do not wish to draw you into an argument or into a pitfall, but I want to see in what the present difficulties to which you have been referring consist?—I think, if I may say so, it would be better if I confined myself to the general principle that they are attended with considerable difficulty in matters of detail, and they are having the effect of considerably reducing the numbers of the Volunteer Force.

5618. Do I understand from you that under these present regulations the Volunteers would be more efficiently drilled—take the case of company drill?—Yes, I think they would be.

5619. Is there any other difficulty?—No, I do not think there is anything else really. have nothing further to say except that, on the question of the Volunteer Force, if you make things arbitrary or obligatory you must pay. You cannot put it on an individual corps to pay if it is arbitrary or obligatory.

5620. But a certain number of drills was obligatory under the old system before a man could obtain the capitation grant?—Yes.

5621. (*Sir John Jackson.*) In your experience with regard to the rifle-shooting of Volunteers in competitions, have you usually found that they shoot better than the Regulars?—Individuals shoot better; there are much better shots in the Volunteers than in the Army as individual shots, but the whole shooting is below that of the Army, and it would be disgraceful if it was not so—that is, the collective shooting of the force as a whole.

5622. You find the Regulars shoot better?—As a whole, and they go through a more systematic course of training than is possible in the Volunteer Force. If you take special team shooting, the Volunteers generally, not always, win.

5623. And that would apply to the artillery as well as to the rifle shooting?—That I know nothing about.

5624. I asked the question because some years ago I was a Volunteer officer of artillery, and at that time, in the district where I was in the North of England, we always found that the Volunteers beat the Regulars?—I do not know about the artillery.

5625. What pay did the Volunteers receive who went out to South Africa?—Army rates throughout—that is, the Volunteers who did not go with the Imperial Yeomanry.

5626. You stated that in your opinion the German soldier on the average was a more intelligent man than the British soldier; would that apply also to the Russian soldier?—No, the Russian soldier is not an intelligent individual.

5627. And, of course, the Russian soldier, I take it, is more or less an illiterate man?—Yes, but, of course, the physique is infinitely superior.

5628. Both to the German and the British?—Yes; my account of the present Russian Army was to have been in the "Daily Telegraph" to-day, and I think it will be out next month, and that will give the whole detail.

5629. The average German soldier is, I take it, a better educated man than the British soldier?—Yes much better educated, and there is a very high tone

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about his education; even in the most inferior regiments of the Line there is a greater uniformity.

5630. Did you find in your experience in Russia and Germany that there was any decided objection to the compulsory system with regard to their armies?—Oh, yes, I think there is a decided objection, but it is useless to make it heard, because they all recognise that there would be no other way of recruiting the Army.

5631. Still there is the same objection in France, and it is well known there is a very bitter objection there?—Yes, but it is recognised as essential. France with a volunteer army would not exist.

5632. And the same applies, perhaps in a lesser degree, in Russia and Germany?—Yes, in a lesser degree; and first of all they are very much used to be organised—I was going to say driven. To take away young men at 18 to 21, or later in the case of the Russians, from 22 to 24, just at the time they are starting their careers, is fatal to many careers, and would only be tolerated by the English at the last ditch of liberty.

5633. And do you not think that the feeling against the system of compulsory enlistment has a tendency to make a man less eager with his fighting?—Yes, one would think it had, but one does not see it so in practice.

5634. You think when the time comes feelings of that kind pass off?—I would say, as a general whole, having been with the German Army in peace and in the field, there is more earnestness from beginning to end. I should not say it of the French or the Austrians, or the Russians, but with the Germans earnestness is the cardinal feature, from whatever cause it arises. I would say that earnestness is not the cardinal feature of our people, either in peace or in the field. Courage is, of course, their cardinal feature; but as to the earnestness, I should hardly put it in the same way, except as to football and cricket, polo and hockey.

5635. Perhaps that is accounted for by the fact that the British soldier is from a lower grade of society?—One hesitates always to say anything which might be interpreted as a reflection on the Army, but that construction is, I think, the right one.

5636. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) You say in your *précis* that there does not appear to be the slightest realisation by the Adjutant-General's Department of the great lessons of the war, and so on. As far as you know, is anything being done to reorganise upon the lessons of the war in that direction?—I very much hesitate to say anything which might be taken as a reflection upon the authorities that are, but I do not see the signs of it, and from what I hear the signs do not seem to be very apparent. They may be existent, and it may be owing to my failure, and that of those with whom I am acquainted, to perceive them.

5637. But as far as the great lesson of the war goes, which is described here, to your knowledge there is no effectual method being taken of attracting the largest possible number of men for military training, nor to perfect the cadres of officers and non-commissioned officers?—I see no evidence whatever of it, and it is quite clear that it cannot be, because the Regulations issued on the 1st November, 1901, while I was in South Africa, had to be hurriedly withdrawn, because they were found absolutely unworkable. It is a great pity, if I may say so, as you lead me up to the point, that we have a force of nearly 300,000 men which has absolutely no representative at all on the Headquarters Staff of the Army. There is absolutely nobody who has any knowledge of the Volunteer Force; there is the greatest sympathy and the greatest goodwill on the part of the Inspector-General, but that the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces meets with a great deal of difficulty from his hierarchal superiors is a thing which is absolutely common knowledge.

5638. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Are you in agreement with the general opinion amongst soldiers that the weak spot on the Volunteer Force has always been the deficiency of officers?—Quite.

5639. How do you propose to remove that deficiency? If you were at the War Office, what steps would you take?—That would be extremely difficult.

5640. Can you point to any leading directions at all, in a few words?—In a few words it would be quite impossible to do that.

5641. There are not one or two leading points you could fix upon?—No, and I should be sorry to attempt it, as I might mislead.

5642. Would you go so far as to say it was an insoluble problem?—No, I do not think any problem is insoluble, because I should try first in this direction and then in that; but the difficulty is increasing. The force is over 2,000 officers short. You increase the difficulty of obtaining officers, because you increase the call upon the time of the officer, and increase also his pecuniary liability and his responsibility.

5643. If you have no solution to offer I will not press you further on that point. I will now ask you on the general maxim you laid down just now, which was that you should get the maximum of men with the minimum inconvenience?—Yes.

5644. Supposing that by getting the maximum of men you somewhat lower the efficiency of the Volunteers by the diminution of drills and so on, is there not this danger, that the country then has a larger number of men to call on in whom it puts confidence as a defence, and is therefore less inclined to be called upon for money to train soldiers?—That, I see, is a view of it, but it is not a view which I share at all. The view you express is rather that the more you give to the Volunteers the less you will have for the Army, but that is not a view which, with all deference, I should be willing to acquiesce in at all. The conditions of England as regards defence are not such that you would call out the Volunteers to-morrow morning to resist the invasion of any foreign nation. The certainty is that with the smallest forethought you have weeks, if not several months, for preparation available, as you had in the case of the South African War clearly six months' warning, and if not six months, at the very least three months even after the war broke out. Of course, if the authorities for the moment do not choose to avail themselves of those warnings, and do not choose to see them because the emergency has not actually arisen at that moment, nothing can be done, but I think, with the Volunteer Force, there is no possibility of its being wanted as a whole, or in considerable numbers, without weeks of preparation.

5645. And you would not say there was a considerable fraction of the Volunteer Force which is ineffective?—No doubt some proportion of the Volunteer Force is ineffective, as is the case with any standing Army at all times as regards preparation for a campaign. I find that 36½ per cent. were rejected medically and from other causes in the regular Army on the outbreak of the war, and the proportion of the Volunteer Force would not be higher than that.

5646. You are speaking of rejection for physical reasons?—Yes.

5647. I am speaking rather of inefficiency of drill?—A smaller proportion of the Volunteers would be rejected on that ground, especially nowadays. May I venture to submit my view? The drill has changed completely in the last few years, and the new Drill Book practically says "Go down there." It is not now marching in serried order, but you get there as best you can, and act on the situation you find, and the Volunteer can do that as well as any Guardsman, or better.

5648. Have you paid attention to the question of the artillery in connection with the Volunteers?—Only generally in the sense that I have a very large regiment of artillery in my constituency. Of course, and more's the pity, they are armed with museum guns.

5649. You have not given special attention to the point?—No, not to the organisation of the artillery, except as regards their armour, which is, of course, lamentable.

5650. They are now being properly armed?—Not field batteries yet.

5651. But they are promised?—No, they are under consideration, and that has been the case for many years.

5652. You mentioned the difficulties you had in equipping the City Imperial Volunteers, and you had to strip your own regiment of belts for them?—Yes.

5653. Supposing the Volunteers were suddenly called upon on an emergency, generally throughout the country, would there not be a great lack of equipment?—A terrible lack of equipment, and I hold very strongly indeed that all those things are matters which cannot be improvised, and which must be maintained.

5654. Do you say there is still a lack of equipment?—There is still a very serious lack of equipment.

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5655. I ask you that because we were told by a high military authority the other day, that they were properly equipped?—The Volunteers as a whole?

5656. Yes?—The Volunteer Force as a whole is fairly equipped with essentials.

5657. That was my question to you?—That would vary very much indeed; they have great coats, belts, and so on, but if one takes the City Imperial Volunteers, for instance, there were no means of getting their equipment; no contractors could possibly supply it. There was no leather, and that is why I had to strip my own regiment. Great strides have been made in the equipment of the Volunteers in recent years.

5658. I must take you back to my original question. Before the war, would you say on the whole the Volunteers were fairly equipped?—Yes, I should say they were fairly equipped.

5659. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You have seen a great deal of the Continental armies—in Germany and Russia especially?—Yes.

5660. Apart from ordinary pluck, bravery, and, if you will, physique, do you consider that from their better education, and more thorough training, the Continental troops, say in Germany, are superior to and more efficient than those of our Army?—No, I should not say that, because I think where we score so tremendously is in our pluck and courage; but there is more thorough theoretical training, and more thorough preparation for emergencies, in the Continental armies. Why, if I may say so, our difficulty is great is that we do not know our enemies; we do not know where we shall have to fight, and therefore the difficulty with us is greater; but that is no reason why we should have no General Staff and no preparation for probable campaigns, whereas the Germans and the Russians have everything ready for the contingencies which are probable. In case of war in France, an attack by Russia, with their objective clearly defined, and with a probable attack from Germany, they are able to make their preparations much more thoroughly, and to have everything drawn out more exactly, than we have; but that is no reason for our having no preparation, or very little. Every detail, as far as I have seen in 1866, 1870, and 1877, in every campaign must be thought out when there is no emergency, and if the only way is to improvise on an emergency arising, you may get through—"muddle through," as Lord Rosebery said—as we have got through, but you only get through with lavish expenditure, and with infinite labour and great risk.

5661. As the result of conscription, education of a military character is necessarily more general in Germany, for instance—in fact, compulsory?—Quite so.

5662. And you consider it has resulted in greater intelligence amongst the men both in the regular armies, and in the one year volunteers on the continent—especially in Germany?—Yes, I think so; but I think I ought also at the same time to say that the English Army has many more difficulties to contend with. If you take Aldershot, for instance, which is our only training camp, with the exception of Salisbury, in every movement, according to modern war, the troops are hampered by private property, and this and that being out of bounds. The difficulty of movement in our small country is very great indeed, and no foreign army is exposed to the like difficulty.

5663. You have stated that the recruiting in 1901 for the second levy of the Imperial Yeomanry was scandalous?—That was my view of it.

5664. Do you consider that there was sufficient care taken in the medical examination of those troops before sending them away?—No, I do not think there was sufficient care.

5665. Have you formed any opinion as to with whom rested more immediately and directly the responsibility for it?—No; of course, it is perfectly clear that men were wanted, and that too great strictness on the part of the medical authorities was not enjoined.

5666. Of course a great many men were wanted?—Yes, and if you want a great many men in a hurry you must not be too particular.

5667. And they were not very particular as to physique?—No; and the proof of it is really shown by the sick returns. One of the most interesting things will be found probably in the number of men who were sick within three months of landing in South Africa. Many men may pass the doctor who are really unfit for a campaign, but that can be found out much more readily by a month at Aldershot, in camp or barracks together, than by any board of doctors, and you will see it instantly then.

5668. I think you mentioned that owing to the much higher pay given to the Yeomanry a great many Volunteers entered the Yeomanry corps; did you recommend that higher pay should be given to the City Imperial Volunteers?—I made representations upon it, but I do not know that they were official representations. A great many representations were being made, but it was evident that they were not being regarded. I cannot say whether I absolutely did or did not represent myself in any definite form that I can point to, but I did press very strongly indeed that this high rate of pay should only be given to men who had already a certain amount of training, and were thoroughly recommended by their own regimental commanding officer, and I would have put the responsibility upon him if bad men were sent.

5669. You would then have had men who were really efficient Yeomanry?—Yes; for instance, Duke Street, Piccadilly, was taken up with the most extraordinary looking out-at-elbow crowds trying to enlist into the Yeomanry, and I thought it was scandalous to see amongst them several Volunteers in uniform, who may have been good or bad men, but I thought it was wrong that they should have had no advantage and no privilege at all, and I thought that the high rate of pay was very largely indeed thrown away. Although there were many battalions of Yeomanry, those left of them in the field after the first and second weedings out had taken place, and some officers had been removed and others replaced, two or three battalions being put together to make one battalion, as to whom their commanding officers in South Africa were able to speak on many occasions in the highest terms, I do not think that is any answer to the way in which the thing was done.

5670. (*Chairman.*) You do not think it would have been possible to give the service companies any higher rate of pay than the ordinary men in the Army?—No, it would not have been possible, and I think if it had not been for the 5s. a day having been sprung upon us, there would not have been the hesitation to join the service companies that there was, but once 5s. a day is going everybody wants 5s. a day instead of 1s., and nobody is pleased with 1s. a day if he can get 5s.

5671. (*Viscount Esher.*) I see you have got the Volunteer decoration; does that imply a certain number of years' service in the Volunteers?—Twenty years in the Volunteer Force.

5672. How long have you commanded a regiment?—Twenty-two years; I have commanded the present regiment for 19, and I commanded another regiment, the Central London Rangers, before I went to the Metropolitan police many years ago.

5673. Are there many colonels commanding Volunteer regiments who have had a longer service?—I believe I am one of the senior, or very nearly so, in the country.

5674. Have you had many direct communications with the War Department during these 22 years?—A great many more than the War Department would approve of.

5675. With whom have those communications been carried on, as a rule?—With the authorities for the moment, whoever they were. I have always been pretty active.

5676. Whom do you call the authorities—the Secretary of State or the Under-Secretary of State or the Commander-in-Chief?—I think the whole of them; I think I have been in constant communication with practically the whole of them. The immediate authority at the War Office is the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces.

5677. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Is that General Borrett?—General Sir Alfred Turner, a great friend of the Volunteers. General Borrett was temporarily in the position during the war. General Kelly-Kenny, the present Adjutant-General, formerly held the position. Sir Edward Bulwer was the first, when I first got the command of a regiment of Volunteers in 1875, and then Sir Lyon Fremantle was another, and there have been a long succession of them, and they have all been general officers who were most heartily sympathetic, and have done everything they possibly could; but they had considerable difficulties to contend with and that there are very considerable difficulties to contend with at the present time is a certain fact.

5678. (*Viscount Esher.*) Your right of access is to the Inspector-General?—Yes.

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5679. Have you been consulted by the Secretary of State at all during the course of this recent reorganisation?—No, but I hope it will not be thought that I have any feeling on that ground whatever. I have only been consulted upon it to the extent that I insisted in Parliament on the withdrawal of the impossible Regulations which were framed. I cannot say it was a voluntary consultation at all; it was a very arbitrary consultation, for I had the whole force, if not the country, behind me.

5680. I understood you to say you thought there ought to be some authority at the War Office specially invested with the care of the Volunteers?—Yes, that is so, and the Inspector-General is now; but if you take the Imperial Yeomanry, for instance, the Commander-in-Chief recognised that, and there are two officers now on the Headquarters Staff of the Army, Lord Chesham and Colonel Lucas, who are representatives of the Yeomanry Force, and with great knowledge of it, and the Secretary of State himself, as an Hon. Colonel of Yeomanry. There are 26,000 Yeomen and there are two members on the Headquarters Staff, and there are 270,000 Volunteers, and there is no representative. I admit it is attended with considerable difficulty, because there is a great difference between town and country regiments and different regiments of different classes, but I think there ought to be something of that sort in justice to the Volunteer Force, and in justice to the Commander-in-Chief, who cannot possibly have a particular knowledge of the detailed organisation of the Volunteers, which is very peculiar indeed.

5681. Would not the Commander-in-Chief look to the Inspector-General for any information he required?—Yes, but the Inspector-General, however sympathetic, has no knowledge of detail, and I must honestly say that the late Secretary of State, Lord Lansdowne, did endeavour to meet it in appointing an officer who had been my adjutant for a few years, but he has since been transferred.

5682. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You spoke of the difficulty of obtaining the services of reliable officers and non-commissioned officers; how are the regimental officers for the Volunteers chosen or selected?—They are appointed on the recommendation of the officer commanding the regiment, and they receive the King's commission.

5683. Are they taken from men in the regiment?—In some regiments they are; in my regiment I take a proportion of them from the ranks, because my own men are rather of a superior class.

5684. Have you any suggestion to offer as to how the services of reliable officers and non-commissioned officers could be obtained for the Volunteers?—No, not off-hand; that can only be attained by increasing the popularity of the force. I have often suggested that it should be a *sine quâ non* for advancement in Government employ, that the claimant for Government patronage should be able to show some State service, voluntary or otherwise.

5685. I speak of the officers and non-commissioned officers?—That is what I mean; so long as you maintain the system which we have at the present time, that service in the Army or Militia, in the Yeomanry, or the Volunteers, obtains no privilege of any sort, and there is no privilege now existing, the Service will fail to attract. You must give it some privilege or other to attract your men to it. It may only be a vague privilege, but there must be something, and they ought to have something which the ordinary civilian who does not serve his country in any shape or form, does not get, or is not entitled to.

5686. I suppose in each Volunteer corps there are commissioned officers who have served as non-commissioned officers in the Regular Forces?—No, a very small proportion indeed.

5687. Not as instructors?—As instructors, I beg pardon; there is a certain proportion of instructors to every Volunteer corps.

5688. They are men who have served as non-commissioned officers in the Regular Army?—They are as a rule on their Army engagement, but they are called sergeant-instructors, and not called non-commissioned officers of the Volunteers, being on a different footing altogether. Their services are invaluable. One might say this, as you are so good as to mention the point, that the Volunteer sergeant-major who has to work all the year round, and to conduct a large part of the correspondence under the adjutant, has not the warrant rank which he has in the Militia. The sergeant-major of Militia who acts during the training is a warrant officer, whereas the sergeant-major of Volunteers is not—he is only an acting sergeant-major. Those are details which I did not venture to trouble the Commission with.

5689. I only wanted to know if you had formed any opinion as to how reliable officers and non-commissioned officers could be obtained?—The only thing I can possibly say is the determination of the Government to make voluntary service some qualification—not a sole qualification, but a good mark towards civil advancement or civil employment. As to non-commissioned officers of Volunteers, they as a whole are first rate, and often better than the sergeants of the line.

5690. You think if that were done you could then obtain the services of reliable officers?—Yes, I think it would then have a very considerable effect indeed, because what everybody wants is to establish a claim over others in competition for employment. Of course, we are in great difficulty in this country, because in other countries the railways either receive subventions or are the property of the State, and that opens an enormous avenue for the employment of men who have served well in the Army. The non-commissioned officers who serve for 10 years in either the German or the Russian Army, and also in the French, Austrian, Italian, and Spanish Armies are all absolutely certain of Government employ for the whole of their lives, either in the *gendarmerie* or on the railways as guards or conductors, and so on, so that the man who serves for 10 years in any foreign army with credit is quite certain of State employment for the rest of his life. The real difficulty here is that not only is there no such certainty, but there is no advantage in having served. Supposing I was a candidate for any post, the fact of having been a Volunteer so long (I do not cite it as a particular instance) would not be counted in the least in my favour. I have pressed this repeatedly on the present Prime Minister, and one always gets sympathetic replies, but nothing is done. The other day the Treasury answered that they had no power; I wanted the Treasury to lay down a positive rule that no messenger should be appointed in any Government office who could not show any Government service.

5691. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) You are not speaking of the Regular Army now?—Yes and no. Army or Navy Service first, then Auxiliary, Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers.

5692. And the Regular Army would have to be satisfied first?—Yes, quite so. I could not put down any suggestion in absolute words at this moment, but I would make State service some qualification for civil employment, whereas now you do nothing.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

Colonel Sir E. W. D. Ward, K.C.B.

Colonel Sir E. W. D. Ward, K.C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War, recalled and further examined.

(*For previous evidence, see Questions* 1430-1552.)

5693. (*Chairman.*) The branch of your experience upon which we would ask you to give evidence to us to-day is with regard to your control of supplies, in the first place in Natal and afterwards on the advance to Pretoria, with regard to which you have furnished a statement (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 254) to the Commission, which we have before us?—If you please.

5694. Did you go out with Sir George White?—I went out with Sir George White. On the 16th of September I left England. I proceeded to Cape Town, and from Cape Town I proceeded round to Natal.

5695. And took charge?—And took charge.

5696. At what date did you arrive in Natal?—On the 7th October.

5697. And at that time what were the supplies?—In Ladysmith, approximately, we had two months' reserve for 1,870 men and 1,000 horses; in Pietermaritzburg one month's reserve for 2,000 men, and in Eshowe two months' reserve for 200 men and 80 horses. In addition to that there was 60 days' reserve either en route from England or at the base depôt at Durban.

5698. Was that the total amount of supplies then in Natal?—Yes, there was a considerable amount, of course, of local supplies that we obtained afterwards.

5699. I suppose those supplies were laid in in accordance with the scheme of defence for the Colony, were they not?—Yes.

5700. Did that not provide for such stations as Dundee?—Yes, that included the Dundee force.

5701. You did not mention any reserve of supplies for Dundee?—When we got there it was discussed whether a brigade should be kept at Dundee, and when it was decided that it should, we then brought the supplies there up to two months' reserve.

5702. But there was not a base depôt, before you did that, at Dundee?—There was a certain amount of supplies at Dundee. I could tell you by looking up exactly how much was at Dundee then. It was not two months'.

5703. I only wanted to make out whether what you mentioned, viz., two months' at Ladysmith, one month at Pietermaritzburg, and two months' at Eshowe, really represents the full amount of supplies in the Colony?—No, there was Durban as well; there was a certain amount landed at Durban, and the remainder was on the sea, making up the 60 days.

5704. (*Sir John Edge.*) But for what troops?—For the whole of the troops in Natal at the time.

5705. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) For 10,000 or 12,000 men?—12,000 men.

5706. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) At Durban at that time?—Either on the sea or at Durban when we landed.

5707. (*Sir John Edge.*) For the force who were under orders?—Yes.

5708. (*Chairman.*) I want to get it quite clear. The first statement that you make here is two months' reserve for 1,870 men, leaving out horses, at Ladysmith, one month's reserve for 2,000 men at Pietermaritzburg, and two months' reserve for 200 men at Eshowe?—Yes.

5709. That is about 4,000 men only?—Yes. Then the remaining troops were landing there at the same time as we were.

5710. Quite so; but with regard to the reserves in Natal before the expedition from India and other troops were sent, were those supplies for 4,000 men only?—Yes.

5711. And no more?—And no more.

5712. There was no accumulation of stores in the Colony for any troops beyond what had been the sort of permanent garrison?—Yes, those were the permanent garrison.

5713. Then at that time there was not in Ladysmith any provision for a base of supply for more than the ordinary garrison of 1,870 men?—Not just at that time. We began increasing it at once.

5714. But, then, that is what I want to know. How did you come to increase it at once; was there any decision that Ladysmith was to be made the main base of supply for the larger force?—Yes; that was decided after Sir George White got to Pietermaritzburg.

5715. It was not decided until he got to Pietermaritzburg?—No, when I got my orders I do not think there was any such decision then.

5716. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) That was after the interviews between the Governor and the General Officer Commanding in Natal?—Yes.

5717. (*Chairman.*) Did not the interview with the Governor refer chiefly to the retention of Dundee?—Yes, the interview before we went away, on the day before we started for Ladysmith, was practically entirely, so far as I know, on the retention of a brigade at Dundee.

5718. That is as appears in the despatches, and there is no doubt about it. What I want to know is whether the selection of Ladysmith as the main base for the larger force which you had to deal with when you arrived in South Africa was made before or only after the arrival of Sir George White in Natal?—I should think it was probably made before.

5719. It did not follow necessarily from the scheme of defence for the colony so far as you know?—No.

5720. But then after you arrived, these 60 days' reserve of provisions for the larger force being on the sea, so soon as it arrived in Durban you sent it up country?—Yes.

5721. And distributed it between Ladysmith and Dundee?—Yes, we completed Dundee, and at the same time went on completing Ladysmith.

5722. And you practically threw everything into Ladysmith?—Yes, with the exception of the two months', which we pushed on to Dundee.

5723. And at the time the siege commenced can you give us the figures which you had to deal with then?—For the force we had then we had 65 days' breadstuff, 50 days' meat, including trek oxen, 46 days' groceries, and 32 days' forage.

5724. Calculated on what force?—On the force of 12,700 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men and white employees, 1,400 Cape boys and Kaffirs, and 1,500 Indian natives.

5725. And besides that, on the commencement of the siege, you had to deal with the civil population?—Yes, which brought up the whole total to 21,000; and, therefore, reduced the number of days' reserves.

5726. (*Viscount Esher.*) Does it come to this, then—that between the 7th October and the 2nd of November the stores in Ladysmith were made up from your first figure, which was enough for 1,870 men for two months, to an amount for 21,000 people for 65 days?—No, it is not for 21,000 people for 65 days; it is for the force.

5727. For the 12,000 men?—Yes.

5728. All those provisions were poured into Ladysmith between the 7th October and the 2nd of November?—Yes.

5729. (*Chairman.*) And if it had been decided when you arrived in Natal that the base should have been at any other place the supplies could have been accumulated there?—Yes, quite so.

5730. You are not prepared to speak, I suppose, as to the selection of the base?—No.

5731. All you had to do was to carry out your orders?—I got my orders, and only had to carry them out.

5732. But I suppose you might perhaps say this much: after you had accumulated these stores at Ladysmith, and it became apparent that the Boers were invading the colony, would it have been a practical operation to have withdrawn those stores across the Tugela? No, I think not decidedly, unless it were done very early in the day; but when the invasion was practically certain it was impossible to have withdrawn the supplies and stores.

5733. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) What do you call early in the day—after Talana?—No, before Talana. You see, up to this time we used every train, poured in everything we could, bought up local supplies, and so on. I should say perhaps under half the time it would have been impossible.

5734. (*Chairman.*) It seems to me to stand to reason that if you increased your stores in Ladysmith to the amount you stated between the 7th October and the 2nd November, it would have taxed the capacity of the railway completely?—They were working very hard; every truck that we could possibly get hold of was used to bring up these supplies.

5735. Then the siege lasted, as we know, from the 2nd of November to the 1st of March?—Yes.

5736. That, from what you have said, you had not full rations for?—No, we had to expand them in every way we could by various expedients.

5737. The history of your success in the management of the supplies during the siege is well known, but if you would like to make a short statement about it now we shall be very pleased to hear you. It is not necessary to go into all the details perhaps?—What we did when we found that the siege was a certainty was this: We took all the supplies in the town, so that the civilian population and ourselves might have an equal share. We also took over the mills, made arrangements for the water supply, and practically took every possible precaution to use every mode of extending our supplies as far as we could manage to do so.

5738. And, speaking generally, you were able to find supplies of all necessaries, or at any rate substitutes for necessaries?—Yes, substitutes principally. Of course, we gradually had to alter our ration as our chances of relief got smaller.

5739. What did you eventually cut it down to?—Three ounces of mealie meal and ¼lb. biscuit. We used horseflesh, of course, so that we were able to extend ourselves on that, reducing the ration in other things

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which we had not got. What we worked on to was, if possible, to hold out until the end of March. We had reason to believe from the heliograms that we might be relieved towards the end of February, and we thought, in case of anything happening to delay the relief, we should extend for a month longer, so that we were prepared to hold out to the 31st of March.

5740. When did you come to that determination?—I think the 31st of March we settled some time in January, so far as I remember.

5741. After the attack on Cæsar's Camp?—After the attack on Cæsar's Camp.

5742. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) After Spion Kop?—No, before Spion Kop.

5743. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) After Colenso?—Subsequent to Colenso; it was some time in January.

5744. (*Chairman.*) And that you could have done?—That we could have done. Various expedients had to be used. We had come down to a very small amount in the end.

5745. But the men were reduced in strength?—Yes, of course they were. They had none of the things that were really necessaries; they had no vegetables and things of that sort, and no butcher's meat practically. They were really living on mealie flour and various expedients made out of horses. We had to retain all our cattle for the use of the sick towards the end.

5746. And for the sick were you able to supply satisfactorily?—Oh, no. We gave them the best we could; but our sick rate increased so enormously that it was impossible to give them everything they wanted. The principal medical officer had to extend his medical comforts to the largest extent possible. He was always in consultation with me, and he had to alter his hospital diet according to what we were able to give him. We took all the spirits and all things likely to be useful for the sick into our possession before the siege began, and locked them up, so that everything that could possibly be given to them they had.

5747. Did these supplies last—the spirits and so on?—Yes, they were going on on the same principle. We had also extended them to the 31st of March—that was our idea, that we should gently reduce that scale in the same way as we reduced other scales.

5748. And the drugs and these things—were they still available?—The medical officers, I know, were getting rather anxious about them. A certain amount of drugs were finished up, I believe. You see, we had very large numbers sick. On one occasion, the 1st of February, we had a proportion of 2,477 sick, taken out of 12,800 men, and in addition to that number there were many other men, as we call it, "attending hospital," who really in ordinary cases would have gone into hospital, but who would not go in because they felt they were required for the defences, or who could not be spared. So that really even more than that number were receiving drugs.

5749. That was the highest point, I see, in your numbers?—Yes.

5750. They got better afterwards?—Yes, the number gradually went down again. We noticed as General Buller's force approached us the sick rate went down, and as they retired it went up again. The decrease in the end was a good deal owing to that, I think. And it was also the survival of the fittest, of course. Any man who was really weakly had gone down by that time.

5751. You had some difficulty with the water supply?—The water supply was cut off by the Boers at the commencement of the siege, so that we had to resort to condensing, and with the assistance of the naval and railway staff we fitted up locomotives into condensers and condensed the water.

5752. Was that satisfactory?—Yes. It was a limited supply, of course, but it worked very satisfactorily.

5753. How much were you able to supply?—Speaking from memory, about half a gallon a day per head, and sometimes a quarter of a gallon.

5754. Of condensed water?—Of condensed water. Of course, we were rather hampered by the fuel question, which became rather difficult at the end. I think during the last portion of the siege we gave them about a quarter of a gallon. We began with half a gallon.

5755. Did they not use the river at all?—The river was very foul. There were a good many dead animals floating in it, and it was very thick water, too. It is quite undrinkable in a pure condition, so we had to use different appliances for clearing it, and then we condensed it afterwards. We cleared and boiled the water, in addition to condensation.

5756. Is there any other special point which you would like to mention about the siege?—I do not think there is anything beyond what I have put down in the statement.

5757. Would the supply of ammunition come under you at all?—It did. I was Assistant Adjutant-General for B duties. I had to keep an eye on the ammunition reserves.

5758. And were they accumulated in the same way as you spoke of for the supplies?—Yes; they were not sufficient. We were very short of ammunition during a great portion of the time. I am afraid I have not the details with me. I have what was expended.

5759. What I meant in my last question was, whether at the time you landed in Natal, there was only an ammunition supplies reserve on the same footing as there was of food supplies?—I am afraid I cannot tell you. I only took over the looking after the stores, practically, after the siege began.

5760. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Who can give us information on those points?—The ordnance officer was Colonel Stanley when I arrived in Natal.

5761. (*Chairman.*) But, presumably, with regard to the reserves in Ladysmith, if the food supplies were only two months reserve for 1870 men, the ammunition reserve would have been calculated on the same scale?—Yes.

5762. And the larger reserves were on the sea at the time?—Yes. I know, from memory, that that was the case.

5763. They were filled up during the same interval—between the 7th of October and the 2nd of November?—Yes.

5764. And you took it over on the 2nd of November?—It was a little bit after; I think it was about the 10th that Sir George White handed that over to me, too.

5765. And then you at once saw that you were going to be short?—We knew we were going to be short then. We had lost a certain amount at Dundee, and had had these fights, so that we knew we should be short during the siege; and, therefore, the expenditure was very much curtailed.

5766. In what way was it curtailed?—Well, we did not fire back. Very often our guns did not open fire at all for a day.

5767. Do you think that the defence was prejudiced thereby?—I should think so. I should think that, probably, the Boers got more hopeful as they found that they were not being fired back at; they thought that we were probably in a worse condition than we really were.

5768. And you were eventually reduced to a very small reserve, I believe?—A very small reserve at the end. I thought I had some notes here, but I see that it is only what we used.

5769. I think in some of the telegrams I have seen that Sir George White mentioned the amount?—Yes, I have data at home about it, showing how much we had.

5770. But the ammunition, I suppose, you extended in the same way as the food—to last till the end of March?—Yes, that was the idea. We kept it all—it was no good firing back shot for shot—and retained it a good deal in the event of another attack.

5771. Was it chiefly artillery ammunition that you were short in?—It was chiefly artillery ammunition that we were short in. We had a good deal of small-arm ammunition left.

5772. After the relief, supplies were sent up immediately, I believe?—Yes, to Ladysmith. Practically, with the relieving force we had supplies sent in.

5773. There was plenty of reserve in the colony at that time?—Yes, there was a great deal, I believe. I saw a very large amount at Durban, when I passed through on my way.

5774. Did you leave immediately after the relief?—I left immediately after the relief and joined Lord Roberts.

5775. What did you do then?—I became Director of

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Supplies of the Field Force. I joined him at Bloemfontein, on the 20th of March.

5776. And you succeeded Sir Wodehouse Richardson?—Yes.

5777. We have had evidence from Sir Wodehouse Richardson, so that, perhaps, you will take up the story from the time when you succeeded him?—If you please.

5778. What was the position you found when you arrived at Bloemfontein?—When I arrived at Bloemfontein, I found the strength of the force, which had entered that town on the 13th of March, the date on which Lord Roberts entered it, to be 34,000 officers and men, and 11,500 horses. That is exclusive of natives and transport animals. The reinforcements, which entered the Colony between that date and the 3rd of May, the date of the move to Pretoria, numbered 1,600 officers and 48,600 men, with a corresponding increase in natives, horses, mules, and transport animals.

5779. And the chief time of stress was until the railroad was open?—Yes.

5780. When was that?—The bridges were broken down. The bridge at Norval's Pont was not open for traffic until the 29th March, and *viâ* Bethulie the railway was not open until the 10th of April. In consequence of that and the difficulties of the march across, I found that the amount of breadstuffs for the force then in Bloemfontein on my arrival was under 10 days' requirements, and that the supply of grain in store was only five days', including the amount carried by the troops.

5781. And you had some difficulties then?—At first, we had considerable difficulties; then later on we also had a good deal of difficulty, because there was only the one line of railway. In fact, we could only get seven and a-half trains of 24 trucks up, and those trains had to bring up the remounts, the troops, the ammunition, equipment, and everything else, so that there was considerable difficulty in getting the requisite amount of supplies.

5782. That was the main reason, I suppose, of the delay at Bloemfontein?—Yes, that was one of the principal reasons of the delay.

5783. It was absolutely necessary to accumulate a reserve before you moved on?—Yes.

5784. What reserve did you accumulate?—On the 3rd of May, 30 days for the whole force.

5785. That you then considered sufficient to work upon?—It was quite sufficient. We should have liked more, but it was sufficient to start on knowing that the railway was then clear behind us.

5786. Just to put your opinion on record before you pass from that, what have you to say as to the medical comforts during that time?—The medical comforts were sufficient in Bloemfontein—medical comforts, including fresh and condensed milk.

5787. All through?—Up to the time I left. Gradually, of course, our opportunities of bringing up supplies increased, so that whenever the supplies began to come up, a proportion of medical comforts came with them.

5788. But, during the period of stress, did you always have enough?—Yes, quite enough. There were a large number of grocers' shops in Bloemfontein, and we were able to make up our medical comforts from them a good deal.

5789. And when you moved on from Bloemfontein, what was the arrangement about the supplies for the force?—On the march from Bloemfontein to Pretoria, the following orders were issued for the conveyance of the supplies of the Field Force: (*a*) The current day's rations and one extra day's biscuit and groceries were carried on the soldier, in addition to his emergency rations, and one extra day's biscuit and grocery ration. (*b*) One day's forage on the horse. (*c*) Two days' complete rations (with preserved meat), and two days' forage, regimentally in the wagons attached to the units. In the Cavalry Division, where they had a Mule Supply Column, a larger quantity of supplies was carried. In this Division, the method was as follows: On the soldier, in his haversack, the unexpended portions of the day's ration. On the horse, in the wallets: (*a*) Two days' biscuits, three days' groceries, or (*b*), when marching light, the emergency ration only; in the nosebag, the unexpended portion of the day's ration, and in the cornsack 12lb. of grain. In the regimental supply wagons: Four days' biscuits and groceries, two days' grain. The supply columns of this division varied much in strength, but, as a rule, their average capacity was: Biscuits and groceries, five days; grain, four days.

5790. As to the supply column, does that move with the Division?—It moves with the Division; it is really the link between the Supply Park and the ration wagons that go with the unit.

5791. And the Supply Park is the final reserve?—Yes, it is really a moveable magazine.

5792. And that followed on?—That followed it. It consisted of ox wagons.

5793. What did the supply column consist of; was that ox wagons?—The supply column was mule wagons. We divided the supply park into columns, each capable of carrying the supplies of the various divisions or forces. These columns were further sub-divided with divisions designated "A," "B," and "C," each under an officer, or warrant officer, and carrying the following quantities of supplies: "A" carried two days, "B" two days, and "C" three days. The reason of dividing it into three was, that we were able to keep up an interchange between empty and full wagons between the railhead and the wagons of the units or the supply columns.

5794. And these columns and supply park pushed out from the railway in any direction in which the column was moving?—Yes, from the railhead. The railway in the Orange Free State was considerably broken, and, therefore, our railhead was practically where the last break was.

5795. And you managed throughout to keep up the supplies?—Yes, we were rather close on some occasions on the march up, on account of the difficulty of the drifts and broken bridges, but we were able to keep the troops supplied the whole time, though it was a very anxious time.

5796. You do not know of any case in which they were really short?—I know of no case in which they were really short. I know of cases where I was very anxious lest they might have been short.

5797. And, of course, you had any supplies that you could collect on the march?—Yes, we picked up supplies at various places—Kroonstad, Vaal River, and Johannesburg—anywhere, where we could get supplies; and then, of course, we got a considerable amount at Pretoria when we got in what had been left by the Boers.

5798. The reserves of the Boer Government?—Yes.

5799. Was this same system adopted elsewhere?—This same system was adopted throughout both Colonies.

5800. Working out from depôts?—Working out from depôts which were really supplied by the railway; either the main line or the branch line.

5801. And the next alteration in the circumstances was the opening of the line to Natal?—Yes, and as soon as it was opened, we had the two lines, one from Cape Town and the other from Durban, and then for getting supplies we had very few difficulties. That was on the 29th of July.

5802. What have you to say about the quality of the supplies?—The quality of the supplies was excellent. There were a few minor things which we noticed, which have been practically rectified now—packing and the marking of the cases, and a few things of that sort; but, taking it all round, I think the supplies were most excellent.

5803. Do you mention marking of the cases for any particular ration?—We found out, for instance, that if you put "Port" or "Brandy" on a case, that case sometimes did not get up to its destination; therefore we altered it.

5804. It was better to keep it anonymous?—Yes.

5805. And you had, I suppose, a certain number of complaints?—Yes; but I cannot remember any complaint of real importance. For instance, there were complaints occasionally about things like flour, which, perhaps, got damaged on the march, and things of that sort, but on the whole I have never seen a campaign where there were so few complaints.

5806. You could deal with them all yourself?—Yes, there was nothing I could really not deal with.

5807. And that applies to the goods that came from

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home and to those got in South Africa?—Yes; very often the goods from home were considerably better than those got in South Africa, because a good deal of those local supplies were of a cheaper quality than we should have bought ourselves.

5808. What have you got to say about the meat supply?—As regards the meat supply, of course on the march we really lived principally on the enemy; most of our cattle was captured—the refrigerated meat could not be brought up, because the railway was broken during most of the time of the march.

5809. As soon as you got the control of the railway you brought up the refrigerated meat?—Yes. Even that was a difficulty, because there were such a lot of stores, remounts, and troops coming up at the same time—the same difficulty that we were in in Bloemfontein—that as soon as the railway was opened there were so many hundreds of things to come up. Then we also had captured a considerable amount of cattle, so that on the whole for the first month or six weeks at Pretoria we had practically hardly any refrigerated meat; the men were living on fresh meat. And then all the troops were on the move, so that we could not have used much refrigerated meat then. For the first couple of months in Pretoria the troops were always going out in columns in various directions away from the railway line, and then the refrigerated meat would have been quite useless.

5810. The refrigerated meat could only have been used within a limited distance round the railway?—Yes, for those living within a limited distance round the depôt. And by driving the cattle we were able to save transport too, so that we always preferred driving it if we could to save the carriage of the meat.

5811. I think one witness said that driven cattle were sometimes rather tough?—Yes; but I think most of the South African cattle was rather tough.

5812. Therefore, the refrigerated meat was rather approved of?—Yes; the men liked the refrigerated meat when they got it, but, unfortunately, the circumstances were such that they could not get it very often.

5813. I think we were told that Lord Methuen's force had chiefly refrigerated meat?—That was in the earlier part of the war, for the reason that they were fighting alongside the railway line, because the Boers had not begun to break that railway. But our difficulty was that the railway was broken, and then when it was open for the first month or six weeks it was more important to get other things up.

5814. Did you afterwards use it after you got full control of it to bring up the refrigerated meat to Bloemfontein?—Yes; we brought a good deal up as soon as the line was open. We got as much practically as we wanted in Pretoria towards the end, but most of the troops were away in columns fighting in various directions then.

5815. You have no complaint to make of the refrigerated meat?—No; all the refrigerated meat that I saw was very good indeed.

5816. Do you think that in price it compared favourably?—The price, I think, was high.

5817. The cattle, of course, that you took in war you did not pay for, I suppose, or did you pay for it?—We paid for a certain amount, but the captured cattle we did not pay for, and that cattle was sold to the contractor at so much per pound.

5818. It was sold to the meat contractor?—Yes, he was unable to bring his own food up. He could not get his own cattle up for two reasons: First, it was a long distance to drive them up, and he had also the difficulties about the trains; the same thing prevented his refrigerated meat coming up, so that he was only too glad to buy all the captured cattle that we had.

5819. How did you sell it?—At 9d. a lb.

5820. Was it a standing contract?—Yes.

5821. What did you pay for that meat?—This is captured meat.

5822. But you sold it for 9d. a lb. to the contractor; what did you pay the contractor for it afterwards?—11d. Then he had to take it over and kill it and take the risk of animals dying.

5823. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Was there not some sold at 5½d. to the contractor, handed over the counter to the contractor, and handed back at 11d. to the soldier?—I do not know—not under me.

5824. You have no knowledge of it at all?—No.

5825. Still you admit that there were profits made by the contractor in taking it and giving it back at a higher price?—I do not think so on the 9d. a lb., because he had some very heavy losses. He had to keep that cattle probably a month or two, and, what with sickness and so on, if he made anything I do not think it was more than a very fair business profit; and sometimes he could not have gained by it. Out of the 2d. a lb., he had to pay for all his staff, and so on, and then take the chance of death. I do not think it was too much.

5826. (*Chairman.*) You found it necessary, too, to do something for the townspeople?—Yes; in every town that we came to we had to start Relief Committees, because in most of the places the town had been practically cleared by the Boer forces before we got in, and sometimes the people had been living on their own domestic supplies, and had used them up, so that we had to take them over.

5827. But you managed them through committees of their own members?—Yes, under Imperial officers. We took the leading inhabitants of the town and made them members of the Committee, and put them under the presidency of Imperial officers. In most cases of distress we had a sub-Committee of Ladies, who inquired into the cases, and I must say they behaved very well indeed; they gave us great assistance.

5828. And you established a scale of rations —We established a scale of rations, and a scale of prices, too.

5829. Was that different from the military prices?—Yes; what we found in all these towns was that as soon as we got in they wanted to charge three times the ordinary prices, because the traders wished to make their fortune, so that in defence of the inhabitants whom we had to look after at every place, I received orders to fix a price list, which I did, if possible, with the Chamber of Commerce of the town. I got the invoice of prices, and found out what the rates should be, and then placed the list before them, and they told me if they had any complaint or suggestions.

5830. So that the trade should have a fair profit?—A fair profit without, practically, robbery.

5831. And you always enforced the rule that any able-bodied man who refused work was refused food?—Yes; we found in Pretoria especially a large number of Africanders and people anxious to get food for nothing, but who did not want to work for it, so we started that rule, and it worked excellently. The man had to show that he was engaged, or had to do Government work, or he did not get his ration. We fed his family, but refused him.

5832. You were able to find him work?—Yes, we were able to find him work; or the municipality took him on.

5833. Have you any recommendations to make as to the future about the goods traffic?—Yes. There was considerable difficulty in regard to that, which was really due to the fact that the officers in charge were very keen and zealous, but had not very much practical knowledge. I suggest that the goods traffic, as distinct from the passenger traffic, should be placed in charge of officers of the Army Service Corps, who should be given an opportunity of qualifying themselves for this important duty by learning the system of railway traffic management in some of our large traffic termini. The corps might be further supplemented by obtaining the services of stationmasters, goods superintendents, and railway clerks, who, I have no doubt, if asked, would join the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps as Captains, Subalterns, and non-commissioned officers, and volunteer for active service if a national emergency arose.

5834. I think you do have some men of the Army Service Corps who are employed in peace time on railways in this country, have you not?—There are no Army Service Corps non-commissioned officers employed.

5835. I mean men?—The Royal Engineers are employed on the railways.

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5836. One witness, I know, mentioned a connection with the railways. Is there anything that you wish to say which applies to the Army Service Corps?—I should like the Engineer and Volunteer Railway Staff Corps and the Army Service to work together in this matter; but the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps has got all the senior officers, but has not many junior officers. I think Major is the lowest rank, and is held by men of rather high position in the different railway companies. I think we might get some very useful assistance out of practically the lower ranks of the railway companies, and I think it would have been a great assistance in a big place like Bloemfontein or Pretoria if you had a lot of men whom you could rely on, who would take charge of all this goods traffic and run it. I found in all these stations that we had to depend on Hollanders, men who were not so desirous of assisting us, and very often left us when their services were most required.

5837. Is there any provision at present in the Army Organisation of men who have acquaintance with railway duties of this kind?—Yes, in the upper ranks, but not in the lower. Engineer officers are taught the practical management of railways and so on; but what I am referring to more is practically goods work.

5838. Traffic management?—They understand traffic management. It is more in the goods work that I found that we wanted more expert assistance.

5839. Do you think that is attainable?—I think so, myself. I have talked to a good many stationmasters and other railway officials at manœuvres, and so on, and I have noticed a great desire on their part to have something of the sort. They quite understand that they cannot take the same position as the manager, who is Lieut.-Colonel or Major of his corps; but I think they would all rather like to have some opportunity of applying their knowledge in that way.

5840. What rank would you give them?—According to their position. I should run the ranks down to non-commissioned officer, a stationmaster of a medium station, a Captain; a small station, a Subaltern; and my idea is that a goods clerk should be taken as a sergeant, and other ranks similarly.

5841. And he would be asked to do for the military railway the same class of work he has been doing ordinarily?—Yes.

5842. And if you bring him into the corps you must give him rank, I suppose?—Yes, he would be bound to have rank, because he would be always mixing with soldiers of other corps, and he would be bound to have some position.

5843. (*Chairman.*) You had some difficulties in the distribution of ordnance stores, had you not?—Yes. When you have your large ordnance depôts at the different big rail-heads, or wherever it is, there is no organisation for distributing the stores in the field; that is to say, when they once start off, and leave the depôts, the ordnance depôts are not strong enough to do it; and it occurred to me that a simple way out of that would be if the men who did the supplies of food sent up these stores, too. There is not a very large number of them required. There were several cases where difficulties arose in consequence of stores being sent up with nobody practically to look after them; the ordnance people had not sufficient *personnel* to detail anyhow, and it took some little time for the stores to get to their units. Whereas, if the stores had been in the possession of the men who were also giving out the food, there would have been no difficulty at all.

5844. That is something like the position which you yourself held at Ladysmith?—Yes; while I held my position at Ladysmith, I was really in charge, although I had no responsibility for them—that is no account responsibilities for them. I was really a sort of Director of Stores, if I may put it in that way; but my view rather was to have a supply depôt, which should have in the field a small reserve of these necessary stores, just in the same way as we have a small reserve of food.

5845. May I ask if that suggestion has been put forward?—I do not think it has yet.

5846. It is one that might be taken up?—It is one of the things that we are going over and thinking of; it has not been practically put into shape yet. There are a large number of these things that we have found practically might be improved upon, and we have either done them, or are working at them now.

5847. Does that remark apply to the paucity of paymasters?—Yes, that has been quite recognised, and one or two schemes are under consideration now to try and rectify it. There is one scheme which is in a nebulous condition—which has not got very far yet. We found considerable difficulty in South Africa, because the Pay Department was a great deal too weak; practically, we could only man our big stations, such as Pretoria, Bloemfontein, and so on, and for the smaller stations on the march up we were left without a paymaster at all; the consequence was that a great deal of unnecessary responsibility was thrown on officers of other corps. I should like to see the division or column have its own financial branch wherever it was, manned proportionately to its size, to make all payments, the senior official being the financial adviser of the general, and responsible for the proper conduct of the business as opposed to the executive transactions of the force in supplies, and in stores, and which should also carry out the primary audit of all the supply and store accounts of the force, as well as that of their pay lists. In this war, especially, a great many generals had a very extensive financial work thrust on them in various districts, with practically no expert assistance at all.

5848. There was no expert assistance until Sir Fleetwood Wilson went out?—I mean a manual adviser working with the General. A column might go, probably, and take over a town, and the General suddenly assumes the position of Governor and Administrator, and has no financial man to help him at all. My view is that the branch should be large enough to supply a man or men of that class to every column.

5849. But surely you would begin with the Commander-in-Chief; and there was no regular financial adviser for him?—Yes, I should run it the whole way up. I was rather thinking of beginning at the other end of the line.

5850. I only meant that you would go from top to bottom?—Yes, certainly. The Financial Adviser of the Commander-in-Chief would be at the head of the list, then the Adviser of the General Officer Commanding the Army Corps, then those of the Division Generals, then those of the Brigade Generals, and so on.

5851. The system of accounts also wants adjusting, you think?—Yes; we found considerable difficulty in our accounts out there. The accounts have gradually got too complicated altogether, especially the men's pay lists and the different forms that have to be used. I think we have agreed on a plan, which I hope will answer, which is going to be put into trial on the first of next April, which will very extensively simplify all the accounts of the soldier; and, also, we have committees considering the question of accounts for supplies and stores, and so on, simplifying them as much as possible.

5852. You give us, in your statement, a specimen of the daily supply duties, carried out by the supply branch of the South African Field Force?—Yes, I thought the Commission might like to see it, so as to give an idea of one day. I took it at random.

5853. You might hand that statement in?—If you please. (*The following statement was handed in.*)

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STATEMENT of Rations issued 21st September 1900, north of the Orange River.

From whom Received.	Europeans.	Natives.	Horses.	Mules.	Oxen.	Civilians' Relief Committee.
S.O. Corps Troops, Pretoria	2,668	486	544	481	56	—
7th Division, Pretoria	9,573	2,336	3,887	1,655	1,397	—
Cunningham's Brigade, Pretoria	1,234	180	308	629	208	—
D.A.A.G., Mafeking	1,128	228	105	639	—	133
A.S.C., Kimberley	7,398	1,051	2,413	1,517	35	178
A.I.G., Kimberley	2,989	459	1,090	380	—	68
Cavalry Division	6,682	1,454	4,080	2,865	—	1,567
G.O.C., Kroonstad	10,033	2,164	4,760	2,111	1,999	51
Commandant, Pietermaritzburg	1,443	189	608	227	2,552	—
General Paget	6,325	1,258	2,306	2,344	1,700	—
General Clements	4,276	866	1,897	2,083	—	—
G.O.C., 11th Division	8,623	866	1,357	2,775	150	—
G.O.C., Hamilton's Force	3,286	456	600	1,139	—	—
S.O., Hutton's Force	837	280	958	557	—	—
Colonel Lea, Smaldeel	16,191	3,003	7,321	2,746	4,905	278
G.O.C., 8th Division	3,758	481	1,122	676	—	—
General Hunter	7,882	813	3,702	1,860	6,136	—
D.A.A.G. (B), Lines of Communication, Germiston	6,428	728	1,164	528	129	12
G.O.C., Heidelberg	2,354	546	517	234	636	103
General Hart, Krugersdorp	658	—	—	—	—	—
S.O. Corps Troops, Pretoria	493	227	437	294	183	—
Natal Army	43,887	1,036	9,815	3,850	4,733	—
G.O.C., Johannesburg	4,726	1,005	1,032	804	107	296
G.O.C., 1st Division	2,696	666	2,801	1,887	—	146
	3,229	520	1,180	1,087		
21st Brigade	2,608	558	679	942	—	—
Total	161,405	21,856	54,683	34,310	24,926	2,832

5854. Have you anything else that you wish to add?—I have not said anything about the transport in Ladysmith.

5855. Did that come under you, as well?—In the siege, it did. It is different from General Buller's transport. That was outside, and was cut off from us.

5856. What can you tell us about the transport in the siege?—During the siege we worked it in this way: The units had regimental transport when we started, which was capable of carrying three days' rations, blankets, waterproof sheets, regimental reserve of small-arm ammunition, and water; but when the siege came on we worked the whole transport departmentally, that is to say, under the different officers of the Army Service Corps in charge of each brigade.

5857. That is the same system as was adopted in the march to Bloemfontein?—It is the same system as that which Lord Roberts adopted practically on the march.

5858. Did you find it necessary to introduce it in Ladysmith?—I do not think that our transport really had a fair trial then, because we were never on the move; but that is the system that whenever transport is working a place and is, say, brigaded, it is worked under the Army Service Corps officers; and as soon as we were shut in, the system immediately came under operation at once, and we worked the whole departmentally.

5859. It was not a definite change of the system; it was part of the system?—Yes.

5860. In the other case it was a change of system?—Yes, it was a change of system; they took it from the regiments, and allotted it to the Army Service Corps, and then apportioned so many wagons to each unit as long as it was on the march.

5861. What is your view of the different systems?—I think myself that I like the last system. Very often, for instance, somebody in Natal, some regiment, looked after that transport (that is to say, the officers and men did) admirably, but, on the whole, I think that this system gives you all the same advantages, with the additional advantage that you have more of a grasp of the transport, and you are able probably to prevent waste, or its not being used to the greatest possible advantage.

5862. Is there any other point that you wish to mention?—No.

5863. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Were you acquainted with the question of the stacking of stores at Durban?—No; I was only a very few hours at Durban, going up and coming back.

5864. Who can give us evidence with regard to that? You are aware that there has been a great deal of criticism about it in the Press?—Colonel Morgan, who either has landed or is going to land in a few days in England.

5865. Did you have the supply of the starving Eighth Division?—Yes.

5866. Would you mind saying to what extent the statements that have been made are true, that they were always short?—I think their difficulty was that there were depôts ready for them, but for various strategical reasons they were not able to go there.

5867. The supplies were ready for them, you say?—Yes; there was an abundance of supplies in the depôts.

5868. And it was merely a military question?—Yes, it was merely a military question, the convoys not being able to go there.

5869. You said that on the 10th or 12th of January you arrived at the conclusion that you could hold out, so far as supplies went in Ladysmith, up to the 31st of March?—Yes.

5870. Previously to that you must have made estimates also?—Yes.

5871. In the middle of December, for instance, what was your estimate of the date to which you could hold out; can you carry your mind back to that?—Yes. In the middle of December three months was the time I estimated.

5872. You thought then that you could hold out for three months longer?—Yes.

5873. Earlier than that you probably had the same opinion?—Yes.

5874. There was no time prior to the middle of December at which you had a moment of despondency, and thought that you could only hold out for a very short period, so far as supplies went?—No.

5875. Now I want to come to the question of the Army Pay Department, on which you gave evidence last. That department only had authority to pay accounts that were certified by somebody else, I presume?—That is so.

5876. They had no power of audit at all?—None.

5877. With whom did the power of audit rest?—The supply accounts, for instance, were audited at Capetown.

5878. By whom?—By the Supply Auditor, an officer of the Army Service Corps.

5879. Were the whole of those accounts absolutely audited by him?—All the supply accounts.

5880. But take other accounts. For instance, sup-

posing one finds in an account that a bandolier which ought to cost 5s. is charged 15s.—thousands of them—and that is passed and paid by the Pay Department as a matter of course, as a bank pays a cheque across the counter, where would such an account as that be audited?—I should hardly think it would be audited, under the conditions, until it got home.

5881. As a matter of fact, I know that it was not, but I wished to get it on the notes; and some of those accounts have not come home yet?—No; that is my proposal—to catch it a bit earlier, so that the General might——

5882. I understand that; but, so far as the last war is concerned, had any provision been made for a proper audit of accounts locally?—No, because I believe there was an idea that the Pay Department could do it; but it was absolutely impossible.

5883. They had not the men?—They had not the men.

5884. And they had not the training?—They had not the training, and their work was so gigantic that the moment pressure came on (and there are a million things always coming in) audit, with anything like the present establishment, would be absolutely impossible.

5885. Have you any reason to suppose that I am wrong when I say that they paid over thirty-five millions in South Africa in the Pay Department?—I could not say.

5886. If I give you that figure it does not surprise you, at any rate?—No.

5887. And that, of that thirty-five millions a very small portion has been audited yet?—They are auditing it now.

5888. But that is three years after?—Yes.

5889. When many people are dead and many others are scattered?—Yes. My own experience is that unless you get an account audited practically at the time, the audit will be of very little good for the Service at all.

5890. Unless you audit at the time, it is no use?—That is so, because a man is dead or has retired, and the force is broken up.

5891. Then is there not something to be drawn from that, besides a mere increase in the Army Pay Department? Is there not also an inference to be drawn that the department should be trained to that kind of work in time of peace?—That is part of the scheme.

5892. You intend to introduce that, do you?—As I say, the scheme is at present somewhat nebulous. I may say that I have got it on paper.

5893. It is not merely a question of numbers, you agree, but also a question of training?—Yes; the training in auditing, and all those points which came out during the war are being considered in the scheme.

5894. The nebulous idea, at any rate, is that the department should have a training in auditing in time of peace?—Yes.

5895. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) In connection with the supply stores in the field, we have had it in evidence—I do not remember whether it was in your evidence or not—that the 6lb. tins of meat were objectionable?—Yes.

5896. Are you aware of that yourself?—I am.

5897. You did not mention it, I think?—I did not give the evidence, but I quite concur in the evidence that they are most objectionable.

5898. In whose department does it fall to take steps to secure that there shall be no 6lb. tins in future?—The Quartermaster-General's. That is one of the things that has been taken up.

5899. Apparently, formerly the additional 10 per cent. of expense in having them in smaller tins was the consideration that has prevented them from having the lesser sized tins?—Yes; personally, I should like to have them in 1lb. tins.

5900. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) As regards that question of the 6lb. tins which was put to you just now, was it not greatly owing to there being supplies in stock of that kind at the various places where they hold stocks which were bought by the Government?—Yes; I fancy that was the reason.

5901. Would not that happen again in any war? You would have to buy millions of pounds of meat, some in 1lb. tins, some in 2lb. tins, and so on?—I do not think so. If the trade knew that you were not going to use them, I do not think they would make them.

5902. That is to say, if they knew in time of peace that you would not take them in time of war?—Yes.

5903. With regard to what you said about paymasters acting as a sort of financial advisers to Generals when detached, do you think that the training of a paymaster would fit him for such a very important position as that of financial adviser to a general officer who was going to occupy a tract of country?—Under the present system, certainly not.

5904. How could you train them to be financial advisers even if you had a great extension of numbers? They would have to deal not only with the financial circumstances connected with purchasing stores, but perhaps with levying money. It must be an exceptionally clever man who could be a good financial adviser to a commander in a foreign country?—I should train them in the Accountant-General's branch of the War Office—the finance branch; and the man who would take charge of an important expedition or hold an important place would be a man who had held a high position in the finance branch, and had been accustomed to deal with large subjects.

5905. But he would only deal with large subjects of accounts and so on at the War Office; but you might have a good deal of work to be done in connection with the financial administration of the district. Sir Fleetwood Wilson, of course, had a very large and excellent experience when he was sent out to be financial adviser to the Commander of the Forces, and such a man could no doubt be got hold of here and there; but I should have thought that the Pay Department was not a very good training for him, because even a man trained to audit need not necessarily be capable of being a financial adviser?—I think that a man who had held a high position in the finance branch of the War Office—say Assistant Accountant-General—and had had to deal with the large subjects that such a man is dealing with every day would be quite capable. I could name two or three now who would make most excellent financial advisers to a general.

5906. Not many, I suppose?—A great many for a small expedition. For a large expedition, like that in South Africa, I should think there are very few men, whom you could not pick out without a great deal of trouble, who would be quite fitted for it, with all the various matters that are constantly coming up to be settled; but I think I could pick out four or six men whom I could recommend to any general without the least hesitation.

5907. Then with regard to accounts being audited, I think something was said about the Pay Department auditing. Surely they are the people whose accounts have to be audited. Their payments should be audited by somebody else?—Quite so; perhaps I was not quite clear in my answer. I was speaking of accounts which at present are not audited practically till they come home to the War Office, and which I want audited at an early stage.

5908. And then the audit must be very incomplete; they must accept the accounts and pay them, and there is an end to it?—They have to accept them and regret.

5909. Can you say on what date after the siege of Ladysmith commenced the ordinary ration was reduced? I suppose a vegetable ration was not obtainable at all?—No.

5910. How long did the troops retain a full ration after they were shut up?—On the 7th of November we began to reduce.

5911. And what was the minimum to which they were reduced? I want, if you can tell me, to know the minimum ration which they were receiving at the time of relief?—Fresh meat (horse) 1lb., 3ozs. mealie meal, and ¼lb. biscuit; cooked meat (horse) ½lb., tea or coffee 1-6oz., sugar 1oz., salt ½oz., pepper 1-64oz., mustard 1-20oz., vinegar 1-10oz. A horse sausage ration was issued with the above. Chevril 1-3rd pint per man daily. This was for subsequent dilution.

5912. Biscuit had altogether given out, had it not?—We had a small amount of biscuit left.

5913. But the men did not receive a ration of biscuit?—Mealie meal and ¼lb. of biscuit. There was a small amount of biscuit, and we had a small reserve of biscuit in the different defences.

5914. And were all these mealies stored up before

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the siege commenced?—We had a certain amount of mealies stored up, and we collected a lot in our house-to-house visitation.

5915. Did you join the main force before or after it reached Bloemfontein?—I joined after they reached Bloemfontein.

5916. There was some trouble about provisions owing to the capture of convoys. Did any trouble of that kind occur after you had advanced from Bloemfontein?—There were some convoys that were captured.

5917. Did that occasion inconvenience and reduction of rations after you left Bloemfontein?—No. The convoys, small ones, were captured belonging to some columns moving out past the railway—two or three—one, I remember, near Heilbron.

5918. But at headquarters you never had any deficiency of rations on the advance to Pretoria?—No. When I say we had not any deficiency, the troops had not any deficiency, but we were absurdly low then in consequence of the railway being broken behind us and the wagons being unable to get through the drifts.

5919. Were you obliged to reduce rations?—No.

5920. Nor after you reached Pretoria?—No.

5921. After that, I suppose, things began to come in pretty regularly?—Yes; and then we had the great assistance of what we could get at Pretoria, and also at Johannesburg we could get a good deal, because there was a large amount of stores in the shops and warehouses. Johannesburg was well provided, and the railway station at Pretoria was full of Boer supplies.

5922. And you took possession of those?—Yes.

5923. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I should like to ask you one question, in consequence of what Sir Henry Norman asked you with reference to the Army Pay Department. Have you served in India?—No.

5924. But you know the Indian system?—Yes.

5925. There the Controller-General of Military Accounts is practically Chief Paymaster-General of the Forces in the Field?—Yes.

5926-7. And then, practically, the Pay Department has the control of the audit?—Yes.

(*Sir Henry Norman.*) Is that a recent order?——

5928. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I will read it: "Controller of Military Accounts.—The officer appointed Controller of Military Accounts will be practically Chief Paymaster-General of the Forces in the Field and auditor and compiler of the Field Accounts." And then it says: "When an office of Audit and Account is formed at the base of operations a Controller of Military Accounts will be in charge, assisted by three examiners," and so on. "One of the examiners at the base will also discharge the duty of Field Paymaster there." So that he will combine the two offices of examiner and paymaster. (*To the witness.*) Under the scheme which is there suggested I presume that the paymaster would not audit his own payments; he would audit the prices of the things on the bills presented to him?—Yes.

5929. That is to say, a bill is presented to him, and he will have to satisfy himself that the prices on the bill are just?—Yes.

5930. (*Viscount Esher.*) When you landed in Natal what was the base depôt of supply?—Durban.

5931. When did you first go up to Ladysmith?—I think about the 12th of October.

5932. Did you go back to Durban after that?—No, I only passed through Durban after the siege.

5933. When you got to Ladysmith you found there the supplies, which you have detailed in your statement, for about 1,870 men?—Yes. At the same time, of course, supplies were on the way up.

5934. Who ordered them up?—We ordered them from Maritzburg before we started, and orders to this effect were also being already acted on.

5935. When was it settled to order them up to Ladysmith, do you know? When was the first order given to you?—I think it must have been the 8th of October. As we landed the Indian Brigade and the other troops were landing at the same time and moving up towards Ladysmith.

5936. What was the idea of moving up towards Ladysmith? What did you understand to be the idea—that Ladysmith should become the base depôt?—Yes. We were hoping then to move on towards Pretoria.

5937. Did you understand Ladysmith to be selected as a great *place d'armes* for ordnance and supplies?—Yes.

5938. Selected, when; before you got there or after?—I understand that it was selected before, in the original scheme for the defence. It was the junction of the railway, you see.

5939. In point of fact, it was not full of supplies for a large army—only for 4,000 men?—No; but the supplies for that were on the way, either arriving then at Durban or on the sea.

5940. Then you understood that they were moved forward by order of the officer commanding in Natal at the time?—Yes.

5941. You do not know whether any consideration was given to any other Base Depôt than Ladysmith?—No, I cannot tell.

5942. Then you obtained supplies locally, did you not?—Yes, from Maritzburg and from Durban, and also what we got in Ladysmith.

5943. What did you do; did you enter into contracts there?—No, in Ladysmith we bought up everything. There were local contracts.

5944. You obtained supplies locally, you say?—I meant locally in Natal.

5945. Did you enter into contracts?—Yes; contracts had been entered into before I got there.

5946. Entered into by whom?—By the general who was there before and his supply officers—General Penn Symons.

5947. Did you enter into any contracts yourself?—No.

5948. I suppose you gave a great many orders, did you not, for purchasing supplies?—Yes.

5949. Both then and subsequently?—Yes.

5950. Do you consider that there was much extravagance?—Up to the time we were shut up in Ladysmith, I should say there was no extravagance; probably the prices naturally went up; the merchants understood that we had to get the stuff, and I should think probably the prices went up, but to a very small extent.

5951. You had nothing to do with the railway rates?—No.

5952. You know there has been considerable criticism of the railway rates paid in Natal?—Yes.

5953. That had nothing to do with you?—No.

5954. That was owing, I suppose, to no arrangement having been made beforehand with the railway companies?—Certainly.

5955. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Who was supposed to be in charge of that question—anybody?—The Assistant Adjutant-General for B duties in Natal at the time.

5956. With whom would it fall to make new arrangements with the number of troops that were there?—With the General and his staff officers.

5957. The General in command only?—No.

5958. Is there nobody under him?—His staff officers.

5959. (*Viscount Esher.*) In point of fact, the responsibility would be his?—Yes.

5960. Would it not have been possible to have entered into contracts also for supplies at an earlier date than the 7th of October, for local supplies in Natal?—But there were. I arrived on the 7th.

5961. So far as you know, were those contracts reasonable?—Yes.

5962. And did Sir Fleetwood Wilson inquire into those contracts, do you know?—I do not know. He may have. I think he probably inquired into the larger contracts.

5963. That would be in the Cape Colony?—That would be in the Cape Colony or in Natal later on. Of course, when I got there it was before Sir Redvers Buller's Army had arrived, and the contracts were naturally much smaller.

5964. If you had to do the whole thing over again, do you think you could save much money?—I am certain I could if I had longer time.

5965. But with the same time at your disposal, if a little more foresight had been shown, what is your opinion now?—You mean, given the time I landed in Natal?

5966. I mean that you have had very considerable experience, both in Natal and in the Cape Colony. From what you saw of the way in which the supplies were managed and arranged for, do you think, if the whole thing had to be done over again, that you could suggest a system under which a very considerable saving could be effected?—It is a question of time; given the same time I do not think I could, barring, of course, the martial law and measures of a similar nature. Where I was there was no contract. I cannot speak, of course, much of the later contracts, because they were all done in the Cape Colony. I went up straight to the front, where there were no contracts, and similarly in Natal. I practically had to contracts, because I went into Ladysmith.

5967. What you mean is that when you were up at the front all the supplies were forwarded to you, and you merely had the distribution of them?—Yes, or, if necessary, we bought. We did not have any contracts—or very small ones.

5968. What was forwarded to you was bought by whom?—At the base in Capetown.

5969. And who was the officer?—Sir Wodehouse Richardson.

5970. You were in constant heliographic communication with Sir Redvers Buller, were you not?—Yes.

5971. I think you have said that on the 16th of December you had supplies for three months or thereabouts?—Yes. We had not supplies for three months, but I said I could hold out for three months.

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5972. Did Sir George White at that time ask you, do you recollect, say, about the 16th of December, for how long you could hold out?—Yes.

5973. That was before he sent an answer to the message of Sir Redvers Buller?—Yes.

5974. Then there is the later date of the 28th of January. At that time Sir George White said that he could hold out another six weeks. Do you know whether he consulted you then?—Oh, yes.

5975. Therefore his opinion at that time was based on information which he got from you?—From me—yes.

5976. Now, to go to another question altogether, I think you said that it would be desirable to have trained men for goods traffic?—Yes.

5977. Has anything been done since you got back to bring that about?—No.

5978. Whose business would it be to see that a change was made to carry out such a suggestion as that?—It would partly be the Quartermaster-General, and partly the Inspector-General of Fortifications.

5979. Do you know whether anything is going to be done?—Oh, yes; all these things are being considered and worked upon.

5980. Is that a change which is very difficult to bring about?—Oh, no.

5981. Does it require a very great deal of consideration, or, indeed, the appointment of a Committee, to decide a question of that kind?—I should not think so. I do not see any difficulty about it myself at all. All these arrangements will be taken in turn.

FIFTEENTH DAY.

Wednesday, 19*th November* 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The Earl of ELGIN AND KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman*.

The Right Hon. The Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Hon. The Lord STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Hon. Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
The Hon. Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary*.

Sir GUY FLEETWOOD WILSON, C.B., Assistant Under-Secretary of State for War, called and examined.

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5982. (*Chairman.*) You are Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the War Office, I think?—I am.

5983. And in 1901 you went out to South Africa temporarily, as financial adviser to the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

5984. And, in consequence, you have sent in a report dealing with the subjects to which your attention was called in South Africa?—My reports were confidential reports addressed to Lord Kitchener, for his use in South Africa. Lord Kitchener sent them home, and they were eventually printed and laid before the Secretary of State.

5985. And you have handed them in to us?—I have handed them in to you in answer to a request so to do. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 303.)

5986. I think we should be glad if you would take the heads of those reports and just mention concisely any points which are of interest. I understand that the more important questions referred to you were commandeering claims and compensation for damage, the Imperial, military, and Colonial railway rates, provision of specie, supply accounting, and ordnance purchases?—The situation, when I reached South Africa, was this: The Commander-in-Chief found that a great deal of money was being spent in connection with those particular points to which you have alluded, and which I reported upon. He was, I think, anxious in regard to the expenditure in connection with most of them; he had not time to look into them himself, and he gave me those as specific and concrete subjects to deal with, and thresh out for his information. Irrespective of that, he desired me to take up anything which I thought required looking into, and especially to review the contracts which were being placed on a very large scale throughout the country.

5987. Then, in the first place, as to commandeering, is there anything you would wish to say to us?—As to commandeering, the main point which Lord Kitchener desired me to consider and to deal with was the question of meeting the claims which had arisen in connection with commandeering, and after going into the matter, as is shown in this report, I suggested the creation of those courts, which are fully detailed, I think, here, and which have been in working order and have been at work since I left Pretoria. They were established when I was there, and Lord Kitchener asked me to be President of the Court, which I agreed to do merely to start it, because I was anxious to come home; but, roughly speaking, it has been at work on the lines which I laid down till quite recently, when it has become more of a civil court, in consequence of the war having ceased.

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5988. Commandeering was freely used, was it?—To some extent we existed on commandeering in South Africa, and it became a very serious matter after the De Wet inroad into the colony, when it became necessary to clear the whole colony, for instance, of all horses, trek oxen, and transport animals generally. That could only be done by seizing the goods and supplies and animals, and giving what were technically called chits (receipts) for them, and we were face to face with the payment of these claims when presented. At the early stages of the war, Lord Roberts had always given value for whatever he took, even from the Boers.

5989. That was the principle of commandeering all through?—The principle of commandeering all through was, that whatever we took we were to pay for, unless it was property belonging to actual fighting men.

5990. We have heard of cattle being captured. I suppose they were not paid for?—Anything that was absolutely taken from fighting men would not have been paid for. That was one of the difficulties of the situation. I very soon realised that it was a common practice with the Boers for the old father to be a most eminently respectable, quiet and loyal citizen on his farm, while he had three sons fighting. He held possession of the farm, and the cattle, and the horses, and, although three of the active members of his family were fighting against us, he generally managed to claim against us for whatever we took. That was one of the difficulties we had to face, and I endeavoured to lay down, as I have described in my report, a system which would preclude the man on commando from claiming anything against the Imperial Government Army Funds.

5991. And you think that commandeering was used wherever it was practicable and necessary or useful?—It was the recognised system which was to be applied when it was considered advisable in the military interests to do so.

5992. I asked the question, because we had some evidence earlier that in the early stages, quite in the early stages, of the war there was a difficulty about commandeering?—I see your point. In the early stages of the war Lord Roberts' practice had been (I was not there) to pay cash as much as possible for everything; and I represented to Lord Kitchener that to continue this practice was to give the sinews of war to the Boers. In that very case, if you paid the father who had three sons in the field, the money would probably go to swell the war-chest of our enemy; and it was then that we adopted very much more freely the system of giving paper receipts, instead of paying cash.

5993. But this point that I mention was a little further than that, that quite at the early part of the war there was a difficulty in commandeering, under the state of the law in Cape Colony. That was perhaps before your time?—It must have been quite at the early stages of the war, before I was conversant with the situation or the methods adopted. Undoubtedly, the tone during the early part of the war was to pay for everything, and to make friends with our enemies as much as possible.

5994. Then I suppose there is nothing much else that you would wish to specially notice under that heading?—I think, in regard to the whole of my reports, they deal mainly with a condition of affairs which has ceased to exist, and, I have dealt with it as fully as possible in my reports, and, except in one or two cases, where a lesson may be deduced with a view to improving the present system of organisation and administration at home, so as to make it better fitted to deal with the conditions of war, I really do not think that the Commission will derive much benefit by going through all these reports.

5995. I thought that if we simply took the summary which you put at the beginning, it would be quite sufficient?—Quite so.

5996. The next point you mention is the Imperial and military railways?—In regard to the railway rates, as I point out there, the main feature of the present system is that, owing to there being nobody in South Africa, especially during the early stages of the war, whose special function it was to watch expenditure, contracts and agreements were come to with the railway companies, or rather the existing agreements were allowed to remain in force, which resulted in a very undue amount of money being paid to the companies for the work they did; they were practically paid on a peace footing during war time. That Lord Kitchener desired me to inquire into, and I went twice to Cape Town and once to Durban, and had long interviews, not only with the managers and directors of the railway companies, but with one or two prominent politicians, who I thought would influence the decision eventually arrived at. I pointed out first of all that we were protecting the railways, and that without the protection we afforded them, they would lose the whole of their property; secondly, that during a condition of war their traffic receipts would fall to nothing but for the carriage of military men and stores; and, thirdly, that we had, at any rate at the time that I was there, the option of training only with the one or the other. And I was excessively well met, I think, by the Natal railway manager, who expressed every desire to come to a satisfactory understanding; and, eventually, Mr. Price, I think it was, of the Cape railways, also expressed a willingness to review the terms. Lord Kitchener summoned both of them to Pretoria, where we had interviews, at which I was present, and the outcome was a considerable reduction of rates. I will give you just one instance (I forget whether I have quoted it in my report): I found that the Natal railways were charging third-class passenger fare for every soldier they carried. I pointed out that according to their own contract they guaranteed to carry every soldier as a third-class passenger in a third-class carriage, but that during the greater portion of the war they had crammed thirty and forty privates into open cattle trucks, and, thereby alone, vitiating the terms of their contract. All that you could not expect Sir Redvers Buller, with the great burden which rested upon his shoulders, either to deal with, or even to consider. It always will be so in the early stages of a war; the General's only object is to push his troops forward, and it must devolve upon somebody specifically allotted to that duty to see that whilst there is no impediment thrown in the way of rapid transit, yet that reasonable conditions are established for the transport and carriage of troops, for the local purchases, the provision of stores, and so on. That is what led me to advocate (which I have done in the last paragraph of this summary of my reports) that in future wars the Generals in command, and even their subordinate commanders, should be assisted by somebody with a financial knowledge, who could take that burden off their shoulders, and I think that a great deal of money could have been saved had that system been adopted from the beginning.

5997. By a proper revision of rates?—And in the expenditure of money in South Africa altogether.

5998. I mean as regards the railway especially?—Yes. I had to deal with accomplished facts when the money was spent, but if anybody had been there in the early stages of the war, I think a considerable amount of money might have been saved; very large sums.

5999. You mention the provision of specie; that is another point?—The provision of specie is a Treasury matter I would like to point out, and I was perhaps travelling beyond my province when I reported upon that point; but I considered that I was justified in doing so, because the Treasury Chest Officer is the Army Paymaster, and on those grounds I considered that I was amply justified in drawing attention, as one of my men, so to speak, was spending the money, to the conditions under which that money was being obtained. But, of course, the only step that we could take was to send a report to the Treasury for their consideration. I may mention that the Treasury expressed their appreciation of what I have tried to do, and that they subsequently reviewed the terms and reduced them.

6000. Then the next point that you mention is supply accounting?—The supply accounting is a matter which concerned us, and only us, and I have indicated in my report what I thought was extremely faulty, as regards the system on which receipts were given and accounts were kept in connection with the supply, and both with regard to supply accounting and to the next point, ordnance, I think that the war has conclusively proved that we ought to recast our system in both cases; but, with your permission, I would prefer to deal with those matters more specifically later on.

6001. I will just ask you here, was the system adopted in South Africa in accordance with the rules, or was it a deviation from the rules?—Except in regard to starting what I may call pooling losses or deficiencies, the system was the recognised system at home, and I submit that the very fact that we had in a very important matter to start a-new, and I think

an unsatisfactory, system locally, proves that our whole peace system is not altogether applicable to war, and should be reviewed and changed. I represented this strongly when I came home, but it was considered that the pressure on the War Office was so great at the time that the consideration of the matter must be postponed. I believe that it is the intention of the Financial Secretary, as time goes on, to take up the question. I do not know if it has yet been dealt with; I am not aware that it has.

6002. But you prefer to deal with the finance, and also the ordnance, later?—I think I am prepared to take any point in supply accounting that you like to take now; but I have dealt as fully as I well can with the matter in the body of the report. Briefly speaking, what I found was that the system of this central account to which I allude was one which was open to objections from the accounting and financial points of view; but I am afraid it would be a very long story to go into the whole details of the accounting, and in point of fact, I think it would be better, if you wanted the full details of the system, to take it from one of the officers, either financial or supply; it would, perhaps, be fairer to them to do so. I do not think I have much to add to what is before you in my reports on that point. I have dealt with it very fully.

6003. Except that you consider that the central account is a serious defect in the system?—I thought the central account, as introduced in South Africa, and as then being worked, was not one that could be defended. And this was recognised at once by the supply officers in South Africa, who immediately modified it. I would like to say that this so-called central account was the result of a genuine effort to meet a deadlock. I would like to say distinctly that I do not think that it was in the slightest degree produced to avoid showing up what took place. I think that the officers had to do the best they could to invent a system which would work at all, and they invented this one; but I do not think it was one that could hold water from the financial point of view, and I had it altered.

6004. And you stopped it without detriment to the Service?—I think so. The moment that I pointed out the danger of the method to the officers concerned they adopted another.

6005. You said that it was introduced to meet a deadlock; but I suppose the deadlock did not occur by stopping it?—No; but perhaps I ought not to have used the word "deadlock." I would like to withdraw the word "deadlock," and substitute for it the difficulty of accounting closely for what was missing. The system of accounting was so complicated, and all our system of accounting is so complicated in peace time, that it breaks down in the field, and they have to substitute something for it, and it was a rough-and-ready, but not altogether a satisfactory, way of dealing with it.

6006. In the case of ordnance, what appears from your report is that there was a very considerable waste?—The case of ordnance I considered to be one of extreme gravity. When I reached Pretoria I found that Lord Kitchener was really excessively concerned about the ordnance purchases at the Cape, and he asked me to take it up as the very first thing, but I preferred to wait and feel my way. I eventually went down to Cape Town, and from the moment I began investigating the matter I realised that it was one which required not only a very thorough investigation, but which would of necessity involve severe criticism on the conduct of two officers. I represented to Lord Kitchener that it would perhaps be better, as the occurrences took place at the base, to have specially-trained officers, or officials rather, from England to deal with the case, because I was not personally conversant with the technicalities of ordnance supplies and stores; however, he preferred that I should do it, and the result of my inquiries is stated in my report. The Commission will notice that I had to express a somewhat severe opinion, which I did with great regret, on two officers. The subsequent proceedings were that my report, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief, was submitted to Sir Reginald Gipps' Committee, and was reviewed by Sir Reginald Gipps' Committee—in fact, the whole inquiry was reopened. And in regard to that, I would like to say that I was handicapped in my work by the fact that the officers concerned had already left South Africa, that a great number of documents were not forthcoming, and that it was extremely difficult, in the conditions in which Cape Town was, with the plague going on at the time, really to trace matters back to their original state, to the initial point. Before Sir Reginald Gipps' Committee I gave evidence, and the two officers concerned gave evidence before it, and they were very strongly supported in many of their contentions by the Ordnance Department; but the outcome of that inquiry was a report, which was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, and passed up by him to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State felt himself compelled to ask that Colonel Clark should be removed from the Active List. I think the matter was thoroughly investigated, and notwithstanding repeated and urgent appeals, the decision was upheld, and I think the incident is practically closed. But in relation to this ordnance matter, which was an extremely painful one for me to deal with, I should like to say a few words presently about the system of contracts, which appears to me to bear very strongly on this particular point, and I will do so if I may.

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6007. I think, after what you have said, it is unnecessary for us to go into the details of the particular transactions?—I think it is, really.

6008. But I just want to make quite clear in my own mind whether this again was a deviation from the system, or whether it resulted from the system. Perhaps that will come out in what you have to say?—I think I would prefer to answer it in this way: That if you think well to read through the actual report on the ordnance you will recognise that that was a deviation, not only from the War Office system, but from any system that was ever thought of or invented.

6009. That is what I did think in reading it over. Then we will leave the rest of that subject till you deal with it in your subsequent evidence. Then estimate of expenditure is the next point?—Practically I took over the duties which were being carried on by the Pay Department at Cape Town under conditions of such pressure that it was practically impossible for them to deal with the work.

6010. A war cannot be conducted on estimates?—No, but I think it is most important that you should have an estimate of expenditure on certain items. For instance, supposing that you propose to go into winter quarters, with an army in the field, you might require hutments for 150,000 or 250,000 men. I think it is certainly important that a reasonably accurate estimate should be made locally and sent home, because it is impossible at home, under certain conditions of warfare, to make an estimate. You must consider the difficulties of the country, water supply, and so forth, and I think that in one sense it is very important to form estimates during war time.

6011. Oh, certainly; only that the expenditure must fluctuate, and it must be irregular in payment?—Yes, but you ought to be able to watch it; but, of course, obviously, anything like a peace estimate and return of expenditure is quite impossible in war time, and would be useless, because you cannot keep to it.

6012. But the Commander-in-Chief did issue an order regulating charges?—Yes; I advocated that certain returns should be compiled, so that the expenditure might be watched; and after all, I need not say before this Commission that if you watch expenditure you to some extent control it, and the Commander-in-Chief was good enough to issue an Army Order embodying my recommendations.

6013. Is there anything else you would wish to note under that head?—I think I would prefer to deal with part of the subject under the head of the Pay Department, but I would draw attention to the fact that the system of accounting which we have adopted up to the present time has rendered it extremely difficult in one case, and a very important case, viz., in the case of money due to troops to know how you stand. I will deal with that more fully later on, but I allude to it here in this connection, you notice, of the pay of men at the bottom of page 5 (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 305), which will show you that over half a million of money on the 31st of March, 1901, was recredited to Votes 1 and 3, in accordance with financial instructions. You really did not know how you stood with the pay of the soldiers.

6014. Lord Kitchener wished the contract services to pass under your review?—I think I have dealt with that fairly fully in this abridgment of my Report. The question of contracts I hope to deal with in a minute or two.

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6015. There were two matters, which you say, deserve passing mention—about telegraph and the telephone accounts?—Yes, I mention those. Again, I must remark that this was for the information of Lord Kitchener at the time, and I should be sorry if it were taken as a reflection on the officers who had charge of that accounting, but I did, in point of fact, find a great arrear in these two particular items, and I drew attention to that, and had them brought up to date.

6016. You have some general remarks; is there anything you would like to amplify in them?—I think the only thing I would like to do on that, is to emphasize the opinion I have expressed that I think it would pay the country well, whenever it does go to war, unless it is a small expedition in a savage country, to establish a machinery by which, not the control, but the review of accounting for expenditure in the field, should be taken off the shoulders of the Commander-in-Chief in the field.

6017. You think that in the late war you might have saved about a million?—Yes, and most probably a good deal more.

6018. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) A minimum of a million?—Yes, I think so.

6019. (*Chairman.*) In the course of your evidence you have referred to one or two points on which you would speak later, and the first, I think, is with regard to the Contract Department. We shall be very glad to have from you any information that you can give us with regard to the system in the Contract Department?—What struck me very forcibly, when I was in South Africa, was the inapplicability of part of our peace system to war conditions, and notably the contract system. My views I had already stated before I went out to South Africa, but I would like to repeat them, if I may, at this moment.

6020. If you please?—The contract branch, I think, does not fit properly into our army system, which assigns the supply of arms, equipment, stores, provisions, clothing, etc., to the military—*e.g.*, the Director-General of Ordnance demands stores, makes stores, inspects stores, keeps stores, and issues stores; but when, in the process of manufacture, he wants to use iron, or nails, or cloth, he goes to a civilian department to buy them for him. This civil department, in the ordinary run of cases, acts as a mere post office between the military and the contractor. Questions as to the capacity of firms, the manner in which they have carried out past contracts, the extent to which time is important, or slight deviations of pattern may be permitted, the special circumstances which render it desirable to employ a particular firm or to accept a higher tender, the likelihood of further orders coming on soon, etc., are all points best known to the military, and are habitually referred to them. For example, a contractor wants an extension of time. He writes to the Director of Contracts to ask for it. The Contract Branch refers the application to the Military Branch. The Military Branch (probably after consulting the local military authorities) replies "no objection." The Contract Branch informs the contractor, who probably had obtained the sanction of the local authorities at the outset, and only wrote to the Director of Contracts to carry out the prescribed routine. In regard to a considerable amount of the supplies and works, the Director of Contracts would appear to be little more than a registrar and critic. His services seem still less required in connection with ordnance stores. In some cases (*e.g.*, machinery), he cannot even determine which is the lowest tender. Again, in buying an engine, its cheapness or dearness will depend not only on contract price, or "initial cost," but on the "cost in use." A high-priced engine may be really the cheapest if it is economical in the consumption of fuel, and so on. The actual work of contracting in such cases is virtually done by the military. I am, therefore, most strongly in favour of transferring the making of contracts to the military, both to economise time and labour, and to admit of decentralization, and because I consider the duty to properly appertain to them. This is only an instance of a general principle, which I should state somewhat as follows:—All work akin to the work of the military districts should be military work at headquarters. The civil headquarters should be confined to audit (in a wide sense), to Parliamentary and legal work, and to questions of general principle outside the routine of the fighting army. Following this principle, labour questions, etc., should remain under the Parliamentary officials. They should, however, be dealt with in the civil branches immediately under the Secretary of State and his assistants. The registration of contracts should be a function of the Accountant-General, who should also have the power of criticising them by way of audit. This would supply a grave deficiency in the present scheme. The vast amounts authorised by the Director of Contracts, unlike all other expenditure, escape altogether from audit. If any report is required (and one is called for annually), he reports upon himself. I am aware that the Navy have a separate civilian Contract Department. The Navy may not have officers to deal with such matters. The Army has. There is no Director of Contracts at the India Office. I must say, however, that, subject to minor modifications, the Dawkins Committee recommended the retention of the present system, mainly, it would appear, because "The Committee believe that, as a general principle, the retention of a central buyer is to the public interest." This view would appeal to business men, and they predominated on the Committee, and I agree that the principle is a sound one. But the result is disastrous in war. A number of officers entirely untrained, as regards purchase duties, unacquainted with markets, devoid of any business experience, at the mercy of brokers of doubtful integrity, are called upon to expend enormous sums of money. Such a system is grossly unfair on the officers, and disastrous to the State. The case of the ordnance purchase, dealt with in my reports to Lord Kitchener, and which are before this Commission, is an instance of what happens in war time. The Director-General of Ordnance protested, and rightly protested, against a system which throws such onerous commercial duties on untrained officers. When it is realised that in war time all local purchases are made by military officers, and that the amount paid to contractors in South Africa during the war, came to no less than 13½ millions, the necessity for a change of system becomes apparent. In other words, whilst it may be in accordance, and I think is in accordance, with sound business in many cases to have a Director of Contracts who actually does the contract work, that is to say, to have a central buyer, that system prevents in war time, when you cannot use your Director of Contracts, the officers who will have to effect purchases knowing anything about their work. I think that is a matter which calls for, at any rate, very close examination and consideration.

6021. The question of the retention of a central buyer has been before many Committees?—It has.

6022. And they generally have all unanimously approved of it?—They have. I allude specially to Sir Clinton Dawkins Committee as being the last one which has dealt with the subject. But I will tell the Commission that until I went out to South Africa I myself failed to realise the difficulties which arise in the field. If you could put your London system into the field I would have nothing to say; but when it comes to spending 13 millions (of course, that includes one or two very large contracts for transport and meat, and so forth, but, at any rate, several millions), and that money has to be spent by untrained officers, I think the result is eminently unsatisfactory.

6023. Would it not be possible then to introduce officers who have been trained in the Contract Department in the same way as you propose to introduce the financial adviser?—Well, the only proper way in which you could do that would be just what I advocate—that the various military officers should effect their own purchases through their own officers, and that their work should be reviewed, examined, and audited by a director of contracts, if you must have one, who would be a registrar and examiner of contracts.

6024. That is what I understand. By that you mean an alteration of the present peace system?—Yes, quite so.

6025. My question rather referred to an extension of the peace system to meet the emergencies of war?—You mean that you would have a civilian contract officer attached to the Army?

6026. I am only asking you?—I do not think it would work, for two reasons. First of all, you could only apply that at the base, and a great many of these purchases would be effected away from the base. I do not think you could drag about civilian clerks all over the country.

6027. Not for every piece of business, but I suppose the larger contracts are effected at the base?—Yes, they would be; but I do not see what advantage you would

get by it. In the case of supplies the quartermaster-general practically does place and carry out his own contracts. In the districts it is so.

6028. I am only struck by the fact which I have mentioned, that all these Committees and Commissions have been in favour of a central buyer in peace?—Yes, they have, and I feel that my view is not in accord with the views of people who are eminently better qualified than I am to judge; but I have been so struck by the necessity of working up a system at home which will apply in the field that that is the conclusion I have arrived at.

6029. (*Viscount Esher.*) But in regard to the Chairman's point, under this new Army Corps organisation, as I understand, every commander of an Army Corps is to have a financial adviser. That is an extension of the accounting and financial system to Army Corps. Do you understand from that that when an Army Corps takes the field the civilian financial adviser will accompany him?—I myself fail altogether to understand the system which has been introduced. In the first place they are called auditors, and they are also supposed to be financial advisers. I do not myself think that it is a wise proceeding, that the same man should advise as to how the money is to be spent and afterwards express an opinion as to whether it has been judiciously spent or not.

6030. But you see my point. Lord Elgin suggests that the civilian contract officer should possibly accompany, say, an Army Corps in the field, or possibly a division?—Yes, but I prefer to train military officers both for contracts and for finance; that is to say, for a certain portion of the financial work (and I will come to that), and not to send civilians running about with an army. When I and my assistant, Mr. Flynn, left South Africa, I urged Lord Kitchener most strongly, if he wished anything in the nature of a financial officer, to carry on the office which I had started, and which was in working order, to appoint a military man, and I succeeded in persuading him to do this—in fact, he did not require much persuasion, and he got a man from India, who has done admirable work since. The difficulties which a civilian has to contend with under war conditions can only be really realised by one who has gone through it. I was very exceptionally placed. In the first place, I had a non-financial position at home, so that I was not viewed with that suspicion which sometimes attaches to a man who goes out merely to criticise the expenditure of money. I really hardly like to say so much about myself.

6031. (*Chairman.*) But I think we shall be very glad if you will?—Another great advantage that I had was a social one, inasmuch as I had known all these officers, or a great proportion of them. Many of them belong to the same clubs that I do. I really think this does bear upon the point. It seems egotistical to speak about myself, but the long and short of it is that when I arrived at Pretoria I found myself in the midst of friends. Instead of officers looking upon me as an antagonistic critic, they came freely to my rooms, and asked me to help them if they had got anything in a state of confusion. We met, so to speak, on the terms on which we had last met in London. And I have associated with soldiers all my life. I think I understand their idiosyncrasies pretty well, and all that gave me exceptional advantages, without which I really do not think I could have done any good at all, assuming that I did do any good. Whether you can expect the same result by the mere shovelling out of civilians in the field I very much doubt, and you run an unnecessary risk of friction. If you have got a military man who has had the necessary training, and is therefore competent to do the work, you have no friction, because he is a colonel or a major, with specific written orders from a superior officer, and that is enough. But although I was appointed in Army Orders a member of the Headquarters Staff, and although I possessed the advantages which I have indicated, I did most of what I was able to do by coaxing. I think it would be better if you could get officers thoroughly trained for the work. I think the result would be more satisfactory, and I should think it would be more agreeable to the Army.

6032. I am not disputing a great deal of what you have been saying, but is it not a possible alternative to disorganising, if I may use that expression, the present system to possibly introduce some training of military officers to perform this work, but still to maintain the system, if, as all these Committees and Commissions have suggested, it is the best for peace time? Did you give evidence before the Sir Clinton Dawkins Committee?—I gave some evidence on contracts before that Committee.

6033. You gave your evidence before you went out?—Yes. I did not touch on this point. I gave my evidence the day before I sailed, and I was very much handicapped in consequence.

6034. Then had they any evidence, do you suppose, before them on this question of contracts in South Africa?—Do you mean as regards the contracts working in the field?

6035. Yes?—I do not think so, because practically the question had not arisen.

6036. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Were they not dealing only with home contracts?—I think so. I want to make it very clear that if it were not for the difficulty which arises in the field, I see no reason why you should touch the present system. What has struck me is that owing to the present system we have large purchases of necessity made by untrained officers, and I want a system at home which will train the officers.

(*Chairman.*) I quite appreciate that.

6037. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) In other words, to make officers commercial men?—Well, to put a little commercial knowledge into officers. You have an instance of what can be done, and a very good instance, in the supply departments of the Army. Business men, I think, will admit that a man like Colonel Ward, who was a prominent supply officer, has got very marked business capacity, and that he has acquired in the course of his experience as a supply officer. They make their own contracts.

6038. (*Chairman.*) Then that is the main point which you have to mention with regard to the contract system?—Yes. I do not wish my evidence to be taken as a mere criticism of the present system, which I daresay may be a good one, and which I have no doubt is well worked; but I say that the fault of it is that it does not give you a trained contractor, so to speak—an officer trained in contract work with an army in the field.

6039. Then you also, in the course of your evidence, said that you could speak to us, if we wished, on some points connected with the Pay Department?—That is another system which obtains in peace, and which, I think, proved to be entirely unsuited for war. I will not take up your time unless the Commission wishes it with a detailed technical exposition of the system *quâ* pay accounts. That the system did not work well is evidenced by the chaotic condition of affairs even at the present moment in regard to the payment of arrears of pay to South African soldiers. But a far more urgent matter is the recasting of the *personnel*. I think Lord Kitchener gave a little evidence on this point before you. He told me he would do so.

6040. He did speak of it?—The fact is that Army paymasters are overpaid and over-classed for pure cash duties, and underpaid and untrained for financial duties. I would separate the two. Cash payment and simple accounting require neither high remuneration nor high-class training. Complex accounting and finance do, and the Pay Department should be classified accordingly. The early training of an Army paymaster, first as a combatant officer and afterwards as an accountant, is quite inadequate so far as higher financial work is concerned. Indeed, I am inclined to think it actually spoils an officer for such work, and a military accounting staff is as necessary as a military medical staff. It is rather an analogous case. Why should you not have civilian surgeons, who are admittedly the best that can be obtained, and would be ready to go—why should you not send them? You have to supplement the establishment in case of war—a big war like this—but you also find it essential to have trained medical men as part of the military system. I think you want that in the case of contracts and financial duties.

6041. Is not the Paymaster a part of the general military system?—Yes, he is, but I think, as I have indicated here, that you want to divide the present body of men into two classes: Those who do the inferior routine work, and those who are to be called upon to act somewhat in the nature of financial advisers to the Com

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mander in-Chief. I ersonally am strongly opposed to the Department being a Civil Department. The plan was tried, and failed egregiously. It would be a retrograde step, and, in my opinion, a Civil Department would break down in the field. The Dawkins Committee stated, paragraph 67, page 12:—"Suggestions were made that the Paymasters should be removed from the control of the Quartermaster-General and be placed under the orders of the Accountant-General. The Committee do not view this proposal with favour. It is their belief that military officers are best controlled by military superiors, and it appears that the Accountant-General has sufficient voice, as it is, in the selection and promotion of Paymasters. At the same time, it would be an advantage if selected Paymasters could be temporarily employed in the Accountant-General's Department." I entirely agree. As germane to this question, I would draw attention to the following paragraph in my South African report. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 306). "(11) It is the nature of financial criticism to look for defects and propose remedies. It must not be thought, because the result of my investigations is to suggest various changes in the direction of economy, that I am blind to the large amount of excellent and economical work which has been done in South Africa. On the contrary, I believe that the Departments generally have aimed at economy. The flaw has been the absence of any financial authority at headquarters with time, knowledge, and power to treat financial questions as a whole. There are many matters in which large savings can only be effected upon general lines. If a Financial Adviser had been appointed at the beginning, instead of towards the end of the war, he could have prevented excessive charges from arising, instead of merely curtailing them when large and unnecessary expense has already been incurred. He could have established a system for watching and controlling expenditure, and could have systematised commandeering. He could have seen that the use of Army money for railway purposes was confined within limits. He could have secured reasonable rates from the Natal Railway, and have pointed out with authority that specie could be obtained at less expense. He would probably have arranged that supply accounting was conducted upon defensible lines, and that Telegraph and Intelligence Accounts were not allowed to get hopelessly into arrear; and if he had not been able to prevent the Ordnance difficulties from arising he could have checked them at an early stage. Also he would have been able to apply to questions now arising the knowledge gained throughout the whole war. He could, above all, have relieved the Commander-in-Chief of a volume of work which should not fall on him. My experience in South Africa has convinced me that it is desirable that in future wars a Financial Officer should accompany each Army Corps, and a Financial Adviser of high standing be attached to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief. The necessity is greatest at the commencement of operations when Generals have no time to devote to considerations of finance. It was inevitable, for example, that General Buller should pass by the question of the Natal Railway rates. A Financial Officer, with no executive duties to perform, would as surely have taken steps to get them reduced, saving some £300,000. In the present war, I believe that an expenditure of a few thousand pounds on a specially-selected financial staff would have saved the public, at the very least, £1,000,000." The present pay system, the actual system of accounting, has, I think, entirely broken down. In 1888 Mr. Seed introduced the station paymaster, and created the Army Pay Corps, and this led to an improvement of the *personnel*; but it was not, I think, a satisfactory system, and it has broken down in war. It is amazing that it should ever have been adopted, as it entailed a mass of heavy and complicated accounting on the fighting officers. I cannot understand how such a system could ever have been proposed. I do not know whether you would prefer to have this from one of the finance people, an actual paymaster—they could put it to you more clearly perhaps, and with greater knowledge. The actual paymaster is, as you know, the captain of the company. In reality, it is the colour-sergeant. The old paymaster was a regimental officer like the doctor. The Royal Artillery and Engineers never had any regimental paymaster; they were dealt with differently. In the old days, the account to the War Office was done by the paymaster-sergeant, and then, as I say, in 1888, a system was introduced of throwing the whole of this complicated accounting on the captain of the company, which meant that the fighting officer was to keep these elaborate accounts. In war time, of course, it was absolutely impossible. And subsequently this account was still more complicated by having to bear the clothing account, which, as you know, is a very complicated account under the present system, the actual wear of the garment being recorded and a life given to the garment, in fact. Under the system about to be adopted, the paymaster will issue cash to the captain, who will pay the men and send back a simple cash account to the paymaster, who will prepare the pay list. There will be no compilation of these accounts; the actual pay sheets are to be sent up to the War Office. But the present system is that the unit is struggling with a complicated account, while the paymaster is waiting in his office at the station for it to come. Now it seems an unfortunate arrangement that the combatant officer and his pay-sergeant, or whatever he is called, should be toiling over these accounts and endeavouring to get them straight for the paymaster, who is really a species of accounting officer, who is waiting at the station for them, and, unless he is a man of energy and goodwill, need not afford the slightest assistance to the unfortunate unit, which has its military duties besides its pay duties.

6042. Is it not the case that these matters are all under consideration and are being revised?—Yes; what I was leading up to was this: that these are matters of detail, and I think the changes which are to be made may be admirable changes. But the Committee which reported upon them has not touched upon the main question of financial advice, and I do not see where your financial adviser is coming from, unless you send a civilian into the field; and, remember, that means attaching a civilian to every column commander. I do not mean column commanders in the South African sense, because that meant small detached bodies, but I am talking of important bodies of troops.

6043. Divisions?—Divisions, for instance. It would mean attaching a civilian, and I think that is the system, that he is to go out from Aldershot or Salisbury Plain, or wherever he is. My idea is that your paymasters should be divided into two classes, the lower class dealing with the mere accounting and cash duties, and a superior section of them trained (I would train them, if necessary, under the Accountant-General at the War Office, I think that would be a very good thing to do), and then let them act as, so to speak, "financial assistant," rather than "adviser" to the General in the field.

6044. Do you mean that your superior class would rise from the junior class?—They might, or might not. I should think it would probably be very much on the same system as the second division and the higher division in the Civil Service. The good men would rise, and the inferior men would not.

6045. There might be special recruiting for the second class?—I would start it as a regular accounting army branch.

6046. Both branches?—Yes, you must have soldiers with soldiers.

6047. I want to know whether the financial adviser is to be a man who rises from being paymaster, or to be a man brought in for the special object of financial work?—In the case of the financial adviser to the general officer commanding a large army in the field, I would send him the very best man, the best suited for the work; I would not care whether he was a Treasury clerk, a War Office clerk, a General, or a banker; I would choose the best man and send him out. But he would only be called upon to advise upon very large questions, and he would be with the headquarters staff, and his position would be rather that of a confidential friend of the Commander-in-Chief than anything else. But you want more than that. A General commanding a division, and even in some cases a Major-General, would be, and I can conceive a Brigadier-General being very greatly assisted, and money being much more economically spent, if one of his military staff were conversant with financial work, with superior accounting and, generally speaking, with a business-like expenditure of money.

6048. And these are to be military officers?—I would have them military officers.

6049. But specially selected for the work?—Specially selected and specially trained; you would have men with an aptitude for it. You have done it with the Army Service Corps; it is precisely the same condition. In the old days, when supply and transport was controlled, and commanded by Sir Arthur Halliburton

as Director of Supplies and Transport at the War Office, a civilian, General Buller proved conclusively after the Nile campaign that, although the Army had been most admirably served in the sense that ample provisions had been sent out from England, where the breakdown took place was locally, in the field, because the men had not the training; the men who had to deal with the matter had not had a good peace training. He created the present Army Service Corps and one of his attacks on my administration of Pimlico, not on my personal administration, but on the fact that a civilian was in charge of it, was a very sound one. He said "my Ordnance officers do not learn how to handle clothing, which they will have to do when they get in the field"; and I met him partly by employing none but reservists so far as possible, by which means I gave the Army a certain staff (I could part with a large proportion of them), who had experience in the handling of clothing, baling, numbering, and so forth. And if you have done it, and done it with signal success with reference to supply and transport, I fail to see why you should not at any rate try it with regard to finance and contract. The previous system is a *remanet* of the old days when the soldier was called upon to fight and do nothing else and all the administration was civilian. Now the trend has been to teach your soldier, not only to fight, but to organise his army, and to administer his army, and I think you must have one thing or the other.

6050. (*Viscount Esher.*) Who is the present Financial Adviser to the First Army Corps at Aldershot?—He is one of the clerks in the office; the post is not even that of a principal clerk. I think it is an admirable thing to systematise and decentralise the examination of accounts, and in that way I think that these so-called auditors attached to the Army Corps will do very valuable work, and I think the system is an excellent one, instead of dragging all the work up to Pall Mall, to deal with it locally; but I do not think it will meet the requirements of an Army in the field as regards helpful advice *quâ* the actual expenditure of money which is necessary for the General in the field if you are going to have an economical arrangement.

6051. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) And the actual making of contracts?—I think the same applies to the actual making of contracts.

6052. (*Viscount Esher.*) With regard to these new Army Corps Financial Advisers, are they under the Financial Secretary at the War Office?—Yes; and I may point out that my position in South Africa was a totally different one from that which will be occupied by these officials. I was detached from the War Office and lent to Lord Kitchener, and put on his Headquarters' Staff. I took my orders from him, and I was his officer. These men will be the officers of the Financial Department of the War Office, and they will be attached to the Army in the field by the War Office, which is a very different thing. Their present position is that they are officers of the Accountant-General's branch, but that they are to render advice if asked for it, I presume—I should be very sorry for them if they offered it without being asked for it—to the General Officer commanding the Army Corps. I hope I have made the distinction clear, because I think it is an important one.

6053. (*Chairman.*) You spoke just now of employing reservists. You have had an extension of that in the War Office lately, have you not, in the clerks?—I am sorry to say that we have not. We have had an extension of employment of retired officers and time-expired soldiers, which is a very different thing from having reservists. I do not know whether you are asking me my views upon that subject.

6054. Yes; we should like to know your opinion?—I have always been a strong advocate (I am one of the original promoters of it) for the employment of military officers and military men on clerical duties in the purely military branches of the War Office; indeed, I may say that I have been taken to task for unduly urging this change. The Admiralty is worked on the very opposite system, but the conditions of the two services are entirely different, and my remarks on this apply to my observations as to the Admiralty system of contracts (that is to say, there is a difference between the two departments). The unit of the Navy being the ship, Naval service gives comparatively little training for the higher work of organisation and administration. Army units, upon the contrary, are grouped into commands of large size, and these into still larger ones. Army officers are thus gradually trained for the administration of the Army as a whole, the work of headquarters. The principle of decentralisation so strongly advocated for the Army rests upon the supposition that the work of headquarters and that of the districts differs in extent rather than in kind. The proper administration of the military districts requires some knowledge of the system at headquarters. It is, therefore, of great benefit to the Army that many military officers and military clerks should be trained there, and that the War Office should become a manufactory of good military clerks for the districts, where they, in turn, would train younger men for services locally and in the War Office. It is highly desirable that officers should work at headquarters with the same material that they will have to use in their districts and upon service. I may mention that the Dawkins Committee reported (*vide page* 16) that, "In regard to the doubts expressed in some quarters as to the qualifications of soldier clerks, there seems reason to believe that the Army can supply the class of men required, if adequate care is taken in the selection." I must point out, however, that the system which has been adopted differs in one most important point from that which I have advocated. The officers and men now appointed to the War Office are *retired* men. I realise fully the pressure which has been brought to bear to employ men who have become incapacitated through war service, and on the whole, the result is better than might be expected. I confess, however, that I view with grave apprehension the manning of the War Office with retired officers and pensioners, few of whom have any previous training. Neither have a future to look to; both may soon drift into a listless condition, and on neither will you have a real disciplinary hold. But the paramount objection is that the plan fails to produce the trained men on the Active List who are so much wanted in the districts, a want which the Army Corps organisation will accentuate, and which is especially felt in the field. The want of good orderly-room clerks was a serious matter in South Africa, as was the lack of officers in the junior ranks with elementary administrative experience.

6055. Your point, as I understand it, is that instead of retired men you would like to have reservists?—I would prefer to have men on the Active List and Reservists.

6056. Do you mean on active service in the Army?—Yes.

6057. As clerks?—Yes, as clerks. I want to have a trained body of clerks to do the clerical work of the districts. You see, you have at this moment two complaints. One is that at the War Office you cannot get on without civilian clerks, and the other is the complaint from the districts that they cannot get their work satisfactorily done for lack of a sufficient number of well trained military staff clerks, orderly-room clerks. I want a system which will train a sufficient number of good orderly-room clerks, and the only way I can see in which you can do that is by training them, while they are on the Active List, at the War Office, and interchange them between the districts and the War Office; in other words, carrying down to the lower class of military administration precisely the practice which obtains with regard to the higher-class administration. The change which was introduced of five years' tenure in lieu of life tenure of appointments at the War Office has conferred an enormous benefit upon the Army. You have an officer; you bring him up for five years into the Adjutant-General's branch. He leaves us a totally different man; he has got larger views; he realises the purport of what is done. You take him out of that narrow regimental circle where he cannot understand why things are done. It has never struck him while he was with his regiment that we have to make an Army as well as command and use an Army. The change has been an extraordinarily good one as regards our officers. They come up, and go through a certain amount of work at the War Office, and then they are sent back to the districts, and other men are brought up, and you have this interchange between headquarters administration and district administration, which is of extreme value. Now I want that carried down throughout to the lower class of work, as well as the higher.

6058. I can quite understand it with regard to the

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officers; I have seen some of them in India. But with regard to the men I do not quite follow you. These men you say should be on the Active List. They are not men who would stand in the fighting line?—They would no more stand in the fighting line in one sense than the Army Service Corps men do, or the Hospital orderlies; but they would be on the Active List, and they would be available to serve in the field. Again I work back to that, "When you get to the field." Take, for instance, Pretoria; we had to start a War Office at Pretoria; we had practically a War Office at Cape Town, and there was hardly a man available except wounded men recovering or enteric patients recovering from the hospitals. All that means bad administration and extravagant administration.

6059. I quite follow, and I am not criticising the scheme put forward in the least. I only say that that, of course, is different in essence from what I understand is a feature of the present scheme which is to provide for the soldier who has been fighting in the field?—Yes. I say, I quite appreciate that the pressure was very great, possibly irresistible; it is a very great argument; but I prefer to view all subjects connected with Army Administration from the point of view of having a thoroughly efficient fighting machine, when it comes to the fighting, to side issues, such as maintaining wounded heroes and soldiers out of employment. I think the State ought to find some other means of doing that.

6060. How would you recruit for a service, such as that you have been describing?—It would only be an enlargement of the present recruiting. I think the result of having these places to offer men would be a great inducement to a good man with a certain amount of clerical experience and training to enlist. At present, you offer an inducement, which can only apply to a very few men, and that inducement consists in the possibility when he has served his time and been wounded that a certain amount of employment would be found for him. But, I think, you would get a much better class of clerks for the Army—you would tap a better stratum.

6061. That is what I wanted to make quite clear?—You might recruit practically as you do now for the hospital orderlies and the Army Service Corps. If you got a man in a regiment as you do now, who shows an aptitude for clerical work, and has had training, you would probably draft him into it.

6062. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) But each regiment has now its orderly clerks?—Yes, and they have great difficulty in obtaining a sufficiency of men suitable for orderly-room work. Any regimental officer will tell you that.

6063. (*Chairman.*) Then take the other side of the matter. With regard to these men that you are getting now, is it your opinion that they can do the work efficiently?—It is impossible to say, the system has only been in force a very short time. I have stated, that I think it is very fairly successful, but we have had unsatisfactory cases already. But it is quite impossible to express an opinion as to how it will work; it has not been in force long enough.

6064. We have had evidence from one department that in certain branches of that department the opinions of the heads of the department were, that it was quite fatal?—Yes, I know that some officers who are clear-headed men of business, as well as soldiers, are quite averse to it. I think there is a great objection if you have time-expired military clerks, over whom you practically will have no hold. If they misconduct themselves, all that will happen will be that they will walk out of the office, and you never see them again. In point of fact, it has happened that a man goes because he gets better employment, and he will not even take the trouble to tell you he is he going; he does not turn up. Now, if you have men on the Active List, they are under military discipline, and my experience of soldiers is, that if you want good work out of them you must keep them under military discipline.

6065. You have had a long experience in the War Office ,and we should be glad, I am sure, to have your opinion on one or two points which have been a difficulty with us in regard to the organisation of the War Office. Have you been a Member of any of the Boards which are now in existence, or have been?—Yes, I was a Member of the Army Board, from the beginning, so to speak, from the first moment that any civilians were put upon it.

6066. We have had so many Army Boards mentioned to us; may I ask which Army Board that is. Is that the one of 1899?—With your permission, I could give you a brief statement showing what has been done.

6067. Very good; that will bring it out quite well?—A perusal of the minutes will have enabled the Commission to gauge the value of the Army Board as a consultative and advisory body. The office memoranda before the Commission indicate its composition, and its functions, but I understand that you would like a brief review of its creation and development. When, in June, 1899, the Government were considering the reinforcement of the forces in South Africa, the old confidential Mobilisation Committee was assembled, the Adjutant-General presided at it. It was at once realised that such a body had neither the constitution nor the powers which the emergency called for. Accordingly the Commander-in-Chief assembled and presided over a special committee to advise on matters relating to the South African crisis. The Board sat as the Commander-in-Chief's Committee from July 13th, 1899, onwards. It sat for the first time as "The Army Board for mobilisation purposes," on September 11th, 1899, and its existence was officially established by office memorandum of September 21st, 1899. It was constituted "The Army Board," by office memorandum of May 28th, 1900, and first sat as such on the 11th June, 1900. Irrespective of mobilisation and war a small Army Board had been in existence as a Promotion Board, and had been used, although it was a Promotion Board, for the discussion of any subject which the Commander-in-Chief wished to have brought up.

6068. Was the Commander-in-Chief President of it?—The Commander-in-Chief was President of it. In September, 1899, this Board was amended, so to speak, by office memorandum of September 21st, 1899, which added the Assistant Under Secretary of State, the Military Secretary, the Director of Military Intelligence, and the Accountant-General to that Board. On May 28th, 1900, it having been found that the functions of the Army Board were somewhat ill-defined, and that the questions of promotion and selection intermingled with non-cognate matters, an office memorandum was issued, constituting three Boards, viz., the Army Board, a Promotion Board, and a Selection Board. The constitution and the functions of the three Boards were clearly laid down (you have the papers before you). Since then, as you know, a permanent Executive Committee of the War Office has been established, and that same War Office Memorandum reaffirmed the existence of the Army Board, of which I am a Member, and which is now under your consideration.

6069. When you speak of the Permanent Executive Committee, do you mean what is called the War Office Council?—No, the War Office Council is a Council presided over by the Secretary of State; the Army Board is presided over by the Commander-in-Chief; and the Permanent Executive Committee has been created, and is presided over by the Permanent Under Secretary. The Selection and Promotion Boards, so far as I am aware, still sit, but they are purely military, and I have no cognisance of them. Lord Lansdowne was much impressed by the paramount necessity, in view of the South African crisis, of constant interchange of views between the high military officers, of careful deliberation, and of rapid decision. He considered that preparation for war would be best advanced by frequent meetings of an Army Board, presided over by the Commander-in-Chief, advised on financial points by the Accountant-General, and guided in regard to relations with other departments to Parliamentary pledges, to office procedure and precedent, and to the political situation, by a permanent civil official. That is how the present Board grew into what it is. It was at the instance of the Commander-in-Chief himself, that I was selected to serve on the Board. The Board, as will be seen by the records, met constantly during the war, and I think all its members will bear me out when I say that its deliberations and decisions were of extreme value in regard to the conduct of the war. The Board is now very rarely summoned. No doubt the trend of the recommendations of the Dawkins Committee was to merge in the War Office Council the functions of the Army Board, and at first sight the necessity for the two bodies may not be apparent. But the Members of of the Dawkins Committee, with one exception, were entirely inexperienced in headquarters administration—in other words, with preparation for war, and I think that the result is unsatisfactory. Whilst on the one hand we have had a large measure of executive decen-

tralisation, on the other we have had a considerable increase in administrative centralisation. Questions were formerly carefully and exhaustively considered by his military advisers before they were submitted to the Secretary of State for decision. Only subjects of the highest importance and Army Board decisions with which the Secretary of State disagreed, used, as a rule, to be referred to the War Office Council. In other words military proposals were threshed out before the Commander-in-Chief, at the Army Board by all his military officers assisted, if I may use the term, on the lines I have indicated, by the Accountant-General on Finance, and by myself as regards House of Commons' questions, policy, and so forth. Generally speaking, the War Office Council was summoned when the Secretary of State found himself unable to accept a decision that the Board had come to. Then he summoned his military officers into his room, and held a War Office Council, so that he might have the personal views, the *ipsissima verba* of the various military men, and come to a conclusion after having received fuller military views and military information. A perusal of the proceedings of the War Office Council, I cannot help thinking, leads to the conclusion that much of the Secretary of State's time would be saved if the subjects under review had been discussed by the Army Board. But there is also this great drawback in referring everything to the War Office Council, that discussion can hardly be free and untrammelled in the presence of a member of the Cabinet with whom rests the final decision. I believe that the conduct of business would be materially advanced by frequent meetings of the Army Board.

6070. The Army Board in the shape in which you advocate it only existed during the war?—Yes, it began at the dates I have mentioned; it is in existence now by Order in Council.

6071. But it was only in existence in its full activity during the war?—In its full activity, as you say, it was only in existence during the war; but, of course, at the Board we discussed a great many questions that arose out of the war, but which perhaps were not necessarily war subjects.

6072. Then why has the Army Board dropped into abeyance since the war?—The constitution of the Army Board, so to speak, necessitates for its assembly a summons from the Commander-in-Chief, so that I am not in a position to answer the question. If the Commander-in-Chief thinks fit to summon the Army Board he does; if he does not think fit to summon he does not summon it.

6073. As a matter of fact, although the same questions must have arisen since the war, it has not been summoned regularly?—I would prefer not to answer that question, if you please.

6074. But you have said that it has not been summoned?—It has been rarely summoned.

6075. At the same time, in your opinion, it would be well that it should meet?—I think that it would be better that many of these subjects should be thoroughly threshed out before a proposal is put up to the Secretary of State in regard to them, and I think it would be well to have a free discussion on these points before that.

6076. (*Viscount Esher.*) What points precisely do you mean?—Any point that it may be considered advisable to discuss.

6077. (*Chairman.*) As I understand it, what the Army Board was intended for was to discuss military subjects in the presence of all the military heads of departments, with certain members present for advice, and to come to a decision on these military subjects?—That is so—essentially military subjects.

6078. You say that the subjects considered by the Army Board would be essentially military subjects, discussed in the presence of military members, by whom a collective opinion would be come to, and then that collective opinion would go to the Secretary of State?—That is so.

6079. What is the alternative? As I understood it, the alternative is that each department brings up a subject to the Secretary of State direct?—Yes, to a large extent that is so, and I think that in consequence of the Army Board not meeting regularly there is a great increase of minute writing, and there is a tendency for one branch to act independently of another: and although this may have been to some extent checked by the Executive Committee, still one can imagine a case of proposals being put forward by one military department which materially affect two or three other military departments before a full discussion had taken place on that very point as to how the other departments are affected by it.

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6080. And therefore the proposal comes up to the Secretary of State before you get it, and perhaps forestalling and preventing a collective opinion of the collective heads?—Yes, when you have not had the subject, I think, sufficiently threshed out.

6081. And without the knowledge of the other departments?—Theoretically every department ought to be in possession of the knowledge, because the paper, as we call it, ought to be circulated; but undoubtedly, especially in times of pressure like the preparation for the Estimates, it is quite conceivable that one department might advance a proposal, and by mere accident another department which was concerned might not fully realise what it was. At any rate, it seems to me that the advantage is obvious of having around a table a discussion on a proposal by the several military officials concerned, before that proposal is sent up to the Secretary of State.

6082. I only want to be quite clear that I am right about this. As the Order in Council runs at present the Adjutant-General's Department is under the control of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

6083. The other departments—the Quartermaster-General, the Director-General of Ordnance, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and so on—are under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

6084. In the first case I suppose the Commander-in-Chief would certainly submit a proposal from the Adjutant-General's Department to the Secretary of State?—Yes.

6085. In the other cases he would not submit it?—They are not obliged to submit through the Commander-in-Chief. The Director-General of Ordnance, the Quartermaster-General, and the Inspector-General of Fortifications would minute to the Permanent Under-Secretary, who would submit it to the Secretary of State.

6086. But I suppose they, being under the Commander-in-Chief's supervision, he would, in the natural course of business, see the papers?—He would not necessarily see all the papers. For instance, papers in connection with the administration of the ordnance factories would probably not go near him.

6087. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) He could call for any papers that he wanted, of course?—Yes, of course he could.

6088. (*Chairman.*) But the net result is that there might, and there probably would be, a good many questions on which under that system there would not be the collective military opinion that there would be if the Army Board worked in the way it did during the time of war?—I will put it, if I may, in this way—that you run the risk of such a thing, and I think that the Army Board precluded the possibility of one department carrying through one proposal without all the other departments having fully stated their views if it bore at all upon their administration.

6089. Then you think it is a great advantage that on all these military subjects there should be that collective opinion before a definite proposal comes to the Secretary of State?—Yes, certainly, I think it is a great advantage that there should be an interchange of ideas in regard to every proposal between the great military heads, and I think it is a very expeditious way of conducting the business. Obviously the alternative is to circulate a great number of minutes.

6090. You have not yourself been a member of the War Office Council?—No; the Permanent Under-Secretary is a member.

6091. And you cannot therefore speak from knowledge of the subjects that come before it?—Yes, I can speak with knowledge of the subjects that come before it, because every subject which is submitted to it is drawn up on an agenda paper, which comes to me, and also a *précis* of the discussion and of the decisions given. I get those as custodian of office papers every time that the War Office Council meets. I should, of course, attend in the absence of the Permanent Under-Secretary.

6092. And in the way in which you would like the business directed all the decisions of the Army Board would almost as a matter of course come before the

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War Office Council?—The War Office Council is only summoned for a specific subject. The Army Board proceedings would be in the possession of all the members of the War Office Council, but the War Office Council is only assembled to deal with a specific subject.

6093. Perhaps I ought to put my question in a different way. None of the subjects on which a decision of the Army Board was come to would come before the War Office Council except as decisions of the Army Board?—They would not be referred to the War Office Council unless the Secretary of State specially wished to do so.

6094. Then the other subjects that would come before the War Office Council would be subjects of general administration?—They would be subjects which would be either too important for anybody except the War Office Council to discuss and deal with, or they would be subjects on which for some reason or another the Secretary of State wished to hear all the pros and cons himself instead of having the subject threshed out by the Army Board.

6095. We have been told that there has been a change in the procedure, perhaps I ought to call it, of the War Office Council; that is to say that whereas formerly no matter was brought before the War Office Council except by the direction and with the approval of the Secretary of State, now any member may raise any point that he thinks is necessary?—I believe that is so.

6096. And of that you are aware from seeing the agenda paper?—Yes, and I know it from the Army Order which constituted the Council. I think it is alluded to in that. At any rate, I am acquainted with the fact.

6097. There seemed to be a doubt among some members of the Council as to their powers?—The utmost power that they could have would be to represent to the Secretary of State that they wished to have some particular subject discussed, and it would be for him to decide.

6098. That is not what we were told, and that is not what the recommendation of the Dawkins Committee was founded upon. We were told that the change in the War Office Council went further than that; that is to say, that any member had now the right of asking that any question which he thought of importance should be put in the agenda paper?—I am afraid I cannot do more than refer to the Army Order or office memorandum, which lays down the procedure.

6099. This, I think, is the Army Order to which you refer: "The Council will discuss such matters as may be referred to it by the Secretary of State and any question brought before it by individual members"?—Yes; that is the constitution of the Council, as laid down officially.

6100. That means that any member may bring before the Council any question?—According to that.

6101. Which was not the case before?—No, it was not; it was purely the Secretary of State who summoned it. I have never been a member of the War Office Council, and I would prefer not to answer any questions about it, because I am not a member of it.

6102. Then I do not think we need go further into that matter. You press for the value of the Army Board?—As you have asked me whether I had any views in regard to the Army Board, I certainly think, and my experience as a member of it led me to think, that it was a very valuable institution, and would be still more valuable if it met pretty frequently.

6103. There was another point which has come out in the evidence once or twice, to which I think you might speak, and that is the relations between the War Office and the Treasury. That probably comes under your observation. In the case of a demand being made, say that it was made under the system that you have advocated of the Army Board forming an opinion in a military subject which involved expenditure, what would happen to that in relation to the Treasury?—I am not quite sure that I gather the purport of your question.

6104. What would happen when a military subject involving expenditure is put forward. How is it laid before the Treasury?—It would be laid before them in the ordinary course by means of a letter addressed to the Treasury by the Accountant-General and signed by the Financial Secretary or the Accountant-General.

6105. We have been told by representatives of the military departments who have come before us, that after they have made a recommendation they have nothing further to do in the negotiations with the Treasury?—No, I do not think they have.

6106. That is entirely left in the hands of the financial side?—Yes; the military authorities would have nothing to do with that. When once the Secretary of State had agreed that the proposal was a good one, and that he would ask the Treasury for money for it, it would rest entirely with the finance branch to carry on the negotiations with the Treasury. But, of course, that does not really affect the larger question of the refusal of supplies to the War Office, as a question of policy, so to speak.

6107. That is what I am leading up to?—I thought you meant only the ordinary machinery by which the money was obtained.

6108. We want to be clear as to the machinery, but we also wish to deal with the larger question?—That, of course, is a question which entails the relations rather between the Secretary of State for War and the Chancellor of the Exchequer than those between the War Office, as an office, and the Treasury, as the controlling and financial department, and I do not know that it is quite within my province to discuss it or even to volunteer any remarks about it. But do I rightly gather that the purport of your question is that the military authorities have a difficulty in getting money for their requirements?

6109. That is so; that is what has been represented to us?—Do you mean in regard to normal Army expenditure?

6110. Yes, or exceptional Army expenditure?—Do you mean as regards affecting preparedness for war, or merely normal expenditure for the up-keep of the Army year by year?

6111. I will take either side; I think it has been represented to us on both?—I am afraid I can only give you what is really worthless, which is my personal view of the matter. I do not know whether the Commission think that is worth having.

6112. I think so?—In regard to normal Army expenditure, I must confess that the cry that money is always being refused is, in my opinion, rather exaggerated. No doubt money has been, and often is, at first refused, but I cannot recall to mind any instance of a sound reasonable demand clearly and completely put forward being refused. Two difficulties, not, I think, so fully realised as they should be, arise in connection with military demands. The first arises from the extreme difficulty which is experienced by anyone not versed in military matters, to realise correlation in military expenditure, if I may use the phrase. It is easier to realise in the Navy when the unit is the ship. It is far more difficult in the case of the Army, and it is this, I think, which has led to money which was essential as a whole being granted piecemeal. Unless it is very clearly explained *ab initio*, it may be difficult for a civilian to understand why, when he has sanctioned a huge sum for guns, he should suddenly be called upon to furnish another almost equally huge sum for emplacements. If the two have not been put forward as one being absolutely dependent upon the other, the second demand comes as a sort of shock. And I think that in the past, at any rate, there has been lack of correlation in demands put forward by the military departments. I do not say that this is an instance of what has actually happened, but it might happen that an Adjutant-General might ask for a large increase of the Cavalry when the stabling accommodation is non-existent, and could not by any possible means be provided for some time to come—given any amount of money. The Army Board would come in very usefully in that respect, but it is quite easy to appreciate the possibility of the money being asked for an increase of Cavalry—and yet you could not create that Cavalry because you have not the stabling for them, and we all know that stabling takes time—you may have to buy the land, and then build. Another great difficulty, I think, up to the present, has been the absence of what I might term a recognised and accepted scheme. In the past, I think, very often the Government of the day, whichever Government was in office, had huge financial demands hurled at its head without a clear indication of what it was intended to work up to. I think that at the present moment we have got into a very much improved condition. It is not my business to say whether the six Army Corps system is good, bad, or indifferent, but at any rate

it is a recognised system, and the money which is asked for, whether the whole of it is granted or part of it is granted, is all being spent towards the completion of a specific plan; and I think that that in itself will tend to make it easier to obtain money for Army purposes. But I think, generally speaking, with the Cabinet, and especially a Prime Minister, taking a direct and real interest in Army matters, whatever side of politics he may be, and with military demands advanced in a complete and well-digested condition, there would be very little fear of money being refused. Whether the present War Office organisation tends to produce complete and well-digested demands, is not for me to say; but I think that a great deal of the question of preparedness for war is quite independent of money, and I think it is a mistake to approach the subject, as it so often is approached, from the standpoint of money having been refused, and, therefore, things not having been quite as satisfactory as they might have been. It is not my wish in any way to discuss, as regards the late war—it is not my business to discuss—the sufficiency or insufficiency of preparation for the late war; but I would like, as an old official of the department, and the only one, I mean in the position that I occupy, who has been there a great number of years, to point out that when the preparation for war depended on pre-arranged organisation, the War Office met the strain with signal success. The complete success in regard to mobilisation, the upkeep and despatch of drafts, and the embarkation and transport of troops and supplies, were the outcome of good organisation laid down during peace. The manner in which the Army in South Africa was fed is without parallel, and this again was the outcome of machinery perfected in peace time. Whatever may be said as to the horse supply, it should be remembered that no one anticipated such gigantic numbers being required. At first, the military policy seemed rather adverse to an enormous supply, and Lord Lansdowne was naturally guided by that. I will not dwell upon the reasons which prevented the military authorities advising large purchases of horses, because they are known, but, in point of fact, if we had sent an Army such as was proposed, that is to say, the first Army Corps, a cavalry division, a battalion of mounted infantry, and four battalions for the lines of communication, which was the force indicated in the Memorandum of June 8th, 1899, the proper complement of horses would have been obtained without difficulty. The number would not have exceeded, I believe, some 23,000 horses. If the Army Corps had been sent out at the beginning, with short notice, there would have been little difficulty in getting those. Then there is another point on which the War Office has been found fault with. No doubt Lord Roberts found transport inadequate when he arrived at Cape Town, but no War Office can provide against such a *volte face* as was executed in South Africa. Everything had been arranged with a view to an advance through the Orange Free State. Transport was arranged at the base, and the Secretary of State was informed, and stated that all would be ready for an advance on or about December 23rd, 1899. But Sir Redvers Buller suddenly and completely altered the plan of campaign, broke up his transport for service in Natal and the Modder, and in November (that was a month before the date fixed) Methuen was fighting his way to Kimberley. I fail to see how any Secretary of State, or War Office, can be charged with lack of foresight under such circumstances. It is not my place to criticise the Intelligence Department, nor have I any wish to do so; in most respects their information was remarkably accurate; but it is only fair to the Government to remember that we have on record the frank avowal of the Commander-in-Chief, who, on November 6th, 1899, spoke as follows: "We have found that the enemy, who declared war against us, are much more powerful than we anticipated." That was a public statement of the Commander-in-Chief. Not even the Intelligence Department realised that immature boys and decrepit old men would be in the fighting ranks; they, in fact, excluded: "lads between 16 and 18, and men between 50 and 60," from their estimates. Of course, they could not realise, any more than we could, that the Boers were able to move heavy ordnance almost as easily as field guns. So far as I know, we heard nothing of the idiosyncrasies of individual Boer commanders or of the phenomenal military capacity they were likely to display. But even in the matter of numbers the acting head of the Intelligence Department, on September 28th, 1899, informed Lord Lansdowne, that is, the Government and the War Office, that "the largest number of Boers which would be opposed to a British force in Natal will not exceed 13,500.

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6113. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) That was Colonel Everett; Sir John Ardagh was not back?—But Colonel Everett was in charge, and, consequently, the responsible officer to whom the Secretary of State had to look for advice.

6114. But Colonel Altham was away at the time?—Colonel Altham was away, but Colonel Everett was in charge at the time. My only object is to show that, at any rate, different estimates were put forward.

6115. You can hardly call it an Intelligence Department report, I think, on that ground——

6116. (*Chairman.*) Surely the formulated expression of the Intelligence Department was in "Military Notes," which was drawn up before that?—Yes; but I merely quoted that as an instance where different numbers were estimated.

6117. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) But Sir William Everett was not supposed to be an authority on that subject?—The Report is signed by "William Everett," as "Assistant Adjutant-General for the Director of Military Intelligence."

6118. It was simply a mistake of his, issuing that Report?—That is not for me to say; we were given the figures.

6119. Sir William Everett had been engaged on negotiations with the French Government in regard to boundaries for a considerable time, and he was not a recognised authority on the South African question?—I should like, if I may, to point out that it is hardly fair in criticising the War Office to lose sight of the fact that one very salient feature of preparation was the short service and consequent reserves, which enabled us to send out the splendid material we did to South Africa; and that was the outcome of long and careful thought and preparation; and, subsequently, of the unflinching determination on the part of the then Secretary of State to maintain the system. Now opinion is unanimous that the reserve, the outcome of short service, saved the situation; but Lord Lansdowne had to face a very powerful agitation during his first two years of office, the avowed object of which was to revert to long service. Short service is an instance, and a notable instance, of War Office preparation for war. Of course, the question also arises of the upkeep of war material; but I need not point out to the Commission that it would be impossible for this country to be ready for war in every country in the world. In one instance, we should require a huge flotilla of shallow draught vessels, and transports, furs, and snow shoes, and all sorts of things. But, still, what I think is wanted in the way of expenditure for preparation for war is what I should call automatic sequence in expenditure. We will assume that the Secretary of State informs his military advisers that it may become necessary to send an Army Corps at short notice to, say, Asia Minor, for the sake of argument. The next step should be automatic and immediate. The Army Board, we will suppose, would be summoned, and the chief military heads would be called upon to state exactly what was required to make up deficiencies in any shape or form, and that is when the action should be automatic and complete. Whatever is necessary should be procured immediately, and authority to spend the money should be granted at once. In no other way, I think, can you avoid the waste of time, which is fatal to the conduct of a successful operation. You really cannot make up leeway in preparation for war.

6120. (*Chairman.*) In this late case, there was delay?—In this late case there was a period during which we were marking time.

6121. Yes, we have had it in evidence that there were requisitions from the various departments which began as early as June or July, 1899, I think, but that no sanction was given for expenditure until September. That is a period which you say ought not to have occurred?—I think it ought not. It must be clearly understood, of course, that I am not criticising what was done, but, in fact, there is no secret about it. It was publicly stated to the country, and the country accepted the view that the Government preferred to run a certain risk rather than run the risk of forcing on a war which they thought that open and very serious preparation for war might lead to. That is a matter for the Cabinet to decide, and nobody else can decide it for them. But from the standpoint of efficiency of the force which is to go into the field, it is, I think, a very fatal thing

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6122. As a matter of Army administration?—As a matter of Army administration. From the moment that there is a serious possibility of a force being sent into the field there ought to be no waste of time between that moment and the actual moment of departure for fighting, so to speak, in the expenditure of the money which is requisite. That is a matter of primary importance.

6123. Is there any other subject that occurs to you on which you could give us any information?—I may say that as regards that period which you have alluded to, that is a matter, of course, in which I cannot be of any use to the Commission; it is a subject which will be dealt with, and can only be dealt with, by Lord Wolseley and Lord Lansdowne.

6124. Quite so. I only put it to you as a matter of administration?—Yes.

6125. (*Sir John Edge.*) Who is to decide when a serious possibility has arisen of having to send a force into the field?—The best answer I can give is to indicate that in this very case of the South African War the Secretary of State informed the Commander-in-Chief that there was a grave probability, under certain conditions, of an army having to be sent to South Africa. I think that that would be the moment, and not a moment later, when whatever force it was considered might be necessary to go into the field should be brought up to an absolute pitch of readiness by the expenditure of public money.

6126. Then I gather from that that the Cabinet must decide when that serious possibility arises?—The Cabinet alone are in possession of the information which can enable them to judge that there is a danger.

6127. It must be for the Cabinet to decide when the step is to be taken?—Yes.

6128. So that the responsibility would rest with the Cabinet?—Absolutely; the responsibility must always rest with the Cabinet, and entirely with the Cabinet.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

6129. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) (*To the witness.*) You mentioned the substitution of paper receipts for gold for articles commandeered. Were those paper receipts negotiable, or were they only made payable after the war?—They were only to be made payable after the war, the object being that money should not get into the hands of the fighting Boers.

6130. I understand; but they were only to be payable after the war?—Yes.

6131. They were not negotiable documents?—No; we laid down distinctly that they were not to be negotiable documents. On a previous occasion, as you may remember, I think it was the question of the abolition of slavery, we gave the money equivalent on paper to the Boers, and Jews went round the country collecting, and giving them a very small figure, and that was always held to be one of the great grievances which the Boers had against us.

6132. I had that in my mind when I asked the question whether they were negotiable documents?—They were not negotiable documents, but I am sorry to say I have heard since that some of the Boers parted with them for money. I think, however, that every measure was taken to prevent that, and I think the gentleman who bought them will find he made a bad bargain. It was very prominently brought to my notice before I left South Africa in reading up the history of South Africa, and one of the things I made a great point of was that whatever the organisation for the payment of these chits might be, one thing especially was to be guarded against, and that was the possibility of their being negotiated.

6133. You arrived at Pretoria about 17 months after the war began?—That is so.

6134. And therefore 14½ months before the war finished, so that for considerably more than half the war there was no one out there whose special function it was to watch expenditure; I am using your words?—There was, I believe, a gentleman, whose name I have forgotten, who was appointed at one period of the war what might be termed financial adviser to Lord Roberts. I think he was in a bank here; but I gathered from what I ascertained that he never took any part at all, and that the only thing he may have been consulted upon was in regard to the amount of specie which might be obtainable in one particular district on the advance of the troops, or something of that sort. There was nobody discharging any duties analogous to those I was called upon to discharge later.

6135. Is there no machinery in the War Office that has to look forward to that question in connection with wars?—No; I do not think there is; the whole machinery of the War Office is a machinery for dealing with accounts of money after it has been spent in the field.

6136. When a war takes place there is a very large expenditure by officers?—There is.

6137. And one would have thought there might have been some machinery in the War Office that would foresee that, and would provide?—I am not aware of any, and I am not aware of anybody having been attached to the Army for that specific purpose, either during the Nile Campaign, the Tel-el-Kebir Campaign, the Red River Expedition, or the Ashanti War.

6138. Coming to the question of the Standard Bank of South Africa, as you point out in your report, they made a very excellent profit during the early period?—They did.

6139. The headquarters of the Standard Bank is in London, is it not?—Yes; it is in London, I believe.

6140. That being the case, it might have been natural that there should have been some arrangement made with them here, without throwing that on the General in the field?—I do not know that it was thrown on the General in the field. The Army Paymaster acts as agent for the Treasury, and he would be in direct communication with the Treasury over any arrangement for the obtaining of specie.

6141. Then the arrangement with the Standard Bank, which you ratified and amended, had been an arrangement made by the Treasury?—Absolutely; and I must point out that I could not ratify or make any alteration in it; all I could do was to report home, and ask the Secretary of State to make representations to the Treasury, inasmuch as, although it was Imperial funds, it was Army money.

6142. So that no responsibility attaches to the War Office for the arrangement?—Absolutely none.

6143. Then, coming to the Natal and Cape Government Railways, I suppose the new terms you made with them were prospective, and not retrospective?—We got a certain amount of money back eventually as a set-off to claims they had against us; there was what I might call an adjustment account, so that I would not like to say we got no back money. We wiped out claims which would have come under the head of back money.

6144. And did those claims amount to any considerable proportion of what you would have recovered if your terms could have been made retrospective?—The actual adjustment of account was carried out after I left; I indicated the lines on which I thought it would be well to go, but it was, of course, a very long process, and a detailed process, which was finally carried into effect after I left.

6145. But there again there is no machinery in the War Office ready, when war is declared, to put itself in motion, for making terms with railways in different parts of the world?—No; that is a point I press when I say that the chief commander, so to speak, should have the ablest and the most serviceable man attached to him for that specific object. You never know, you cannot foresee, what conditions may arise in which the Commander-in-Chief finds himself negotiating with people whom he cannot coerce.

6146. But do you think, in the case of railways in our own Colonies, it would be necessary to throw any burden on the Commander-in-Chief at all, no matter by whom he might be advised? Could not those things be arranged prior to the war, or on the outbreak of war, by the home authorities?—It is very difficult to arrange everything prior to the outbreak of war; in connection, for instance, with the carriage of goods on the railways, you must bring in as a factor in the calculation the amount of defence of the property of the railway which the Army may be called upon to undertake, and in peace time it is very difficult to realise; and certainly, I do not believe that anybody realised in this country, that a relatively very small force of Boers could hold up the whole of the

railway system of South Africa. It would have been looked upon as out of the question.

6147. You gave evidence on the point, which all those who have been in South Africa have seen, of truck-loads of soldiers going up, all paying third class fares?—Yes.

6148. Surely a thing of that sort might have been foreseen?—Yes; it would have been foreseen at once by anybody who had not got a great burden of thought, so to speak, on more important matters. The General Officer naturally says, "Never mind what you bring them up in; bring up those troops as hard as you can."

6149. That is why I suggest that it should not be thrown on the General in the field, but should be arranged by the Home Department?—Yes, but I think it would be better to have a man with him who could devote himself to that particular class of negotiations when the emergency arose. For instance, would you ask the Canadian Pacific Railway to enter into a most detailed contract with us as to under what conditions they would carry troops for us in certain eventualities which I had better not indicate?

6150. In such a case as that do you not think that is an instance where it would be vastly better that the highest expert opinion in this country should be brought to bear on the subject, and should deal with the Canadian Government rather than that the General on the spot should have to do it, even with the financial adviser you might give him, and who would not be a first-class financial authority?—I do not think you want this great technical expert for it. It is only a business transaction. If you are to carry troops a certain distance under certain conditions all you want is a reasonable figure for which you can do it. You do not want to go into all those technicalities.

6151. Do you not find in business life that the higher the authority the better the action?—No, I do not.

6152. "Authority" including the practical man who has succeeded?—I am afraid I do not quite follow your line of argument.

6153. My point is this: Let us take your case of Canada and the eventuality you alluded to. Would there not be a much better chance of satisfactory terms being arranged here by experts of high authority and long experience than by the Commander-in-Chief in the country, aided by the general financial adviser whom you suggest he should have?—Well, I think, if I may say so without offence, you are magnifying the difficulty. In this specific case of the Natal railways the thing was practically an oversight. We had a peace contract with the Natal Railway when we had a very small force garrisoning the country, and when it was no advantage to the Natal Railway to carry our men or our parcels, for they really came to parcels, except at the ordinary peace rates, and it would have been unreasonable of us to have attempted to get them to do so. Where the lack of foresight took place was when the military operations commenced and Ladysmith was invested, or before that even, and the military authorities failed to realise that they would be paying peace rates, which were acceptable for a small number of men and a very light consignment of goods, on the whole Army and its supplies; but you do not require a technical expert in London to deal with it. All you need to have is a man not occupied in the actual military operations to say, "I must look into this. I will go round to the railway company and make better terms."

6154. Does it not strike you that we have the machinery at the War Office for dealing with all these questions—there are several of them I have alluded to—and such matters could not be overlooked by them, and would probably be much better done?—I am rather averse to having an enormous machinery at headquarters which professes and attempts to deal with every conceivable eventuality. My experience leads me to think you will always find something abnormal in the condition you have to deal with in war, and even if you have your machinery at headquarters, and to a large extent your schemes pre-arranged, I think you will still require financial assistance when the time comes if you are going to carry the thing through satisfactorily.

6155. Taking those three points I have referred to—the supervision of expenditure, the importation of money, and the carriage of troops by railways—those are not abnormal questions not likely to arise, but they are questions which must arise in every war?—There is no objection whatever to dealing with those three points from the standpoint of preparation.

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6156. That is my whole point?—If I may be allowed to point this out, if you come to the terms in connection with the raising of specie, you are largely dependent on the state of the Money Market, and you are largely dependent on the amount of money in the country, the balances of the banks at the time being in the country, and you are largely dependent upon the facilities for transporting specie. You could not lay down the exact rates in anticipation of a war.

6157. Then I fall back on my previous question: Is not the headquarters of the Standard Bank in this country?—Yes, it is. I take it you mean that the negotiations which took place at the outbreak of the war would have been better carried on in London than in South Africa?

6158. I suggest three things. I suggest that the War Office might have been prepared before the war, and had a system for watching expenditure; I suggest that the negotiations with the Standard Bank would have been better carried on by the headquarters in London with the headquarters of the Standard Bank in London; and I suggest that the arrangements with the railways in our colonies would have been better carried on here than by the General on the spot?—Yes; but I must point out, with regard to one, that the War Office has absolutely nothing to say to the arrangements made with the Standard Bank.

6159. I suppose they had to make the application to the Treasury for the money?—No, it is purely a Treasury Chest matter. I travelled out of my province to deal with it at all.

6160. Still, you did deal with it?—Yes, because I thought it my duty, when I saw money, as I thought, wasted, to draw attention to it; but it was nothing whatever to do with the Office.

6161. My question did not refer to the War Office only, but to the War Office and Treasury?—Then I agree with you entirely on that point. I would like parenthetically to say that I have no knowledge whatever as to whether there was or was not close intercourse between the Standard Bank and the Treasury. There probably was, and that would have been in London. I know nothing about the transactions; I only dealt with the case as I found it.

6162. Only it seems improbable, seeing the rates given in your report, that the Treasury here had agreed to them?—Oh, no. I think the matter, in point of fact, was entirely dealt with by the Treasury at home.

6163. Coming to the Army Pay Department, I understand that now in the field they simply act as bankers paying cheques over the counter, and they are not entitled to question the cost of any bill presented to them?—Lord Kitchener uses his paymasters, or tried to, very much more as financiers than they ever had the training for, or than I think they had any reason to be expected to be called upon; but, generally speaking, the paymaster has very little to say.

6164. According to Regulation?—According to Regulations. Mr. Marzials, the Accountant-General, would be the best person to give you the details, but I certainly would be very much surprised to find that a paymaster was for one moment expected to control expenditure.

6165. I would hardly say "control expenditure." My case was this—that supposing an account were presented to him ——?—He would pay.

6166. Although he might see that the articles on it were three or four times the value?—Yes; so long as he had his vouchers, I apprehend, speaking subject to correction, his duty would be simply to meet it—in fact, I am pretty sure of it.

6167. Did you go to Kimberley?—Yes.

6168. Did you go into the question of the De Beers Account?—No, there was nothing going on at Kimberley, except a certain number of bullets.

6169. Did you see the De Beers account?—Yes.

6170. Could you speak of it from personal knowledge?—I would prefer not to speak of it, because it did not come before me officially.

6171. Do you not think it might be an advantage if the Army Pay Department were allowed to report to

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the General on excessive charges?—The whole drift, if I may say so of the remarks I made this morning, was to that effect. I want to have a hierarchy, so to speak, of the Pay Department, which would be in the position of acting in a sense as financial assistants to the officers.

6172. But even the lower departments should have a power of reporting to the General, or some superior officer?—We are drifting rather into a discussion of what the Department might be if it were totally different to what it is, but I take it the best plan would be to separate the two, and to let the junior, the inferior branch, deal merely with the work they do now, and have a few higher class men.

6173. You mean the higher class men could not be spread over the whole country?—It would be quite open to the higher class men, if I may so put it, to issue instructions to the lower class men to bring certain things to their notice.

6174. My question really comes to that—that you would recommend that the higher class men should make that their practice?—It is very difficult to recommend in regard to a non-existing state of affairs, but I can see that it would obviously be the result of being in charge of the Department.

6175. There is no harm in putting that into the Regulations?—Not the slightest.

6176. You referred just now to the question of officers in the War Office being brought into the Departments and men also—clerks—and we had evidence the other day that the recommendations of the Dawkins Committee had been carried out in that respect?—The recommendations of the Dawkins Committee, which have been carried out, are the substitution of military men for civilian clerks in the military branches. That much has been carried out.

6177. Are you quite sure that the recommendations of the Committee have been carried out?—Up to that point, yes.

6178. For instance, Number 13 says (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 290): "To remove the Higher Division clerks from the Military Departments, replacing them by military officers with the proviso that adequate continuity is preserved"?—Yes.

6179. And in the right hand column, which states what has been done, it says: "Retired officers, or those about to retire, are being employed in place of the Higher Division clerks," which is quite a different thing from a junior officer on active service?—I think so; I indicated that this morning. I say that, as I read it, the Dawkins recommendation has been carried out up to the point of substituting military men—I do not say active or passive, but military men for civilians.

6180. I did not know that you drew special attention to that, and I think that makes the whole distinction—whether you have an active or a passive man?—I pointed that out this morning, but that is not my paper you have there.

6181. No, I am examining you on a War Office paper. As regards the men, the recommendation of the Dawkins Committee, No. 14, was: "To replace Second Division clerks in the Military Departments by carefully selected soldier clerks"?—Well, I should not call them soldier clerks myself; but they were, of course, soldiers, and they are now becoming clerks.

6182. Whereas "pensioned warrant and non-commissioned officers are being appointed"?—Yes, that is so.

6183. (*Sir John Edge.*) You spoke about the want of business arrangements at the commencement in Cape Colony?—Yes.

6184. Did you find there was no business-like system of purchase out there when you went?—Certainly not what I should call a business-like system. You must remember this is only a summary of my report, and I have endeavoured to show that the condition of affairs was certainly not what you would describe as a business-like system of buying.

6185. Was that business of purchasing at that time carried on by men who had been trained for that purpose?—No; that is the point which the Director-General of Ordnance made when he came to deal with his own officer who suffered in consequence of these purchases, and he protested, saying: "You try men, or, at all events, you charge men with incapacity and with worse, and you forget that these men are not allowed in peace time to buy so much as a broom handle, and you suddenly put all this work upon them, and expect them to be as good as a City business man."

6186. If your view was adopted, you think that would be avoided in the future?—It seems to me, if you developed the system which is already in force in the Army Service Corps for the supplies of the Army, and you applied it to Ordnance, you would, *ipso facto*, get men with experience as regards the purchase of stores. Now in the Colonies and in South Africa, the purchases were all locally made, and you have your central buyer in London, and he may be a heaven-born central buyer, but he does not come in, in war time, and he does not, in point of fact, come in in the Colonies. In the Colonies the purchases are so small that it really does not matter, but in war time, as I said, the payments made to contractors were over thirteen million pounds, and untrained men had to carry through all those, except what I would call *munitions de bouche*, and the large Ordnance contracts were made by men with no experience in buying at all.

6187. Who had no experience practically in going into the market and getting the best terms?—That is so, and of course in that particular case they naturally were at the mercy of every broker and every rascal who could get at them.

6188. I gather that you think if these men had been properly trained those excessive charges would have been avoided to a great extent?—Of course, you might have a bad man or a good man, and he might show at a disadvantage or at a great advantage under any system, but at any rate you would cut from under their feet the reasonable protest that they are called upon to discharge in war time what they have had absolutely no experience of in peace time, and I think it a perfectly reasonable protest.

6189. I suppose under the present system the same thing that occurred at Cape Town may be expected to occur again?—Given the same conditions, I have very little doubt it would. You might have perhaps a modification, because you might have a better man or a stronger man at the head, but I would like to point out that with regard to this case at Cape Town the man with whom I had to find most fault was undoubtedly a man of capacity and of great energy, and I am not sure if you got a man who was perhaps more careful in other ways, but who lacked his energy and his capacity, you might not get just as bad a result. Unless you have the training, I do not see how a man is to buy successfully.

6190. Taking it all round, the chances would be that this enormous extra expenditure would have been avoided if you had had trained men?—Certainly; and if there is no change in the system, and given the same or analogous conditions, it is my belief you will have the same result.

6191. Were some of the supplies that were sent, we will say to Bloemfontein, diverted on the road?—Well, in war time you will easily understand it is not an infrequent occurrence to have a leakage in transit, you cannot avoid it; for instance, a Column Commander comes into a junction, and he is under orders—his orders are to start at once for somewhere else; well, if he is worth his salt he will loot the train that is in the station before he goes, and that train will come up short of what it started with.

6192. You mean he will take the things forcibly from the train?—Yes, you take anything you can get when you are put in that position.

6193. And, possibly, give no receipt for it?—Oh, no; there literally would not be time, and every man would be ordered to take his rations and come away. I am giving an extreme case, but one which might occur, and I believe did occur.

6194. Theoretically, I suppose, the man at Bloemfontein, to whom they were consigned, would be held responsible?—Yes, unless he protected himself by saying that these abstracted goods had not arrived. What they did was to accept the train, and write off deficits against excess in hand elsewhere. That I think would not appeal to a business man as a sound transaction. That was the difficulty; it was a very easy, rough and ready, pleasant way of dealing with it, but I think it was indefensible.

6195. You do not suggest that any large quantity of stores was stolen on the road?—Oh, no.

6196. They were taken for military purposes in these cases you are mentioning?—There was peculation no doubt, but there always is.

6197. But that would be to a small extent?—Yes, you have it on the railways at home; there is an appre-

ciable amount of stuff lost in transit. There was no wholesale evil in that respect, and it might have occurred one way or another.

6198. The supposed instance you gave us would, of course, be taking them for military purposes?—Yes.

6199. And necessary purposes?—Oh, yes; still from the point of view of reasonable accounting it is I think, a mistake to assume that everything is quite right.

6200. I quite agree with you, I only want to see exactly what the state of affairs was. Now with regard to commandeering, I gather that you commandeered for what were necessaries for the Army, and you also commandeered so as to remove instruments of war, horses and things of that sort, that might be used by the enemy against us?—At the later stage when I was in South Africa, I should say the commandeering was extremely expensive, from two standpoints: One was that we had to pay for what we commandeered, and the commandeered supply was often absolutely useless. For instance, we commandeered every mare in foal, simply to remove every four-legged beast from the sphere of action. The moment they got to the high veldt they were all dead, and the foals the same. I was present when 90,000 sheep passed between Bloemfontein through Irene Camp to Pretoria. The loss was something terrific on the road, and when we got them to Pretoria, we actually had to issue double fresh meat rations to the troops, because the single fresh meat ration was so inferior to the Maconochie tin.

6201. From the driving?—Yes, they were all fevered, so that we lost money both ways, but it was unavoidable.

6202. Such commandeering, as there was, was purely for military purposes, either in one shape or the other?—Yes, either to benefit the Army or injure the enemy.

6203. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) With respect to the deficiency caused, possibly by goods being taken *en route*, and sometimes necessarily taken, I suppose there is something in the nature of a way bill which goes up with these goods to the consignee?—Yes.

6204. Would not the simple course and the straightforward course be for that officer, the consignee, simply to report: "I have received so much less"?—That is what I wished done when I drew attention to what I call the irregularity of the previous procedure. You must not take it that this is going on now.

6205. The other arrangement of setting it off against some goods that might be 600 miles off was surely a very stupid arrangement, and a very involved one?—I am afraid it was.

6206. The plan I have mentioned seems such a straightforward way to do it, simply for the officer to say: "I am informed that such-and-such goods have been taken away *en route* by General So-and-so"?—Obviously it is better to write off a loss than to pretend it has not occurred. That class of thing is attributable to the old system at the War Office of fighting over every shilling spent in war time. I think it is obvious that when there are operations in the field, you must go at losses, and write them off in a very different spirit to what you do in dealing with home accounts under peace conditions, and that in the past was not fully recognised. I think it is very likely, owing to the officers having been trained in such a condition of fear about showing a deficit, that this class of thing was done to avoid it.

6207. With respect to the training of military men to take the work of really commercial men, I understand you would begin at the very bottom of the ladder?—Yes.

6208. You would take in the first instance the soldier clerks in the orderly-room, and you would take the best of them, and bring them up to the War Office?—Yes.

6209. You would train them to your methods?—Yes, I would give them a larger purview.

6210. And then return them to their former avocation?—I should take them to a great many places in these large military districts, created under the Army Corps system. I do not know where they are to find the men to do the work.

6211. And then you would take others on in their places?—Yes, a constant mill.

6212. Then you would go to a higher stage with respect to the paymasters?—Yes.

6213. And you would allocate the simple duty of paying out cash to a certain class of paymaster, but with the superior class of paymaster you would educate him to a higher standard?—Broadly speaking, yes.

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6214. So as to enable him to be able to contract, to enter into small contracts in the first instance and larger contracts afterwards?—No. He would have nothing to do with the contracts, the two things are separate—the contracting and the paymaster's business. I think the system which obtains in the supply department in the Army Service Corps is the best, and I would let the Ordnance officers be trained to contract work, and to do their own contracts, and keep my Pay Department quite separate for what you might call the general control over expenditure.

6215. Then the principal Financial Adviser of the Commander-in-Chief would only, so to speak, check the contracts that had been made?—I would like him to be even a bigger man than that; he would only deal with very large contracts like Weil's contract for transport, and the cold meat storage contracts. Those are contracts that could never have been accepted as they stood if there had been proper——

6216. Supervision?—That is so.

6217. From what class would you take the men who are to be the financial advisers, say, of a brigadier-general?—That is what I would train my superior paymasters, if I may so call them, to do, with that specific object in view.

6218. Because they also would have to make contracts occasionally?—No, the contracts would be made as they are now where soldiers do make the contracts, by the officers of the military department which deals with the stuff purchased. For instance, if it is a question of hay, the Quartermaster-General's officers buy the hay, and he has trained men to do it; but the Ordnance Department have no voice in the purchase of a yard of cloth or shoe nails or a piece of sheet iron.

6219. At page 5 of your report (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 305, you say: "This waste appears to be attributable to insufficient preparation and organisation before hostilities, lack of forethought," etc., etc. What class of officer is responsible for that?—The officer held responsible was the principal ordnance officer at Cape Town. He was held responsible, and very properly so, because he was the head of the Ordnance Department which has to provide and furnish the Army with ordnance stores; but the poor man had never had any experience of buying. The demands on the Ordnance Department were far in excess of anything which could have been contemplated, and he had to go and buy in the open market everything he could lay his hands upon, such as clothing, wagons, harness, water bottles, and everything of which there is the detail in my report. If he had only lacked business methods in purchasing these goods he might have made no doubt a number of errors, but I felt it my duty to represent that there was more than that. I do not think I need go into it now, as he was placed on the Retired List; but that is a case which I think is a very notable example of the evil of the present system. These unfortunate officers in Cape Town were called upon to expend millions of money in buying articles for the troops, and up to that date they probably would have been severely rebuked if they had bought anything worth more than £100. At the present moment, subject to correction—and you might ask the Director of Contracts whether I am wrong or right—I am under the impression that under no condition can any ordnance contract be made out locally for more than £25, and it is only in case of extreme emergency that they may make a contract for £100, and these are the very men who had to spend millions sterling at short notice in Cape Town, and without whose expenditure the Army could not have advanced. It is not fair to them, and it is ruinous to the taxpayer.

6220. In point of fact, the course you have suggested to-day you think might probably get rid of this in the future?—I think if you train your officers in peace time in the duties which they are called upon to discharge in war time you protect yourself to a very large extent, if not altogether—at any rate, to a very large extent—against the recurrence of those evils I have pointed out.

6221. In point of fact, the preparations for war and the necessary purchases in preparing for war ought to be carried out on commercial principles and by men trained as commercial men?—I would put it in this way if I may, that as in war time a certain class of man is the only man that can discharge those duties you had better make him as much of a business man

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as you possibly can before the emergency arises, and when you have time to train him at home in peace time. The only way in which you can do that is by letting him discharge the duties in peace time under supervision and during a period of training which he will have to discharge when the emergency arises in the field.

6222. With respect to the Army Board of which you are a member, you say that at present a proposal may come from one department which may in point of fact affect other departments, and that may go before the Commander-in-Chief or the Secretary of State without the other departments being consulted in the first instance with respect to it?—It might so happen. The Army Board precludes the possibility of it.

6223. If they are consulted the proposal might then go to the Commander-in-Chief in a modified way so as to meet the objections of the other departments?—Quite so. I indicated a suppositious case where the Adjutant-General might put forward a large claim for cavalry, and at the Army Board meeting the Quartermaster-General might say, "My dear Adjutant-General, do not ask for those, because we cannot house the horses." Then they would talk it over, and we would come to the conclusion that it was waste of time to ask for what you could not provide accommodation for.

6224. Do you not think that the Army Board ought to be a board which should meet, say, at certain stated intervals?—I do. I think it would be an excellent thing if the Army Board met once a week even if there was not business to transact. It would be quite simple to send round a note to say that there was no business before the board. I believe that takes place sometimes in the City, that boards meet, and there is nothing before them except to confirm the minutes of the last board.

6225. There ought to be a Board day, in point of fact?—I think so; but, of course, you must take that as purely my own personal view, and it must not appear to be criticising the present arrangement, because it has been adopted after mature consideration.

6226. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I think at the present time the Director of Contracts is a civilian?—Yes.

6227. And I think your suggestion was that it would be better if the Director of Contracts were a military man?—No, I am afraid I have not made myself clear—certainly not. I think you must either have a Director of Contracts or you must have an assistant Accountant General discharging the duties of Registrar and Auditor of Contracts. I see no objection to retaining the Director of Contracts, and, on the contrary, I think it might be advisable.

6228. I thought you instanced the case of an engine, and said that offers for engines might come before the Director of Contracts, who might not have the technical knowledge to decide which was the better engine, as one engine might be a more economical one than the other, and so on, and in a case like that a military man, with better technical knowledge, would be the better man to fix the contract?—Yes, but he would be an officer of the Ordnance Department, presumably the officer who required the engine, and your Director of Contracts is still wanted, or, as I would prefer to call him, Inspector of Contracts, or Controller of Contracts, or something of that sort.

6229. He would be the man who actually signed the contract?—No, I want the Director-General of Ordnance to make his contract, and then the contract, once it was made and finished, would come under review. I do not know whether you are acquainted (and, perhaps, it would not take me a minute to explain it) with the system under which we work?

6230. Not very well?—In Great Britain all local contracts come up for review, that is to say, after the contracts are made for food supplies, transports, scavengering, fire, and light, by the General Officer of the district. The Director of Contracts does not touch it until it is done. That is the case with what we call *munitions de bouche*, but on the other side, where you have the ordnance supplies——

6231. Larger items?—Often larger items, including of course, clothing, blankets, hospital requisites, etc. The Ordnance officers and the General Officer of the district are not allowed to buy, and it is only done by the Director of Contracts at headquarters.

6232. In that case the Director of Contracts, if he requires any information or any expert advice can call in technical men?—Yes; and he does it in close relation with them, but my point is that whereas in the case of the *munitions de bouche* your officers are buying during peace time, and their work is examined, reviewed, and audited by the Director of Contracts, and they are therefore able, when a war comes, to buy in the field, because they are doing it every day in peace time; with the *munitions de guerre*, or, as they are called, the hardware of the Army, you do not allow your Ordnance officers to buy anything. You make your Director of Contracts buy for them, and when a war breaks out you have, on the one hand, your supply officer thoroughly conversant with his work, and who buys without any scandal and without any difficulty and without any extravagance, and you have on the other hand your Ordnance officer quickly called upon to buy what he wants, but absolutely inexperienced in so doing, and that I cannot believe to be a good system.

6233. I see the disadvantage there; but on the other hand, I suppose we may take it that, as a rule, a military man, when he comes to take up commercial matters, does not usually turn out exceptionally well?—I agree.

6234. From that point of view, do you not think that for that important position of Director of Contracts you are better with a non-military man?—I want him to be a non-military man.

6235. But I understand you wish the Director-General of Ordnance to fix his own contracts?—I do not want you to suppose for one moment that I would advocate putting any business in the hands of officers. I do not, if you can avoid their having to do the business; but my point is that when it comes to war your officers, and your officers alone, will have to do that business transaction.

6236. In the field?—In the field during war time, and that being so, it seems to me that you not only have great extravagance and mismanagement, but you may run the risk of a complete breakdown if you do not train them in peace time. I think the Army Service Corps men do their work admirably, but I am not prepared to say that a loaf baked by the Army is either as good or as cheap as that baked by a civilian baker; it may or may not be.

6237. It comes to this, that in peace time you see no objection to the present arrangement of a Civil Director of Contracts?—I see great objection, because if you carry it on in peace time you have not trained the men for war. If you want economy and extreme efficiency during peace time you will get it better by employing civilians than by employing soldiers, but the whole question is whether, as you have to throw over those civilians and employ soldiers the moment it comes to a war, it is not more prudent, as well as wiser, and in the end more economical, to train your soldiers in peace time.

6238. Do you see any reason why a civilian trained during peace time should not take the position of an important buyer at the war?—Well, I do not think you can do that; that has been suggested, and you might do it in the case of one large base, but I do not believe, as I have indicated this morning, it is either possible or advisable, or likely to be successful, if you have an army of civilians attached to an army of soldiers.

6239. Your opinion is that they must be military?—Yes.

6240. I think you told us on the question of disinclination to incur expenditure that the recommendations from the Army Board go to the Secretary of State, and he may recommend, and it goes before the Treasury branch?—Of course the recommendations of the Army Board may be in regard to matters for which money has already been voted, in which case we do not require to go to the Treasury.

6241. But I am assuming it is a case where you require to go to the Treasury?—Yes, any expenditure of money either in excess of the Votes, or involving a transfer from one Vote to another, has to be referred to the Treasury for Treasury sanction.

6242. Then you told us that you thought that no reasonable requisition had been refused?—Well, what I meant to imply was that I think where a really large and important measure has been advocated as essential by the War Office, when it has been clearly and distinctly put to the Treasury, or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I think the money has been forthcoming. I do not say that military demands have not been refused, they have, but it is possible that some of them may have been quite unreasonable.

6243. For instance, we have had it in evidence that months before war was declared suggestions were made for the purchase of more guns?—Yes.

6244. And for the sending out of more men?—Yes.

6245. That really failed on account of the refusal to supply the means?—I think I dealt with that point when I said that I think there ought to be an automatic sequence as regards that, and that what is wanted for preparation for war should be granted forthwith.

6246. When it has been decided that there is the risk of it?—Yes.

6247. In the case I refer to, if months before it was shown by the experts that these guns were necessary, and that it might be a wise thing to incur the expenditure of sending more troops out, and that was not done owing to this refusal to incur the expenditure, I think we may say that that was a mistake?—Yes, I think that is quite obvious; it must have been a mistake; but I must point out that any large expenditure of that class, involving millions for an Army Corps, would be dealt with entirely by the Cabinet. It would not be a question of the Treasury and War Office, it would be a Cabinet question.

6248. That, I understand. We heard that suggestions had been made for expenditure in surveys and mapping, and in the way of obtaining private information by the Intelligence Department; those would be questions that would be settled by the Secretary of State and the Treasury?—Yes; those two questions would very probably be settled when the Estimates were framed. When I said I never remembered a good case in which money had been refused, you must not take it that I mean in the ordinary everyday course of carrying on the business of the office. Everything has to be taken in relation to other things. You cannot have an unlimited supply of money, and it is obviously ridiculous to ask for an unlimited supply, and the Secretary of State would naturally allot the money, according to his lights, acting on the advice of the military authorities, to what was the more important object. What I was indicating was rather that where you have had a large measure of reform, for instance, I have two in my mind like the Fortification Loan of Mr. Stanhope, with which I had a good deal to do, and the Armament Loan of Mr. Stanhope, and the defence of the coaling stations, where it has been put forward in a really businesslike form, and the proof of its necessity has been made amply apparent, my experience is that the House of Commons has always voted the money.

6249. In this case we have been told the reason why they did not was the risk of precipitating the war?—I understand that is the recognised and accepted reason.

6250. With regard to the Cape railways and the rates, in a case of that kind could these railways not have been commandeered?—No. I do not think you could commandeer the railway of Natal. Natal was an independent colony, and it was assisting us in every way it could.

6251. You were bound to make ordinary arrangements?—Yes; I do not think you could commandeer the railways of a friendly and independent colony. Of course, you *could* commandeer anything.

6252. Not when the Boers were invading the town?—There was no object in it. The Commander-in-Chief would certainly have commandeered the railway if he had been met by obstruction. If the Natal railways had refused to move troops, the process would have been short and sharp, we would have taken over the railways; but quite the contrary was the case, and I would like to make that very clear indeed, that nothing struck me so much as the magnificent readiness of everybody in Natal to assist the Imperial Government.

6253. And in Cape Colony was it the same?—I was better acquainted with Natal, and the Natal railways were worked in a most magnificently loyal way. It was only as I was dealing with it from the purely financial aspect that I had to draw attention to the fact that the terms were onerous; but so impressed was I by the magnificent conduct of the Natalians and the Natal railways in business transactions, that I urged Lord Kitchener most strongly not to bring it to anything like an acrimonous footing, and that is why I went to Durban myself, and talked it over across the table with Hunter.

6254. Are the Natal railways Government railways?—Yes.

6255. Had you anything to do with the fixing of rates with the Cape Colony railways?—Yes, I had a great deal to do with it, but that was rather paper work; we fought them and got a reduction.

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6256. Do you mean to say that you were as well met by the Cape railways?—I fancy so: I do not think there was any disinclination to assist.

6257. You were well met in both cases?—The terms with the Cape railways were infinitely better for us than the terms with the Natal railways.

6258. You spoke of peace rates; had you in mind that the war rates should be higher than the peace rates in a case of that kind?—No; the very opposite.

6259. They could not carry on their traffic?—Not only that, but, obviously, if you send a few dozen men you are not going to get a great reduction. If you send six trusses of hay by railway you will have to pay the ordinary commercial rate, but if you say that I am to send 20 train loads of hay up, I want special terms, especially if it is to be 20 train loads a week.

6260. (*Viscount Esher.*) Putting special training for war out of the question altogether, am I right in thinking that you indicate that a civilian Director of Contracts would be likely to enter into more satisfactory contracts than the military head of the department for whom the contracts were being entered into?—I did not quite catch your question.

6261. I thought you rather indicated in answer to a question that you thought the civilian Director of Contracts in peace time, putting all the special training for war out of consideration, would be more likely to enter into satisfactory contracts than the military head of the department concerned?—That was in connection generally with the aptitude for business of civilians versus soldiers, and I should think that was so.

6262. Take the Ordnance Branch; do you not think the present head of the Ordnance Branch, for instance, is perfectly well able to take care of himself?—Certainly. The present head of the Ordnance Branch is a man of very exceptional attainments and capacity.

6263. But, apart from the present head of the Ordnance Branch, does it not strike you that the man likely to be appointed the head of the Ordnance Branch would be as capable of entering into a contract for ammunition, for instance, as the Director of Contracts?—I do think so. I think what I indicated in answer to a question was that, generally speaking, I was not prepared to say that a soldier made as good a man of business as a civilian.

6264. Is not really the important thing the after check on the contracts and the examination of the price?—Yes. At present we have this remarkable state of affairs, that the Director of Contracts, who places contracts to a very large figure, expresses satisfaction with himself after he has done it, which would not be the case if you had the Director of Ordnance making his contracts, and then your civil officer, whatever you call him, reviewing them, as he does now the contracts of the Supply Department.

6265. That is a better system, and a right system of administration?—I should say most certainly.

6266. Now, let us go a step further. With regard to these financial advisers of Army Corps, are they responsible for the examination of bills?—I must tell the Commission quite frankly that I do not yet clearly understand what the functions of these auditors are; there would appear to be merged in one official the duties of auditor, financial adviser, and accountant, and I may be quite wrong—I daresay I am—but I have been trained in a school which does not look upon auditing and accounting and financial advising as one and the same. I think it is advisable to keep the three functions separate.

6267. They have been appointed in consequence of the principle of decentralisation?—Yes; and if given certain duties I think they would discharge them very satisfactorily, and that it would be an improvement.

6268. I suppose that the Commander of an Army Corps—Sir Evelyn Wood, for example, as Commander of the Second Army Corps—is empowered to incur expenditure?—Oh, yes.

6269. If he incurs expenditure, are the bills examined by this financial adviser and his branch?—Yes; I believe that, with some exceptions which have to come up to headquarters, the idea is that the examination of

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the military accounts of the district ought to take place in the so-called audit office in the district.

6270. And that auditor is responsible not to the officer commanding the Army Corps, but to the Financial Secretary?—Yes.

6271. That is a perfectly proper system?—It is perfectly proper, but, at the same time, he has to act as financial adviser.

6272. You object to his double capacity?—Very strongly.

6273. But your suggestion was rather to substitute for these financial advisers attached to these Army Corps military men?—No, I would like to make the paymaster a better trained and consequently an abler man, and let the Commanding Officer turn to him for advice.

6274. But you would not propose to abolish these civilians attached?—No, certainly not, and I hope that is quite plain from my evidence. So long as you take the auditor in the Army Corps district as simply a piece of the War Office taken from here and put there as a financial branch, nothing could be better, but directly you take that man from the accounts branch and turn him into all sorts of things besides, then I think you run the risk of a mistake, and difficulties have arisen already. In a district a question has arisen as to whether the War Office official who is called local auditor, can call for documents and do acts of that character without the authority, and possibly even in opposition to the wishes, of the General Officer Commanding the Army Corps.

6275. You were connected with the Army Clothing Department for a long time?—Yes, I was at the head of it for six years.

6276. What was the change made when you left the Army Clothing Department?—The Army Clothing Department was an entity by itself, as it were; it was a self-contained department, and it was the remains of a very old system, when the Director of Clothing was by Order in Council answerable for the provision, supply, and maintenance of clothing and necessaries for the troops, and owing to its not being a very prominent department, I think the peculiar conditions under which it was established were rather lost sight of, and in the various changes which took place at the War Office the status, independence, and power of the Director of Clothing were always laid down in this repeated very short Order in Council, and I think it worked very well, although it is not for me to say so. When the change took place, when the Ordnance factories were placed under a military man, under the Director-General of Ordnance, and removed from the authority and command, so to speak, of the Financial Secretary, it was felt that the Army Clothing Department, which was essentially an Ordnance work, ought to be brought within the system, and at that moment there was a vacancy at the War Office for the post I at present hold, and the opportunity was taken to bring me up to Pall Mall and to merge the Royal Army Clothing Department in the general arrangement of Ordnance factories.

6277. And so it has remained?—And so it has remained.

6278. You have seen all the telegrams that passed between the War Department and the Indian Government at the commencement of the war?—Yes.

6279. And the great demands which were made upon India for boots especially, and clothing of various kinds?—Yes, putties and so on.

6280. How is it that we were unable to obtain sufficient supplies here?—I think that the demand was so far in excess of anything which was anticipated, and the waste was so far in excess of anything which had before taken place, that we had to buy wherever we could.

6281. That would be perfectly true if these demands had been made when we had 170,000 or 200,000 troops in South Africa, but these demands commenced almost immediately; how do you account for that?—I account for it to a great extent in this way; when I went to Pimlico at the head of that department, there was practically no reserve of clothing; I realised that this was a very grave state of affairs; I pressed very hard indeed for a reserve of clothing, and I would have liked to have built up the whole of my reserve at once, but obviously tha would have been a very expensive way of doing it, and an unreasonable demand to make on the Government, so I suggested that although it was of paramount importance to obtain these reserves at the earliest possible moment, yet having gone carefully into the matter and having found that there was no storage room, and that storage houses would have to be built in all the military centres, I said, "In view of that let us build up this reserve over a period of so many years," and that was done, and I think if it had not been that that was done we could not have gone to war at all. But irrespective of that, the supply of clothing was laid down "so many coats, so many men," or "so many men, so many coats," and I think that one of the reasons why at the beginning of the war we required so much more reserve clothing, was that it had never been anticipated that so large a force would be sent out of the country.

6282. As one Army Corps even?—I think we had enough for the First Army Corps.

6283. It would not appear to be so from those telegrams sent to India at the very commencement of the war?—Yes, but was not that to fill up deficiencies tha had been created here by the fitting out of the Army Corps? Even if you lay down your stock, the moment you have issued it, or that you must look forward to issuing it, you have at once a great call upon you which cannot be met straight away, in this country, perhaps. I mean, if I may put it so, that the bigger your reserve the bigger your demand on the trade for refilling it when it is depleted. Perhaps I might point out that when I talk of a reserve of clothing I do not mean a huge reserve for eventualities; I mean clothing for the reservists. Sir Henry Brackenbury made a great point of that in his Minute which is before you (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 278), where he represented that we were inadequately provided for war, but what had been looked upon as sufficient, or at any rate to a great extent what had been furnished, was clothing for the reservists, and that was there, and they were clothed without difficulty or delay, but the moment you empty your warehouses you must get stuff to put into them again, and I think that is the reason we had to go to India and elsewhere, just as we had to go to Hungary and America for horses, as we cleared every horse out of the country here.

6284. With regard to the Rhodesian Field Force, you had a good deal to do with that?—Yes, I had a great deal to do with that.

6285. Was any contribution made towards the expense of that force by the Chartered Company?—I would prefer that you should take the financial aspect of the Rhodesian Field Force from the Accountant-General, and I will tell you frankly why—not because I do not want to tell you the little I know, but I know next to nothing. My efforts were concentrated in getting that force out, and I was not interested in who was to pay for it; that was a matter for adjustment afterwards, and as I ceased to be interested in the force I ceased equally to be interested in the adjustment.

6286. You ceased to be interested in the force at what point?—Once I had got it out.

6287. (*Chairman.*) With regard to the boots, was it not the case that one reason for the deficiency in boots in this country was that hand-sewn boots were required, and they could not be got?—Yes, the hand-sewn boot represents an industry which has died out; you can make so much more money by machine-made boots than by hand-make boots, that men will not teach their boys the trade.

6288. And apparently in no place but the villages of Northamptonshire could you get them?—In Leicester and Northampton.

6289. I think in the course of your evidence you referred to the Weil contract, and I understood you to mean the contract for the ox wagons?—Yes, for transport.

6290. And I thought you took exception to that contract?—No, I said it was all settled before I went out. It was a matter which was so pressing that Lord Kitchener took that in hand himself, and I think it was after he had dealt with the Weil contract that he came to the conclusion that it was essential that he should have somebody out to take that class of work off his hands.

6291. The contract for the ox wagons, do you mean?—The transport; Weil contracted for the whole transport of the Army.

6292. I think we had it that that was all done before Lord Kitchener went out at all?- Lord Kitchener was face to face with continuing the contract or with break-

ing the contract, and I think it was largely owing to the enormous amount of work which was thrown upon him when he determined to break that contract, that he asked for a man from home.

6293. You do not mean to say, that you take exception to the contract as a contract?—Well, I never had to do with it, but I must say I think it is difficult for anyone to say whether it was a good, bad, or indifferent contract who was not there at the moment. If the contract enabled the Army to march, and there was no other way of enabling the Army to march, it was an excellent contract whatever it cost, but undoubtedly certain features became apparent in connection with the contract which showed that everything had not been sufficiently safeguarded.

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6294. It was represented to us as a good contract to be carried out for the purpose, and that the ox wagons were forthcoming?—Oh, yes; I said to Lord Kitchener that I thought Weil, if anything, had been a little hardly treated, although there were very unpleasant incidents. It was rather the Cold Meat Storage contract that I was referring to.

6295. I think you put them both together?—Then I am obliged to you for letting me correct that.

Mr. Alfred Major, Director of Army Contracts, called and examined.

Mr. A. Major.

6296. (*Chairman.*) You are Director of Army Contracts?—Yes.

6297. And you have been so for a long time?—Over seven years.

6298. The office memorandum on the subject says that: "The Director of Army Contracts is charged, in concert with the Supply Departments, with the purchase, sale, or hire of all supplies, stores, clothing, and buildings required for the Army which are not within the powers of purchase specially assigned to heads of Supply Departments, and to General Officers Commanding"; and then it lays down regulations; that is, the power under which you work?—That is so.

6299. I do not think it necessary for us to take you in detail through the procedure in your office, because you have been examined quite recently, and that evidence before the War Office Contracts Committee is before us, and we need not trouble you to repeat it; but your duty is to purchase when you receive a requisition from a department?—That is so.

6300. When you receive those requisitions you issue advertisements to the trade?—We issue tenders to the trade as a general rule; there is an annual advertisement issued to the trade in order to invite people to come in for competition, and certain requirements are specially advertised from time to time, but, as a general rule, we issue tenders only to those people who are on our list.

6301. And then when you get the offers, you consult the Supply Department concerned?—Yes.

6302. With regard to the case of the war, were you able to conduct matters on that same system throughout, or had you to make any modification?—In the case of the war a good many of the purchases, especially of supplies like forage, were made by private bargain and by private arrangement.

6303. In this country?—The purchase was always made in this country, although the article purchased might come from Australia, Canada, the Argentine, or the United States.

6304. But the whole bargain was made in this country?—The bargain was made in this country.

6305. By private arrangement?—By private arrangement.

6306. Between whom?—Between people of whose respectability we were assured, like Messrs. Weddell and Co.

6307. But on behalf of the War Office, who acted for the War Office in these matters?—The Director of Contracts.

6308. You acted in these matters, but you did not go through the ordinary procedure; that was all?—Not by tender.

6309. You made all the contracts, I understand?—Yes.

6310. Not the heads of the departments?—No.

6311. In all cases the contracts made in this country were made through you?—Through me.

6312. I think you have stated that the war found you as a branch fully equipped for the emergency so far as organisation, experience, and touch with the trade were concerned, but insufficiently equipped as regards staff?—I am sorry to say that was the case.

6313. What difficulties had you with regard to staff?—Our work was trebled in a very short time, and the difficulty was to expand our staff proportionately. Anything like an experienced staff at such a time, when it is wanted in other branches of the office, it was impossible to get, and we were obliged to work with such experienced staff as we had, with the addition of inexperienced assistants.

6314. Do you think there were delays in consequence?—No, I do not think so, because we met it by enormous extra exertion.

6315. Your clerks had to give extra attendance?—The whole staff were working from 12 to 14 hours a day.

6316. Do you think there ought to be any modification in your peace arrangements in order to meet an emergency of the same kind if it happened again?—I am always of opinion that a branch like the Contract Branch, which feels the very first suggestion of anything like a political difficulty, ought to have a little power of ready expansion as regards the staff; but it has no doubt been very difficult for the authorities to arrange that we should have a proper staff.

6317. Have you made representations on the matter?—I have frequently.

6318. And they have not been met?—There have been inquiries in process with regard to the staff, but nothing has been done until quite recently.

6319. Have you got a larger staff now than you had before the war?—A much larger staff.

6320. Permanently?—Not permanently.

6321. Your permanent staff remains the same as before the War?—My permanent staff now has been modified. I am still very short of staff, but I hope to get gradually the staff that I have asked for.

6322. The effect of a very large demand, such as you had during the war, is to increase the proportion of purchases from the trade, is it not?—Yes.

6323. Very largely?—Very largely.

6324. I have before me a table, given in your report, which shows that the proportion in 1900 was two millions and a half to the ordnance factories and eleven millions and a half to the trade?—That is so.

6325. Whereas in the year before the war there was not very much difference in the proportion?—That is so.

6326. Did you find that you had any difficulty in getting that large proportion of increase from the trade?—In certain respects we had difficulties; with a very large proportion of the stores that were required the trade met the demands fairly well, but in such things as those as to which the demand was very limited in prior years, and the trade which supplied also was very limited, or where there was very great difficulty in meeting a sudden extra demand, there was delay. As instances, I might mention, saddles, tentage, and picketing pegs, but, generally speaking, I think the trade met the enormous extra demands of the war far beyond our expectations. I mean that if I had been asked by the officer who was responsible for supplying the Army with stores what stores he could rely upon as being possible to obtain from the trade within a certain period, I should certainly not have given those stores in anything like the quantity, or at anything like the rate with which we got them.

6327. Do you consider it necessary, in order that the trade should be in a position to supply stores, that they should have a share of the provision of those stores in time of peace?—Certainly.

6328. Otherwise they are not prepared to expand their business?—They are not prepared to meet our require-

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ments as regards quality and pattern; they vary almost in every instance from the ordinary trade pattern.

6329. We had the case mentioned of tinned meat, in which the supply of 1lb. tins fell short; was your attention drawn to that?—The size of the tin in which the meat is demanded from me is decided by the Quartermaster-General; there is always a certain amount of reserve of tinned meats kept at Woolwich, and the reserve before the war was kept 25 per cent. in 2lb. tins and 75 per cent. in 6lb. tins; that has been changed since, and now it is all being kept in 1lb. and 2lb. tins, but at considerably extra cost. During the war we certainly bought 40 per cent. of the quantity that was required in 1lb. and 2lb. tins, and, considering that the demands were so enormous, we were obliged to take the meat in the tins in which it could be obtained and in which it was already packed.

6330. Do I understand that there were no 1lb. tins in reserve before the war?—There might have been some.

6331. I thought you said they were 2lb. tins?—1lb. or 2lb. tins. I think I am right in saying that there were no 1lb. tins.

6332. A great deal was made in some of the evidence of the absence of 1lb. tins, and of being compelled to use 6lb. tins, with consequent waste?—That is so as regards the difference between the 6lb. tin and the 1lb. tin, but I do not think any serious complaint has been made as to using 2lb. tins.

6333. I think, according to you, of 1lb. and 2lb. tins there are nearly 25 per cent. in reserve?—That was so before the war commenced.

6334. Did you exhaust the supply of 1lb. and 2lb. tins in the trade?—Yes.

6335. Do you think that in future the regulations, as you say, being now altered, there will be a larger supply in the trade of the smaller tins?—There will be a larger supply in reserve. The whole of the Woolwich reserve will be kept in future in 1lb. and 2lb. tins, and if sufficient time could be given, of course, we could get further supplies packed in 1lb. or 2lb. tins to meet our demands. If our demand is sudden, as it always probably will be in time of war, for large quantities we should still have to take the tins in which they were packed.

6336. But is the 6lb. tin the more ordinary tin of commerce?—Yes.

6337. And the 1lb. and 2lb. tins are not so usual?—Not, perhaps, to the same extent.

6338. That is one of the cases, then, in which it is necessary to give the trade a share during peace time, in order that they may have something in reserve to assist you in an emergency?—They would not keep the 1lb. or 2lb. tins beyond what ordinary commerce required or absorbed, without definite orders from us.

6339. You think it would not change the fashion, your desiring to have them?—No, I do not think so.

6340. Did you have to place many of your orders abroad?—A great many.

6341. For certain articles you had to go abroad?—Hay and oats, very largely indeed.

6342. Any other articles?—Tinned meats almost entirely, you may say.

6343. From the colonies?—From the colonies, and from America very largely. The colonies could not supply all the tinned meat that was required.

6344. You had no difficulties at sea?—No.

6345. Otherwise you might have had some difficulty if you had had to rely on this country?—Yes; this country could not have done it as regards tinned meats.

6346. I think you have stated your views with regard to the contracts for meat. Did you take exception to the contracts that were made for meat?—With regard to quality, do you mean?

6347. As to terms. I do not quite know whether the contracts for meat were made in this country or in South Africa—the cold storage contract, for instance?—The first contract with the South African Cold Storage Company was made in communication with the War Office.

6348. Through you?—Through me, and we had a little competition; the first offer that was telegraphed to me was stating that the South African Cold Storage Company had offered to supply the troops with three million lbs., I think, at the price of 1s. a lb., and that was to include slaughtering, distribution, and everything. When this offer was telegraphed home to us they strongly recommended the acceptance of that offer. A few days afterwards we had an offer from another firm offering to supply at the rate of 10d. instead of 1s., but that offer of the second man was only just received when he raised his price to 11d., and in the end, considering that the Cold Storage Company were very much more in the habit and accustomed to supplying meat than this other contractor, we accepted the offer of the Cold Storage Company, at least we told them in South Africa to accept it at the rate of 11d. a lb., but we had no knowledge at that time, nor was it ever hinted to us, nor was it even hinted by the Chairman of the Cold Storage Company, Sir James Sievewright, that any proportion of that meat for which we were paying 11d. a lb. would be supplied in the shape of frozen meat. We presumed it would be all fresh meat, all meat on the hoof. Had I known at the time that it was contemplated that a large proportion of that should be frozen meat I should have demurred to paying the price of 11d. a lb. for it.

6349. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Had not Sir William Butler made a previous arrangement for 9d.?—I never heard of it.

6350. (*Chairman.*) How was that entered into? Was it entered into with the usual procedure in contracts?—There was a regular form of contract, with all the necessary stipulations entered into at the Cape.

6351. I understand from the regulations, and from what we heard in other evidence, that the ordinary form is that there is a specification prepared by the Supply Department, and then you go through the procedure which you have mentioned in getting the offers; was there a specification in this case?—There was certainly no specification given to me as regards the supply of meat; there would be conditions in the contract that was entered into. I never saw this contract until some considerable time afterwards, but there would certainly be conditions entered into in the contract as regards the quality of the meat.

6352. Who settled the conditions of the contract?—The General Officer Commanding out there.

6353. What share did you have in the matter?—Only in the question of the price.

6354. How could you settle the question of the price if you did not know the conditions?—It was to be made in the shape of live cattle, whatever live cattle was acceptable. There were no other conditions, and it was to be slaughtered. If you will allow me, I will just read out the first telegram I got on the question of this meat supply; it is dated 20th October:—"Tenders have been received from the South African Cold Storage Company to supply, slaughter, and cut up fresh meat for all troops on active service Cape Colony, Orange Free State, Transvaal Republic, up to 3,000,000 lbs. weight, at the rate of 1s. per lb., Secretary of State paying 4d. per lb. for any purchased by contractors and not taken over by military authorities. Offer kept open till to-morrow at the latest. Recommend acceptance; telegraph acceptance or not."

6355. Who was that from?—From the General Officer Commanding at Cape Town.

6356. At what date?—20th October. On the 21st October we sent this reply to that telegram:—"Your telegram, 20th October, tender, South African Company, does not appear favourable, nor has it been represented by you that there is likelihood of failure of local cattle supply. We can send cattle, if necessary, at much lower price. Under these circumstances, do not consider tender should be accepted unless cogent reasons can be given." On the 25th October, that was four days after our telegram, we had this further telegram:—"Your telegram of 21st October, No. 405. Military situation favourably affected state of market. Cattle offered by Weil for the troops on active service, Transvaal Republic, Orange Free State, and Cape Colony, at the rate of 10d. per lb. dead weight, Secretary of State guaranteeing consumption of 3,000,000 lbs. weight. Strongly recommend being accepted immediately. It is considered quite impossible for the troops on active service and for railway department to deal with large number of imported cattle, as suggested by you in telegram. South African Company's agent reconsidering former offer. Telegraph to Sievewright, Director, call on Director of Contracts." We had Sir James Sievewright down to the office, and

the result of that call was, as I mentioned just now, that Weil's offer being altered to 11d. a lb. the very same day it was received, we reduced the offer of the Cold Storage Company, which was 1s. as sent us in the first instance, to 11d. a lb., under the impression that the whole of the meat that was going to be supplied was to be live cattle, and I think that assumption was fully justified by the telegrams.

6357. (*Viscount Esher.*) Then there was a breach of contract?—So far as we were concerned it was not understood otherwise; the people at the Cape thoroughly understood it, but it was not communicated to us.

6358. (*Chairman.*) Of course, that comes from your not having seen the conditions before you advised acceptance of the contract?—Well, the Cape people recommended us to accept the offer at a higher price than we really accepted it at. The offer they recommended was 1s., and then 10d., which was afterwards raised to 11d., and then we accepted the offer of the Cold Storage Company at 11d., and on the recommendation of the local authorities, who were perfectly cognisant of the fact that it was intended to supply a considerable amount of frozen meat.

6359. (*Viscount Esher.*) Were they cognisant of that when they sent these telegrams you have just read to us?—Yes.

6360. (*Chairman.*) You had no representative of your office out at the Cape at all?—No

6361. At what point did that question of the frozen meat arise?—It arose some time afterwards; some time in January it came to our knowledge; that was about three months after the war commenced; and I wrote to the General Officer Commanding in South Africa this letter: "In reference to your letter of 1st November, enclosing copy of the contract of the South African Cold Storage Company for the supply of fresh meat to the troops on Government service in Cape Colony and Transvaal, and secondly, in reference to your telegrams of the 29th December and 5th January, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to point out that the contract in question does not mention frozen meat, and was understood here to be a live cattle contract, the slaughtering and distribution being undertaken by the contractor. I am, therefore, desired to ask under what circumstances the contractor has been permitted to deliver frozen meat and in what quantity?"

6362. How did they claim to be entitled to send frozen meat?—They claimed to be entitled to send frozen meat by arrangement out there with the local authorities, and the local authorities admitted they infinitely preferred the delivery of frozen meat instead of the delivery of fresh cattle.

6363. We have had a good deal of evidence with regard to that; but, of course, the question of price would come in, would it not?—That is so; the question of price should have come in, but the company said in regard to that question of price that if it had not been for their having had permission, and its being thoroughly understood by the authorities out there that frozen meat would be a part of the supply, the price would have been 1s. 2d. a pound. I dare say the Commission are aware that when it came to my knowledge that frozen meat was being supplied, I had a further interview with Sir James Sievewright, and represented to him that the price was excessive, and that he must reduce the price by at least 2d. a pound, which was assented to, and from the very date on which the supply was first commenced we recovered 2d. a pound, which gave a refund of nearly £30,000 in the first three months, but the company locally protested very strongly against that refund, and this is what they wrote: "The tender for the fresh meat in the first instance was 1s. 2d. and 1s. 1d. a pound, which prices we reduced to 11d. per pound, because you stated that it was immaterial whether we supplied fresh or frozen meat. You even mentioned at the time your distinct preference for frozen meat."

6364. Who was that written to?—It was written by the Cold Storage Company.

6365. To whom?—To the General Officer Commanding the Cape. It goes on: "I am instructed to protest against the summary method you now indicate would be adopted, because they, the contractors, will be precluded by your action from doing other than upholding the contract as it stands." The summary method referred to there was specific instructions to the General Officer Commanding that he was to make a deduction of this £28,000 from the price of the frozen meat.

6366. Your view when you got that first telegram was that a shilling was too high for fresh meat?—We thought it was.

6367. And, therefore, *a priori* for frozen meat?—Certainly.

6368. What would have been your idea about the price of frozen meat?—Of course, a very uncertain factor came into the question of the price of frozen meat, and that was the cost of distribution as to which in the War Office no one had any precise knowledge. So far as the base ports were concerned, the delivery of frozen meat was then being effected at about 3d. a pound, and to charge 8d. a pound for distribution for carrying up country we should have considered a very excessive price. The cost of distribution was afterwards ascertained to be about 2d. a pound, but we should probably in the earlier days have thought 4d. a pound was ample; and, therefore, we should have thought 7d. a pound would have been a good price for frozen meat. I admit that the cost was quite uncertain in the early days; it was the first time that frozen meat had ever been supplied or attempted to be supplied with regard to an army in the field.

6369. It is quite clear that the negotiations with regard to the contract failed, because there was not a clear understanding between your office and the General Officer Commanding at the Cape as to the terms on which he was negotiating with the company?—The General Officer Commanding at the Cape merely gave us at the War Office the information which I have read out to you in those telegrms.

6370. Which do not express that preference which is detailed in the manager's letter you also read?—No, we had no conception at the War Office that frozen meat was going to be supplied, and Sir James Sievewright admitted when I spoke to him afterwards, "I perfectly will admit you had no reason to suppose that it would be supplied," and for that reason he accepted my proposition that the price of frozen meat should be reduced at least twopence a pound from the commencement of the first contract.

6371. Was not that contract for meat rather an exception to the rule in this respect, that most of the contracts in South Africa were taken by officers on the spot without reference to the War Office?—That is so.

6372. Was this the only one that was referred?—Only those for meat were referred.

6373. How was it that this one was referred?—I cannot exactly say why, except that the director of the company being in the country at this time, they rather thought we might have an opportunity of consulting with him on the subject.

6374. But, as you said, the contract itself was drawn out and signed at the Cape?—Yes.

6375. All the other contracts and large contracts were taken at the Cape without reference to the War Office?—Yes, without previous reference.

6376. I suppose, therefore, they did not go through any of the procedure laid down for your office?—Oh, no, there are regulations existing in the Army Service Corps regulations for the guidance of officers in dealing with contracts.

6377. But those Army Service Corps representatives are not brought into connection with your office in any way?—In this way, that all Army Service Corps officers while they are in this country or on foreign stations, are always employed more or less on making contracts.

6378. In connection with your office?—Independently of the contract department, except that contracts are sent up to the War Office for review after they are made, but they have the entire responsibility of making all contracts for food supplies.

6379. It has been represented to us that it might be a better system if some of the contracts which are now taken through your office in this country were taken by the departments themselves, just for the purpose of training these officers in duties which they are obliged to perform in war. What have you to say to that?—All I can say is that that special question has been very fully and very recently gone into by the committee presided over by Sir Clinton Dawkins, and, as I think I point out in my report, the existing system has been practically maintained, that there should be a central supply department. All these arguments were

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brought before Sir Clinton Dawkins' committee as regards the advantages.

6380. Surely it can scarcely be said that all the arguments were brought before Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee, because the facts about the contracts in South Africa were not all known?—Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee was only about a year and a-half ago, and the war had then existed for some time.

6381. I am quite aware that certain investigations into what had been going on in South Africa had not been made at the time?—No.

6382. Are you aware of the facts as they have been brought out by further investigation at the Cape?—I am aware of certain facts; I may perhaps not be aware of all the facts.

6383. You are aware that there were difficulties and irregularities with regard to the making of contracts at the Cape involving considerable sums of money?—I have heard that sort of thing mentioned; the only ones that I know of specifically were certain purchases which were made by the Chief Ordnance Officer at Cape Town.

6384. Supposing certain purchases were made by that officer, and that it might be reasonably said he had had no experience?—I should have said as to the officer in question, considering that he had been five years at Woolwich, where all these contracts are coming before them continually, and where the procedure is as well known as it is by anyone at the War Office, it would be impossible for him to be ignorant on the question of the usual system on which supplies are obtained.

6385. I understood that in this country all supplies were purchased through your office?—There are a great many supplies which are not purchased through the Contract Department; the Ordnance officers have power to purchase up to £25 in value locally.

6386. But the officer who has purchased up to £25 is put in rather different circumstances if he is required to purchase up to a million?—He is; but as a general rule he would take the same course with regard to seeing that the prices that he paid were fair and reasonable. It is the only way you can do it as a general rule, by getting prices from three or four different people.

6387. In that case, why should he not purchase at home?—There is no reason why he should not if he were so ordered; but the purchases up to a million are very rare. To have every officer throughout the kingdom making his own purchases of stores would be buying in detail instead of buying wholesale.

6388. Do not misunderstand me. I am not contesting, so far as I am concerned, the proposition that for purchases in peace the central buyer has great advantages; but what I want you to consider is that in the time of war, as is shown by what you have already said, you cannot deal with the purchases that have to be made locally, and it is represented to us that one cause, at any rate, for those purchases not being satisfactory is that the officers who are then necessarily called upon to deal with them have not had the experience or the contact with the trade which it is the essence of your existence that you take from them, and I wanted you to say how you looked at it from that point of view?—The conditions of buying out in the country at the time of active service are totally different from the conditions of buying at home here as I buy. You must remember that the officers who have by far the largest expenditure of money on foreign service are the people who have experience of making similar contracts in this country.

6389. To small amounts?—Large amounts, too.

6390. What officers are you referring to?—To all the Army Service Corps officers, who make the annual or biennial or six monthly contracts for food and forage in the United Kingdom all through the districts.

6391. We are thinking more of the Ordnance Department officers?—I will come to them; the Ordnance officer at a foreign station is, as a rule, not supposed to purchase many stores, and the stores required, which come under the category of Ordnance stores, are, as a rule, sent out from this country, and must be.

6392. But cannot be in the case of war?—In the case of war, certainly.

6393. But they were not?—There may have been some purchases made there, but not to any extent, comparatively speaking.

6394. Could you tell me the number of millions?—I do not know any number of millions of Ordnance stores that were purchased.

6395. The number of millions spent in the purchase of stores in South Africa?—Were they Ordnance stores?

6396. I took the word ordnance from you as showing that the Ordnance officer was in charge?—The principal purchases would be in regard to food stores and supply stores. There would be a certain number of wagons; the transport was largely met by the Weil and other contracts; but after a time, when the war was supposed to be over, the whole of the wagons and the whole of the oxen were bought over from the contractors, and that was a very large purchase, as there were 1,250 wagons which were in use from one contractor alone, and the whole of those, with their teams, were bought up at £250 a piece.

6397. There was a large sum of money spent in So Africa by officers not in connection with your department which in ordinary circumstances would have been spent through you?—It would have been spent through me in a secondary sense only. I cannot say what the exact amount of warlike stores that were purchased was. With regard to all other transactions, such as the cost of transport or the cost of supplies of food and forage, these are all contracts which must be made locally on the spot, and they are made by officers, a part of whose training is to make contracts, and who make them every day.

6398. Contracts for those stores would in ordinary circumstances in time of peace be made through your office?—No.

6399. None of them?—No, the contracts for transport, the contracts for food and forage, are made locally by the General Officers Commanding in districts, and they are only sent up to me afterwards to look at. If I find fault with them, and I do sometimes find that they have passed over a lower contract and taken a higher one ,it is my business to point it out; but they make them.

6400. For any part of the amounts that were spent upon stores which in ordinary circumstances would have been purchased through your office, would it not be desirable that in the case of war they should be purchased by officers having full experience?—Considering that no man in the Army can possibly be in the Army without knowing the system under which stores are purchased, it is mainly a question of common sense. As a matter of fact, I may say that the officer who made these purchases was correctly advised by another officer of the department, and although the purchasing officer had been at Woolwich, where the contract procedure must be as well known as it is at Pall Mall, he was advised by another officer who had never been at Woolwich the proper way to buy, but he refused to take the advice.

6401. If you say that these officers who purchase stores locally under ordinary circumstances can do so quite well, subject only to your superintendence of what they have done, why should not the Ordnance do the same thing, and purchase for themselves, and not through you?—For the reason, as I said before, that if every Ordnance officer was buying for himself, you would be buying retail instead of wholesale.

6402. Does not that apply also to the Army Service Corps?—No, because contracts for food and forage must be made locally, and must be made for the supplies in each district.

6403. There is, of course, one other suggestion. Would it not be better that your department should be represented on the spot in the case of a war?—That is a question of policy to a great extent. My opinion is—and I gave evidence a short time ago before the Select Committee on National Expenditure in the House of Commons to the same effect—that I think it is an advantage to have a representative both of the Finance Department and of the Contract Department at the seat of war. I think certainly that the experience they would possess would be advantageous, but, of course, when a war breaks out, if you wish to send a very experienced person, and a person who will conduct his duties judiciously without in any way fettering other people, it is a very difficult thing to spare the man. For instance, if anybody had asked me at the beginning of this war, "Have you anybody to go out and represent you locally?" I should have said it was perfectly impossible.

6404. That means there ought to be some modification of the staff of your Office?—Yes.

6405. Have you ever considered it from that point of view?—I have not, because it depends upon the personal views of the Secretary of State whether he thinks it is expedient in any way to interfere with the complete responsibility of the General Officer Commanding in connection with everything that takes place with the Army in the field. Speaking from experience, I was a member of the Finance Commission which went out in the previous Boer war, and I certainly think that our presence there (we went out to assist the General Officer Commanding in conducting financial questions) was of very great advantage. We had had the previous experience of the Zulu war, in which I do not say there had been wasteful expenditure, but there had been an enormous number of very large advances made to officers for the purpose of purchases all over the country which took years to settle, and some of which were ultimately lost, and a large sum of money had to be written off as a loss. Our presence in the Boer war of 1881 stopped all that sort of thing.

6406. In what capacity did you go there?—I went out with Sir William White, the Accountant-General of the Army.

6407. Were you in the Accountant-General's office at the time?—Yes, I was Principal Clerk, and I went out as Sir William White's first assistant.

6408. Not from the Contract Department?—No.

6409. Was there any representative from the Contract Department?—No.

6410. Is there any other point with regard to the relations of your department with the proceedings of the war that you would like to bring before the Commission?—I do not think so, unless there is any particular point on which the Commission wish to ask me for information. I am only in a position to say that all the supplies that were demanded from me were always obtained, and I do not think any department can say there was any delay on the part of the Contract Department in obtaining the requisite supplies, although in particular instances there was a little difficulty in obtaining them as quickly as they wanted them.

6411. But on the whole the trade responded very well you think?—Exceedingly well.

6412. (*Viscount Esher.*) You think, on the whole, your department was successful as regards its action at home here during the war?—I think so.

6413. But I suppose you would not say the same as to the general purchases at the Cape, that they were made as cheaply as they could have been made?—Well, the instance of the meat contract is one that rather looks as if perhaps a little more economy might have been practised. I do not know with regard to the other large contracts, such as the transport, whether it was possible to get it at a smaller figure; it would require local knowledge and local inquiries to enable me to give an answer on that subject.

6414. With regard to that particular meat contract, if the officer who entered into that contract had had a little more experience, do you think he would have fallen into the obvious trap into which he did fall?—He had very large experience.

6415. Who was he?—It was Sir Wodehouse Richardson, whose evidence you have had, who entered into that meat contract; he was negotiating that meat contract, and he had had large experience.

6416. Had he had much experience of entering into very considerable contracts?—Only the contracts that would be made in the various districts for supplies of forage, and so on.

6417. Supposing the most capable officer in your home branch had been out there, do you think he would have fallen into the same trap?—I think if a member of my branch had been out there he would certainly have taken care, when the representation came home, that we should have had the full information about the contract, which we should have had in this case, but did not have.

6418. If you had had that information, what would you have done?—In the first place, I would have taken the opinion of the Quartermaster-General on the question of fresh meat. I may say that in this country the supply of frozen beef is objected to altogether.

6419. Assuming they were content with frozen meat—I am only considering the question of price—you were perfectly cognisant of the price at which you considered a reasonable tender should be made?—Not for distribution.

6420. I am talking of the actual price of the meat itself; that you would have known?—We should have known the price at which meat could be delivered at Cape Town.

6421. And if you had been informed of this fact that frozen meat was going to be supplied, you would have taken a very different view of that tender?—Yes, certainly.

6422. Then I go back to my other point. Do you not consider that if you had had an officer of your own out there he probably would have taken the same view out there that you would have taken here?—Yes, certainly; but whether he would have been able to obtain a reduction in price or not, considering these people had a practical monopoly of the supply, I cannot say.

6423. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) In connection with the contract with the Cold Storage Company, did it occur to you to ask the question whether, being a contract by a cold storage company, they were going to supply frozen meat or not?—No, it did not.

6424. Who are the agents at home of the Cold Storage Company—Weddell and Company?—No.

6425. Do you know who they are?—I daresay, as you know, that company has been absorbed by the Imperial Cold Storage Company. Who the agents of the Cold Storage Company were previously I do not know.

6426. Was any inquiry made in London about them?—No, we only negotiated with the chairman of the Company.

6427. Weddell and Company are agents to a very large extent for cold storage?—They are.

6428. I suppose you know them?—Very well.

6429. Was an inquiry made from them with reference to frozen meat at that time?—No, we made no inquiry, because we had no knowledge or suspicion that frozen meat was going to be supplied.

6430. Although it was to be supplied by a Cold Storage Company?—Yes, but no mention was made of frozen meat; it was simply to slaughter cattle.

6431. They might be slaughtered there and put into cold storage; large quantities might have been slaughtered and put into cold storage at once?—Yes.

6432. Under that contract that might have been done?—Yes.

6433. And then supplied to the troops as frozen meat?—The curious thing is, that although I saw Sir James Sievewright many times on this subject, he never mooted the question of frozen meat being supplied.

6434. In point of fact, you only had to pay 9d. a pound ultimately for the frozen meat?—That is all.

6435. Are you under the impression that 3d. a pound was the price of frozen meat in Cape Town at that time?—A great deal more than that.

6436. I thought you mentioned 3d. a pound?—I say it could be delivered wholesale at the base ports at something like 3d. a pound.

6437. Do you mean at Cape Town?—At Cape Town.

6438. Do you happen to know any shipments that were delivered at anything like that price?—I know the Admiralty were being supplied, and I think the contract with the Admiralty was 5d. a pound at that time, but the price at which you could buy meat in Australia, and deliver it at the Cape, was something like 3d. a pound; it may have been one-eighth more, or one-eighth less.

6439. There was a large quantity of beef I suppose from Australia—from Queensland?—Yes, it would be principally beef.

6440. Do you really think that was delivered at 3d. a pound?—I do, somewhere there about; it may have been a halfpenny more.

6441. Or 2d. more?—Oh, no; nothing like that. A contract we made the other day, which includes distribution all over the Transvaal, was only 5½d. a pound, and that was made on the basis of getting delivery at the Cape when meat was dearer than it was in the early days of the war. You could get meat delivered at the base ports at 3½d., because the people who tendered at 5½d. calculated upon the cost of distribution being as nearly as possible, 2d. a pound. That was the price only six months ago.

6442. Where is that meat coming from?—It was coming from Australia chiefly.

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6443. Not now, surely?—Not now; a good deal of it now is coming from the Argentine.

6444. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Do you buy medical stores?—Yes.

6445. Who is answerable for the condition of those medical stores as far as accepting them is concerned when the contract is concluded?—The Army Medical Department.

6446. In the case of buying things like traction engines and so on, do you buy traction engines?—We make the contracts.

6447. Who is answerable for the acceptance of those?—The Inspector-General of Fortifications.

6448. You have nothing to do, except to make the contract?—That is so.

6449. And I suppose that is the case with a good many articles?—A great many; in fact, everything. I only make the contracts. The department itself says whether they will accept what I buy or not.

6450. For the most part the examination is made at Woolwich?—For the most part.

SIXTEENTH DAY.

Thursday, 20th November, 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Hon. The Viscount Esher, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Hon. The Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, G.C.M.G.
The Right Hon. Sir George Dashwood Taubman-Goldie, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wylie Norman, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir Frederick Matthew Darley, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir John Ommanney Hopkins, G.C.B.
Sir John Edge.
Sir John Jackson.

Bernard H. Holland, Esq., *Secretary.*

Colonel Alfred G. Lucas, C.B., M.V.O., Deputy Adjutant-General of Imperial Yeomanry, called and examined.

Colonel A. G. Lucas, C.B., M.V.O.

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6451. (*Chairman.*) You are the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Imperial Yeomanry?—Yes.

6452. That being a new office since the War?—Yes, it was created in the early part of 1900.

6453. But you have had connection with the raising and organisation of the Imperial Yeomanry from the beginning?—Yes.

6454. You took part in the first conference on the subject in December, 1899?—Yes, the 19th December was practically the beginning of the organisation.

6455. You assisted in matters at home and afterwards went to South Africa?—Yes.

6456. And there is a Blue Book, which we have before us, which I think has been laid before Parliament which embodies your experience?—That is so. (*The title of the Report is:—Imperial Yeomanry—First Report of the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Force regarding the Home organisation, Inspection of the constitution of its Base and Advanced Depôts and Distribution of Stores in South Africa, and proposals for future Organisation, called for by the Secretary of State for War, 1st June, 1900, and submitted 15th May, 1901. Cd. 803*).

6457. Of course it is not necessary for us to take you in detail through the Report which has been published, but our object in asking you and others of your colleagues to appear to-day was to give us any information that bears particularly upon the second head of our Reference, viz., the provision of men for the force in South Africa?—That is as to the recruiting of the three forces of Imperial Yeomanry that were sent out.

6458. That was your share of it, no doubt. There is a White Book which has just been handed to us which I have not had time to look at, and I am not quite sure what it refers to; it is entitled, "*Imperial Yeomanry—Report of the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Force regarding the raising of Drafts and new Battalions for the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa. Supplementary to the Report submitted on the 15th May, 1901*"?*—That is the Final Report which I was ordered by the Secretary of State to write, and it would have been submitted last year, but a further force was ordered to be raised, and we held it over until the closing of the proceedings, and now this Report is practically up-to-date and will be submitted in the course of a few days to the Secretary of State.

6459. What relation does it bear to the former Report?—It simply follows on.

6460. Does it incorporate it?—I do not know whether it will be incorporated. It is a continuation of the First Report, bringing the history of the raising of the force up to the final stage.

6461. There is nothing in this White Book which is contained in the Blue Book?—No, but there are some references in the later Report to things that are mentioned in the First Report.

6462. Of course, I cannot deal with this new one to-day. With regard to the first steps that were taken as to the organisation of the Yeomanry, is there anything you would like to say?—You wish really to know, I suppose, the history from the very beginning, the early days? The proceedings during the first fortnight are not recorded in this First Report.

6463. Certainly, we will be glad to hear about those proceedings?—If you wish to begin from the beginning I will have to give that. Lord Chesham and Lord Valentia, and one or two other officers had approached the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State with regard to the advisability of raising a force of Yeomanry for active service in South Africa, but prior to that, in the early days of October, I myself had approached the War Office. I saw the then Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces, General Borrett, and he told me that there was no intention whatever of employing the Yeomanry. However, after the disasters that occurred in the early part of the War, I wrote a letter stating that I considered it was advisable to call up the Yeomanry and to form a Special Service Corps for service abroad, and, even if their services were not required, the expense would be immaterial, and I thought it would be the right thing to do. I had an answer to that, which is recorded in this First Report, stating that there was no intention whatever of employing the Yeomanry (*See page* 142, *First Report*): but within three weeks of that time it was decided that the Yeomanry forces should be employed. Immediately I heard of it I went to the War Office and offered my services in any capacity that they thought

* The White Book was subsequently issued as a Blue Book under the following title:—"Imperial Yeomanry. Report of the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Force regarding the raising of Drafts and new Battalions for the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa, supplementary to the Report submitted on the 15th May 1901, called for by the Secretary of State for War, 17th May 1901, and submitted 1st January 1903—1458, 1903."

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would be advisable, and I was referred to Lord Chesham. I went to Lord Chesham and saw him at Grosvenor House, where he was staying, and he asked me if I would undertake the Home Organisation, which I rather demurred at, as of course, I knew it meant a very responsible and a very large undertaking; however, he put it in such a way to me that I had the peculiar business training which perhaps might be necessary in an organisation of this kind, having regard to my long connection with the firm of Lucas and Aird and Lucas Brothers, that I undertook it, on condition that I had a free hand in the choosing of my staff and, practically, the drawing up of the rules. At that time most of the arrangements with the War Office were verbal. I had several interviews with Mr. Wyndham, and we had also a certain number of unofficial letters and it was on those unofficial letters and those interviews that we started the Organisation. For the first fortnight, as you can well understand, we were with no guide to go upon at all, starting an absolutely new organisation which really meant a business on a very large scale, with no staff, no offices or anything. Of course, it was confusion to begin with, and so I represented to the Secretary of State, and also Mr. Wyndham, that to get the organisation in proper order a Committee should be nominated, and it should be put in Army Orders, and that a staff should be appointed as soon as possible and adequate offices engaged. That was agreed upon, and on the 4th January, 1900, the Army Order was issued appointing the Committee. Prior to that there was an *ad interim* Committee appointed by Mr. Wyndham, consisting of Lord Chesham, Lord Valentia, Mr. Walter Long, and myself, but Mr. Long only attended I think two or three meetings, so that he really took little active part. We carried this work on from the commencement, and at that time Lord Chesham was Chairman of that *ad interim* Committee, and I had charge especially of the Finance and the Transport. At that time it was decided by the War Office that we were to undertake the whole of the transportation of men and horses—in fact, we were to do the whole business ourselves; and so arrangements were made and six transports were chartered. Through the kindness of Lord Rothschild, who interested himself very much in the movement, he suggested that Mr. Ogilvie, of the Alliance, Marine and General Insurance Company, should be appointed to advise us with regard to the hiring of the ships, and he was consulted so far as that portion was concerned. I do not know if you would wish me to go into that, because, I think, if you do not mind, I ought to, as there is a suggestion which I wish to make, with regard to the transports, and I might finish that question first.

6464. Certainly?—Those ships were engaged, and a Mr. Houlder was appointed to superintend the inspection of the horse fittings and general fittings on the ships, in fact the whole thing was arranged in a businesslike way. When it came to the time for the embarkation of the first troops that were ready, we suddenly found that, owing to the very strict Regulations of the Board of Trade, it was quite impossible for us to carry out the intention of the War Office to transport these troops. It appears that ships were bound to sail under the Merchant Shipping Act, and that precluded carrying practically any horses with the men, so directly we knew that, I saw Mr. Wyndham, and subsequently Lord Lansdowne, and told them that it was impossible for us to carry out the transport, and that there was only one of two things to be done, either that the ships must sail under the Admiralty, or under the Board of Trade, and he asked me if I would go and see Mr. Goschen. I did so, with Mr. Wyndham, and pointed out to him the difficulty and asked if he would take over the whole of the transport arrangements. That was done. The Admiralty then took over the whole of the transport arrangements, and also they took over the ships which we had chartered with the exception of one which was condemned, and which they said was not fit, and so they carried it all out. Before that I had had an interview with Mr. Goschen and Lord Lansdowne, when it was decided we were to manage the transport. There was a good deal of feeling at the Admiralty that we were not competent to carry out such an arrangement, and, also, that we would be competing with the Admiralty in the hire of ships and, therefore, putting up the cost of transport. However, I endeavoured to convince Mr. Goschen that that was not the case, inasmuch as we were chartering our vessels at a considerably lower rate than the Government, and on being pressed and asked how that was, I told him that it was simply by personal influence, and interviewing the owners of ships and large shipping companies and appealing to their patriotism. I told these companies that as we were all working in a case of emergency I considered they should help us, and they met us in the most liberal manner, and, therefore, we were able to charter these ships at a lower rate, and in some instances to have passages of both men and horses given us free.

6465. But you could not use them?—Eventually we could not use them, and it is a question I wanted to raise with regard to that, whether it would not be worth the while of the Commission to consider whether in a case of emergency the Regulations of the Board of Trade being so stringent, should not be altered, or that in case of a repetition of the past war, or in a case of great emergency, transports outside the Admiralty should be hired, as ordinary transports, by an organisation such as ours if it is required. That is the only reason I bring this subject rather lengthily before the Commission, because I think it is a question worthy of the consideration of Parliament and the country—whether the laws regulating the Board of Trade should not be rather modified.

6466. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I presume you mean with the assent of the Secretary of State for War?—Of course. I may say that it was his distinct wish that we should undertake the whole of this transport, really, I think, as an experiment, only we were prevented at the last moment.

6467. (*Chairman.*) But you do not maintain, do you, that it was not the best plan that the Government should do all the transport?—That the Admiralty should do it?

6468. Well, it is done through the Admiralty?—No, I should not like to say that. I think it is a matter of great consideration with those who know all the facts. I should not like in an off-hand statement to say I think it would or would not be advisable.

6469. I do not think you quite follow what I mean. Your difficulties at the beginning were that you were, as you said, entirely unorganized, and you gradually got into shape and into connection with the War Office, and now, I suppose, you are still more distinctly part of the War Office and part of the military system. Is it not better that the military system of the country should meet all its requirements rather than that they should have in the case of emergency to fall back upon such unorganized efforts as you were obliged to put forward?—That opens up the whole question whether the separate organization of raising the Yeomanry was sound, advisable, or not, and I most distinctly think that it was.

6470. To meet the emergency?—Yes.

6471. Certainly, but you would not say, I suppose, that any part of that effort, if it could have been from the beginning a part of the military system of the country, would not have been still more effective?—If it could have been, but at the time it could not.

6472. I quite agree with you that if there are restrictions in the laws which prevent the carriage of troops it is necessary to raise outside the military system, it is quite a matter for consideration whether there should not be some modification of the law; but the point I wanted to put to you was whether your whole experience does not point to this, that the military system ought to be complete, including the transport of troops?—Certainly, and it was for that reason I think that Lord Lansdowne was anxious for us to do this transport. I have no right perhaps to say so, but that is my own opinion: to show, probably, that the troops could be transported independently of the Admiralty.

6473. (*Viscount Esher.*) What are the particular restrictions of the Board of Trade to which you object?—We were obliged to sail under the Merchant Shipping Act, and by that Act you are not allowed to take troops and horses, and that practically knocked us out of sending our force. We were anxious as far as possible to send the men and horses together.

6474. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Why are you obliged to

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sail under the Board of Trade?—You cannot sail under anything else except the Admiralty or the Board of Trade. I was given to understand that we could not hire a ship to convey troops and munitions of war and horses unless we sailed either under the Board of Trade Regulations or the Admiralty.

6475. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Under the Merchant Shipping Act?—Under the Merchant Shipping Act.

6476. (*Chairman.*) Anyhow, as a matter of fact all your transport was done by the Admiralty?—It was all handed over and carried out by the Admiralty.

6477. We will take a note of the point you raise. What is the next thing you have to say?—As soon as possible we arranged for offices; first of all we took a small house in Suffolk Street, and very soon found it was not large enough, and we moved to St. James's Square. The Committee was then appointed, and also the staff, and I think I might say here, that I consider whatever success the Yeomanry Committee met with in its work was very largely due to the selection of the staff which was made, and more especially I consider it was of very great value that practically the whole of what I may call our professional staff, was chosen from men of Indian experience—the Indian Staff Corps—and they brought to bear a very broad and open mind on all the questions that came before them, and I think it was owing to their support that the work of the Yeomanry Committee was as successful as it has been. I do not know if you would like me to go into the question of the horses in those early days and the arrangements made?

6478. With regard to the Remount question as a whole, you mean?—Yes, that would come really more under Remounts.

See Q. 13016.

6479. We have not yet dealt with the Remount question, and we shall not be able to do so at the present sittings, and therefore it is quite possible that when we come to deal with it we might desire to have evidence from you again, but of course if there are any general observations on the provision of horses that you would like to make now, it is quite open to you to do so?—I should really only make a general statement with regard to that, for this reason, that there was a Committee held—the Remount Inquiry—and some rather severe statements were made with regard to the Yeomanry Committee's proceedings, and I cannot help thinking that it was not a business proceeding and rather unjust that sweeping statements should be made and published in a Blue Book when neither myself nor any member of the Committee was called to give evidence at all. The evidence that was given before that Committee was all one-sided, and they never heard our side of the question. So far from my agreeing that the Yeomanry paid too much and were extravagant in the purchase of horses, more especially in Hungary, my opinion is the reverse. As to the first batch of horses that were purchased there, we paid rather more than subsequently, but we got a very much better article. All through, the horses we bought, not only in Hungary but elsewhere, were far superior to those bought by the Remount Department, for the simple reason that we gave more money for them, and my opinion very strongly is, that instead of reducing the price and getting an inferior article, such as horses straight away from the prairies and grass, it was far better to pay £5 or £10 more, and get horses in hard condition, fit to work; and that is the policy which we adopted. Also with regard to the supply of horses, when we finally knew the number of men to be raised we allowed 5 per cent. per month for wastage and arranged for a depôt in Cape Town at Maitland Camp where there should never be less than 1,000 horses, and those horses were to be kept in the country, if possible a month, to get acclimatised before they were issued. We were then informed by Sir Ralph Knox, the Permanent Under-Secretary, that 5 per cent. was not sufficient, and that we ought to allow 10 per cent., and so arrangements were made for that percentage, in fact we had over 13,000 horses purchased for the force of a little over 10,000 men, and my object was to look ahead so that we should not at any time allow our force that we were responsible for to run short of horses. Soon after all our arrangements were made, the War Office decided to take over the whole of our Remount arrangements, spare horses, *personnel* and all, and to continue the Remount business themselves, so that our efforts were in vain. We had not therefore the chance of carrying out what I consider with foresight was the proper thing to do, viz., to have rather more horses than to be short of a single one. In fact, I interviewed Lord Landsowne with Sir Ralph Knox on that question at the War Office, and pointed out to him very strongly that to my mind it was far better to have 20,000 spare horses than to keep an Army Corps waiting one day for one horse. My way in private business is always to have a surplus of everything so as never to stop, and that is why we looked ahead in this matter. On the question of horses, I should like also to say this: we had £40 per head granted from the War Office, and on that account alone the Committee in their purchases were able to save £75,000 to the Government. This has never been stated at any of these inquiries.

6480. On the whole purchases?—On the whole of the Committee's purchases.

6481. I think what you have said rather bears on my impression that it would be better probably to go into this in detail when we deal with the whole subject—I think it would, probably.

6482. Then I suppose you proceeded to enrol?—We proceeded to enrol at once, and also to purchase horses and to arrange for the equipment, but I do not hold myself really responsible for this organisation until the 4th January, when I was appointed to the general superintendence of the Committee, and when I had the authority to regulate matters.

6483. When did the enrolment begin?—It began at once.

6484. In December?—Yes, in December.

6485. About a month before your Army Order was issued?—About a fortnight or three weeks before, but purposely I have not alluded in this First Report to the first fortnight's working. First of all Lord Chesham was chairman of that *ad interim* Committee, and I did not like to do so without having an opportunity of seeing him, which was impossible as he was in South Africa; another thing is that the confusion of the first fortnight was such that really recording was impossible. It was not until we got into proper offices and had a staff in working order, that anything could be properly recorded. Then our policy was to hold daily Board meetings of the Committee, at which the heads of the various departments were present. The Minutes of the meetings were accurately kept and recorded, they were typed off and sent round the next morning to every member of the Committee before the next day's meeting, so that all had an opportunity if they wished to alter or comment on any of the proceedings before they were signed. These are all recorded and printed, and I think you have a copy of them.

6486. I suppose enrolment was going on during the fortnight?—Yes.

6487. Have you anything to say about the proceedings at the enrolment to make up the first contingent of Yeomanry?—The enrolment of the first force was arranged for through the Yeomanry centres, and the whole of that first force was entirely recruited through those centres, with the exception of one or two independent corps that were raised in London, the Sharpshooters, the Rough Riders, the Duke of Cambridge's Own, and Paget's Horse.

6488. Did that apply also to the appointment of officers?—The appointment of officers was made on the recommendation of the commanding officers of the Yeomanry for their particular corps as far as possible.

6489. On the same principle?—On the same principle.

6490. Had you difficulty in finding officers?—Not so much with the first contingent because there were a large number of Yeomanry officers to select from; there were also some officers of the Reserve and Militia; we had not the same difficulty with regard to the officers of the first force as we had afterwards.

6491. What was the total number of the first contingent?—The total number of the first contingent in 1900 was 550 officers and 10,371 non-commissioned officers and men. First of all the Order was for 3,000

then it was decided to raise 5,000, and afterwards it was increased to over 11,000, and eventually it was decided to limit it to 10,000 men.

6492. And that number was despatched at what date?—They were despatched at various dates. I think it would help very much if I referred to this First Report at page 205, as it is impossible for me to carry all these matters in my memory, therein are given the sailings with the list of ships. Those are for the horses, but not for the men. You will find what I want to refer to at page 46, paragraph 190: "The Transport 'Canada' was the last vessel despatched with Imperial Yeomanry, and she sailed from Southampton on April 14th." "In January the first four transports to sail for South Africa were the 'Cavour' on January 27th, the 'Winifredian' on January 28th, the 'Lake Erie' on January 30th, and the 'Goth' on January 31st," and so they followed on. That is on page 45 of the First Report.

6493. And that completed your work for the first contingent?—That completed the work of the recruiting or raising. That force was entirely equipped and clothed by the Committee or by the commanding officers of Yeomanry. The War Office could not supply us with a single article of any sort or description.

6494. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Not even arms?—I am referring to the general equipment and clothing; arms they supplied—that is to say, the rifles and bayonets. The new pattern rifles first supplied, we discovered were wrongly sighted, and attention was drawn to this, and it was thought that it was not the rifles but the bad shooting of the men. However, the men's shooting was so bad that it could not be right, and, on having the rifles tested, we found that the sights were absolutely incorrect, and you could not hit a haystack with them. They were subsequently called in for adjustment.

6495. (*Chairman.*) Was the equipment done from the headquarters of the Committee?—It was done partly from the headquarters of the Committee and partly from the Yeomanry centres. Those who wished to supply their own clothing locally could do so. We had a Capitation Grant of £25 originally per man, for the clothing, equipment, and saddlery. That was found insufficient as time went on, and it was increased by another £10, that was £35 per man, but I may say that at that time—it is well within the recollection of this Commission—there was a tremendous demand for every article. A large number of troops were being raised and sent out, Government stores were absolutely depleted, and naturally we had to pay rather a higher price than we should have done in normal times. That must always necessarily be the case, I think, but as to the articles (and I allude to this because I think it is only right I should), there was a question asked in the House the other night, and Mr. Brodrick replied to it, as to the comparative cost of equipping a yeoman and an ordinary soldier. The answer given was not correct, I mean not correct in this way, that they had not got the details properly. For instance, we did not equip our men with drill jackets. We thought that a drill jacket in a climate such as South Africa, where men would get very hot during the day and wet and cold at night, was not good for them, and we issued nothing but serge, except just at the very first start a few local corps issued drill. We issued nothing but serge; every man had two serge jackets, and they were of a very superior quality, and the same with the other articles of clothing which we issued, so that the comparison that was mentioned the other night was hardly a correct one. As a matter of fact, as to the clothing it totalled out, if we take it that the soldier was equipped in the same way and with the same number of articles, our men cost 12s. 5½d. more than the Regular, but it must be borne in mind that whereas the Government contracts, of course, were very large and continuous, ours were only limited and required in a very great hurry, and we had to pay more for certain articles.

6496. Getting them in detail throughout the country would naturally cost more?—Of course.

6497. But that was due very much to your dependence on local funds?—Entirely; and I would like to mention with regard to this matter that there was a Report issued by the Committee on Public Accounts, and ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 16th July, 1902, in which they say (*see page V.*) that: "The result so far as concerned the raising of the men appears to have been satisfactory, but in the financial point of view it was far otherwise. In the first place both Forces were competing with the Regular Army in the same market for the same articles," and then it says: "The Yeomanry, in fact, paid higher prices for articles of their equipment and got inferior goods." My remarks with regard to the Remount matter apply equally to this, that neither I nor any member of my staff, nor any member of the Yeomanry Committee was ever called to give evidence before that Public Accounts Committee, and those sweeping statements are made without any knowledge at all of the Committee's proceedings, which I consider a most unjust and unfair thing, and it is not true, as the articles on the whole were very much better than the Government supply. In a few instances they may have been inferior, but on the whole they were very much better. That Committee have passed their judgment on certain articles left over—mostly surplus materials not supplied by the Committee—but returned from the various Yeomanry contres.

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6498–9. I think you have stated in your First Report the opinion that it would be advisible, if the case occurred again, that the funds should be centralised. It was the County Funds, was it not, that contributed a good deal to the matter being dealt with?—Certainly. So far from its being the case as stated in the Report of the Public Accounts Committee that "In the financial point of view it was far otherwise," it has been lost sight of entirely, that over and above the Capitation Grant allowed by the Government £80,000 was raised through the County Funds, some £30,000 of which was expended on charges that I certainly consider are debitable against the War Office. Men had to be billeted, they were raised in a hurry, and prices were up, so that it was impossible for them to billet themselves and feed themselves on the cavalry rate of pay, and therefore it had to be supplemented; their rations also had to be supplemented, and all of that came out of these private funds, and I say really it ought to be debited to the Government. In the raising of the second and third contingents of 1901 and 1902, after a great deal of argument, when it was pointed out that the men could not live on the rate of pay, extra allowances were sanctioned.

6500. I am quite aware of that fact, but I was alluding to this passage in paragraph 496 of the First Report; "In any future similar organisation, however, it is strongly recommended that County Funds or private subscriptions be centralised for the common good of the Force. The money thus subscribed would be better utilised and the general arrangements for its application would be more effectively dealt with"?—Yes, I think so, but although I adhere to every word I have said in that paragraph, I think it would be difficult because there are some counties, take Northumberland for instance, which raised, speaking from memory, something approximate to £25,000; while another county would probably only raise £500 or £1,000 so that it would be a very difficult thing to club all those subscriptions together. Naturally one county would say, "No, we have subscribed £20,000 and we want that money for the benefit of our own men entirely, whom we have raised; it has been subscribed locally." But, I think, it would be far better to have, if not the whole, a certain proportion of the control by a central authority for the benefit of the whole Force.

6501. It was just because I had some personal knowledge of the difficulties that I put the question to you?—It would be better if it could be done that it should be a general subscription; for instance, we had £66,000 in round figures subscribed to our central fund owing to the very great liberality of Messrs. Wernher, Beit, and Company, who gave us £50,000; that we have had control of entirely, and it has been of the greatest possible assistance, in fact we could not have got on without it.

6502. If the thing had to be done again you would have to fall back, as you did before, on local effort and local funds?—I think so, but if we could get those funds centralised, or a certain amount of them, it would be very much better, as I think it would be better distributed from a central office than locally.

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6503. You told us that 10,000 men were sent out with the first contingent; you could have got more men, I suppose, at that time?—We could have got an unlimited number; and I should like to bring to the notice of the Commission that letters are recorded in this First Report, and also in the Supplementary Report, showing that on several occasions I urged the War Office not to stop recruiting, but that we should be allowed to proceed to raise drafts for the Force that was sent out, because it was perfectly obvious that it must melt away, and this was the only Force sent out there in connection with which drafts were not permitted to be raised, and yet the casualties in the Yeomanry were higher, I believe, than in any other branch of the Service, being over 30 per cent. The consequence was that the Force which did such splendid service in the early part of the War was allowed practically to melt away. Had it been kept up, there would have been no cause for the hurried raising of further contingents.

6504. There was no provision for maintenance of the numbers?—There was no provision for drafts.

6505. I see something about it on page 29 of the First Report. At page 29, paragraph 93 of that Report, you will find this: "Arrangements, however, have been made to send out drafts to the extent of eight officers and 460 men for 39 companies, or a total of 474 non-commissioned officers and men?"—Yes, but these were originally sanctioned as drafts, and were required to make good the sanctioned establishment of a base remount and store depôt at Capetown.

6506. The next paragraph says: "But doubts still arose as to whether further drafts were to be sent or not." After that you did not send any more?—No, although I applied both verbally and by letter, and I brought the attention of the War Office to the fact immediately I returned from South Africa. You will see this at paragraph 83, on page 27 of the First Report: "About this time the question of the augmentation of the Force for the supply of drafts to meet field casualties in South Africa came under the consideration of the Committee. It was at first proposed that five depots should be formed for this purpose, namely, one in Scotland, Edinburgh; three in England, York, Birmingham, and Trowbridge; one in Ireland, Newbridge."

6507. That was not done?—It was not considered.

6508. (*Viscount Esher.*) When was that?—That was just when we had completed the raising of the first force. The Committee then took into consideration the advisability of raising drafts immediately, so that they could be trained for two or three months before they went out to join their regiments.

6509. (*Sir John Edge.*) Do you know why it was determined not to send out drafts?—I cannot say." At page 29, paragraph 94 of the First Report, you will see this: "But doubts still arose as to whether further drafts were to be sent or not, as reports had been received that 150 men had been sent to Bloemfontein from the base to replace casualties at the front, whereby the base depôt strength was accordingly weakened, and on May 16th the War Office was asked whether more drafts would be required, 10,346 non-commissioned officers and men having been sent out up to this date. The War Office replied that no more drafts need be sent out by the Imperial Yeomanry Committee."

6510. (*Chairman.*) They gave no reason?—No.

6511. (*Viscount Esher.*) Have we got the correspondence with the War Office in this book?—Yes, it is in Appendix No. 3 on pages 142 and 143 of the First Report, but at that time I should say that this was verbal. May 16th ought to have been in writing, because it is mentioned there as a specific date. (*Some further correspondence on the subject of drafts was subsequently supplied to the Commission, vide Appendix, page 524 post.*)

6512. (*Chairman.*) The next operation which you undertook was the Rhodesian force, was it not?—The Rhodesian force was part of the 1900 force that was raised; it was only a portion of that force which was detailed to go to Rhodesia.

6513. They were part of the 10,000 men who went out?—Yes.

6514. As regards that contingent, you were satisfied with the quality of the men sent out?—Certainly, they had the advantage of some two or three months' training under the eye of the commanding officer of the Yeomanry in the district where they were raised and his staff, and there is no doubt they received a very good training in the time, and considering the time of year. Of course, it was a very bad time of year, in mid-winter, but that period of training had a very good effect, as both men and officers were known to each other. It gave time to weed out any inefficients, and there is no doubt that the force was a very good one indeed. It also had another very great advantage in this, that when they arrived in South Africa, before going into action, the majority of the force was marched right through the Colony, and it was another six weeks or two months before they went into action, so that they had the special training of a long trek, which afterwards stood them in good stead there is no doubt. They gathered a knowledge of the country and of the methods of scouting, and that sort of thing.

6515. At what time did you find it was necessary to take up the question of replacing casualties, or replacing the men?—Immediately; attention was drawn to it at once. Whilst the force was being raised the question was asked as to the supply of drafts, and we proposed that we should have depôts where they should be raised and trained and drafted out as they were required. That was thought of at the time, really before the force had gone out; it was merely common-sense.

6516. In advance?—Yes.

6517. And the answer to that is the one you have given us?—Yes, it was decided that drafts were not to be raised.

6518. The next thing is, when did it become imperative to do something?—That further force was raised in 1901; we call it the 1901 force.

6519. Lord Esher calls attention to Paragraph 87, at the top of page 28 of this First Report, where there is some arrangement about drafts made?—Yes, that was never carried out; that was when the limit was originally fixed at 8,000, but the force was afterwards increased to 10,000, and the drafts were not raised. The only arrangements made for drafts were the eight officers and 460 men for the 39 companies. (*See page 29, Paragraph 93, First Report.*)

6520. How was the question of raising the second contingent brought about?—That came in the beginning of January, 1901. Before we pass from that, may I also say, in justice to the Committee, with regard to the equipment the same forethought was displayed there as in the other case. We not only equipped this force entirely but when they were equipped we approached the War Office and asked them if they would give us their scale for wastage of equipment based on active service, and I myself saw the Adjutant-General on this point, and it appeared there was no such scale. I was asked to make one out. However, Sir Evelyn Wood made the scale out and sent it over to us, and General Badcock and Sir Robert Baillie went through it, and it was very carefully considered and finally adopted. Then we had a six months' reserve allowed. Those articles of equipment and clothing were despatched to South Africa to store, and besides that the Committee did not consider that even that six months' reserve was sufficient, although it was thought that the men would be back in three months' time, and the Committee purchased very largely extra stores and equipment for the men out of their private funds, and they were all wanted afterwards, and a great many more. They were all issued during the War, and a very large amount of the Imperial Yeomanry equipment was, during the War, handed over to, and taken over by, the Imperial authorities in South Africa, as they were short of different articles at the time. There is one item of something over a thousand saddles that we handed over to them, and there were various other things during the War that we had a surplus of and of which they were short at the time. In everything we tried to look ahead, and we had a very large surplus for our force, but none too large as things turned out.

6521. (*Sir John Edge.*) And not unnecessary, even if the War Office had not drawn upon you?—Not at all unnecesssary. Everything would have been wanted and a great deal more, but after my visit to South Africa everything was taken over by the Imperial authorities. We handed over all our stores, and from that time instead

of our sending private stores out they undertook the further equipment of the force, which I think was right for this reason: that owing to the great difficulty of transport on the railway, and the fact that our force was scattered all over the country it was utterly impossible for us to deliver our own private stores and equipment to them. Therefore it was far better to have it all done by one authority.

6522. (*Viscount Esher.*) At what date did that take place?—The handing over?

6523. Roughly?—Roughly speaking, I arrived in the beginning of July, 1900, and all the stores we had left were handed over during that summer and autumn.

6524. (*Chairman*). That was before the second contingent was raised?—Yes, in the case of the second contingent we had nothing to do with clothing at all. With the first one the Committee had the entire responsibility of the raising, clothing and equipping up to the point, as I say, when the War became more prolonged than had been expected, and the Committee was dissolved, and therefore the Imperial authorities took over the whole of the equipment after that date.

6525. The Committee was dissolved?—The Committee was dissolved on the 25th of May, 1900, and my services were retained with those of Colonel Beckett, who was managing the Finance Department, Colonel Deane, Colonel Davidson, Sir Robert Baillie, and others of my staff.

6526. It was under that superintendence that the second contingent was raised?—The second contingent was raised in this way: it was thought necessary to raise more men, and General Badcock and Colonel Deane were appointed to assist me in the raising of this force. There was a question of another Committee being formed, and I stated that I thought the work could be done better, and personally I would much sooner have the responsibility myself if assisted by officers in whom I had confidence and whose help would be of value than by having a large Committee such as we had before. Therefore, General Badcock and Colonel Deane were appointed, and Colonel Davidson remained on the staff, and the 1901 Force was raised by us.

6527. Was that on a request from the War Office?—Yes; we were officially appointed on the 15th January, 1901.

6528. How was the necessity for the raising of the men brought out? Was that on a request from the War Office?—It was an order from the War Office.

6529. Is that recorded in this First Report?—No, it is really recorded here on page 10 of the Supplementary Report: "On the 15th January, 1901, the Commander-in-Chief decided that Lieutenant-General Sir A. R. Badcock, K.C.B., C.S.I., and Colonel T. Deane, C.B., should be appointed to prepare a scheme with Colonel A. G. Lucas, the Deputy Adjutant-General, and to advise on the measures necessary for carrying out the organisation. They attended at the War Office and discussed the question with the Commander-in-Chief, submitting to him a memorandum which will be found in Appendix No. 2 of the Supplementary Report."

6530. You are now quoting from the Supplementary Report, which of course I have not seen?—That is so, this memorandum was read out in the presence of the Secretary of State, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Under Secretary of State. Those were our suggestions. We were asked how we would propose to raise this force, and those suggestions will be found on pages 67 and 68 of the Supplementary Report. At that interview it was pointed out that it was necessary that these men should have a proper training similar to the others before they went out to South Africa, and we suggested that they should have at least two months training, but owing to Lord Kitchener's and Lord Chesham's wish it was decided that they were to have their training in South Africa instead of in England. Therefore these men were simply raised by us and they were sent down to Aldershot and practically shipped off as fast as transports could be found for them, so that you may say the 1901 force had practically no training before they left.

6531. (*Sir George Taubman Goldie.*) Do you produce the telegram from Lord Kitchener on that subject?—No, it is confidential.* The Commander-in-Chief would, if it is asked for, no doubt give it to the Commission. I can read you Lord Chesham's proposals.

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6532. (*Chairman.*) What did Lord Chesham say?—That the men were to be forwarded to Durban and sent up to Germiston at once for training. (*See Paragraph 26, page 13, Supplementary Report.*) Of course, the authority was really Lord Kitchener's, and that is a confidential document that I have not access to. I know it is so, because Lord Roberts told me. That was the origin of the force being sent out, and it must be manifest to anybody that we had no control over those men when they were once recruited. We were only practically recruiting agents in a way. We arranged and managed all the recruiting with the Yeomanry centres. The men were all raised through the Yeomanry centres as before, but when they were sent to Aldershot we were no longer responsible for them at all, and that is where I think a great mistake was made—there was a dual control. We raised the men and sent them there and then they were under a different authority, not as in the case of the first contingent, where my office and the Committee were absolutely responsible for the organisation of the men until they left the country.

6533. Until they went on board?—Yes, so that those men went down and there were no means of finding out the inefficient officers or men. They were all sent off, and, speaking from past experience now, it would have been far better if they had been trained at home, and I should myself strongly advise in the future, if any force of this kind is ever raised again, that on no consideration whatever should you allow a single man to leave the country until he is passed as efficient by the officer commanding the district. It is the greatest mistake in the world to do otherwise, as there must always be a tendency to employ men before they are ready once you have got them on the spot in times of emergency.

6534. At that time did you hold the position that you now hold?—Yes, I was appointed Deputy-Adjutant-General in February of 1900, and I have retained that position since.

6535. The Committee you have mentioned was appointed to assist you?—General Badcock and Colonel Deane were appointed to assist me, and we acted really as a small Committee—that is to say, we acted together in everything.

6536. But, I suppose, you, from your office, had chiefly to do with the correspondence with the different centres; the centres raised the men and despatched them to Aldershot?—Yes.

6537. I think, even from the centres, they sent up drafts?—They sent them direct to Aldershot.

6538. In the case of the second contingent, I rather think the drafts were sent up in details from Scotland also?—Yes, in the second lot in 1901. They all went to Aldershot and were shipped straight off.

6539. I mean that even the officers in charge of the Yeomanry centres never got their recruits together in the same way as they did in the case of the first contingent?—No, they were simply medically examined and put through a riding and shooting test and sent down to Aldershot. They had no training at all.

6540. And that is your answer to the criticisms with regard to the raising of that contingent?—What "criticisms"?

6541. There have been public criticisms of the men who were sent out with the second contingent?—Yes; but I am not going to say that those criticisms are correct; they are very incorrect. The second force proved itself to be a most splendid force. They had harder fighting probably than the first, and the reports of all the officers commanding those regiments, after the men had had a proper training, were to the effect that they behaved themselves magnificently, and were a very fine force indeed. It was only sending them out before they were trained that was the great mistake—the men were right.

6542. After a certain amount of weeding?—Yes, a certain amount of weeding, and that is always the case You must have a certain amount of weeding in the most carefully selected force.

6543. Your suggestion is that the weeding of the first contingent took place at home?—Yes.

6544. And would have taken place here with the second contingent if you had had time?—Yes, as in the

* The telegram was subsequently supplied to the Commission.

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third, because the figures in the third, when we come to that, will show you the numbers that were weeded out of that force before they went out.

6545. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) In the second contingent about 100 officers and 1,000 men were weeded?—No; 42 officers and 700 men. I was not on the spot, and do not know at all what methods were taken for finding out the inefficiency of these men, or whether they had a proper trial or not. I will give you an instance of one officer who was reported as inefficient and a bad rider; this was a Mr. Gilmour, who came to my office and eventually he was called before General Gipps' Committee. He was returned as a bad rider and inefficient; but, as a matter of fact, he was one of the members of the picked polo team of New Zealand, a man who had hunted all his life, and was a very fine horseman. General Gipps' Committee made a test of his riding, and they passed him as being an exceptionally good horseman. *There* is one instance—a thorough gentleman and a very nice man indeed obliged to resign his commission. If there was one mistake made there may have been others. That is an instance I give you that I know of where a mistake was made. I do not say that there are many others, but a very glaring mistake was apparently made in coming to a hasty conclusion, I consider, in condemning an officer and making him resign his commission.

6546. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Was that condemnation in South Africa?—Yes, when they first went out.

6547. (*Sir John Edge.*) I gather from what you say that Mr. Gilmour was condemned as being inefficient also?—Yes; he was put down as inefficient, and the reason given was that he was a bad rider.

6548. That was the only reason given?—It was put generally; but, as a matter of fact, he was a man I considered rather superior if he had a little time. On that I do not consider I am competent to give information, because it was something done outside my jurisdiction entirely.

6549. (*Chairman.*) I only mentioned the criticisms in order to give you an opportunity of saying anything you desired to say?—I think I am right.

6550. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Perhaps you are speaking of those who were eliminated instantly, and not those eliminated within the first four months?—Well, they came home very quickly—a very large number. I do not like to speak without knowledge of what was done out there, and I think it would be better for the Commission to find out perhaps from the officers who were out in South Africa at the time what methods were taken to ascertain the inefficiency.

6551. I did not ask you as to the methods but as to numbers; I thought you would know the numbers. The numbers are stated to have been 100 officers and 1,000 men in the first four months?—In the 43rd paragraph, on page 17 of the Supplementary Report, you will find this statement: "Out of 506 officers appointed under the difficulties which have been here referred to, forty-two only were rejected in South Africa, or about 8 per cent. on the number given. A letter of explanation regarding these officers will be found in Appendix No. 3, and full inquiry was made in regard to these rejections by a specially appointed Committee at the War Office, and in some instances, although the officers were not re-instated, it was found that the causes for their rejection were at least doubtful. No doubt, had these officers been given the amount of drill and training which was originally proposed and expected, they would have proved as efficient as those of the First and Third Contingents." I certainly stand by those remarks.

6552. Then as to men?—As to the number of men, from memory I think it was about 600 odd, but I should like to refer to that paragraph also, if I may. About the middle of page 21 of this Supplementary Report you will find: "The number of those rejected was stated by the Secretary of State for War to be 700" (that was in answer to a question asked in the House) "out of 17,000 sent out during the year." The majority of those, as far as I can understand, were rejected on medical grounds—by far the larger number.

6553. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Had there been no medical examination in this country?—Certainly, there had.

6554. Equally strict in the other cases as it was with regard to the First Contingent?—Yes, I should say equally strict as regards the First, but not so strict perhaps as regards the Third. I think it was as strict, although it was done under a different method. The examination of the First and Second Contingents was done by the Yeomanry doctors and civilian doctors specially allowed to be employed. The examination of the 1902 Contingent, the Third force, was entirely by the Army doctors, and the rejections were very large.

6555. (*Chairman.*) The rejections here?—Yes, there was a loop-hole, which was a mistake looking at it now. In the Army Order which was issued originally it was stated—I am not quoting the words because I can refer to it as it is in this First Report—that in the examination the men were to be passed not so strictly as for the Regular service, but simply they were to be passed sound for the campaign.

6556. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Sufficiently fit for the campaign?—Yes, that gave a little loop-hole to be rather lenient in certain cases, no doubt, and that was subsequently altered.

6557. (*Chairman.*) Is this what you refer to: "In carrying out the medical examination of candidates it should be borne in mind that it is unnecessary that they should fulfil all the conditions of fitness required of a recruit enlisting for the full term of service in the Regular Army. It is sufficient that the candidate should be free from organic disease or other defect likely to prevent him from doing his work during the duration of the present war." That is paragraph 15, page 148, of the First Report?—Yes, that gave rather a loop-hole.

6558. That was in the Secretary of State's Instructions?—Yes, those were the Instructions for the original force, and they were adopted for the second too; but in future I would most strongly urge that there should be no relaxation whatever in the standard of health.

6559. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You consider that the fact of these Instructions being given was most unfortunate with regard to the result?—I do not say "most unfortunate," because I think the result was on the whole very satisfactory. I think 700 men out of 17,000 is not such a very large percentage when you come to think that we had not any opportunity of weeding those men out at all, and that some of them were inclined to be drunkards and undesirable characters, as is always the case in the enlisting of any large number of men either for civil or Government employ, so that I do not consider really, under the circumstances, it was a very large proportion.

6560. (*Chairman.*) You said that in the First Contingent there was a considerable amount of weeding out?—Yes, but it was done quietly.

6561. You do not know the percentage?—There was more leisure and more time.

6562. But you could not compare the percentages of what you rejected at home in the First Contingent with these percentages?—No; we could compare the Second and Third as we have them recorded, but as to the First I do not think we have any record. That would be done more at the Yeomanry centres as the training went on, where, if they found a man was not likely to become efficient, he was simply weeded out. There was a smaller force raised, and there was not the same amount of hurry, and they got a very much larger percentage of Yeomen and Volunteers.

6563. What is the comparison with the Third Contingent?—It was 400 odd rejected at Aldershot out of 6,500.

6564. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Those 400 had been accepted?—Yes, they had been accepted and weeded out. You will find it on page 53 of the Supplementary Report under the heading of "Recruiting—Wastage," and I find I have overstated it a little: "Measures adopted to make good the wastage which occurred in the battalions (after recruiting had been stopped), due to the inefficient men being discharged. This deficiency amounted to about 300 men, or a percentage of 4·6 on the whole force. Tests were not imposed previous to attestation, and the training at Aldershot and elsewhere resulted in the elimination of many men who did not appear

likely to become fairly efficient in the short period of about two months allowed for instruction." It works out to just about the same, and that shows the care that was taken here, and if the same opportunities had been given for eliminating in the other Force, the result would have been about the same. I think if you inquire from the ordinary recruiting authorities you will find it is not a high percentage.

6565. Have you any Return showing the number of Yeomanry who were invalided, not rejected?—I am afraid I have not got that Return, and it would be a very difficult thing to get.

6566. The proportion of Yeomanry who came before me at Chelsea invalided appeared to me very large compared to the number of men invalided from the Line, and I think myself, the medical test being more lax than in the case of the Line, is in some degree accountable for that?—I do not know if we can get that Return. They may have it at the War Office; those Returns would not come to us, but they would go direct to the War Office, in the case of the last two forces especially. We managed the whole of the casualty list to begin with when the Committee was at work. All that evidence, if it is in existence, with regard to the last two contingents, would be in the War Office.

6567. On page 190 of the First Report there is a statement with regard to it?—That is only with regard to the first contingent.

6568. There is a Return as to casualties there?—That Return is only as to the first Force, as to which we kept a note of the casualties ourselves, but with regard to the other Forces, the 1901 and the 1902 Forces, I doubt very much whether they have kept a separate account of those invalided at the War Office.

6569. (*Chairman.*) There were 1,397 men invalided out of 10,000?—That shows the grand total of casualties at 3,093, approximately 30 per cent., and it was very heavy.

6570. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) That "invalided to England" might mean recovering from enteric?—Yes, from various illnesses, and the disease I think was more severe in the first year than it was afterwards, as the privations were worse.

6571. (*Sir John Edge.*) That figure of 3,093 includes 216 killed?—Yes, it is the total casualties.

6572. 330 died of disease and 606 were taken prisoners?—Yes, that was the Lindley disaster, the Irish Contingent and the Duke of Cambridge's who were captured, principally.

6573. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) "On the 2nd March, 1901, the War Office brought to notice that the general standard of physique of the corps recruited in London had been found by the Secretary of State for War, after personal inspection at Aldershot, not to be up to the standard hoped for." That is on page 99 of the Supplementary Report; do you agree with that?—No, I do not. Mr. Brodrick made that statement after going down to Aldershot. I think he saw the men when they had first come down. There was an enormous number huddled together, and he thought the standard was not up to the mark, but I would sooner go on the Returns we have from all the recruiting stations which you will find here. It is a Return we called for, and it is on page 120 of the Supplementary Report.

6574. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) May I ask if they were in uniform at the time Mr. Brodrick saw them, or in the ordinary clothing in which they had gone down?—I should think, probably, most of them were in their ordinary clothing, and it makes a very great difference indeed. In the Return I have just mentioned, at page 120 of the Supplementary Report, you will find the Reports from the various districts, and on the whole the Report is favourable as to the stamp and physique of the men of that Force, compared with the others. There are one or two instances you will find where they are not up to the same standard, but taking the average all through it was a fair comparison.

6575. (*Chairman.*) You also had letters from Lord Chesham, and Lord Kitchener's expression of opinion, too, was satisfactory?—Yes.

6576. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) That is with reference to the first contingent, and not the second?—I think Colonel Deane could answer that, as he was on the spot at the time.

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6577. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Do you consider that, taking all in all, the men of the first contingent were superior both as regards physique and intelligence—in short, men of a better class—than those of the second?—Yes, I do. I think that the first contingent had a larger percentage of men of a better social position, there is no doubt about that, but so far as their fighting qualities were concerned, when they had had the same amount of training, the Reports from those who commanded and were with both Forces were, that the second Force was quite equal to the first.

6578. They were equally brave and courageous?—Yes, and good in the field.

6579. But not with the same measure of intelligence; not so well educated as a whole?—No; I think you may say on the average they were not so well educated, or of quite so good a social position as the first.

6580. But not taken from the streets as has been said?—No, that is absolutely wrong. How that report got about that we were taking the scum of London was that, unfortunately, one or two of the recruiting stations in London were in a very prominent place in Pall Mall, and people saw all these wretched loafers, who went from one place to another and were rejected, standing about outside, and they were standing about to get what they could out of some of the other men, but these were not the men enrolled at all. If you had seen the men themselves that were enrolled, you would have formed a very different opinion of them.

6581. In short, you took the best men you could get for the purpose at the time?—Yes, and I think the answer to the incorrect statements is, to read the reports from all the recruiting stations, and those who were responsible for recruiting them, which are all embodied in this Supplementary Report.

6582. (*Chairman.*) At the time of the second contingent, I see from this book that the question of drafts was again raised?—Yes, and not allowed.

6583. What happened with regard to that?—It was not allowed.

6584. How was it raised?—I raised it myself on one or two occasions verbally, and it was raised, I think, officially, if I remember right, when the Force was completed. That question was raised in an official letter.

6585. (*Viscount Esher.*) Are you now speaking of the second contingent?—Yes.

6586. (*Chairman.*) It says on page 18, paragraph 55, of the Supplementary Report that there was considerable correspondence with the War Office as to drafts?—I think it would be well to speak to that correspondence.

6587. You are speaking of your own official letter?—Yes.

6588–9. The result was that no official reply was received?—The reply was in the negative. (*See page* 10, *paragraph* 1, *Supplementary Report.*)

6590. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) About what date would your letter be?—On the 23rd October, 1901; it is on page 223 of the Supplementary Report. There were these two letters, one of which was a semi-official letter, which I wrote to the Adjutant-General soon after the present Adjutant-General was appointed to his position, and this letter refers to another method that was decided on by the War Office to obtain the 1902 contingent, without consultation with me. It was thought that the War Office could raise these men themselves through their own ordinary recruiting districts. I was consulted on this and I saw Lord Roberts, and he told me that they were going to try it, and also that some eight or nine gentlemen in the country had undertaken to raise contingents and regiments. I told Lord Roberts that I felt certain it would be an absolute failure, and that he would not get the men through the ordinary recruiting stations, and through the War Office. My experience showed that if you wanted the Yeomen they must be got through the personal influence of the Yeomanry Officers and the

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county gentlemen in the various districts. However, it was decided that it should be done outside my office. I pointed out that I thought they might get about 1,000 men, but that more likely they would get 600. I then went for my leave to Scotland for three weeks, and when I came back, on my way through London, I called in at the War Office, and the Adjutant-General sent for me and told me this had failed, and they had not got the men. That was the reason for my writing this letter of the 23rd October, 1901.

6591. How many did they get do you remember ?—They got about 300. Then I saw Lord Roberts (the Adjutant-General took me in to him), and he told me this had failed and asked me what I thought was the best thing to be done. I said if the men were wanted there was only one thing to be done, namely, to raise them in the same way as they were raised before ; and I added, "I will be responsible, if you want 10,000 or 5,000 men. I will get 5,000 men for you in a month or under a month, and we will get any number in reason that you want." The thing was put into our hands and we got 5,000 in a good deal less than a month. It was simply a matter of organisation and knowing how to get the men. As to these men, although it has been said in the Press and elsewhere that they are of an inferior class, they are not. The second contingent may have been a little inferior socially to the first, but they were a superior class of men to the ordinary army recruits. They were not men who were going to adopt the Army as a profession; they were mechanics and workmen, who, owing to slackness of labour, thought it was a good opportunity to earn 5s. a day; there is no doubt that was a great inducement, and they also wanted to go out to South Africa with the idea of settling out there. These men came forward, but when they were asked to go into an ordinary recruiting station and strip, huddled together with a lot of ordinary recruits who were being brought in by the sergeant, they would not do it, and they walked out. They were of a different class and they would not subject themselves to it. I told Lord Roberts that, and he quite saw it. That was only one reason. Shall I read that letter ?

6592. (*Chairman.*) It is a long letter ?—Yes, it is a long letter, but it is rather important as bearing on the matter.

6593. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) What is the date of the letter ?—The date of the letter is 23rd October, and it is on page 223 of the Supplementary Report.

6594. I ask that because it is a long time after the second contingent had been raised ?—Yes.

6595. Many months afterwards ?—Certainly.

6596. Then of course that letter could not have been considered before the second contingent had gone out ?—This letter was not considered with regard to the second contingent.

6597. When the second contingent went out you did not propose that there should be a reserve ?—We certainly proposed that there should be drafts, but it was not allowed. It was brought forward that drafts should be raised, and it was pointed out how the former force had been allowed to waste, and it was not allowed.

6598. Could you refer us to that representation ?—I think I can. There is a letter also from Lord Chesham on that very subject, pointing out the necessity of raising the drafts. Colonel Deane has reminded me that one letter which was written was a private letter to Lord Roberts to Madeira on his way home. The drafts had been refused before, on our application, and I addressed Lord Roberts on the whole question, and within a few days of his arrival it was decided to raise the further force. I remember it perfectly well.

6599. To raise the second contingent ?—Yes.

6600. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) But the question is as to the recommendation of drafts ?—The question of drafts pure and simple was never allowed.

6601. Not for the first contingent ?—No. Although most of the men of the second contingent sent out to South Africa were drafted into existing regiments men of the old corps were gradually brought home, so that actually, although the second force was nominally composed of drafts, they eventually formed a new force when the old force was sent home. That was a matter of organisation out there, which I was not on the spot to see.

6602. (*Chairman.*) The question which I started with referred to a distinct passage on page 18 of this Supplementary Report, which perhaps I may just read, as it is not long:—"In regard to drafts, correspondence again took place with the War Office, and it was urged as necessary that the force in the field should be kept up to the full strength by the gradual supply of trained men, as the casualties amounted to about 30 per cent. per annum. The formation of depôts was proposed in much the same manner as set forth in paragraph 83 of the former report, and a staff was suggested for these depôts at such places as London, Newcastle, Doncaster, Manchester, and Reading. Had these suggestions been given effect to, it is probable that the third Force, the formation of which was authorised in 1902, would not have been necessary. No official reply, however, was received to the proposals alluded to, but the Deputy Adjutant-General was given to understand that no drafts would be required." That is what I was alluding to; it was the formation of depôts to keep up the strength of the second contingent; that was again raised with the same result as in the first, that they were refused ?—That ought to be mentioned in these Reports somewhere.

6603. I do not think it is necessary to trouble you just now about it, as you can give us the reference afterwards ?—Yes, but I believe that had reference more to drafts for the second force. (*The witness subsequently gave the reference as Appendix 4a, page 76, of the Supplementary Report.*)

6604. I understood it to mean exactly what you said happened with regard to the first ?—Yes, exactly the same. We did put forward the necessity of not allowing the original force to dwindle down, and the drafts were not allowed, they were refused. That went on for some time, and as I say I caused this private letter to be written, which no one knows anything about except Lord Roberts, myself, and Colonel Deane, putting before him what I considered the serious position of not raising drafts, and within a very short time after he came home he decided on the raising of this second force.

(*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I understand the Chairman's question to be, what steps were then taken for drafts after that, but before October, 1901.

6605. (*Chairman.*) I was only bringing out, as I have not seen these papers, a confirmation of what you said at the beginning, that if your scheme for depôts and the keeping up of the force in the field by drafts had been allowed, the separate raising of the second and third contingents would not have been necessary ?—Probably would not have been necessary.

6606. And I gathered from this, which caught my eye, that after the second contingent you did exactly the same thing, and asked that depôts should be allowed and drafts sent out, but it was refused again ?—Yes ; I will make a note of that. I am told it was in June, 1901, that the letter was written, and I will have it looked up and produced.*

6607. (*Viscount Esher.*) With reference to the statement on page 18 of this Supplementary Report that the Deputy Adjutant-General was "given to understand" that no drafts would be required; does that mean private correspondence or verbally ?—That is verbally.

6608. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You are aware drafts were allowed for all the other forces, no matter where the force was drawn from, at home or abroad, and that the Yeomanry were the only exception ?—It was the only force for which regular drafts were not provided.

6609. (*Chairman.*) I suppose besides the ordinary percentage there was this necessity for the second contingent, that a certain number of the men of the first contingent, or at any rate the officers, came home ?—Well, the first contingent had served their time. They were enlisted for a year or the war, and they had had a very hard time of it, and a large number of them were men of business, and they wanted to come home.

6610. I do not say there were not good reasons, but as a matter of fact in addition to the ordinary wastage of a regiment there was that cause for a second contingent, was there not ?—Their time was up.

* The letter was subsequently sent to the Commission, *vide* Appendix, page 523 post.

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6611. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Their time was not up; it was a year or the end of the war?—But they had served a good deal over a year, and a good many of the men remained out and rejoined the second contingent.

6612. (*Chairman.*) I am only trying to get at the facts. I understood you to say that if you had been allowed drafts you would have kept up the strength, but this seemed to me to point to an additional reason for the probable necessity of the second contingent—that some of the men had completed their engagement and come home?—That is so.

6613. And therefore the ordinary system of drafts to keep up the strength of the regiment would perhaps not have met the case?—No. I do not think it would in that particular instance, for this reason, that I think I am right in stating that at that time Lord Kitchener asked for some 35,000 more mounted men, and it was decided to raise a proportion of them as Yeomanry. That might have occurred independent of drafts.

6614. That was an additional force?—Yes. This force of ours was included in the 35,000 mounted men who went out.

6615. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I observe that the second contingent was the first one that got 5s. a day?—Yes.

6616. On the recommendation of your Committee?—Yes.

6617. It is incidentally mentioned that that was to be given to the first contingent after they had served a year?—Yes.

6618. When was that authorised?—I cannot remember the exact date, but I think how it arose was that there was a good deal of feeling in the Imperial Yeomanry that they were only paid Cavalry rates, whereas all the locally-raised forces were paid 5s. a day. You remember at the time there was a good deal of agitation, and letters in the papers, and that sort of thing, and it was decided that these men should have, at the completion of their twelve months' service, 5s. a day, the same pay that the local Colonials were getting.

6619. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Those from the Colonies?—No, the locally-raised ones, not the others. Then there was a discussion as to the advisability of paying these men the ordinary rate of pay, and it was thought it would not be possible to get a large number of men unless they were paid more, and inasmuch as the Yeomanry of the 12 months' service were receiving 5s. a day it was thought much better not to have two rates of pay, and the 5s. was granted to the second contingent. The only thing that was done that I think might have been altered, and was altered in the third contingent, was the payment of 5s. a day from enlistment. It would have been better from embarkation, and we should have paid them the 5s. a day only from the date of embarkation, and the Cavalry rate of pay before that time.

6620. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) In point of fact, as I understand it, as the Colonial mounted levies received 5s. a day, it was thought necessary to give the first contingent the same after they had been a year in Africa?—Yes.

6621. And that led on to the second contingent getting the same concession, only from the very beginning?—Yes.

6622. I see you recommended that they should have the option of the priority of appointment to the Transvaal Police; was that sanctioned?—Those were our recommendations, and it was always understood that the Yeomanry—those men fighting out there in common with the Colonial forces—should they desire it, should have the preference in any billets that were going in the colonisation, or any official billets that they were suited for.

6623. Was that ever officially approved?—It was certainly approved. (*See Appendix* 6, *page* 79, *of the Supplementary Report.*)

6624. And carried out?—Well, it has been carried out probably to a certain extent; a very large number of men who wished to stay out there were obliged to come home. Of course, it is impossible for me to give an opinion really without knowing the facts of the case, but I cannot help feeling that perhaps more might have been done for the Yeomen.

6625. In point of fact, were they not recruiting here at the same time for the Yeomanry and for the Transvaal Police?—Yes, at the same time, and that was another reason why the 5s. was necessary.

6626. (*Chairman.*) That was recruiting at the time of the third contingent?—The second.

6627. Now, would you go on to the third contingent. That was raised in September, 1901?—The third contingent was raised in September, 1901. It was the further force which was thought necessary to be raised, and it was raised through the Yeomanry centres in the same way as the others, but they were drafted down to Aldershot, where a camp of instruction was formed for the English detachments. There was also a depôt formed at Edinburgh for the Fincastle Horse, and at the Curragh for the Irish Horse. There was an instructing staff sent down to each of those depôts, and the men received very nearly three months' instruction before they left. That gave an opportunity for eliminating the useless officers and men. It might be thought, and it has been stated, that more care should have been exercised in the selection of officers, but at that time, when we had to find this large number of officers, the choice was very limited indeed. As you can imagine, nearly every eligible officer had gone into the regular service, and for the second force particularly it was very hard indeed to get really efficient officers with knowledge. The third force was better; we had a larger percentage of officers from the regular forces allowed to us, and I would most strongly recommend in the future that a larger proportion—if possible the commanding officer, the second in command, the Adjutant, and the squadron leaders—should all be regular officers, unless they are officers of auxiliary forces, who could be specially recommended, because it is all-important, more especially in an irregular force, where discipline is not perhaps quite so well known as in the Army, to have officers who are thoroughly efficient. The junior officers could be trained easier. Then there is one other matter which I should like to refer to, showing what a difficult task we had in the selection of officers. Every officer who applied had to be recommended by some officer of standing, or some officer under whom he had served. In several cases officers or Yeomen who had come back had been very strongly recommended by officers of high standing, who had vouched for their characters, yet the majority of those forty who were discharged as inefficient, or who were drunkards, had been highly recommended by officers of high standing, showing you how difficult it is to make selections. It is like a man giving a character to a butler when he knows the man to be a drunkard; it is a most wrong thing to do, and you can see, therefore, how difficult it was for us. When men of very high standing recommended a young fellow, naturally we concluded that, anyhow, his character was all right. In several cases, however, such candidates turned out to be hopeless drunkards.

6628. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Were many officers drawn from the Militia, in which, of course, there are a very considerable number of those retired from the Army?—Not very many from the Militia. The numbers are given on page 49 of this Supplementary Report, and show exactly where the officers were drawn from. In the third force there were 395 officers commissioned; there were 80 from the regular forces, 19 from the Militia, 18 from the Yeomanry, 16 from the Volunteers, 35 ex-officers who had already served in South Africa, 166 non-commissioned officers and men who had served in South Africa, and who were promoted on recommendation of their Commanding Officers, and 61 ex-Regulars, ex-Militia, etc., making up a total of 395.

6629. (*Chairman.*) Of that force the first battalion were raised in February, 1901?—Yes.

6630. And they went on into the spring of the next year?—Of the first battalions that sailed, the 25th and 26th were raised from men who had already served in South Africa, either Colonials or Yeomen. The first went out complete under the command of Colonel Harvey. The second went out not complete; there were only three squadrons, as they could not get a sufficient number of men, and those went out under Colonel Younghusband. Those were under different

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conditions; they were ex-Yeomen and Colonials, and formed special corps.

6631. And the other battalions from Scotland and Ireland went out later?—They went out later; they had training. Those other two did not have the same training because they were all men who had already served out there in the first contingents, and it was not thought necessary to give them the same amount of training.

6632. With regard to that force, had you satisfactory reports as to physique?—Very satisfactory. The Returns are in this Supplementary Report, and you will see them on page 46. I will read just one or two, as it might be interesting: "*Ayrshire*—Very few of the men presenting themselves had any knowledge of riding or of horses, and for this reason were not as good as those sent out in 1900 and 1901." "*Bedfordshire*—Recruits much superior in every respect to those of 1900 and 1901." You can see how they vary in different districts. I go now to "*East Kent*—Men as good, if not better, than previous drafts physically, but inferior in other respects; 50 per cent. of applicants had never been on a horse." That gives the reports we received from the various Recruiting Districts showing how they varied, but I think they were fully up to the standard of the others, and the force that actually sailed was quite equal to either of the others, because there was the opportunity of weeding out the useless men. As to the Irish and Scotch, I went round with Lord Roberts to inspect the whole of these contingents, and seeing them side by side with the Regular Forces, the difference was very great; they were a magnificent set of men, very fine indeed, especially the Irish and Scotch. They were rather too big for mounted men—some of them were more like heavy dragoon men.

6633. You have now spoken of the three contingents; what have you to say as to the experience from them with regard to the future?—Do you mean the future as to raising such a force as the Imperial Yeomanry for active service, or the future as to the Home organisation?

6634. I will take both, but supposing you had to raise a similar force again?—I think the shortest thing for me to say with regard to that is, without going through it, all proposals are in these two Reports. I should only like to add to what has been said in them one or two suggestions with regard to the Home organisation and with regard to the raising of such a force. The thing to consider broadly is whether this could be better done by any other means or through any other organisation than that specified, and on looking back into the past I think it would have been impossible for the War Office to have raised this force under their hard and fast rules. The only way to raise it was by the more than cordial co-operation of the Yeomanry centres and the Yeomanry Commanding Officers, for the Yeomanry is a very peculiar force in that way. The officers, as is well known, are composed of county gentlemen, men of business a great many of them, and with great knowledge of their immediate locality, while the men are drawn from various classes all over the country. The officers are in touch practically with everything in the county, and they are backed up by a staff which I consider is the most efficient staff in the Auxiliary Forces, because the non-commissioned officers, the permanent staff of the Yeomanry, are men chosen as being the best men from Cavalry regiments. It is such berths as these that a really good man looks for, with a comfortable home on retirement, and not such very hard work, and therefore you get the pick of the very best men in the Yeomanry. To that I put down to a very great extent the success of the working of this organisation. Now with regard to the future, if a proper department is instituted at the War Office for the Auxiliary Forces, and it is not starved, but has an efficient and adequate staff consisting of a certain number of representatives from the three branches of the Auxiliary Forces, with their own separate offices, I think that with extra help, should it be found necessary to raise Yeomanry again, it could be done through that Department, more especially if my suggestion, which I have been for some years advocating, but more strongly since I was appointed to my present position, were carried out of raising a Special Service Corps for Yeomanry. It has always been a hobby of mine to have a squadron of Special Service men in every Yeomanry regiment, that is, men who will sign on for service abroad in case of emergency for a certain number of years, and they would receive a bonus or extra pay for that. I see Mr. Brodrick has now stated that is to be done, and these men are to have £5 a year, in accordance with my recommendation. I think if that is started you will then have a nucleus of 5,000, 6,000, or 7,000 men, probably, if it is properly organised, ready to put your hand on in case of emergency. That would form the nucleus of a very large force to recruit on in the same way that the 2,000 men that were originally recruited from the Yeomanry force were the nucleus that we recruited on from all the outside forces, and on that, basing the calculation that you would get three, four, or five to one from outside, you might raise a very large force indeed on that nucleus. I would most strongly recommend that there should be a Department in the War Office for the Auxiliary Forces, with separate offices or branches to deal with each. The Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces should be a man of exceptional ability and, moreover, the greatest thing, a man with tact, because these Forces are not like the Regulars. They are treated too much so, and a proper amount of consideration to their sentiments and their peculiarities I think is not shown by the War Office; it is more that they are considered soldiers, and they must be run on the same lines. You cannot do that with the Auxiliary Forces; it is purely a voluntary force, and you must manage them on different lines. Therefore I would suggest that this Department should be formed distinct from that of the Adjutant-General, and that the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces should be responsible direct to the Commander-in-Chief; under him there should be an Inspector-General of Militia, of Yeomanry, and of Volunteers, each responsible for the work of his own office.

6635. Why do you want to separate them from the Adjutant-General?—Because I consider—and I am speaking purely from my own experience, as a business man who has seen a very great deal of the inner working of the War Office in the last three years, as you can understand—that the Adjutant-General's Department is absolutely overworked. It is too big to control such an enormous amount of work, and therefore it would be better to separate and divide it up, and this would be a very good way, because I think the Auxiliary Forces would then perhaps receive a little more consideration than they have done in the past. I speak for the Yeomanry and Volunteers when I say that they have not received that consideration, in fact, the Yeomanry were going to be disbanded a few years ago as a useless force; that is a well-known fact and no secret. If they had their own Inspector-General and their own staff, there would be an end to that sort of thing.

6636. They have their Inspector-General?—They have their Inspector-General now, but the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces is entirely under the Adjutant-General, responsible to him and not directly to the Commander-in-Chief. My theory is that it should be a separate office, with separate branches to deal with each Force. It is large enough for that; it is composed of some 300,000 or 400,000 men, whatever it may be, a very large number of men, who want a little different treatment from that given to the Regular Services.

6637. It is something like a demand for a Cabinet Minister?—Well, it may be, but I only speak from the experience that I have had. I have had a long experience now, not in the Militia, but in the two branches of the Volunteer Service, and a very long innings in the Yeomanry, and knowing that they have not received quite the attention they should have had in the past, I think it would be advisable that they should have more control of their own affairs. I would propose that there should be a staff under the Inspector-General composed of Yeomanry officers more or less, men of known ability for administrative work, in the same way as you would have your Inspector-General and his Brigade Staff for executive work, but those should be drawn from Yeomanry, Volunteers, and Militia. It would be a very great encouragement to those Forces

to have such appointments, because now, what happens? A man commands his regiment and, no matter how well he does it his time comes to an end and there is nothing more for him to look for, but if he was eligible for appointment as Brigadier (there are Brigade commands in the Volunteers) he could be of some service in the administration of the Force from his knowledge gained. I think it would be an incentive and a help in every way to the Yeomanry branch of the Auxiliary Forces.

6638. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Do you think your suggestion is partly based on the feeling that perhaps in the Adjutant-General's Department there has always been a desire to build up the Regular Forces at the expense of the Auxiliary Forces?—There is no doubt about it that the first consideration is given entirely to the Regulars, and in the recruiting the whole complaint was that we were competing with the recruiting of the Army. Of course it was utter nonsense, as we were recruiting from a different class altogether. The whole thing is, Army first, Militia second, and the other two may take care of themselves; if they do not take care, notwithstanding all this patriotism that has been evoked in the last War, it will die out, and it will be a very difficult thing indeed to get the men again.

6639. (*Chairman.*) I was only referring to the difficulty of increasing Departments in any sphere of business under separate heads; that is a difficulty which has to be faced?—It has to be faced because it is a financial question, but if you are going to raise the force from 10,000 to 35,000, and you are going to expect from them a higher state of efficiency, and you are to ask more from them than hitherto, then I say certainly it is false economy not to increase the staff. If I had worked my office with the small amount of help that some of the officers in the War Office have, I should never have got through my work at all. If you cut down your staff and your help, it is the worst economy in the world, quite the worst, and I think if the Militia—perhaps I had better not say the Militia because I do not know so much about it—but if the Yeomanry and Volunteers were managed more by their own people who know what is wanted and what can be done and what cannot be done, you would find they would economise in many ways.

6640. That is the main point with regard to home organisation?—I think so; there are other things in my report. What I have stated here is going rather further perhaps than what I have recommended in my report, and that is why I wish to mention it. There is another matter that I think very important that should be considered, and that is with regard to the supply of horses. That is a matter that I have alluded to in the report, and I cannot help thinking that there the Yeomanry might help very much indeed. My proposition is that the Yeomanry Adjutants, who have a certain amount of time on their hands, should be made District Remount Agents, and it should be their business to know every horse in their district that is fit for service. They should be registered, so that in case of emergency you have a registration system decentralised under Cavalry officers. The Commanding Officer of Yeomanry would also be responsible for it, and you would know then in every county the number of horses that would be ready at any time in case of emergency, instead of under the present system just a few remount officers going about and buying horses here and there, and not knowing in the least what supply there is. I think it would be a very good thing.

6641. (*Sir John Edge.*) Are there Yeomanry in each centre of horse supply?—Practically now there are Yeomanry in nearly every district; if not in every county, in every district. With regard to the Yeomanry organisation in Ireland, I think it has been commenced, but I understand, that there is some hitch, because there are certain Acts of Parliament necessary, which was all pointed out in this First Report at the time I wrote it, proposing that the Yeomanry should be raised there. I said it would be necessary to have legislation, but still it was forgotten, I suppose. I think at the time this book was written—I say it with all diffidence—if its various proposals had been considered, a great many of the troubles that occurred afterwards might have been avoided. For instance, on the one question of pay, when I was out in South Africa with Colonel Deane, we saw at once that the whole pay system was radically wrong and impossible, and immediately I came home I drew the attention of the authorities to this, and proposed that a pay-book should be issued, and that the men should be paid on the coupon system. That was the system adopted by the firm of which I was lately a partner, Messrs. Lucas and Aird, when we had the contract for the abortive Suakin and Berber Railway in the Egyptian War. Our firm sent out a very large number of men, and every man had his own little book in his pocket, and was paid by advances on the coupon system. Then we went still further, and so that there should be no mistake about the identification of the men, every man had a metal disc, which he wore round his neck, with a number on it which corresponded to the number on the coupon and in the book, and there never could be a mistake; in connection with all that large number of men we never had one farthing wrong in our accounts. You will see that a correspondence took place on this subject, and we were informed that it had been tried by the War Office and failed. We ascertained that it had not been tried on the proper system, and therefore we pushed it forward again, and eventually Mr. Brodrick spoke to me privately one day on the difficulty about the pay, and I told him that I thought it might have been averted if my recommendations had been considered at the time, as we foresaw this, and asked for a pay officer to be appointed at once to tackle the thing, so that the trouble should not come on, but it was not agreed to. It was allowed to go adrift until the crash came, and the men came home with no pay accounts or anything. The book system has since been adopted, and is in use now, and I think if it had been adopted at once it would have saved a great deal of the public funds and a great deal of trouble. The simpler the pay system is, the better.

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6642. (*Chairman.*) We have had evidence that the War Office are considering the whole pay system?—Yes. They have adopted this book and issued it. With regard to any further recommendations, I would like to suggest to the Commission whether it would not be advisable to call any other members of my original Committee whose names I sent in to you. They all worked most loyally with me, and were responsible for their various Departments. It is a question whether they should not be called by this Commission. Personally, I should like it. Of course, I do not want it to be thought by my colleagues that they are in any way kept out from giving evidence.

6643. If we find that the information we require for our purpose in any way makes it desirable, we should certainly call them?—I thought I should mention it because I did not want it to be thought that I did not wish them to be called; on the contrary, I should like this matter to be probed to the very bottom, because I do feel that certain statements have been made with regard to the working of the original Yeomanry Committee which are not just, and so far as I am concerned, and all my colleagues, too, we are only too anxious that the thing should be enquired into and probed to the very bottom. There is absolutely nothing that we do not want to see daylight. My endeavour and policy all the way through, and that of my colleagues, has been never to hide a mistake; but, on the contrary, if a mistake was made, to bring it to the surface and show it up, so that in future we might benefit by the past. To hide a mistake is the greatest error in the world. We could have hidden a lot of mistakes that we made, and which would never have been seen or heard of, but what is the use of that? We want to bring out mistakes.

6644. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) There is one question I should like to ask you. In making your suggestions as to how we should go to work if there is a future war, and we wished to send a force of Yeomanry Cavalry abroad, and to improve the Yeomanry Cavalry, you said you thought it very desirable to have a much larger number of officers from the regular Cavalry in the superior appointments in the Yeomanry than there is at present. Do you think the Cavalry have an establishment which would enable many officers to be given? We have had it in evidence that Cavalry regiments are very much under-officered, and that has shown itself during the present War, as a great many officers had to be brought back for Depôt purposes and Staff pur-

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poses, and so on. Do you think there will be really any material number of Cavalry officers available for service with a large force of Yeomanry Cavalry?—I do not think it is absolutely necessary to have Cavalry officers; I said Regular officers. There is no doubt that in a campaign of the magnitude of the last one it would be very difficult indeed to get officers, but there are a certain number of officers of the Reserve, and there are generally a certain number available from India—we had a certain number from India—and if possible it would be far better for the efficiency of the force to have a larger percentage of Regular officers. Of course, whether they would be forthcoming or not it is quite impossible for me to say. What I should like to see would be that the Special Service Corps that are to be raised should be officered as far as possible by the men who would be likely to go abroad with them.

6645. And who have had some training?—Yes. I think every encouragement should be given to officers retiring from the Regular Services to join one of the branches of the Auxiliary Forces. It is worth the while of the country paying them a little more if necessary to get their services.

6646. (*Chairman.*) Is not the difficulty to get subalterns from the Regular Forces?—I do not think you would get subalterns of the Regular Forces, it would be more necessary to get senior officers, and I think senior officers are the most important. I said the commanding officer, the second in command, the adjutant, and squadron leaders especially.

6647. (*Sir John Jackson.*) From what class do you mainly get recruits for the Yeomanry? Are they mostly from the young farmer class?—Ten or fifteen years ago they used to be drawn almost entirely from the farmers or the agricultural classes, but that is altered very much indeed now. Since the great agricultural depression there is no doubt that a much larger percentage of recruits come from the towns, and that must increase. Take the existing force now since it has been enlarged, there are four London corps, and most of those men are clerks.

6648. And from factories?—They are mostly clerks.

6649. I see on page 48 of this Supplementary Report special reference to the *esprit de corps* of the Northumberland Hussars?—Yes: "*esprit de corps* in this district is said to be extraordinary."

6650. These were not men mostly from the agriculturists?—No, this is not Home Yeomanry; these are men that were raised for service abroad, and they were mostly Newcastle mechanics and men of that class. There was a very large percentage of miners and mechanics. They were rather rough at first, but they were a good lot of men.

6651. I notice with regard to Westmoreland and Cumberland it says: "Men not up to the physique, stamp, and class of those previously obtained." I suppose the men in the North of England are mostly big men?—In my opinion there were very few recruited in Westmoreland and Cumberland.

6652. But you do not know any particular reason why they should have deteriorated?—The recruiting area is very small there, and the best men had really gone out; I think that is the answer. When you come to a place like Northumberland you have got almost an unlimited recruiting area, and the districts, in the numbers recruited, vary very much. You will see some are better and others not so good.

6653. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Did you find when you handed over the sea-transport of the Yeomanry to the Admiralty that it was well carried out by them as far as you saw?—Oh, certainly; in our position it was an impossibility for us to do it, and even if it had not been for that technical difficulty which I have referred to, looking at the number of men that went out afterwards, I do not think we could have tackled the thing; I had that entirely on my own shoulders at first. When Sir John Hext joined our staff to manage the transport I talked it over with him, and with his experience, which was very large indeed, he quite convinced me that it would have been an enormous undertaking for us, as it really would, with no organisation and no special knowledge. We might have done it, and we should have done our best, but it would have been a gigantic undertakin

6654. And having no special staff you would on any future occasion be inclined to hand it over to the Admiralty again?—Yes.

6655. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) From what source or sources did you draw your horses for the Yeomanry; it may be all mentioned in these Reports?—It is mentioned. We only bought horses for the first contingent, and those horses were purchased to the number of close on 4,000 by the commanding officers of Yeomanry locally, who were raising the force. Those were country-bred cobs of a very good stamp, and they did remarkably well. It is impossible yet to say what the average price was exactly, but it was somewhere about £36 or £37.

6656. They were all got within the United Kingdom?—Yes, these 4,000 were; the Committee had to make up the balance. We purchased a certain number in England in various parts, and also some in Ireland. In Austria we bought 3,811; in Australia 750 (those were bought through Lord Rothschild); 1,278 at the Cape. If we could have gone to the Cape at first we had the offer of a much larger number, and also a large number of Basuto ponies, but the Remount Department told us that we could not buy horses at the Cape, and they were not to be had. Looking back now I think if we had gone straight ahead and sent out an efficient staff to the Cape we could have bought 5,000 or 6,000 horses there; as it was we bought 1,278, and those local-bred horses were worth two of the others, as they were acclimatised. We bought 1,355 in Ireland, and in Great Britain 6,318. The average price was—England, £39 11s.; Ireland, £31 6s.; Austria, £29 2s.; Cape, £29 13s.; and Australia, including freight, £30 3s.; the horses we bought there were £12 each.

6657. This question will come up again, I understand. Were any purchased in Canada?—No.

6658. Or were any efforts made to ascertain if horses of a suitable character could be got there?—We were making all our arrangements to purchase, but there was a certain amount of jealousy on the part of the Remount Department, I suppose, as we were going about with a separate organisation purchasing, and they said we were competing against them. We wanted to buy in America, and they told us they did not want us to go there; when we wanted to go to Ireland they did not want us to go there also, and so we had to go to Hungary. We cabled to Australia and purchased largely there, but they asked us not to purchase there, so that our area was rather limited.

6659. I think you mentioned that all the clothing for the Yeomanry was woollen serge?—Yes, all except a certain number of drill jackets that were purchased at the outset by some local corps. They purchased a certain amount, but drill was very soon discarded.

6660. But you considered that as regarded health and comfort it was infinitely better to have serge alone?—Certainly.

6661. While the Regular Forces had in a great measure cotton?—They had cotton at first, but it was all altered afterwards. The drill was, I believe, practically condemned afterwards, and they had nothing but serge.

6662. (*Chairman.*) I think we had it in evidence that there was a report in the War Office even before the beginning of the War, recommending serge; of course, that meant that preparations had to be made?—Yes, it was very difficult to get the material at all at the time. No one knows what it was—the rush working day and night to turn out things.

6663. There is just one question about the horses which I notice in your report. You say you think a small horse is better for the Yeomanry force?—Certainly; I think an active cob between 14.2 and 15 hands is the best.

6664. Especially when you have indifferent riders?—There is no doubt about it, but anyhow the cob is a better size, I think.

6665. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Were any of those little Barbary horses used in the War?—Not by us; I do not know whether they were or not. Colonel Deane draws my attention to the report of certain officers on the conduct of the force in the field in 1901—that is the one that was run down so much, if you remember. I believe that Colonel Jarvis is coming before you as one officer

who served, and it may be thought desirable to call two or three other commanding officers who had been with both the forces of 1900 and 1901. Page 73 of this Supplementary Report, Appendix 4 will be found worth reading as the opinion of some Regular officers on this much-abused force.

6666–68. (*Chairman.*) Do these all refer to the second contingent ?—Those are as to the second contingent. I only draw your attention to it because Lord Roberts called for a report from the commanding officers on that force when there was so much being written in the papers. These reports were most highly satisfactory, as the corps were commanded entirely by Regulars. They are very highly satisfactory indeed.

6669. (*Chairman.*) Have you said all you would desire to say, as we do not in the least wish not to hear anything ?—I think so, because, as I said before, everything is really in my report, and I stick to it; practically there may be a modification of one or two suggestions made in my first report. At the present time I might modify them a little, but they are such small details that they are scarcely worth mentioning.

6670. You will understand that if there are any points in the Supplementary Report that I have not taken up, it is because I have not read it ?—Yes, and if at a future time it is thought necessary to go more fully into the Supplementary Report, of course I will be at your service.

Colonel A. G. Lucas, C.B., M.V.O.

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6671. May I understand the position of the other officers who accompany you; would they give separate evidence ?—Colonel Deane has been the Chief of my Staff all through; first of all in the Committee he recorded all the Minutes of Proceedings, and he has been not only with me as Chief Staff Officer the whole time here, but he accompanied me to South Africa on my visit there, and later on, last year, he was again deputed to South Africa to assist Lord Chesham in connection with the 1901 Force that went out. Colonel Davidson has also been on the Staff of the Imperial Yeomanry Committee, and also on my staff ever since the commencement. Sir Robert Baillie had entire charge of the equipment and clothing, and he could go much more into detail on those matters if you wished it.

6672. I do not think we require it in detail, but we are sitting in the afternoon, when we expect Lord Chesham, and therefore if Colonel Deane, the Chief of your Staff, would appear after luncheon, and simply say whether or not he has anything to add to your evidence I think it would, perhaps, be satisfactory to you ?—It would.

Recalled at Q. 13016.

(*After a short Adjournment.*)

COLONEL T. DEANE, C.B., called and examined.

Colonel T. Deane, C.B.

6673. (*Chairman.*) As Colonel Lucas has told us, you were a member of the Yeomanry Committee in 1901 ?—Yes.

6674. And you took a share in the work at home, and also accompanied him to South Africa ?—Yes.

6675. You have heard the evidence which he has given; do you agree with the general tenor of it ?—Yes; I think I cannot do more than corroborate all that Colonel Lucas has said. I do not think there is anything that I could usefully add to the evidence that he has given; he has made a complete statement. As you are aware the detail of the organisation of the first force is in this First Report that has been published, and that of the second and third contingents is in this Supplementary Report, which is now under submission, and anything that he has had to propose in connection with the Home organisation of these forces will, I think, be found therein. I should like to emphasise what he said in regard to what appears to have been a great mistake, in not sending out drafts as he recommended. On three or four separate occasions, after the organisation of the first force, proposals were made to send out to South Africa more men to keep alive the force out there. Those recommendations were refused, and it was only, as Colonel Lucas has explained to you, on his communicating direct with Lord Roberts that on Lord Roberts's return to England he sent for him and sanctioned the formation of the second force. The formation of that second force was at first a matter of considerable doubt, that is to say, doubts were expressed as to whether more than 5,000 additional men could be raised. As the figures show in this Supplementary Report the organisation resulted in 17,245 men being got together within a very short time. The great difficulty in connection with that second force was officers; nearly 3,000 applied, and probably some 1,500 of those were interviewed. Some of their recommendations were very high, but as Colonel Lucas has shown you, many of the best recommendations resulted in the officers being found quite unfit for their positions. However, I do not think that that was altogether the fault of the selecting authorities, because every care was taken in their selection. We were excluded from taking officers of embodied Militia, or indeed of any Militia. We were excluded from selecting officers of the Regular Service because they were not available; we were also excluded from selecting officers from the Reserve, because we were told that they were not available. There, therefore, remained for our selection officers of the Yeomanry, who were few, and officers of the Volunteers, very many of whom were quite insufficiently trained. A certain number of selections were made from the men and non-commissioned officers of the original force who had returned, but it was impossible to obtain a sufficient number of qualified officers for the large force of 17,000 men that was sent out within six weeks, and I think that one of the points to consider with regard to any future organisation is the necessity for taking some measures for the provision of an adequate supply of trained officers. I confess I do not know where they are to be found under present arrangements.

6676. You think the same difficulty would recur ?—I think the same difficulty will recur. In the organisation of the third force we had also very considerable difficulties. About 395 officers, I think, were selected, and we had to examine some 1,200. Many of them were men unfit for their positions although very highly recommended. We had the greatest difficulty in selecting them, and even when they were selected and sent to Aldershot, many of them were eliminated by their Commanding Officers there, and by the General Officer on the spot. But if any system is adopted in future, that is the right one; the officers ought to be tried first, and those who are unfit ought to be got rid of as soon as possible. Even with the care that was taken in the organisation of the third force, several officers were found unfit. They were not only found unfit at Aldershot, but some of them, as I have recently heard, were found unfit in South Africa. In the Regular Service it is very hard indeed to judge of an officers' capabilities after a year's service, or two years' service; indeed, for command of a squadron or second in command, or for the command of a regiment, it becomes a matter of careful consideration after years, as to whether an officer is fit. How then is it possible to nominate in a very brief period officers supposed to be fit to command a squadron of Cavalry or Mounted Infantry in the Field ? It is impossible to expect success under such an organisation. I think the wonder is, that the officers and force did so well as they undoubtedly have done.

6677. Do you agree with Colonel Lucas that for the future it would be an advantage if there was a nucleus of trained officers ?—I think it would be highly advantageous if it could be so arranged. I think it would be advantageous also if there was a sort of Yeomanry Staff Corps, as has been suggested by the Yeomanry Committee, that is to say, that out of the large number of officers who are now returning, most of whom are seeking for military employment, and are unable to get it, at least those who have done well in the field, should be asked whether they are willing to serve, and that their names should be registered. I do not know that there is any system of the sort in force, although it has been recommended.

6678. Is there no record kept in the office now ?—That is a matter for the War Office. We have not been

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asked to do anything in that direction, although it was recommended. I do not know what they are doing in the War Office in the matter.

6679. You have spoken of the officers. What do you say of the men of these two contingents?—The recorded percentages of rejections may appear very high, but in regard to the second contingent you must remember that the medical qualifications were not so strict as those required for the Regular service. There was therefore a loophole for men to be less efficient, less up to the standard, than they are in the Regular service. But when the percentage is considered, that is to say, 700 rejections on over 17,000 men, it is not such a very large percentage after all, considering the hasty manner in which the force was raised.

6680. I was going to say that we need not perhaps repeat what Colonel Lucas has said. He pointed out that there was not the opportunity of weeding out in this country that you had in the other two contingents?—Quite so.

6681. The 700 that you referred to were the whole of the rejections from the second contingent, were they not?—That is the statement of the Secretary of State for War in the House.

6682. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Do you endorse that, or do you say it was a thousand?—I must accept the figures of the Secretary of State for War.

6683. Because he is Secretary of State for War?—Because he is Secretary of State for War.

6684. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Those rejections took place here before they went out, did they not?—No, in South Africa.

6685. That does not include the very large number of men invalided within a few weeks or months of their arrival in South Africa?—I think it covers the period under discussion up to the Secretary of State's statement in the House, which I think was about this time last year, if I remember rightly, or a little before.

6686. The 1,300 rejections in these statements is to March, 1901?—That is for the first contingent.

6687. You have no Return of those invalided in the second contingent?—Those are in the War Office; we have copies.

6688. (*Chairman.*) Is there any point that came under your notice when you visited South Africa that you would wish to speak to?—Well, I have some diffidence in making any remarks when there is an officer like Lord Chesham present, who knows much more on the subject than I do. I would therefore suggest that your Lordship should question him in regard to the operations in South Africa, in preference to my saying anything.

6689. Certainly. But I meant any question with regard to organisation, if, as I thought, you went out to look into that chiefly for the Committee?—I went out on two occasions. The first occasion I accompanied Colonel Lucas, when our duty was mostly in connection with the organisation of the depôts, and the distribution of stores, and their being handed over to the Imperial authorities out there, and so on. The second time I went out I was ordered to report myself to Lord Kitchener, who would make such use of my services as he required, and I was appointed Commandant of the Imperial Yeomanry Depôt, Elandsfontein; but as Lord Chesham was constantly there, he is perhaps able to give an opinion on the subjects connected therewith better than I am.

6690. You have nothing to say about the first visit?—No; I think that everything in connection with the first visit is in this Report, and that therefore it would be superfluous for me to refer to it now; it is all on record. I may say that I had an opportunity of seeing a great many men of the second force, and so far as I am personally concerned, I was favourably impressed with their physique. I think it was a pity that they had not more training; but under the circumstances, as more men were wanted in the field to make good depleted squadrons, the first consideration was to get them to their squadrons and regiments. No doubt if they could have had longer periods of training they might at first have done better.

6691. That is all you wish to say?—I think so.

6692. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Is it within your knowledge that applications were made by officers and non-commissioned officers of the Colonial forces who having served in Africa returned to England, for commissions as officers, for instance, in the second or third contingents?—Yes, many.

6693. From the Colonials?—Yes, many.

6694. And were many appointments made?—Inquiries were made in regard to all those who applied, and those who were considered suitable, where their recommendations were high and where after a personal interview they appeared likely to do well, were certainly selected.

6695. Could you say roughly what number of officers may have been taken from the Colonial forces—I mean now not the local forces of South Africa, but from those from the other Colonies outside of South Africa?—No, I cannot say without looking up the figures.

6696. Would it be a considerable number?—I think it would be a considerable number.

6697. As well from those who were commissioned officers as from non-commissioned officers who were well recommended?—Yes, quite so.

6698. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) How would you suggest keeping up a staff of officers for the Yeomanry for future war service?—I would suggest their names being registered as willing to serve abroad, and inquiries being made as to their capabilities in the past, and their names being placed on a sort of Staff Corps. That was the proposal of the Home Yeomanry Committee that was originally assembled, and I think it was a very good one.

6699. But you want a considerable number of senior officers in each battalion of Yeomanry, do you not?—In regard to the Home Yeomanry, do you mean?

6700. Yes?—I think those are filled up with comparative ease.

6701. I am speaking of going on service?—We had very great difficulty in selecting.

6702. I mean ready to go on service?—Of course, the list would always have to be revised annually, say, with regard to asking them whether they were prepared to go, and so on.

6703. But you say there is great difficulty in getting officers?—Great difficulty.

6704. And my question is, how would you suggest getting officers for service abroad in any future contingency?—I think it would be advisable to at least register the names of those who have done well in the Field.

6705. That would only be for the moment; a few years may elapse, and those men are out of it?—After that, you mean?

6706. Yes; how would you suggest to meet that?—I have no suggestion to make under the present system. I do not see what you can do. Trained officers are exceedingly difficult to get.

6707. Would it be possible, do you think, to have supernumerary officers in Cavalry regiments prepared to take up positions in the Yeomanry in such a contingency?—That is a question of finance—what it would cost. It would no doubt be a very excellent system, if you could have a certain margin, or surplus, of officers in each corps, either Infantry or Cavalry, to meet the requirements of war; but I think when the cost is counted up, that probably there would be great difficulties in the way.

6708. You have no suggestion to offer—that is what it really comes to—how to have a supply of officers?—Not unless the establishments are increased; unless the War Office sees fit to increase the establishment by giving some margin. At present there is none.

6709. Not only none, but we are told that they have not sufficient officers for the requirements in Cavalry regiments?—Quite so. It is very difficult to get them, particularly with the means which they are told they must possess.

(*A Paper by Colonel Deane on the Constitution of the New Yeomanry Force in April* 1901 *will be found in the Appendix, page* 526, *post.*)

Colonel J. Davidson, C.B., called and examined.

Colonel J. Davidson, C.B.

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6710. (*Chairman.*) You have been a Staff Officer on the Yeomanry Committee, I believe ?—Not on the Committee. I assisted the Committee.

6711. And what was your particular branch of the work ?—Generally speaking, the kind of questions that are dealt with in the Adjutant-General's Office—discipline and such like questions.

6712. And the provision of men ?—Yes.

6713. You have heard the evidence that has been already given ; do you agree generally in what has been said ?—Yes.

6714. Is there any point that you would like to mention from your experience ?—I do not think there is anything except what has been already said. Most of our opinions were collated in the two Reports which you have before you.

6715. I do not want to give you any trouble unnecessarily. I only wanted to give you full opportunity if there was any point which had come under your special attention which you thought it would be useful to mention to us ?—The various suggestions in those books were got together after consulting all the officers employed, and I do not think there is anything new that I could put before you.

6716. Very well. I do not think, then, we need trouble you to give further evidence.

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6717. (*Chairman.*) You were one of those who started the Imperial Yeomanry Force in December, 1899 ?—Yes.

6718. We have, of course, before us the Report which has been published of the Imperial Yeomanry, which gives the details of what took place at that time. Is there anything on which you would wish to make any observations ?—No, I think everything is in the book.

6719. Then, at what point would you prefer to take up your evidence, with regard to the organisation, or with regard to the proceedings of the force in South Africa ?—I think the proceedings of the force in South Africa. The organisation has been already fully dealt with, I imagine.

6720. You did not hear Colonel Lucas's evidence, but you heard the other officers confirm it ?—Yes.

6721. And that, you think, would be sufficient for us ?—With regard to the original organisation, I think so.

6722. But if there is any point on which you would wish to make any comment now, we will give you the opportunity ?—I think not. Of course, there was always a difficulty in getting officers for the original contingent and for the two last ones. One of the difficulties in the organisation was finding a suitable number of officers, but I think beyond that there is nothing more to be said. The staff was thoroughly unorganised to start with. We had to improvise a staff ; in fact, we had to improvise everything. In the original contingent there was more possibility of getting officers with a certain amount of training than there was with the last two contingents. I do not know whether it comes under the head of organisation, but I think the main point that caused the difficulties of the last two contingents, and which explains the giving the men 5s. a day, was the fact of the drafts not being kept up. The last draft that we got was in June, 1900, and we were then running rather low—at least, fairly low ; the last draft came out, and we were told that no more were coming—presumably the war was coming to an end. But if the drafts had been kept going, I feel confident that at the Cavalry rates of pay we should have been able to keep the whole 10,000 or 11,000 men in the field going if drafts had not been stopped.

6723. Colonel Lucas has told us that proposals to send out drafts were put before the War Office, but were declined ?—Yes, that was done from Home.

6724. Was that done after you left ?—I think before I left England this proposal was made, but after I had left the Imperial Yeomanry Committee.

6725. Colonel Lucas told us this morning that that was done, both when the first contingent left and also in the case of the second contingent ; that on both occasions there was a proposition to establish depots and keep up drafts, but the War Office declined ?—We sent home a very strong letter urging that drafts should be kept going for the 1901 contingent, which was the second contingent sent out. We sent that from South Africa, by Lord Kitchener's orders, to urge the necessity of keeping drafts going for us.

6726. That was a recommendation from South Africa ?—Yes, from South Africa. It may have been also done from Home at the same time, but I remember well sending home the recommendation.

6727. Was that an official paper ?—Major Knight, I think, would have it. It would be in the Office in South Africa.

6728. You wrote officially ?—I wrote officially to the Yeomanry Committee or telegraphed to the Yeomanry Committee at home.

6729. Under the directions of Lord Kitchener ?—With the approval of Lord Kitchener. Touching organisation, would remounts come under that heading ?

6730. Well, with regard to remounts, we are in this position. We have not taken up the remounts question at all yet, and shall not be able to do it, as I explained this morning, at these sittings ; so that if there are any points of detail with regard to that subject it might be necessary for some representatives of the Imperial Yeomanry to come back when we take that question up ?—I was only going to say that at the commencement we had various people buying all over the country. There were Yeomanry Committees and Colonels of regiments, generally buying rather against the Regular Remount Office, which, of course, put the price up, and was very unsatisfactory, and I was going to suggest, with a view to future organisation, that the whole of the remounts for any mounted force going abroad should be under one control, and that the control of the Government. An indiscriminate lot of buyers going about for different offices had a very bad effect, I think.

6731. You think it increased the cost ?—I think so. Eventually, it was all merged into the general Government Remount Department, and then it acted much better. With regard to the 1900 contingent, we have had generally very favourable reports of them. Those men had more chance, as they were sent out with their own officers, who were to lead them in the field. They got a certain amount of knowledge of each other on board ship, and they went up country together. When the first lot of Yeomanry, the 1900 contingent, landed they had a certain amount of time to get together, except the contingents like the Irish and the Duke of Cambridge's Own Yeomanry, which were cut up at once. They had more time (more or less under fire) to get a training without incurring the risk of a very severe disaster. It was just after Paardeberg, when the Boer forces were more or less scattered and had not got together again. I attribute a great deal of the training in South Africa of the first lot of Yeomanry to the success they had afterwards, but with regard to the second lot of Yeomanry, of course, they had not the advantage of coming out with their officers. There are extraordinary cases how many contingents were put together on board ship which Major Knight will be able to tell you about to-morrow. Those ships were composed of, I think, something like 30 or 40 squads of men enlisted for various regiments put together in one squadron, or one section, as they called it, of 110 men on one ship. They had no chance of getting any cohesion as a squadron, and they had to be

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used in the field very soon after they got out, after, in many cases, being sent to the regiments for which they had been enlisted. I suppose out of the new lot, the 1901 Yeomanry, 75 per cent. had never been on a horse before they passed the test in riding at home, and about 25 per cent. had ridden very little. As an instance I can mention one man who was going on rather a dangerous trek to Rustenburg from Elandsfontein. The squadron leader told me that none of them could ride, but he was perhaps one of the worst, because he was found with his left foot on his off stirrup trying to get on his horse, and a very good Canadian Scout with that contingent made the remark: "I am certain of one thing, the Boers in this part of the world are not hungry, or they would have taken us all long ago"—they were escorting a convoy. With regard to the officers of the 1901 contingent, we asked that no officer over the rank of second lieutenant should be sent out, because we had a great many men of the 1900 contingent that we thought, on the recommendations of officers in the field, would be available to promote as officers, which eventually was the case; therefore we did not want to run the risk, knowing the difficulty there would be at home in obtaining officers, of having squadron leaders appointed at home who might be inexperienced when they came out to South Africa. The result of sending out men only of the rank of Second Lieutenant was not satisfactory. They had to be promoted temporarily for going out on board ship to take command, and that caused a great deal of friction through the temporary appointments not being thoroughly understood, most of them being civilians. They had the rank of Captain to go out, and they objected to relinquishing the rank of Captain when they got to South Africa. I think the procedure of the raising of the second lot of Yeomanry, the 1901 contingent, was in such a hurry (I do not see how it could have been avoided) that men were sent out who really caused a great deal of harm to the name of the English officer. There were several cases that I could mention if you wish to have them. I have one case here of a man being reported on by his Commanding Officer as follows:—"I have the honour to inform you that this officer is likely to be of more use if employed with the Intelligence Department than with a squadron of Imperial Yeomanry, as his knowledge of the English language is not sufficient to enable him to exercise sufficient control over the men of his troop, and, further, that his age (45 years) and deportment are not conducive to good discipline amongst the officers of the squadron, of whom he is the junior in rank." With regard to this officer we had a report from Cape Town, from the Police, to say that he had had two years' imprisonment for diamond stealing in Cape Colony and £500 fine. I enquired into his previous history, and I found that he had Colonial experience; he had been in the Bechuanaland Police; he had been at the siege of Mafeking, and General Baden-Powell reported on him as "a very plucky fellow with a small lot in the field, but such a hopeless drunkard that we had to reduce him from the rank of Corporal." How that man got to be an officer can only be excused on the stress of the difficulty, and the fact of his having some medal ribbons, which recommended him. But a few cases of that sort, of course, we have had, and a few cases of that sort have done much harm to the Yeomanry, I think, in general.

6732. But the cases are few?—We sent home about 100 officers.

6733. The return given to us was 42, I think?—About 100 officers. I will not say as to the exact figures; I think that is in the books.

6734. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Were they sent home for inefficiency?—For misconduct and inefficiency. Some of them could not ride at all; that was one cause of inefficiency.

6735. (*Chairman.*) This is what is stated on page 17, paragraph 43, of the Supplementary Report: "Out of 506 officers appointed, under the difficulties which have been referred to, 42 only were rejected in South Africa, or about 8 per cent. on the number given"?—I think there were others sent away to different posts; I mean that we made use of other officers in different ways than leading mounted troops; several were sent to transport. But there were, I think, certainly more than 42 officers who had to be changed.

6736. It goes on: "A letter of explanation regardi these officers will be found in Appendix No. 3; and full enquiry was made in regard to these rejections by a specially-appointed Committee at the War Office, and in some instances, although the officers were not reinstated, it was found that the causes for their rejection were at least doubtful. No doubt had these officers been given the amount of drill and training which was originally proposed and expected they would have proved as efficient as those of the first and third contingents." That is the Report as it stands here.

6737. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) When you mention 100, or probably 100, would that cover a period of some months or would it be immediately?—I think it would cover a period of some months; it would not be immediate rejection.

6738. Four or six months?—I think about six months. Major Knight would have the papers that would show it.

6739. (*Chairman.*) The letter from Colonel Lucas to the Adjutant-General on these officers, which you will find on page 71 of the Supplementary Report, deals with the point that you raise. It begins: "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of War Office letter No." so and so, "1st August, 1901, enclosing a list of Imperial Yeomanry officers who from various causes have been found unfit for commissions, and who have, therefore, been either called upon to resign or otherwise disposed of"; and that was the list of 42?—I thought these were nearer 100, but that may be so. Up to Christmas, 1901 (I should think that would be about the time I should take it), I should imagine there were about 100, but I speak under correction.

6740. At any rate, those who went out with that contingent and were immediately found unfit would be included in the list of 42?—They would be included in the list of 42. There were 27 I know who resigned their commissions in one Gazette.

6741. And no doubt mistakes were made. However, we also had evidence this morning that mistakes were sometimes made on the other side?—Yes, of course.

6742. That officers were sent home as stated in this Report, where the War Office could not sustain the rejection?—As to that, of course we were rather dependent on the reports; but I should think as a rule we were so short of officers that the column leaders were very glad not to be too critical of the officers under them.

6743. We were told that an officer whose services were dispensed with, and who was sent home as being inefficient, as being unable to ride, turned out to be a very fine horseman?—I heard of that man, and I could not account for it. He was reported as unfit to ride. Of course, I will not guarantee that a mistake was not made. I can hardly conceive it possible that any fine horseman could have been sent home as a bad rider. He could always prove his horsemanship and appeal for a further trial if he wished to remain in the service.

6744. But the important point is that from the conditions under which these officers were enrolled in this country mistakes were likely to occur, and perhaps, at least I do not know whether that is your impression, the number of mistakes was not so very excessive as has been sometimes represented?—I think, of course, it would be very likely inevitable in the hurry; but I think no chance should be given for those mistakes. I think Lord Kitchener telegraphed home (at least I know he suggested it) that the second contingent of the Yeomanry should be sent out without training. That was on the lines of the South African Constabulary, who received the attested men. They were attested I think in the ports on landing. They were then sent up country, and put into depôts and tested and proved as to whether they could ride and shoot, as it was supposed nominally that they could. I do not for a moment imagine Lord Kitchener ever anticipated getting out as Yeomen men who really could not ride at all, and having to train them from the very beginning for a mounted force against the Boers. Therefore, I thought that if the men could really sit on their horses, which, though important, is, I think, much more easily taught than riding and horse management, we could have got them into shape, as Baden-Powell did the Constabulary, which, thanks to good officers and a good set of men, is a very satisfactory force.

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6745. As I understand the position of the Yeomanry Committee is that owing to those orders to send out the men untrained to South Africa they had really not the time to make the necessary examination into the qualifications of either officers or men which would have enabled them to weed out the inefficients in the same way as they did in the first and third contingents?—With regard to weeding out the first contingent, that was not done; but there you had a class to draw upon that you did not find afterwards.

6746. But they were weeded out, I think?—Before leaving England do you mean?

6747. Yes?—I hardly know of anybody; I think not many.

6748. Not many perhaps, because the class was better, but they had the opportunity of doing it. If they found a man tumbled off his horse consistently I imagine they weeded him out?—Yes, but that was done under a different system. They were not sent to Aldershot, but rather tested in their own headquarters.

6749. Quite so, and that is what the Yeomanry Committee say, that they had not the same opportunity of doing that afterwards?—That is quite so. With regard to the men, of course there is one thing that I think wants further organisation, and that is the medical test. The men of the first contingent that we took out were not, I think, as hardy as the second contingent, because they were perhaps a better class of men; they had not roughed it perhaps as much as the second lot; but there were fewer cases, I think, of men who ought not to have been sent out.

6750. With organic diseases?—With organic diseases. I have a list of them here. There were a certain number of men who became sick with various things directly who certainly ought not to have been enlisted. This is the opinion of the Principal Medical Officer: "All these men are being sent to England for discharge, and in my opinion should never have been enlisted"

6751. Which contingent was that?—The second contingent—the 1901 contingent.

6752. And what is the number? Is it any considerable number?—It would be included, of course, in the 700. The point is, however, that they were invalided for different things which ought to have been so very apparent.

6753. You are aware that the test was not the same as that for the Regular Army?—So I heard, but I think the tests were very various.

6754. But I mean according to the Instructions of the Secretary of State. Do you know what they were?—I heard that they were that the test was not to be so severe—that the men were not to have served so long a time. But so many men were weeded out with bad teeth, for one thing.

6755. This is the particular instruction: "In carrying out the medical examination of candidates it should be borne in mind that it is unnecessary that they shall fulfil all the conditions of fitness required of a recruit enlisting for the full term of service in the Regular Army. It is sufficient that the candidate should be free from organic disease or other defect likely to prevent him from doing his work during the duration of the present war?"—Then, of course, in the list I have here there are so many men who were medically unfit.

6756. Could you give us a typical instance or two to put on the notes?—Varicocele, debility, varicose veins, dental caries, bronchitis, hernia, heart disease, emphysema, V.D.H., which I believe stands for valvular disease of the heart, tuber of lung, appendicitis, phthisis, dilated heart, and so on.

6757. (*Chairman.*) Doctors, I suppose, make mistakes, too, sometimes?—Those are several of the chief diseases. The heart, I know, was the trouble with a great many of them, and loss of teeth—about six men in one battalion suffered from that. Of course, that meant that they always went wrong; they had some ailment from the food if they had not a full set of good teeth. Here are some more cases: Loss of many teeth, defective eyesight, orchitis, hœmorrhoids, and fistula.

6758. You will let us have those returns?—Certainly. (*The returns were subsequently sent in.*) There were, I may say, two great drawbacks in the organisation. One was that many men concealed their ages. Men over 35 did not as a rule stand the work, and I know that we got several men who claimed to be 35, if they thought they were not likely to be found out, in both contingents, who wanted to go out to South Africa. Then again there was a great drawback from the fact that we also had, I will not say a large, but a certain proportion of men under 20; and both those classes, the older men and the younger men, failed.

6759. And that was in other contingents besides the second?—That was in both the contingents. That is one of the points in regard to the general organisation of the whole thing.

6760. Would you say that a man of 35 is not fit?—A man of 35 is, and some men who are older; but very likely a man would have been getting on for 50 and he called himself 35, and as a rule, though we found some of them fit, the greater number of breakdowns were in the very young men and in the men who claimed to be younger than they were. If the ages had been really kept between 20 and 35 I think it would have been right.

6761. After the weeding out of the second contingent they did well, did they not?—Yes, I got reports from those in the field under whom they were serving that they did very well indeed. The men were of excellent physique—the residue of them—and they were all very well reported on.

6762. What was your exact office in South Africa?—Inspector-General of Yeomanry.

6763. So that you had to inspect them?—Whenever I could, I had to get round to see all the contingents.

6764. And you saw most of the men in that way?—Yes. I saw all the second lot, except two battalions I saw them come through the Elandsfontein depôt, so that I saw them there before they went on trek; and afterwards I visited them whenever they got near to the railhead where they could be seen. To take an instance, I was travelling 56 days in the train between the 17th of October and the 26th of January, so that I was moving about to see as much as I could.

6765. And, as a whole, what is your opinion?—As a whole, I think almost every soldier who saw them at Elandsfontein said, "What an excellent stamp of recruit. I only wish we could get them in the Service." But they were, of course, absolutely recruits then, and they received their training under very severe circumstances.

6766. They were a superior class of recruit to the ordinary recruit?—They were.

6767. That was natural, I suppose, under the circumstances?—I think the 5s. a day had a good deal to do with that in the second lot.

6768. And how about the first lot?—The first lot, I think, went out simply because they thought they were wanted. Of course, we did not think it was going to be a very long war, and they enlisted for a year, or for the period that the war should last, and they thought the war would be over before the year. Otherwise, they were a class of men to whom, from the nature of their employment, it meant really in many cases ruin to come out. They could not be spared for a year, and we could not have got that class of men for an indefinite period.

6769. And a good many of those men came home after the first year, did they not?—A good many of them did. Then, as touching another point in organisation, one difficulty that we had in April, 1901, was that we had a lot of old Yeomen of this class that I am describing—the better middle class—and those men got very much worn out. They had very hard work in the field, and I have no doubt there was a certain amount of grumbling and anxiety to get home, in fact it was general, though they never seemed to fail when there was occasion for them. Then there was, of course, a difficulty with this old lot who were left to put in among them the new men of a different class who knew nothing, who could not look after their horses and could not ride. It was a difficult thing to amalgamate them with the old lot. We were told to do it at first, but I think it almost got to work better without. The old lot grumbled at having practically no help from the new ones, and the new ones were rather discouraged by the grumbling; so that it took

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some time to work round. But, as I have already said, in four months' time, when the officers and non-commissioned officers were good, it was a very good force.

6770. They did amalgamate?—Of course, most of the old lot had gone then, except those who were willing to stop out. Practically, you may say, the old lot had gone home.

6771. And those who stopped out worked in with them?—They meant to stay—they liked it. But I do not think I would ever keep a force of that description for the sort of work that we had (a volunteer force in the field really) for more than six months at the outside.

6772. Then would not that tell against the system of filling up by drafts?—The drafts would come out fresh. You would have your nucleus, and, more or less, if you had good luck, you would have your tradition of Service prestige. That would hold them together. You would not lose your staff and your non-commissioned officers.

6773. Would there not be the difficulty of amalgamation with each draft?—I think that probably the drafts would come out much of the same class as the original lot; anyhow it would not be so much felt, I should say, as putting a whole half-squadron to fill up another. If you had odd men coming out in drafts it would be a gradual process, instead of having one big rush and putting in three-quarters of the whole. Our squadrons had come down to 30 or 40 strong in many cases, and to make them up to 160, which Lord Kitchener wished, brought in practically all the new men with a very small nucleus.

6774. Do you really think that the force would not be effective after six months?—I think if you want to keep it at its best, the men that you enlist for active service look forward to about six months' work as Volunteers. You see, a lot of these men are not like a soldier, who is trained and accepts his position. They have very likely got a hankering after home and their business, and there are all sorts of things to distract them. They like to go out and serve for a time, and I think it is rather better in the way it was done in the Colonial corps. There they enlisted, some for three months, some for six months, and some for more, but in the South African campaign it was generally a few months' engagement. They had a bit of leave after that, and then came back again fresh, and did well. But in the case of an entire force of Volunteers of a class who have their interests at home I doubt very much myself whether they will last more than six months at their best in a severe campaign.

6775. With the same keenness?—With the same keenness. They want a change. They have never been accustomed to routine. Of course, the life we had was a very dull, dragging one, with constant exposure and very great hardship, and men who had a certain amount of comfort at home, I think, felt it more than the Regular trained soldier who has lived a much harder life.

6776. But as a matter of fact the Yeomanry stood it as well as the others, did they not?—They stood it, I think, as well as the others in physique, but I think possibly there was more feeling about it, especially as some of the South African Colonial Corps were getting leave after a few months, going home and coming back again. They will always come back; but I think six months in the field is enough for Volunteers.

6777. In your *précis* you mention in passing what is a minor point, perhaps, that the change of name from "squadron" and "regiment" to "company" and "battalion" was a mistake?—I think so. You see, in raising the force it was raised from a force with cavalry nomenclature—"squadron" and "regiment," and I think to change it to "company" and "battalion" was not advisable. Another thing, the non-mounted forces that we had in the Yeomanry were all from the cavalry and had been used to a cavalry designation. I think the idea was to prevent our thinking ourselves cavalry, and having to work as Mounted Infantry. The real fact, however, was that Mounted Infantry and Cavalry in Africa had to work as Mounted Rifles, which is something rather between the two, and I think it was rather a mistake to change the name of a cavalry force as that cavalry force would have done just as well for the work without any change in name.

6778. Was that change made in South Africa?—The change was made in the War Office. I think we generally changed it back as much as we could when we got to South Africa, and called ourselves "squadrons."

6779. But in working the change did not make much difference?—The whole force, cavalry and everybody, worked in the same way. The force had to do all the work of cavalry except the idea of shock tactics.

6780. And that will be the rule in future, I suppose?—I think as cavalry is handled it will be very odd if they do not get home, as the Boers did on to our troops sometimes. When we did away with our swords and lances the Boers began riding home. The Boers on several occasions got within 30 yards of our position, and then they generally made a success. The Boer then used his rifle, firing rapidly from his horse. I think that if a man once got within 30 yards he would get home altogether with sword or lance, and the effect of sword or lance, especially the moral effect, would be more than that of the rifle. General French told me that he was perfectly certain that on several occasions, if we had stuck to our swords and lances, our men would not have been ridden down by the Boers with their rifles.

6781. But the organisation of the Yeomanry for the future is to be the same as it was in South Africa, is it not—as Mounted Infantry practically?—I think they wish to have them trained now as Mounted Rifles, not to do entirely infantry work, but to be trained to work rather on the principle that the Boers did—that is to say, to gallop to positions and then get off and shoot, but not to make long infantry attacks—not to be used as an infantry force.

6782. But they will not have swords and lances?—I hope they will have some weapon besides the rifle, because in a bad light a man has much more confidence in himself, and it has a better effect on his enemy, I think, if the enemy knows that he has something to defend himself with, or to attack with, in addition to the rifle.

6783. You make some remarks in your *précis* about the state of the Yeomanry as it was at home in 1899; would you like to say anything about that?—About the strength of the force, I think the strength was nominally 10,000, but that is dependent on the returns. I should think you could not count on more than about 8,000 fairly efficient men being on parade in the whole year. Out of that I suppose you would not expect to get more than 4,000 men fit for service. Of course that was the nucleus of the force we raised, the 35,000 men.

6784. But that was only for home defence?—The force originally, the old Yeomanry of 1899, never expected to go abroad, and that, I take it, is the great reason why so many Yeomanry officers did not go out to South Africa, because they had accepted the conditions of home, and were too much tied down to home to be able to go out except at too great personal cost to themselves and their families.

6785. And the force was below its strength in officers also?—It was below its strength in officers, and it is so.

6786. And it had no Service equipment?—It had no Service equipment and no transport. The question of officers for the Yeomanry now is a very difficult one. The officers are very much below strength in most regiments, and they are certainly not really practically good officers, from want of experience and inability to train.

6787. Have you any proposition to make?—I think it would be a very good thing, as Colonel Deane said, if this large number of men who have acted as officers in South Africa, men well reported upon as having been satisfactory, could be attached, made into a Staff Corps, or join the Officers' Reserve, which I believe many are doing, but attached to Yeomanry regiments for the purpose of teaching them what they have learnt. A Yeomanry regiment I look upon as a depôt much more than a regiment. I do not think that there is a single regiment in England which, if you take it all through, is fit for service, and I do not think it ever

could be. You may want to get men; and officers, colonels and squadron leaders, may be able to raise men from their local influence, but they will not be able to train the men when they are got. You must have your trainers besides, to get the men efficient in the short time you have to do it, and you must have your local influence. If you have your regimental organisation, and are not allowed a lot of supernumerary officers, your regiment goes on like a cavalry regiment, and it is very hard to prevent promoting the officers of local influence; therefore it is a very hard thing to bring in an officer because he is a trained man, over anybody who is doing good in other ways. And also it is a very hard thing to get subalterns. I do not think subalterns are very necessary if you look upon it as a depôt, and I think the only way we shall get Yeomanry to be of any use is to look upon each Yeomanry regiment as a depôt for general service. It is really what the Yeomanry regiment acted like in 1899. We sent round to each colonel of a regiment, who formed a squadron as a rule out of that regiment, and therefore the other three squadrons practically were a depôt.

6788. Colonel Lucas also made a suggestion that a certain proportion of the regiment should be enlisted specially under the obligation of serving abroad?—I am rather sceptical about that. I have heard it mooted, and I think of course it would be an excellent thing if it could be done; but you at once bring two classes in. You have your service men who look down upon the others, who may be very good men, and who might be trained for defence, but they cannot from their circumstances go abroad. They might have a big business, and be very useful men for Home Defence.

6789. But it is only a proportion of the regiment that he would have for service abroad; the rest should be for Home Defence?—I am rather doubtful whether, if you have the two classes in, you would not cause friction, and might not lose good men. I should like to see it, of course. It would obviously be a very excellent thing to have, if you could have it, but I think it would have a prejudicial effect on recruiting generally.

6790. What reminded me of it was what you said about the difficulty of promoting local officers. If you had that distinction among the officers, the officers that you had a difficulty in promoting would not wish to serve, probably, in the Foreign Service Squadron?—That might be so. It is a question, of course, that has never been tried, and it might answer. I should be doubtful myself with regard to the men. With regard to the officers, I think very likely it would be an excellent thing to have a list of Service officers in each regiment. If we get 35,000 men eventually—of course it will not be done yet—we shall have always a very fine reserve of men who can really ride sufficiently for minor work, and they ought to be able to shoot.

6791. But if you do not make a distinction between them, at the time of emergency you will have to distinguish as you did last time, and it will only be a small proportion of the numbers on the roll who will come forward for Foreign Service?—I am afraid that will always be so, but you might get a report in from the regiment, for instance, "He cannot keep his service squadron up"—"The men do not feel inclined to go on." I do not know whether Colonel Lucas would make a difference in the pay and equipment and allowances of his service squadron from that of the others.

6792. Yes, he did say that?—That might do, but I think very likely it would come down in most Yeomanry regiments to consisting of one service squadron.

6793. Four Colonels of Yeomanry went out in command, I think?—Yes.

6794 And two others, though they had not a command?—Yes, Lord Scarbrough said he did not feel that he had experience enough to command a regiment in the field, and he was lucky enough to get Colonel Younghusband to command, and he went out as second in command to him. Colonel Rolleston went out in command of a squadron.

6795. But the rule was that no Yeomanry officer should be given the command of a squadron unless he had served in the Army?—Yes, that was the War Office rule.

6796. And a useful rule?—Yes, I think it is necessary, though eventually we had some Yeomanry officers who had never been in the Army, who commanded with success.

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6797. Those are the men who have proved themselves?—Those are the men who have proved themselves in the field.

6798. So that there were 16 officers for the command of battalions who had to be found?—Yes.

6799. And 19 seconds in command, besides squadron leaders?—Yes. As regards the original organisation, I think it was rather a pity, though it would have been bad to stop the enthusiasm, to let different Committees, different parties, raise men for different corps. It would have been very much better if that had been done entirely through Colonel Lucas's office, because, as a matter of fact, I think the corps which were raised outside were, as a rule, not so well officered as those who were raised by the original Imperial Yeomanry Committee.

6800. You are not objecting to their being raised locally in the several districts?—No, but there were several corps raised in London under different names. I think if the Imperial Yeomanry Committee had been much larger, it would have had better powers of seeing what went on. In the raising of the second lot—the original officer—the separate London corps raised a great many men; for instance, the Duke of Cambridge's Own, I think, raised 2,400 men, out of London. I am told that they took men—whether it was so or not I do not know—that the other corps would not have; and I know that the reports we got about the 1901 Yeomanry from home were bad. The staff for raising a force of this sort ought to have very comprehensive powers to control that. I cannot see how Colonel Lucas's staff could have had any power to see what was being raised elsewhere; in fact, they had to do with officers and nothing else.

6801. Colonel Lucas did give an explanation with regard to the recruiting in London; he rather protested against some of the rumours you allude to?—The worst lots of the Yeomanry which we happened to get out were from the Duke of Cambridge's Own, which was raised in London; also from Reading and from Leicester.

6802. Do you mean in physique?—In physique and general character.

6803. Were they included in the men who were sent home—the 700?—I should think most of them. I should think most of the men that were sent home were from those contingents. The Duke of Cambridge's Own, per Roll, arrived in South Africa, 2,737; 2,737 men came from that one office.

6804. Can you say what proportion were sent home?—I could not out of that lot, because the whole of the men that were sent home were generalised. I think it might be found out.

6805. Because that is a considerable number—2,700?—Out of one office, yes. Out of London only, you see, were raised (this is a Return I had for those coming out on board ship, and these are actually what landed) 466 Rough Riders, 1,205 Sharpshooters, 2,478 Duke of Cambridge's Own, and 450 of the Metropolitan Mounted Rifles. That is out of London alone.

6806. If you take in Leicester and Reading besides, that makes a large proportion, and if those were bad contingents the 700 may very largely have come out of those three contingents?—I should think the 700 came chiefly out of the Duke of Cambridge's Own and Leicester and Reading, because the Sharpshooters were a good lot as a rule; and so that looked rather like what we heard (I cannot guarantee it, of course) that the Duke of Cambridge's Own recruited men that were not taken by other corps.

6807. (*Sir John Jackson.*) In point of fact, if you take out the Duke of Cambridge's Own and Reading and Leicester, the result would be that you would have a very small percentage of inefficient men in the remainder?—Yes.

6808. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Did you mention Paget's Horse?—Paget's Horse had 448 advertised as coming out, and 452 landed.

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6809. They were raised in and near London, I think?—Yes, they were raised in and near London. They were a superior class. I forgot to mention them in the London contingent. Paget's Horse in both contingents had a most superior stamp of men, as good as any.

6810. (*Chairman.*) That would tell favourably on the general percentage?—Yes, what I said before was that the class of men we saw at Elandsfontein first of all were a very valuable set of recruits; officers said, "We wish we could get those in the Army." Their failures were due to the fact that they were absolutely recruits, and that they were used almost directly on service.

6811. You stated that you were Inspector-General of Yeomanry; but at first you commanded in the field?—Yes, I commanded a Brigade.

6812. From March to November, 1900?—Yes.

6813. Is there any other comment that you would like to make upon the situation in South Africa generally?—No, I think not.

6814. Or with regard to the future?—With regard to the future, of course, I agree with everybody that the officer question is the great point.

6815. That is more difficult than the men?—I think that is more difficult. That is what we proved in South Africa, where we had these useful recruits, as you may call the second lot of Yeomanry. They were all of good physique, and willing men, and were very highly spoken of after they had been four months in the field, when they had good officers; but without officers, of course, they were useless. I think that is one of the greatest points, the importance of officers and non-commissioned officers, which has been proved by the second contingent of Imperial Yeomanry, which came out absolutely recruits, and in four months' time, with good officers, proved useful in the field.

6816. Unfortunately the reserve that you might have from officers who have served in the field, as has been pointed out, will exhaust itself in a very few years?—Yes, of course it will, and it is a good thing to use them now.

6817. What would you look to after that?—Unless we have a war very constantly, to try them, I do not see what we are to do. But it is, of course, an absolute necessity. How to get them is another question.

6818. Do you see any source except doing as was done on this occasion; that is to say, to do the best you could on the emergency when it arose?—I should, of course, keep this list of Reserve Officers going, and have it up-to-date with the best trained men that could be found.

6819. But where would you recruit it from?—I would like every man to have a training in the Army if possible, and I do not see in what other way you can make any test a good one. Officers leaving the service should be attached to the Reserve and kept going with Yeomanry regiments when they are out for their training in a supernumerary rank.

6820. That would, of course, only provide for the senior ranks?—I think the rank keeps a great many officers out who would otherwise be very useful in giving their experience in training Yeomanry. I think if you had a Staff Corps you could have officers attached to the regiment in the rank which they held in the Army who would be able to do minor duties. They would not join a Yeomanry regiment. A Captain would not join as a subaltern of a Yeomanry regiment, but I think a Captain would do duty with a Yeomanry regiment willingly in almost a subaltern's rank if he were called a Captain and only attached to the regiment. It is relinquishing rank which comes very hard on a man of about five or six years' service—to come in as a subaltern under somebody he does not know. If he was attached to command a troop which is a subaltern's position, he would possibly have 25 men whom he would keep up to drill and encourage.

6821. Do you think that men retiring from the Army would come in?—I think they would be attached to Yeomanry regiments under those conditions. Therefore I look upon a Yeomanry regiment as a depôt to which you want to get so many officers attached, to train men, and to be a sort of link.

6822. Then would those men go on service?—I have no doubt a good many officers coming from the Regular Service would be only too glad to go on service.

6823. Being attached in that way?—Being attached in that way as a Staff Corps of Yeomanry, if you like to call it so, or a Yeomanry Reserve of officers.

6824. Is there any other point that you would wish to dwell upon?—No.

6825. (*Sir John Jackson.*) You were referring to the dislike that the Boers had to the sword and lance as against the rifle. I, as a civilian, can never quite understand how cavalry approaching a line of infantry get there if the infantry are good shots; is it the fact that that result which you refer to came about because our men were very bad shots?—I think not. I think, for instance, in a bad light you can get close up. The point of cavalry is that it must not be an open attack against infantry unbroken, but at Brakenslaagte the Boers charged up to within 20 yards and Colonel Benson was caught. There was a heavy storm of rain, and the Boers took advantage of that and came on unexpectedly.

6826. Our men could not see the Boers until they were right upon them?—No; and when you are within 30 yards of course it does not matter whether you have a rifle or a sword. Brakenslaagte was the end of the march, of course. It was very wet, our force had been fighting all day, and suddenly Botha's force came down and cut them up.

6827. But in the ordinary way if you had a clear day, a cavalry charge would have very little chance against expert marksmen of the line?—Yes, but the expert marksman is not the better for seeing men riding at him. He is not so good a marksman. I think the shooting is too dangerous to depend upon. For instance, we had good shooters in the Soudan who had to form squares.

6828. I should have thought that if they had been in line, if the men had been good shots, the cavalry would not then have got at them?—Of course we had not the Mauser rifle; we had the old Martini-Henry, but still up to 700 yards that is as good as anything. I have never seen any severe losses from rifle shooting at over 600 yards. The effective power is from 400 to 600, because there you really lose men.

6829. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Might I ask you as to the complement of guns attached to each battalion—I mean Maxims and Colts, or other light quick-firing guns?—First we had one as a rule; some battalions had none. But I think if a Maxim is used by a very good man it is a very good weapon.

6830. Are you aware that the Colonial forces, those coming not from South Africa but from the Colonies, had attached to each contingent a considerable number of these guns?—Yes.

6831. There was a Maxim which is borne, I think, on the backs of two mules or horses?—Yes.

6832. And there was also a galloping gun?—Yes, we had both.

6833. Was the galloping gun found to be very useful?—No, we found the other much more useful. The pack saddle is much more useful than the galloping gun, in the experience of the brigade that I was with.

6834. So that galloping guns were not favoured?—No, we did not like them at all.

6835. Not even in the plain country?—The plain country, of course, would suit them better, but even in the plain country in Africa you have a lot of rock, and I think one knocked them about a great deal.

SEVENTEENTH DAY.

Friday, 21*st November* 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable The Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable The Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B. G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Hon. Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
SIR JOHN JACKSON

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., Secretary.

Major-General J. P. BRABAZON, C.B., C.V.O., called and examined.

Major-General J. P Brabazon, C.B., C.V.O.

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6836. (*Chairman.*) You, I think, commanded the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa?—Yes.

6837. The whole body?—Yes.

6838. From what period?—From some time in March, 1900, I think, till the end of November, 1900.

6839. So that you speak to the year 1900?—Yes.

6840. You have not given us any *précis* of what you wish to say?—No, I did not know exactly what sort of information you wanted. I shall be delighted to answer any question you may put to me. Before leaving Pretoria Lord Roberts asked me to write him a report, and I did, a very exhaustive one, which the Adjutant-General was kind enough to tell me is now kept in the archives of the War Office; he told me the other day that he was reading it. I said all I had to say then.

6841. If it is in a pigeon-hole in the War Office, we have not got it out, so that if you could tell us any of the points in it about the Yeomanry itself we shall be glad to have your evidence?—The men, to begin with, were, I think, the finest body of fighting material as material that ever left these shores, because they were the bone and the blood and sinew and the intelligence of the country; they were the men that we want in our ranks; the men that other countries have got in their ranks. Of course, they had everything to learn, but from their intelligence they tumbled to it very quickly. But at the same time you must remember that I do not think these untrained soldiers would have stood for five minutes against regular troops. The reason that they were so good out there ,for one thing, is that they were irregular troops fighting irregular troops; the Boers were Yeomanry, and, therefore, they met on their own platform, which was good English blood and bone against the Boer blood and bone. But I do not think that in a European war or against European troops these irregular troops would stand for five minutes.

6842. In what sense would they not stand against European troops for five minutes?—Simply because disciplined troops will always beat undisciplined troops. I am only telling a hundred times told tale. It was a most extraordinary war, fought under absolutely different conditions (it was my sixth campaign) from those of any other war I had ever seen. In the first place both the Cavalry and Yeomanry (for the Yeomanry were used as Cavalry) were doing a thing which certainly Cavalry were never taught to do, and that was, always attacking fortifications; there is no such fortification in this world as a Boer kopje; and, therefore, we were at a tremendous disadvantage. But it was an irregular war fought by irregular troops on each side, so far as the mounted troops were concerned.

6843. The Yeomanry were practically Mounted Rifles, were they not?—Yes, they were, and when the Boers found out that they were only Mounted Rifles they quite changed their tactics and attacked them, which they never dared do as long as they had the fear of the arm blanche—the lance or the sword. We used to pray day and night that they would attack. I fought many times all day, and had men killed all round me, and never saw a Boer. I never saw a Boer attack or come out in the open all the time I was there. But directly they found that we had not a lance, which they hold in mortal dread (I do not think the lance is a particularly good weapon), then they said: "Hallo, here are these fellows, we can go at them," and they came at us, and used to kick us from one end of the country to the other. On General French's march from Barberton they used to shoot our men down all over the place. I only instance that, because the men there told me it was a sort of rearguard action all the way; the Boers used to gallop into camp with them, shooting them off their ponies.

6844. But still you say they were a fine body of men?—Physically magnificent, because they were the representatives of England, the Yeomen of England, and intelligent men, and there was a large number of gentlemen in the ranks. They were a vastly superior crowd of human beings to the men we have in the ranks, naturally. They were the men I want to see in our ranks as soldiers, which other countries have.

6845. In the course of 1900 they had a good deal of training in actual warfare, had they not?—Yes, and they accommodated themselves wonderfully quickly to it.

6846. Therefore, when you say that they could not stand for five minutes against European troops, surely that is subject to some qualification?—No, I do not think it is in the least. We never had formed bodies to fight against, you see; there was never a case of a corps of impact; we had nothing to fight against, except these kopjes, behind which were hidden Boers.

6847. Well, of course, I have to take from you your estimate of the force which you commanded?—Yes.

6848. You are speaking entirely of the first contingent; you came back from South Africa before the second contingent went out?—I did; but I saw the others here in London, and I was surprised to hear that a few of the officers who commanded them said they were just as good as the first contingent, and they liked them, because I never saw such a ragged lot of wretched-looking creatures in the whole course of my life.

6849. That was before they went out?—Yes.

6850. And before they had had any training?—Yes; but you must remember that it is a very difficult thing to train your troops in front of the enemy; in any other war they will not give us the time to do that.

6851. I am not defending the course taken, but I am only saying that that was the point at which you saw them?—Yes.

6852. When you were commanding in South Africa, in what sense did you command the body as a body of Imperial Yeomanry, because they were all split up, were they not?—Absolutely, in no sense, except as being gazetted to command them. I was to have had six regiments of Yeomanry, which were never given to me, which I never saw, because in the exigencies of the Service they were wanted here and there, and every plan that was made was upset the day after it was made. I was to have had six regiments under my absolute command, a division of Yeomanry under my personal command, but those could never be gathered together, so

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that when we got to Pretoria I was in a sort of way attached to Lord Roberts' Staff as representing the Yeomanry, just as there was a General Officer representing the Artillery and the Engineers. I was never consulted, and on the one or two occasions on which I did give a very forcible opinion was put on one side and over-ruled. On one special occasion I was furious at the idea of officers going home before the war was over on private affairs and for political purposes, and that sort of thing. I forbade them; I refused them leave; but then they went to Lord Roberts, and if they had any family interest they got their leave.

6853. I suppose the men in the first contingent were enlisted on the footing of a year's engagement, were they not?—I am not quite certain about that. I think it was a year, or as long as the war lasted; but if they were enlisted for, I do not care what time, surely officers who are fighting ought not to be allowed to go back—that is my opinion—it may be old-fashioned.

6854. It depends upon the terms, of course, on which he man enters the Service—what he has engaged to do?—Did the officers enter on those terms?

6855. I am under the impression that they did?—Anyhow, they had not been out nearly a year, the officers I have in my mind's eye, because this occurred very soon after we got to Pretoria in June or July.

6856. Then, if you never were actually in command of the regiments, as you anticipated, on what lines does your report go which you have sent in?—I saw a great deal of them. I saw a certain amount of fighting, and I was also in command of them down at Dewetsdorp and Wepner and at Thabanchu, and I saw them out at different times, when I was not in personal command.

6857. You saw different detachments of them?—Yes, I saw a good deal of them at different times.

6858. Did your report deal with the detachments which you saw, or with the subject generally?—I think it was more with the subject generally. One heard a great deal, and one saw a great deal, and one gathers from the reports of others. If you see men like Lord Chesham and Lord Valentia, and other people, who saw a great deal more than, perhaps, I did, together with what one saw one's self—one's own experience—one can form ideas.

6859. Of course, I am at a disadvantage in examining you in not having seen the report. If there is any question which you raised in that Report which you consider of importance, we shall be very glad to hear it?—Yes; there are one or two things. One thing I insisted upon, and I am glad to see that Lord Roberts has issued an Order with regard to it. I do not say that it was anything to do with my report that made him issue an Order a short time ago, but I dwelt very strongly upon it in my report. I pointed out that the great essential for irregular troops, especially for that sort of warfare, was to make our men shoot accurately at short distances Any firing, in my experience, over 500 or 600 yards, and up to 1,000 and 1,500 yards, is more or less unaimed fire. It may be all very well at Bisley, where the wind and sun is shaded off from you, and where there is nobody else shooting at you, which rather unsteadies people's nerves, but where the Boers beat us was in their extraordinary accuracy at short ranges. I pointed out that I had seen a great many Boer rifle ranges, but I never saw one over 400 yards; they are generally about 300 yards; and where they beat us so completely was that when we got on to kopjes at close quarters, say, a few hundred yards, a man could not put his finger up over a rock or ridge without being shot.

6860. But I suppose the Boers did shoot at much longer ranges than that?—Yes, but they shot very often simply, one or two shots, as trial shots, then they began pumping lead into us. I know very often they shot from the reverse side of the kopje. Supposing you were the English, and this table was a kopje, the Boers very often shot from this side of the kopje altogether. They had a few fellows in front; those fellows had trial shots from this side to find the distance, and then they just told the others where those shots struck; and then all those fellows under cover perhaps never saw us. If you pump lead in a certain direction at a proper distance you must hit somebody.

6861. You mean they were shooting without taking aim?—Absolutely. I do not believe in aim in action over a few hundred yards. One thing I made rather a point of, was that our fellows had no arm of attack. For Yeomanry cavalry it is essential to have a weapon, an arm of offence, and if if you take away from them that arm of offence you put them under a great disadvantage, in my opinion. Lord Methuen probably would never have been captured, we should never have had those disasters that succeeded one after another in rapid succession, those Boer charges right up to our guns and into our camps, if we had had some weapon of offence. We had the rifle, but the rifle is essentially an arm of defence, and we had no arm of offence. Then comes the question, what would you give the men? The sword that our cavalry have got is absolutely useless; it is too heavy and too blunt, and too unwieldy. The lance requires an extraordinarily good man to use it; it is very heavy, and it is a very difficult arm to wield. My opinion is (I daresay some people laugh at me) that if I was raising a regiment to-morrow of Yeomanry I should arm them with light axes or tomahawks—to be carried in front of the saddle. I think it would have a very demoralising effect to see 500 men galloping down on one brandishing those things; I think one would soon be off. I should not like it myself. And they cause most awful wounds; they make a tremendous impression, and they are very light to carry. Another reason for them is that you cannot get Anglo-Saxons to point. The Italians and French—the Latin races—point, but you cannot get an Englishman to point. It is natural for him to hit and strike.

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6862. And that tells against the lance?—In a whole regiment of Lancers there are very few good lancers. It is demoralising to see a regiment coming down with lances at the charge, with steel glittering; but any cavalry regiment that will bear that shock and meet them in hand to hand fighting will do for it. The lance is, of course, a weapon that can only be used at short quarters, and at short quarters it is a most difficult weapon to wield.

6863. I suppose it would be rather difficult for a man to carry a Yeomanry rifle, and either a lance or the present sword, would it not?—It is rather overloading them, but our Lancers carry lance, carbine and sword. That is another thing; something must be done to take the weight off the horse; it absolutely must be done. But after all regiments carry two weapons; the Hussars carry carbines and swords, and the Lancers carry carbines and lances and swords.

6864. Then those are highly trained troops?—Yes, undoubtedly.

6865. For the less trained troops, even supposing they get more training, as you desire them to do, it would be an additional difficulty to give them the two weapons to carry, would it not?—I think you must have the two weapons; you must have an arm of offence, you must have a weapon of offence; you must have something that, when you see Boers coming at you, you can draw, whether it is an axe, or the cavalry sword, or a rapier. Personally, if they would not let you have a tomahawk or an axe I should have a rapier.

6866. That would be entirely pointing?—That would be entirely pointing, like the lance. The sword does not kill, it does not even hurt. I remember in Afghanistan we got home occasionally, and the Afghans wore a poshteen, a kind of leather coat with sheep's wool inside. It was ridiculous trying to cut them down; you might have beaten them with a cane as well.

6867. The sword did not cut through it?—Cut through it, no; they did not feel it. They did not know you were hitting them, absolutely.

6868. That is your representation with regard to the armament of the force?—Yes. You cannot give Cavalry and Yeomanry a rifle. Personally, I think an improved carbine, which is a rather lighter carbine, is as good a weapon as you can give cavalry soldiers. The carbines carry an enormous distance, quite far enough, in my opinion, if you will only give elevation enough, and aim in the direction.

6869. Then what is the next point that you would draw attention to?—You know I have not seen the report since I wrote it two years ago. It was a very diffuse one.

6870. But you probably have the different subjects in your mind?—Well, what I insisted on very much indeed is what I began by saying, that I consider the whole of the Army ought to be as good material as the Yeomanry were—I mean physically—when they were sent out. We shall never do any good, in spite of Royal Commissions or anything else, until we get the

proper men in the ranks by conscription, and the sooner we do it the better, because it will have to come to that.

6871. I do not think we have that subject referred to us?—No, but it is rather an important one. The reason I thought that these men were such fine fighting material is because they were the representatives, as I have said before, of the bone and blood and sinew and intelligence of the country. There were a lot of details that I went into—about bitting horses, and so on—mere matters of detail, which different commanding officers would have different opinions about. You will not wish one probably to go into those things.

6872. No, I think we need not go into details of that kind. Have you considered at all the future of the force?—Yes, I have, more or less. I should like to see them linked to cavalry regiments, just as the Militia are to infantry regiments.

6873. But you know the scheme as it now stands?—No, I do not.

6874. I mean that there is an idea of having a force of 35,000 men, Yeomanry only, to be raised in the different Yeomanry centres as Yeomanry. Is that a scheme that meets with your views or not?—Entirely. I should like to get 70,000; but I do not know where they will get the 35,000 men. Do you think they will get them?

6875. That is not for me to say?—I am all for 35,000 men. It is a nice number. 70,000 would be nicer.

6876. But I rather gather from what you said before that if they were raised in that way, and intended to be practically on the same footing as the Militia, that would not meet your views?—Oh, no. I see a good deal of the Yeomanry in the regiments in the county where I hunt, and they are nearly all young farmers—fine young fellows, good riding fellows, that you meet out hunting all the winter. Those are the sort of fellows if you only get enough of them. But the Midlands—Warwickshire, Northamptonshire, and Leicestershire—are essentially where you get the good farmers of that class. They do not exist in other counties so much.

6877. But if you take the men of a good class, and have them out for a fortnight or three weeks, or whatever the term is, will that turn out a force that you would consider a trustworthy force?—It would be a very good beginning, undoubtedly.

6878. I rather gather from what you said before that you would not consider that amount of training to be sufficient?—I think they would make a most excellent Yeomanry—Irregular troops. I do not think the training would be sufficient to meet European cavalry, if you mean that.

6879. I do not suppose that is intended. But you have not any definite criticisms to offer upon the scheme?—No, I have never seen it.

6880. (*Viscount Esher.*) You said something about taking the weight off the cavalry horse. What is your idea of the weight that a cavalry horse should carry—about?—Of course, you know in hunting one considers 15st. a heavy weight. We carry over 20st.

6881. Taking the average height and weight of a man, what do you think you could get the average weight down to for the cavalry horse by using proper equipment?—I should say 14st. or 15st. I think a very considerable quantity ought to be carried in light carts.

6882. And what weight saddle would you use?—The best saddle I saw out there had no flaps. It was the United States cavalry saddle, and it was the best I saw; but whether the United States gentlemen are lesser in beam than I am I do not know. I found I had not room in the saddle, and many people complained that it was too short, and used to rub one's backbone.

6883. What did that weigh, do you know?—No, but I do not think it weighed much more than half one of ours.

6884. About 10lbs.?—I should not think 10lbs. Major Knight (who is here) says a little more than that.

6885. Did you find the Yeomanry good horse-masters?—Yes, they were good horse-masters; but it was a very difficult country in which to be a good horse-master, because very often forage and water were scarce, and however great a knowledge you may have, and however good a horse-master you may be, if you cannot feed and water and rest them, your horses must go to pieces. I am rather proud of my horse-mastership, and yet I all but lost all my three horses—they went to shadows.

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6886. Did you form any opinion as to how you can turn Irregular cavalry into good horse-masters?—I think, of course, the Regular cavalry officers understood pretty generally the management of and looking after their horses, and there were a great many Regular cavalry officers in the Yeomanry; but I think that the officers who were not old soldiers did not understand much about horse-mastership. At the same time, I am bound to say that I do not think they compared unfavourably with the Regulars—on the contrary.

6887. Hitherto you have been speaking about officers. How about the men?—At first a great many of the men did not know anything about it, but they picked it up. To start with, undoubtedly, of course, a cavalry soldier knows all about feeding, watering, and grooming his horse; but some of these fellows did not. They had never done such a thing in their lives. They had to learn all that.

6888. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You had a pretty fair sprinkling of cavalry officers in the Yeomanry, had you not?—Yes.

6889. And I suppose they were very useful?—They were most useful—I do not know what we should have done without them. I think nearly every commanding officer was a cavalry officer, with very few exceptions, and most of the adjutants. As you say, there was a fair sprinkling of cavalry officers, and I do not know what we should have done without them.

6890. The actual Yeomanry officer who has not been in the cavalry has, of course, no particular experience in that kind of thing except what he may have picked up during the eight days' training. or whatever it is?—Exactly.

6891. And you think it is necessary that there should be a good sprinkling of cavalry officers?—Yes; I would have them all cavalry officers if I could. I would certainly have as many as possible. They must be better; they have been trained to it, it is their profession, and they must know more than people who have not been trained to that work.

6892. And you would say that it is essential to have a good sprinkling of them?—Absolutely.

6893. You would not think that a Yeomanry cavalry regiment which went into the field with nothing but Yeomanry officers would be efficient?—No, I would not indeed; I am certain they would not be efficient.

6894. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Had you had previous experience of irregular forces?—Well, nearly all my fighting in all my campaigns has been practically against irregular troops—in Ashanti, in the two Afghanistan campaigns, in the Soudan, and in the Nile expedition—they have been all more or less against irregulars; in fact, the country has not fought regular troops since the Crimea, you know.

6895. But had you had experience of commanding irregular troops?—Never.

6896. Your experience has been with Regular troops, I suppose?—Certainly.

6897. You are a cavalry officer?—Yes.

6898. Would you consider that the bayonet might be used with the carbine—a short bayonet?—No, absolutely not; it would be no good at all.

6899. You think it is too unwieldy?—I should say so; it is neither the one thing nor the other. You could not use it on horseback. Just fancy, a fellow with a carbine with a bayonet on the end of it! Oh, no; you must have an arm that you can use independent of your bridle arm. It would be useless to have a carbine with a bayonet at the end of it in one hand and the bridle in the other hand.

6900. Could not men be trained in a very short time to use the point?—Well, as I say, it is natural for the Anglo-Saxon race to strike. All the Latin races, you know, fence and understand the point, but Englishmen and Germans, and the whole Anglo-Saxon race, do not. You always get them to hit; you cannot help it.

6901. But in the Regular cavalry they are taught the point, are they not?—Yes, they are *taught* it.

6902. And they exercise it?—Yes. Of course, there are points in sword exercise, and that sort of thing; but in a scrimmage they always hit—they always strike. That is my experience.

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6903. Then if the sword is no true weapon of offence in the Regular troops—if they always hit, what have they?—The Regulars opposed to us would have the sword also.

6904. But do they use the point?—Foreigners do a great deal more than we do.

6905. The point that I want to get at is this: If the sword is an ineffectual weapon ——?—I think our present sword is, but I think our sword might be made an effective weapon by having it lighter, better balanced, and more wieldy. I do not say they never point, but I say that it is the instinct of a man, according to my experience, to strike. I say if you have a sword at all, I should train them entirely to point, and have a rapier, because my experience is, undoubtedly, that swords have an excellent moral effect; it is the moral effect of the Cavalry, the moral effect of a troop coming down and brandishing these glittering weapons—that is all. Any Infantryman who keeps his head may laugh at Cavalry—they cannot get near him.

6906. To come to another matter, have you come across any of the Australian troops in the field?—Yes.

6907. Did you notice how they ranked as horse-masters? What is your opinion of them as horse-masters?—I did not notice much difference. At the beginning, of course, they knew more about it from their mode of life. If you ask me which were the best horses and who were the best horse-masters that I saw out there, they were the New Zealanders—at the beginning, of course. Afterwards everybody got the same sort of horse, and the New Zealanders rather levelled down and our fellows levelled up. Our fellows got to know something more about it than they did at starting, and there was nothing to choose between the English and the Australians or the New Zealanders, but I do think that at first the New Zealanders and Australians—certainly the New Zealanders, were better horsed and took better care of their horses.

6908. Did not the Australians and the New Zealanders (I will put them together) take better care of the horses on the march; for instance, did they not walk with the horse a good deal in place of always riding the horse?—I did not notice that particularly, but I did notice one thing throughout the whole campaign—I really believe, although I say it, that I was the only man, certainly the only General Officer, who tried to stop the abuse of horseflesh. I never saw such shameful abuse of horseflesh in the whole course of my life as existed throughout the whole campaign, and not an attempt was made to check it.

6909. But with what troops was that?—With all the troops, more especially the irregular ones, because the Cavalry, I must say, knew better, and their officers knew better, but one never saw an irregular man go, except at a gallop—he thought that was the normal pace for a horse—if he rode into Pretoria to get a tooth-pick or a glass of beer, he would gallop his eight or ten miles there and back. The horses were abused in every sort of way, and there was no attempt made to check it. I tried my little best, both with draught animals and with the mounted troops, but I could not do much—I was shocked, I was horrified. We might have saved at least 25, if not 50, per cent. of our animals if proper care had been taken of them. But that must come from the head; everything filters down from the top, from the head, and I do not think that from the very tip top of the whole lot they cared twopence how horses or draught animals were abused.

6910. Then there is another point I would ask you about. Have you any suggestion to offer as to the best means of getting officers for the Yeomanry in future?—I should say that in every regiment there are always a lot of old Cavalry officers, and I think old Cavalry officers are very fond of going into the Yeomanry; they want very little inducement to go into it, I should say.

6911. But, of course, the old Cavalry officers would probably be of the rank of Captains and Majors; how would you propose to fill the subordinate ranks?—I think the young gentlemen of the country are rather fond of going into the Yeomanry.

6912. But would they make efficient officers with their training?—They would make the best that we could get, and the old Cavalry officers would leaven the whole; they can generally ride, and they can generally shoot.

6913. Was not the great difficulty with the Yeomanry the inefficiency of the officers?—No, I will not say it was the inefficiency of the officers; it was the ignorance of the officers and men of the work they had taken up; they were all Volunteers, they were a lot of people who had never been soldiers before, and who knew nothing about it; they did their best, and they did very well.

6914. Have you any suggestion to offer as to the best means of getting efficient officers for the Yeomanry?—It lies entirely with the officer whether he likes to be efficient or not; if he likes to study his profession and take trouble he will be. I think all the officers did well. I think they were the class that did best in the whole campaign. The regimental officers pulled us through.

6915. (*Sir John Edge.*) Your opinion apparently is that the axe is a better weapon than the sword?—Yes.

6916. If you had to attack a man who was defending himself with an axe, you would prefer an axe and not a sword?—I should.

6917. Take it the reverse way. Supposing that a man with an axe was attacking you, would you prefer an axe or a sword to defend yourself?—I should prefer an axe certainly in a melée, or in a charge.

6918. Take an ordinary case: Supposing you had to defend your life, for instance, against one man, and he was attacking you with an axe, would you prefer an axe to defend yourself or a sword?—I should prefer a light axe, a light sort of tomahawk axe, I should say that you could guard with it just as well.

6919. You certainly could not use the point?—No, but you could cut him from helm to chine, as they used to say; and there is no reason why there should not be a point; there would be no objection to their being a point to the axe.

6920. You would have a point—a real old war axe?—Yes, you might, only much lighter than the old war axe.

6921. Is that the general view, do you know, in the service?—No, I believe it is entirely my own view.

6922. Do you know of anyone else who entertains the same view?—Nobody.

6923. Now to come to another point. The Cavalrymen, of course, are taught the point, are they not?—Yes, they are.

6924. They are instructed in it?—Yes.

6925. And it has been used, and used effectively, by our British Cavalry, has it not?—Well, if you get a return of the wounds at the end of a campaign, the extraordinarily small proportion of wounds from sword or lance is quite marvellous.

6926. But has it not been used effectively? I had better draw your attention to what I am referring to. My recollection is—I have not looked it up for some time—that it was found necessary to instruct our Cavalry in the old Sikh wars to use the point, and nothing else, and that they did it with great effect. That is my recollection, but I cannot guarantee that it is accurate?—I think the effect of Cavalry is the shock, the moral effect of the shock; and if you get into a melée, although you may be taught the point and all that sort of thing, you will find the fellows hacking at one another. That is what I have always seen.

6927. But if they have been obliged to use the point before, could they not be made to use the point again?—I do not mean to say that it is never used; I know in assaults-at-arms they point.

6928. I am not talking of assaults-at-arms; I am talking of fighting in the field?—My experience, from what I have seen of fighting in the field, is that in a melée you see fellows hacking at one another nearly always. Of course, if a man keeps his head and gets the point, the point is a thing that gives a much more dangerous wound than a cut.

6929. It certainly would with the poshteen in the way?—The cut would not go through with the poshteen behind it.

6930. You do not recollect to have heard that the point was used with effect in the Sikh wars. Have you ever read that it was found that our Cavalry soldiers could not compete with the Sikh Cavalry soldiers because the Sikh man guarded and cut, and cut the other man's head off?—If he cut it off he did not point it off.

6931. Then they were instructed to use the point

alone?—The reason of that is because the Sikhs have a beautiful light sword that they can wield just as a man wields a whip. I am a fairly strong man, but I cannot cut with our Cavalry swords; they are ill-balanced, heavy, and have a slippery handle.

6932. But could you not have a lighter and much more manageable sword which would cut and also give the point?—Undoubtedly. I think our sword is an infamous sword. That is what I was talking about when I said it was not worth twopence, but of course, with a lighter sword you could, no doubt, do ten times more execution, and keep it as sharp as a razor. Our swords are as blunt as the edge of this table.

6933. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Can they not be sharpened?—They get blunt in two days with the steel scabbard. All the Sikhs have leather scabbards.

6934. (*Sir John Edge.*) Yes, they have leather and wooden scabbards. A man with a poshteen on has a kind of armour on?—Yes, he has. I have seen bullets not penetrate the poshteen.

6935. They must be bad bullets?—I have absolutely seen it. I have seen a man knocked head over heels by a bullet which has made a bruise, but has not gone into the skin.

6936. Was it a spent bullet?—No; coming from close range.

6937. Fired from what?—I am talking now of the two campaigns of 1878-9 and 1879-80 up at Cabul, in Afghanistan; they (the Afghans) were not so well armed as they are now.

6938. I think we were armed with the Snider in those days?—I do not know.

6939. But in the Afghan War that you are referring to, in 1878, how were we armed?—With the Martini.

6940. Have you seen at short range a Martini bullet stopped by the poshteen?—No; I have seen their bullets stopped by it.

6941. Their bullets is another matter, of course; that is a very different thing. To make the thing plain, to a man who was not protected by a poshteen a cut with the sword from the shoulder would be a dangerous cut?—Yes. That is the reason why in India and at home now they always wear a steel chain on the shoulder, because those fellows always cut at your bridle arm, but then they have got swords. I think our sword would very likely break the collarbone, which would be just as effectual to put you *hors de combat*, but they would not cut your arm off as the Afghans and Sikhs do.

6942. And they are kept in a better state; they are kept very sharp?—Yes, and they are much lighter.

6943. And they cut with a drag, do they not?—Yes.

6944. One word about the carbine. Is the carbine as effective a weapon as a rifle at, say, 600 yards, for accuracy?—I should say it was.

6945. And up to 800 yards?—The longer the barrel is, of course, the truer you are supposed to shoot; but I think up to 600 or 700 yards I should say for all practical purposes the carbine was accurate. I do not say that you might not in match shooting make a little better work with the rifle.

6946. I was just coming to that. Do you know whether in match shooting any handicap allowance is made to men shooting with the carbine as against the rifle?—No, I do not know much about that; but I have known in stations Cavalry to shoot matches with Infantry, each with their own weapon, and the Cavalry to win.

6947. At what ranges?—I think up to 600, 700, or 800 yards. I remember that happening with my own regiment at Lucknow. We shot against some regiment, I forget now what, armed with the long rifle; we had the carbine and we beat them.

6948. That is very meritorious?—But I think for all practical purposes, up to 800 yards, the carbine is quite good enough. I should like to see it a little lighter.

6949. (*Sir John Jackson.*) You suggested the use of his tomahawk weapon; and you said that if the Yeomanry could not have the tomahawk they might have the rapier. The rapier is a weapon, of course, with which they would have to point?—Yes.

6950. Then you said that the Anglo-Saxon was not a good man at pointing, so that in that respect the rapier would not be a good weapon, would it?—But then they could not hit; they would be obliged to point. I say that the rapier would be a better weapon than a lance, and you cannot hit with the lance; you must point with the lance. If you have a thing that you can only point with you must point.

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6951. But if you had not your tomahawk and you had a good sword, you could both point and strike with the sword, could you not?—Yes; but it would not have the same demoralising effect as my tomahawk.

6952. But, assuming that you could not have the tomahawk, you say that the rapier is the next best thing?—Yes, I think so.

6953. Notwithstanding the fact that the Englishman is a bad hand at pointing?—Yes, I do think so, because it would be light and handy, and after all, in my opinion, it would be a sort of improved lance.

6954. In your experience in South Africa, did you ever find the Boers stand up against an attack of our trained troops?—Never in the open. You understand, what we call the open—in the field, never; but they stood with their ponies at the bottoms of the kopjes and shot us down under most perfect cover, while we, perhaps, never saw them, and only hit one or two occasionally.

6955. My point is this: You said that our untrained troops could not possibly stand five minutes against regular trained troops, and then you compared our irregular troops with the Boers as being practically of the same grit; therefore, the idea that occurred to me was: Could the Boers stand up against our Regular troops in a way that our Irregular troops could not stand up against the Boers?—No, I do not think the Boers would stand in the open.

6956. Or anywhere?—Mind you, after they got such confidence, when they found that we had no lances or swords, they did attack us. They not only stood up, but they attacked us. But I never saw that, because it was after my time. It was after they had taken away the weapon of offence from our mounted troops.

6957. But having regard to your statement that the Boer was an irregular soldier and was put alongside our Irregular soldiers, I wanted to knew whether in your opinion he would be a man more likely to stand up against regular troops than our irregular troops would be?—No, not half so likely.

6958. The British would have the better pluck?—Yes, infinitely. I daresay I do him a great injustice, but I think the Boer is not a brave man. I am certain he is not. There are some very brave fellows naturally in every army, but I do not think he is a brave man.

6959. That is to say he is all right in a corner, but he does not like coming out and fighting?—I do not think he does. But then our troops degenerated most terribly towards the finish, when they got sick of it. I do not think our troops fought too well, you know.

6960. Then you made a remark that if any infantry man kept his head cool cavalry could never get near him?—Never.

6961. As only a civilian that had been my idea, but I was asking a question upon that point yesterday, and we were told the reverse. You, however, I understand, are quite of opinion that if there were good marksmen in the line being charged by cavalry if they kept their heads they ought to drop every cavalryman?—With the present arm they could not get up to infantry. In the old days we always used to form square for cavalry, but that is an exploded idea altogether now. In the Franco-Prussian War and in every war I have read of of late they never formed square.

6962. But if you have cool-headed men and good shots drawn up in line you would say that they should drop every cavalryman before the cavalry got up to them?—Yes, it is impossible for cavalry to get near them; and when you do get near a man with a bayonet I think the cavalryman is at great disadvantage, because he has one arm occupied with his bridle, and then he has to look after his horse as well as himself and to turn his horse. I had a very unpleasant experience once myself when I was attacked by a Soudanese.

6963. In fact, in old days it was always said that men formed in square were absolutely impregnable

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against a cavalry charge if they were good men?—Yes, of course. There are very few instances where squares have ever been broken. Now they do not go to the trouble of forming squares.

6964. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) In regard to light carts to carry part of the Cavalry equipment or Yeomanry equipment, would that necessitate a very large augmentation of the transport?—I am afraid it would.

6965. In South Africa, as a rule, what was the amount of transport, say, with a squadron of Cavarly—how many carts, roughly?—I cannot tell you offhand what the allowance was, but the cavalryman had no transport; his food was carried.

6966. That is what I mean?—He carried everything he had on his horse.

6967. What I am trying to find out, if you happen to know, is, in addition to the ordinary transport for his food, hay, and so on, what amount of extra light cart transport would be required to carry a portion of his equipment. If you doubled it, say, would that do?—I should say about four carts to a squadron.

6968. Did you see any light carts of a good working description out there which would have done for that purpose? Did you see any of the Australian carts?—I may have seen them, but I did not notice them.

6969. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Did you in your report deal with the question of weight carried by the horse?—Yes; of course, every cavalry officer must do that as the first thing. That is the thing that is killing us—killing the Cavalry—killing mounted forces.

6970. Did you go into details as to what should be carried in carts and what the man should continue to carry himself?—I think I did.

6971. I am anxious to know, because everybody knows that the weight must be reduced. The difficulty is to get specific recommendations?—I should have absolutely nothing on the man except his arms, the lightest saddle possible, his ammunition, and just a little haversack.

6972. But surely he would carry a ration, would he not, for himself?—His arms, I said.

6973. But he would carry a ration of food, would he not?—In his haversack.

6974. Do you think that in your report you have gone into those details? If so, I need not ask you about them?—Yes, I did, more or less, into some of them.

6975. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Is it your opinion that the Colonial troops—by which I mean the Colonials outside of Africa—those from the other Colonies—were more careful of their horses than the generality of the troops?—I think they began by being better horse-masters, by knowing more about it. I think, as a rule, they were more accustomed to a horse than our Irregular troops and Yeomanry were, but, as I said before, our fellows picked it up, and towards the end of my time there was very little difference between the two. Horseflesh, I say again, was shamefully abused by everybody.

6976. And from what you saw do you think that their horses stood out longer than the others?—I think certainly the New Zealanders and some of the Australians had a better class of horse, a more wiry animal, and better suited for the country, than we had. I am referring to the first lot that came out.

6977. Had you an opportunity of seeing as well those from Canada?—No, I do not think I had. I could not pass an opinion upon them.

6978. The axe that you would recommend would be one which could be used both in cutting and thrusting, I understand—something like the Indian tomahawk?—Yes, and I say there is no objection to have a point to it.

6979. But a point that would be really useful in thrusting?—Oh, yes, rather.

6980. You commanded the first contingent, and you saw something of the men who composed the second contingent. Would you consider that those of the second contingent were equally good—equal to the others in physique and in intelligence?—No, not to be compared with them. The second lot may have made good soldiers, and some people said they did, but I never saw such a lot of rapscallions in my life.

6981. You look upon the first contingent as having been the *élite* of the Irregular Forces from Great Britain?—Yes.

6982. They were raised under the control of Lord Chesham's Yeomanry Committee, were they not?—Yes.

6983. But that was not so with the second contingent raised in Great Britain? That was not done by the first committee?—No.

6984. Not at all?—I believe not.

6985. You saw the men of the second contingent?—Yes; I went out very early. I went out in October, 1899, in command of a Cavalry brigade, and I came home in December, 1900. I saw them here.

6986. In appearance they were not to your mind equal to the first contingent?—No. I should say that they were fellows you would hardly have taken for the Line.

6987. May I ask whether you saw both of the contingents in uniform?—When I saw them they had put on their uniform just before they embarked. I used to see them about the streets.

6988. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I want just to emphasise the point that you did not see the second contingent in South Africa at all?—No, I did not.

6989. I want to emphasise that, because we have been told on very good authority that after they got out they turned out a very good set of men?—I have heard some officers say so and I have heard some officers say the very reverse.

6990. But your evidence can only go to what they were when they were in this country, when they were first raised?—Yes.

6991. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You have been asked about transport with Irregular cavalry. How would pack-horses do, each man having his pack-horse?—A horse, of course, can draw more than he can carry; he can draw double, three or four times the amount. A horse dragging a cart will carry perhaps a ton and a half, but he could not carry that on his back. That is the reason why I think that carts are better than pack-horses.

6992. But for a mobile force will not pack-horses be better?—Yes, if you were going on a little raid, to occupy three or four days travelling, very light, and taking just as much food as would last two or three days, and wanted to make a dash, undoubtedly.

6993. I do not know whether you know anything of Australia or New Zealand. In Australia and New Zealand men have journeys of two or three months, and it is a pack-horse that they take?—Yes, but they could take a great deal more in a light cart with that horse.

6994. But it is not every country that is adapted to a light cart. You can travel everywhere almost with a horse?—Yes, that is very true, but it is very seldom nowadays, I fancy, that you go into a country where there are not some sort of tracks or roads that a light cart can travel on, though there are some occasionally. We had not a wheel of any sort when I went from Cabul to Kandahar; every single thing from a gun to a toothpick was carried on mules and ponies.

6995. (*Sir John Edge.*) You say that you have heard some officers speak adversely of the second contingent of Yeomanry. Are those officers who have had Yeomanry under their command?—Yes, I have heard them say so; and I am bound to say, on the other hand, that I have heard them say that when they were once knocked into shape they made very good soldiers. But the difficulty is the knocking them into shape; we shall not have time to do it again. I heard one man, who is a very gallant fellow, who has done very well in this war, who went out with a very admirable lot of Yeomanry in the first instance, say that these fellows made just as good soldiers after a time; but nobody can convince me that they were of the same physique.

6996. Do you know whether the officers who passed the adverse criticisms upon the second contingent of Yeomanry were speaking of the men before they were trained in South Africa?—No, after they were trained. I am bound to say that I think one might be almost as good a judge here as if one was out there; one has only to read the papers—there were regrettable occurrences.

6997. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) They occurred, too, in the first contingent, did they not?—I do not think to the same extent.

6998. (*Sir John Edge.*) And, I believe, they occurred also outside the Yeomanry?—Yes, they did.

6999. I do not know whether it is fair to ask you if you can give us the names of two or three officers

who have had the second contingent Yeomanry under their command, and have spoken adversely of them?—No, I will not give you the names of those who spoke adversely, but I will tell you the name of one who spoke very much in their favour.

7000. That is not quite what we want to get at?—Speaking of regrettable occurrences, perhaps, it is not in my province, but I am happy to say that in six campaigns in which I have taken part there was only one in which I saw the white flag, and that was in this last one. The regrettable occurrences would not have occurred if the first man who used the white flag, not being the senior officer, had been shot dead. I never saw so much bad fighting in the whole course of my life as I did in South Africa.

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7001. Only one question on that. In the campaigns in which you have been engaged would the white flag have been of any use if it had been raised?—Absolutely none, so we had to fight it out, and we did.

Colonel Viscount VALENTIA, C.B., M.V.O., M.P., called and examined.

Colonel Viscount Valentia, C.B., M.V.O., M.P.

7002. (*Chairman.*) You were at headquarters, I think, in South Africa?—In South Africa, I was Assistant-Adjutant-General for Imperial Yeomanry, appointed here.

7003. And when did you go out?—I went out on the 27th of January, 1900.

7004. And was that with the early detachments of the Yeomanry?—Before any of them had started.

7005. And you remained, how long?—I remained until the same time as General Brabazon, November, 1900.

7006. So that your experience is with the first contingent?—Entirely.

7007. I understand that you are prepared to give some evidence with regard to the organisation?—Yes, but I should like to know whether you wish my evidence to be criticism of the organisation as it was, or proposals for the organisation as it might be in the future.

7008. I should like both. We have had evidence with regard to the details of the organisation at some length from Colonel Lucas yesterday, so that it is not necessary, I think, to go through the history of all the organisation?—No. Then, I think, I had better give you what I look upon as the shortcomings of the organisation, as it came under my experience.

7009. If you please?—I think the worst part of the organisation was, that the regiments, or battalions, as they were called, of Imperial Yeomanry were not provided with an adequate staff. The staff that was proposed by the Imperial Yeomanry Committee was exactly the same as that told off to regular regiments, and in almost every detail that staff was cut down by the then Adjutant-General of the Forces at home, so that no Yeomanry regiment went out to South Africa, of the first lot, with an adequate staff.

7010. In what particulars was it cut down?—There was no paymaster to the regiment; there was no paymaster-sergeant to the regiment; there was a quartermaster to the regiment, and no quartermaster-sergeant-major, and no quartermaster-sergeants to the respective squadrons, and the regiments were sent out in most cases entirely without transport.

7011. It was the case, was it not, that the Yeomanry did not act much as regiments?—Unfortunately, it was, yes.

7012. And, therefore, in that respect, did these deficiencies of staff tell more or less upon them?—I should like to correct myself in saying that they did not act as regiments, because in many cases they did act as regiments; but the regiments were not composed of the original squadrons that started from England as those particular regiments, but they were made up in many cases from four companies, from four different regiments, and made into regiments, and so sent to serve as the mounted troops of a brigade or column—a system, which I know, all the Brigadiers found great fault with, and I think nobody can possibly approve of.

7013. How did that happen?—That is entirely a headquarters matter. It was not done, certainly, by the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Imperial Yeomanry. It was done, I conclude, by the orders of either the Adjutant-General or the Commander-in-Chief, or his Chief of Staff. The regiments did not arrive in Africa as regiments; in many cases the ships were not large enough to hold four squadrons, and in many cases where they held two or three squadrons, they were not squadrons belonging to the same regiment, so that they arrived in South Africa a squadron to-day, say, of the regiment, a squadron to-morrow, and a squadron a fortnight hence. Then they were sent up by squadrons or by companies, as they were called, and dotted about all over the line of railway, between Cape Town and the North, and from time to time, as regiments were required, they were made up of squadrons or companies wherever they might be handy on the line of route—four of them put together and made into a regiment, when a regiment was required for a column or brigade.

7014. Then that, to a great extent, grew out of the accident, so to speak, of the transport from home?—No, I think not, because there was a large base camp at Maitland, a few miles from Cape Town, where the regiments were put together and were worked together under their commanding officers, and they might perfectly well have been sent to the front. When four squadrons were sent to the front they might have been sent as a regiment; in 99 cases out of 100 they were not sent as a regiment, but a company was sent from one regiment, a company from another, and so on, and then when they were got together they were made into these mixed regiments with strange officers and strange squadron leaders, who had never seen each other, and very often, with no great certainty in the mind of the officer who was to command the brigade or column, as to who was the senior officer, and whether he was fit to take command of the four squadrons, he being probably only a captain.

7015. You represent that that was unfair to the Yeomanry organisation?—Most unfair, and not likely to add to the efficiency of the so-called regiments. Also, I think it was hard upon the officers commanding columns and brigade to whom they were attached. I have heard more than one officer so commanding complain of it.

7016. But reverting to the question which I asked you before, was it not the case that the Yeomanry service, as a whole, was mostly in smaller bodies than regiments?—As they were enlisted at home, do you mean?

7017. No; the service of the Yeomanry in South Africa, as a rule, was in smaller bodies than regiments. I think it has been stated so in the Report of the Deputy Adjutant-General of Imperial Yeomanry that they were split up into detachments, and served as detachments?—Yes, in many cases they did; in many of the small columns and small brigades that were formed there were four squadrons or companies of Yeomanry, which were the only mounted troops that the officer commanding that brigade or column had.

7018. And those were brought together?—Yes, and it frequently happened that they were not the squadrons forming the regiment.

7019. Then what is the next point that you would like to mention?—Their armament.

7020. That is all you wish to say about organisation?—I think so, unless you wish to ask me any questions.

7021. I thought, after what you said later, that you wished to mention something about organisation at home?—For the future. By all means, if you will hear my views upon the subject, I shall be delighted to give them to you, if you think them worth having.

7022. Certainly?—Perhaps I had better go more or less through the points, as you received information on them from General Brabazon. I think they began with the officers, the difficulty of finding officers for Yeomanry regiments, and the advantage of old Cavalry officers as Yeomanry officers. I think that might be met with very well by allowing Cavalry officers when they retire to finish their service in Yeomanry regiments instead of, as they have to do now, to finish their service in the Militia before they are eligible for pension and discharge. As it is now, I have no doubt it is known to the Commission, that officers can retire and by serving a

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certain time in the Militia obtain their pension at the end of so many years' service. That rule applies to Cavalry officers, as well as to Infantry officers, so that the effect is now that a man who has been all his life in the Cavalry, and done all his service in the Cavalry applies to retire, and is ordered to serve with a Militia regiment so many years, until he is eligible for a pension. It seems to me quite extraordinary that they can expect an officer to take an interest in a Service in which he has no experience, and ask him to serve in a totally distinct Service from what he is accustomed to in order to obtain his pension for the last few years of his service.

7023. Do you restrict this to cavalry officers?—Yes, my recommendation would be that cavalry officers who have to serve a certain time in the Auxiliary Forces to get their pension, should serve in Yeomanry regiments, instead of serving, as they do now, in the Militia.

7024. But would it not be also desirable, if you cannot get enough cavalry officers, for instance, that infantry officers should be able to get the same advantage by serving with the Yeomanry?—Certainly, except that they at present have the advantage of serving with the Militia. But speaking as a colonel of Yeomanry, I should be very glad to have infantry officers.

7025. But for a service like the Yeomanry it is not so essential that a man should have been a cavalry officer as that he should have been an officer in the Regular Army?—I do not think it is. I should prefer cavalry officers myself very much.

7026. But you might get many officers from the infantry who would be of service to the Yeomanry?—Plenty; the very fact of their having been in the Regular service makes them far more valuable than any man who has not.

7027. The difficulty being to get a nucleus of officers from the Regular Services in the Yeomanry, it is more important to take a Regular Service officer than to get necessarily a cavalry officer; is not that so?—Yes, our difficulty is to get Yeomanry officers at all in sufficient numbers; almost every Yeomanry regiment in the service now is short of officers.

7028. Would that expedient give you a sufficient nucleus, do you think?—There is another plan, I think, and that is that Army candidates should be allowed to serve so many trainings to qualify them for commissions in the regular Army in the Yeomanry. They are now allowed under certain conditions to serve in the Militia, and then, having passed the qualifying examination, to pass into the service without going to Sandhurst. I think Cavalry officers might be allowed to do the same thing for the Cavalry service, by serving in the Yeomanry.

7029. The Yeomanry training is not as yet as long as the Militia, is it?—No, it is about half now, it is rather more. The Yeomanry training is 18 days now, and the Militia is a month—28 days.

7030. Is that sufficient training for a man to be of real use to him as a candidate for the Army?—It would be a very valuable preliminary training, and one which could be perfected, of course, when he joins the regular regiment, and is drilled till he is a formed soldier. The same conditions, I think, should apply to Cavalry candidates joining Yeomanry regiments as apply now to line candidates serving with the Militia.

7031. But that, after all, would only supply you with a nucleus; you would still have difficulties in filling up your officers in the Yeomanry?—We might; but it would mitigate the difficulties very much. I think in the Midland counties we could always get officers if we had that little assistance; we are not so very short of officers.

7032. And men?—With regard to the men, I think we have had very much greater success in enlisting since the war, and I believe we shall have greater success in future. The War Office have made the terms easier for the men, and have given them an allowance for horses, which I look upon as a very important concession. I think every regiment, or, certainly, a very large number of regiments, were 50 per cent. stronger last year than they had been in previous years.

7033. Do you approve of the proposal to have a separate section of the Yeomanry for service abroad?—No, I object to that entirely. I think you will never get the good men, what we look upon as our best yeomen, to bind themselves for any unforeseen contingency for the sake of £5, which is the inducement offered by the War Office. When war breaks out, and there is a national emergency, you will find those men will volunteer without £5, and will be glad to serve, as glad to serve as they were in the first instance in the Imperial Yeomanry, at very small rates of pay. In fact, there was an instance of a squadron serving without pay.

7034. I suppose the object of that is to endeavour to avoid the pressure that came in the emergency on this occasion?—The object seemed to be, from what Mr. Brodrick said yesterday, to make it easier, when you required the services of Yeomanry, to get hold of the men; you would have their names down, and there they would be ready. And that is all you could say; you would have their names down and kept at the War Office, or at the regimental district, the headquarters of the regiment, and, possibly, you might have clothing kept for them in the stores of the regimental district, but otherwise they would be just as green yeomen as yeomen who would volunteer when a national emergency occurred. I can see no advantage from that, and, certainly, one disadvantage is the expense of it. And I think it would make an invidious distinction, too, in the ranks of the regiment.

7035. Is there any other remark you would like to make upon the future organisation?—I should like to see the regiments differently armed from what they are now. Their arm now is a long rifle, and, in some cases, I believe, there are regiments which still carry swords. I should like to see them armed with a short rifle, carried in a bucket, a sword on their saddle, and a revolver if another weapon is required. That, I believe, is the armament of the United States Cavalry.

7036. You still wish them to carry swords?—Yes.

7037. I think you said a lighter sword?—Yes, certainly, a lighter sword than the present regulation Cavalry sword.

7038. Is that of the nature of the rapier that General Brabazon has spoken of?—I do not think I should go so far as that. I think the sword is a useful weapon to cut with, and should be capable of being used as a cutting weapon. The point remains, and though it is acknowledged, of course, by all authorities that the man whose habit it is to point is a better man than the man whose first idea is to cut with the sword; yet there are occasions when a cut is very useful. General Brabazon instanced the case of a man having his collar-bone broken; if you break a man's collar-bone you handicap him out of action for some time.

7039. (*Sir John Jackson.*) How about the present scabbards?—I do not think they are successful; they make a noise, they blunt your sword, and they add to the weight; they are much heavier than leather or wooden scabbards.

7040. (*Chairman.*) You do not go so far as the tomahawk?—No, I do not see the advantage of the tomahawk; I think that a revolver would do all that the tomahawk does, and more.

7041. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) What is the range of the revolvers used now?—I think they shoot at 21 yards; it is something like that. Major Knight says it is 30 yards. I know it is something very short; but I should think for use in warfare it should be used, if possible, at very short range. I think that you throw away ammunition if you use it at long ranges.

7042. (*Viscount Esher.*) Did you say a rifle carried in a bucket?—Yes.

7043. You prefer that to its being slung?—Yes, I do; because, if not, the man has not a hand free to use his sword. If a man carries a rifle as he does now, in a heel-bucket, always holding it with his right hand, or with a sling on his right arm, he has not a hand free to use his sword. If you put it in a bucket, so that his right hand is free, he can make use of his right hand to wield his sword. The Imperial Yeomanry were armed with the bayonet, and I look upon that as an absolutely useless weapon for their purpose. I should think there was hardly any case in the whole campaign when the bayonet was fixed, and the only use I saw made of it was to tie up a horse, used as a picket peg; and for that purpose it is extremely badly suited.

7044. (*Chairman.*) But you agree with General Brabazon that some arm of offence, I think he called it, is necessary?—Certainly, I quite agree with him. Various misfortunes would not have happened had

the mounted troops been armed with sword or lance. I was only yesterday reading a letter from Colonel White, who commanded a column, in which he referred to the services of the Yeomanry regiments, and said they would have been of far greater value had they been armed with either sword or lance, or some offensive weapon.

7045. Then transport, I think, is the next point?—Transport, I think, should be confined to squadron transport. There should be a waggon, or whatever is the vehicle of the country in which your campaigning is, to each squadron. The unit that is generally sent out on outpost is a squadron, and if you can send them out with their own transport, those men would be far more comfortable, and more certain of being fed, and, generally, more fit to stay a long time on outpost than if you have regimental transport, and no means of detaching the squadron's effects to go with the squadron on outpost.

7046. Is that for the supply of food?—Yes, if you have to take a quantity of food—if you have to take more than a day's ration.

7047. The principle adopted in South Africa was even to do away with regimental transport for that purpose, was it not?—I think it was. There were different phases. They began with regimental transport; that was discontinued, and I think it was revived. Anyhow, that was speaking of the Army through; I am speaking only of mounted troops such as Imperial Yeomanry or Cavalry.

7048. I think that the change which was made after Lord Roberts arrived in South Africa affected the mounted troops as well as the rest of the Army, did it not?—There had to be an enormous change made in the transport when Lord Roberts arrived, because the transport broke down so; but I think, on that head, Major Knight will give you more valuable information than I can, he having been for some time a transport officer.

7049. Is that all you wish to say, then, about transport?—Yes, I think so. I think that the transport of a Yeomanry regiment should be confined to squadron transport.

7050. And as regards the general utility of the force, have you anything to say?—As regards the general utility of the force I should suggest that they should retain their Cavalry character, and that they should not be made, as they are practically made now, Mounted Infantry. The Mounted Infantry service is not so popular in the country as that of the Cavalry, and the class of men from which our recruits are drawn are more inclined to enlist, if you call your regiment a Cavalry regiment, than if you call it a Mounted Infantry regiment. Throughout this campaign the Imperial Yeomanry have been used almost entirely as Cavalry; almost every column commander or brigadier who had Yeomanry under him, I think, would bear me out in saying that they used them entirely as Cavalry from one end of the campaign to the other.

7051. I thought General Brabazon said just the opposite, that even Cavalry were not used as Cavalry in South Africa?—I quite understand what General Brabazon meant; that they were used to attack in quite a new way; that instead of beginning in formed bodies they had to attack kopjes, which he described as fortifications. That is quite a new thing, of course, for Cavalry.

7052. (*Viscount Esher.*) He was referring to shock tactics?—Yes, I did not refer to shock tactics when I said they were used as Cavalry, but that they were used as Cavalry, as they were the ears of the force and the eyes of the force. But they were never used as Mounted Infantry, if I am right in my acceptation of the term Mounted Infantry—that is merely a force of Infantry put upon some animals or vehicles to get it from place to place. That was never the rôle of the Imperial Yeomanry during the campaign while I was there.

7053. There is a third designation, of Mounted Rifles, is there not?—Yes, I believe there is. I see no distinction myself between Mounted Rifles and Mounted Infantry.

7054. But do you mean that you would wish the Imperial Yeomanry of the future to follow on the lines of the regular Cavalry?—Yes, it is rather vague now. The opinion seems to be very vague of the highest authorities at this moment as to what Imperial Yeomanry are. When we were talking in the House of Commons yesterday on the subject of the Service section, as it is called one member asked Mr. Brodrick whether the proposed section were to be Mounted Infantry or Cavalry, and he did not give any definition, but he said they would be the same as the Yeomanry at present. What that is meant to convey I do not know.

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7055. But I rather gathered that the sense of General Brabazon's evidence was that you could not expect Yeomanry to stand against Regular Cavalry?—I do not think you can expect any irregular troops to stand against regulars.

7056. Then is it not better to adapt their purposes somewhat to what they would be able to stand and to do in the future?—I think the argument is the same, whether you pit them against regular Infantry or regular Cavalry. If they are irregulars they are not likely to be as good.

7057. And, again, are you speaking of the Yeomanry as a force to serve at home or abroad?—Primarily at home, only to serve abroad if called upon, and to serve then on the voluntary system as they did in this war. The difficulty was not to get men to volunteer for this war; the difficulty was to get men not to volunteer. Almost every man, no matter how old in my regiment, was prepared to go out, and I had to cast I do not know how many men because they were over the age, which was originally 30, and afterwards put up to 35. Several good fellows, as good as you could find anywhere, 40 years old, came and wanted me to enlist them, and I was obliged to refuse. They would have stood the country a great deal better than boys; they were as efficient as soldiers as they ever were in their lives.

7058. But as regards the nature of the force in the future, if the Yeomanry regiment in its permanent organisation is primarily or entirely for home defence, is Cavalry the arm that is most useful for home defence?—I think so, because there is no Cavalry force for home defence, except it be the Yeomanry. To complete your force, whatever it may be, Army Corps, or whatever you call it, for home defence, you must have some Cavalry, and there is none at present, unless you allow the Yeomanry to be Cavalry.

7059. I should have thought, looking at the enclosed nature of the country, that there might be difficulties in using a large Cavalry force in this country?—There is no doubt that in an enclosed country like England it would be difficult to use a large Cavalry force in line or deployed to any extent, but still there are many things for which Cavalry would be useful in an enclosed country or otherwise, such as outpost work and reconnoitring, which is quite as much the province of Cavalry as extended movements in line, or echelon, or the shock tactics that are so frequently referred to.

7060. Then you do not mean in advocating that they should follow on Cavalry lines, that they would go in for extended movements in line or tactics?—No, except for drill purposes—I think the country in so few parts of England is suitable for it.

7061. You advocate that, partly at any rate, because it would make it a more popular Service?—Yes, I admit that. I think it would also make it a more valuable Service; but I quite admit that it would make it a more popular Service, and you would be able to recruit more.

7062. What is the next point you wish to mention?—I do not know that I have any other suggestions to offer you. Referring to what General Brabazon said, I think his recommendation is a very valuable one, that Yeomanry regiments should be attached to regular Cavalry regiments in the same way that Militia regiments are now attached to regiments of the line. Also, of course, that the equipment of the Yeomen should be made lighter than it is at present.

7063. The weight on the horse is too great, you mean?—Yes, the weight on the horse's back. That could only be relieved by providing for whatever is carried now being carried elsewhere in the squadron cart. With regard to the officering of the first contingent of Imperial Yeomanry, the first 10,000 men, General Brabazon, I think, said that with very few exceptions the commanding officers were old soldiers. I think there was only one exception. Every effort was made by the Committee to get Cavalry officers, or, at all events, old Army officers to take commissions in the Yeomanry.

7064. There were Yeomanry Colonels in command, I think, but I suppose they had also served in the Army?—With one exception.

7065. I think we had evidence that four Yeomanry

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Colonels went out in command?—I could not say. Lord Chesham was one certainly, an old Cavalry soldier.

7066. I think it was Lord Chesham's evidence?—I do not remember who the four were. There were Colonel Howard and Colonel Blair—Howard of the Derbyshire Yeomanry and Blair, the Leicestershire; that is three, I think there was another.

7067. There were four, I think. Is that all you wish to say?—Yes.

7068. There is just one point that I had intended to put to Lord Chesham yesterday, but as you were in South Africa, I should like to mention it, as I do not wish to pass it by—that is the hospital equipment. Did you see the Imperial Yeomanry hospital equipment?—Yes, I went with General Brabazon to inspect the Imperial Yeomanry hospital equipment at Deelfontein, and anything more perfect I do not think you could suggest. The site was very well selected, the arrangements were perfect, the water was good, it was close to the railway, and certainly the evidence that the men gave, and the officers who were laid up there, speaks volumes for the whole organisation and the way in which they were treated. I spent the best part of one day and a night there going into it thoroughly.

7069. The first report of the Imperial Yeomanry that has been published has a paragraph, No. 485, on page 108, saying pretty much what you have just mentioned, and you entirely confirm it?—Yes, I cannot say too much for it. Both the hospitals were model hospitals, both the one at Deelfontein, which was an old-established hospital, and the one at Pretoria, which was only established after we had been at Pretoria some time.

7070. (*Viscount Esher.*) How do you think the officers and men of your Yeomanry regiment compare with the officers and men of your old regiment, the 10th Hussars, in regard to horsemastership?—Of course, there are some whom you may call almost natural horse-masters—young farmers who have been having the care of horses all their lives. On the other hand, there are men who have not been so trained, like master tradesmen and that sort of thing. Of course, there is not the same instruction given in the care of horses that there is in a Cavalry regiment.

7071. Have the officers in your Yeomanry regiment any veterinary knowledge at all—elementary, of course?—None from instruction; only from experience.

7072. Did they know how to shoe a horse?—I should not think so, I think that is very rare.

7073. You would not often find that knowledge in officers of the Army?—No, very seldom; they do go now through veterinary courses; it is one of the many things they have to go through, but it is very exceptional to find a young gentleman who can shoe a horse. I believe there was only one who went to South Africa as a Yeoman, and he turned it to great account; he was taken prisoner and shod the Boer horses when he was a prisoner. He was an accomplished man.

7074. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) There were two Yeomanry hospitals, I think you said?—Yes, two, one at Deelfontein, and the other at Pretoria.

7075. Were they stationary?—They were both stationary. And there was also a field hospital.

7076. Where did the field hospital go?—It went with the Army as it advanced.

7077. As I understand, the Yeomanry were scattered all over?—Yes, they were. Their work was not confined to Yeomanry, of course; they had to take patients from any corps, and that was the case with every hospital.

7078. Then were Yeomanry when they fell sick or were wounded at a distance sent to it?—If they could be they were sent to the hospital. When they could get transport for them and it did not interfere with other hospitals they were sent to Deelfontein or to the hospital in Pretoria; during all the last part of that year I should think all the sick Yeomen went to the hospital at Pretoria; it was quite the exception to find them elsewhere.

7079. It was kept separate from the general hospitals?—Yes.

7080. At Deelfontein, I suppose a great many of the patients were not Yeomen?—Yes, a great many.

7081. It made itself useful to the whole Army?—Yes, General Codrington was a patient there for some time.

7082. I think you said that when the Yeomanry left England they were deficient in transport, did you mean land transport?—Yes.

7083. But what land transport could they have taken from England which would have been suitable for service in South Africa?—They could have taken Scotch carts and horses, and I think in some cases they did. I think one or two regiments did bring out some Scotch carts, but, of course, the best transport is the vehicle of the country, whatever it may be.

7084. That is an obstacle in all foreign campaigns to taking transport from England. Probably the transport to be obtained here would not be suitable for the country?—What I meant to convey was rather that all the transport available was required for regular troops, and it would have been an advantage if the Yeomanry had had transport of their own.

7085. And you think for that transport that Scotch carts, whatever they were, with horses, would have been useful throughout the war?—Yes, very useful. There was something in the way of transport sent out; some tongas were sent out, but they were not the true tonga, they were absolutely useless. They were sold at Cape Town afterwards.

7086. You were not alluding to the tongas sent from India, are you?—No; these were made in England. I do not think we had any sent from India.

7087. Oh yes, there were?—We had some with the regular forces, but not with the Yeomanry. There was a tonga train at Pretoria, but that was sent from India. The Yeomanry tongas were of a different model; they were tongas only in name.

7088. They were not as useful as those sent from India?—No.

Major W. C. Knight, C.S.I., D.S.O.

Major Wyndham C. Knight, C.S.I., D.S.O., called; and examined.

7089. (*Chairman.*) You were Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General for Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa, I think?—I was first employed with the Yeomanry in London to raise the force. I was then Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General as long as General Brabazon was in command.

7090. In South Africa?—Yes. And then I was representing the Yeomanry at Army headquarters when Lord Chesham was appointed Inspector-General. I was Chief Staff Officer to him till he went home, and the same to General Bellfield till the end of the war and up to August last.

7091. So that you practically went through the war with the Yeomanry?—Yes; from the beginning till they had all come home, except the third contingent.

7092. You saw the organisation here originally?—Yes.

7093. Have you anything to say with regard to that point in the first place, in relation to what you saw at home before you went out?—I think that, on the whole, the organisation at first was good. It was taken up at a time when the War Office could give very little help. It was practically done by Yeomanry Colonels, and considering the natural inexperience, I think the results were exceedingly good.

7094. I do not think we will trouble you to go through the details, because we had them yesterday; but I thought I would give you an opportunity, if you wish, to notice any particular point?—I think the strong point of it all was that the counties were all helping, it was not all done in one place, but each county was selecting its own officers and was enlisting its own men. I think the county organisation was the strong point of the first contingent of Imperial Yeomanry.

7095. You have been good enough to give us a *précis** of the evidence you would wish to give, and the first point is with regard to the equipment of the first contingent. You think that they were excellently equipped, I understand?—Yes.

7096. That perhaps is due to the fact which you have

* The *précis* will be found on page 517 of this volume.

just mentioned—that they were looked after in each county by the county officers?—Yes. Partly to that and partly to the fact of having private funds on which to draw. There was no question of articles being too expensive if they were thought necessary. We could give them the very best of everything.

7097. The two things hang together, I should imagine; being done by counties, there would be county funds?—Yes; and in London we had a Central Yeomanry fund, too.

7098. Still, though that was a great advantage to the Yeomanry, you think that in future campaigns they ought to be treated as parts of the Regular Army?—Yes, I think so. It was really because the War Office could not equip them that this work was thrown on the committee; there were no stores available.

7099. I think we had evidence yesterday that afterwards in South Africa it became almost impossible to continue the separate system?—Yes; we went on with the giving out of Yeomanry stores as long as there were any, and they were very good, and there was very great competition by people not in the Yeomanry to get hold of our stores, which I think was the best possible proof how good they were. And then as we ran out we gradually filled our depôts from the Government ones, and had our depôts working entirely under the Army Ordnance Department.

7100. But that was also on account of the difficulty of managing in so many different parts of the country under the separate system, was it not?—Yes; the force was so widely scattered, and was being fed from depôts all over the country, so that we could not keep up the number of depôts.

7101. As to mounting, I may mention that we do not propose to go into details of the remount question at these sittings, but all I understand you wish to say is that you think it was a mistake on that point to have a separate organisation?—Yes; I do not think it could have been avoided at the time, because practically, with horses as with clothing, the Government could not help us. We were told to get our own horses. But I do not think it ought ever to happen again like that.

7102. For what reason?—I think that the Government should be able to provide horses for as many mounted troops as they require.

7103. Then as to the men of the first contingent, what have you to say with regard to their quality?—The first contingent, enlisted in a time of national emergency, consisted almost entirely of men superior to the classes ordinarily enlisted. The bulk of these men could ride and handle firearms, though owing to want of experience with rifles their shooting was in most cases indifferent.

7104. They were of excellent class, the first contingent?—Very good.

7105. So much so that some of them, or a number of them, were fit for commissions afterwards?—Yes; we had a certain number in the ranks who actually had held commissions previously.

7106. (*Sir John Edge.*) In the Regular Service?—Yes; commissions in the Regular Service, Militia, Volunteers, and every kind of commission; commissions in the Army and in the Navy.

7107. (*Chairman.*) And many of them remained in the Colonies, and got good positions in the Colonies?—Yes.

7108. You had some difficulty on account of men coming out understating their ages, had you not?—I think we had a certain number of men in the first contingent who were a good deal over 35. There was a great deal of enthusiasm at the time they were enlisted, and everybody was not so particular as Lord Valentia has just stated in his evidence, that he was personally, in the case of his own regiment, in casting men who were over the age.

7109. And those men could not stand the hardwork?—No.

7110. Do you think that 35 years of age is one to be adhered to?—I think so, for the ranks.

7111. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Only for the ranks?—Only for the ranks.

7112. (*Chairman.*) And the general physique?—The general physique of this first contingent was excellent, and far above that of the Regular Army.

7113. Is there any other remark about the first contingent that you would like to make?—I think not.

7114. And as to the second contingent, what did you see of them?—I saw the whole of that contingent from the time it came out till it went home.

7115. Where were you—I mean in South Africa—at the time the second contingent came out?—I was at Pretoria and Johannesburg, where we had our big depôt at Elandsfontein, six miles outside, to which the bulk of the contingent came; and when I could get away I went round with the Inspector-General.

7116. And you saw them on their first arrival?—I saw them on their first arrival, the bulk of them. I saw most of the regiments after they had been in the field for some time, and I used to hear frequently from the officers commanding regiments.

7117. Then the general stamp you say was good, though below that of the first contingent?—Yes.

7118. But there were exceptions?—Yes.

7119. What were they?—The contingents sent from Leicester and Reading were bad, and that enlisted at one of the London offices as the Duke of Cambridge's Own was disgraceful.

7120. They were not up to the standard in the ordinary physical requirements?—They were not up to the standard for the Regular Army, and in many cases they were men who had been previously rejected for the Yeomanry. Colonel Weston Jarvis can give evidence as to a large number of these men having been previously rejected by another London office.

7121. And some of them had to be sent home for medical reasons?—Yes, a considerable number.

7122. There were, besides the medical reasons, a number of them who could not ride or shoot?—The shooting of those who remained compared favourably with that of the first contingent, but 75 per cent. could not ride. The men of this contingent were much younger than their predecessors, and it was necessary to keep them under much stricter discipline. Many men who had been sent out were too heavy for mounted work, and numbers suffered from organic disease, and could not have been fit for military duty at the time they left England.

7123. You say it was necessary to send home altogether over a thousand men of the contingent?—Yes.

7124. Do you give that number from any figures in your possession?—No, I am giving evidence without any figures at all, because all our papers are in South Africa; but I think that is about the right figure, and that would include men who were not actually sent out of the country, because we had these big depôts running, and we replaced the *personnel* of the depôts by men who were unfit for the field.

7125. The figures given to us yesterday officially were 700?—I do not know where they would come from, because we have never given anybody the figures.

7126. Only that they were the men who actually came home——

7127. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) You do not say that a thousand were all sent home?—Yes; that would include those at the depôts. I think about a thousand were sent home.

7128. (*Chairman.*) This is the report:—"Those who were sent home as unlikely to become efficient number 724"?—Then there would be those who were sent home as organically unfit, suffering from disease.

7129. No, it is stated that that included those. The same point arose yesterday, and I only put it to you whether you could make it clear that your figures were based upon returns that you could produce or not, as you were on the spot?—I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the thousand, but we thought out there that we had sent about a thousand men home and to our depôts, and we never have sent anybody a record showing exactly how many men did go at the different times.

7130. I suppose they have the records of the men who came home, because the question was inquired into by the War Office——

7131. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) May there not have been a good many discharged who remained

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in the country?—There were very few remained in the country, and about a hundred went to the depôts.

7132. (*Chairman.*) Anyhow, if these figures in the report are based upon returns, you would not, of course, put this estimate of yours as against them?—No, not if they are based on returns—if they came from our office.

7133. At any rate, it is not disputed—it is accepted on both sides that there was a certain proportion, whether it was seven hundred or a thousand, of the men of the second contingent who were sent home as unfit?—Yes.

7134. And, of course, those men had not, as the first and third contingents were, been trained at home at all?—No.

7135. So that those rejections included in the case of the second contingent any proportion of men who in the other contingents would have been rejected during the course of training at home?—They included a very large number of men who should never have been accepted for any class of soldiering or any contingent.

7136. That may be; but is not my question quite true, that they did include all the men who in the course of training at home would have been found unfit, and therefore would not have been sent out if they had been trained at home?—I think not all. I think you will find that Colonel Weston Jarvis will tell you that in his lot they found a certain number unfit after they arrived in South Africa. He went out with the second contingent, but with a battalion that had been put together and picked over in England.

7137. But there was a difference between the second contingent and the other two contingents in that it had had no training at home?—Yes.

7138. The training at home, if it is worth anything, I suppose, provides for the rejection of the unfit as they appear at the training?—Yes.

7139. Therefore, in the case of the second contingent, whatever the proportion was, it may have been that a proportion of those men who had to be rejected in South Africa would have been rejected if they had been trained in England?—Yes.

7140. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I think you said that your figures included a certain number that ought never to have been enlisted?—I would say of the whole of the men we sent home that none of them ought to have been enlisted.

7141. (*Chairman.*) Of course, that you will have to prove?—Surgeon-Major Kilkelly, of the 1st Battalion of Grenadiers, who was in charge of the Yeomanry Hospitals, is in London, and so far as possible, we sent all the men who were physically unfit before a committee which was assembled at the Yeomanry Hospitals, and he has the details of the men who were physically unfit.

7142. That is the physically unfit, but you sent home, as I understand, a proportion of men who were not physically unfit, but who were otherwise unfit?—Yes.

7143. We had a case mentioned to us yesterday, in which a man was sent home not because he was physically unfit, but for other reasons, and when his case was gone into in this country it was found that the reason would not hold water. I only mention that to show that mistakes may have occurred on both sides?—Under the Army Order which Lord Kitchener published under which the men were got rid of from South Africa it was quite possible to get rid of a man who was a bad character.

7144. Yes; there is no question of that in this case. It was a case of a man being sent home because he could not ride, the man being an excellent polo player. That was an officer?—They did not refer it back to us. I could probably tell you about the officer if you give me his name.

7145. I do not recollect his name, but the case was mentioned yesterday. At all events, we come to this, that after the weeding out of these men, whether it was seven hundred or a thousand, or whether they ought to have been rejected at home, or might have been rejected at home or not, you are of opinion that the bulk of the contingent made excellent soldiers?—Yes.

7146. And you refer to the opinion of the Regular and other officers which we have already got in the reports of the Imperial Yeomanry?—Yes.

7147. Did you see these second contingent men on service yourself and in action?—No, I never saw them in action.

7148. But they did have a good reputation in that respect?—A very good reputation.

7149. Then as to the third contingent there is not so much to be said, because they arrived so late, I suppose?—They practically arrived after the war was over.

7150. You say that on arrival they probably shot better than the other contingents and rode better than the second contingent; but they were far inferior to the first contingent in riding and horse management?—Yes.

7151. The first contingent were the best in their riding and horse management out of the whole three contingents?—Yes.

7152. I suppose you do not want to refer specifically to any of the reports that you mention in your *précis*?—I do not think so.

7153. Then as to the question of drafts, you think there should never have been any second or third contingents if there had been drafts?—No; I think we should have had drafts from the beginning—drafts sent to the units of the first contingent.

7154. You are aware that that was proposed to the War Office, and was refused by them?—Yes. I think it was refused at the time when they did not realise how long the war was going on, or that there would ever be a necessity for a second contingent.

7155. It was refused at two distinct periods, apparently, both in the case of the first contingent and in the case of the second contingent?—I do not think we had asked for it from South Africa in the case of the second contingent.

7156. Perhaps not, but they were pressed at home. At any rate, the decision on the question of drafts was a War Office decision?—Yes.

7157. But you think that would have been the proper way of keeping up the force?—It entirely disorganised the force in the middle of the war having to send home the cadres of all the existing squadrons in the field and reform them. We were forming 117 squadrons in different parts of South Africa at the same time.

7158. Was that partly due to the conditions under which the men had enlisted in the first contingent?—It became due on account of the drafts having been delayed. If the second contingent had been sent out even in bulk to be dealt with a few months earlier we should not have had the same difficulties. What we wished to do out there in the scheme put before Lord Kitchener was to allot 150 men to each squadron. Of those, 50 were to be sent to it at once and trained with the old Yeomen of the first contingent, who then had had over a year's experience. After those men had shaken down we were going to send a second 50, and as soon as the officers under whom they were in the field expressed their approval of the way those men were working the old Yeomen would be allowed to go home, and we would send the third contingent of 50. But events moved too quickly for us, and we had to send them practically in two lots. We sent first about 50 men to each squadron, and then we had to fill up the squadron to the strength of 150. We did not have as long to do it as we should have liked.

7159. And the men arrived mixed up in the second contingent?—The men of the second contingent were enlisted by the county centres and by certain London offices. Presumably, they arrived at Aldershot as distinct contingents from different counties. At Aldershot they were mixed up, and they were sent out in sections of 110. On a ship there would be, perhaps, six sections of 110 men, and each of those six sections would have Leicester men, each of them would have Hampshire men, and each of them would have Northumberland men. There seems to have been no reason for mixing them up, and it made it very difficult to keep up the county connection.

7160. Speaking from recollection, I think the county men were sent up in detachments also; they were not sent up as county contingents, as in the first case, but were sent up as they were enlisted?—That may have been the reason. I could give you the actual figures how they were mixed up in some of the ships, if you want them.

7161. And that greatly increased the difficulties?—Very much.

7162. You could not send the men to their own county squadron?—So far as possible, we sorted them out, and when the men came up to our central depôt at Elandsfontein, we sorted them there. But when we had to send them from the port of debarkation straight to the unit, we had to deal with them as mixed sections.

7163. Have you any comments to make upon the force—in the first place, as to officers?—The success of any irregular force must depend on the way in which it is officered. The most difficult task which devolved on the Yeomanry staff in South Africa was the getting rid of the large number of undesirable and incapable officers sent out from England. Here again the difference between the three contingents is very clearly marked. The officers of the first contingent were in most cases men of position, and a certain age, with, as far as possible, previous military experience. They were selected at Yeomanry centres by the Colonels of home Yeomanry regiments, except the commanding officers, who were selected by the Yeomanry Committee. Socially, they were rather above the average of regular officers, and they showed great keenness and adaptability in the field. The officers of the regiments raised by small Committees, as Paget's, Roughriders, Duke of Cambridge's Own, Sharpshooters, were not quite so good socially or professionally. The weakest point about the officers of the first contingent was the large number who went home before their men after a very few months in the field. Luckily, there were in most cases better men in the ranks to take their places. As regards the second contingent, it consisted of four formed battalions, two formed squadrons, and 400 officers, and 14,000 men as drafts, this gave a total of about 530 officers (I am not sure about the numbers not having had any figures to refer to). These officers were selected in England, and were far in excess of the number actually required. They were supposed to have held a commission in some branch of the Service, or to have had "previous South African experience during the war." Instead of being selected by the county Yeomanry authorities, the Yeomanry office in London advertised for them. The result, as seen in South Africa, was startling. Some had never ridden, some had never been in decent society before, some had indifferent records as privates in the first contingent. As an instance, Sir John Sinclair, commanding one of the old squadrons, wrote to me, when they arrived in the country, and said: "I see with disgust that three of my most inefficient privates have been given commissions in the Yeomanry." And he then gave chapter and verse as to why they were not fit to serve, not only as officers, but in any capacity. The first one was unable to hold his water when he saw a Boer; the second one had fits; I forget what the particulars were of the third one. Many were physically unfit. From memory, I think it was necessary to get rid of over 100 of these officers, and that in one week's "London Gazette" over twenty resigned, or were dismissed. The harm done to the name of the Imperial Yeomanry, and to the officer class generally, was incalculable. Their ideas on money matters were so irregular, that it became necessary for the Field Force canteen to refuse to cash Yeomanry officers' cheques. This contingent contained a number of good officers, and a large number of those capable of being made into good officers. Nearly sixty regular officers, mostly from units serving in South Africa, were lent to the Yeomanry, and by their work and that of the officers of the first contingent who had remained on, coupled with constant weeding of those found inefficient or undesirable, the second contingent reached the standard of efficiency, of which the regiment mentioned in Colonel Kekewich's letter (marked B) was a fair example—Colonel Kekewich's letter was attached to my *précis* (*vide Appendix, page* 519, *post*.

7164. With regard to the figures, you said that you could not state that they were accurate. This is the figure, as appearing in the report, which was handed in to us yesterday as "to be presented." (*Vide Supplementary Report on Imperial Yeomanry, paragraph* 43, *page* 17.) "Out of 506 officers appointed" (in the second contingent) "under the difficulties which have been here referred to, 42 only were rejected in South Africa, or about 8 per cent. on the number given. A letter of explanation regarding these officers will be found in Appendix No. 3, and full inquiry was made in regard to these rejections by a specially appointed committee at the War Office, and in some instances, although the officers were not reinstated, it was found that the causes for their rejection were at least doubtful." Those are the figures given?—The number is nearer 100, I think, than 42. We sent home a certain number of cases which were very bad, in which the officer was dismissed, or he was told what the case was against him, and asked if he would like to resign, or to have his commission cancelled; and in most cases they resigned. Some of these cases were extraordinary. There was one man who arrived drunk with his draft—he was one of several who arrived drunk with their drafts. We sent for him and asked him what previous military experience he had. He said he had served in the Imperial Light Horse during the first part of the campaign. Major Karri Davies was staying with Lord Chesham at the time, and he asked him for an official report of this man. He gave it very shortly; he said: "So-and-So is an impertinent, incompetent coward." This man had served as a saddler in the 16th Lancers; he served as saddler sergeant in the Imperial Light Horse; he had never held any executive rank; he could not speak the King's English properly, his only comment when Major Karri Davie's report was read to him was, "Well, he didn't ought to have said that"; he was one of very many who were like that, who, if they had been looked at before they went out, could not have been given commissions. We had another private, a man from the 4th Hussars, as far as we could judge a habitual drunkard.

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7165. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) He came as an officer?—These men came as officers. There were a large number of men in the ranks of the Yeomanry and other corps who had got home very early in the campaign—in the case of the Yeomanry, after the regiment, perhaps, had been out for two or three months. The first contingent of Yeomanry practically did no soldiering during the first two or three months. They were on the lines of communication, waiting for a chance of being sent up to the front; at that time it was quiet in Cape Colony, and there was no fighting done there. These men were invalided and came home, and when officers were wanted they came forward, and gave as their previous South African experience that they had served such and such a unit during the campaign. Reference does not seem to have been made to the officers under whom they actually served as to whether they were suitable.

7166. (*Chairman.*) I do not want to excuse anything that ought to have been done otherwise, but, of course, the pressure was very great at the time, and when you say that reference was not made to the officers under whom they served, under the circumstances under which the second contingent was sent out, it was impossible, was it not, to refer to officers in South Africa?—I do not think so. As regards those who had previous experience in the Imperial Yeomanry, there was probably not a single squadron of Yeomanry of the first contingent that was not represented in England at that time by at least one officer; officers of the first contingent had in many cases come home, or been invalided, and I should think every squadron was represented—at any rate, every regiment, and the officers who had previously selected the regimental staffs of the first contingent, Viscount Valentia and Colonel Crichton, volunteered their services.

7167. Not of the Imperial Light Horse, to which you alluded?—The Imperial Light Horse even would be, I should think. There were a great many officers who had gone out from England.

7168. But even that meant a considerable amount of investigation and time and the explanation given in the official letter to the War Office simply is that the time was not available to make complete inquiries?—I think there would have been time for a responsible officer to have seen these gentlemen personally.

7169. Of course, looking at it after the event, everybody will be sorry that that was not done; I am only saying that that is the explanation given?—In some cases these candidates for commissions did not see any responsible officer. I do not think any responsible officer could have given men of that class a commission, or have put their names forward in any way. We put a large number of these officers through a certain set of questions in South Africa, as to whether they had been seen by anybody, and as to whom they had given as reference, and by whom they had been medically examined. These statements were afterwards signed by the officers concerned, and they are at the present moment in South Africa.

7170. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Whom did they see as a rule?—In some cases they saw the hall-porter, who gave them a form to fill up. In other cases they only wrote, and had a form sent to fill up, in

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which they were asked to give two references, and they were told they had to be medically examined. We had one man who was a Maltese; the only thing we were ever able to find out he could do was to play the piano. He refused to get on a horse at all. He is now taking money at the door at one of the principal hotels at Pretoria.

7171. (*Chairman.*) What was his object in going out with the Yeomanry then, if he could not get on a horse?—There were a great number of people who thought at that time that the war was pretty well over; they wanted to get to South Africa, and they thought it was rather a good way of getting there at Government expense.

7172. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) With a free passage?—Yes.

7173. (*Chairman.*) Your evidence, then, comes to this, that the personal investigation of the officers in this country was not sufficient?—Yes.

7174. If the explanation of that is that there was not time, and if that is well founded, you would say that there ought to be time?—I cannot understand how there could not have been time.

7175. Well, of course that may be; but if there was not time you would say that there ought to be; that it is not a proper organisation for a force of this character that there should not be time for the personal investigation of these cases in this country before they are sent out to war?—Certainly.

7176. Is there anything else you wish to say about the officers?—As regards senior officers, the Inspector-General of Imperial Yeomanry had cabled asking that senior officers should not be sent, but no notice was taken of this, and four battalions were sent out fully officered, and in three cases so badly officered that it was found necessary to break them up and reform the four into two battalions, and even then to put in a Regular officer to command one of them.

7177. A good many were sent out with only subalterns, were they not?—That was the drafts; they were all sent out with Second Lieutenants.

7178. And that caused some difficulties, too, did it not?—Their being Second Lieutenants did not cause any difficulty, but a great many of them were given the acting rank of Captain for the voyage, and everyone of them said he had been assured that he would have his rank confirmed when he arrived in South Africa.

7179. That is what I mean. That caused some difficulty in sending them out without senior officers?—Yes. I should like to explain the discrepancy between the figures of 42 and 100—about the officers sent home.

7180. Certainly, I thought I asked you that?—There were a large number of billets in South Africa for which officers were required, and there were a great many sent out, who although they were not suitable to lead men in the field, were quite useful as Railway Staff officers, and in such posts, and they were allowed to go to them. The numbers who went to each branch could be given from the office in South Africa.

7181. And those were not the distinctly undesirables?—I think the term undesirables was a mistake as applied to the whole of those officers; many of them were excellent socially and in every way except that they were not fitted for mounted work.

7182. Quite so; but I think the 42 was applied to the undesirables?—My figure of 100 meant to include all the officers whom we had to get rid of from the Yeomanry.

7183. And the 42 applied to those cases of rejection that came home?—Yes; who were not suitable to hold His Majesty's commission.

7184. Then with regard to the third contingent, have you anything to say about them?—They were selected, as before, by the Central Yeomanry authorities, without any reference to the counties. The general stamp of officer was not as good as it might have been, and men were sent out in higher positions without any reference to their previous record during the war. In two cases men who had held subordinate positions were sent out in command of regiments. One of these left South Africa as a Subaltern and the other as a Quartermaster.

7185. Of course, as they did not serve you have no knowledge of what their capabilities were?—No, but the man who had been out in South Africa serving as a Quartermaster, and went home, was hardly qualified on his war record to come back again and command a battalion over the heads of all the officers we had out there; it caused a great deal of discontent. There were other cases in the third contingent of officers. There was one case of an officer whose commission had been cancelled in South Africa; we had been asked to give him a commission before, and it was found that he was not a desirable character, and it was cancelled without its ever appearing in the "London Gazette" or his ever doing any duty. He came out from England as an officer in the third contingent, and he had to be sent home. Another of the officers on arrival was taken by the police as an old illicit diamond buying offender.

7186. Then as to the way in which the force was used in South Africa, I think you wish to say something?—It was used mostly by squadrons. At first there was a tendency to employ the Imperial Yeomanry on lines of communication, but latterly they were used exactly the same as any other mounted units. It became easier to work them in battalions towards the end of the war, owing to the commanding officers and battalion staffs being either Regulars or those who had proved their fitness for their positions during the campaign. The first contingent was during the first ten months very much split up in squadrons, acting for themselves and with no central authority to whom they could refer. Gradually this was changed, and the whole force highly centralised, each squadron corresponding direct with the office of the Inspector-General of Imperial Yeomanry, which was established in the neighbourhood of a large Yeomanry camp which was formed at Elandsfontein. A pay office was established at Elandsfontein, and every effort made to bring the pay work up to date and to help the squadron commanders with their accounts. This work was made very much more difficult by the 1901 contingent having been sent out without numbers, last pay certificates, or next-of-kin rolls. The 1901 contingent came out practically without any of the ordinary documents which accompany a soldier.

7187. Everything was done in such a hurry?—Yes; I am merely stating what we found in South Africa. Owing to the way the country drafts had been mixed up at Aldershot, and the incompetency of the officers placed in charge of them, it was exceedingly difficult to trace some men at all. This contingent left England in the spring of 1901, and in the autumn of the same year only a portion of the missing documents had reached South Africa. A few had not arrived by the end of the war.

7188. It must have been a very troublesome business to you?—It was.

7189. And the pay system did not succeed?—The system of making squadron or company commanders responsible for the compilation of the accounts of their units failed completely. We had altogether 35,000 officers and men in the country; we had two paymasters for this force only, and they were quite unable to compete with the work. It was very difficult when the first contingent went out to get any trained men to do the work of pay-sergeants. The officers generally were inexperienced, the accounts got more and more in arrears as the war went on, and when the first contingent went home they were very bad.

7190. You could not devise a system out there, I suppose?—We did devise a system out there, but we only tried it with the last contingent. We started a system of pay-books, each man having a little book which showed exactly when he was last paid and how much he had got owing to him; but those pay-books have only been given to the third contingent, and I do not know how it worked. We were rather afraid that it might be open to fraud.

7191. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Was not that only a recurrence to the little books that used to be used in the old days?—I think so.

7192. Every soldier used to have a small book in the old days?—Yes.

7193. (*Chairman.*) What suggestions have you for the future?—I think we should have a larger number of paymasters in proportion to the force, and that all pay work should be done in their offices, and the work

of compiling the accounts taken away from the men who actually have a command in the field. They are naturally responsible for cash disbursements, but it was found that they could not keep accounts in the field, even with the best intentions.

7194. And as to the force as a whole, what do you suggest?—We ought to begin at once to form the nucleus from which to officer the Yeomanry of the future.

7195. I think we have had already evidence on the lines of what you say, that officers who have served should be registered?—That is so. More than 2,200 officers have served in the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa, and there is a large amount of detailed information as to the capabilities or defects of these officers in the Imperial Yeomanry offices in South Africa. I would propose that every officer who served with the Imperial Yeomanry during the campaign, and is certified by his late commanding officer and one of the late Inspectors-General of Imperial Yeomanry as suitable, should be asked to record his name on the Reserve of the Imperial Yeomanry and be affiliated to one of the home Yeomanry regiments. An officer so affiliated should be able to come out for training with such regiment as supernumerary in the rank he held in South Africa, and to draw the pay of his rank during training. In this manner officers would be able to keep in touch not only with soldiering but with units, with which they could serve in a future campaign.

7196. I suppose coming out in the rank that he held in South Africa is the essential point of it?—I do not think you would get a man who had been Lieutenant-Colonel in South Africa to come out as a subaltern in England. I think that is one of the difficulties with the whole of the Yeomanry now in getting officers from the cavalry—that if they come in they are very often asked to do so, with a rank lower than they held in the regular Army. I think it would be better to have officers in their own Army rank. These Yeomanry officers now have their own Army rank in the Army in return for their services during the war. I think it would be better for them to be *à la suite* of a particular Yeomanry regiment in which they could serve occasionally.

7197. And do what duty?—And do whatever duty they were told when they got there. All enlistments of men and selection of officers in future must be by the home regiments of Imperial Yeomanry, helped, in the case of officers, by the Lords-Lieutenant of counties or committees selected by them. All appointments of officers to be approved by the Army Corps Commander, and if regimental staffs are formed they should be selected by the Army Corps Commander. The weak point all through the successive contingents has been the difficulty of finding efficient regimental staffs, and, generally speaking, from commandant down to regimental sergeant-major, it has been necessary to draw on the regular Army. Where amateurs were given field rank, it was frequently impossible to employ them in active operations, owing to their being senior to the column commanders, and when they attempted duties of quartermaster and adjutant they generally failed. To obviate these difficulties, I would suggest that in future only squadrons should be formed, and that they should be attached to cavalry regiments and treated in every respect as the Volunteer Service companies were treated, being kept up to a strength of 150 rank and file by drafts.

7198. Do you think that forming only squadrons would be popular?—I think the only people who would not like it would be the people who would hope to have command of a regiment.

7199. There is a good deal of county feeling in that sort of thing now?—The county feeling in the first lot of Yeomanry was entirely squadron feeling. The battalions were put together rather haphazard, and the county feeling was so strong that the commanding officers in many cases had a very difficult task to get quite ordinary things done. They all liked to act on their own account.

7200. You are speaking of the experience in South Africa?—Yes.

7201. But then the organisation at home, of course, is quite different. The numbers of the county contingents in this country are very different from what it was possible to send out from each county to South Africa?—There are 52 regiments in Great Britain, and if each of them sent two squadrons, we should not have as many yeomen as we had in the field.

7202. But I thought you meant by this, that you would organise the home force by squadrons, and not regiments?—No, this is merely for war.

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7203. I beg your pardon; it had not come out that it was only for war?—Yes. In war I would suggest calling on the Army Corps to send so many squadrons from the particular Army Corps. The Yeomanry colonels would then be consulted as to how they should be formed.

7204. But the organisation of the Yeomanry will be by regiments in this country?—Yes, of the home Yeomanry. I have not referred to the home Yeomanry, except as volunteering for active service.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

7205. (*Chairman.*) (*To the witness.*) I think you have some further views with regard to the organisation of the Imperial Yeomanry for the future?—I have views as regards the Imperial Yeomanry being extended beyond Great Britain, affecting all the colonies, and I will hand in this paper, which is rather lengthy, embodying my views on the subject. (*The Report was handed in. Vide Appendix Vol., page* 168.)

7206. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You have said, I think, that if the drafts asked for the first contingent had been allowed, the second, and perhaps also the third contingent, would not have been required?—Yes.

7207. We have had evidence upon that already; do you consider that if these drafts had been allowed by the War Office, you would readily have got the same class of officers and men for them as were sent out originally?—As regards the officers, we should not have asked England for any more officers. We had a number of the officers of the first contingent of Yeomanry who were willing to stay on, and who went home because their men went home; they did not want to stay on and command a fresh lot of men; and we had, as I have pointed out in my evidence, a very large number of men in the ranks of the first Yeomanry contingent who were suitable for commissions—in fact, we drew gradually on them for the commissioned ranks, and gave some hundreds of commissions in South Africa. I do not think, therefore, that we should have wanted any of these raw officers if the drafts had gone to the original squadrons.

7208. The force altogether would have been of a better class?—Yes, much more efficient in the field.

7209. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) With reference to the 42 undesirable officers, I want to make quite clear that, in your opinion, some of those were so undesirable that a brief interview with any responsible official or officer would have ensured their not being selected?—Yes.

7210. (*Sir John Edge.*) I see you refer in this *précis* to several extracts from letters?—Yes.

7211. They speak generally very well of the efficiency of the Yeomanry in the field?—Yes. Those were to prove that the second contingent, after weeding, was a very good fighting force.

7212. All these extracts you have given us refer to the second contingent?—Yes.

7213. Colonel Kekewich, I see, wrote, on the 3rd June, 1902, with reference to the 7th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry (*vide Appendix, page* 519, *post*): "In bringing the good services of all ranks of this battalion to notice, I trust that the valuable services it has rendered during the war may be taken into special consideration. The regiment came under my command in July, 1901, and its record is most distinguished. There has always been a real good fighting spirit in it; and all ranks have always 'played the game,' and fought well. Once, when about a dozen were cut off and surrounded by several hundred Boers, they fought it out until half of their number (six had been killed and wounded. Its casualties since March, 1901, have been:—

——	Officers.	Men.
Killed in action	8	43
Died of wounds	—	7
Wounded	6	96
Died of disease	—	16
Accidentally injured	—	2
Total	14	164

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"Not a single instance has ever come under my notice of any officer, non-commissioned officer, or man in any way showing 'the white feather,' and this will probably be considered a very special record, considering that it was at Vlaakfontein (six officers killed), Middlefontein, Moedwil, and Rooiwal." You can tell us generally whether the other reports you received as to the second contingent of the Yeomanry, after they had been weeded, were to a similar effect, saying that they had good service?—Yes, all these previous extracts are extracts from letters to me by officers commanding regiments.

7214. I see one of these is from Captain Humby, commanding the 74th Irish Squadron Imperial Yeomanry, dated 8th October, 1901; another from Lieutenant-Colonel Keir, commanding the 1st Battalion of the Imperial Yeomanry, dated 30th September 1901; then there is an extract from a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Jarvis, commanding the 21st Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 28th September, 1901; then an extract from a letter from a Lieutenant-Colonel Banon, commanding the 17th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 10th September, 1901; there is an extract from another letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Banon, dated 18th September, 1901; and an extract from a third letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Banon, dated 21st September, 1901; then there is an extract from a letter from Captain Baldwin, who was a staff officer with mounted troops in Kekewich's column, dated 2nd October, 1901; another from Colonel Von Donop who commanded the mounted troops in Methuen's Force, dated 12th September, 1901; another from Major Campbell, of the 9th Lancers, in reference to the 30th, 31st, and 91st Companies of Imperial Yeomanry, dated October 6th, 1901; one from Lieutenant-Colonel Hickie in reference to the 89th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated September 16th; another from Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, of the 6th Dragoon Guards, with reference to the 9th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated August 17th, 1901; another from Major Sykes, of the 2nd Dragoon Guards, with reference to the 89th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated September 16th, 1901; one from Lieutenant-Colonel De Rougemont, with reference to the 12th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 6th September, 1901; one from Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, with reference to the 5th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 1st October, 1901; and another from Major Campbell, of the 9th Lancers, with reference to the Yeomanry in Damant's column. All those spoke very favourably of the second contingent of the Imperial Yeomanry?—Yes.

7215. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I gather from the paper you have just handed in to his Lordship (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 168) that you propose to suggest something in connection with the Yeomanry in the Colonies; is that the over-sea Colonies—over-sea to South Africa?—Yes, the whole of the Colonies—to have a Mounted Reserve for the Empire, being in three classes.

7216. Have you consulted any one connected with the Colonies with reference to such a scheme?—No; except in South Africa I have not had the opportunity.

7217. What is your proposal with respect to it, generally speaking—I do not want you to go into detail—with respect to Australia, say?—That we should take advantage of the contingents which have been trained by the present war, and ask them if they would be willing to come forward another time. The object of this paper was to have a scheme by which those responsible for the defence of the Empire might know on how many men they could depend in the various parts of the Empire in the event of war, first for general service anywhere, second for defence of portions of the Empire, and thirdly for merely the defence of their own portion; and it is entirely on those lines that that paper is written.

7218. You have not been in communication with General Hutton, the Commandant of the Australian forces?—No.

7219. Have you handed your Report in to be published?—Yes.

7220. It would depend altogether on political matters as to whether there would be any response out there?—Yes; this is merely a scheme, and does not go into details as to any particular Colony; it is only the general principle of our knowing beforehand what we can depend upon

7221. Do you know Sir George French, who has been Commandant in New South Wales?—No.

7222. It is merely your suggestion as to what might be done?—What might be done.

7223. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I think there is still some uncertainty in the minds of some people as to the period for which the Yeomanry of the three different contingents had to serve; you are acquainted with the conditions under which all three were enrolled?—Yes.

7224. As I understand it, they were all three enlisted for "not less than a year, or till the end of the war"; that is to say, there was no obligation if the war continued for two years to let them all go after one year?—There was no obligation with the first contingent to let them all go, but it was generally understood at the time when we enlisted the men that it only meant for a year; the whole idea at that time was that the war could not possibly go on for more than a year, and, therefore, it was worded "for a year, or the duration of the war," the idea being that the war would be over within the twelve months.

7225. But the same wording was used when the war had lasted a year when the second contingent was raised—"not less than a year or till the end of the war"?—I think they again thought that.

7226. But it was not expressed so?—No.

7227. It seems to have been assumed in South Africa that the first contingent were entitled to go after a year, and arrangements were made to replace them?—Yes; the men who came forward, both men and officers, certainly understood that a year was the limit for which they would be kept.

7228. Was there anything in the language of the engagement to warrant that? It seemed to me to be rather an obligation on the part of the Government that they were not to be dismissed under a year, or they would be paid for the balance?—No, I think it was a great deal a matter of what the general opinion was at the time, both of those in authority and the people who enlisted.

7229. You think there was a general impression on the part of the men that they were entitled to go at the end of a year?—Yes.

7230. It was very unfortunately worded; you said that you thought on future occasions like the recent war it would be desirable that the horses should be supplied, not as on that occasion, partly as far as the Yeomanry are concerned, under the direction of a Committee, but that the whole supply of horses should be under the War Department?—Yes.

7231. But I think you do not mean that Yeomen who wish to go direct from the Yeomanry to the Imperial Yeomanry should be debarred from taking their horses?—Certainly not, but they should sell their horses to the Government. Government should pay for these horses before they start.

7232. And I suppose that was done?—That was done with about 3,000 horses, I think, or something under 3,000, with the first contingent. There were 3,000 horses came from England; I do not know how many belonged to the men, and how many did not.

7233. But you think those who desired to bring their horses were allowed to bring them, receiving their value?—They were allowed, and in many cases the men were allowed to, whether the horse was suitable or not; there was a great idea of not separating the Yeoman from his horse, and people did not quite know the necessity of keeping down the size of the horses.

7234. And you think in that way some unsuitable horses may have gone?—I think so.

7235. Were you present in any military operation in which Yeomanry were engaged? Had you any opportunity of seeing them in action and under fire, and so forth?—General Hunter's operations in the Wittebergen.

7236. Or operating in the presence of an enemy at all?—Yes, I have seen a certain number of them, not very many, 1st, 4th, 11th battalions and Lovat's Scouts.

7237. And you thought their conduct was satisfactory on all these occasions?—Very good indeed.

7238. A number of men were sent back as unfit under the terms of an Order, issued by Lord Kitchener, was it not?—Yes.

7239. Do you remember the terms of that Order?—I cannot remember them verbatim.

7240. He said something to the effect that the men could not ride or shoot?—Yes, I am not sure whether the words ride and shoot were put in, or whether it was that the men were found incompetent.

7241. Did that apply only to the second contingent?—It only applied to the second contingent, because by that time the first contingent were under orders for home.

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7242. Did all those men, who are said in one place to have numbered a thousand, and in another 700, belong to the second contingent, who were sent back?—They were all men belonging to the second contingent.

7243. Were any men sent back from the first contingent, do you know?—None.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Weston Jarvis, C.M.G., M.V.O., called and examined.

Lieut.-Col. A. W. Jarvis C.M.G., M.V.O.

7244. (*Chairman.*) You saw something of the raising of the first contingent, I think?—No, sir, I was in Africa before the commencement of the war; I was with General Plumer in those days.

7245. Did you see anything of the first contingent?—I saw a certain number of three squadrons of the first contingent about August, September, October, and November, 1900.

7246. That is all you saw of them?—That is all I saw of the first contingent.

7247. Have you anything you wish to say about them?—No, beyond the fact that they seemed to me very good men.

7248. And as to the stores?—As to the stores, I heard what Major Knight said in his evidence about the Yeomanry stores being of advantage, and I thought perhaps you would like to hear from me that I remember upon one occasion being sent into Pretoria by General Plumer to try and obtain some clothing for his force, which was very ragged indeed, and the only clothing I could obtain at all was from the Yeomanry stores at that time. I could get nothing I wanted from the ordinary ordnance, but they were able to borrow what they wanted to supply General Plumer's force from the Yeomanry stores, which was of great advantage to us in the bush.

7249. Did you come home after that?—When General Plumer's force was disbanded I was at home for a few weeks from about Christmas, 1900.

7250. And at that time you saw the second contingent enlisted?—They asked me to take out one of the new regiments, and I went out in command of one of the new regiments in March, 1901.

7251. Did you see anything of the enlistment as it went on?—I saw a certain amount of the enlistment, and I was fortunate in having the selection of my own officers for that regiment. I saw the enlistment of the 21st and part of the 23rd Battalions.

7252. Where was that taking place?—They were enlisted in London under a committee, of which Lord Dunraven, Sir Henry Seton-Karr, General Stracey, Sir James Fergusson, and others were members. They had to undergo special tests, and they were all very carefully selected. I dotted down a few figures on that head in case they might be of service. For those two battalions, the 21st and 23rd——

7253. Have they not a name?—They were called the Sharpshooters. There were 3,762 applicants for enlistment, and 1,205 were selected, 2,557 being rejected. Of the 1,205 selected 13 were old Yeomen, 607 Volunteers, 188 ex-Regulars, and 397 civilians. Their average age was 24, and 169 of them were married men. I think possibly that some men may have understated their age, and perhaps the average is not so accurate as it might be, but of the 2,557 who were rejected I am quite confident a great number were immediately enlisted by the Duke of Cambridge's Own, and I think that they were the men who brought a certain amount of discredit on the 1901 contingent. The men that were enlisted by Lord Dunraven's committee had to undergo a special shooting test and special riding test. I do not know whether you would care to hear what the shooting test was, but I have it here. Of those 2,557 who were rejected 373 failed to pass the shooting test, 268 the riding test, 707 the medical test, and 1,209 were apparently obviously unfit—they were returned as obviously unfit—and 2,000 of them were immediately enlisted in other ways.

7254. What was the shooting test?—Seven shots at 200 yards standing, seven shots at 200 yards kneeling, seven shots at 600 yards any position; and the minimum score was 65 out of a maximum of 105. Many men made over 80, and some over 90 points. They were all very good shots, and, in fact, we had various shooting competitions in Africa, especially after peace was declared, and we never lost a match—these men always won every match. A great deal of care was taken in enlisting that corps, and, of course, they rather resented or felt the discredit which was thrown on the 1901 contingent generally.

7255. The Sharpshooters had a corps in 1900, and this was a continuation of it?—Yes, they had one battalion in 1900—the 18th Battalion, I think it was.

7256. So that they had some experience to go upon?—They had some experience. The Duke of Cambridge's Own had former experience, too.

7257. You took this regiment out: was it a complete regiment?—It was a complete regiment.

7258. Major Knight complained of the men being so mixed up?—I had great difficulty to prevent their being sent out in drafts such as he described. The procedure at Aldershot at that time was that as soon as 110 men, I think it was, were equipped they were sent out immediately, and sent up to the depôt at Elandsfontein, and there the idea was that they were to be drafted to the different squadrons. I fought to take my regiment out as a complete unit, and I had the greatest difficulty to get it done, but eventually it was all right, and I took mine out as a complete unit. I felt that if they were sent out in drafts of 110 I should never see the regiment again.

7259. So that you had the advantage of having them under your hand on the way out?—I had the regiment under my hand on the way out, and I am glad to say they were never split up. I had the regiment as a whole throughout their term of service.

7260. So that they had an advantage in their training over some of the others?—Their training was *nil* practically before we went into the field. We went from Cape Town to Elandsfontein, and two or three days after we were sent down to Standerton, where our horses were served out, and I had two regimental drills before we went straight into the field, doing the advance work of the column. That was all the training my regiment had—two regimental drills.

7261. How did they behave under those circumstances?—They behaved very well. They only wanted to be told what to do and how to do it, and it would have been a hopeless task without some officers who had had previous experience of the work. I had fortunately had the selection of my own officers, and I had carefully picked out a great many men who had served in the earlier part of the war with other units, but without that it would have been perfectly hopeless. The whole success, in my opinion, was entirely a question of officers. The men were always the same, and were keen. They only wanted to be told what to do and how to do it; but if you had not the officers to tell them it was perfectly hopeless. Of course, they were not very good at first, and it was very difficult in large extended operations to be everywhere, but they soon learned their work, and did very well.

7262. Have you anything more to say with regard to the second contingent or this regiment in particular?—No. With regard to the men I sent home, I find I sent home 18 under Lord Kitchener's order, and I took the opportunity, of course, of getting rid of undesirable men.

7263. In spite of the care in selection, you did find you had that proportion of undesirable men?—Yes. I sent home 18, and it was chiefly, with the exception of one or two, from medical unfitness. I think I had two cases of valvular disease of the heart, and things of that sort. Directly they got into hard work they were chronically in hospital, and it was perfectly impossible to get on with them, and I took the opportunity of sending them home under Lord Kitchener's order.

7264. I suppose they were medically examined before

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they went out?—I believe so. Every man was medically examined.

7265. But there was that proportion of men in your regiment whom, either from medical reasons or otherwise, you had to send home?—Yes, I took the opportunity of sending the men home that I thought were no good and one or two rather doubtful characters.

7266. What was your total number?—Practically 500—485.

7267. Have you any suggestions as to the future organisation of the Yeomanry?—Yes. I feel very keenly upon the Yeomen of the future. I think they ought to be made a very good force, and they could be made a very good force. I heard what General Brabazon said about affiliating regiments, and I am strongly in favour of that.

7268. To cavalry regiments?—Yes, and I think it would create a good feeling and keenness amongst the Yeomen.

7269. How is that to be managed, looking to the comparative number of Yeomanry regiments and Cavalry regiments in the Army?—There are so many more, you mean.

7270. Yes?—That is a question of difficulty; you might affiliate two Yeomanry regiments to one Cavalry regiment.

7271. I am afraid there would have to be still more, as there are 52 Yeomanry regiments?—I do not know how many there are, but there are a good many new regiments.

7272. I think that was stated to-day—52?—The main thing is officers; as on service, so at home, the chief question is that the regiments should be properly officered, and I entirely agree with Lord Valentia that if officers could put in their term of service for pension with a Yeomanry regiment, as officers in the Line do now with the Militia, it would be a very good thing, and also if young men wishing to go into the Cavalry could do so through the Yeomanry, as they now do into the Infantry through the Militia. I know Lord Chesham's views about a staff corps for officers.

7273. We had Lord Chesham's evidence yesterday?—I agree with that view; I think a great deal might be done there, because the difficulty is the question of rank. And then there is another difficulty that does not so much affect London regiments; my opinion is that one ought to get as many ex-cavalry officers as possible to serve in the Yeomanry, and a great many ex-cavalry officers would join the Yeomanry if they could be given a squadron; but in the county regiments it very often happens that the local magnate is the squadron leader, and it is necessary that he should be so for recruiting purposes. That does not apply so much to London, and if there are to be Yeomanry in London as there are now, some new regiments, I think something might be done to get them properly officered by inducing ex-cavalry officers to become squadron leaders. The other point, with regard to London Yeomanry especially, is the horses, mounting them; they cannot be trained and efficient unless they are mounted, and I do not see where the horses are to come from for mounting the Yeomanry in London unless the Government will take the matter in hand. They give you a £5 horse allowance, but a £5 horse allowance is not much good. I believe it costs in many instances more than the £5 to hire a horse for the training, and the class of horse that is hired for that £5 is not good enough; he is a broken-down cab-horse as a rule. I am strongly of opinion that there should be a Yeomanry Department, a department under the War Office, in which all these Yeomanry questions could be more fully dealt with.

7274. That is all you wish to say?—That is all I wish to say about the future.

Colonel the Earl of Scarbrough, A.D.C.

Colonel the Earl of SCARBROUGH, A.D.C., Yorkshire Dragoons, called and examined.

7275. (*Chairman.*) You have taken a great interest in the Yeomanry question, I think, from the beginning?—Yes, I have.

7276. Were you concerned in the organisation of the first contingent?—Yes; I am Colonel of a Home Yeomanry Regiment, and as such I had to help to raise the first contingent of Imperial Yeomanry.

7277. And you went out to South Africa with them, did you not?—I went out as second in command of the third regiment.

7278. What have you to say with regard to the organisation of the first contingent?—Well, I think, as far as it went, it was excellent; it was very imperfect, of course; every thing was done in a very great hurry, and perhaps, starting with the officers, I think one mistake was made in some instances; that is to say, the command of regiments was given to officers who really were not fitted for it, being in some cases Colonels of Home Yeomanry regiments, who could not be said to be up to date in any respect. I myself was offered the command of a regiment, and I declined on principle to take it, because I thought the whole venture was a huge experiment, and that it was essential that we should have in command of each regiment of Yeomanry a thoroughly up-to-date man, a Regular if possible, or at any rate a Reserve officer very recently left command, and all the more because we were not allowed to have a Regular Adjutant or a Regular Quartermaster or a Regular Regimental Sergeant-Major, and we had to find our regimental staff wherever we could from Yeomanry and retired officers and non-commissioned officers. I think it was a mistake. Fortunately, in my case the result of my having made this protest was that I was able to get Colonel Younghusband, who is a distinguished officer in the Indian Army, appointed to command the regiment, and the advantage from the very first was enormous to us.

7279. You would also rather have Regulars as squadron commanders?—As to squadron commanders, at that time there was a dearth of officers of experience, and we were obliged to have Yeomanry officers who had never had any experience except the experience they had with their Home Yeomanry regiments. Squadron commanders, as a rule, if possible, should have experience beyond what they get with their Home Yeomanry regiments. As to subalterns, the Home Yeomanry subalterns who went out did excellently; it was simply a question of gaining experience.

7280. And non-commissioned officers?—As to non-commissioned officers, I think, as far as we could, we got good men, and in many cases we took non-commissioned officers of the Regulars who were doing duty on the permanent staff of the Home Yeomanry regiments; they were excellent men, but there were not sufficient of them, and we had to get others, non-commissioned officers who had retired and were in civlian employment, who came forward and volunteered, and except that they were not up to date, and were rusty, they eventually turned out good men, as a rule. I think the question of non-commissioned officers as regards the future should be left to the Yeomanry regiments, the responsibility of training men should rest with them.

7281. As to the men you got with the first contingent, were you satisfied with them?—Yes, the men were excellent. I do not know whether it would interest you to know, but when I raised the first Yorkshire contingent we had 450 men, and of those men 12½ per cent. were farmers, 9¼ per cent. grooms, 9 per cent. clerks, 8 per cent. engineers, 4 per cent. butchers, 4 per cent. of no occupation, 2½ per cent. shoeing smiths, the same labourers, travellers, and drapers, and 48 different professions went to represent the remainder. That was a combination of most trades and professions, I should think, and goes to show how widespread is the military instinct in the country.

7282. What you want are good shots and good riders, quick at mounting and dismounting?—Yes, these are the principal assets of an Imperial Yeoman.

7283. Is there anything else you wish to say about that period of the organisation and going out of the first contingent?—On the question of horses the War Office, as you probably know, declined to take the responsibility of mounting the Imperial Yeomanry in the first instance, and the Imperial Yeomanry Committee therefore had to make their own arrangements, and to a great extent they relied on making large contracts with individuals. Several Yeomanry colonels asked to be allowed to provide the horses for their own contingents, and up to a certain

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point were allowed to do so. I applied, and I bought all my own horses in the county for my own contingent at an average of £34 12s. 6d. apiece. I think that system, if it had been put into general practice all through, would have worked admirably, but the Imperial Yeomanry Committee could not waste a moment; they had to find these horses, and they naturally did not like to make any experiments without knowing what the result would be. I made a note on this point, which I will read, with your permission. In the first instance many Yeomanry colonels offered to relieve the Committee of their responsibility, and purchase all the horses for their contingents themselves. It is a pity this system had not a more exhaustive test, as where it was carried out it proved a great success. Out of 13,512 horses bought, 3,789 were purchased in this way, after which the colonels were stopped buying. This system of decentralisation is undoubtedly the best for the future. The home Yeomanry organisation is in many ways admirably suited for the purpose; it is in direct touch with the horse-owning and horse-breeding classes, and it should not be difficult to work out a plan by which each Yeomanry headquarters in time of war should become part of the machinery of the Remount Department. The home Yeomanry headquarters, which as you know are scattered all through the country, were never called upon by the Quartermaster-General's department to assist in any way in helping to get remounts or to report on the resources of the different counties in that respect until the spring of this year, when we got an official circular from the Quartermaster-General's department asking us to report on what resources were left. That, of course, was after they had gone to all parts of the world to get horses, and as a matter of fact we found that in March, 1902, as far as the North of England was concerned, there was a large supply of serviceable horses and cobs still available.

7284. You wrote to the War Office, I suppose, did you not?—Yes.

7285. Would you mind putting in that letter?—Yes, I will put that letter in if I may. It is as follows:—"March, 1902.—Sir,—In reply to War Office letter 116, Yeo., 64, of the 14th inst., respecting sources of supply of riding horses and cobs in this district, I have the honour to report as follows:—I have caused inquiry to be made from a number of farmers and horse dealers who have been employed during the last two years in collecting remounts. All are of opinion that there are plenty of serviceable cobs still to be had. One dealer said he would guarantee to find at least 30 cobs a week for the next six months. Another stated that he had been stopped buying, and that if the demand were regular he could find 200 horses a week. Four farmers from different districts stated they could find from 30 to 40 cobs in their respective localities. I venture to add my own opinion for the consideration of the Q.M.G. as follows. I cannot discover that there is any proper local organisation for the inspection and purchase of remounts in a horse-breeding county like Yorkshire. The only remount officer we know of has far too large an area for effective working; he cannot always be travelling. In January, 1900, I had to purchase cobs for the three companies of Imperial Yeomanry sent out by the county regiments; for this purpose I appointed two committees of Yeomanry officers, each consisting of two officers and the regimental veterinary surgeon, to work the whole of Yorkshire. They advertised in the local papers, stating their requirements, and that they would attend at certain places on certain days in the week, where all horses for sale were to be brought. The result was that in a little over a fortnight I had purchased 350 first-rate cobs, averaging £34 12s. 6d. each, when I was stopped buying. I believe some system of this kind is wanted now. I would suggest, at any rate, that the veterinary surgeons of the county Yeomanry regiments be appointed assistants to the remount officer. I would also draw attention to the fact that numbers of horses have been rejected for slight blemishes, such as a chipped knee, and other slight defects which do not cause unsoundness, and in no sense make them less fit for active service. I think in this way we lose numbers of good animals, and there should be more latitude in this respect. Again, horses should not be rejected on account of colour. In South Africa we had all colours amongst the foreign horses and there can be no reason why greys, red and blue roans, and duns should not be bought in this country. My experience leads me to think that it is of the greatest importance to obtain horses that are in work and are corn fed, and in order to secure as many as possible of these, I see no reason why horses should not be bought up to 12 years old. The older horses stand the hard work better than young ones. Again, by adhering too rigidly to the height standard we lose many good horses. A quarter of an inch over or under the standard height should not cause rejection. Hard and fast rules suitable for peace requirements have not been sufficiently modified to meet the late emergency.—(Signed) SCARBROUGH."

7286. Have you anything to say with regard to your experience with the Yeomanry in South Africa?—No, except perhaps as regards their equipment. What handicapped us more than anything else I think was the crushing weight; we started with every kind of equipment, and we gradually shed as many as we could of the articles, and I think finally, when I left we had practically got the average weight a horse had to carry down from 20 stones to 17, and, of course, 17 stones in itself is a crushing weight.

7287. Particularly for small horses?—Particularly for small horses.

7288. And small horses you recommend?—Small horses I recommend principally because they are so easy to nip on and off in a hurry.

7289. And also the smaller man?—The man ought to be a light wiry man about 10 stone or 10 stone 4lbs., and my own view is that he should carry nothing on the horse except a light but strong hunting saddle, and, of course, his arms, a field glass, water bottle, mess tin, and a pair of light wallets, in which he could carry a meal, and a nose bag to carry a feed for his horse, and a blanket. Even then, I do not think you could get the average man down under 14 stone.

7290. You would abolish the haversack?—I would abolish the haversack, which is generally full of rubbish weighing about 8lbs.

7291. If the man carries so little, there must be carts or something?—Yes; it is essential that there should be a light troop cart attached to every troop, or else pack mules.

7292. Which do you prefer?—I think it depends on the country.

7293. You said he should carry his arms; is that a rifle?—A rifle, and I would suggest a sword-bayonet as the other arm. It is impossible to teach a Yeoman, with the short training he has, to use a rifle and a sword efficiently, and besides that according to the present method of carrying the rifle, he cannot use his sword at all, so that the sword becomes useless. The sword bayonet, on the other hand, that is to say something more like a naval cutlass than anything else, something you could fix on to the rifle, and at the same time use in your hand if necessary, seems to me to be the most serviceable kind of weapon.

7294. It was said to-day that a bayonet could not be used while on horseback, because you had to use one hand to hold the reins?—Yes, that is so; I do not think on horseback the bayonet would be of any use.

7295. And it was also said that you really required some arm of offence, as it was called, to prevent the enemy coming in a rush to close quarters, as happened at the latter period of the war?—While the man was still mounted?

7296. Yes?—Well, of course, the sword bayonet I have in my mind would be practically a short sword, and you could use it for purposes of attack on foot.

7297. One method advocated was a sword attached to the saddle, and a bucket to put the rifle in?—Of course, if you have your rifle in a bucket there is always the danger, if you have a fall, or you lose your horse, that your horse gallops away with the rifle, and you are left defenceless. In my own opinion the proper way to carry the rifle is on your back, and, if not on your back, then you must have it in your hand.

7298. Do you advocate revolvers for the Yeomanry?—For officers and senior non-commissioned officers.

7299. Not the men?—Not the men.

7300. As to the nature of the rifle, one witness to-day said it was not necessary that the rifle should be used, as a rule, at long distances, and that it was sufficient if it shot well up to 300 or 400 yards?—That would be all right in this country. I suppose you could hardly ever find a range of 2,500 yards here, but in any country like South Africa I think it is absolutely essential that all mounted troops in future should be armed with a rifle that carries up to 2,500 yards.

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7301. And a carbine would not be sufficient?—No; if it was possible, as I understand it is, to cut a rifle down and make it shorter, and therefore lighter, and yet to have the same range, that would be the best possible rifle for mounted troops, in my opinion.

7302. What was the shooting of the Yeomanry like?—It was very indifferent; I do not think it was on account of the men not being able to hit a target if they saw it, but because they were utterly ignorant of judging distances, both officers and men, and they had never had any training in this respect.

7303. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Had you range-finders?—We had not range-finders; if we had any gunners with us we got the range from them, but we were always in front as a screen, and the chances were that the guns were somewhere behind, and we probably did not know the range until it was too late. I think that is the most important thing in musketry practice—to teach the men how to judge distances.

7304. (*Chairman.*) That is a matter for training?—That is a matter for training which hitherto has been neglected.

7305. Although you think the Yeoman, as a whole, could not carry a sword or a lance as well as his rifle, you would like to have lances?—There were plenty of opportunities when we would have given anything to have a lance or a sword, preferably a lance.

7306. Do you mean by that lances among the Yeomanry?—No, I do not think we could possibly teach the Yeomanry the effective use of a sword or lance and the rifle too; I think it is better that they should have this smaller weapon, the sword-bayonet, for use in case of emergency, and I would not cumber them with a regular sword or lance.

7307. You would rely on the Regular cavalry to do that?—Yes.

7308. As regards the future, what have you to say?—May I just say one word, as you mention the Regular cavalry. My own impression is that the Imperial Yeomanry, and all Irregular troops of that kind, should be trained as mounted rifles—it does not matter what you call them—but all mounted troops that are not actually cavalry should be used for a special purpose. They should be used to find the enemy, or, if I may use a simile, to act as "tufters." I do not know if you know the methods of the Devon and Somerset Staghounds, but they have a pack, and they also have a few hounds, which have to find the quarry and drive him out of his hiding-place, and when he is driven out then they loose the pack; and my impression is that the duty of Imperial Yeomanry or mounted infantry is first of all to locate the enemy, the cavalry being always held back in leash, so to speak, to be launched when the occasion requires. If the mounted rifles drive the enemy out of a kopje or a position, then the cavalry are at hand to make their advance and pursue. As it was in South Africa, the cavalry were largely used as mounted infantry; they were working all day long to find the enemy, and acting practically as riflemen, attacking positions, and when the enemy did retire their horses were completely done up, so that they were not able to deliver any effective pursuit or to overtake them. My own view is that there ought to be in any big mounted force in the field two branches—mounted rifles, to act as I have stated, and the cavalry as well, working together as two distinct branches of one arm.

7309. And the second would be essentially the sphere of the Regulars?—The second would be essentially the sphere of the Regulars, but neither should be called upon to do the work of the other, as was the case time and again in South Africa.

7310. And the Yeomanry would be sufficiently effective to do the first branch of work?—The Yeomanry should be trained to do the work of the mounted riflemen.

7311. That leads up to your idea of what the Yeomanry in future should be?—I would like, if I might, to make some few remarks upon Mr. Brodrick's scheme. He has laid it down that we are to endeavour to raise 35,000 Yeomanry in this country for home defence only, and their liability for service is to be limited to the United Kingdom. Well, I maintain that it is a great waste of money, and that 35,000 cyclists would be infinitely more effective in this country than 35,000 horsemen, and infinitely more economical.

7312. Because of the enclosed nature of the country?—Because of the enclosed nature of the country.

7313. You have said it would be less expensive; would you give the cost?—The cost of a Yeoman to-day to the State, and that is apart from what it costs the regiment besides, is £19 13s. 6d., and the cost of a Volunteer is £6. My view is that to be of any real value to the State, the Imperial Yeomanry should be prepared to serve anywhere within the Empire, and to act as a reserve to our very limited force of Regular mounted troops, but only, of course, in case of national emergency. May I read a few notes I have made about that?

7314. Certainly?—To be of any real value to the State the Imperial Yeomanry must be prepared to serve anywhere within the Empire, to act as a reserve to our very limited force of Regular mounted troops, in case of national emergency, but the liability must be distinctly defined and laid down as a first principle, and the obligation must be paid for. It would be a fatal error to rely on the patriotism of the moment, as we have done in the case of the South African War, with the result that of the first 10,000 men raised through the home Yeomanry organisation for service in South Africa, more than two-thirds were civilians, pure and simple, with no training at all, and this in spite of the fact that the war was most popular, and the enthusiasm at the time the call to arms was made was very great. With the 1901 drafts sent from Yorkshire, the proportion was as follows: Yeomen, 67; Volunteers, 243; civilians, 648; total, 958. There is no reason to suppose we should do better another time; consequently we should have to fall back again on the raw civilian to fill up the ranks, and again undertake the very dangerous experiment of knocking men into shape in face of the enemy. The error of allowing the Yeomanry to believe that they will only be wanted to serve in these islands applies to all our auxiliary forces alike. The youth of the country should be educated up to the idea of Imperial defence, not home defence, and our aim should be to supplement the Regular infantry, the Regular artillery, and the Regular cavalry of our trained Army by a large force of Imperial Volunteers (infantry and artillery) and Imperial Yeomanry. In such a scheme the Colonies might reasonably be expected to play a great part. I understand now that some such scheme on a modified scale is being suggested in reference to the Yeomanry, and has been put before members of the House of Commons yesterday by Mr. Brodrick; that is to say, that there is to be a special service section in every home Yeomanry regiment, which would volunteer for service abroad in case of emergency.

7315. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) They volunteer to be liable for service abroad?—They volunteer for the special service section. This is the note I have got about that: This ear-marking of a fraction of each corps as a special service section is wrong, because (1) In a great national emergency all available men would be required, not merely a few. (2) This establishment of two classes of men in a regiment would work badly in practice. (3) It would cause difficulties between the Yeoman and his employer, for the responsibility of joining the special service section would rest with the man. It would be a voluntary action on his part; he would get no sympathy from his employer, and he would run the risk of losing his place by his action; whereas if the liability to serve abroad in national emergency were universal in the Yeomanry for a limited period, the employer would accept the inevitable, and the responsibility of volunteering would be taken off the man's shoulders. It seems to me to be a very great pity that Mr. Brodrick in his scheme has made no attempt to retain the services of the trained South African Imperial Yeomanry, after undergoing the best possible training in that country. The bulk of these men will be lost to the service, and the opportunity of forming a really efficient mounted Reserve for Imperial defence has been thrown away. It should have been possible to raise from them a new force of, say 10,000 Imperial Yeomen, who would be attached to the Home Yeomanry Corps, from which they sprang, and included in the increased establishment, which has been fixed at 35,000 men. These would form the first line of an Imperial Mounted Reserve, with a two or three years' liability to serve in case of national emergency anywhere within the Empire, and an inducement to enter into this liability would have to be offered in the shape of an annual bonus of, say, £12 per man. At the end of the first term the men should be encouraged to renew their obligation to be called out in the defence of the Empire for a further period of two or three years,

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but only as a Reserve to the first line, and receiving, consequently, a reduced bounty in exchange for the lessened liability. At the close of their second term they should be invited to serve for a further fixed period for home defence only, liberal recognition to be given to men who complete their three terms of service. My own view is that it is a great mistake locking up this large force of mounted men in this country, and not being able to employ them elsewhere.

7316. (*Chairman.*) It is a question whether you would get them?—That is a question of paying them, I think; assuming you gave £12 a man to 4,000 men, it works out to £48,000, and one Cavalry regiment of 400 men costs something like £59,000 a year.

7317. Yes, but you only get by your £48,000 a liability to serve for two or three years, and in a case of emergency?—That is all.

7318. Instead of a permanent cavalry regiment?—Yes.

7319. What I rather meant was: Do you think that a man for £12 (you know much better than I do) would undertake that liability of being called from his business for two or three years to serve abroad?—If you get him young—and we want them young really; that has been the fault with the Yeomanry in the past, that we have got men who were past the age really, and they have stayed on too long. We do not want men to stay too long; we would like to get them at 20, and to pass through their training in, say three, six, or eight years before really having settled down, married, and got their business.

7320. What kind of training would you give these men?—The first line?

7321. The first line?—They should have an annual training obligatory in the case of the first line, and I should not make it longer than the present training.

7322. Eighteen days?—It is eighteen days.

7323. And the second line?—As to the second line, I would rather have it as it is now—18 days, once in two years, and the third line once in three years. All the men in the second and third lines would have had their 18 days of annual training for three years, and would be supposed to be efficient. They would, of course, have to have their annual squadron drills and their annual musketry course. As regards the home training of Yeomanry regiments, I feel very strongly that it ought to be insisted upon that, say, once in three years a regiment should go to one of the big camps for training, and that they should not go every year to their county centre, whatever it may be, irrespective of whether it is suitable for training or not. In a great many cases in the country the regiments go out in county towns, which are really absolutely unsuited for training mounted troops; they simply ride up and down lanes, and have, perhaps, a small common to drill on. Once in three years it should be essential that they should go to places like Aldershot or Salisbury, or any other large camp that may be created in the future in their own Army Corps District.

7324. Those are the men you have been speaking of; how would you provide officers for a force of that kind?—As to the officers I would say the first line should be officered entirely by Yeomanry officers who have served in South Africa, or by the reserve of officers, or by officers who on retiring from the Army would be granted a gratuity or retired pay, for which they might not otherwise be eligible, on condition that they serve for a fixed period in the Imperial Yeomanry. That is allowed now; that is a new regulation which has just come into force—that is to say, Cavalry and Infantry officers who for some reason or another do not wish to go abroad again, and who have, say three, or, perhaps, two years to serve for their pension, or to enable them to retire on retired pay, are allowed now to finish their term of service in Yeomanry regiments.

7325. Is that so?—That is so now.

7326. Because several witnesses to-day have asked that it should be so?—That is a new regulation; they go for five years to a Yeomanry regiment, and they can qualify for their retired pay. (See Army Order 137, June, 1901.)

7327. As has been done in the Militia?—As has been done in the Militia.

7328. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Do you get subalterns in the way you propose here?—The subalterns would be men got from the county just as you get them now; I think you would get just as many as you get now, and probably more, because there would be a chance of their being selected for employment in the first line.

7329. But there would be no promotion, as the places would be filled up by the higher officers?—You would have to have two sets of officers; you see the third line would be the Home Yeomanry regiments, and they would be filled as they are now. Of course, in Mr. Brodrick's scheme, which I understand is to be put in force, of raising one squadron in each regiment for special service, the same difficulty as regards officers will arise, only on a smaller scale, than mine. They will have to earmark officers and second them.

7330. (*Chairman.*) If these officers are willing to take commissions in the Yeomanry because they do not want to go abroad, surely they are not quite the class that would be effective for foreign service in an emergency?—Well, they would enlist for the Home Yeomanry regiments only.

7331. But you were speaking of the first line, were you not?—I understood that Sir George Taubman-Goldie was speaking generally.

7332. I was going back to what you read?—The difficulty will be officers, and the difficulty is officers now; I mean as things are at present I do not think there is a Yeomanry regiment in the kingdom which is not short of officers, and I think it is largely because we have hitherto procured our officers from the county, and we have not gone into the towns. Now, in order to get our increased establishment of 35,000 men, the bulk of the men are bound to come from the towns, and are coming from the towns, and my contention is that we shall have to go into the towns and get our officers there as well; that is to say, to a certain extent we shall tap the Volunteers.

7333. Do you think you will get the officers if you do that?—Yes, I do not think there is any doubt.

7334. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) From professional men, and so on?—Yes.

7335. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Would you have the officers pass through the Yeomanry into the regular cavalry as is now done in the case of Infantry passing through the Militia?—That also is a new regulation, which has just been conceded.

7336. Has that regulation been published?—Yes, it is an Army Order. (See Army Orders 94 and 170, 1902.) You mean for first commissions?

7337. Yes?—Yes.

7338. That is very important; has that only just been issued?—Yes.

7339. (*Chairman.*) That is your scheme for the future?—Well, I simply wanted to record my protest against the present scheme, that is to say, the earmarking a certain number of men in each regiment, and also, I think, it is such a pity that all these, something like 28,000 Imperial Yeomanry who have been trained in South Africa, should come back to this country and be lost.

7340. Unless they were to enlist in the Yeomanry they would clearly be lost under this arrangement?—Unless we could have formed a new force composed of these very men.

7341. Separate altogether?—Entirely separate, but affiliated to the Home Yeomanry regiments, from which they were originally recruited.

7342. Do you think they would have done that?—I think we should have got the men; we have got a certain number of them who have come into the home Yeomanry regiments, but a very small percentage. I think there was a very great *esprit de corps* among all those regiments in South Africa at the time, and I think if we had struck while the iron was hot we should have got the bulk of those men to form a new force.

7343. Is there any other point you would like to mention?—There was a point mentioned, I think by Colonel Jarvis, about affiliating Yeomanry regiments with cavalry, and I think that might have answered very well if cavalry regiments were in any way connected with counties, but the territorial system does not exist in the cavalry regiments as it does in the infantry regiments, and there is absolutely no connection what-

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ever between any cavalry regiment and any county. Going back to the South African Imperial Yeomanry, and referring to the pay question, I am Chairman of an Appeal Board, called the Imperial Yeomanry Appeal Board, which has been appointed by the War Office to endeavour to settle with these Imperial Yeomanry as regards their pay when they come home. There have been great difficulties as regards the pay lists; in many cases they have been lost, and in many cases they have not been kept at all, and so forth, and the Appeal Board was appointed to try to settle with these men on equitable grounds as far as we could with the figures we had before us, but the conclusion we have come to is that it is essential that in future what is called the Soldier's Small Book should be used not only on active service, but in peace time as well; it was universal in the army until a few years ago, and it was abolished. It is a small book, in which every transaction between the soldier and the State is recorded, and it really is a Last Pay Certificate, that is to say, a man keeps this little parchment book in his pocket, and every issue of pay is recorded, so that if it is kept up to date you can see exactly when the last issue of pay was made, and that is one thing that in South Africa nobody ever knew; no man knew when he was last paid, or what he had to get.

7344. What happens if he loses his book?—It is his own fault, and he cannot complain if we cannot settle with him immediately. As it is he has great cause for grumbling, because it is not his fault; the pay lists are kept by the officers and the non-commissioned officers, and if the pay lists are not forthcoming, of course the man has cause to grumble.

7345. If a Boer took his clothes, it would not be his own fault?—No, that would be his misfortune, but it would only be one man who would suffer; in this case the Boers took the company waggon, and they took the pay lists of the whole company, and all the men suffered. In the case of a small book for each individual only the individual suffers if he loses it.

7346. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) This pay question has been a very serious question?—Yes, and it is still; it is a very great grievance that those men of the 1900 contingent are in some cases not yet settled with, although we have done our utmost to get all the information we can. We simply have to take their word in many cases, and verify it as best we can; we shall never get any evidence. As the result of our representations the 1902 contingent did go out with small books; that system was reintroduced as regards the Imperial Yeomanry by Lord Roberts' order.

7347. (*Chairman.*) Did the difficulty only arise in connection with the Yeomanry?—I have no absolute knowledge as regards the Regulars, but I believe there was great difficulty with them as well.

7348. It cannot have arisen on the same scale, or we should have heard of it?—No, because you see the Regulars were not discharged, and it did not affect them so much, but directly an Imperial Yeoman came home he was discharged, and he immediately required to be settled with. If I may say a word as to this second contingent, the 1901 contingent, I had come home by then, and I had to raise a contingent from Yorkshire, and I am confident that, as far as the men were concerned, they were on the average as good men as the first lot. The mistake made was that they were not trained at home, nor were they organised through the home Yeomanry regiments as the first contingent were. We were simply ordered to get these men, and directly we got a man we had to send him off to Aldershot, and we had no more responsibility with him. And in the same way with the officers; we had nothing to do with the raising of the officers. As you know these men were sent to Aldershot, and they were sent out to South Africa without any training whatever, and in a very short space of time they were reported as being in the casualty lists.

7349. Were any of your men sent back?—Yes, a certain number of men were sent back, and through being chairman of this Appeal Board, of course, I know that several of these undesirables who were sent back at once came to the Imperial Yeomanry Pay Office to be settled with, and we heard a good many stories of their grievances, which in many cases seemed to be real.

7350. But I was referring to the Yorkshire men who, you say, were as good a class as the first; were any of those sent back?—Yes. I have not the statistics of those.

7351. But there were some?—I only know of one authentic case, and he was sent home on medical grounds, but we really lost sight of the men; we had no further responsibility in connection with them, and we did not even know when they came home, because they never reported themselves to the Home Yeomanry Headquarters, and it was only by chance that we found out when the men had come back.

7352. But those were men you had carefully selected at the time?—Yes.

7353. And still afterwards they turned out in South Africa men whom the authorities preferred to send home?—Yes. As regards the case I have quoted, I understand the commanding officers of the Imperial Yeomanry regiments out there at the time were given a pretty free hand to draft men home, and the grievance that these men came with to me at the Imperial Yeomanry Pay Office was that across their parchment certificates of discharge were written the words "Not likely to make efficient soldier." That appeared to rankle very much with them; they said it was impossible to get a character or to get civil employment with those words written across their parchment certificates. It is a term that is well known, and is I believe used in connection with the Regulars who are dismissed the Service, and they made a great point of this, and ultimately we did get fresh parchments issued to these men.

7354. Without those words?—Without those words; there was fresh wording used. As regards the bulk of that 1901 contingent, had they had the same opportunities and the same training as the 1900 and the 1902 men, I do not think we should have heard anything about there being undesirables amongst them.

7355. You had come home permanently before that time?—Yes.

7356. And you did not see them in the field?—Not the 1901 lot, but I have seen the written testimony of their value from several column leaders.

7357. Is there any other point?—I think not.

7358. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I believe you served in the Regular cavalry?—Yes, I did.

7359. So that your evidence is given from the point of view of the Regulars as well as of the Yeomanry?—Yes; I served in South Africa at the time of the Boer War of 1881.

7360. With what regiment?—The 7th Hussars.

(*The Earl of Scarbrough handed in a Paper entitled "Secretary of State for War's Scheme with regard to the Yeomanry, vide Appendix Vol., page* 169.)

EIGHTEENTH DAY.

Tuesday, 25th November 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable The Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable The Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B. G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Hon. Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

Major-General W. H. MACKINNON, C.B., C.V.O., called and examined.

Major-General W. H. Mackinnon, C.B., C.V.O.

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7361. (*Chairman.*) You have been interested in the Volunteer Service for a long time?—Yes.

7362. And you took a prominent part in the raising of the regiment of London Volunteers in the time of the war?—Yes.

7363. We should be glad to hear from you anything you have to say with regard to the transactions that took place at that time in connection with the raising of the regiment?—With regard to what should be done on a future occasion?

7364. In the first place, as to what took place generally and any difficulty that arose?—It was rather an exceptional case, the raising of the City Imperial Volunteers, and it was done at a time of great emergency. The regiment was conceived in the brains of certain City people, the Lord Mayor, and Colonel Boxall, the sanction to raise the regiment was given by the Commander-in-Chief verbally, and he subsequently wrote a semi-official letter confirming that, and, generally speaking, the regiment was not formed by any of the ordinary official channels of the War Office, but it was done in a private interview between the Lord Mayor and the Commander-in-Chief. With a regiment raised like that it is rather difficult to give very much opinion about how it would work on another occasion. We had every possible assistance afforded us, there was no lack of money, we had General Turner, from the War Office, who is a great authority on the Volunteers, especially the Home District Volunteers, and we were allowed pretty well *carte blanche* in the way of money for clothing and equipment. We had the whole machinery of the Mansion House at our back, and there is really very little criticism that I have to pass on the actual raising of the regiment. It was not done, strictly speaking, in a military way, but was done entirely by civilians, and, speaking as a military man, I have very little criticism to make on the actual raising of the regiment.

7365. You mean that it was done effectively?—It was done very effectively, but there was no lack of money and no lack of the best business heads in London to do it for us, and it was almost impossible that there should be much of a hitch.

7366. You say it was begun without any official sanction?—No, it is on the records of the regiment that the sanction to the regiment being raised was given by the Commander-in-Chief in a semi-official letter to the Lord Mayor; it did not go through the ordinary channels of the War Office. The Lord Mayor drove down to the War Office and saw the Commander-in-Chief, who gave verbal sanction to the regiment being raised.

7367. What was the date of that?—The conversation referred to was on Friday, the 15th December, 1899; that was the first interview between the Lord Mayor and the Commander-in-Chief, and on the 16th December unofficial intimation was conveyed to the Lord Mayor that his offer would be accepted. On that the Lord Mayor went ahead and took his own steps for raising the regiment.

7368. I suppose there was official correspondence afterwards?—Well, very little indeed; there was a letter from the Commander-in-Chief signed by himself, but simply a semi-official letter, beginning: "My dear Lord Mayor,—It gives Lord Lansdowne great satisfaction to hear that the City of London proposes to send out a large contingent of Volunteers."

7369. The conditions of service must have been laid down?—That came out in an Army Order subsequently.

7370. What was the date of that?—6th January, 1900, nearly three weeks later.

7371. Before the regiment sailed?—Very little before the regiment sailed; in fact, we were working rather in the dark at the Mansion House the whole time. We simply got telegrams and letters giving us certain directions as what the enlistments were to be, for how long, and what the terms of service were, and these telegrams and letters were subsequently embodied in this Army Order which came out on the 6th January, 1900.

7372. You practically raised the regiment on unofficial correspondence confirmed by that Army Order afterwards?—Yes.

7373. What were the steps taken by the Lord Mayor to raise the regiment?—The Lord Mayor summoned all the Volunteer Commanding Officers of the Home District and told them he considered there was an emergency, and that an offer of Volunteers would be acceptable to the War Office, and he asked them if they could furnish so many men, which was at first laid down at 40 for each regiment, but as some of the conditions were rather stiff, we took less than 40 from some regiments and more than 40 from others.

7374. But as far as possible you got representatives of each regiment?—As far as possible we got representatives from each regiment.

7375. Had you any difficulty in getting the men?—No, none at all; we got them easily.

7376. Were there more men than you required ready to go?—Yes, there were more men than we wanted, I should think about 25 per cent. more than we actually wanted. We could have taken 25 per cent. more than we actually did take. There was one condition which made it rather hard, namely, that married men were not accepted, and, of course, a great many of the London Volunteers are married.

7377. And you were satisfied with the class of men?—Thoroughly. I think the medical examination was not strict enough in some cases; as time was a great object the War Office allowed the Volunteer medical officers to examine the men, and I know that in a great many cases they not only had not the practice of examining recruits for the Army, but they were also rather inclined to let men whom they thought good men pass. I am sure they did it with the best intentions, but we had a great many cases of bad teeth, and a good many cases of flat feet, which was quite inexcusable, and other cases which showed they were not so particular as they should have been, and I think at another time it would be very advisable to have Regular medical officers.

7378. When were those defects discovered?—Not until we got out, some on board ship and some afterwards.

7379. And you had to send the men home?—The bad cases did not last so very long, but that would

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not affect a very large proportion; I cannot say exactly, but from 5 to 10 per cent. would not have been passed by Regular Army doctors. There was great pressure on the Regular Army doctors in England at that time, and it would have been quite impossible for them, at any rate those in London, to examine the men we took out, in the time.

7380. You are referring to London military medical officers?—Yes.

7381. You think the examination ought to be done by military officers?—Yes, I do, because it was very slackly done in certain cases; some of the Volunteer medical officers are, I believe, honorary, and know little about the requirements of a soldier at all.

7382. As to equipment, had you any difficulty?—Practically none; the equipment was very good indeed, with possibly the exception of the haversacks, which were bad. It was rather a fad of ours in the City to try waterproof haversacks, and we went in for the waterproofing of the material at the expense of the durability; that is to say, they kept out the water, but very soon wore out. They were very bad haversacks. Generally speaking, the equipment was quite equal to the sealed pattern of the Army.

7383. You had to provide the whole of the equipment?—Yes, excepting that we could not get waistbelts for the men, and the Queen's Westminsters lent us 1,300 or 1,400 waistbelts, and we told the contractors to give the new ones to them when they came in from the manufacturers, which was not until after we sailed. The whole of the clothing was provided by the City, and was altogether equal to the sealed pattern of the Army; in fact, I think the serge was better. The boots were far and away better than the Army boot; there is no comparison whatever. They cost, I believe, about 15s. a pair, and they came from Nottingham; every man was given two pairs of thoroughly good boots, the best possible boot, in fact, and it made a very great difference to the comfort and efficiency of the regiment. After we had been out several months in the country, I should think at the least six months, we got a new supply of our private boots, and we threw away our old worn-out boots, and the officer commanding the regiment alongside us in our brigade came and begged me to give his men the worn-out boots instead of the Army ones they were wearing, because they were such a different pattern, and in every way entirely different—there was no comparison. I think at another time in raising the Volunteers it is most important that they should have some sort of comfortable boot, and not the ordinary Army boot.

7384. I suppose it would be important that the Army soldier should have a comfortable boot?—Yes.

7385. (*Viscount Esher.*)—What is the difference in price?—I believe the Army boot now is about 9s., and our boots were about 15s., but our boots were superlatively good, and they were quite as good as any I should use myself for shooting or anything else. The Army boot is made on a different pattern, and the sides are stiff; it is made, I believe, by machinery. It was very fortunate indeed that the City Imperial Volunteers had this boot—I cannot speak highly enough of it; it was an absolute blessing for us, as we could see the men in other regiments suffering far worse with their feet than ours were.

7386. (*Chairman.*) And, of course, none of this equipment was in store; you had to get it all at the time?—It was not in Army stores, and it was entirely bought from private contractors.

7387. It was not in reserve in any way?—No, not in any Army reserve.

7388. You got them from the trade at the time?—Yes.

7389. And you had no difficulty in getting them in the time, with the exception of the belts?—We had no difficulty in getting any of the equipment; some of the khaki serge was very slow in coming, but there was great demand for it in Pimlico, and I suppose they went to the same contractors as we did. There was no difficulty in getting anything except the belts. The boots came easily enough.

7390. You left England at what time?—On the 13th January, the 20th January, and about the 31st January.

7391. What was your full strength?—As nearly as possible 1,550, subsequently increased by a draft of 150 six months later, which made it 1,700.

7392. Was that all infantry?—No, it was divided into a battery of artillery of six guns, two companies complete of mounted infantry, and an infantry battalion.

7393. Is there anything else you would like to say with regard to that period before you left England?—No, I do not think so. It was a very exceptional case. We were given every possible assistance by the City, and we had some wonderfully good trained accountants to help us; in fact, it was done under far better circumstances than any regiment of the Army could possibly be raised under by any ordinary machinery we have in the Army.

7394. As to the experience of the regiment in South Africa, is there anything you would like to say with regard to that?—Well, I have nothing but praise to say for the men; they all went out with a set purpose, and they were determined to see the thing out at whatever cost it might be. I have nothing but praise to give to the officers and to the rank and file. Some of our officers were weak in the way of efficiency.

7395. Do you mean physically?—They were not so efficient as they might have been, and also some of them were physically weak, and that was due, I think, to the great pressure of getting officers as quickly as possible. Three of us had to select these officers in about four days, and it was a very difficult thing out of the many officers we had to see to tell at once who would be the best. With about seven or eight exceptions I think we did get as good officers as we could get in London.

7396. Were they all volunteer officers?—Nearly all.

7397. You did not take any Regular Army officers?—I took about six, one orderly officer, two quartermasters, two adjutants, and a transport officer.

7398. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Your other officers were all volunteers?—Yes, they had all been in the Volunteers for many years.

7399-400. (*Chairman.*) The regiment took part in the ordinary work of the campaign?—The regiment took part in the ordinary work of the campaign. The mounted infantry were sent up country within a very few days of arrival at Cape Town, and, of course, it was a very great thing for them going up-country; but they were certainly not fit to go, they had not got their saddles fitted, and they had hardly got all their horses and equipment. They were sent up-country almost immediately they landed, before the great part of their equipment arrived, and they took part in an action directly they arrived at Jacobsdaal, and after that they were scattered all over the country, and had very little chance of pulling themselves together.

7401. Did you provide the horses?—Yes, in the City. We telegraphed to a gentleman at Cape Town called Mr. Abe Bailey, and asked him to provide 400 horses. He got us our 400 horses, and I think he did the very best he could for us; most of them were Basutoland ponies.

7402. Did you provide the remounts afterwards?—We did for a short time, and after that we got the Government remounts.

7403. (*Sir John Edge.*) What was the average price of the horses?—£23 at Cape Town. We first of all telegraphed to Buenos Ayres, and tried to get them from there, but we could not get them for the price, and we could hardly have got them in the time, so that we had to rely upon Cape Town to get them for us.

7404. (*Chairman.*) Did the regiment follow?—The infantry battalion arrived at Cape Town, and had about a week there, and then they went up country, but they did not go so far as the mounted portion; they only went to Orange River, and fortunately for them they were kept at Orange River six weeks. We worked very hard at Orange River teaching the men outposts marching, and so on, and they were also getting acclimatised to the country, and by the time they went up to join Lord Roberts for the forward move the infantry battalion were pretty hard and pretty fit. The artillery came out about two days after the infantry left Cape Town, and they stayed at Maitland camp two or three weeks, and then went up for six weeks to a place called Victoria Road, and they were also very fit when they took part in the forward move later on. Of course, with volunteers going out like that it is rather hard on them to send them straight up to the front, and a little bit wasteful in the way of the men as far as their health goes. A good many men in the mounted infantry fell sick at first.

7405. The regiment took part in the movement from Bloemfontein to Pretoria?—Yes.

7406. When did they return?—We returned from

Pretoria to Cape Town on the 4th October, 1900, I think it was, and arrived in England about the 29th October.

7407. Did you provide any transport for the regiment?—Yes, we did; I had *carte-blanche* from the Mansion House to do what was wanted in the way of getting transport, horses, and so on, but we found the Army authorities very obliging to us in that way, and we gradually dropped off all our transport except that we had an ambulance belonging to the regiment, which we horsed ourselves, and which we kept going the whole way, which was invaluable to us, and also to other regiments in the brigade. That was a private ambulance, and that was the only private transport that kept with us at all for the whole time. That came back with us all the way to Cape Town, and we left it there

7408. Otherwise you relied on the ordinary military transport?—Yes. The condition of service, or the condition of raising the regiment, was that we were to provide everything up to the time we landed at Cape Town, and after we landed at Cape Town the War Office were supposed to take us over; but as there was money left at the Mansion House the Lord Mayor said he would do what he could to help the Government after that, and we had all our own blankets with us the whole campaign, and a great many other articles of equipment, which we took out with us—camp kettles, and various other things. I should think at least £4,000 or £5,000 worth was landed at Cape Town with us, and when we left South Africa at the end of the time I gave those over to the War Office authorities in Cape Town as a present from the Mansion House, so that really, although the War Office took us over from the time we arrived at Cape Town we were, comparatively, not very much expense to them.

7409. The distinction between your case and that of the other volunteers was that you were raised as a complete regiment in contradiction to the Service Companies, which were raised elsewhere?—Yes.

7410. Have you any opinion with regard to those two alternative methods of raising men?—I think as regards the London Volunteers, the Home District Volunteers, I do not approve of service companies, I do not think the men approve of them, and I do not think, as a rule, the commanding officers of London Volunteers approve of service companies. I have spoken to many of them since I came back, and they have certainly told me they did not. There is not very much connection between the London Volunteers and the territorial regiments. The territorial regiments of the London Volunteers are chiefly the Middlesex Regiment and the Royal Fusiliers, and a great many of the London Volunteers are attached to the Guards for discipline and correspondence, but are put down in the Army List as belonging to the Rifle Brigade and the 60th Rifles, with whom they have no touch whatever, or very little; and even in the case of the Middlesex Regiment, there is a Volunteer battalion of the Middlesex Regiment, which has its headquarters at Hornsey, and the depôt of the Middlesex Regiment is at Hounslow. They are many miles apart, and, of course, Hounslow is not the county town of Middlesex in the same way that other counties would have a county town, say Derbyshire, for instance. In Derbyshire the Derby Regiment at Derby would have a great deal of connection with its own Militia and Volunteers, but in Middlesex, being such a large place, and London being so paramount, there is very little connection between, say, Hornsey for the Volunteer battalion of the Middlesex Regiment and Hounslow, the headquarters. Generally speaking, in London I do not think we work very much on the territorial system at all, either the Middlesex or Royal Fusiliers, or whatever it may be. The 6th Royal Fusiliers Militia are at Finsbury, and the Royal Fusiliers' headquarters are at Hounslow, 12 or 13 miles apart; it is not the county town; there is not much attraction to take the men there, and they do not see very much, or know very much of each other.

7411-12. Do you make a point of the position of headquarters?—I do, because I think Volunteers in Kent, my own county, go into the county town a good deal marketing, etc., and they come across the Staff of the Headquarters of their own county regiment, and it causes a good feeling between them. The Staff at the depôt are very glad to see the Volunteers when they come in, but I do not think it is carried on very much in London, and I do not think there is much connection really between the territorial regiments and the London Volunteers. Really the London Volunteers look to the Guards more than anything else. They rule them to a great extent, and they do the whole of their correspondence. A letter that a Volunteer Colonel in London writes goes through the Guards Battalion, even although they are frequently put down in the Army List as belonging to Winchester. What I say with regard to the men is this, and I found it in my experience in South Africa, that my men, although they were very proud of the Regular Army indeed, and got on extremely well with them, always wanted it to be remembered that they were Volunteers and not Regulars. It was a very important point that they were continually making, and I think that they rather have a feeling that when they go out, although they are perfectly willing to be enlisted as Regular troops, and to go out on the same footing as Regular troops, with the same articles of war, they would like to keep together in a large body of Volunteers.

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7413. Is that because they are recruited from a different class?—Partly, and also their conditions are different; their life is different, and their jokes and chaff are all different. When they lived in camp I am sure my men would rather have had a unit complete by themselves than having a hundred of them attached to one regiment and a hundred attached to another. Another thing I think is that the Volunteer Service Companies, on being sent out to South Africa, were sometimes sent up to the front at once; it was unavoidable; or, perhaps, they were wanted for some reason or other; and it is an awful hardship for a hundred Volunteers, perhaps straight from their desks in some city, to be sent right up to the front 1,000 miles away from where they land at Cape Town, and then be suddenly thrust into a very smart line battalion, and perhaps have to march with them. It is a tremendous hardship for them, and it is really hardly a fair thing for them, and although a good many of the Volunteers had stopped a time and got acclimatised, still it is a great trial for a company of them to be suddenly thrust into a line regiment.

7414. And too severe a test for them?—Yes.

7415. Were there any service companies in London?—Yes, there were.

7416. In addition to the City Imperial Volunteers?—Yes, but they went out subsequently. I am sure their commanding officers would say they were very good men. I am not finding any fault with the men, but I think the general inclination of London Volunteers is to go out as a body of Volunteers complete, a unit of Volunteers under selected officers, whoever they may be, and to remain as Volunteers for the whole campaign, even although they are enlisted as Regular soldiers and on exactly the same footing.

7417. That observation applies principally, at any rate, to London?—Yes, it is what came under my observation out there.

7418. You would not say the same of the country Volunteers?—I cannot say. I know whenever we passed the Volunteer Service Companies our men were always very thankful that they had come out with their regiment instead of going with a Volunteer Service Company.

7419. Of course, it would be more difficult to enlist a complete regiment?—Yes, certainly; and, of course, the territorial system is that the Line, Militia and Volunteers should work together, and I am bound to say that in theory I think most people would say that the Volunteers should go out by hundreds, each to join their own territorial regiment. I am only saying what came under my own observation, and what many of my men were very particular about.

7420. Would the difficulties arising out of differences of class be as patent in the country Volunteers as in London?—No, I always thought it might be that, but I do not think it was at all, because it is wonderful how the men cotton together, and you would find a man with perhaps £250 a year as a confidential clerk cottoning with a costermonger from the East End for the whole campaign, and being the greatest friend of his, and as happy as they could be together. I do not think, therefore, the class had anything whatever to do with it; I thought it would have, and I was very much surprised to see how little it had.

7421. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Then where does the difficulty come in that you mentioned?—That they are under different conditions; when I spoke just now of the costermonger and the clerk, they were both Volunteers, not a Volunteer and a Regular.

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7422. You spoke of their jokes being different, and so on?—Yes, I meant the Volunteer and the Regular.

7423. (*Chairman.*) As to the future, that is the first point you take in your *précis*; the next is with regard to the machinery for summoning the Volunteers?—I think in the case of the City Imperial Volunteers, and also in the case of the Yeomanry, which I commanded for three months at Aldershot, the raising of both those forces was done in a very great hurry, and I think it is very advisable to lay down some rules for future guidance in case we have to raise Volunteers or Yeomanry again in a great hurry. Both in the case of the City Imperial Volunteers and in the case of the Yeomanry the officers were not the first people appointed. The great idea was, and I am sure there was some very good reason for it—possibly political or something else—to give out to the country that we were raising a large force, and the terms of service were published in newspapers and telegraphed all over the country, and immediately that went out the men began to pour in long before we were ready for them; in fact, we were not at all ready for them. The moment it got out in the newspapers the Mansion House was inundated with people from all parts of the world who wanted to come into the service, and it was the same at Aldershot. So far as I know, there is no machinery at present, there is no system at present, devised for our guidance in the future, and we might have at any time, of course, to raise another regiment of either Volunteers or Yeomanry in a hurry, and I do not know of any system which has been devised to meet it. It is very advisable that the officers and the Staff should be appointed before the men. If it was bad in our case it was worse in the case of the Yeomanry. I remember that after shipping out 13,000 or 14,000 Yeomen to South Africa, we discovered that we had 70 officers still left who had not even joined at Aldershot, although we had shipped off the whole of the men. Those 70 officers had to go out in one or two steamers by themselves, after the whole of the Yeomanry had been despatched, which, of course, is not only very objectionable for discipline, but it is very wasteful, because in the case of these men, especially the Yeomen at 5s. a day, you had to give them leave to go to London and enjoy themselves, getting their full pay and doing absolutely nothing. It was very noticeable at Aldershot with the Yeomanry, and it was pretty bad at the Mansion House, although, of course, the whole raising of the City Imperial Volunteers was only the matter of a very few weeks, and that did not matter so much. Even then we had no sergeants to organise our men into companies, and to tell them their orders and march them about; the men were there without sergeants, and without officers, probably, too.

7424. I understand you think that in the Regulations for the Volunteer forces in the future there ought to be a provision in preparation for a war for the appointment of this Staff for a regiment?—Yes, I hardly go so far as to say there ought to be a black and white regulation, because, I suppose, different cases are altered by circumstances, and you might get, perhaps, some Lord Mayor of London who could not raise a regiment of men, or would not care to, or something like that; but I think there ought to be some scheme in the War Office distinctly laying down what procedure should be followed in case of a sudden raising of London Volunteers or a sudden raising of Yeomanry, because there was absolutely no method about our raising of the City Imperial Volunteers excepting the method, which was very great, of the Lord Mayor and the City. The Lord Mayor is not, of course, a military man, and knows nothing of the Army, but in this instance he happened to be a particularly capable and energetic man.

7425. I suppose the idea of the Volunteer Force at the War Office, before the war, was that it was not to go upon active service?—Yes, it was.

7426. What you want is that there should be some scheme, at any rate, in the War Office, providing for the active service of Volunteers if an emergency occurs?—No, I am sorry that I do not make myself clear. What I mean is this: Supposing that within a few months we had again to raise suddenly a force of Volunteers or a force of Yeomanry. I should like a general outline of the scheme under which that would be laid down.

7427. That is what I meant?—Only a general outline. I do not know, in future, for instance, whether the War Office would ask the Lord Mayor to do it or not, and I do not know whether they might not possibly go to the Lord-Lieutenant of the county, or somebody else; but, of course, everything then was done in a very great hurry; it was not done on any rule, or any particular principle, and it was practically done entirely by General Turner and the civilian element at the Mansion House, and I think it will be a great thing if some scheme could be laid down for future guidance.

7428. I do not think there is any real difference between your answer and my question?—I do not want to alter the status of the Volunteer; he would, anyhow, have to be enlisted as a regular soldier, because the Volunteers are not liable for service abroad.

7429. All I meant was that you wanted the acceptance of the principle that the Volunteers might be called upon, and that there should be some preparation in the War Office for that principle being put into action. Is not that what you mean?—Yes; and I also wanted some preparation of the machinery which would be put into motion to bring the Volunteers out.

7430. That is what I understood; but you want that machinery to be civil, do you not?—I should suggest so as far as possible, certainly in the case of large towns. I think our Volunteers were far more pleased, in fact I know they were, at being called up by the Lord Mayor than they would have been to be called up by the General Commanding the District. Although General Trotter is their great friend, and they are very fond of him, still it was rather a dislike of War Office procedure altogether, and I am sure they very much prefer being called up by civil machinery.

7431. We have had some evidence from the Yeomanry side that it would be of great advantage that there should be a nucleus of officers of the Regular Army in any future organisation of the Yeomanry available; does that apply to the Volunteers?—Yes, I think quite as much to the Volunteers. I think it most important, certainly when a large body of Volunteers goes out, that a Regular officer should be in command of them, and that his staff, to a great extent, should be Regular officers.

7432. How would you propose that that should be provided for?—I do not think that could be. There is always a list of names at the War Office of officers who are recommended for particular duties, and I think that, as in the case of the City Imperial Volunteers, we should always get an efficient staff.

7433. I am only trying to bring the two things together. You say that the machinery for summoning the Volunteers should be as much as possible civil and not from the War Office, but the appointment of the Regular officers would depend on the War Office?—Yes, that was the case before; the War Office appointed the officers, and notified their names to the Lord Mayor.

7434. That is what you think would be desirable?—I think that is sensible—that certainly the staff of any large body of Volunteers should be nominated by the War Office.

7435. And nominated in good time, before the men begin to come in?—Yes, they should be nominated before the conditions of service for the men are promulgated at all.

7436. With regard to equipment in the future, would you leave that in the hands of the civil authorities, or would you have any claim on the War Office?—I am sure we got our equipment much more quickly through its being ordered by the City than we should have got it from Pimlico or Woolwich, because Pimlico and Woolwich were very much pressed just then for drafts going out, and our City people were sent all over the country to the manufacturing towns, and picked it up much more quickly.

7437. There, no doubt, the City of London would have an advantage over a country district?—Yes, they would.

7438. As to married men; you mentioned in the early part of your evidence that you did not take married men?—We did not take married men, but I would just as soon have married men as not, only it is an expense to the country, not only the separation allowances, but also the widows' pensions; otherwise there is no objection whatever to the married men.

7439. Do you suggest that in future that rule should be altered?—Yes, so far as my own personal feeling is concerned; but, of course, the expense to the country would be much greater.

7440. In your *précis* you speak of the rules for allot-

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ments by married men; what does that refer to?—The allotment is the pay which the married soldier on enlistment decides to hand over to his wife; if a man gets one shilling a day, I think he may give up to 8d. a day to his wife, and that money is deducted from his pay in England and paid regularly by the Paymaster in London to his wife, and the man goes abroad on the balance of 4d. a day.

7441. Have the men a choice?—Yes, but that was rather badly arranged, both in the case of the Yeomanry and the City Imperial Volunteers, as it was done in a hurry. It was not clearly explained to the men what proportion of their pay they might give to their wives while they were abroad, and the result was that we had correspondence for months and months from South Africa about men, some of whom objected to pay so much as was stopped for their wives, and some of whom said they had offered to pay more. It was not at all clearly settled by the men before they embarked. I think those allotments should be settled by the officer who actually enlists the men for the Army, and that a man should there and then decide what he wishes allotted to his wife. There was very great confusion at Aldershot for months and months, and I believe it is going on now, for the men went off in a very great hurry and the pay was stopped, and they disputed the amounts which were stopped. As a natural result very often the poor woman suffered because a man went abroad in some cases without any allotment, and months afterwards, when we wrote and asked him why he had not made an allotment, he said he had, but there was no record of it.

7442. I thought you said at the beginning that you did not take married men?—We were ordered not to take them where practicable, but in the case of the staff there were married men. The sergeant-majors were married men, and I am sorry to say a great many of the men were married between the date of enlistment and the date of sailing, contrary to orders, and when we arrived in South Africa I found we had 5 per cent. at least of married men.

7443. Is there any other point you would like to mention?—There is a point which refers to the whole Army which I should like to mention, and that is that I think it very advisable that the general body of the rank and file should be taught cooking. That applies to the Regular Army as well as to the Volunteers. We had the greatest difficulty in teaching our men to bake bread or to cook their meat unless they had the best possible conditions for doing it, and the men's health suffered tremendously, and we certainly lost a good many men through sickness owing to their not having even an elementary idea of cooking. I believe there is an order that Volunteers may go to the school of cookery if they like, but I think it is most important that cooking should be one of the things that every single man in the ranks is taught, whether he is a Regular or a Volunteer.

7444. I suppose where practicable it is done regimentally or by companies?—Well, it is not done at all; I do not think a man cares a bit about cooking unless he has got to do it.

7445. But there is a provision for cooks?—Yes, but there are only a certain number of cooks per regiment, only about 2 per cent. They cook very well, but the remaining 950 men, or whatever it may be, cannot cook at all, so that when the cooks get sick or detachments go off by themselves there is no man to cook. It was not only the ordinary cooking of beef and mutton, but there was a great deal of the horrible flour of the country that we got, and the men could not cook it; they did not know how to do it; even if you gave them grease and the flour and a camp kettle they did not know what to do, so that it was a case of many men going to the hospital for the want of the elementary knowledge of how to bake a little bread. Of course, that applies especially to Volunteers, because even their best cooks are not very good.

7446. Does not the same thing happen in the Army if their cooks get ill?—Yes, but I think an Army man is perhaps rather more handy than the Volunteer; when the Volunteer gets into the field he does not know very much at first, and it is very difficult to make him do it. There is another thing I should like to mention, and that is the artificers of the mounted branch; not only were we very hard up for artificers, but we could not raise them anywhere in London, and the result was that the mounted infantry and the battery went out with a very small proportion of artificers, and some of these men got sick, collar-makers and so on, and it was very difficult indeed, in fact impossible, to replace them. A great many mounted men were rendered useless by their saddles not being fit to use. If it could be possible to arrange that we should have some call on artificers, such as by registering them and paying them, as they pay for horses in England, so much a year, and then to have a call on their services in case of war, it would be a very great thing; but there was the greatest difficulty in getting shoeing smiths and all artificers, in fact. And so it was in the Regular Army, because even the War Office could not raise them. If there could be any system of registration by which young village blacksmiths would register their names for service abroad, and then when their services were required go with the regiments that required them, it would be a very great advantage.

7447. And the Volunteers should participate in that?—Yes, they should participate in that.

7448. (*Viscount Esher.*) What sort of artificers? Are you thinking principally of smiths?—Yes, and collar-makers.

7449. It is not a very difficult thing to shoe a horse?—Oh, yes, it is.

7450. Has it not struck you as rather strange that cavalry officers and cavalry soldiers are not taught to shoe horses?—Yes.

7451. Would not that be a simpler solution of the problem than to call upon smiths—at any rate, for the Regular Army?—Yes; but I know a great part of England was scoured for men to go abroad.

7452. At present there is no attempt either to train the cavalry officer or the cavalry soldier in shoeing horses?—I believe not.

7453. That is not so in all the armies of the Continent, so far as you know?—No; I believe it is more looked after there.

7454. In Germany cavalry officers, at any rate, are taught to shoe horses?—Yes.

7455. When was your appointment made—after the public notification by the Lord Mayor as to the City Imperial Volunteers?—My appointment was made on the 20th December, five days after the Lord Mayor went to the War Office, and the notice to the Commanding Officers went out on the 20th, the same day as I was appointed.

7456. What staff had you appointed at once?—None at all; my staff came dribbling in up to the day we sailed. My paymaster arrived just before we sailed; one of the medical officers arrived so late that he was left behind, and they came very late. One of the quartermasters did not arrive until after we got the men fitted with all their clothing and equipment.

7457. I understand your point is that, should it ever become necessary to raise another regiment on the lines of the City Imperial Volunteers, the first step should be to appoint a staff?—To appoint a staff, and also the staff of each company, such as the pay sergeant.

7458. That ought to be done before any call is made for the men?—Yes.

7459. And your second point is that the general plan of such procedure should be laid down beforehand in the War Office, so that it would be quite ready to promulgate in the event of such a thing occurring again?—Yes.

7460. With regard to officers, there was some difficulty, I suppose, in finding officers for the City Imperial Volunteers?—There was some difficulty in selecting them; there were plenty of candidates, of course.

7461. What kind of candidates?—Do you mean their professions in life?

7462. Yes?—They were mostly clerks, and in business houses in London.

7463. Had they had any experience at all?—They were all experienced Volunteer officers, had been to many camps, and to manœuvres, and had got certificates of qualification in various subjects, such as tactics, and various others.

7464. I suppose there was some difficulty in finding your staff?—The regular staff?

7465. Yes?—None at all.

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7466. We were rather short of officers at that time?—But there was no difficulty in finding the regular staff.

7467. That means they were taken away from other duties?—Yes.

7468. There was no difficulty in that sense; what you meant was that there was no difficulty in finding Regular officers who were anxious and pleased to serve with you?—Yes.

7469. But the Regular Army had to be drawn upon for that purpose?—Yes, it had; but two of my permanent staff were retired officers; the two quartermasters were serving, and the two adjutants were serving, but I think there was no inconvenience to the public service.

7470. That is to say, out of six, four were drawn from the Active List?—Yes; but one was a riding-master who would not have gone abroad, because riding-masters do not go abroad; one was a quartermaster of garrison artillery, who would not go abroad, nor would his regiment. Another was an officer of a Guards battalion which did not go abroad; that made three, and the fourth was a staff officer, so that out of my six officers I do not think that the public service was inconvenienced, except in the case of one.

7471. How did the Volunteer officers behave on the whole? Did they show fair competence?—They showed the greatest possible zeal and the greatest possible keenness to learn their work; but, of course, they were ignorant of many of the duties of camp life.

7472. On the whole, did they do well?—They did very well; but I think that it would always be advisable to let them remain on the lines of communication for a certain time before going to the front.

7473. When the regiment was in course of being raised, did you get assistance from the War Department?—We drew our arms and ammunition from the War Office, of course, as we could not well get them from anywhere else; but in every other respect the regiment raised itself in the City.

7474. Did you get much sympathy from the War Department?—Yes; we had General Turner attached to the Mansion House for the six weeks, and Major Fremantle, who was the Commander-in-Chief's Volunteer Aide-de-Camp, was also lent to us, but he remained at the War Office, and was our channel of communication.

7475. Anyhow, you got plenty of encouragement?—We got every possible help.

7476. You said something about boots in the earlier part of your evidence. They were all hand-sewn boots, I suppose, that you got?—Yes, I believe they were.

7477. Not made by machinery?—No; they were hand-sewn.

7478. Your attention was not drawn to any boots that came from India, was it?—No, I have never seen them.

7479. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You said all the equipment was raised by yourselves except the arms and ammunition; but where did the guns come from?—They were raised by ourselves.

7480. Purchased?—Yes.

7481. What sort of guns were they?—Twelve and a half-pounder, Vickers and Maxim quick-firing.

7482. And you got the ammunition also from there?—We were bound to, because it was the only ammunition of its kind in South Africa.

7483. And the reserve ammunition for the artillery out in South Africa was unsuitable for your guns?—Yes, we took it all with us.

7484. Including your reserve?—Yes.

7485. Can you tell us how much you took?—I cannot tell you offhand.

7486. Were there no men admitted to the regiment who were not Volunteers?—Yes, there were; we took civilian workmen of Vickers and Maxim's to help in working the guns, and also to help in repairing them. I do not think that otherwise there was a single civilian taken.

7487. Except those men, all of them had had some previous experience of drill?—Except those men, all had had previous experience of drill. There may have been isolated cases; every man was enlisted as a Regular soldier, and I cannot tell you offhand if every single man had previously served in the Volunteers or not, but to the best of my belief he had.

7488. That was the footing on which you were authorised to raise the regiment?—Yes; it was supposed to be a Volunteer regiment specially enlisted as Regular soldiers.

7489. For what period were you enlisted?—For 12 months, or for the duration of the war; if the war was over in less than 12 months, the men had the option of taking their discharge, but if the war lasted longer than 12 months the War Office had the right to keep them.

7490. Could you practically have kept them?—Oh, yes.

7491. But I suppose you would have allowed a man to leave if he wanted at the end of the 12 months?—Oh, no, so long as the war was not over.

7492. Why was it that the corps was brought home long before the war was over?—That I cannot tell you; that was Lord Roberts's order.

7493. You still think they could have been kept?—Undoubtedly they could have been kept longer.

7494. Would there have been discontent?—I do not think so; I think the majority of the men are very sorry now that they came home when they did. Of course many of them were in very good situations at home, and, although there was absolutely no grumbling, they were all very pleased when they got the order for home.

7495. You really do not think there would have been very much dissatisfaction if they had been kept to the end of the war—those men who were forfeiting their pay at all events, if not their situation?—There would have been none, supposing things to turn out as they did, but when we got the order to come home, the idea was prevalent that the war was over. The Guards' battalions were coming home, and the day we got the order the idea was prevalent all through Pretoria that the war was over.

7496. You took no horses from England; they were all purchased at the Cape?—We took none, with the exception of the battery.

7497 Where did you get those horses?—They were mostly omnibus horses.

7498 Did you get them under any of those terms which exist as regards registration?—No, we got them privately.

7499. Did they cost much?—I cannot tell you; my impression is that they cost £54, but I should not like to say that.

7500. Could the mounted men all ride well? Were they all experienced riders?—Very few of them.

7501. And they had to be knocked into shape out there?—Yes, they had really to knock themselves into shape, because the mounted portion went up country so soon that there was no time for drill or for riding.

7502. And some of them you think could not ride before?—Some of them could not ride at all—very bad indeed.

7503. You have expressed rather an unfavourable opinion as to the system in which service companies of Volunteers were sent out to be attached to regular battalions, and, of course, your City Imperial Volunteers had immense advantages in being formed into a body, and having liberal funds supplied, and so on; but do you think it would be possible or useful to send ordinary battalions of Volunteers, even if they wanted to go?—I do not think it would from country districts, but my remarks only applied to London. I think my remarks would be applicable also to the bigger towns like Manchester and Glasgow; I know that in Glasgow they are very applicable.

7504. Do you think such a regiment as the London Rifle Brigade or the Queen's Westminsters could be expected to go out?—Oh, no; but I meant a composite battalion from the Metropolis as we had; it would be quite impossible to send any Volunteer regiment complete.

7505. Would it be easy to send a composite battalion? You had large funds at your disposal, and you were able to make yourselves independent of the War Department at a time of great pressure, but do you think that could be done to any great extent in London?—Our men only had the ordinary soldier's pay.

7506. But there was a great deal given for equipment, and you were able to purchase things in the market without going to the War Office: suppose it was desired to form three or four composite battalions from the

London Volunteers, or two even, do you think you could form them without very great pecuniary assistance from the public?—I am sure you could raise them if you could get the money, and of course, if the War Office themselves raised them the War Office would equip them and clothe them.

7507. Do you think they would come forward?—I am sure they would; I am sure you could get two battalions from London.

7508. And do you think you could get battalions from the large towns?—I know you could get a battalion from Glasgow, because I made it my business to make inquiries there.

7509. You said it would not do for country battalions?—I do not think so, because they would have very little association with each other, they are so scattered.

7510. Supposing a much larger force than your battalion of Volunteers was desired to be sent abroad, do you think you could get efficient officers even for the positions of commanding officers and staff?—They would be from the Regular Army on my principle, and I am quite sure you could get them.

7511. But we have it in evidence already that the regiments are under-officered as it is for purposes of war; nearly every battalion was employed in this war, and, therefore, where could you get the officers, as they had not enough for their own purposes? There is a Reserve of officers, but it is not probably the exact sort of Reserve you would require: where would you get the subalterns or young officers?—I am quite sure that if we had taken out two battalions instead of one at that time when there was great pressure, we could easily have got the permanent officers as staff for the two battalions.

7512. Without injuring the efficiency of Regular regiments?—Yes, without injury to the efficiency of the Regular regiments; only one of my officers was really missed at all.

7513. Your regiment was one; but if a large force of Volunteers was to go?—I am sure we could have raised two regiments at that time, and officered them so far as the staff was concerned by Regular officers who would not have been missed.

7514. Under the other system a large number of regiments furnished companies, and I suppose when they got to their regiments they found the staff all ready for them?—Yes, they only took out their three officers, a captain and two subalterns.

7515. Do you think those three were generally Volunteer officers?—Yes, undoubtedly.

7516. That is then one advantage of that system (although you have mentioned some disadvantages) of sending out a company from the Volunteer battalion to the Line battalion?—Yes, it is; you would have fewer Regular officers to find.

7517. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You said a short time ago that the men disliked the War Office procedure, and preferred being called up by some civil authority: what is the reason of that dislike, do you know?—The reason, in my experience, was this, that all my officers were very well educated men and thoroughly business men—they were essentially business men—and there were any number of complaints while all were out there about the way applications are treated when they are sent in either to the District Office or to the War Office; they do not like the procedure of the War Office, they think it slow, and they do not like corresponding with the War Office.

7518. Too much red tape?—They think there is too much red tape, and they cannot bear it, and it quite astonished me to hear the way they talked about their correspondence with military people generally, not only the District Office but the War Office, whenever they had to go to camp, or when they were writing on military matters. They were continually complaining that it took a week or ten days to get an answer, it came through so many channels, and they did not like it. I know so far as my regiment is concerned they would far more quickly respond to a call made by some civil authority than they would to a War Office summons.

7519. Then it is the want of business capacity of the War Office that they complain of?—Well, the War Office methods they say are not their methods; they were continually telling me that.

7520. With respect to the allotments made by married men, single men may also make allotments in favour of persons dependent upon them?—Yes.

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7521. And they ought to be ascertained quite as clearly, if the single men have mothers or sisters dependent upon them?—Yes.

7522. You spoke of the cooking, and said there might be only one or two cooks to a battalion: I suppose what you find fault with really is that men are often detached, 30 or 40 men may be by themselves, and not one of them able to cook?—Quite so.

7523. Did you come across any of the Colonial troops, such as those from Australia and New Zealand?—Yes.

7524. They were all able to cook?—Yes, and the Canadians, too.

7525. And able to make bread?—Yes.

7526. At least their bread?—Yes.

7527. All the man wants is a little flour and water, and he is able to make what he calls a "damper"?—Yes, and a little grease or fat.

7528. And not even that?—Not even that sometimes; it is wonderful what they can do, but our men could do nothing even with the fat.

7529. You were speaking of a number of men not being able to ride, and you say they were sent off on service within a few days; these men could not possibly become horse masters?—No, that was almost a greater disadvantage than their want of knowledge of riding; they had no idea of horse-mastership.

7530. And you think men ought to have some experience in that way before they are attached to a mounted corps. They ought not only to be able to ride, but to have had some experience among horses?—Certainly; it was quite lamentable to find so few men who knew anything about a horse.

7531. There again you find that the Colonists had the advantage; very few of them could not shoe a horse?—Very few.

7532. (*Sir John Edge.*) I suppose your officers with the City Imperial Volunteers that you have been speaking of, and who were business men, were comparing the system of business by which one house in the City will do business with another in five minutes, with the way business has to be done in a Government Department?—I think so—very likely.

7533. I do not know what your experience is, but mine is that there is a great outcry against red tape, and it is very unreasonable, as people do not understand it?—That is so.

7534. As to the omnibus horses, were they suitable? Did they stand?—They did extraordinarily well all through the Army.

7535. With your battery?—With our battery they did marvellously well; our battery had a very great chance, because they were two months at one place up-country, with very little to do.

7536. And the horses got seasoned?—They got thoroughly seasoned.

7537. Where did you get your non-commissioned officers from?—From the Volunteers; it was a great difficulty to choose our non-commissioned officers, because every man, and in fact, every officer, too, had first to enlist as a private in the Army, and after that we had to select men to act as non-commissioned officers. I made the appointment "acting" for two months, so that, after the two months, if they did not do we could change them; but there was great difficulty.

7538. But you selected them in the first place from men who had been non-commissioned officers in the Volunteers?—Yes, and who were known by the officers who were with me; I asked if they could recommend them, but it was a very weak point of our regiment.

7539. It always is in the Volunteers?—Yes.

7540. How do the officers and the non-commissioned officers of the Volunteers compare as to efficiency in their respective grades?—The officers show to great advantage as compared with the non-commissioned officers. One reason, I think, is that all Volunteer officers attend a school, whereas very few non-commissioned officers do.

7541. From your experience have you any suggestion to make as to any means for improving the efficiency of non-commissioned officers of Volunteers?—It is a great difficulty, because of the lack of time; they can-

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not give up the time for improving their knowledge; that is the great difficulty with non-commissioned officers of Volunteers, and it always has been. We tried in London some years ago non-commissioned officers' classes at Chelsea Barracks, but they only came for a short time, I think a fortnight, and even then they had to give up their time for it, and it did not count for their drills, and all we could teach them then was giving them a little confidence on parade with their men, giving words of command, and knowing how to move their men about a little, but we could not ground them in their duty.

7542. As to marching, how did the City Imperial Volunteers compare with the Regulars?—Very well. When we began our march they did very badly indeed, worse than any Regular regiment could possibly do. They had no idea of march discipline, they fell out of the ranks and fell in just whenever they liked, without asking any leave, and on the first four days of our regular marching I thought the regiment would fall to pieces, but after we got to Bloemfontein and joined the Army (we had done then about 100 miles), they continued the march from there, and kept up well with the Regular regiments.

7543. They got stricter in their discipline?—No, I think they got the education; they did not know what march discipline meant before, no man knew. They used to fall out, and if a man got a little bit tired he would lie down by the side of the road and come on in half an hour's time, whenever he liked, without asking any leave, or showing any *esprit de corps*.

7544. But that passed away soon?—That passed away; luckily we had 100 miles march with a small column of Australians and Canadians, to Bloemfontein with the men continually falling out. But after they had pulled themselves together, and we had done up their sore feet, they were a very great credit to the whole force. They had no idea of marching when we first started.

7545. Of course, the City Imperial Volunteers were composed of men in very different positions in society?—Very.

7546. How did they shake down—quickly?—Yes, they shook down very quickly, and very cheerily, and happily, and contentedly; there was far less grumbling in the City Imperial Volunteers than there would be in a line regiment.

7547. Did the men shake down amongst themselves as comrades?—Wonderfully.

7548. Irrespective of their social position?—Absolutely irrespective; as I said a little time ago, a confidential clerk would continue the whole campaign on terms of the greatest friendship with a costermonger; in fact, I speak of that from experience, because I know the clerk and the costermonger, and they meet now in London. It was the same all through, and there was absolutely no division. There was a good deal of chaff; one company was called the class company, and another called the East-end company, but there was no feeling.

7549. (*Sir John Jackson.*) You told us your men were supplied with boots at a cost of 15s. per pair?—About that.

7550. And you consider these boots were about as good boots as could be made?—Yes.

7551. The boot of the Regulars I think you said cost about 5s. less?—Yes, or 6s. less.

7552. Does it not appear to you that if you want to put a man in his best fighting condition the difference of 5s. extra on the cost of his boots would be a very good expenditure?—I always have thought that very strongly, and I think it is one of the very great things that is wanted in our Army, to have a good boot for the soldier.

7553. A flexible boot?—Yes, the Army boot is very good in the way of durability, but it is so stiff.

7554. One hears so many complaints about soldiers' boots, and it has often struck me that it is absurd that, for the sake of a few shillings, they should not have better ones. You told us that you thought it was rather hard for the Volunteers to be mixed up with a Regular regiment?—Yes.

7555. Do you not think there would be an advantage from the discipline point of view in having the Volunteers mixed up with the Regulars?—I dare say that if 100 men of the Volunteers go to a Regular regiment for a year's campaigning they probably would learn more than my City Imperial Volunteers learned in their year. I think they might learn more, the discipline would be stricter, and a Regular regiment would possibly carry out their duties more strictly that we did.

7556. Do you think if you had, say, 50 Volunteers sent up to the front to a regiment of Regulars, those 50 Volunteers would stand fire better amongst the Regulars than they would if they were just in their own regiment without Regulars?—That is rather a difficult thing to say; I know no men could have been steadier than the City Imperial Volunteers were under fire.

7557. Of course, having come from the class from which the Volunteers come, those men were more intelligent, and of a better type, and one would think in the ordinary way they would stand better than the ordinary class from which the Regulars are recruited?—But they would not have the training; they would join the regiment after it had been out in the country for some time, and that was the case in this war—that the Regulars had been marching a great deal, and fighting for a long time, when a hundred raw men of the Volunteers were sent out from England, and in some cases joined their battalions pretty soon.

7558. Might I put it this way? Do you think the Volunteer, left by himself, would be more disinclined to carry out strictly the instructions of a commander than the Regular?—On the one hand he would have the advantage of having the Regular's example to follow if he were attached to a Regular regiment, but I certainly think in the case of the City Imperial Volunteers there was a fixed determination on the part of all ranks to be a credit to the Volunteer force, and to obey every order implicity.

7559. Do you go thus far? Do you think they would in practice carry out those instructions with as much certainty and with as little hesitation as the Regular soldier?—I am sure the City Imperial Volunteers did; it was one of their very striking peculiarities, the cheerfulnes with which they obeyed the most disagreeable orders, burying dead horses and fatigues of every sort—the men would buckle to and do it at once without any grumbling.

7560. I think you said they were getting the ordinary soldier's pay of 1s. per day?—Yes.

7561. With your men generally, I take it, the 1s. a day would not be a matter of greater importance?—No.

7562. Did you ever hear the question raised as to why they were paid 1s. a day, while the Yeomanry were getting so much more?—No, it was never raised.

7563. The question of pay would not be an important matter with them?—No.

7564. How were these artisans from Vickers and Maxim's paid?—They were paid the ordinary soldier's pay, because they were enlisted as soldiers.

7565. Did they get any special bonus?—Yes, that was done by the Mansion House Committee, and I cannot tell you offhand what it was. They were specially enlisted at certain rates of pay.

7566. On the question of horse-shoeing, I think you told us that hardly any horse soldiers, either in the Regulars or Volunteers, were able to shoe, and something was said about the men in the German Army all being taught to shoe; it is not every man who can make a good horse-shoe?—No.

7567. In my experience I have come across smiths, and I do not think I have found one smith in twelve who after having tried to be a horse-shoer, has been a competent horse-shoer; do you not think it would be better if they increased in the regiments the number of competent horse-shoers rather than make every man more or less an incompetent horse-shoer?—I should like to see both.

7568. You would like to see every man able to shoe?—Every man able to shoe, and at the same time the staff of qualified shoers increased.

7569. (*Sir John Edge.*) Would you like to send your valuable horse to be shod on chance by any man who had received instruction in a regiment?—No.

7570. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Were the Vickers-Maxim guns you took superior in range to the ordinary Artillery field guns, as far as you know?—Yes, they were; they were reported upon as being superior in range.

7571. Did you find them effective in every way?—Yes, very effective in every way.

7572. And no trouble with the ammunition?—No trouble with the ammunition, because we had our own.

7573. As regards fuses, had you a longer burning fuse than the ordinary artillery, as that was one of the drawbacks with them?—I am afraid I cannot tell you from memory.

7574. I think, speaking without the book, they had a range of 8,000 yards?—I think it was 8,000 yards, but I am not quite sure.

7575. You took a paymaster out with you?—Yes.

7576. Had you any difficulty about paying in the field?—We had the greatest difficulty, even with a paymaster, and the work of that paymaster was very great for the whole campaign. He remained in some central place where he could get at the three branches of the regiment, and even with him we had the greatest difficulty about pay.

7577. Of course, those difficulties continued up to the end, even after the arrival of the City Imperial Volunteers in England?—Yes, I think it would be a great thing if the pay of the army in the field could be simplified.

7578. (*Sir John Edge.*) Was there any cause for complaint against the fighting of the City Imperial Volunteers?—Absolutely none.

7579. And it was not on any ground of that kind that they were sent home?—Oh, no; Lord Roberts came to see us after he gave the orders for home, and he made us a farewell address, which was most complimentary in every way.

7580. They had been steady under fire, and done their work well?—Very well indeed; there was never the smallest complaint against the regiment on that score.

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7581. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) May I ask, have you had an opportunity of comparing the quality and fitness of the equipment generally, and the boots especially, supplied here, with those of the Colonial contingents?—No, I never noticed the Colonial boots at all; I only compared the boots we had in the City Imperial Volunteers with the regular Army boot.

7581*. And the equipment generally?—And the equipment generally, too; I am comparing it with the Regular Army equipment.

7582. (*Chairman.*) As regards the boots, I think that you said the Regular Army boot was a machine-made boot?—I did not mean to say that, because I am not aware whether it is a machine-made boot or not.

7583. I only mention it because we had some evidence that they had a difficulty in supplying the number of boots, and, indeed, had to go to India because hand-sewn boots are only made in a very small part of England?—I was not aware of that; I thought they were machine-made.

7584. (*Sir Frederick Dorley.*) Your boots were hand-sewn?—Yes.

7585. (*Chairman.*) You have nothing else you wish to add?—No, nothing at all.

7586. (*Sir Frederick Dorley.*) Is your 12½ pounder gun a similar gun to the naval gun?—It is in size, but this is a special gun made by Vickers, Son, and Maxim, which has never been adopted by the Service; they have been tried, but the Ordnance Department did not like them for the Army, why I cannot tell you. They did extremely well with us in South Africa.

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7587. (*Chairman.*) You are Inspector-General of the Auxiliary Forces, are you not?—Yes, since the 26th March, 1900.

7588. You are prepared in the first place to tell us the condition as to the strength of the Auxiliary Forces in October, 1899?—Yes, the Militia was 600 short of officers and about 24,000 short of men. The Yeomanry was then a very small body; the reorganisation had not yet begun, and it was not very much short of the establishment, the total strength being 10,114. The Volunteers were 33,560 below establishment, which was 263,000 and the strength 229,000.

7589. I suppose these figures are published?—Yes, they are all published.

7590. It would bring it out more clearly if you gave us the total numbers instead of the deficiencies?—I have got them all here. I will take the Militia first; the strength of the Militia in 1899 was 109,551.

7591. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) The establishment being what?—The establishment being about 123,000, between 123,000 and 124,000.

7592. (*Chairman.*) Will you give us the Yeomanry?—It is hardly worth while taking the Yeomanry at that time, because of the small body of Yeomanry that then existed. The strength was 10,114, and I am not prepared to say what the exact establishment was until the reorganisation began in the following year. In 1900 there was a great fall in the Militia, owing to 14,500 Reservists joining the Regular Army, and the strength then with the establishment was only 93,000. In the following year, 1901, the strength came up, with the same establishment, to 102,500, and at the present time with the same establishment the strength is 104,380. As to shortage of officers in those three years, in 1898 it was 505, and in 1899 624, and then in 1900 it went up on account of the very large number of young men, who came into the Militia to go for active service in the hope, mainly, of getting commissions through the Militia, not only those who went abroad with battalions from home, but into the battalions at home, in the hope of getting commissions, and a very large number of Militia commissions were given during the war, not less than 1,982, so that was a great temptation, and it brought the strength of the Militia officers up very considerably. In 1901, I am sorry to say, I have not got the figures, but the shortage of officers now has risen again to 671. I must explain to you that this includes seconded officers, so the actual number short is not so short, but we cannot count seconded officers as effective officers, because they are seconded for duty in various parts of the world. Several are appointed to Militia regiments at the request of the Colonial Office, and are given commissions in the Militia in order to enable them to hold commissions in the Colonial Forces abroad, in West Africa and East Africa, and those officers may never come back to the Militia, because it is a condition that they are not taken back to the Militia without the approval of the Officer Commanding, who has the nomination of his officers. These commissions are given in great measure for the convenience of the Colonial Office.

7593. Do I understand that those officers are included in your shortage of 671?—Yes, those are included.

7594. Will you give us the corresponding figures of the Volunteers?—I will begin first in 1881 to give the difference, and then I will skip from 1881 to 1899. In 1881 the establishment was 245,429, and the strength 208,308. In 1899, just before the outbreak of the war, the establishment was 263,416, and the actual strength 229,854. In 1900 and 1901 great additions were made to the Volunteers throughout the country, and on July 1st, 1901, the establishment was 342,003, and the strength 306,000, including Volunteers in South Africa. This year, up to date, the establishment is 346,450, and the strength 272,957, so that the shortage at the present time is 73,493.

7595. That is a considerable falling off?—A considerable falling off. As to officers, the establishment is 9,049, and there is a shortage of 2,020.

7596. Have you the figures as to officers?—Only the present figures.

7597. Of those auxiliary forces, what number went to South Africa?—Of the Militia 1,691 officers and 43,875 men. Of the Yeomanry, if you take the whole of the Imperial Yeomanry and consider them as auxiliary forces, 1,393 officers went out, and 34,127 men. If you take only the Yeomanry actually serving at home as belonging to the auxiliary service and take the others only as temporary, 224 officers and 2,789 men went out.

7598. And the Volunteers?—The Volunteers went out in different batches, and I will take them separately. Of the City Imperial Volunteers, 59 officers and, with the reinforcements, 1,667 men; then of the

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Service Companies, 473 officers went out and 16,149 men. Of Artillery Volunteers there were eight officers and 235 men, and of the Engineer Volunteers 54 officers and 1,157 men. That makes a total for the Auxiliary Forces of 2,509 officers and 65,872 men, or if you count the whole of the Imperial Yeomanry, 3,678 officers and 97,210 men.

7599. How does that compare with the total numbers?—The total numbers that went out to the war were 448,435, and as there were over 29,000 over-sea Colonials and a very large number of Colonial bodies were formed there, I think you may take it that very nearly 200,000 auxiliary troops of one sort or another served in the war.

7600. Is there any application of those figures you wish to make?—Of course, the shortage is very unfortunate, and, if you will allow me, I will commence with the officers. It is almost impossible to see any way of filling the subaltern ranks of the officers. For the Militia and the Yeomanry, officers of eight years' service and over in the Army, that is, Lieutenants or Captains, can retire from the Service, and go to the irregular infantry or cavalry, and get £100 a year for ten years; but that does not meet the difficulty of filling the subaltern ranks, because officers of that standing would hardly go to the auxiliary forces as subalterns. The Yeomanry, which has an establishment of 1,196 officers, has a shortage of 416, and that is nearly all in the subaltern ranks; that is a shortage of 49 per cent., and the great difficulty is to get young officers to join the auxiliary forces.

7601. And you do not see any remedy?—It is entirely a matter of money. The uniform is very expensive, even the cheapest uniform, and a man cannot get his uniform under £25 to £40, while in a red clothes regiment £70 to £80 may be spent, and all officers like to be very well dressed, so that the expense hits them very hard. It really is, to a very great extent, a matter of money, because, of course, they serve at an expense, they do not gain anything by serving, except the birds of passage, who hope to get into the Regular Army through the Militia or Yeomanry.

7602. Are you speaking of the Yeomanry uniforms?—No, at that moment I was speaking of the Infantry Volunteer uniform; of course, the Yeomanry are more expensive. Great efforts have been made to cheapen them, and the uniforms of some of the regiments are infinitely cheaper than they used to be; but still the expense is very great. I may say that this fall in numbers is due to a great extent to the excitement of the war being over, and the reaction was to be looked for.

7603. Surely the uniform of a subaltern in an infantry Volunteer regiment does not cost £70?—No, except in a red clothes regiment, if he chooses to provide himself with a tunic and expensive belt, silver belts and so on. An officer commanding a Fusilier battalion told me the other day that the cost to some of his officers on joining was as much as £70. Of course, it might be a good deal less, but young men will buy expensive uniforms, and our uniforms in the Service are so very expensive.

7604. We hear a good deal about the cheapening of uniforms?—Yes, and efforts have been made, but the officers will not take advantage of them. I speak of Regular officers now. I do not know what the Auxiliary Forces would think, but the Regulars do not like the idea. In Germany the Emperor does not allow the uniforms to cost much money, and if the tailors were to attempt to form a league to raise the price of uniforms, all the clothing would be made in Government factories. Not long ago efforts were made in this country, and I know Mr. Brodrick is most anxious of all things to cheapen the cost of uniforms; but the proposal was not received with satisfaction at all.

7605. Not received with satisfaction by whom?—By the officers of the Army. They said they would not have clothes made in factories. One instance of the difference in cost between the equipment in the German Army and ours is that the forage cap of infantry up to the rank of General costs 5s., while mine cost £3. It is the same shape. That is only one instance; but everything is the same. I have the prices here from the Embassy.

7606. One has always understood that the expenses of uniform were caused a great deal by the constant changes of orders coming out from headquarters?—I am afraid the pattern of the uniform is changed a good deal; there is a good deal in that. Even efforts to cheapen the uniform cost a great deal to officers who are already provided with the existing uniform; and that was the case the other day, when the old staff dress was done away with. It was very cheap for officers who were succeeding to the staff, but very dear to officers who were already on the staff, although fair time was given to them to wear out their old uniforms. Still if one officer gets a new uniform another officer does not like to be seen in the old pattern.

7607. With regard to the shortage of officers, it is chiefly in the subaltern ranks?—Yes, especially in the Yeomanry.

7608. For the senior ranks you would look to officers coming from the Regular Army?—Yes, to some extent; that clause of the Royal Warrant which permits officers to serve for 10 years is not made much use of. There are some cases of it, but £100 a year is no very great inducement when a man leaves the Army.

7609. We had some evidence that it was very desirable for the Yeomanry that they should have Regular officers?—They have this concession, and they have had it for some time. I think it is very desirable, but at the present time it does not take very much.

7610. And that officers of the Regular Army might be induced to join if they were allowed to be attached with the rank which they had previously held in the war or elsewhere; do you think that would be useful?—If officers were allowed to be attached to the auxiliary forces?

7611. With the rank they had held during the war or on service?—On full pay?

7612. It was a question of rank, as I understood it?—With Yeomanry officers, as a rule, the pay is not much object; with Volunteers and Militia it is a very great object.

7613. But the rank?—I do not think the rank alone would tempt them in.

7614. What I understood the objection to be was that an officer who had served in the war with a superior rank would not come and do duty in a Yeomanry regiment in an inferior rank unless he was known by the rank which he had previously held?—He would be, as a matter of course; he would never lose his rank. If he came into the Militia, say, as a captain, and he had been a major in the Army, and had consented to serve as a captain, he would keep his rank in the same way as a brevet rank would be—he would never lose his Army rank. It would be by his own consent if he agreed to serve in a lower rank than he actually held, and he would still have his rank outside the regiment.

7615. If they held their rank would many of them serve in an inferior position?—Not very many Army officers go to the auxiliary forces. In certain cases officers who retire from the Regular Army are obliged to serve for five years in the Militia or Yeomanry, and after the year 1909 all officers going on retired pay who joined after 1899 will be liable, if called on, to serve for a time with Militia or Yeomanry.

7616. And in the Volunteers, what about the shortage of officers?—How to make it good? There is the same difficulty, and I think it is a very great deal a matter of money—I should say almost entirely. At present an officer joining the Volunteers gets £10 towards his uniform, and if within about a year he passes certain tests of efficiency he gets £10 more. If he fails to pass he has to pay the £10 back. That is called outfit allowance, but that is not sufficient to tempt them in.

7617. There again you see a difficulty in supplying the shortage?—Very great difficulty.

7618. You have spoken as to the officers; what about the shortage of men?—The Volunteer Force is rather in a state of excitement and in a stage of transition now owing to the new efficiency regulations which have been introduced, which are exceedingly hard for some corps to carry out, not by any means all. I was up at Birmingham visiting an institution of Commanding Officers, which was very representative, last week, and many battalions there were represented who said they had not much difficulty in carrying out these regulations, and those battalions were pretty well up to strength, but in the London corps it is very difficult indeed.

7619. Will you explain why?—I will take the Queen's Westminsters; the regulations are that every Volunteer

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has to go into camp for at least 144 hours every alternate year, but as Shoolbred's and Maple's and other firms supply large numbers of volunteers, it is absolutely impossible for them to allow the whole of their men to go away at any one time, or they would dislocate their business. It is also very hard for clerks in banks, of whom there are a very large number in the Metropolitan Vounteer corps, to get leave to be away for a whole week, and where there are three or four men in one establishment it is impossible for a bank or a firm of lawyers to let their clerks go away for one week together. That is the great difficulty they have in carrying out the regulations.

7620. What is the particular object of that regulation?—To get the men into camp every other year—to get the battalions together, and it certainly is very beneficial to them. The great stumbling-block in the way of these camps is that there is no additional pay, and up to the institution of these new regulations a Volunteer was not compelled at all to go into camp; if he did go into camp his minimum was 72 hours, but now he must go into camp at least every other year, and his minimum is 144 hours. That means considerably more wear and tear on the clothing, and of course the commanding officer, who has the financial responsibility of the corps, may be a great loser and becomes very anxious, and that is the reason why there has been a great outcry in the evening papers about the diminution of the Volunteer Force. The commanding officer gets £1 15s. a head for every efficient man he has in his corps, and he therefore depends upon the very large number of men he gets. Numbers are all very well, but efficiency is a good deal, and up to the time these new regulations were introduced a man had (after the first two years, in which he did 60 drills) to do 12 drills a year, and there were a large number of men in many corps who had absolutely to be whipped up to do these 12 drills in order that they might become what is called "efficient" and the commanding officer get the capitation money. Now it is almost impossible for a good many of the men to go into camp, as I said, and therefore the capitation money will be less, and the commanding officer will be a loser on every man who does not go into camp, so that although the efficiency of the corps in some ways would be increased, the numbers would be very much reduced. There would be no very great harm in that, but the commanding officer, being absolutely personally financially responsible for every penny of funds that are handed over by Government to the corps, would be a very great loser, and therefore the commanding officers in corps which cannot go to camp in large numbers are now in a great state of agitation. Still, it was absolutely necessary to raise the efficiency of the Volunteer Force if we are to go on upon a voluntary system of service.

7621. Then it is a question of money?—Almost entirely; there will be those difficulties I have described just now, where a trading establishment has, say, half a company or a whole company, of ever getting those men under present regulations into camp together.

7622. It is impracticable?—Almost impracticable, unless the camp is extended, say, for 14 days to allow the whole of the men of the battalion to pass through it in sections. Every man in the battalion has to be 144 hours in camp—that is, clear of the day of arrival and departure—and if the camp was opened for 14 days most of the officers would be able to stay there, and the paid permanent staff would stay, and in that way they think they would get nearly every man of their battalions to do his 144 hours in camp. Provisional camps as recently proposed may do some good, but not so much, in my opinion, as camps extended as I have stated.

7623. But you would not have the whole battalion together in that case?—No, but you would have them out in very large numbers for a week's training.

7624. But the object of the regulation, I understood you to say, was that you should have the whole battalion together?—As far as possible.

7625. But if that is impracticable, you think what you have described is a modification which you might accept?—It does not quite carry out the object; it would be a modification, but the men would get into camp, and there would be large numbers of them together, and, after all, that would to a very great extent meet the object.

7626. What is your object in having them all together?—The idea is that it gets them to know one another well, and to work together as they would have to do on active service.

7627. Is it contemplated that these regiments should serve as individual units?—Oh, yes, for home defence only; we do not look to the Volunteer Forces going abroad. Of course, they went abroad in the war in a great emergency, but we do not make rules or regulations or plans for such an emergency happening again, any more than the country would prepare for an emergency in which they would have to send out an Army of 448,000 men. We would hardly be prepared for that.

7628. Would it not be advisable that you should have some plan in the War Office by which you would be able to use the Volunteer Forces, should an emergency occur again?—I heard what General Mackinnon said, and in theory it is excellent, but there is one very strong thing against it; the Volunteers are for home defence, and if the idea of foreign service was spread or known there would be a very great deal of difficulty in the ordinary times of peace, when there was no excitement of war, in employers taking men who had any liability to foreign service, and there would be great disinclination on the part of the families of men to allow them to serve as Volunteers—that is my opinion. So that I should look on the Volunteers as entirely a home force, and if the occasion arises they will come very well to the front, as they did in the South African war.

7629. I do not think General Mackinnon's evidence went to the length of proposing that any obligation for foreign service should be put upon the Volunteers?—Well, instead of obligation I would say if any idea in the ordinary times of peace of going abroad was inculcated or held.

7630. From the point of view of the War Office, how would that idea be stimulated by your having in reserve in the War Office some sort of a scheme by which you could carry out in the case of an emergency what you were obliged to carry out in a hurry on the last occasion?—There was machinery in the War Office for raising the Service Companies, and a very large number of officers and men, over 17,000, went out in those Service Companies. I had not the advantage of seeing them in the war, but I always hear that the Service Companies did exceedingly well.

7631. In what sense was there a machinery in the War Office for the Service Companies?—There is the machinery of the Adjutant-General's department, which is the department charged with the raising and organisation of troops, who issue those orders such as that order that is in this book which I hold in my hand, and to which General Mackinnon alluded, that was issued on the 6th January, 1900, and which drew up all those plans and schemes under the Adjutant-General.

7632. Quite so; but that scheme which General Mackinnon quoted was a scheme entirely new?—It was new, but I hardly think for the Volunteers such a scheme is necessary, because if one wants them one will always be able to get Service Companies. They will always come forward in a time of emergency.

7633. You prefer to live from hand to mouth?—Yes, with regard to the Volunteers and foreign service, because I look on them as essentially a force for home defence, and a force that keeps us from conscription. It is for home defence they would be used in 19 cases out of 20. As a matter of fact, in August, 1900, we put forward a scheme to have a Volunteer Active Service Company in each Volunteer corps, *i.e.*, a company of picked men, who could be drafted into Line units on the outbreak of war, but the matter had to be dropped owing to the opposition of the Volunteers themselves and that in Parliament.

7634. But the twentieth case might be a very great one?—The City Imperial Volunteers was an excellent body of men, and I had to do with them from the first, and I was employed by Lord Lansdowne to go to the office, not actually to do any of the organisation work, but just to see that the regulations were acted up to as far as necessary. There was no hard and fast adherence to regulations, but of course these gentlemen knew very little about regulations, and it was exceptional, because our treasury was on the spot, and we had not to appeal to the treasury for funds, but the work was done admirably. That must be looked on as entirely an exceptional case, because the next Lord Mayor might not approve of raising such a force, and one cannot establish that as a precedent, whereas one can establish the Service Companies as a precedent.

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7635. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Who was the Lord Mayor when the City Imperial Volunteers were raised?—Sir Alfred Newton. Sixty-six Service Companies were sent out in a very short time, in the first instance in 17 small detachments; they were followed by 44 in relief of them in a year's time, in 13 small detachments, and then there was a further number sent out without any difficulty whatever, and of course they had the advantage of going to the Regular battalions that things were done for them, and they very soon got into shape. The difficulty with the City Imperial Volunteers was the cooking, and the rough work of the camp; they got into it, I am told, very quickly, but they had a difficulty at first, while the men who joined the battalions were really received with open arms, and they were at home in a very short time. From imitation of the Regulars they were with they very soon picked up their duties.

7636. (*Chairman.*) With regard to the service companies, was there any idea before the war in the War Office of that use of the Volunteers?—No, none whatever. Just before the war broke out offers were made from two Militia battalions, and 10 battalions of Volunteers, and a regiment of Yeomanry, to have bodies ready at the disposal of the Government. Of course, no one in the world dreamt of the magnitude the war was going to assume, and these offers were simply noted, and I believe, in addition to that, Sir Howard Vincent offered a battalion, but I could not get any record of that. It was not considered then that the Auxiliary Forces, who are mainly for home defence, would be required in the least. It was considered that the Regular Army would finish the war in a very short time.

7637. I want to make it clear about the organisation; there was no preparation beforehand for the employment of Volunteers?—No.

7638. When was it first considered?—It was first considered after that week of the battles of Colenso, Magersfontein, and Stormberg. The City Imperial Volunteers were offered before.

7639. May I just put it to you: at that time you began to consider it, and you say that it was taken up in the Adjutant-General's Department?—Yes, I am speaking from hearsay, for I did not go into it until the end of March.

7640. No doubt you know it must have been taken up by the Adjutant-General's Department?—Clearly, because they were formed.

7641. Then I suppose Army Orders were issued?—Yes.

7642. Have you any dates when the Army Orders were issued?—The City Imperial Volunteers' Order was issued on the 6th January.

7643. I am speaking of the service companies?—The others were issued in the same month—that for the Volunteer service companies 2nd January, 1900; that for the Imperial Yeomanry 2nd January.

7644. That means that all the arrangements were made in the stress of the war?—Yes.

7645. I am just putting it to you; we must take it into consideration that there may be another emergency, even if it is the twentieth, as you say, of the cases; would it not be better if you had some idea in the War Office of what the organisation would be before that emergency came before you?—Yes, I think it could be done.

7646. But nothing is being done?—No, not beyond that we have the precedents of what has been done in this case, and that the offers would come in from the Volunteers immediately from every part if the country were in the least difficulty, and the Orders similar to those used on the previous occasion would be ready to be issued again.

7647. I do not consider it from the point of view of the Volunteers, but from the point of view of the War Office?—I understand; it would be possible to have a scheme.

7648. You mentioned an offer made by Sir Howard Vincent?—I am not aware of it; I could not find a record of it in my office.

7649. He told us he made the offer, and got no reply?—I am sorry for that.

7650. Just to go back to the question of the present regulations, you said it was a question of money; is that because of the practice of giving the grants by capitation?—You mean about the men now?

7651. Yes?—Yes, I think the time has come when the capitation should be increased, because camp, and other things which cost money, have been made a matter of compulsion; a man must go into camp every other year, and I think, therefore, the financial position of the commanding officers should be improved.

7652. What is the position of the capitation grant now?—The Volunteer costs the country, all told, £6 2s. 6d. against £20 6s. for the Yeoman, £19 8s. for the Militiaman, and £52 for the Regular infantry man, or it comes to nearly £80 if you include barrack accommodation, and all that—£84, I think.

7653. And you consider that is too little for the Volunteer?—I think so; I think the Volunteer would be a very cheap force if you could raise his efficiency, if he cost £10 or £12, because his material is excellent.

7654. When you say his material is excellent, what do you mean?—I mean the *personnel.*

7655. That is taking the Volunteers as a whole?—Taking the Volunteers as a whole. Of course, there are exceptions, and in some of the big towns the men are not so good, but take them all round, one could do anything with them.

7656. Do they come from a different class from the regular soldier?—Yes, mostly; if you take corps from Liverpool, and so on, the regiments are about the same class as the Militia, but otherwise they are superior both to the Regulars and the Militia. They are not always superior in physique, but they are in intelligence and in quickness. May I quote an instance? In the year 1900 we had what were called Lord Lansdowne's emergency camps; they were voluntary, and no corps was allowed to draw the allowance unless they went in at least 50 per cent. of its strength; 169,000 Volunteers, I think, made use of those camps, the duration of the camp was from a fortnight up to 28 days. I had come into office then, and I inspected a large number of the camps, and the improvement in the corps, from being 14 days together at drill, was perfectly marvellous, and far more than an ordinary Regular battalion or Militia battalion could have been worked up to in the time.

7657. It is of great importance to the country, then, to maintain the numbers of the auxiliary forces?—Of the greatest importance, because unless we want conscription I think there is no other way of meeting the Imperial responsibilities.

7658. But you will have a difficulty in keeping them up?—Great difficulty.

7659. And the only suggestion you have to make is this increase in the grant?—That would do it, I think, to a very great extent, because the position of the commanding officer is so difficult; if you have financial responsibility on a man like a commanding officer his position is not a pleasant one in any way.

7660. Is there any other point you wish to draw attention to?—The cost of uniform I have drawn attention to.

7661. On the 12th March, 1900, the Under-Secretary of State made this statement: "Now I come to that part of the scheme, and I am able to give details in addition to those I gave the other day. In the first place, as to the improvement of organisation:—We intend to divide into two that gentleman who is two gentlemen rolled into one—the Inspector-General of the Auxiliary Forces and the Inspector-General of Recruiting. We mean to have one officer at the War Office in future specially charged with the Auxiliary Forces, and we mean to give him a Staff, two Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-Generals, one of whom will be for the Militia, and the other for the Volunteers; in fact, there will be a separate branch of the War Office to deal with our Auxiliary Forces, men who are *personæ grata* with them, and who are specially qualified to understand their interests." You are of opinion that it is of great importance that there should be an Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces at the War Office, with direct access to the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

7662. That is not the position as yet?—That is not the position as yet.

7663. But you think that in order that the business of the Auxiliary Forces may be dealt with with proper despatch and satisfactorily it ought to be done?—I do.

7664. Do you think he ought not to be an officer in the Department of the Adjutant-General, except as to discipline?—That is so.

7665. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) And, as a matter

of fact, at the time you took office you were not under the department of the Adjutant-General, even as to discipline?—The department was not separately constituted.

7666. You were not practically under the Adjutant-General?—Yes, I was.

7667. (*Chairman.*) Will you state your reason for wishing it to be a separate department?—My reason is that for the Auxiliary Forces, and especially for the Volunteers and Yeomanry, it is most necessary to have an official at the War Office who is in close touch, and above all in sympathy, with them, and who knows and acknowledges the difference between them and the Regular soldiers. In my opinion far more will be got out of the Auxiliary Forces if they are treated in that way.

7668. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Is there not an officer somewhat in that position now for the Yeomanry?—Lieut.-Colonel Le Roy Lewis, a commanding officer of Yeomanry, who served in the war with Imperial Yeomanry, has been attached to my department as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of Yeomanry during the re-organisation of that force, and I could not have done without such an officer. Lord Chesham has been appointed Inspector-General for Yeomanry, but his duties have not been administrative.

7669. Was not the Deputy Adjutant-General for Yeomanry in that position?—No, there was an office during the war, but that was for the South African Imperial Yeomanry, and those were not administered by my department in any way. Colonel Lucas, whom you have seen, was in that position.

7670. You administer the Yeomanry just as you do the other forces?—Yes, the home Yeomanry.

7671-2. (*Chairman.*) Is there any other point you wish to draw our attention to?—There is one other point, and that is the point of inspection, but that opens a very large subject. It is very important that the system of inspection, as carried on in Germany, should be more in vogue with us. I mean that the rules should not be so rigid and hard and fast, and that commanding officers should be given more power as to the way in which they carry out their measures to secure the efficiency of their corps, and everything should be judged by inspections, as it is in Germany, from the smallest units upward. The captain is responsible for his company, and he inspects it; the battalion Commander inspects each company, and his battalion is inspected by the Brigade Commander, who is responsible for his brigade. The Divisional Commander then inspects the brigade, and is responsible for the division, and the Army Corps Commander inspects the divisions. Everything is carried out in that way, and the officer is allowed to work up to the pitch of efficiency that is required of him in his own way, and is not interfered with, but if he does not work it up to that pitch he gets what they call in Germany *blauer Brief*, or blue letter, and he has to go promptly. That ladder of inspection is very important. It increases individuality and gives responsibility to everybody from the subaltern officers upwards. The subaltern officers are responsible for their sections.

7673. And that is not our system?—No, hardly.

7674. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) I gather from what you say it is your opinion that the Auxiliary Forces should be made more efficient than they have been in the past, and that extra inducements should be given to Army officers to join the Militia, the Yeomanry, and the Volunteers?—Yes.

7675. And that a larger grant of money should be made?—Yes, that is my opinion.

7676. You also think that they should be considered as for home defence—that it should not be kept present before them always that they may be called upon in any emergency?—Yes.

7677. And you think that in time of need there would be no difficulty in getting from them as Volunteers any number of men that might be required?—That is so.

7678. Do you consider that conscription in any form would be desirable for the Militia?—I do not think it is necessary. I have been a great many times with the German Army attached to the Staff, and I have seen a great deal of conscription in Germany. There it is suited to the institutions, the temper and the constitution of the country, and it is a most admirable system for a country that is coterminous with another country which may attack it, but I cannot consider that it is necessary for the defence of this country, because our food supply would fail if our fleet were destroyed, and it would not then be any use if we had an army of 2,000,000 men. The Navy, moreover, is our safety in the British Islands; and, therefore, I think we should be saved from conscription or compulsory service. Moreover, I do not think it is suited to the temper of the country, but that is a matter of opinion.

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7679. Do you not think that suitable uniforms could be found for the Auxiliary Forces at a much less cost than at present?—Yes, the great difficulty is that the tailors keep the prices up.

7680. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) In the establishment that you gave us of the Militia in 1899, did you include the Militia Reserve?—Yes.

7681. What was the Militia Reserve at that time?—In 1899 it was 14,500.

7682. And those, of course, were all drafted away to the regular forces?—Yes, at once; so that at the very time the Militia stood most in need of its best men they were all taken away. I say the best men, because the Militia Reserve were generally the better men.

7683. But the Reserve men do not come out to training every year?—Yes, they do.

7684. With reference to the cost of uniforms for officers I just want to get it clearly from you. Do you think that if a much cheaper uniform was introduced compulsorily by order of the War Office, that would seriously diminish the number of officers in the Volunteers?—No. I do not think so, as long as they allowed them a certain amount of showy facings; you must have some little show.

7685. But there could be a certain amount, sufficient to attract the men, quite cheaply?—Quite cheaply.

7686. Coming to the question of subalterns for the Militia and Yeomanry, it has been suggested that that could be partly met by increasing the number of commissions in the Regular Army offered through the Militia and Yeomanry?—Yes, I think so; of course, those officers would be only birds of passage, but some of them who failed to pass the examinations would possibly stay on, and it would be a supply, to a certain extent.

7687. And then, by making the time in the Militia rather longer, they would be birds of slower passage?—Yes.

7688. And remain longer?—Yes, you would increase the age to rather more than 23? I advocated that before Mr. Akers-Douglas's Committee.

7689. Up to what age?—If a man would come in as late as 29, I would allow it; it would be at his own option, as he would be very likely to be superannuated, but that would be his own look-out.

7690. Coming to the recent complaints of Volunteers as to the extra efficiency enforced upon them now, is it only the question of camps that they complain of?—I hear complaints about musketry, but as the new musketry regulations are not quite determined it is difficult to say. If they have to carry it out in its entirety, it means three days and more, which involves an increase of expense. The Secretary of State has stated in the House that he will meet some of the commanding officers of Volunteers and talk it over before it is settled.

7691. I had better not ask you about musketry while that is pending?—That is pending.

7692. Do you think it is essential from your point of view that this increased number of days in musketry should be enforced?—Of course, it is most desirable.

7693. But is it essential?—Not absolutely essential.

7694. You think their shooting is good enough without it?—Of course, it leaves room for improvement, and it would be most desirable to get it, and, again, there would be much less difficulty in carrying out the musketry if they get more money. That falls on the corps, because the question of ranges is one of enormous difficulty now, and they have to take their men from London down to Runemede and other places, and every journey costs a very large sum of money. If the Government, when they increase the musketry conditions, will also increase their grants for travelling, there will not be much difficulty about it. That is entirely a question of money. I believe the grant is to be increased.

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7695. And has the number of days' drill in the year been increased also?—No, the first year a man has to do 40, and after that he only has to do 10, unless he fails to go into camp, when he has to do six extra drills.

7696. I suppose you will agree that there is a point of average efficiency for the Volunteers below which it would be better almost not to have a Volunteer force at all?—Quite so, and then comes in the financial difficulty; if they do not get their efficiency it is much better that as soldiers they should be got rid of, but it means so much loss to the commanding officer.

7697. But, on the other hand, to have Volunteers who are not up to a sufficient standard of efficiency is not much good?—They are useless.

7698. And, more than that, they are a danger to the public?—Yes, because the public thinks it has reliable men, and these men are worth nothing.

7699. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) What is your shortage—I think you gave it before—in the rank and file of the Militia at this moment?—The strength is 104,000, and the establishment is 124,000, so that there is about 20,000 of a shortage.

7700. Assuming that shortage to continue, how would you propose to get the number of men you require?—Will you allow me to hand in a paper showing a curious state of things, which shows where the shortage is in the Militia. The shortage in the Militia is due really to the declining numbers of the agricultural labourer. (*The paper was handed in.*) In the large towns, in nearly every case the battalions are well up to establishment, while some of the country battalions are almost depleted; one battalion has 180 men.

7701. I was rather leading up to this point: To ensure the Militia being kept up to its full strength, which is very desirable undoubtedly, would you propose any measure in the future, supposing that the recruiting does not fill it up?—We have puzzled over how to keep the Militia up from a population which is apparently decreasing, and it seems a thing that cannot be done. There is no doubt that the agricultural labourer is decreasing very much in this country, and if you look at that paper you will see that the decrease is entirely in those battalions where the men have flocked into the towns. There is no difficulty in the towns in keeping up the Militia at all as regards men, but it is in the country districts, where the agricultural labourer is becoming more and more scarce, that the battalions fall away, and you will see that that is so in every case except in Sussex, and that is due to the great local interest and popularity of the commanding officer, Lord March.

7702. Then really the solution of it appears to be to augment the battalions in the towns to take the place of those battalions in the country which cannot in the future exist?—Yes. I am now sitting on a committee which meets this afternoon, and which is discussing that very subject, and considering this great difficulty—what we are to do with these battalions, which have their headquarters and their cadre, and they are simply dying away. Huntingdon and Cornwall are the two worst.

7703. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I think you gave it in your evidence as your opinion that if the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces, as the head of his department, were only responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, it would be better?—I think so.

7704. And I think you put it that the chief reason you had for coming to that opinion was that the ordinary military officer, say in the Adjutant-General's department, is too apt to look upon the Volunteers as if they were Regulars?—I did not say in the Adjutant-General's department, but generally that is, to a very great extent, the feeling, in my opinion; and an officer who is constantly engaged in drawing up orders, rules, and regulations for the Regular Army may unconsciously frame such rules, etc., for Volunteers as if they were Regular soldiers without avocations in civil life, which must be their first consideration.

7705. Which you think would be got over to a great extent if the Inspector-General of Volunteers were not under the Adjutant-General?—And were a man in close touch and sympathy with the Force—of course, the matter of selection would be very important, as he might not be in close sympathy with the Force—he should be a man who understood their difficulties, and appreciated them

7706. And who was in sympathy with the Volunteer system?—Yes.

7707. You told us something of conscription, and you compared the state of things in Germany with the state of things in England. You have seen a great deal as Inspector-General of Volunteers, no doubt, of the class from whom the Volunteers in the large towns are recruited. Do you think that if, for the Regulars, a pay were given which would approach somewhat closely to the pay that a first-class labourer would receive, say in a manufacturing town, you would have any difficulty in getting an ample number of recruits for the Regular Army from that very class of respectable first-class labourers, who, to a great extent, fill up the ranks of the Volunteers in the large manufacturing towns?—I do not think so, at a price the country could possibly pay. I do not think anything under 4s. or 5s. a day would really get that class. I have thought a good deal over that lately, and asked other people's opinions, and the difficulties now of competing for the labourer in the employment market are increasing greatly as the conditions of that market become better, so that I do not think we could get these men into the Regular Army by any means short of conscription.

7708. Then it comes to conscription unless the country is prepared to pay 5s. a day?—To get that class.

7709. Having regard to the fact that in England what you may call the first-class labourer, a well-fed man of good physique, earns his 4s. a day, say, if you take off his wet days and for lost time, he will not earn more than 18s. or 20s. a week, do you suggest that if the country could give that man as a soldier, say, 18s. a week, you would not find a very large number of them who would be delighted, who would like the job?—Of the labouring class?

7710. The better class of labourer, the labourer who in civil life works regularly, who, of course, is well kept up, and is a well-fed man; do you not think, with an inducement of, say, something like half-a-crown a day, all found, you would find that you would get a very large number of men of that class to fill the ranks of the Regular Army?—You would get a certain number, but the charges would be enormous to the country, and I do not think you would get any great number of this class to fill your ranks even at half-a-crown a day and all found. Of course, it is a mere matter of opinion.

7711. I have come a good deal into contact with men of that class, and I have very strongly got the idea that with a little more money you would find men of that type very anxious to be soldiers—men who may, perhaps, have got into one particular corner——

7712. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) May I interpolate one question on what Sir John Jackson has said? If the labour of the man in question is worth half-a-crown a day to the country, how would it cost more to the country?—I mean the taxpayer.

7713. I want to have that on the Notes?—I distinctly referred to the Army Estimates.

7714. He cannot cost more to the country if his work is worth half-a-crown a day?—I am talking of the direct charge on the Army Vote.

7715. (*Sir John Edge.*) Do I understand that under this new regulation no capitation at all will be paid to the man who has not attended camp?—He has to attend camp every other year, and every year the commanding officer has power to excuse 10 per cent. of his men only from going to camp, the captitation being reduced to 25s. from 35s. That is the only general exception. Power is, however, vested in the Secretary of State to exempt in special cases over and above the 10 per cent.; but this is only in exceptional circumstances, such as sickness, an epidemic in a town preventing a corps encamping, etc.

7716. Only 10 per cent.?—Yes, and then with a reduction of 10s. out of the 35s.

7717. Do you see any great objection to having that graduated capitation extended to more than the 10 per cent.?—No, I do not see any great objection to it; it might be extended to 20 per cent. without doing any harm, I think.

7718. Or even more than that, I should think; the commanding officer naturally would get all the men he could into camp?—His one object is to get every man he can into camp.

7719. That is one of his objects, and another object is to have sufficient funds to work his corps?—Yes.

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7720. Does the Government propose to make any allowance for camp?—In addition to the present allowance?

7721. In addition to the capitation grant?—Not at present, but I have represented that very strongly, and I know it is being considered now.

7722. But at present, according to the Regulations, no additional allowance is given for camp beyond the Capitation Grant?—No; of course, for the days in camp there has always been an allowance; for instance, it is half-a-crown a day per man who goes into camp for six days, plus days of joining and quitting camp, and there are some special corps called Field Army Corps, whom we need not take into consideration, because they are quite exceptional, who get 5s. a day for camp, and they must be in a fortnight; but that is all outside the capitation grant.

7723. There is an addition made?—There has always been 2s. a day for camp up to 72 hours; now they get half-a-crown a day camp allowance.

7724. Up to 144?—Yes, up to 144 hours.

7725. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Do they find themselves out of that?—They have to be found entirely, except their journeys to and from camp; all their food and everything else has to be found out of that, and any remuneration that is given to the men is not recognised by us, but I have no doubt the commanding officers do give a certain amount of remuneration to the men in some cases.

7726. (*Sir John Edge.*) I was just coming to that; the expenses of taking them to the camp and taking them back again to the headquarters would either fall on the officers of the corps or on the Capitation Grant?—Not the travelling expenses; they get that.

7727. That is an allowance made to them?—That is an allowance made; they get their allowance going into camp, and that has always been the case, the actual travelling expenses.

7728. They are brought to camp free and taken back again?—Yes.

7729. And they get half-a-crown a day?—Yes, if they go into camp a certain number strong, 300 strong, they get 2s. 6d. a day for the days spent in camp and going to and fro; if they go less than 300 strong they get the allowance of 2s. for the days in camp only.

7730. Some corps probably could not put 300 men into camp?—No.

7731. There are corps which are not 300 strong?—That is so, but not many.

7732. What happens in those cases?—They get 2s. 6d. a day for actual days in camp only.

7733. You have had practical experience: would not a small corps require as much allowance per man, and even more ,than a large corps?—More money?

7734. Yes?—Yes, really they would; the 300 is fixed because that is considered the least number that a battalion is useful at for being exercised together; so that the rule has been made—and this is not a new rule, but a very old rule—that every corps to gain the first class allowance must be in camp 300 strong. That was only for 72 hours until this year.

7735. As a matter of fact, does the capitation grant run the corps? I know there are some corps that are self-supporting, where the men pay their own expenses?—There are a great many corps which are self-supporting, and with extremely good management it will support the corps. Under the new conditions, of course, it is difficult to say. They say now: "Oh, our uniforms will cost a great deal more; there will be a great deal more wear and tear of the clothing, and in some cases we cannot keep the men in camp for half a crown a day, and it will fall on our capitation fund; we shall have to go to musketry so many times, and that will all come on our funds." But up to now any carefully managed corps could do on the £1 15s.. Of course, there is an enormous difference in management; that we find constantly.

7736. Will the £1 15s. pay their railway expenses going to field days and things of that kind?—Yes; not the camp but the ordinary extra field days. In many cases, in all the corps where the men are at all better off, they pay those themselves.

7737. There are many corps where it has to be found out of the capitation grant or out of the pockets of the officers?—Yes, in some cases, the officers of the Volunteer Force give a very large sum of money to their corps.

7738. Prizes for keeping up musketry are given. Are those found out of the capitation grant or out of the officers' pockets?—Those come often out of the pocket of the Honorary Colonel of the Volunteer Corps. Very often he is a man in a very good position, and he gives a prize or two, but most of the prizes come out of the officers' pockets.

7739. I think I may take it that with the exception of a few corps, where there is not much difference between the officers and the men in social position, the officers have to put their hands in their pockets very extensively to run the corps, to keep it up in musketry, and to keep the corps going?—Yes, in one way or another.

7740. Is not that a greater deterrent in getting officers than the expense of the uniform?—Probably it is , the expenses of mess in camp form another thing, as the officers cannot mess themselves under from 8s. to 10s., and often more.

7741. I do not think they grumble about that; in most corps, in fact, with few exceptions, is there not a very heavy draw on the officers' pockets?—Yes, for prizes.

7742. And for the purpose of keeping the corps going?—Yes.

7743. Would not those expenses be more a deterrent to young men coming in as officers than the expense of buying a uniform, which would last from three to five years?—It is very curious, but I had not thought of that point of prizes, and I have no doubt that is so. I distribute prizes a very great deal, and I am perfectly astonished at the amount of prizes given. I know that tradesmen very often help a great deal.

7744. Have you ever gone into the question? Have you ever known an instance where the captain of a company has had to pay £150 a year to keep his company going?—No; I knew the captain of a Yeomanry squadron who paid a great deal more, but I never knew a Volunteer officer who had to pay that amount. The country owes a very great deal to the Volunteer body as a whole.

7745. Do you think that it is fair that those expenses should fall on the Volunteer officer? He gives his time, and pays his own extra expenses. Do you think it fair that the expenses over the capitation grant that are necessary really for keeping the corps running should fall on the Volunteer officer?—Are you alluding to prizes?

7746. Prizes and all that?—It would be very difficult to make any regulations as regards prizes, because they differ with every corps, and it is not a thing that is recognised.

7747. I know the difficulty; but will you agree with me in this, that in order to encourage musketry and to keep musketry as far to the front as you can, it is necessary to provide prizes in Volunteer corps?—Yes; it would be a most excellent thing; we do this in the Regular Army, but the value of the prizes is not great.

7748. Is it not almost necessary?—Yes, it is most desirable, because, after all, the shooting is the first thing.

7749. Do you not think that ought to be paid for by the country and not by the officer?—I wish I could see it done. I wish I could get the Volunteers a great deal more than they have.

7750. I do not know what the proposed regulations are about musketry, but why is it necessary under these regulations that they should go three or four times to the range?—The Volunteer Commanding Officers say they cannot carry it out under that time; the number of rounds has been increased.

7751. How many have they to fire?—Fifty-six now 14 of which are for collective practices.

7752. And how many courses?—Eight. The new regulations have not come to me, and I am speaking a little out of book without them. They told me it would take them three days, and that they are looking forward with apprehension; but the blow has not fallen yet.

7753. How many days does it take them to shoot their 56 rounds?—Some corps said they could do them in one. I see the discrepancy, but I am only telling you what they say.

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7754. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I understand from you that you ascribe the shortage in the Militia very much to the decrease of the agricultural labourer?—Yes, in the rank and file.

7755. If there was conscription or any form of conscription, the same thing would arise, as the men are not there?—Not in those districts.

7756. So that if you had any form of conscription in those districts there would be the same results—still a shortage?—There might be a shortage, but everybody would have to serve then; and, of course, now the shortage is only due to men not wishing to serve. If you compelled everybody to serve, which is not a custom I advocate in any way, you would probably rake in enough just to keep the battalions going even in those districts, because the shortage may come to some extent from disinclination to serve as well as from the decrease in numbers.

7757. Have you ascertained what the ratio of decrease in the agricultural labourer has been? Is it very marked?—Those are statistics I could not give you. I could get them, but I cannot give them straight off. I only know generally.

7758. Is it a marked decrease?—It is a marked decrease, very marked; the people have come to the towns. The same difficulty is beginning to arise in Germany, too, not that they cannot get the men, but that the men are flocking into the towns, and the physique is falling off.

7759. You mentioned an article of clothing, I think a cap, which in Germany would cost 5s. and here £3?—Yes, £2 18s. is the exact sum here.

7760. Is there much difference in the actual intrinsic value of it?—Not in the cap itself, but they put a lot of gold embroidery on our peak, and that is what makes it so expensive. Another reason, if I may pursue the subject of the expense, is that our buttons are most elaborately carved; in Germany the distinction is only known from what is on the shoulder, which we have also, and the buttons are perfectly plain, and that makes a difference of £1 in the cheapest garment we have, the patrol jacket. With plain buttons the price would be £1 less than it is with the elaborately carved buttons.

7761. Do you not think all that ought to be got rid of, the difference in the expense of the button, for instance?—Yes.

7762. If all that was got rid of and all this useless gold lace, would not the dress of the officer be very much reduced in price?—Very much reduced. I may say something has been done; gold stripes and gold embroidery have, to a great extent, been done away with, but it is in the case of a few small things like the cap, and so on, that the expense is caused.

7763. You say the difficulty is that the officers wish to have expensive things?—Yes, but I do not know that they care much about the gold lace on the peak of the cap. They like to have a smart uniform.

7764. But could you not have a smart uniform and well made without all this expense?—Yes; to begin with, we could have plain buttons, and that would be something. Ordinary plain clothes are not cheaper in Germany than in England, but the difference in the price of uniform is perfectly astounding. An infantry officer's tunic costs £3 10s. in Germany, while here it is £8, £9, and £10; an infantry officer's frockcoat costs £3 10s. in Germany, while here it costs from £7 to £8.

7765. And yet their uniform always looks smart, and they look smartly dressed?—Yes.

7766. I fancy it is only amongst a certain class of officer that the desire to have expensive uniforms exists?—It is so.

7767. If there was a hard and fast line drawn that a uniform was to be of that cheap description, all officers would have to acquiesce in it?—They would.

7768. Do you not think that is what ought to be done?—The uniform by the last Regulation has been decidedly cheapened and brought down, and every effort has been made in the last year or two to do that. As I said, the expense fell on the officers who already had the old uniform, who had to put away that and get another, but it was to the advantage of younger officers joining. It might be still further cheapened, and I know that every effort is being made to cheapen the uniforms.

7769. Do you think it is really the expense of the uniform and other expenses which deter many officers from joining these Auxiliary Forces?—Certainly.

7770. Therefore, it seems to me to be a very important matter, if that difficulty of expense could be got rid of?—Yes.

7771. (*Sir John Edge.*) Is not the smartness of the uniform to some extent a question of recruiting?—With men?

7772. And with officers?—Oh, yes, certainly, so that you must have the cheapness along with smartness.

7773. You would not have so many young officers going to the Volunteers if they had not a smart uniform to put on?—No, nor in the Regular Army either.

7774. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) With reference to the question just asked you, we had evidence that the corps which are called crack corps, which generally means smartly dressed, had been able to recruit much more easily than those which were not smart; the Inspector-General of Recruiting gave that evidence?—As to the Volunteers?

7775. No, in the Regular Army?—I think that is so; certainly the uniform has always drawn.

7776. That applies also to officers?—Yes.

7777. Sir John Jackson asked you whether you thought if the men got 3s. a day or 2s. 6d. a day clear of everything you would not get men of the better class of labourers?—A certain number, but I do not think enough.

7778. Have you taken into consideration that all those men of the better class of labourers are married men who could not be enlisted, and that in point of fact you would not get many more men?—That is so; I omitted to say that, but some of the men would naturally be single.

7779. Of course, they do not enlist any man who is married?—No.

7780. And the man with 3s. or 4s. a day is in the great majority of cases a married man?—Probably.

7781. And therefore he is not eligible to enlist?—No.

7782. You had to do a good deal with Militia regiments going out to the war from the time you took up the office?—Yes.

7783. We had it in evidence that only four regiments declined to go; that is to say, did not volunteer to go, but were there not a number of men in each regiment who stayed at home?—There were what are called Militia details.

7784. Without any reproach to themselves or their courage?—They said that they could not go abroad.

7785. Have you any idea what sort of proportion of men usually stayed behind?—I could hardly tell you that, but except in one or two cases it was not a very large proportion.

7786. And some officers, too?—There were a few officers, but very few.

7787. The Militia regiments generally went out rather weak?—They went out very weak as regards men, owing to the large number of Militia Reserves that were taken away, and I think I am right in saying that in the last battalions that went out they were obliged to have a strength of 400 rank and file only. With regard to the officers, they were made up, I do not say well, but in any way that it could be done, and they did not go out short of officers.

7788. It was given in evidence that in some cases there were only eight officers of the regiment available, and that two-thirds had to be brought in somehow?—They were brought in anyway, some Volunteer officers and a large number of young officers.

7789. That was a very bad system, was it not?—A very bad system, but we could not devise any better at the time.

7790. There were Engineer Volunteers who went out?—Yes, 50 or 54 officers and 1,100 odd men.

7791. Under what sort of organisation did they go out?—They went out in sections mostly, a company one or two, but sections mostly.

7792. When they arrived out there those sections were attached to Royal Engineer companies?—Yes, they did work on the railways, drove engines, and were very good men indeed. I believe the service was most excellent, both of the Volunteer and Militia Engineers.

7793. I do not remember anything being said as to Artillery Volunteers?—Yes, eight officers and 235 men; that was all that was wanted. There were a large number of Artillerymen who volunteered, but they were not wanted.

7794. What was done with them, were they attached to existing batteries?—They were mostly.

7795. And absorbed into them really?—Yes. Of course, that does not include the Honourable Artillery Company, which went out as part of the City Imperial Volunteers.

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7796. (*Chairman.*) Is there anything you wish to add?—No.

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(*After a short adjournment.*)

(*Several Tables were put in by Sir A. E. Turner. Vide Appendix Vol., pages* 161-167.)

Mr. Frank T. Marzials, C.B., Accountant-General, War Office, and Mr. C. Harris, Principal, Accountant-General's Department, examined.

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7797. (*Chairman.*) (*To Mr. Marzials.*) You are Accountant-General at the War Office?—That is so.

7798. When were you appointed to that office?—I was appointed in August, 1898.

7799. In your *précis** which you have been good enough to send to us, you have quoted the Orders in Council from 1870 onwards. I do not know that it is necessary to take you through them?—I should think not.

7800. Would you just tell us shortly the position of the Accountant-General in the War Office?—The position of the Accountant-General of the Army is twofold. In the first place he is assistant to the Financial Secretary, and advises him on all financial matters; he is the chief permanent financial officer in the War Office; and at the same time he occupies a somewhat curious Parliamentary position, inasmuch as he is Accounting Officer under the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1866; thus it is his duty, if the Department does anything that is *ultra vires* or contrary to Act of Parliament, or contrary to Treasury ruling, solemnly to protest that that is wrong.

7801. Is that a duty which you have to perform often?—I have never had to perform it.

7802. You say that as the chief permanent official on the Financial side, any propositions for expenditure made by the military departments come before you?—They would come before my branch, they would be considered by my branch, and probably come to me personally, and be by me submitted to the Financial Secretary.

7803. And those proposals may come in one of two ways: either in connection with the Annual Estimates, or as special propositions throughout the year?—That is so; they would be raised by the various branches concerned at any time during the year. If large proposals, they probably would not be kept until the Estimate period.

7804. Taking the first of the two, in connection with the Annual Estimates, what is your duty with regard to propositions put forward on that occasion?—My duty with regard to the Estimates is, in the first place, to criticise whatever proposals are made for expenditure, to turn those proposals into money, in so far as they represent increased expenditure, and in that form to see that they go before the Secretary of State.

7805. Before the Secretary of State direct; or do they pass through the Army Board now?—Under the present regulation they are submitted to the Army Board. The Army Board considers them, and proposes them to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State thereupon looks through them, gives a certain figure, and says, "Beyond that figure the Government is not prepared to go this year, and you must reconsider such proposals as go beyond that figure, and pick out those which are of the largest importance, and bring your proposals down to what there is money to pay for."

7806. Let us take it a little more in detail. In the first place, the Army Board grew up in the course of the war, did it not?—No, the Army Board is a Board which existed anterior to the war, but at the beginning of the war is was made rather into an Advisory Mobilisation and War Board, and after that, while the war was in progress, this duty of considering the Estimates was placed upon the Board.

7807. I think it is stated in your *précis* here, that on the 12th October, 1901, an office memorandum assigned that duty to the Army Board?—Yes, practically in the middle of the war.

7808. It was not until then that they had the Annual Estimates submitted to them?—That is so.

7809. You are a member of the Army Board?—I am a civil member of the Army Board.

7810. And the Assistant Under Secretary is also a member?—Yes.

7811. You are the two civilian members of the Army Board?—We are the two civilian members. We were both placed on the Army Board at the beginning of the war by Lord Lansdowne, not for the purpose of giving advice on any military questions that came before the Board, but as regards the Assistant Under Secretary, that he might inform the Secretary of State of what was going forward, and I, that I might advise the Board on the financial side.

7812. I have before me the evidence which you gave before Sir Clinton Dawkins' Committee, and I need not take you through the whole of it, but there you said on that point that as regards any military questions that arose you, and your financial colleague, were absolutely silent, and expressed no opinion, unless the Commander-in-Chief asked you for an expression of opinion on any particular point?—That is our attitude.

7813. But that when any question arose as to expense, then of course you gave your opinion?—That was so.

7814. Then the Army Board, having the Estimates put before them epitomised by the Finance Branch, come to a conclusion on them, and submit them to the Secretary of State. That is the procedure?—Yes.

7815. And then you say, and I think it also appeared in your previous evidence, that you have a sort of total given you. You say, "Generally we have some sort of total given us by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and we have to work the various Votes more or less down into those sums." Would you explain in what way that working down is carried out?—The proposals consist of a large number of detailed proposals, proposals varying in manner, involving additions to the various arms, Artillery, Engineers, Infantry, or for the Volunteers, and so forth; also various proposals, it may be for changes of patterns of clothing, or patterns of stores, or additional quantities, and these being all scheduled down, the Army Board considers which are of most importance and urgent, and which may be deferred to another year and need not be pressed at that time.

7816. Then the object being to get somewhere near the total given you, the result is again put before the Secretary of State?—That is so.

7817. The Secretary of State, if he approves, sends it on?—Yes. In all these matters, of course, a great many of these questions are matters upon which the Secretary of State himself has probably formed strong opinions, and he would not necessarily accept the Army Board ruling as to the relative importance, or he might even communicate to the Army Board his opinion that such and such things were of vital importance, and that whatever else was abandoned, those would have to go forward. The Secretary of State is not a mere recorder, of course, in these matters of what is placed before him.

7818. Oh, no; the Secretary of State, as we understand, is the over-ruling authority all through?—Quite so.

7819. But at what point would that communication of his views generally take place; after the first meeting to consider the Estimates, or after the second meeting?—I think it would take place after the first meeting probably.

7820. You would have it before you in considering how to work down, as you say?—Quite so.

7821. Then after the Estimates are agreed to in the War Office, I think we were told that it was the duty of the financial side to present them to the Treasury, and to give any explanations?—We then take all the various Votes; those which we have prepared ourselves, which are the *personnel* Votes, and those which we have prepared in concert with the military branches, as approved

* The *Précis* will be found on page 521 of this Volume.

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by the Army Board. Those are amalgamated and placed together, and each Vote separately is submitted to the Treasury, with an explanatory letter showing where there have been increases, what those increases are, what is the motive for them, and the reason for our action in proposing larger expenditure.

7822. In writing?—In writing.

7823. Who draws up that statement?—That is drawn up in my own branch.

7824. In some cases there must be technical details. Do you take those details from the military side?—Those are done in concert with the military side. I may say that in all these matters the two sides, the finance side and the military side, constantly work together. For instance, with regard to the Quartermaster-General's services, supplies, or with regard to the Director-General of Ordnance services, which are arms and ammunition, we practically do their finance for them; thus if the Director-General of Ordnance is going to consider any question, before he puts it forward he would by personal or written communication with the members of the Finance Branch find out exactly what the cost would be; and in the same way, in submitting these estimates, if there was any doubtful point it would go to him officially for his opinion as to the form in which it ought to go, or it would be arranged verbally as to which was the best way to put it.

7825. So that in going to the Treasury you would feel fully informed on those points?—Quite so.

7826. But we were told from the military side that any proceedings with the Treasury itself would be entirely the business of the financial side, and that the military heads of departments were not called into conference at all?—That is so; it is very rare that the military authorities are in direct communication with the Treasury upon any financial point.

7827. And in those communications with the Treasury is exception sometimes taken to the Estimates as put forward?—Occasionally it is.

7828. If objection was taken on some point of military administration or point where military opinion would be of value, would it not be better that the military heads should have an opportunity of explaining the necessities?—I do not know that in actual practice it comes to be very much the case. Any objection to any proposal is always referred to the military branch; they always have their say upon it. Then it would go to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State would decide as to whether he would accept the Treasury view or was prepared to contend for the view taken at the War Office of what was necessary. And then we should go back to the Treasury, but in going back to the Treasury we should always take care that the military view which was put forward in support of such expenditure was explained, and if it was a matter of any importance the Military Branch would see the letter. I should like to explain that adverse correspondence from the Treasury on the Estimates is not generally very great, because any large question, in fact most contentious questions, would have gone to the Treasury before the Estimates were in preparation, so that that estimate would, so far as the Treasury is concerned, be mainly a record of things already agreed to.

7829. Agreed to in principle, do you mean?—Quite so.

7830. It would be more a question of the amounts within the Estimates of the year?—Exactly.

7831. (*Viscount Esher.*) The Secretary to the Treasury used formerly to come over and discuss these matters personally with the Secretary of State, you know—the Under-Secretary of State for the War Department and the Accountant-General. Do those meetings still take place?—Occasionally.

7832. Not always before the Estimates?—Not always.

7833. It used to be so?—It was an informal thing that might or might not occur, and which might or might not occur now. In all probability on any large question of very great importance the Secretary of State would probably have discussed it with the Chancellor of the Exchequer now.

7834. (*Chairman.*) Of course, as the office memorandum assigning this duty of con sidering the Estimates to the Army Board was only dated the 12th October, 1901, you have not had very much experience?—No, that is so.

7835. But you told the Dawkins' Committee that you thought it a very valuable body and a very useful body?—That is my opinion.

7836. Only you complain that it does not always meet with regularity?—No, it has not met lately very much. While the war was in active operation, or at any rate up to the end of last year, it met very constantly—at the beginning it met almost daily, and then two or three times a week.

7837. But since then it has not met so regularly?—No; since the beginning of this year I do not think we have met very many times.

7838. You think it would be an advantage if it did meet more regularly?—In my opinion it would be of value.

7839. In order that at the Army Board the military opinion may be focussed and put forward?—Yes; and also I think (which they mostly themselves say) that for the general discussion of their own military wants it is an advantage for them to have the opinion of other military members who are men of eminence in the profession; so that it is of value as an advisory and consultative Board.

7840. Then you said just now that the chief matters that might be considered contentious are decided previously to the Estimates?—Yes.

7841. In inviting you to give evidence we asked whether in the years preceding the war any specific proposals for the expenditure of large sums on increasing warlike and other stores were definitely put forward by the heads of military departments, and if so what was the result of such action. In your *précis* you say you have a difficulty in answering that question?—I have a difficulty in answering that question, because these proposals are mainly proposals of detail. I do not remember anything that would be regarded as a large proposal, certainly no proposal for an increase of reserve of stores or anything of that kind, which was not fully considered and agreed to.

7842. We are quite aware that there was a large scheme put forward which was considered at the beginning of 1900, I think, by a Special Committee under Sir Francis Mowatt?—That was so, by Sir Francis Mowatt's Committee. But anterior to that Committee I do not recollect, nor have I been able to trace, any large proposal for a comprehensive scheme of warlike reserves, except in so far as we have certain reserves of warlike articles for the three Army Corps, two of which were to go abroad, and one of which was to remain at home. Beyond that I can trace no large scheme of the kind.

7843. I do not know that we said any large comprehensive scheme, but what we wanted to ascertain was if one of those matters which you yourself alluded to as contentious was put forward by one of the military departments, what would happen to it?—I may say with regard to the store Vote that up to the year 1897 our financial intervention with regard to it was scarcely anything. The Director-General of Ordnance had his own small financial body; he used to prepare his own estimates, putting in what he thought was necessary, and that did not come to us in any detail for consideration. His proposals were discussed by him with the Secretary of State for War, possibly in the presence of the Accountant-General of that time, but not necessarily. At any rate, we had no details as to what he put into the Store Vote—that was up to 1897. So that with regard to that I cannot from my finance side tell you as to what was proposed and what was struck out. Nothing was struck out by us, nor, one may say, officially struck out, with financial knowledge. What was done was done between the Director-General of Ordnance and the Secretary of State. A Vote would be put forward proposing so much for small arms, so much for ammunition, and so on, and the Secretary of State of that date might say, "I am not prepared to give you these sums; you must reduce them," and the Director-General of Ordnance would knock off a certain sum. But in what form he knocked it off, or how he was working the total he took into his Vote, I could not tell you.

7844. But that is all in connection with the preparation of the Estimates?—Yes.

7845. But you say in your *précis*—these are your words—"New proposals come forward all through the year. If urgent and approved, and if money is available,

they are, with Treasury consent if necessary, carried into immediate effect." Those new proposals which are urgent would come to you?—I do not know that up to 1897 these proposals would have come to us unless there was a deliberate excess on the Vote, because we did not know the detail of the Vote.

7846. Then take it after 1897. I am not speaking only of the Director-General of Ordnance Vote?—The Vote of the Director-General of Ordnance naturally would be the main Vote to which considerations of that kind would apply. As regards the Supply and Transport Vote, from the nature of the case there is not so very much to come forward in the way of new proposals, because the supply of the Army depends upon its numbers; the charge for food and the charge for forage depend upon the number of men and horses and upon the prices; there is not much there that is subject to policy; any increase or decrease is almost in one sense automatic. With regard to the Works Vote (the Inspector-General of Fortifications Vote) I do not remember any scheme that has been put forward that has been blocked. Several proposals for individual buildings have been put forward, no doubt, and those have been either objected to because there was not money, or have been left to be placed on loan, because there have been a succession of loans in 1897, 1899, and 1901, on which larger buildings have been placed. But I do not recollect any block of expenditure.

7847. You said just now, in explaining why questions did not arise on the preparation of the Estimates, that contentious matters would have been disposed of beforehand?—Yes, generally.

7848. That surely presupposes that there were contentious matters?—Quite so; I am not disputing that there have been contentious matters.

7849. Cannot you carry your recollection to some contentious matter during those years preceding the war?

7850. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) How about barrack accommodation?—With regard to barrack accommodation, there have been large proposals, but those large proposals for barrack accommodation have been rather postponed than anything else. They have been met, so far as they could be met, by the loans of 1890, 1897, 1899, and 1901, in each of which loans provision has been made for such an amount of barracks as could be executed within the next few years, after the passing of each loan respectively.

7851. But was there not for years a considerable block on that subject? How about the barracks at Dublin?—I think it is perfectly possible that while the loans were in contemplation work on barracks has been postponed. There is no doubt that up to within the last eight or nine years barracks had got very considerably behind; they had got behind in accommodation, and had also got behind in this, that they were barracks of an old and antique type, which had to be brought in many ways up to modern standards of convenience.

7852. (*Viscount Esher.*) But that cannot be done under the loan; it is not possible to do that under the loan. The loan only deals with the construction of new barracks; is not that so?—No. Items have been taken upon various loans not only for construction of new barracks, but also for bringing old barracks up to modern requirements. There was a loan in 1890, there was a loan in 1897, there was a loan in 1899, and there was a loan in 1901, and that does not exhaust the ultimate requirements. Up to the time when loans have been authorised, there is no doubt that the barracks have not been brought up to their proper standard.

7853. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) For years there was serious complaint upon the subject?—Yes.

7854. On account of their insalubrity?—Dublin was very insalubrious at one time.

7855. And Aldershot obsolete?—The huts at various places were of an obsolete kind.

7856. (*Chairman.*) But you mention here three or four cases of increase; in artillery in 1897; in ammunition in 1897, conversion of batteries in 1898, small arms in 1895, small arms and ammunition in 1895, all of which I suppose were proposals which would have come under the contentious class, and, at any rate, would have had some discussion. Those were all sanctioned according to your statement?—Yes, those were all sanctioned.

7857. Are there none within your recollection? It seems strange that there should be none during the same course of years which were not sanctioned?—I am afraid I do not recollect anything of the kind that has been blocked. You place me in rather a difficult position in this matter, because if any of the military representatives who have been before you had produced any case, or said, "In such and such a year we made such and such a proposal, that proposal we considered of importance, and it was blocked," I could have told you whether it was blocked on financial grounds or on grounds of policy, or what not; but it is very difficult for me to meet a negative, as it were.

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7858. Then your evidence comes to this, that so far as you know, no demands were made from the military side of the War Office during those years which took the form of contentious matter, and were refused by the Treasury?—No, I will not say that, because a vast number of these matters are matters of detail, which certainly could have no ultimate importance, as affecting what may be regarded as the politics of the Army. I certainly cannot say that during that time there have been no refusals on the part of the Treasury. If you like I can give you a return of the applications made to the Treasury, or of cases in which we have gone to the Treasury, and in which the Treasury have given us a refusal, and that refusal has not afterwards been withdrawn on our returning to the charge.

7859. I should like to see it very much?—I could get you out such a return as that. (*The return was subsequently sent in. Vide Appendix Vol., page* 298.)

7860. (*Viscount Esher.*) Is it not the fact that year after year the military authorities have put forward demands largely in excess of what has ultimately been granted either by the War Office or the Treasury?—Most certainly, last year.

7861. And year after year; take any vote you like?—I suppose year after year, yes; if you put it in that way, that what the military authorities have demanded has been in excess of what has been the ultimate grant; but when you come to ask me to give you an exact return of what was put forward it is very difficult for me to do so, because those things have not been put forward always as specific plans or as a specific scheme. If a specific scheme or plan was put forward I could answer you easily, of course; but it has probably been settled, say, in an unofficial communication, "it is no good putting this forward," and therefore the thing has not been put forward. But if you ask me, for instance, as to last year's proposals that came before the Army Board, in 1901 those proposals were considerably in excess of what was ultimately sanctioned by the Government.

7862. (*Chairman.*) I had two objects; one was that, and the other was to know what the procedure was: That if you went to the Treasury with a contentious matter, was the refusal simply given by the Treasury on their own information or from their own point of view, or was there any further discussion on which the military opinion was given an opportunity of being heard?—Certainly, that refusal would distinctly go back to the military authorities concerned, and in some cases they might say, "It is not worth pressing," or in other cases they would say, "It is worth pressing." Then it would go to the Secretary of State for War, and the Secretary of State would decide whether he should press it or not. In a matter in which he was greatly concerned he would probably press it by personal interview; if not, it would go back into office course, and we would press it by letter, or possibly by personal communication with the Treasury itself.

7863. In the case of the Secretary of State, of course his communications would be with the Chancellor of the Exchequer?—Yes.

7864. And your communications would be with whom?—Our communications would be with the permanent officials of the Treasury.

7865. In the case of a branch of the War Office that felt itself starved in its staff, how would an application in that matter be be dealt with?—That application would go to the Permanent Under-Secretary, who is responsible for the office administration; he would decide whether the increase was necessary or not, and on that it would go to the Treasury.

7866. Where would it come to you?—Probably a matter of that kind would come to me as regards the expense of it.

7867. Before it went to the Secretary of State?—Yes, quite so. The official procedure is that when any branch makes a proposal which involves expense, that

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proposal shall come to me, or my branch, for estimate of expense, and any remarks that I have to make upon it, then it shall go from me to the Financial Secretary, and then to the originator in the military branch for him to submit it to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State having on the original proposal the financial remarks upon it, and the ultimate remarks of the military branch. You will understand, of course, that in a great many cases we say: "We agree"; if it is not a matter of importance, it does not go to the Secretary of State at all. If we think there is money for it, and we think it reasonable, the Financial Secretary would say "Agreed," and there is an end of it.

7868. That is, if there is money for it?—Yes.

7869. But if there is any question of getting it sanctioned, it would have to go to the Secretary of State?—Yes, quite so.

7870. But you say that sometimes propositions are not put forward because the department feels that there is no chance of getting them sanctioned?—Yes, I imagine that is the case.

7871. Have you had any proposals before the war or during the war from the Intelligence Branch for an increase of staff?—Yes, there was a proposal for an increase of staff. I think there were two; there was a proposal for an increase of staff during the war, which I think was granted.

7872. Can you give us the date?—I am afraid I cannot.

7873. You could get it, I suppose?—Yes, with pleasure.

7874. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Was that long before the war?—No, it was not long before the war; it was during the war.

7875. (*Chairman.*) There was nothing before the war that you remember?—Nothing that I remember. I will get you the information with pleasure, and will send it you. I have no recollection of their making an application before the war. There was an application during the war, which was assented to, and then I think there was a later application, which is pending now; in fact, it is under the consideration of a committee, of which I am a member, as regards their future staff generally.

7876. So we heard?—I do not remember any application anterior to the war; but I will look it up.

7877. You do not remember any proposition for an increase of staff in the Intelligence Division being refused?—No, I do not remember it before the war. Shall I take a note of it?

7878. If you please. And you will also take a note of the Treasury refusal?—Yes. (*The statement was subsequently sent in. Vide Appendix Vol., page* 301.) How far would you like the note of refusal to extend back?

7879. We should like it, as we put it here, in the years preceding the war?—1895?

7880. Yes, 1895 would do. Then have you any relation to the Director of Contracts?—My relations with the Director of Contracts are very small. The only point at which I intervene with the Director of Contracts is if the Director of Contracts has made a contract, and that contract, for any reason, has to be broken or altered in any way; then the Treasury has to intervene, and I, as representing the Treasury at the War Office, have to intervene, too; that is to say, that any proposal to go outside a contract once made has to come to me before it goes to the Treasury for authority for rescinding or altering; but as regards the making of the contract, or as regards the price that the Director of Contracts gives, I am prepared to give him any information that he wants from my branch; but otherwise I have no control over and no relation to him.

7881. He takes his information from the spending department, and makes the contract, and reports it?—He makes the contract and reports it to us, so that when the sum is paid we see that it is paid in accordance with the contract.

7882. Your duty is only with regard to the payment being in accordance with the contract?—Yes. One thing also we have to see, that is, that before he makes the contract he has money to pay for it, that he is not exceeding the amount we have for payment; but on the contract itself we have no say.

7883. And if a difficulty arises on the question of the amount of money available, what happens then?—The contract cannot be made. We say that is a stopper. If a proposal is put forward for which there is no money voted by Parliament for that year, we can only proceed with it on the assumption that money can be available either on some other item in the Vote itself or on some other Vote of Parliament, the transfer from Vote to Vote we can only effect with Treasury consent.

7884. And if there is an important contract, and a difficulty arises, is it your duty then to go to the Treasury on the matter?—It is our duty to go to the Treasury, but that is purely on the question of availability of funds.

7885. But we can imagine a case in which an important contract emerges rather suddenly, and a difficulty arises. Then it would be your duty, if possible, to arrange with the Treasury?—Yes.

7886. Do you know any case where there has been difficulty in consequence in getting the money at all?—No, that is not at all a usual case. You will quite understand that in answering that question I am answering you according to ordinary peace and normal arrangements. During the war there was no question of that kind. From the very beginning of the war anything that was wanted for war purposes was got and obtained; there was no question of availability of money or not. The money had to be found.

7887. After the 22nd of September, 1899?—Yes, from that date onward, as regards efficiency of the Service, no question of money was allowed to intervene.

7888. Before the 22nd of September there was a question?—Yes. As I daresay the Director-General of Ordnance told you, from the end of September he had a free hand; there was no question of availability of money on his Vote, or anything else. He ordered week by week whatever he wanted, and simply reported it to the Army Board *pro formâ* at the end of the week.

7889. Then, you represent that from 1896 to 1899 you had made all necessary provision for the equipment of the three Army Corps and other troops?—In the specific articles which I have mentioned in my *précis*.

7890. And you say in your *précis* that on the 31st of March, 1899, the total value of stores in the storehouses was eight and a-half millions, of which nearly three millions were at Woolwich?—That is so.

7891. And that you considered was a full equipment?—It was a full equipment, but, of course, the idea of what is a full supply changed very much as the war went on. Anterior to the war there was an equipment of what the troops had in hand, and a certain reserve beyond that; but with the war the feeling of the desirability of a very large reserve at the back of that grew enormously with regard to all articles.

7892. Was it not the case that the equipment of the First Army Corps practically exhausted all the reserves in many articles?—The articles required for the equipment of the three Army Corps were all there, and beyond that there was a certain amount of equipment; but that amount of equipment, particularly of articles that were especially required for South Africa, was very soon exhausted. I am speaking of general stores.

7893. You mention here in your *précis* the inquiry by Sir Francis Mowatt's Committee into the scheme of the Director-General of Ordnance. Did not that proceed on statements by the Director-General of Ordnance that his reserves were exhausted, and were not sufficient?—Certainly, that the reserves were exhausted, and were not sufficient. But, in that scheme which he put forward, he greatly extended the idea of the reserves that ought to be kept. It was an idea beyond what had been recognised before that time.

7894. That is so, I think; but, at the same time, even as it stood, I think his statement conveyed that there was not sufficient in store to do what he was required to do at that time?—I believe that is so; that beyond what the troops actually took with them there was not a sufficient feeding supply after that.

7895. He was dealing with the despatch of the first Army Corps; because I think this arose in November, 1899, and even then in some articles he was short of the number that he required?—He was short of the number that he required to send out.

7896. Then, surely, that is not a full supply for three

Army Corps in that case?—I beg your pardon; I am only specifying in my *précis* certain particular articles of which the supply was adequate. Those you observe are warlike articles: Guns for horse and field artilery, ammunition for horse and field artillery, small arms, and small arm ammunition. I am not speaking of stores generally in this document.

7897. But I was reading a little further up in the paragraph just above, in which you say that you "had made all necessary provision for their equipment, *i.e.*, we had locked up in special storehouses the complete 'mobilisation equipment' the troops have in war, but not in peace"?—That is so; they had the articles that they required for their immediate equipment; but there was no reserve behind.

7898. But, so far as I understood the position of the Director-General of Ordnance, he had not enough for more than his first Army Corps, and not always enough for that?—Mr. Harris here is in charge of Store matters, and he will be better able to deal with that. (*Mr. Harris.*) The explanation is that the mobilisation equipment, as it is called, for three Army Corps was complete—that is, the fighting line was completely equipped—but the Ordnance Department had no reserves, further than the mobilisation equipment, for any expeditionary force on any large scale, or even on the scale of one Army Corps.

7899. Take the first item that is mentioned by the Director-General of Ordnance, viz., harness. He says: "We had 500 single sets in reserve, less than sufficient for five batteries. I had already had to send 800 single sets to South Africa to replace casualties" (*vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 278)?—The whole of the equipment of harness for the first three Army Corps was in store, but the waste of the war was so rapid and so unforeseen that in a very short time what small reserve there was behind the mobilisation equipment ran out. The theory had been, I think, that harness and general stores of that character could be obtained rapidly from the trade of the country when war was declared or was absolutely in sight. That was found not to be the case.

7900. This was in December, 1899?—Yes.

7901. There had not been much waste of war by that time; the first Army Corps had hardly arrived then; but in December, 1899, according to the statement of the Director-General of Ordnance, when he was giving evidence, he reported: "At that time we had 500 single sets in reserve, less than sufficient for five batteries. I had already had to send 800 single sets to South Africa to replace the casualities"?—Yes. All the batteries that existed were completely equipped with harness, quite apart from the 500 sets in reserve, but the wear and tear of that harness, and the loss of harness through the loss of guns in action, which was altogether unprecedented, very quickly exhausted the reserve. At the same time numerous fresh field batteries were raised and added to the Army, and there was not sufficient harness to equip them.

7902. In regard to clothing, the Director-General of Ordnance stated that his reserves of clothing were "inadequate to meet even peace requirements"?—The whole question of clothing, as regards the South African war was, I think, dominated by the fact that the pattern of the clothing in which the men were to fight was only settled in July, 1899, speaking from memory. There was then practically nothing of the kind in existence. The cloth out of which their clothes were made had to be manufactured to a new pattern after that date.

7903. His statement was that the reserves were inadequate, even for peace requirements. That was before the war broke out. And the Director-General of Ordnance stated that he had asked for a reserve of clothing to be provided equal to six months ordinary issue, but that that demand had not gone forward?—I think Mr. Marzials can explain that. (*Mr. Marzials.*) That was a very large demand for clothing that was made after the estimates for that year had been framed, and it was so large that it could not have been met, out of any funds then available, without a supplementary estimate; therefore, the demand was kept over for the next year's estimates. In the meanwhile, the war supervened, and that demand became a thing of the past.

7904. That was a contentious case then?—Precisely. That was a contentious case, which would have come up in the next year's estimates, as to whether the Secretary of State and the Treasury would approve it. It was a large sum—about £335,000.

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7905. But when it did come up in the first instance, what happened to it? It was put forward by the Director-General of Ordnance, I take it?—It was put forward by the Director-General of Ordnance, and it was kept back in the first place because there was time enough to go into it before the next year's estimates, and, secondly, because as soon as the war began it was not any good going into it.

7906. (*Viscount Esher.*) In what month was it put forward?—It was put forward from Pimlico in February, but not sent on to the Finance Branch till May. (*Mr. Harris.*) It was after the year's Estimates had been published.

7907. (*Chairman.*) And then it was kept back?—Yes.

7908. (*To Mr. Marzials.*) How was it kept back?—One of the gentlemen in my branch, who is now retired, was making some calculations as to the cost, and he did not hurry over it, because he knew that it could not be practically considered till July or September.

7909. (*Viscount Esher.*) But how did he know that? He took the responsibility practically of saying whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer would grant the money or not?—Everybody would have known perfectly well that no Chancellor of the Exchequer would have granted a supplementary estimate at that time of the year on what was, after all, not a matter of extreme urgency. The Director-General of Ordnance, in putting the question forward, did not ask for money till the following year.

7910. (*Chairman.*) But the whole question is who decides on the question of urgency?—In this particular matter there was clearly no urgency. (*Mr. Harris.*) May I say, as I had something to do with the matter, that it was recognised by the authorities at the Army Clothing Department, who put the demand forward, that it was not, so to speak, practical politics to expect the Chancellor of the Exchequer to immediately alter the Army Estimates when they had just been laid before the House. It was sent forward rather as indicating to the Secretary of State that there would be an important demand for a reserve of clothing to be met, if money should become available from any other service during the year and, if not, then at any rate on next year's Estimates. The Director-General of Ordnance, who was responsible for clothing at that time, did not at any time hasten action on that paper or complain that it had been delayed, or lay the matter himself before the Secretary of State.

7911. (*Chairman, to Mr Marzials.*) I only want to clear up how the matter works, and this particular case gives us an illustrtion. In this case it may be, as you said, that it was not a matter of extreme urgency, but the fact remains that a demand put forward by the head of a military department was in this case simply put aside by the action of an official in your department?—Exactly so. But I would ask you to understand that that was by no means a typical case.

7912. But supposing that it was not done in that way, but that the demand came into your office, and was brought up to you, would you then, under any circumstances, have reserved it?—If the demand had been put forward as urgent, I should not have reserved it for a moment. I should have put it on to the Financial Secretary, and said, "Here is a proposal for which there are such and such grounds, some grounds of urgency, and some not. It is desirable in itself? Is the Secretary of State prepared to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give him a Supplementary Estimate for it?" I know perfectly well what the answer would have been: That the Secretary of State was not prepared to do it. But that is what would have been done in ordinary course.

7913. Then does that mean that in any case, not exactly of this sort, but of a large sum being put forward by the head of a Department in this way, the decision to reserve it would, as a rule, come from the Secretary of State himself?—Certainly; if it was put forward as an urgent matter from the branch, it would be for the Secretary of State for War himself to say whether he considered it a thing of sufficient urgency for him to press it on the Treasury, in view of a supplementary estimate. Mr. Harris tells me that the

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military branch was perfectly cognisant of the keeping back of the paper, and assented to it.

7914. Is there any other point to which you would like to call the attention of the Commission?—I do not know that there is. I am a little ignorant as to the points on which evidence has been already given to you with regard to the accounts of the war, or with regard to the payment of the troops in South Africa, and the delay which has occurred with regard to that.

7915. We have had evidence with regard to that, but if there is anything that has come before your Department particularly that you wish to mention we shall be glad to hear it?—The whole of that would come before my Department, of course.

7916. Have you to deal with all the claims for pay of Reservists, and so on?—We have to see that they are settled. They are locally settled by the companies or the corps that discharge them, and send them away, but any failure in that respect, or anything of that kind, has to be brought to me, and I have to see that it is done.

7917. A good many difficulties have been mentioned to us with regard to closing accounts?—There are a great many that have been mentioned. I do not know whether you would like to have any details as to the system of the pay of the Army. It is a system of payment by company—the company officer is the officer who pays his men and settles with them. That system is exposed to a most terrible strain on active service, because, of course, the Captain of the company has not only to pay his men and to keep in touch with his finances, but he has also to look after stores, to look after his men, to feed them, and do everything else, and finance is, as it were, a mere corner in the work of a man who is already terribly overworked; and, without any question, that system, I hardly like to say, broke down—but at any rate the strain was very great. The men, moreover, were scattered about, and did not even remain with their own companies; they were left sick, they were transferred to other bodies; they were left naturally without documents in the field, and in the result there were great breaks between the periods at which they had been settled with, and the periods at which they had to be settled with again, and when they got to the port of embarkation to come home, in the early part of the war more especially, their settlement sheets, showing the dates to which they were settled with in South Africa, were terribly wanting. The men came here without documents, and they had to be settled here, making often claims with respect to periods of pay in South Africa which it was extremely difficult to investigate. We have done all we possibly can about it; we have taken even the very slightest evidence that money was due as sufficient, and have tried to settle with the men as fast as we can. With regard to the future, we are considering a system by which the Captain of the company shall, so far as possible, be relieved of all accounting. I do not see myself how he can ever be relieved of the actual payment to the men. He is the only person who has them before him, therefore the actual passing of money must be between the Captain and the men; and also, I think it is a very good matter of discipline that the Captain should be in touch with the men, and should know what is due to them, what they are spending, what necessaries they require, and all the rest of it. But as regards the accounting, the keeping of the accounts of the men, I think we shall be able to take that away from the Captain of the company, and to put it upon the Paymaster, making the Paymaster the Accounting Officer, and the Captain simply the Cashier, with the simplest possible account of cash receipts and cash expenditure.

See Q 18911.

7918. (*Viscount Esher.*) The captain is a sub-accountant, is he not?—The captain is a sub-accountant, and he has now what would be a fairly elaborate account to keep, which is a very heavy burden upon a combatant officer, situated as the officers were out in the centre of South Africa.

7919. (*Chairman.*) We have had evidence from the Imperial Yeomanry that it was quite unworkable?—Yes, with men unaccustomed to such accounts, that probably was so.

7920. That is now under consideration, you say?—Yes, with a view to a new system of payment. Mark you, I do not know that any system of payment that you will ever be able to devise will be altogether satisfactory as regards such a war as you had in South Africa, where the men were so disseminated, where the documents that they carried were so liable to come to grief, either by capture or through stress of circumstances. I have been told that the first thing that the Boers did, if ever they captured a body of men, was to take their papers and burn them. The proposal is that in any similar campaign in future the accounts of the men should be kept at the base, and that merely a record of what had been paid to them by the captain should be sent down to the base, there to be booked against them and recorded. That such a system would be an improvement upon the existing system I have no doubt, but whether it would absolutely meet the enormous difficulties of paying a vast body of men over such a large space, and with such contingencies as occurred in South Africa, I do not know.

7921. With regard to the accounts in general, do the accounts in South Africa come to you?—Yes they do; they come to me for examination.

7922. And have you examined the contracts formed in South Africa?—Yes, of course, but the examination of our accounts is a cash examination. My examiner would see that there was a contract, or that there was an engagement to pay the money, that that money had been paid, that there was a voucher for it, and that it had been properly brought to account; but he would not go behind as to the regularity of the contract itself, as to whether it would have been possible for the store officer to have purchased stores at a cheaper rate than he actually did; that would not be in his province as an examiner. Of course, I know, as a matter of fact, that there have been cases in which prices have been questioned, but those have not come to me out of the accounts, as it were.

7923. It would not be your business to report upon any wasteful expenditure?—It would be my business to report upon any wasteful expenditure if it was brought before me in any way.

7924. But it would not naturally arise out of your examination?—That is so. I may say that I represent the War Office before the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons, and one or two of these questions have come in very much there. I had to go into the question of the original meat contract for 1899, but that I had to do simply, as representing the War Office—not because it came to me particularly as a matter of audit.

7925. (*Viscount Esher.*) But you have examiners under you?—Oh, yes.

7926. Although they do not examine the prices of the contracts, I suppose your examiners do examine the prices given for materials which are not bought by contract?—In those cases there is a local order for the purchase, which is equivalent to a contract; we should have to take it as equivalent to a contract. I do not mean to say that if my examiner found something that was, *primâ facie*, exorbitant or high, he would not bring it to my notice, and I should then ask the Director of Contracts to go into it. But habitually he is not examining to that point. The examination of the contract itself is the Director of Contracts' work.

7927. But the bills, apart from the contracts, are examined, are they not, or do you consider that every bill assumes a contract?—The purchase is either made under contract, in which case we see that it corresponds with the contract, or if it is made under circumstances in which the controlling officer says, "A contract was not possible, but there are fair prices," we should habitually accept it. (*Mr. Harris.*) May I say, in addition to that, that the vouchers in accounts for purchases under contracts or not under contracts, or for contracts made, not by the Director of Contracts, are referred to the Director of Contracts in the ordinary routine of the office, so that he may exercise a better criticism than the Accountant-General's office can.

7928. (*To Mr. Marzials.*) Then it is his business, and not yours, to check prices?—Yes, quite so; a bill of that kind is a *quasi* contract.

7929. I see your point. Then, about that company system of payments—you prefer that, do you, to any other which has been suggested?—I cannot very well myself see how it would be possible to have a cashier, apart from the captain of the company, going round and paying the men. You could not parade them once a week; they are, generally, some on furlough, some

here, there, and elsewhere, and there are many of them at places where there is no Paymaster at all.

7930. But has it ever occurred to you that you might have a system of regimental Paymasters?—Yes, you could have a regimental Paymaster; but the regimental Paymaster never paid anything to the men. Under the old system, which was called the regimental Paymaster system, the captain still paid the men. What the regimental Paymaster did was to take the captain's account and check it, and send it in. There was no difference in principle between the old arrangement and the present arrangement.

7931. But there is no reason, is there, why you should not have regimental Paymasters who would pay the men?—It would be a costly process.

7932. Why?—Because you would have to have considerably more Paymasters; it would do as regards a Line battalion, but it would scarcely do as regards the Engineers, the Army Service Corps, or the Artillery; you would want a Paymaster for each company or battery.

7933. But as regards battalions of infantry, or regiments of cavalry, what objection would there be, apart from the expense, which you say is an objection, to have regimental Paymasters?—It could be done, no doubt—that is quite possible, so long as the regiment remains all at one place, that is, together; but directly it is detached, as the regiment is very often, even in this country, and habitually out in the field, the system of detailed cash payment by a regimental Paymaster would break down. It breaks down so soon as the Paymaster is not on the spot, and in the same barracks with the men.

7934. I suppose that means that special arrangements would have to be made?—I do not quite see what special arrangements could be made.

7935. When a regiment was broken up in detachments. Otherwise, surely in peace time, at any rate, there would be no difficulty, would there, in substituting a regimental Paymaster for the present system?—It could be done, without question.

7936. From your point of view, I mean; there may be other difficulties with which you have nothing to do; but from your own point of view you do not see any particular difficulty?—I do not see any great difficulty, but I am afraid I do not see any great advantage.

7937. That is another question; that is only assuming that the company system is not considered desirable on military grounds, with which you have nothing to do?—Yes, quite so.

7938. With regard to criticism of military proposals, you used the phrase that it was the duty of the Accountant-General to criticise proposals. What did you mean exactly by that?—That is a very moot question.

7939. What did you personally mean?—What I personally mean is that I claim for myself, for my branch, the right to give what may be described as apart from the purely military view, the common sense view of an individual who has some knowledge of military matters, as to the desirability of a thing or not.

7940. That is to say, it comes to this: that on any proposal put forward by, say, the Director-General of Ordnance, you would think yourself justified, from the office you hold, in putting a minute upon this paper expressing an opinion as to whether the proposal was or was not desirable?—I should be justified. I should not always do it. In the first place, it is obviously a claim to which I should be the last to strain; and, secondly, apart from that point, I consider that the Director-General of Ordnance on questions of the kind is far more competent to give an opinion than myself; but at the same time, if necessity arose, I should exercise the claim.

7941. Putting yourself altogether on one side, you know perfectly well that it has been the practice of the Accountant-General very frequently to put minutes on papers expressing his own view as to what proposal was or was not necessary?—That is so. It is, of course, for the Secretary of State to take that minute for what it is worth when it goes before him.

7942. Then the Chairman asked you about the relation between the Treasury and the War Office in regard to proposals for the expenditure of large amounts which have been put forward and rejected. If you take a vote like Vote X., which is the Inspector-General of Fortifications Vote, of course, of late years things have been made much easier owing to the fact that they have been able to obtain money by loan; but, still, apart from that, the Inspector-General of Fortifications has annually put forward very considerable demands for maintenance which does not come under the loan?—That is so.

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7943. Is it not the fact that year after year the amount which he has put forward for maintenance has been cut down either in the War Office or by the Treasury?—It has been cut down, no doubt; but I think it has often been cut down by the Inspector-General of Fortifications himself, because otherwise he would not have got his large Part I. services—his larger demands.

7944. Then let us take Part I. and Part II. in conjunction. I am taking the Votes now as apart from the loan?—Yes, I quite follow you; and then there is also this, that if you take some of the larger things which involve large buildings or involve purchase of land, probably those might fall through, and that so far as they fell through with Treasury consent he might apply the savings towards maintenance. But I perfectly agree with you, that maintenance is a thing that has been starved in the past—that it ought not to be starved, and that it is wasteful to starve it.

7945. But I wish to get it on the notes that the Estimates for the Inspector-General of Fortifications' branch are primarily prepared in the Inspector-General of Fortifications' Department. Is not that so?—Yes.

7946. He prepares the Estimates, roughly estimating the amount?—Yes.

7947. They are subsequently submitted to you?—Yes.

7948. Then the point is this: that the Inspector-General of Fortifications, having put these Estimates forward upon his own responsibility, amounting to a certain figure, year after year they have undergone the process of cutting down, whether by the War Office or the Treasury does not matter?—Although in substance you are right, I am not quite sure that you are right in the actual fact. I could easily look through the Estimates for the past year and see how they have been presented, but my impression is not that they have been cut down after the Inspector-General of Fortificatons had dealt with them, but that he himself cut them down.

7949. I think you may take it from me that it was not so?—Of course, practically it comes to the same thing.

7950. You are responsible for all the forms, are you not, in which accounts are kept throughout the Army?—Yes.

7951. Have you, during the last year, attempted to simplify them?—There has been some attempt to simplify the Army Accounts, and with regard to this proposal, which I tell you is being considered at the present moment, of the Account being kept by the Paymaster, and only the payment to the men being effected by the captain, there will be a simplification of account with regard to that—a great simplification so far as the company officer himself is concerned.

7952. Was not all that question gone into by the Dawkins Committee?—Yes, they did go into the accounts.

7953. But anyhow your view is, I suppose, that the Accounts of the Army might be simplified very much?—I am afraid I do not know that they can be simplified very much in view of what they have to produce. You see, not only have you to produce your various charges, but you have to classify them in a certain way, which is rendered necessary by the form in which the House of Commons expects the Account to be classified and submitted to them, but you have also besides that to meet——

7954. When you say the House of Commons you mean, I suppose, the Comptroller and Auditor-General?—No. I mean the House of Commons.

7955. Do you think the House of Commons ever takes the trouble to go into the question as to the form?—Yes; they have a Committee on Public Accounts, you know. I do not think that you can ever avoid classifying your expenditure in the same way in which the Estimate is produced.

7956. You think, then, that on the whole no great simplification of the Army Accounts is possible?—Except so far as the change of system in making the company officer less an accountant than he is now will

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simplify his accounts. In that respect I think to him (which is of enormous importance) it will be a great simplification.

7957. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Have you sufficient acquaintance with the regimental system of payment to say whether there would not be a considerable difficulty in adopting the plan that was thrown out by Lord Esher of making a regimental paymaster pay the men in this way, for instance: Every man has more or less a sort of rendering of accounts with his captain, which includes a great many things—not only his pay, but reductions made from his pay, which vary from month to month, and he has to be in constant communication every month with the pay sergeant. What would the function be of the pay sergeant then? Would he not necessarily be under the paymaster rather than under the captain if the paymaster paid him?—I imagine that the pay-sergeant's function would to a very great extent cease, and that the paymaster with his clerks would be a kind of cashier.

7958. Do you think it would be a desirable alteration from the previous system?—I do not think so myself.

7959. Has it not always been thought in the British Army that one of the captain's most important functions and one of his most useful functions as regards knowing his men is that he has the payment of them direct?—That is my opinion.

7960. And that it would be very injurious to the Army to do away with the system?—That is my own opinion, certainly.

7961. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) But as he has to pay the men, must he not be an accounting officer?—He would be an an accounting officer, but of a simple kind. At the present moment he has to keep a ledger account of each man in his company. In the case proposed the ledger account of each man in his company would not be kept by him, but by the paymaster; all that the captain of the company would do would be to pay the men 5s, 6s., 7s., keeping a simple account of that which he would render to the paymaster, who would classify the debits and credits in the man's ledger account.

7962. Still, paying some 100 men he would have to keep some sort of book?—Yes, he would have to keep a cash account distinctly. It is the keeping of a cash account as against a ledger account.

7963. He would have to debit himself with the amount received from the office, and credit himself with the amount paid to each individual man?—Certainly, and then he would be able to strike his cash balance at any moment, and see how his cash stood. At the present moment he cannot see how his cash stands, unless he makes up the ledger account of each man in his company.

7964. Then there is Sir Henry Norman's point, that there is a running account for stoppages, and so forth?—Yes; but that running account would under the proposed scheme be kept by the Paymaster.

7965. If I understand Sir Henry Norman's question to you, that running account seems to be known only to the Captain, as to what ought to be deducted from each man's pay, and so on?—He would have to give returns to the Paymaster; he would have to send a return to the Paymaster, showing how the man stands.

7966. Then if he had to give a return to the Paymaster as to the stoppages from each man, and keep an account of the amount paid to each man, crediting himself with the amount paid, and debiting himself with the amount received, how would that relieve him from the severe work you think he ought not to do?—It would relieve him from the accountant's work of keeping books, which is really the trouble, the ledger account between each man and himself. Almost any man can keep an account of receipts and expenditure, but many of these young officers go astray when it comes to an account of not only cash payments, but cash payments distributed over a number of ledger accounts which they have at the end of months to focus into a general balance-sheet.

7967. You were asked about the Accountant-General putting a minute upon a paper containing a proposal. Do you know whether the Accountant-General does that, looking at the matter solely from a financial point of view, or does he take into consideration any military question?—Primarily his function is financial; primarily his function is to show "this proposal, or this scheme, will cost such-and-such an amount of money. It may be desirable or not, but that is how the matter stands as to expense." But beyond that, also, it may be a scheme that he considers is not worth its money, in which case he would express that opinion.

7968. Then in point of fact the Accountant-General is called upon, in writing such a minute as that, to express his views with respect to what may be a purely military matter?—That is so; but I need not say I think that it is done very charily.

7969. Take, for instance, a Vote coming forward for an additional number of guns for a particular branch of the service, or a particular class of guns; that would be a purely military matter?—Quite so.

7970. Would the Accountant-General take upon himself to say that the advantage which these guns, if possessed, may give is not worth the money charged for them?—Oh, no; upon any question of that kind he would give no opinion. But it will be understood that these proposals that come forward are of a very varied character; some are not in the least military; some are questions which any civilian is just as much entitled to give an opinion upon as a military man.

7971. In reference to barracks, perhaps, and the accommodation?—I take a matter that came before me to-day. There was a question of giving an increased grant to one of these charitable societies that deal with Reservists. That is not specially a military matter, you know.

7972. Of course not. You spoke at a very early stage of your evidence, if I understood you correctly, in respect of a total. You said, if I understood you aright, that you had to work down to this total?—Yes.

7973. What is that total?—That total (I do not think I am disclosing Cabinet secrets at all) I take to be the total that the Secretary of State and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, looking at the Budget for the next year as a whole, are able to allocate to military matters. The Chancellor of the Exchequer would look forward to next year and say, "My total expenditure for all services and for all purposes is likely to be this; my receipts are likely to be that. I do not see my way to giving to the Army more than such-and-such a sum."

7974. So that before the Estimates are formed, as I understand, there is a total sum known as between the Secretary of State and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and your estimates have to be prepared in accordance with that total sum; is that it?—That is practically so; but I think one ought to remember this—that if there was some very large military scheme which the Secretary of State was himself convinced ought to be carried out at whatever expense, he would say to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Cabinet, "I require more than this amount of money," and he would make it probably a Cabinet question. I am speaking to you as regards the normal arrangement.

7975. Then do I understand this to be the sort of process, roughly: The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State come to the conclusion that the sum which ought to be allocated for military purposes for the year is in round numbers £20,000,000; then these different officers whose functions are to prepare the estimates—the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, the Director-General of Ordnance, the Director-General of the Army Medical Department, and so forth—all bring in their own estimates?—Yes.

7976. And I suppose they put a sum opposite the estimates when they bring them in?—Yes.

7977. Then these sums make up the total that you know?—Yes.

7978. Then there is a meeting of the Army Board?—Yes.

7979. And a consideration then ensues as to what is to be cut out, so as to bring the sum down to that total?—Yes.

7980. That is done by the Army Board?—That is done by the Army Board.

7981. So that is done after consultation and consideration by the different heads of these different departments?—Yes.

7982. And to bring the matter down to the total which is given to them by the Secretary of State?—Yes.

7983. That is how the military estimates are formed?—Yes. You will understand that that arrangement

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was only inaugurated last year; it only dates from 1901, when the consideration of these estimates was assigned to the Army Board as part of its duty. Before that time the Secretary of State arranged matters with these various military heads; he arranged with them as to what was wanted.

7984. In consultation with them?—Yes.

7985. But that is the procedure which is now in vogue?—Yes.

7986. (*Sir John Jackson.*) You told the Chairman, I think, that you did not remember any application by the Intelligence Department for an increase of staff. I understood you would look that up?—That is so.

7987. Do you ever remember any application for funds for surveying out in South Africa, and for mapping, that was refused?—I do not. I will look that up too. Do you mean before the war?

7988. Immediately prior to the war?—Of course, we could not map in South Africa as long as the Orange Free State and the Transvaal were under the Boers.

7989. Not without difficulties?—I believe it was impossible. I have understood that if the Boers saw anybody looking like a person employed on maps, he had a rather short shrift.

7990. We have had it in evidence that it could have been done, but under some difficulty. Now, following on that, do you ever remember any application being made for providing funds for secret information, and to some extent secret work, in regard to information as to the amount of gold in the country, which was refused, or do you remember a very trifling grant being made of some £200 or £300?—Any secret service money would not come out of the Army Votes, and would not come under my purview. That belongs to the Foreign Office, and I really do not know. I do not remember anything about it. The Intelligence Department of the War Office would settle that with the Foreign Office as regards secret money. We do not administer secret service, except purely war secret service during a war.

7991. Then, I think, you gave it in evidence that during the early part of 1899 you did not remember any important requisitions for war stores being refused?—I will not say that.

7992. That, I think, again you were to look up?—Oh, I will not say that. As between July, 1899, when the war came in view, and September, 1899, when a free hand was given, a very considerable number of subsidiary proposals were put forward.

7993. But I am referring rather to a prior time in 1899, the earlier part, say March?—No, I do not think so; but as you have doubtless been made aware by the evidence that you have had already, money was not available for war purposes until the 22nd of September, or thereabouts, when war was actually declared.

7994. (*Chairman.*) Yes, we heard that sanction could not be got until the 22nd of September?—Yes, quite so. As regards earlier demands I will not speak. I will not say that nothing was put forward there that was not granted.

7995. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Would the matter come under your observation, or would the accounts come before you with reference to purchases made in South Africa, prior to the war, by the Commanding Officer there, of, say, horses or mules?—Yes, all such charges appear in the accounts that come to the War Office.

7996. And come before you?—Yes.

7997. Do you remember anything about any contracts made with a Mr. Weil?—Those contracts were made after the beginning of the war.

7998. But prior to the war, I think some were made with him, were they not?—I know of none that were made with him before the war, except of an ordinary character.

7999. Who is he? Is he a horse dealer?—I really do not know. He is a large local contractor, I do not know anything else about him.

8000. In South Africa?—I think so.

8001. Is he a *bonâ fide* horse dealer?—Horses were not his special department, as far as I know.

(*Chairman.*) Ox wagons, was it not?

8002. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I am thinking of mules?—I think, if you do not mind—not that I do not wish to answer any question about it, but anything of that kind of information you would obtain much more fully from anybody in South Africa at the time those contracts were made. To me they come simply as charges in the accounts.

8003. Then we must get it from them?—Any of the officers whom, no doubt, you either have examined, or will examine, who were in South Africa looking after supplies at the beginning of the war (Sir Wodehouse Richardson, for instance), would tell you all about it.

8004. We have had Sir Wodehouse Richardson before us, but I did not ask him that question?—All the initial large contracts he made.

8005. Do you happen to remember a few months prior to the war about a thousand mules being bought either from Weil or some other dealer of which a large number were sent back and some compensation paid for breaking the contract? I think it was a contract made by the Commanding Officer out there, some months prior to the war?—I am afraid I do not remember. I can get you the information if you want it.

8006. I shall be very much obliged if you would. I was told that 1,000 mules were purchased there some few months before the war, I think by the Commanding Officer?—What is your point about it—as to whether the mules failed in any way?

8007. No, my point is this shortly, that if my information is correct, it shows that there was a little want of attention at this end in doing what was done, because I am informed that these mules were bought a few months before, then on instructions from this end the contract was cancelled to a certain extent, many of the mules were sent back, and a certain sum per head was paid as compensation, and then within a few months many of those same mules were bought back at £10 advance on the old price. That information came to my knowledge, and I was anxious to know whether that really was the case or not?—I will make a note of that.*

8008. On the question of the payment of a regiment, do you really think that there is anything very much in that idea, that by the captain personally paying his men he gets really much more in touch with them than he would if he did not pay them?—I think so. That is the opinion generally, I think, of the military men who have been in regiments.

8009. Is it a usual plan, although the captain pays his men, to have a paymaster attached to every regiment?—No. The paymaster is placed at the central station, and the captain of the company renders a monthly account to that paymaster, but the actual payment of the men is made by the captain of the company; the paymaster is a man who may be at the same station, or may not, but he is simply the compiler of the account; he takes the account, examines it, and sends it to the War Office.

8010. So that, in the regiment, the practical paymaster is the captain of the company?—Yes.

8011. Do you see any reason why, take a whole regiment, there should not be one officer specially detailed to be paymaster for the regiment and practically do nothing else?—As I said before, I think that would prove to be a costly arrangement.

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* The following letter was subsequently received:—

"12th January 1903.—The facts are as follows:—On the 9th September, 1899, a report was sent that a contract had been made by the authorities at the Cape with Julius Weil for 3,000 mules, 2,000 from South Africa and 1,000 from North America. It subsequently appeared that the local resources were about 1,000 more than had been supposed, and the contract for North American mules was therefore cancelled within the next few days.

"The cancellation was arranged without involving any claim for compensation, and the late Director of Transport, South Africa, reports that the contractor, as a matter of fact, appears never to have actually proceeded to obtain the mules in North America.

"As the American mules in question were not obtained by the contractor, the War Office or its agents could not, of course, have afterwards purchased them. "(Signed) FRANK T. MARZIALS."

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8012. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Was not that the old arrangement?—No.

8013. Was there not a regimental paymaster?—Yes, but he did not pay the men.

8014. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Just to make a comparison, say in civil life—take the case of the construction of a length of railway; if you are constructing, say, 50 miles of railway, each ten miles, probably, would be under a particular sub-agent, who, in a sense, from one point of view, is in a similar position to a captain, but no contractor of a railway would ever think of allowing that sub-agent to pay his men; it would all be done by one man over the whole lot. Does not the same principle apply; do you not think it would be better to have it done by one officer, whose business was to pay all over the one regiment, apart from the question brought in with regard to the advantage of the captain getting in better touch with his men by paying them?—But you have always to recollect with regard to the soldier that he is in a very different position from a workman. He has to be clothed in a special way, he has to be fed in a special way, and he is under a discipline which is infinitely more stringent. The simple arrangement of simply paying him a wage and having done with him, which is the civil arrangement, is not applicable, because he is not only paid by the State, but he is clothed by the State, and he is fed by the State, and those arrangements entail a greater complication of account.

8015. Does not the average military officer, say a Captain, in such a case, rather feel it a little *infra dig.* to have much time taken up by accounts?—No, I do not think so. I think they may feel it a little irksome.

8016. (*Chairman.*) Have you anything else that you wish to add?—I do not think so.

NINETEENTH DAY.

Wednesday, 26th November 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable The Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT-ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B. G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Hon. Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

Major-General Sir G. A. French, K.C.M.G.

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Major-General Sir GEORGE A. FRENCH, K.C.M.G., called and examined.

8017. (*Chairman.*) You have had a long experience of the Colonies, I believe?—Yes, I have been 26 years in the Colonies.

8018. And you have been good enough to come to-day to give us some evidence with regard to the contingents sent out to the war from Australia?—Yes.

8019. I believe that you took up this matter early in the day?—Some months before the outbreak of the war I addressed a letter with the idea that it should reach the Commander-in-Chief early, and I think your Lordship has a copy of that letter.

8020. The letter addressed to Colonel Gough, from Sydney, of the 27th of June, 1899?—Yes.

8021. We have a copy of the letter, but will you state generally the purport of it?—The purport of it was, that I anticipated trouble; but I was dealing with the general question as well of Colonial contingents for the Imperial Service. I knew, from my experience, that certain points should be settled beforehand, particularly as to the pay, and allowances, and transport, and so forth. I knew that the men would be willing enough to join, but at that time there was not the slightest idea what pay they would get, or under what circumstances they would be taken. I have every reason to believe that that letter was favourably received, and I think that the success of these first arrangements of the Colonial contingents was largely due to the fact, that the Imperial Government had made proper arrangements about those points at the time, and so had set at rest the men's fears as regards pay or pension, wound expenses, or compassionate allowance for their families, and so forth, and had largely helped the Colonial Governments in going to their local Parliaments to provide funds in the early portion of the campaign for carrying on. In fact, the first contingents were wholly paid by the Colonial Governments.

8022. But this letter was written in June, 1899?—Yes.

8023. Did you receive any reply to that?—I got a reply, in which I was just told generally, that it was favourably considered, and the then Commander-in-Chief took exception to the rates that I put down as the average for men in the Imperial Service of £100 a year; he said he did not think the average should be more than £60. But I was dealing, of course, with the general principle, not the particular sums.

8024. Were any steps taken at that time by the authorities at home?—I do not know. I consider that from this representation, or others, the Imperial Authorities made those very excellent arrangements which were cabled out to the Colonies at the beginning of October, and which set at rest a great deal of uneasiness as to the rates of pay, allowances, and so forth.

8025. I have some of the correspondence here. The first telegram was, I find, one from the Secretary for the Colonies to Queensland to Lord Lamington, on the 11th of July: "Her Majesty's Government highly appreciates the loyal and patriotic offer of Queensland; they hope the occasion will not arise, but if it should arise, they will gladly avail themselves of the offer"?—Yes, I believe that was the response to a distinct offer of troops from Queensland.

8026. And about the same time there were offers from Victoria and the other Colonies, but what I meant was, when were these excellent steps, that you say were taken by the Home Authorities, communicated to the Colonies?—We did not know for certain, I think, till about the 6th of October.

8027. When war was imminent?—Yes, quite imminent.

8028. Did that cause any delay through its being deferred to that time?—I do not think so. The date on which the first contingent was actually sent, was the last day of October I think, from New South Wales. I speak more particularly, of course, with regard to New South Wales.

8029. When was your offer first accepted in New South Wales?—I think it was about the 6th of October that the Australian offers were generally accepted; small numbers were allotted to each Colony to send, quite small numbers.

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8030. What was the number of the first New South Wales contingent?—I think we only sent 250 men for the first contingent from New South Wales, but we were limited by the War Office. The Commandants of the Australian Colonies assembled at Melbourne, on the 1st of October, and went into the whole question, and suggested 2,500 men, mostly mounted, from Australia, but just as they had sent their report in to the Minister, a cable came from home saying, that they were only to supply a certain small number, and that Infantry were most desirable, and Mounted Infantry and Cavalry, the least so. That was rather opposed to the views of the Commandants out there.

8031. The Commandants thought that mounted men would be most suitable?—Yes, especially our mounted men in Australia, who are accustomed to ride across country, and find their own way for a hundred miles.

8032. That decision proceeded entirely from home?—Yes. I can give you the exact wording of it, because I have brought a copy of Hansard, in which the debate in New South Wales is reported.

8033. Will you just read it, so that the Commission may hear it?—This is the statement made by Mr. Lyne, as he then was, Premier of New South Wales, in the House, in which he gives the telegram: "'The Secretary of State for War and Commander-in-Chief desire to express high appreciation of Her Majesty's Government for the patriotic spirit exhibited by the people of Australia in offering to serve in South Africa, and to furnish following information to assist organisation of forces offered in units suitable for military requirements: Firstly, units should consist of about 125 men; secondly, may be Infantry, Mounted Infantry, or Cavalry. In view of numbers already available, Infantry most, Cavalry least, serviceable; thirdly, all should be armed with ·303 rifles or carbines, which can be supplied by Imperial Government, if necessary; fourthly, all must provide own equipment and Mounted troops their own horses; fifthly, not more than one Captain and three subalterns to each unit. Where more than single companies, force may be commanded by officer not higher than Major. In considering a number which can be employed, the Secretary of State for War, guided by nature of offers, desires each Colony should be fairly represented, and limits are necessary if force is to be fully utilised.' They would gladly accept two units each from New South Wales and Victoria, and one from South Australia. The conditions are as follows" (these conditions are rather important, because they touch the points that I have mentioned): "'Troops to be disembarked at port of landing in South Africa, fully equipped, at cost of Colonial Governments, or Volunteers. From date of disembarkation Imperial Government will provide pay at Imperial rates, supplies, and ammunition, and will defray expenses of transport back to the Colony, and pay wound expenses and compassionate allowances at Imperial rates. Troops to embark not later than 31st October, proceeding direct to Capetown for orders.'" You see that the points of the pay, the wound expenses, the compassionate allowances for the wives and families in case of death, are all dealt with there, and that, I think, was a very important feature indeed in first raising those contingents.

8034. And those were dealt with satisfactorily?—Yes.

8035. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) What is the date?—The speech that I have read, by Mr. Lyne, as he was then, in the Assembly, was on the 17th of October, 1899, but that telegram, I have reason to believe, came about the 6th of October.

8036. (*Viscount Esher.*) Who was the telegram from?—From the Secretary of State for War.

8037. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Through Lord Beauchamp, I suppose?—It really came to the Governor of South Australia, just for telegraphic convenience, as you know, and was passed on by the Governor.

8038. (*Chairman.*) It was a telegram to the Governors of the respective Colonies. It was sent out on October 3rd, 1899?—Then it probably arrived on the 4th.

8039. And there was a similar telegram sent to Canada on the same day—the same telegram, in fact. Then steps were taken to raise the first contingent in accordance with that telegram?—Yes, the very limited contingent mentioned. There were two units from New South Wales, only 250 men.

8040. Have you anything to say with regard to the raising of that first contingent?—There was no difficulty in New South Wales for such a small force. We had complete supplies to fit them out.

8041. And do you know what happened in the other Colonies?—I know that the other Colonies, not so much perhaps with the first contingent, but afterwards, were very short of supplies, saddlery in particular.

8042. In the case of the first contingent, all the Colonies were able to collect supplies and to equip them at once?—I should say so, but, of course, I speak specially for New South Wales. I think we were, probably, the only Colony that had the ·303 rifle, and saddlery of the proper mounted pattern.

8043. And that contingent sailed, I think you said, at the end of October?—Yes, I think the first contingent left on the 31st October and the 3rd November. On the 3rd November our contingent left New South Wales. Then some of the Lancers left London on the 10th October; they were, of course, the first Colonial contingent landed in South Africa; they happened to be in England at the time.

8044. Do you think you can give the Commission any information with regard to the strength of the various contingents?—Yes, I can. I inquired at the War Office, with the view that I should be able to hand in to the Commission the exact numbers from each Colony, but they sent a return, of which they said you had a copy, and which they said I could get the information from, but the information had to be picked out.

8045. We have a return of the embarkations?—Yes, I worked from that.

8046. Then that will be much better?—I can hand in a return compiled from that, so that it will be in a condensed form.

8047. If you please, would you give us any information about it before you hand it in?—I may say, the first portion of the contingent is divided here in the War Office returns under those heads, between the 10th of October, 1899, and the 18th of May, 1900. Speaking generally, I think you will find that all those men in the first contingent were furnished by the Colonial Governments at their own expense, a great portion of them at any rate, but that afterwards the whole of the expenses were provided by the Imperial Government.

8048. And what was the strength?—From this return the total for the whole war would be for New South Wales, 6,945 officers and men, and 6,104 horses, and six 15-pounder guns; Victoria, 3,757 officers and and men, 4,081 horses; Queensland, 2,370 officers and men, and 2,704 horses; South Australia, 1,432 officers and men, and 1,411 horses; West Australia, 1,129 officers and men, and 1,088 horses; Tasmania, 749 officers and men, and 664 horses; an additional lot of 250 Bushmen sent from New South Wales, embarked on the 1st April, 1902, and are included. That made a total of 16,632 officers and men, and 16,052 horses, and six guns from Australia. I can hand this return in. (*The return was handed in. Vide Appendix Vol., page* 174.)

8049. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Does it show separately the strength of the first contingent?—That return does not, but the strength can be picked out of the first contingent by looking up the dates on which they embarked at the different places. The first contingent from Australia could not have been large.

8050. Under a thousand?—They were limited practically to five units.

8051. That could not be. There were two from Victoria, two from New South Wales, one from South Australia, one from Queensland, and one from West Australia?—There were only 125 men in each.

8052. But that was more than six units?—Yes.

8053. Had you any from Tasmania at first?—I think a portion of one unit went from Tasmania. They helped to fill up a company.

8054. (*Chairman.*) Tasmania sent four officers and 76 non-commissioned officers and men on the 26th of November?—That would be part of one company.

8055. You mentioned a meeting of the Australian Commandants. What were the suggestions that they

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had agreed to make?—To suggest the formation of an Australian contingent, consisting of about 2,500 officers and men, with a proper proportion of all departments, Army Medical Corps, ambulances, guns, and so forth, as one contingent to be furnished in certain proportions according to population. Of that more than half would have been mounted men, but just as they sent in the report, this instruction came from the Secretary of State for War, and, of course, that offer fell through.

8056. Was the report of the Commandants presented?—It was presented to the Minister of Defence for each Colony.

8057. But it was never acted upon at that time?—No; this telegram upset the whole thing.

8058. Then that being the despatch of the first contingent, what was the next thing that happened?—Then no more was offered until the great troubles in December, 1899, when there were large offers again, and a second contingent was sent. Those were all mounted men.

8059. What date was that?—They began going in January, 1900, but, as a matter of fact, I might mention that the Infantry that were sent to South Africa were actually made Mounted Infantry, for even before that date they found it was mounted men really that they wanted.

8060. So that the Australians became all mounted?—Practically, all mounted.

8061. What was the number of the second contingent?—We sent from New South Wales about 750 men, as well as I can make out—so far as I can recollect. Of course, I have very few documents to refer to.

8062. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Was that in the "Aberdeen"?—No, some of the men went in the "Aberdeen," a small number. Our men went in the "Kent" largely. The "Aberdeen" went on the 3rd of November, that was the first contingent went in that. The "Warrigal" took out the permanent artillery and their horses—those are from Sydney I am talking of, and the "Moravian."

8063. (*Chairman.*) The "Moravian" had Tasmanian troops as well?—Yes, they had 47 Tasmanian Mounted Infantry, and the "Surrey." These all went in January and the early part of February, 1900.

8064. The "Southern Cross" had a large number of the New South Wales contingent?—Yes, the "Southern Cross" left on the 17th of January. That was one of our strongest contingents; we sent a battalion of Mounted Infantry in it.

8065. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You could not say the total strength of the second contingent for all the Colonies, I suppose?—It could be picked out from this return. I was in hopes that I should have got that information from the War Office to day to hand in.

8066. It would be very convenient if we could know what the total strength of each contingent from Australia was.

8067. (*Chairman.*) You say that you can give evidence with regard to the raising, equipment, and dispatch of the contingents generally. I should just like you to do it in your own way. You have not many documents, I believe?—No.

8068. But if you give us your recollection of the matter, no doubt that will be sufficiently accurate?—As regards the first contingent, it being very small, I think there was very little difficulty; all the Australian Colonies were able to equip and send those men to the front. Afterwards, when the larger numbers went there was great difficulty as regards saddlery particularly; practically, none of the Colonies had any stock of saddlery, I mean, of course, the regular, proper military saddle. I think a few hundred sets in New South Wales was about all the stock there was in the country. And I am satisfied that in New Zealand they were in the same way, because they cabled over to us to know if we could spare any.

8069. What did you do then?—We manufactured a small proportion, gradually increasing our military pattern, in New South Wales, but we largely had to take what we could of the stock of saddlery of the country, just something like a hunter saddle, with big knee pads, and a saddle not at all properly constituted for carrying all the equipment that a soldier wants to have on active service. That difficulty extended to all the Australian Colonies.

8070. And did they use that saddlery through the war?—Yes, I think in many cases, probably in most cases, they had to exchange in Cape Town and get military saddles.

8071. And how about other equipment?—Of the other equipment they had a good deal in hand, and the clothing was pretty well all made in the different Colonies. We had a great difficulty as regards helmets for that second contingent. We had just heard that some of the first contingent were on the point of firing into one another, because they were wearing a hat like the Boers, and were mistaken for Boers. The result was that our second contingent were very hastily supplied with helmets, and very bad helmets they were, but it was thought desirable that they should go in those helmets to prevent the possibility of a similar accident occurring. The first contingent were picked officers and men. As the time got on, and numbers were increased, it was most difficult to get suitable officers for the contingents, and there was the same trouble in all the Colonies; there was practically no reserve of officers, and gentlemen had to be taken with very little qualifications indeed for the position of officers. The stock of arms in the different Colonies was very small. I know the Victorian Government had to borrow a dozen magazine rifles from us, so that the men might pick up something on board ship going to South Africa.

8072. They had no rifles?—They had none.

8073. And the men were armed in South Africa?—They were armed in South Africa. We always sent arms and ammunition with our men, because we had them, but New South Wales and Queensland were probably very much the best supplied with warlike stores of any of the Australian Colonies.

8074. How was it that you had them in store?—The Government had provided money for them and got them. In some of the Colonies they had not. I know that the Treasurer of one of the other Colonies received great credit for the way he cut down the estimates, especially the military estimates, with the natural result that when things were wanted they were not there.

8075. But they were in store as a regular part of the reserve supplies?—Yes, for New South Wales and Queensland, but I think the others had very little indeed.

8076. What was the organisation of the force for which that was the reserve in New South Wales?—We had a force, including rifle troops, of about 9,000 or 10,000 men.

8077. Permanent men?—No, not more than about 600 of those were permanent men. Those were principally Artillerymen, and some Engineers, the permanent ones. The balance would be what we call Militia here, who were paid for so many days' drill in the year, and some Volunteers, who are exactly on the footing of your Volunteers here; then there were men of the rifle clubs, who were simply given rifles and ammunition to shoot with.

8078. They were not drilled?—They had just squad drill—able to march round.

8079. Were those infantry?—Yes; they would all act as infantry. They were liable to fill the ranks in case of war, according to the Act then in force in New South Wales.

8080. Was it from those men that you got the recruits for the first contingent?—For the first contingent we took nearly all from the existing Militia regiments; they were a very small contingent.

8081. You got them from the Militia?—Yes, to begin with. Afterwards, of course, we took very largely Bushmen, with very little military experience at all, but very good riders, who knew their way about country, and so on, and could shoot—they were an excellent lot of men. In fact, we sent right away out into the back country for the best of the men there, so that we should get the right sort.

8082. I only ask the question to know how far the existing organisation for the Militia in New South Wales was the backbone of the first contingent, or of any of the other contingents?—Altogether of the first contingent, which was a very small contingent, only 250 men.

8083. And partly of the second?—Yes, partly. Another contingent was sent of over 2,000 men from New South Wales alone, and we had to get five vessels to take them.

8084. And then you had to go outside?—Then we had to go right outside; there was no difficulty about the men, but there was great difficulty to get proper officers for them.

8085. What training had the ordinary officers of Militia before the war?—Some of them had been for many years in the Militia service, where they did about 12 to 16 days during the whole year in drill, and eight of that in camp. Then there was a great deal of voluntary drill in the Militia, too, in New South Wales.

8086. But they had no other training except that?—No, nothing more than that.

8087. Had any of them been in the Service at home?—Very few—occasional ones.

8088. And were you not able to get any officers who had been in the Regular Army for any of the contingents?—Yes; we had a few who were employed on what we call the permanent staff there. We had several of those, and were very glad to have them, and a few others who had left the Service, and were settled out there.

8089. You have spoken of the first two contingents. As regards the third contingent, what have you to say?—The third contingent was really what they call the Bush contingent, which was provided by popular subscription in New South Wales largely, and I think it was pretty well the same in the other Colonies.

8090. What date was that?—They began to go about March, 1900. I see we sent 33 officers and 499 men, New South Wales Bushmen; that was on the 1st March.

8091. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Is that the contingent that went to Beira?—Yes.

8092. Have you anything to say with regard to that contingent beyond what you have already said?—These Bushmen that were paid for by private subscription left during February and March, 1900.

8093. (*Chairman.*) Was that in the second contingent?—They would be the third contingent.

8094. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) But were the Bushmen who left in March, 1900, and went direct to Beira, supplied in South Africa?—No; we furnished most of their equipment; they were a comparatively small lot from New South Wales, a little over 500—550.

8095. Were they not all furnished in New South Wales with the whole equipment; that was, by private subscription?—Yes; they were provided for, but whether they were actually able to find saddles enough I would not be certain. I know in January, 1900, I had to wait till one squadron got done training to take their saddles and put them on another squadron. That was a very few days before they embarked; there was such pressure. Those Bushmen went direct to Beira, as you said.

8096. And then to Rhodesia?—Yes.

8097. (*Chairman.*) I do not want to trouble you to go through this return, which does not divide up the contingents, though if you would just state at what approximate dates the several contingents started, that would be very useful. We have had the first three. With regard to the fourth contingent, at what date did that start?—There were intermediate dates at which certain numbers left.

8098. Could you not say from recollection the approximate dates of the several contingents' leaving?—Yes, I think I can. Those Bushmen that were paid for by the different Colonies by voluntary subscription would be leaving about February and March, 1900, and a very large contingent went in March and April of 1901—over 2,000 men from New South Wales alone.

8099. That would be the fourth?—I do not think there was any number in New South Wales.

8100. Then were there many after that contingent?—Not for some considerable time. In August, 1901, we sent about 350 men; we called those drafts. They were really to make up different corps that were already in the field. After that there were what they called the Commonwealth contingents, which amounted to over 4,000 men. In the return which I have put in I have endeavoured to distribute them according to the basis of population, as that was the manner in which they were practically sub-divided out there.

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8101. Is there anything else that you would like to bring to our notice with regard to that?—There were two of those contingents, some which left and some which were leaving about the time I left Australia, that is to say, February and the beginning of March, and the latter ones only got away in April and May. And I see, of course, a number of them did not leave Hobart until the 21st of May, and Fremantle till the 2nd of June, 1902.

8102. I understand you to say that the arrangement made by the War Office being satisfactory enabled you to raise these contingents without much difficulty?—It satisfied the men, of course, as regards the question of pay and pension.

8103. Are there any suggestions that you would wish to make with regard to any arrangements that might be made for dealing with a similar emergency in the future?—That opens up a very large question. There are several points which have occurred to me through my long service in the Colonies. In the first place, I found that things were not being worked in such a way as to utilise to the greatest extent the great reserve of military power that we have in the Colonies.

8104. We shall be glad to hear in what respects?—I should prefer to make a written statement, but I have made a note here of supplies of warlike stores to the Colonies. That is a most important matter, and it is in anything but a satisfactory position; it always has been, and is now. I can give you an instance. Supposing the Government of New South Wales or Queensland indents on the War Office here for a million rounds of ammunition, and supposing they have a stock of 100,000,000 rounds here, one would naturally imagine that they would ship off a million rounds at once. But the War Office do not do that; they merely call for a contract, and five or six months more are lost, and we may not get that ammunition for twelve months. I know that we have been two or three years getting stores out from England in some cases. That is a terrible state of affairs. The result is that when this war broke out there were very few supplies out there; and, in addition, in dealing with a Colonial Government, if you do not spend the money within the year the probability is that it lapses; it is gone unless it is on loan votes, when it is carried forward, of course.

8105. Were there recognised reserves for New South Wales?—I always tried to get as much as I could in reserve, but I am afraid the recognised reserves are small in any of the Colonies.

8106. Does the War Office recognise a certain amount as the reserve which ought to be kept?—No; the War Office look upon us as strangers altogether.

8107. Then who is responsible for the reserve for the Colonies?—Nobody whatever, so far as I can make out, and I think it is a terrible mistake.

8108. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Except the Government?—Yes; the local Government.

8109. (*Chairman.*) The local Government is responsible?—Yes, and I think they take their responsibility very lightly in some of those Colonies.

8110. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) They cannot get the Votes?—They do not try. I mentioned just now the case of a well-known Treasurer of one of the Colonies in Australia, who got a great deal of credit for cutting down the Estimates, and then when these men had to go to the front there was nothing for them, rifles, ammunition, or anything else.

8111. (*Chairman.*) You say that orders are sent. Who sends the orders?—Take the case of a Colonial Government indenting for ammunition; that is what would occur and what has occurred. Instead of the War Office treating the Colonies as part of the defensive forces of the Empire, they treat them as strangers, and call for contracts, and get ammunition from contractors, and lose, perhaps, six or eight months over them.

8112. And you think the ammunition ought to be promptly supplied?—I think so, certainly. It is the one thing of all others that they ought to be particular about—small-arm ammunition.

8113. There is no reason why the order could not be given by telegram, I suppose?—I think the War

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Office would want to see their way to the money before they took any steps to give orders.

8114. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) But the Colonial Government always do pay for it?—They always pay in full, of course, and a percentage.

8115. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You cannot send stores that have to be paid for until a Vote has been passed for that sum of money?—No. First, you have to get the Vote on the Estimate, then it has to be passed by Parliament, and you dare not indent till it has been passed; and then the War Office step in, and instead of sending the ammunition off they let the contract, which takes a month or two, and you have to wait till the ammunition is manufactured and inspected and sent out.

8116. Supposing you send in a demand for a million rounds of ammunition, you first have to get the Colonial Government to agree to your doing that; then the Colonial Government has to get the Estimate passed?—Yes.

8117. Have you ever known a Colonial Government or Ministry refuse to supply what you wanted?—I should think that must be a very common experience in the Colonies.

8118. (*Chairman.*) In your view there ought to be an adequate reserve constantly kept up?—I think the War Office ought to look upon the Colonies as part of the defensive forces. They have supplies in hand and ready to ship at once. As a matter of fact, it would have been a great advantage to the War Office if we could have sent large quantities of ammunition with our troops to South Africa; it would have saved the War Office at a time when they were under very great pressure indeed.

8119. I was putting it a step further back; that it would be the duty of the Colonial Government to have an adequate reserve properly kept up?—With long experience of the Colonies, I think they take that duty very lightly.

8120. But you think that ought to be their duty?—Certainly; but I do not think they take their duty very seriously. Just now they are cutting those forces to pieces in Australia, reducing Estimate after Estimate. But where I think the War Office ought to step in is that they ought to have the arms ready to issue out when the Government asks for them—to be ready to issue at once warlike stores, especially ammunition.

8121. What is your next suggestion?—I think a great deal of difficulty is put by the War Office and the Treasury in the way of officers and men who wish to settle in the Colonies, and who would be of very great assistance there.

8122. In what particular way?—I think the one thing they want in the Colonies is senior officers of experience; but between the Treasury and the War Office officers and men have a great deal of difficulty thrown in their way. The men are troubled about belonging to the Reserve and liable to service at home, and the officers are simply not allowed to take employment under a Colonial Government without having their pension stopped. They may go out there and sit with their hands idle before them and do nothing, and draw their pension, but if they dare to take the slightest part in helping men out there under a Colonial Government they may have their pensions stopped. I will just read the certificate that a retired or half-pay officer has to sign every quarter. "During that period I have not held any place or employment of profit, civil or military, in any part of His Majesty's service or in the Colonies or in the possessions of His Majesty beyond the seas." An officer who is out there and takes any employment with the Colonial Government has his pay stopped at once.

8123. (*Sir John Edge.*) Pay or pension?—Pension, or half-pay if he happens to be on half-pay.

8124. (*Sir John Jackson.*) That is suspended, of course; if he ceases to be in any other employment it goes on again?—Yes; but supposing a Colonial Government wants to give an officer a small sum for doing certain work, it may be less than his pension.

8125. But if in any year he has not taken any remuneration for the services rendered to the Colonial Government, then of course he gets that pension or half-pay back again?—Yes; but, in the meantime, what a stopper that!—As a matter of fact, I know a case of a General Officer who went on active service, and thought his pension was going on for his wife and family, but some months afterwards he found that it had all been stopped, under Treasury regulations I suppose.

8126. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Though the pay that he was receiving at the time from the Colonial Government did not in any way come out of the Treasury?—Not at all. It is a great block to senior officers settling in the Colonies. And another thing is that an officer going out to the Cololnies may want some ready money, and they will not let him commute his pension or any part of it—not the smallest part of it—as long as he is liable on the Reserve.

8127. (*Chairman.*) What do you mean by liable on the Reserve?—Liable to be recalled to active service.

8128. Of course, these are general conditions applying to all officers connected with their services in the Reserve?—But the result is that it prevents officers from going to a Colony. I am not taking the case of rich men who can afford to live here, but a man not well off, who wants something in addition to his pay, and would start in some other way in the Colonies; his military experience would be most useful to the Colony. He is blocked at home; they will not let him take any pay, and if he has taken military employment it stops his pay. I do not see how that benefits the defence of the Empire or the Colony.

8129. Then what is the next point?—I do not know to what extent this Commission would go into matters unconnected with South Africa.

8130. I think we should like to know from you any points which would bear upon the subject mentioned in your letter, namely, the assistance which the Colonies can give to the Imperial forces, and these, of course, are points which bear upon that?—Yes; but of course they are general to all the Colonies.

8131. In the letter to which you referred at the beginning, you mention a scheme for providing a Reserve in the Colonies?—Yes.

8132. Would you say a few words with regard to that?—I shall be very happy to do so. It is a matter on which I feel rather strongly, because I was getting a scheme in working order, and had brought the matter before the Press, both in England and the Colonies, and it was most favourably taken up by both and by the leading men in the Colonies. I may say that two of the Premiers of the Colonies have written to me most strongly in favour of that scheme, which was practically what Mr. Chamberlain put before the Premiers of the Colonies when they came here. But when I got half way through my work my attention was called to the King's Regulation forbidding officers to communicate with the Press, and the whole thing was stopped. I do not think that helped the defence of the Empire in any way.

8133. However, you can easily tell us what your scheme was?—My scheme was roughly indicated there, that is to say, that the Imperial Government should have Reserves of trained men in the Colonies from the local forces, which would cost them but a trifle any way, and would be available for the defence of the Empire when any serious occasion arose. I had particularly in view, in regard to the Australian Colonies, the defence of India, because they are so near.

8134. How would this Reserve of trained men be provided?—From our Militia out there. We would select the best officers and the best men, and those men who should be put aside on a separate list, ready for service, though, of course, they would have to sign that they would volunteer for service; those men would be in hand at once, at the disposal of the Imperial Government, for a mere nominal sum; you would have to pay them pretty high rates, of course, in war time.

8135. The Imperial Government would pay a bounty to a certain proportion of your Militia, and the return for that would be that they would go on service?—Yes; that is what it came to, and it was mostly highly approved.

8136. What was the bounty that you proposed to give them?—I did not care to go into those details; what I mentioned was about £8 for the infantry man and £12 for the mounted man, if he had his own horse, but I can hand you in the opinions of two Premiers, who highly approved of the scheme (*handing in the same*). But that was all stopped; I could not go on when once my attention had been drawn to the regulation.

8137. But I thought in the beginning of this letter you expressed the opinion that men in the Colonies will volunteer for a war, but not for longer periods?—No; they would not tie themselves to service for any length of time. Those men can get 7s. a day practically for eight hours a day—labouring men. Men mining or shearing can get a great deal more than that; those men will not tie themselves to ordinary garrison life in India or anywhere else, but they will go out and fight and serve you in war.

8138. Is that consistent with your idea of providing a Reserve of men from the Militia, who would be ready to go on active service whenever called upon?—Yes, for war service.

8139. It would only be for war service?—Certainly; they would not go and do garrison duty on small pay—at least, that is certainly my opinion about Australia, and I think I may speak for Canada, too. The men get very much better pay, and are very much better off, and will not do garrison duty on a rate of pay like that of the Regular soldier.

8140. What would they be paid when they were on service?—I should think it would have to be very much higher than the average of the Regular soldier, but I should think it would be a matter of arrangement with the Colonies, and I should think the Colonies would probably assist in that respect.

8141. They would not go on service for the Imperial pay?—I do not think so; they might just for a short war, perhaps, the most ardent of them. You could not get any large number to go on serving on Imperial pay; there is such a vast difference, 1s. 2d. a day, as compared with the 6s. or 7s. a day that they can have.

8142. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) The first two contingents, I think, did go on Imperial pay?—Imperial pay only, do you mean?

8143. Yes, the first two contingents?—No; they got 4s. 6d. a day, of which the Imperial Government contributed 1s. 2d.

8144. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Was 4s. 6d. a day paid to the privates of the first contingent?—Yes.

8145. Was that ever altered or increased?—As a matter of fact, the later ones got 5s. a day.

8146. Privates?—Yes.

8147. And non-commissioned officers?—In proportion. I have got the rates here.

8148. (*Chairman.*) Then this Reserve that you propose would be rather expensive, would it not?—In what way?

8149. If they are to get pay much in advance of the Imperial rates for Imperial service and a bounty, it would come to rather an expensive corps in the end, would it not?—Very much smaller, compared with the Regular Service, because these men would only be paid a higher rate of pay when they were out for active service in war time.

8150. But they do not get the same training, of course?—No; but then, of course, their mode of life is a very good training. For instance, our Bushmen in the back blocks of the different Australian Colonies are in the habit of doing a thing which it would be a good job if some of our cavalry scouts could do—find their way across country 20 or 30 miles. I believe myself that if they were trained too long in barracks they would not improve; they would go off a bit.

8151. We all know the excellent service which the contingents from Australia did in the war in South Africa, but for providing for the general necessities of the Empire, when the circumstances of a war might be quite different, do you not think it might be rather an expensive corps to keep up?—The annual expense in ordinary times would be very slight.

8152. I am looking to the period for which you could use it?—The expense would be considerable, as it is. For instance, the Imperial Yeomanry were paid very high rates in the war, but that was only for a short time.

8153. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) That difference between the rate of English pay and the 4s. 6d. or 5s. a day for the men was paid by the Colonial Governments, was it not?—In the case of the first and second contingents and the Bushmen.

8154. In point of fact, all your contingents had that rate of pay then—a very much higher rate of pay than the British soldier?—Yes, they all had.

8155. And they were serving alongside the British soldier while they were receiving that high rate of pay?—Yes.

8156. Did you hear at all that there was any inconvenience from troops serving together in whom there was such an immense difference in regard to pay?—There might be on the part of the Imperial troops, but, as a matter of fact, we did not give our men that higher rate of pay in South Africa; we gave them the Imperial pay in South Africa, and they got the rest when they came back.

8157. You did not issue any of this difference in South Africa?—No.

8158. So that the man who came back after a year's service had a very good sum?—Yes, a pretty big cheque.

8159. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) And if a man had a family, the family were supported out of the pay?—Yes; they could leave the order on their pay, either for their family or anybody else. Those are the rates of pay we first recommended, but they were subsequently altered (*handing in a statement*).

8160. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Of course, you saw mainly the New South Wales troops that were under your command?—Yes.

8161. Did you see the troops of any other contingents—for instance, the Queensland contingent?—Yes, I saw a great many of the Queenslanders pass through Sydney.

8162. They were very much the same, I suppose, as your New South Wales troops?—Yes, very much.

8163. And you had had experience in Queensland, of course, when you were commanding troops there for several years?—Yes. I was Commandant in Queensland eight years, and in New South Wales six years.

8164. And you think the material is very much the same in all that group of Colonies?—Yes.

8165. And the same class of man?—Yes.

8166. But there is some little difference as regards pay, is there not? You were there at the time of the war; they had not exactly the same rates of pay in each Colony?—Yes, we arranged that, if you look at that Return.

8167. I do not mean at the time covered by this Return, I mean in ordinary times?—Yes, under ordinary circumstances the pay is at very different rates.

8168. Where, do you suppose, they were the highest?—In New South Wales and Victoria they were the highest.

8169. Does not your proposal that the Imperial Government should keep up a certain amount of stores in reserve, and so on, which it is most essential should be kept up, and should require the Colonial Governments to keep it up, somewhat interfere with the principle of self-government; would there not be a difficulty between the War Office and the Colonial Government? The War Office would say: "You are not keeping up your stores?"—I dare say they would.

8170. And the Colonial Government would say. "We are in financial difficulties, and cannot afford the money?"—But the particular point I make is, that the War Office should at once be able to fulfil Colonial requisitions, and ship them without delay.

8171. That is a good proposal, but it would not in any way force the Colonial Government to indent, if they were hard up, for the supplies that you, as Commandant, might think necessary?—No, I do not go so far as that. What I object to is, that when, after a great deal of difficulty you get the Colonial Government to vote the money you cannot get the stuff.

8172. But it would not get you the stuff if the Colonial Government did not vote the money?—No.

8173. Do you think that you could really induce a very considerable number of forces partially paid in Australia, to agree to go on war service by giving them a few pounds a year?—I think so. I think there is a very fine spirit through the country, and that the men would be glad to go on active service.

8174. But such an arrangement would have to be made, say, now, or a year hence, when, possibly, there was no war, and no prospect of active service. Do you think that men would come forward and bind them-

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selves to go, and would adhere to it?—Yes, because they would get a very fair retainer for what they agreed to do. My idea was that these would be picked officers, non-commissioned officers, and men from the existing forces, men whom you knew to be good men, good shots, and so on, who would be allowed then to go into the War Reserve if they wished to do so.

8175. Then, if I understand you aright, you would not allow any man to come into the force unless he was approved?—Unless he was good of his sort, a good rifleman, a good cavalryman, and so on—a very good man.

8176. What number of men do you suppose you could rely upon in the whole Commonwealth?—I think we ought to be able to get from 8,000 to 10,000 men in time into that Reserve.

8177-8. And how about horses?—The mounted men will have their own horses.

8179. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) And keep them up?—Yes.

8180. You would have your horses inspected, I suppose, periodically, to see that they were efficient?—Yes. On the question of the horse, as, of course, you know, a very large proportion of the horses in Australia would not be fit for cavalry work, but I think that the class of mounted men that we would raise there would be more mounted riflemen, for which a very much smaller horse is sufficient—Mounted Infantry they call them here.

8181. Then you would have the bulk of the force Mounted Infantry?—Yes, the mounted men.

8182. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) The different contingents who went from New South Wales were all medically examined, were they not?—Yes, they were very carefully examined.

8183. Were any of the men of any of the contingents returned from South Africa as unfit to serve?—Very few—quite a small number.

8184. Were any of them returned at once as unfit to serve?—None whatever; certainly not any of the New South Wales men, and I do not think any from the other Colonies.

8185. I am speaking of the New South Wales men—none of them were returned at once as unfit to serve?—None.

8186. You say that they were very carefully examined?—Yes, they generally underwent two medical examinations, one up-country and one when they came down.

8187. And only those men who passed the doctor were allowed to go to South Africa?—That is so.

8188. Speaking generally, they were a very intelligent body of men, were they not?—Yes, quite so.

8189. Highly intelligent?—Yes.

8190. Well educated men?—Yes.

8191. And, in many instances, a considerable number of gentlemen were serving in the ranks as troopers?—Yes, and men of good positions.

8192. Such as station overseers?—Yes. We were often glad to take an overseer as an officer later on.

8193. But in the early contingents they went as troopers?—Yes, very many of them. We made officers of them as well as troopers too.

8194. In some instances men came back and then went out again, forming portions of other contingents going out to South Africa?—Yes.

8195. When the first contingent went out, I think you said there were a body of Lancers at home here in England?—Yes, about 70.

8196. They were attached, I think, to one of the Dragoon Regiments, at Aldershot, for training purposes?—Yes, they came home, at their own expense pretty well, in order to train.

8197. They came home at their own expense in order to acquire military knowledge?—Just so.

8198. There were some 70 or 80 men, I think?—There were about 90 came, and I think about 70 of them volunteered to go to South Africa.

8199. They had their officers with them?—Yes.

8200. And I think one of their officers, Captain Cox, distinguished himself afterwards in South Africa?—Yes.

8201. Those men on their return to Australia were passing the Cape and they landed there?—Yes.

8202. Of their own motion?—Yes, they were the first Colonial contingent landed at the Cape.

8203. Then when the units were forming for the first contingent, those men who had landed at the Cape in that way were taken into account as a portion of the units, were they not?—No, they were considered as extra to our two units; we sent out two units.

8204. But you brought them up to a unit?—Yes, we brought them up afterwards. Two officers, a warrant officer and 67 non-commissioned officers and men landed at the Cape, and on the 28th October, a draft went of the New South Wales Lancers of five officers, a warrant officer, 32 men, and 130 horses to make a complete squadron of the Lancers. Those 130 horses, I may say were, probably, the most magnificent lot of horses landed at the Cape. They were taken from the Mounted Police of New South Wales.

8205. Those men of the Lancers that you speak of were highly trained men?—Yes.

8206. Having been trained with a Dragoon regiment at Aldershot?—Yes; they had done seven or eight months' training, I think, at Aldershot with the 7th Dragoon Guards.

8207. Were you there when the last contingent left? I think you said that you had left New South Wales before the last contingent?—Before the very last had left; but I was there when two Commonwealth contingents were raised, and I made the arrangements for the organisation of the first one, and saw some of them off. Then there was a second Commonwealth contingent.

8208. Do you know whether it is a fact that the very last contingent that left were really a finer body of men than some of the previous contingents?—No, I do not know that—I was not there— I had left. I left in the end of February.

8209. Showing that our resources were not exhausted?—Not in the least.

8210. During the supply of these men to South Africa had you anything to say to the providing of the contingent for China?—I had just mentioned that we could do so, but that was quite unofficial. As a matter of fact, we sent a naval contingent.

8211. Had you any part in sending that naval contingent?—No, it did not come before me. We found stores, magazine rifles, and other things for them.

8212. How many men went in that contingent?—I think 250.

8213. Do you remember the time they left—was it not about the same time that some other contingents were leaving for South Africa?—I think it must have been about the month of August, 1900, that they went.

8214. That, I suppose, was done by Captain Hickson, the Captain in command of the Naval Brigade?—Yes.

8215. Those were all seamen?—Yes, they were all men connected with seafaring in some way.

8216. Did they take out full supplies with them of arms and ammunition?—They took arms, I know, because we found them for them—I am not sure whether they took ammunition. I think the naval authorities at Sydney fitted them out completely.

8217. There is one body you have not mentioned, I think, and that is the permanent Artillery that went from New South Wales?—The A Battery left in the "Warrigal" on the 30th of December, 1899.

8218. What number did they consist of?—They were a very fine battery; they consisted of six officers, 170 men, and 140 horses, with six of the latest type guns, cordite ammunition, and everything up-to-date—a field battery complete.

8219. They were very highly trained men, I think?—They were very highly trained men, and they were commanded by an officer of the Royal Artillery, who is one of the best officers in the Service, Major Smith. That battery was twice offered before it was accepted by the War Office—three times, I think. It was declined altogether at first.

8220. You are a Royal Artillery officer yourself?—Yes.

8221. Do you consider that that battery was equal to an Imperial battery?—The equipment was the same;

the men, I should think, were much superior to men in the Royal Artillery, but, of course, the officers and the non-commissioned officers were scarcely of as high a standard; still, taking them all round, it was a splendid unit.

8222. You except the Colonel, of course, in that criticism?—Yes. The Major Commanding is one of the best officers in the Imperial Service.

8223. And the equipment was good?—Very good.

8224. And the horses were good?—Yes; everything was quite complete and up-to-date.

8225. The men were all highly-trained?—Yes.

8226. And very intelligent?—Very intelligent.

8227. You say that they were three times offered before they were accepted?—I think the third time they were accepted.

8228. Then when they got out to South Africa, I believe they were not sent on active service?—They unfortunately got away to a place called Prieska, out of the zone of active operations, although, I think, at the time, a good deal of trouble was expected there, but it did not come off.

8229. Do you remember that Lord Roberts inspected those men on their landing at Cape Town?—Yes.

8230. And you are aware of a telegram that he sent to the Colonial Government at the time he inspected the men of that battery?—Now that you mention it, I have a recollection of it. I know it was quite favourable, but I do not remember the terms of it.

8231. However, they were not employed on any active service?—Afterwards they were, later on in the campaign.

8232. But not for a long time?—No, not for a long time.

8233. Do you know why they were not employed?—I put it down to a bit of bad luck, their being sent away to Prieska, which was a long way off the scene of operations, and a great deal of time would have been lost in relieving them. I think it must have been pretty nearly a week's march off the line of operations.

8234. Are you aware that some feeling was caused in New South Wales at the time by their not being employed on active service?—Of course the people of New South Wales would sooner that they had been, but I am afraid it was the fortune of war.

8235. Have you anything to say with respect to the medical unit that went out?—The Army medical unit was a very excellent one. The officer in charge of it is quite a first class officer in that line, and it was thought so highly of by the authorities in South Africa that they asked us to send another, which we did.

8236. They brought their own horses with them, I think?—Yes. As a matter of fact, owing to the A battery being refused, we gave them 50 of the best horses out of the battery.

8237. That was before the A battery left?—Yes; and then they were so thoroughly well horsed that I believe one of their ambulance wagons was the only one that ever got into Kimberley at the time Kimberley was relieved.

8238. You found, I suppose, a difficulty which other corps have found in giving these contingents a continuous supply of efficient officers?—A very great difficulty.

8239. Have you any suggestion to offer as to how a supply of officers should be kept up, so as to provide efficient officers in case of a similar emergency arising?—The best thing that I can see is that system of Reserve, which would, of course, apply to officers as well as to others.

8240. I think you spoke of officers of the higher rank in that statement which you have just made?—That was a special case as regards officers who were retired from the Regular Service on pension.

8241. But with respect to subaltern officers, have you any suggestion to offer?—We do not expect to have any of those from the Regular Service.

8242. But have you any suggestion to make to the Commission as to how they could be made efficient?—They should be picked officers out of the existing forces. There are plenty of good officers in the existing Militia.

8243. Do you mean the forces at home?—No; I am talking now of the Colonies. I should have a reserve of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men liable for service who volunteer to serve in case of active operations.

8244. How would you train the officers?—They would not be passed into that Reserve until they were trained.

8245. But they would not be trained by simply attending to that work merely for a few days in the year?—They must have a certain number of years' experience before they would be put into the Reserve.

8246. But they would not be at all superior to the present Volunteer officers here in England, would they, by that sort of training?—No; I suppose they would not be very much superior to those unless they had been several years at the work.

8247. But would they be efficient officers to send into the field?—For junior positions I should think they would be fairly efficient; the difficulty would be about senior ones.

8248. Have you formed any opinion as to whether, supposing a similar emergency arose now, there would be any difficulty in getting men from Australia, looking at the matter from a political point of view?—You could get any number of them.

8249. Of the men?—Yes.

8250. But from a political point of view, as matters are now do you think that would be so?—I do not think the political question would come up unless they had to go to Parliament to ask for money. I think that is where the trouble, perhaps, would arise.

8251. Were you still in Australia when the very last contingent was going out?—No.

8252. Do you know that there was some difficulty in getting the Commonwealth Government to move in the matter at all?—They were not very active even with the previous contingent while I was there—the first contingent.

8253. And but for Queensland, perhaps there might have been some difficulty in getting that last contingent away at all?—It might have been so, perhaps. I was not there for the last one. Of course, the Commonwealth Government had a great deal on their hands just then; and another fact was that there is no Defence Act passed yet, and I think there was a good deal of risk in sending those men, from the legal point of view, out to South Africa at all, because I maintain that under the existing Act the whole of those men should have been raised under an officer of the Regular Service. The Army Act is very strong on this point.

8254. However, no one ever raised these points out there, fortunately?—That is so.

8255. I believe the Federal Parliament have very largely cut down the Military Estimates this year?—Yes; I understand £60,000 more is to be taken off and the staff reduced, the permanent men taken off, and so forth.

8256. They did take off £180,000, and now they have taken off £62,000 more?—Yes.

8257. Do you think that that will interfere with the working of the defence out there?—Of course it will; things were run pretty fine always. It will be a very serious blow to the development of the Defence Forces, I think. As regards cost, according to a return that I had laid before the Government when I was there, the comparative cost per head was not more than about 3s. for defence purposes. That is very small compared with the home contribution. The home contribution, under ordinary circumstances, is something like £1 3s. per head for defence purposes.

8258. (*Sir John Edge.*) As I understand, your proposal is that the Reserve bounty should be paid from Imperial funds?—Yes, if they want it as a reserve for Imperial purposes.

8259. Would the Imperial Government have the first call upon those Reserves?—I should think so, unless the country to which the Reserves belonged was invaded.

8260. I have not arrived at that point yet. But would the Imperial Government have the right to remove those Reserves from the country?—I should say so, if they made that arrangement with the local Governments.

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8261. Without consulting the Colonial Government at the time?—I should think so if they pay for them. I assume that the men act voluntarily, and say, "We will serve"; then the Colonial Government have simply to give their permission, and not to find any funds. I do not see how, in that case, they can reasonably object.

8262. Then they would cease to be Militiamen?—Yes; they would have passed through their course, and qualified as trained men.

8263. But would they cease to be for all purposes in the employment of the Colonial Government after they enter this Reserve?—I should think they would; they would pass from the local forces into the Reserve; they would draw no more pay from the Colonial Government; they would be a war Reserve for Imperial purposes, and would be paid for by the Imperial Government.

8264. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Why should it be necessary to withdraw them from the Militia because they are required for service in time of war out of the Colony; could they not remain in the Militia?—Yes; they could if the Colonial Government agreed. Then if they did remain they would be getting pay in two capacities.

8265. Only when they were called out by the Colonial Government. But if they went into a sort of Reserve, in two or three years' time they would probably have lost all their military knowledge, would they not?—I suppose always that those men would train a certain amount either annually or biennially.

8266. (*Sir John Edge.*) At the expense of the Colonial Government or at the expense of the Imperial Government?—From what Sir Henry Norman says, it might be either really; that they would still remain in the forces and train with the forces.

8267. But a different consideration may arise. If they were trained at the expense of the Colonial Government, I suppose the Colonial Government would not part with them unless it was absolutely certain that there was no danger of invasion of the Colony?—Exactly.

8268. And then they would not be, strictly speaking, Volunteers for military purposes?—I think if there was any danger of the Colony being invaded the Colony would certainly have the first claim upon them.

8269. I will put a case to you. Assuming that there is a war, that the Imperial Government is quite satisfied that no invasion of Australia would be possible on account of the Fleet, for instance, that opinion might not be entertained by the Colonial Government. What is to happen then to these Reserves?—I think that is what they call a deadlock between the two Governments.

8270. But I want to know. You put forward a scheme which will cost the Imperial Government a good deal of money, and that is a point that you have to consider?—I think the Imperial Government at home keep the right of removing the Australian Squadron should they want to do so.

8271. Then your scheme would be that the Imperial Government should have the right to call for the Reserves if the Colony did not require them?—Yes; I do not suppose that the Imperial Government would think of calling them away if there was the slightest chance of risk of invasion of any of the Colonies.

8272. Because then the defence of the Colony would become an Imperial question; but I am putting a case in which the Colonial Government might apprehend that the fleet was not a sufficient protection for the Colony, and might be afraid of invasion, whereas the Imperial Government might be quite certain that no invasion would be possible?—I think there might possibly be difficulties such as that, if Australia consisted of half a dozen different States, as it did, but I should think that the Commonwealth Government would take a larger view of such a question as that.

8273. Is the whole of the Militia force of Australia now under the Commonwealth Government?—It is now, since the 1st of January, 1901.

8274. It is all at the disposal of the Commonwealth Government?—Yes.

8275. And it can be moved, I suppose, from one State to another?—It could, if necessary. But when you talk of a force, there were practically not more than about 1,200 permanent men in the whole of Australia, and a good deal less now, so that they are really Militia and Volunteers, and they could not be moved out of their State under ordinary circumstances.

8276. Do you happen to know whether there are any Reserves from the Imperial forces serving in Australia?—There are a certain number; but, as I have already mentioned, a good deal of difficulty is put in their way.

8277. Do they settle there by permission, or how?—I think the men who go there are for the most part time-expired men who have served in India. I used to get a great number of instructors in that way from men who had put their time in India. But I had billets for all of them.

8278. And were they liable to the Reserves?—Yes.

8279. How were they drilled?—They had completed their time in the Imperial service. The men I refer to were usually picked men, whom I engaged as instructors and so forth.

8280. But as Reservists they received no drill at all, did they?—They were men of the Imperial forces, who had put in their time and had come to Australia and did as they liked. They might join our corps if they liked, and they were paid if they did.

8281. Had you any considerable number of those Imperial Reservists?—I could not tell you. I only came across occasional ones.

8282. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I think you stated, in reply to Sir John Edge, that you had only about 1,200 Regulars in the Commonwealth?—I do not think there are so many now.

8283. Then how many Militia have you under the Commonwealth?—I should think not more than 12,000 or 13,000 in the Militia.

8284. And in the Volunteers?—Perhaps 8,000 or 10,000; and then we have a large number of members of rifle clubs, as they call them—men who can shoot.

8285. So that your Regulars, Militia, and Volunteers, roughly, only amount to about 25,000?—I should say from 25,000 to 30,000. I cannot give very close numbers for the other colonies, of course.

8286. With reference to that question which has been raised by Sir John Edge, that, if the Home Government gave a bounty and the Colonial Government paid for the expense of drilling, in the event of a difference of opinion between the Home Government and the Colonial Government there would be, as you put it, a deadlock. That, of course, could be easily got over if the home Government paid for the expense of a certain annual training in the same way as it does for the home Militia?—Yes.

8287. In that event there would be no reason why they should not have a call upon those men away from the Colonial Government?—No; but my idea was that the small retaining fee which the Imperial Government was to give to these men was to cover the cost of their turning up and drilling for a certain time—not every year, say, but occasionally—perhaps a course of drill one year and a course of musketry the next, or every two years.

8288. Do you not think that with such a body of men it would be necessary that they should have, say, a week's training, or something of that sort, annually?—They are assumed to be men who have done their drill and have passed and qualified. I should think once in two years would be sufficient, and then the retaining fee would cover that. They are not to be given £8 or £12 a year for doing nothing, but should occasionally come up for drill and instruction.

8289. With reference to the supply of military stores, I understand that those are requisitioned by the Colonial Government upon the War Office?—Yes.

8290. Then you say that delays occur?—Yes.

8291. And you suggest that the Home Government should keep large reserves in hand?—That they should issue them out of their existing reserves, and replace them. The position to my mind is this—that it would be better if the Imperial Government, when asked for a million rounds of ammunition, should say, "Here are a million rounds; we will make a contract and put that million rounds back in stock," and then make the contract and put them back into their own stock, but issue them at once.

8292. But if the Colonial Government kept a sufficiently large reserve in hand there would not be that need?—Certainly not, if someone could induce them to do so.

8293. It is a question of money again, I suppose?—I may mention that they are making their small arm ammunition now in Australia, and for many years they have been doing it in Canada, and they will be able to supply their own in time in all cases, as they probably do in Canada now. The small arm ammunition is a matter of vital importance.

8294. You suggest with regard to the supply of officers that there must be many officers on pension at home who would be glad to go out to Australia and take up other work, who might be available for military service there, but you say that if they took any remuneration from the Colonial Government their pension would drop in the meantime?—Yes, or their half-pay.

8295. I take it that your idea is that when a man has earned his pension, either at home or abroad, the fact of his continuing or taking up new work with the home or Imperial Government should not in any way interfere with his pension?—I would not go so far as to say with the Home Government, because he is getting a pension from the Home Government; but when an officer goes out and serves a Colonial Government in another country I do not think he should have his Imperial pension stopped.

8296. It sometimes happens at home that an officer has earned a pension, and is allowed to continue, provided that he does not take his pension. That is a case I can quite well understand that often arises?—Very possibly.

8297. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) What influence had the telegram of the 3rd of October, 1899, from the Secretary of State for War, saying, "Unmounted men preferred," on your action in New South Wales?—We had to carry out that instruction, and we sent some unmounted men with that first contingent.

8298. Do you recollect how many—what proportion?—We sent half from New South Wales; and I should think about half of the total from Australia were sent. All those men were mounted afterwards in South Africa, so that practically all the Australian contingents may be considered to have been mounted men from the beginning.

8299. And it did not affect any of the contingents that were sent afterwards?—No, they asked for none but mounted men afterwards.

8300. That was practically repeated by subsequent telegrams?—Yes.

8301. (*Sir John Edge.*) Were those infantry men who could ride whom you sent?—I would not say the whole of them, but most Australians can ride. They were not tested in riding. Every man that went from New South Wales was tested in riding if he went as a mounted man, and very severely tested, but the first contingent were not, because they were askd for as infantry, those who went as infantry.

8302. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) The probability is that they could all ride, though?—Yes.

8303. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) And that first telegram, so far as you know, affected the whole of the Australian contingents?—Yes, the first telegram.

8304. Victoria and elsewhere?—Yes.

8305. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Your first service in the Colonies was in Canada, was it not?—Yes.

8306. How many years ago is that?—I went out in the "Trent" affair in 1861.

8307. And again you went out in what year?—I went out again in 1869, and I was Inspector of Artillery for all Canada, under the Canadian Government then.

8308. You organised the first force of mounted police in the North-West?—Yes, that was in 1873 to 1876.

8309. You commanded them during those years?—Yes, I raised the force from the beginning.

8310. What was the number of that force?—At that time there were only 300.

8311. You are aware that they have been largely increased since?—Yes, largely increased.

8312. Where were the men chiefly drawn from at that time for the force?—They were chiefly drawn from Ontario and a certain number from Quebec.

8313. A certain number from the French Canadian population in Quebec?—Yes.

8314. The larger number came from Ontario?—Yes.

8315. Had you a certain number of Englishmen amongst them?—Yes, a considerable number of men who were not born in Canada, but who had come out from England.

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8316. And the officers?—As regards the officers, of course, those were largely political appointments in Canada—for the officers of that police force.

8317. But on the whole you had both good men and good officers?—Oh yes, a splendid lot of men. I think for that force of 300 men I must have had 2,000 to pick through.

8318. Men who were capable of doing, and who did good service in that country at the time?—Yes; very largely young farmers who wanted to go up in that country to prospect it.

8319. The means of transport there, I believe, at that time were very poor—no railways and hardly any roads?—None to signify. There was only one house from Red River to the Rocky Mountains on the boundary line then.

8320. You were amongst the Indian tribes, and especially the most troublesome tribes of the Blackfeet Indians?—Yes.

8321. You had to keep order there?—Yes.

8322. And you had to keep the country there inhabited, as it was, by such a population, from being overrun by people from the United States coming in with whisky?—Yes, they were ruining our people.

8323. That was a very troublesome thing indeed?—Yes; the prime cause of that force going out in 1874 was the fact of their having murdered about 30 of our Indians out there.

8324. There was then a Prohibition Act, and no intoxicating drinks were allowed into the country?—Not into the North-West Territories.

8325. You were really in the North-West Territories?—Yes.

8326. Not in the Province of Manitoba?—No.

8327. Do you think that the character of the service in that country was such as to sharpen the intellect, and physically also to make those men of the mounted police fitted for such service as they had in the South African war?—Excellently fitted, because, just as I mentioned in Australia, the men were accustomed to find their way across country for great distances, and did not feel lost when they got a mile out of camp.

8328. And from your experience, if you had to raise a force of men, would you go as readily there to take those men as you would anywhere else of which you have a knowledge?—Well, if you ask me the exact question, I think we could get larger numbers in Australia.

8329. Yes; but for the men such as you can get there?—Most excellent men could be recruited now in the North-West, because you could get a larger recruiting ground from the young farmers now settled there who did not exist in my time.

8330. Then you consider that those men, especially those from the North-West of Canada and the Bushmen were especially fitted for the service in South Africa?—Peculiarly well fitted, I should say.

8331. Especially for scouting?—Yes, and for finding their way about the country.

8332. In short, they are quite as much at home in the saddle as on foot, perhaps a little more so?—Yes, more so.

8333. Then you look upon such forces as being a most useful addition to the Imperial forces?—Most valuable. I have officially put out report after report that the mounted men from the back districts of Australia (and the same would apply to North-West Canada) would be a most valuable recruiting ground for cavalry and mounted infantry, because the men can ride, they can shoot, and they can find their way about; and those are three very great qualities.

8334. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) And do for themselves?—Yes.

8335. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) And look well after their horses?—Yes. I think in that way, probably, in Canada they are a bit ahead of Australia, because the horses are so cheap in Australia that men grow careless about them; they pick up a horse when they like, they can always get a horse, and they do not ordinarily take such good care of their horses perhaps as where they are more valuable.

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8336. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) And they can live, and do live, often on short commons while away going about the country. I am speaking more particularly now of the North-West of Canada as it was when you were there?—Yes.

8337. And what do you think of the Canadian horses as being suitable for campaign purposes?—I think that Canada is particularly well qualified to supply, not merely mounted infantry horses, but cavalry and artillery horses. You get a better weight-carrying class of horse there. In 1876, when I came back from Canada, I sent a very strong report to the War Office in favour of purchasing a number of cavalry remounts in Canada, pointing out what could be done; but I do not think they took any action upon it for many years afterwards.

8338. For mounted infantry you consider the horses are well adapted?—Yes, and they have a heavier horse, too, fit for cavalry.

8339. But those of 15 hands and 15·2 you consider well adapted for mounted infantry?—Yes, rather better even than what the mounted infantry wants. But the number of cavalry horses that can be supplied in Australia is very small, considering the immense number of horses in the country. Comparing the two, Canada and Australia, Canada could supply proportionately from its horses a better number of cavalry horses than Australia. Of course, the cavalry horse has to carry 18st., what they call a Light Dragoon, and he requires some substance.

8340. And the officers you got in Canada were capable of becoming good and useful officers, and became so under your command?—Yes, most of them turned out very well indeed.

8341. They were both physically and intellectually good men?—Yes.

8342. (*Chairman.*) Is there any other point that you wish to mention?—No, there is nothing more I have to state.

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Major-General R. H. O'Grady-Haly, C.B., D.S.O.

8343. (*Chairman.*) I understand you are in a position to give us some information with regard to the troops who came from Canada?—Yes, I think I can speak to all details as regards the Canadian contingents.

8344. What position did you hold when you were in Canada?—Major-General Commanding the Canadian Forces.

8345. In South Africa?—No, in Canada.

8346. During what time?—From the 19th July, 1900, to the 19th July, 1902.

8347. Then you were not out at the beginning of the war?—No; I can only speak from official returns as to the first and second contingents and Lord Strathcona's Horse. The others I organised myself.

8348. I suppose the authority to recruit in Canada was the same as was mentioned by General French for Australia, namely, the telegram of the 3rd of October, 1899?—I presume so; I was not there; I cannot speak as to that. The date of the authority to recruit for the first contingent was October 14th, 1899.

8349. The authority from the local government, do you mean?—From the Canadian Government.

8350. Can you say from your records what took place upon that?—Upon that from the records I find that in the first place, as your lordship is aware, the Canadian Government, I believe, offered mounted troops, but they were instructed that infantry would be most acceptable, in consequence of which an infantry regiment was organised, with an establishment of 41 officers, 50 staff-sergeants and sergeants, and 928 rank and file. They were raised by companies locally. The A Company was raised in British Columbia and Manitoba; B Company was raised in London, Ontario, and C Company in Toronto, Ontario; D Company was raised at Ottawa and Kingston; E Company was raised at Montreal; F Company was raised at Quebec; G Company was raised at New Brunswick and Prince Edward's Island; and H Company was raised in Nova Scotia.

8351. Was that for convenience in recruiting?—That, I believe, was for convenience in recruiting, and I believe it was with the idea that there would be a certain stimulus in having the officers and men all drawn from the same localities. I am not sure that it worked altogether satisfactorily.

8352. And that every locality should be represented, I suppose?—Every province was represented by a company.

8353. And how do you think it did not work satisfactorily?—I think from what I have heard that it did not work very satisfactorily, in this way:—When once they were brought together as a regimental unit, and became simply eight units combined for tactical purposes, it worked well enough, but for disciplinary and administrative purposes there were some difficulties—in the way of promotion, for instance. It was impossible if there was a vacancy for a sergeant to promote the senior corporal in the regiment, because he possibly came from British Columbia, whereas the vacancy occurred in the company organised from Quebec. That is the only way it did not work altogether well. Each company had to be more or less kept separate, and its promotion kept within itself.

8354. And was that maintained throughout?—I do not think it was entirely, but it was a difficulty, and I think probably Lord Strathcona knows that Colonel Otter had difficulties from that cause.

8355. The men, I suppose, were got without much difficulty?—No difficulty whatever. You could have got them five times over, I believe.

8356. And what about establishment?—The establishment, as I said, was 41 officers, 50 staff sergeants and sergeants, and 928 rank and file, making a total of all ranks of 1,019. That was the establishment of a British Infantry Regiment on the war strength.

8357. And I see from the telegram I have before me that that contingent sailed on October 30th?—They embarked and sailed on October 30th. There were 16 days altogether from the time the order was given to recruit until the regiment left. In that time, of course, it had to be entirely equipped and clothed, and it is worthy of notice that the whole of the supply of the khaki clothing material itself had to be manufactured in Canada. It was all done within the period, and the regiment embarked fully equipped.

8358. Did the cloth not exist at the time?—Not the khaki drill, the ordinary red clothing, the serge clothing, of course, was in store, but the khaki clothing required for field service did not exist; it had to be made. The regiment was fully equipped in every way. I have the details of the actual quantities. I do not know whether you wish to have them.

8359. No, I do not think it is necessary?—They took two Maxim guns, 50 revolvers, 1,000 Lee-Enfield rifles and bayonets, 160,600 rounds of small arm ammunition, and 40,000 rounds of revolver ammunition. That was all put on board in one day.

8360. Was that provided locally?—It was provided by the Canadian Government.

8361. Afterwards I suppose they drew their supplies from the Imperial Government?—After they arrived on the field the supplies of ammunition were provided by the Imperial Government. Then on the 8th March, 1900, there were 100 men sent out to join them as a draft to make up the casualties. They were recruited in the same localities as the regiment.

8362. At all the different localities?—At all the different localities in quotas; for instance, Toronto supplied 20 men for this draft, Kingston 10, Montreal 10, Ottawa 10, St. John's, New Brunswick, 10, Halifax, Nova Scotia 15, Charlottetown and Prince Edward's Island 15, and Quebec 10. That made up the 100. These men joined the companies that had been originally organised in those respective localities.

8363. It could not have been ascertained that the casualties were exactly in that proportion, I suppose?—No, but the Canadian Government authorised a draft of 100 men to go out. It was known, I presume, pretty nearly the number of men that would be required. During the operations this regiment suffered 541 casualties out of a strength of a thousand men; that is to say, 39 killed or died of wounds, 29 died of disease, 113 wounded, and 360 invalided home to England and Canada.

8364. That extended over what period?—That extended over the whole year for which the regiment was in service in the field.

8365. One year?—They were enlisted for one year.

8366. And the number invalided was 360?—There were 360 invalided during the course of the campaign after arriving in South Africa.

8367. Were there any invalided immediately on arrival?—I am not in a position to say; I have no information; by a reference to old orders I could give you an approximate idea. But, as a rule, physically speaking they were an exceedingly fine body of men.

8368. So that it is not probable that there were any?—I know there were very few, and they came back from time to time in batches of three or four afterwards, when I was out, and so forth in small numbers, until towards the latter part of the campaign, when they came in in larger numbers.

8369. 360 is a large proportion?—Yes, it is, but the majority of those were towards the close of the campaign.

8370. And from what cause principally, do you know—enteric?—Enteric to a large extent. I know there were a great number from that, but the proportion of deaths was not very high; there were 29 deaths from disease.

8371. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You say that those men were invalided shortly before the close of the campaign. What period does that cover?—One year from the date at which the regiment were enlisted, that is October 14th, 1899, to the middle of October, 1900.

8372. That was not the close of the campaign?—No, to the close of the operations they were engaged in.

8373. (*Chairman.*) Did they come home as a regiment at the end of the first year?—Yes, what remained of them—about 500.

8374. They enlisted for one year?—Only for one year.

8375. And they did come back at the end of the year?—They came back at the end of the year, with the exception of two companies that volunteered to remain longer.

8376. Then we may pass on to the second contingent?—The authority to recruit the second contingent was first the Provisional Order, which was issued on the 20th December, 1899, which was confirmed a week later on the 28th of December, 1899. This contingent consisted of two regiments, or battalions they called them, of mounted rifles, and three complete batteries of field artillery.

8377, (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) How many men were there in each battalion?—The total establishment for the mounted troops was 38 officers, 52 staff sergeants and sergeants, and 652 of other ranks and 750 horses; that was the mounted corps. The establishment of field artillery was 19 officers, 28 warrant officers, staff sergeants, and sergeants, 492 of other ranks, and 427 horses.

8378. (*Chairman.*) The total number being 1,281?—1,281 altogether.

8379. How were they raised?—They were raised in the following way: A and B Squadrons were raised all over Canada, C and D Squadrons were raised only in the North-west Provinces and by the North-west Mounted Police. A Squadron was raised, one troop at Toronto, the second troop at Toronto and St. Catherine's; the third troop at Peterborough, Ottawa, and Montreal, and the fourth troop at London and Kingston. B Squadron was raised, the first troop at Winnipeg, the second troop at Portage la Prairie, Virdeu, Brandon, Yorkton, and Winnipeg; the third troop at Montreal, Quebec, and Cookshire, in the Province of Quebec; and the fourth troop in the maritime provinces, Sussex, New Brunswick, St. John, New Brunswick, and Canning, Nova Scotia. A and B Squadrons, when they went out, were styled the 1st Battalion Canadian Mounted Rifles; subsequently their designation was changed to the Royal Canadian Dragoons, as representing part of the permanent Cavalry Force of Canada. C and D Squadrons were entirely raised and officered almost entirely by the North-west Mounted Police; their composition was, North-west Mounted Police, 134; Calgary, 48; Regina, 44; Moosomin, 12; Pincher Creek, 30; Macleod, 22; Maple Creek, 11; Prince Albert, 3; Manitoba, 2; and in the Province of Ontario they got two men, Nova Scotia two men, Quebec one, and one man whose locality is uncertain. They afterwards were called Canadian Mounted Rifles, First Regiment; they were the original regiment of the Canadian Mounted Rifles. Three batteries of artillery were raised; C and D Batteries were raised in Ontario principally, and the E Battery in the Province of Quebec and the maritime provinces. As regards the localities from which these batteries were raised, I may mention that they were all stations where a battery of Artillery is maintained, Militia artillery, Field batteries always, and these men were mostly drawn from the Militia; they were all practically trained Artillerymen, and were extremely efficient, I understand. I never saw them myself. C Battery was raised at Kingston, Gananoque, a few men at Winnipeg, Hamilton, St. Catherine's, and Toronto. D Battery was raised at Guelph, Ottawa, London, and Port Hope. E Battery was raised at Quebec, Montreal, Granby, Woodstock, New Brunswick, Newcastle, New Brunswick, and Sydney, Cape Breton; but you will notice that there were none of these men drawn from Nova Scotia, as there is no Field Artillery there. I think that covers the composition of that Force.

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8380. What did you do for the clothing and equipment of that contingent?—The clothing and equipment of that contingent was entirely furnished in Canada and under considerable difficulties, because the Mounted Rifles were dressed in an entirely new uniform, invented by my predecessor, all of which had to be made at considerable difficulty. The batteries were complete with 12-pounder breech-loading guns. The numbers of these, which were all furnished in Canada, were 720 Lee-Enfield rifles, 113 swords (cavalry), 960 revolvers, 18 12-pounder breech-loading guns. These troops concentrated at Halifax, and they embarked on the following dates: D and E Batteries on the 20th of January, 1900; the Mounted Rifles on the 27th January, 1900, and C Battery and the remainder of the Canadian Mounted Rifles on the 21st of February. The delay occurred through the transport that was originally taken up being found to have scarlet fever on board or diphtheria, I am not quite sure what the disease was; but, however, the medical authorities would not accept the vessel, and another ship had to be procured, which at the time was at sea, and she then had to be fitted, because I may mention that the whole of the fittings of these ships was done by the Canadian Government.

8381. What were the casualties in that contingent?—The casualties in the whole of the second contingent were: Killed or died of wounds, 12; died of disease, 33; wounded, 60, and invalided, 189.

8382. And for what period did they enlist?—For one year, and they came back at the end of the year. The amount of ammunition that was put on board with these troops was 9,000 rounds of 12-pounder breech-loading cordite cartridges, 575,000 rounds small arm rifles. ·303 75,000 rounds of revolver ammunition, 9,450 fuzes (time and percussion), 8,550 shells (shrapnel), 450 shot (case), and 10,080 friction tubes. All that ammunition was drawn from the Canadian arsenal. It might be of interest as regards these two first contingents which were entirely equipped, and paid up to the date of landing in South Africa, if I were to give you the expenditure.

8383. Yes, if you please?—Sea transport, $707,959·61; land transport, $108,350·59; expenses of enlistment, $46,049·78; cost of horses, $131,660; clothing, $290,287·17; warlike stores and equipment, $184,427·27; officers' travelling expenses, $5,463·96; cables and telegrams, $9,382·51; pay, $440,465·31; and sundries, $29,780·87; making a total of $1,953,827·07; approximately £400,000.

8384. Was that all defrayed by the Canadian Government?—It was entirely paid by the Canadian Government. I may mention, as to the conditions of pay of these troops, that they were paid at Canadian rates; that is to say, the British Government paid the British rate after landing in South Africa, and the Canadian Government supplemented it to make up the Canadian rates of pay, which are, approximately, for the private soldier double the British rate, that is, roughly, 2s. a day. The second contingent received higher pay; inasmuch as they were paid at the same rates as the North-West Mounted Police, from which one regiment was entirely raised, and, therefore, they were somewhat in a better position than the first regiment.

8385. What rate was that?—A dollar a day, which I think the North-West Mounted Policeman gets.

8386. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Was it not made up to the first contingent?—No.

8387. Not afterwards?—No, there was a good deal of discussion about it; it was not made up; of course, the second contingent, being entirely mounted, would

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naturally be paid a higher rate of pay than the infantry soldier.

8388. (*Chairman.*) What was the average cost of horses?—The average cost of horses was $115 per horse, say £24, roughly.

8389. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) That is apart from transportation, of course?—That is apart from transportation altogether. That is the actual net price that was paid for the horses. That is worked out from a total of $131,660.

8390. (*Chairman.*) Is that all that there is to be said of the second contingent?—That is all. The next one we come to is Lord Strathcona's Horse. The authority to recruit was dated the 1st February, 1900. This regiment was raised exclusively from the North-west Territories and Manitoba, composed of three squadrons of Mounted Rifles. I can give the numbers of men from each district if you care to have them.

8391. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) They were all raised in the North-west Territories and British Columbia?—Yes.

8392. There were none from the Eastern provinces?—Twelve artificers only, 12 from Eastern Canada, and they were all artificers.

8393. The numbers being altogether how many?—The numbers being altogether 26 officers, 36 Staff sergeants and sergeants, 475 other ranks, making a total of all ranks of 537 and 548 horses.

8394. There was a draft, was there not, too?—This is an extract from the returns: "Lord Strathcona's Horse; 29 officers eventually" (this is including the draft) "and 568 other ranks."

8395. (*Chairman.*) That is a total of 596?—Yes; I had omitted the draft.

8396. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) I speak of the draft because I think they did as good service as any of the others going out?—Yes, for this regiment, which was entirely equipped at the expense of your Lordship, the whole of the equipment was furnished in Canada and made there.

8397. (*Chairman.*) And in the other details are they the same as the first and second contingents?—Yes, their equipment was precisely similar to that of the Canadian Mounted Rifles, with the exception, I think, that they were furnished with long-laced field boots; they had 520 rifles, 540 revolvers, and 366,400 rounds of small arm ammunition.

8398. And what was their pay?—They were paid at the same rates, I think, as the Mounted Police.

8399. A dollar a day?—Yes, I think it was a dollar a day. They concentrated at Ottawa on the 15th of February, 1900; they moved to Halifax on the 12th of March, and embarked on the 13th, the very next day; their casualties were, killed or died of wounds, 12; died of disease, 14; wounded, 24; and invalided, 48.

8400. Is that all you wish to say of that force?—That is all the data I have.

8401. And the next is the South African Constabulary contingent?—The South African Constabulary contingent, which I raised myself. The order authorising recruiting was issued on the 8th of February, 1901.

8402. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You now come to what is within your own personal knowledge?—This is what is within my own personal knowledge. Recruiting commenced on the 21st February, and terminated on the 11th of March. I may just mention that the organisation of the South African Constabulary contingent was of a temporary nature; that is to say, they were not organised in squadrons permanently—that was done after they arrived in South Africa; neither were they clothed in Canada, except in such articles as were absolutely necessary for the voyage. They received their clothing and their arms and equipment and horses at the hands of the Imperial Government after arriving in South Africa. This corps was raised all over the Dominion, in the North-west Territories, in British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island. There was no fixed establishment except as regards the proportion of officers, which was five officers to each 200 men, and the total contingent raised was 30 officers and 1,208 of other ranks, because the other ranks, sergeant and so forth, were merely temporary ranks until they arrived in South Africa, when they were organised and moved to their different stations. The total of all ranks was 1,238 men and no horses. There was no clothing, nor necessaries, nor arms, nor ammunition, nor horses. The men who were enlisted to the west of Ontario, mobilised at Ontario on the 8th of March, and those enlisted to the east mobilised at Halifax on the 12th of March, and the embarkation took place on the 15th of March. The total time from the commencement of the enlistment was about 22 days, and, as a matter of fact, they could have embarked sooner if the transport had been ready for them.

8403. (*Chairman.*) What was the condition of their enlistment, as they are called South African Constabulary?—I can give you the actual terms of enlistment; they were enlisted on exactly the same terms of enlistment as the South African Constabulary enlisted in the United Kingdom.

8404. And were they for permanent service in South Africa?—Yes. The period of engagement was to serve for three years from the date of attestation in South Africa, with, possibly, a re-engagement on increased pay; that is to say, that our engagement that we carried out in Canada was merely a temporary one, and only covered the period between their being raised and landed in South Africa, where these men were re-attested.

8405. They were in a different position from the other forces?—Yes; this was an Imperial force, for which the Canadian Government merely acted as agent for the British Government. The same may be said, in fact, of all the subsequent contingents.

8406. Are they still on service there?—The South African Constabulary are; they are still serving. The casualties reported in the South African Constabulary were: Killed in action, 10; died of disease, 42; and wounded, 13. We had no information as regards the invaliding.

8407. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) What pay did they get?—A third class trooper, 5s. a day.

8408. All the others were higher?—Of course, they ranged from superintending warrant officer at 15s. a day down to staff sergeant at 10s., sergeant 9s., second class sergeant 8s., corporal 7s. 6d., first class trooper 7s., second class trooper 6s., and third class trooper 5s.

8409. Did they get rations as well?—Yes.

8410. (*Sir John Edge.*) And rations free?—In addition to the above rates, an allowance was given to compensate for extra high market prices to all non-commissioned officers and men while stationed north of Wilge River, within a radius of 50 miles from Johannesburg; free issue of rations or forage, clothing, equipment, and medical attendance supplied free; and in exceptional circumstances, where rations could not be supplied, a ration allowance was made of 2s. per diem.

8411. (*Chairman.*) Then is that all about that contingent?—That is all as regards the constabulary. We now come to the third contingent, the second regiment of the Canadian Mounted Rifles. The authority to recruit is dated the 29th November, 1901, and the establishment then authorised was increased on the 16th December, 1901; it finally consisted of six squadrons of mounted rifles. These squadrons were not specially localised, with the exception that the men from the North-West Territories were more or less kept together; but they were raised at the same places as the other contingents, in British Columbia, the North-West Territories, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward's Island. The establishment was 38 officers, 40 staff sergeants and sergeants, and 802 of other ranks, with 872 horses. The clothing and equipment was on exactly the same scale as for Lord Strathcona's Horse, with the exception that instead of dark-green serge clothing the khaki serge clothing was supplied. The cloth for this had to be made for them in Canada, and was very satisfactorily made—it was very good indeed. Leather bandoliers were substituted for web bandoliers, which were not found to wear well. Also ankle boots and putties instead of the long boots that the Strathcona Horse had, and the saddlery was entirely made (I think it was a very remarkable performance) after the order for enlistment was issued—about 900 sets of saddlery of the pattern known as "Colonial." The arms and ammunition were supplied from the Imperial stores at Halifax. They concentrated between the 12th and 28th. The reason for that is that the men were forwarded to Halifax for concentration

in batches as they were enlisted, and the enlistment practically finished on the 26th December. They sailed, D, E, and F squadrons, and one troop of A squadron—21 officers, 24 staff sergeants and sergeants, and 410 of other ranks, and 513 horses—from Halifax for Cape Town on the 14th January, 1902. The remainder of the regiment, with the 10th Canadian Field Hospital, which was a portion of the second contingent, consisting altogether of 23 officers, 24 staff sergeants and sergeants, 393 other ranks, with 446 horses, sailed from Halifax on the 28th January, 1902. There is a fortnight between the sailings. Of this regiment the casualties were: Killed or died of wounds, 13; died of disease, 5; wounded, 42. As to invalided, we had up to the time I left Canada no information. All charges and expenses conected with this regiment were paid by the Imperial Government.

8412. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) In that respect they differed from the three preceding contingents?—They differed from the three preceding contingents; that is to say, for the first and second contingents and your Lordship's regiment the Imperial Government paid nothing until they took them over in South Africa; the Canadian Government and your Lordship continued to pay the difference between the British rates and the Canadian rates.

8413. But the third contingent?—The third contingent was paid for entirely *ab initio* by the British Government.

8414. As well as the fourth?—As well as the fourth.

8415. (*Chairman.*) And paid at the same rates?—They were paid at the same rates; they were all paid at the Imperial Yeomanry rates; the Imperial Yeomanry rate was the scale.

8416. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) The Canadian contingents, not only the constabulary, but the third and fourth Canadian contingents, were paid for at the Imperial Yeomanry rate of 5s. a day?—Yes, they received cavalry pay up to the date of embarkation, and from the date of embarkation they came on the Imperial Yeomanry scale. The third contingent field hospital, which was authorised to be raised on the 3rd January, 1902, consisted of a field hospital, complete with all its vehicles, horses, and drivers, and was raised in Ontario, London, Hamilton, Toronto, Ottawa, Kingston, Quebec, Montreal, Halifax, Nova Scotia, St. John, New Brunswick, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island; and the establishment was five officers, nine staff sergeants and sergeants, 47 other ranks, with eight riding and 21 draught horses. The clothing and equipment was the same as for the mounted rifles. The arms were supplied by the Imperial Government from the Halifax stores. They concentrated at Halifax on the 14th December, 1901, and they sailed with the remainder of the third contingent on the 28th January, 1902. The only casualty was one man died of disease.

8417. (*Chairman.*) And the last contingent was the fourth?—The last contingent was the fourth. Before I begin to deal with the fourth contingent I might mention that in raising the third contingent I specified the quota of men to be raised from every enlisting centre, and not only was there no difficulty in getting the quota, but we could have got the quota, I think, two or three times over.

8418. In each case?—In each case if it had been necessary. With the fourth contingent, which consisted of four regiments—the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Mounted Rifles—there was no specific quotas for any district. Of course, we had, so to speak, picked over a good deal by then, and the system that was adopted was that the recruiting was authorised to commence on a certain date, and the numbers that were recruited were reported to me by telegraph every night, and as soon as I found I had got the total establishment recruiting stopped. They were raised in exactly the same districts and localities—in fact, the recruiting centres were the same in all these contingents. That was governed, of course, by the officers that we could procure to carry them out and for the convenience of candidates getting in to present themselves for enlistment and medical examination.

8419. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Had you in the third and fourth contingents a considerable number of those who had served in the first contingent and the second contingent in South Africa before and who had returned to Canada?—In the third contingent we had a good few. Of course, the constabulary had picked them over first, and, as the inducements in the way of pay were very large, I think the constabulary took a considerable proportion of the men who had been discharged from the first and second contingents. There were not so many left for the others; still, there were plenty. The regimental establishment of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th regiments consisted for each regiment of 26 officers, 31 staff sergeants and sergeants, 452 of other ranks, and 539 horses. The total number that embarked was 104 officers, 124 staff sergeants and sergeants, 1,808 other ranks, with 2,174 horses. I may mention, as regards horses, that we sent out 25 spare horses by permission of the Imperial Government. The clothing and equipment were exactly the same as for the other mounted rifle regiments, entirely made and provided in the country. There was nothing whatever in the way of equipment that was procured from Great Britain.

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8420. (*Chairman.*) But at the cost of the Imperial Government?—This was all at the cost of the Imperial Government. Arms and ammunition were supplied from the Imperial stores at Halifax. These regiments concentrated at Halifax. They commenced on the 18th April, 1902, and completed about the 27th. I could not say exactly, because they came there as they were recruited, in batches of 10, 15, 20, and so forth. Their embarkation took place, the 3rd regiment and two squadrons of the 4th, on the 8th May, 1902, in the steamship "Cestrian." The 6th regiment and the remainder of the 4th on the 15th May, and the 5th regiment on the 20th. It happens that the 5th regiment was the last to go, because it was the last regiment that was completed. The men all came from the North-West Territories, and had the longest distance to come. These regiments, of course, had no casualties, because, unfortunately, they did not reach South Africa until peace had been proclaimed.

8421. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Fortunately?—They came back.

8422. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) I daresay General Haly will say "happily"?—Yes, but it was unfortunate for the regiment, and, if I may be permitted to say so, that they have been rather hardly treated in that they have been refused the war gratuity which all the others got; and, as all these men gave up their employment without the same guarantee of being reinstated that the others had, I think the concession might have been made that they should have got their gratuity, because, of course, it was the accident of war that they were not in time. If they had been there before hostilities ceased I presume they would have got it, and I think it has been rather hard upon them. As regards the details, I might perhaps just say that the total number sent of all these contingents together numbered 351 officers, 7,012 of other ranks, and 4,832 horses.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

8423. (*Chairman.*) (*To the Witness.*) You have given us the details with regard to the troops that went from Canada to South Africa: are there any general remarks that you would wish to make with regard to those men?—Well, no, I think nothing in particular. Of course the first contingent that went out, I think laboured under some disadvantage from the extreme rapidity with which they were despatched from Canada. It was merely a matter of fourteen days from the time it was raised until the time it sailed. I think probably it would have been better if it had been possible to give it a little more training and discipline before it got there, but that is, of course, a detail, and it had to be done afterwards. I think they were some nine weeks at Belmont getting the regiment into shape, but beyond that I do not think, as far as my own experience goes, and from what I have heard, it could have been done certainly more expeditiously, and I do not think any better than it was.

8424. The organisation had to be improvised?—That is so, to a great extent. Of course the difficulty that presented itself was officers and non-commissioned officers. You cannot make those as rapidly as you can Militia is 40,000, so that the proportion of highly trained the private soldier, and the permanent force kept up in Canada only amounts to 1,000 men, whereas the officers available is very small.

8425. Did some of the officers come from the permanent force?—Largely; the permanent force was absolutely depleted during the war.

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8426. Are the officers in the permanent force officers who have served in the Regular Army?—Oh no, none of them; they are Regular officers, but they have never served in the Regular Army.

8427. Did any number of the men come from the Militia?—A very considerable proportion of men; I could, if you thought it desirable, get you some information as to the actual numbers that had been through the Militia, but as a matter of fact there was a very considerable number of men and almost every regiment, in fact every regiment with a few exceptions gave quotas of men. They were enlisted individually; they were not drafted into the contingents as Militiamen.

8428. No, but they had the training?—A great number had had a certain amount of training.

8429. Was the amount of training they got in the Militia sufficient to enable them to leaven the mass?—No. Of course, the training they get is quite as much as the condition of the country renders possible, and I do not think these men can be got out for more than their 12 days in the year.

8430. Is that all they serve?—They do 12 days in the year, and they are enlisted for three years. If a man came out every year for three years, in the third year he would have a certain amount of knowledge; but as a matter of fact, the population is very shifting, and you do not get, perhaps, more than 40 per cent. or 50 per cent. of the men the second year—they disappear. They go to seek their fortunes in other parts of the Dominion, and they may drift, and very likely do, into other parts of the country; but of that there is no record.

8431. The conditions of the Militia force are more comparable to the Volunteers in this country than to the Militia in this country?—Quite so; they do not work on the same footing as the Militia in this country, and it is much more like the Volunteers; in fact, the regiments raised in the Canadian cities are essentially in every particular similar to our own Volunteers. The country Militia go into camp, and they do wonders for the time they are there.

8432. And only for 12 days?—Only for 12 days; it is surprising what they do in 12 days.

8433. You say they are only enlisted for three years; do any proportion of them go on beyond three years?—Very rarely, except the non-commissioned officers; you get sergeants that go on from year to year. In the cities you find them going on for many years, but I do not think in the country districts, so far as my information goes, they get much more than the three years.

8434. Have you any suggestions with regard to organisation by which there might be something to work upon if an emergency arose in the future?—I made the suggestion in my last annual report as to the raising of a Reserve in Canada, not in the shape of a Reserve under the orders of the War Office, as I did not believe that was practicable.

8435. What do you mean?—Of course, universal service is the law in Canada—compulsory service I mean—and my suggestion was that the Act should be put into force so far as keeping up a sufficient Reserve to raise every unit to its war establishment of 900 men. A regiment on the peace establishment has only from 300 to 400 men, so that to raise every Canadian regiment to its war establishment would require about 500 men. My suggestion for a Reserve was that the law should be put into operation so far as to enrol—not to train specially, except in musketry—a sufficient number of men to fill the regiments up to their war establishment.

8436. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Is the law entirely inoperative now?—Absolutely, as regards compulsory service, but it is there. It could be put into operation at any moment the Canadian Government thought right.

8437. (*Chairman.*) You mean you would simply, by some form of ballot, enrol the number of men?—Yes, and keep them on the rolls of the regiment, ready to be brought out in case of emergency, in the meantime training them by means of the rifle clubs which are established all over Canada.

8438. But there would not be any compulsory service?—No compulsory service in time of peace, and I do not think it is practicable.

8439. (*Viscount Esher.*) What is that Act?—The Militia Act.

8440. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) What does it provide?—That every man between the ages of 20 and 60, I think, should be liable to serve in three categories, the first, second, and third categories, of the Militia, and it also provides that the Militia units can be composed partly of Volunteers—men raised by voluntary enlistment—and partly by the ballot; but it has never been put into force.

8441. (*Viscount Esher.*) What are the three categories?—Without the Act I could hardly tell you. It has principally to do with their age. I think it is between 20 and 30 for the first category, 30 and 40 for the second, and 40 and 60 for the third.

8442. What does a category mean?—It means that the men of the first category would be called up first, and if they do not suffice, they then bring out the second category, the older men.

8443. Do you know the date of that Act?—I think it is 1878, but I am not quite sure. The date of the Dominion Act was 1867, and I think there was a Militia Act passed about that time, and I think it was revised in 1878, about 10 years afterwards. I only speak from memory, and I have no copy of it.

8444. (*Chairman.*) Is there any other suggestion you would wish to make?—The suggestion that I would be glad to make is with regard to the value of the Canadian Forces. The difficulty that is experienced is in training officers. The Government maintains schools—cavalry, artillery, and infantry schools—all excellent of their kind as far as they go, but it is almost impossible, in a small school consisting of, perhaps, five officers and 80 men of permanent troops, to give the training for the higher ranks that is absolutely essential if you want to have real efficiency. Consequently, there is no way in which the Canadian Government can give these officers the training, except to send them to Aldershot or some of the large military centres where they could have the chance of really seeing the Army as it is.

8445. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) And which they do now to some extent?—Not of late years; very few.

8446. Have there not been some in these two or three years?—I only know two or three doctors and Colonel Biggar, who went home to take a course in Army Service Corps duties, but I think that if His Majesty's Government really wish to help Canada to maintain a force, if they could apportion a certain sum to be given towards bringing these officers home and affording them several months' training, making them pass an examination before they go back, then you would be helping the Militia of Canada more than anything else the Government could do, because all these Militia officers in Canada are men of business; there is no idle class there; there is no class of gentlemen simply living on their means, and every man has got his hand at the plough. These Militia officers cannot afford to leave their business for six months without some compensation, and that is what, so far, we have not succeeded in getting to any great extent. The officers of the permanent corps can be sent home because they are on permanent pay; they are not men of business, and it makes no difference. It really is the Militia officer who wants to see something of the working of armies.

8447. (*Chairman.*) And the militia officer in the senior ranks?—Yes; if you once make the senior ranks fairly efficient, they can be trusted to do the business with their juniors.

8448. Can you now get efficient subalterns?—Yes, there is practically no difficulty whatever.

8449. Do they go through the school?—They have to go through the school to get their certificates; but, of course, the school is simply what they can learn on the barrack square, largely theory. If anything in that direction could be brought about, so that a sum could be placed at the disposal of the Canadian Government for the purpose of giving Militia officers training, I believe we should be doing something that would help them very much indeed. In connection with everything else, in the military point of view, Canada is self-supporting; it makes its own ammunition, not at present to the full extent to keep up the Reserves for defence of the country, but it will, there is no doubt, eventually. It is about making its own arms except cannot, of course

field guns; it is making its own rifles, and its own clothing, equipment, and saddlery; in fact, at the present moment Canada does not have to call upon the War Office for anything practically.

8450. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Not for ammunition?—Ammunition is the only thing at present. If there were a sudden demand, the small arms factory cannot manufacture enough if the whole Canadian Militia were mobilised and put into the field, but it manufactures sufficient for its requirements in time of peace. Were there a state of war, ammunition and field guns are the two things they would have to fall back upon this country for. At present the artillery is only armed with the 12-pounders—some, indeed, with 9-pounders, but very few indeed. I got rid of nearly all the 9-pounders, and got them replaced with 12-pounders.

8451. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Beginning with July, 1902, you commanded for upwards of two years the Dominion Forces as distinct from the Imperial Forces?—Absolutely distinct.

8452. As to the Imperial forces, what do they consist of at present in Canada?—They have one of these garrison regiments.

8453. In Halifax?—Yes; they have, I think, two batteries of garrison artillery, two companies of Royal Engineers, all at Halifax; then they have at Vancouver a battery of artillery, and, I think, some engineers—I do not quite know how many.

8454. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) At Victoria, I suppose?—At Esquimalt.

8455. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Those are all; there are no other Imperial forces in Canada?—No, none whatever.

8456. And the Dominion forces consist of a permanent force?—Yes, of 1,000.

8457. What is comprised in that body?—Two squadrons of cavalry, a skeleton squadron of mounted rifles which I organised since the war for the purpose of perpetuating the mounted rifles at Winnipeg; two field batteries complete, and very excellent field batteries, and five companies of infantry, one at London, one at Toronto, one at Quebec, one at St. John's, Quebec, and one at Frederictown. We have no permanent medical units, except a few medical officers, but there are seven field hospitals and seven bearer companies, very fully organised (all militia).

8458. There is a Director-General of the Medical Department?—Yes; there are three or four permanent medical officers for the purpose of looking after the permanent troops; but beyond that the medical units are all militia, and very good.

8459. There are no volunteers in the sense of those in this country; they are all militia?—Yes, they are all militia, all enlisted for three years; there are no volunteers.

8460. How many militia?—Approximately, 40,000; I am not sure what they may be for this year; it was thirty-nine thousand seven hundred and something, so that, roughly, it is about 40,000. In that 40,000, I may mention the permanent force of 1,000 is included, because they are practically militia; they are all under the Militia Act, and they are practically militia permanently called out for service. That is their legal status.

8461. But there really is another force, which must be looked upon as a portion of the permanent forces there?—That is what I am talking of.

8462. The mounted police?—Quite so; but, excuse me, they are not under the militia, they were not under me.

8463. But they are a permanent force; they are soldiers who are drilled and well fitted for their service?—Yes, they are very excellent troops.

8464. In looking for officers for the contingents to send to South Africa, you drew a good many of them, and some of the very best, from the mounted police, did you not?—Yes, the 1st Mounted Rifles, I think, were almost entirely organised and officered by the North-West Mounted Police.

8465. And a large number of the men?—Well, we had 134 altogether out of 400, about a quarter of the men. We might have had the whole of them if the Government would have allowed it, but the Premier would not allow the North-West Mounted Police to be depleted. I had the greatest difficulty in getting as many as I did.

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8466. You also had a number of your officers who had been educated and trained in the Royal Military College, Kingston, had you not?—Yes—not a very great number. We had some, but there are not a great number. Of course, we took no officers, or very few, who were not officers in the militia, who had militia commissions, but, as a rule, the cadets from the Military College do not go into the militia, they go into the reserve; very few of them serve with the active militia, and we had not a great number, except, of course, in the permanent force. We took all the permanent force officers we could possibly spare.

8467. Those who had been educated at the Military College you found to be excellent officers?—Very good, indeed; their training is good. Of course, they had very little experience as officers. Thy had not much experience in the handling of men, because they had passed, as I say, from the college generally into civil life; but the Government keeps a lien on their services. They are all very highly trained, and very good officers they make.

8468. A good many of them obtained commissions in the North-West Mounted Police?—I believe so.

8469. And also on the railways?—Yes, I believe so.

8470. And have experience on the railways?—Yes, they have. I cannot speak from my own knowledge.

8471. Amongst them, I think, we may mention Colonel Sir Percy Girouard?—Yes.

8472. And there are many others who really distinguished themselves in South Africa?—Very much so.

8473. So you consider that would be a very good source from which to draw a certain number, at any rate, of the officers?—Undoubtedly, and it was a great regret to me that we could not get them into the Militia.

8474. Do you think it would be well to enlarge the Kingston Military College?—Certainly not, on its present footing. I look upon it in this way, that, as a military institution, it is an excellent one for the British Government, because we get a number of very good officers, but Canada gets very few.

8475. How is that?—I am not prepared to say; but these young gentlemen go through the college and get a most admirable education, not only military but also civil, especially in civil engineering.

8476. Is it not an advantage that we might be able to furnish from Canada a considerable number of well-trained, well-educated officers for the British Army?—Excellent; I think the Military College at Kingston, from the point of view of the British Army, is a most admirable institution.

8477. There are at present, are there not, in the British Army, in all arms, in the Engineers, in the Artillery, and in the Regular Forces, a very considerable number of them?—Yes, and most excellent officers, too, but that is where the principal military advantage of the college is.

8478. (*Viscount Esher.*) How many cadets are there?—About 60, as a rule; it varies. I think this year there were 60 cadets.

8479. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Does not your permanent force get the advantage of it?—Yes, but the permanent force is so very small. They are very good, as a rule.

8480. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) How many are there in the permanent force altogether?—1,000 non-commissioned officers and men.

8481. And of these how many are cavalry or mounted men?—I cannot speak positively, but approximately there would be about 260 of the Field Batteries.

8482. Then there will be, roughly, 700 of cavalry?—Oh, dear no; there are about 270 in the Artillery.

8483. And 700 odd of mounted men?—Oh, dear, no, the cavalry is about 50 mounted rifles and about 120 cavalry; that is about 170 cavalry. The infantry number somewhere about 600, five depôts. There are five companies of about 120 each, but they are not always quite up to their establishment; we sometimes want a few. That is approximately the strength.

8484. The permanent force is under very much the same discipline as the Regular Forces here?—Absolutely identical.

8485. So that you look upon them as good, efficient troops?—Excellent troops.

8486. All the different branches?—Yes, excellent; the Artillery are especially so—extremely good.

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8487. As to the Militia Volunteers—for they are all Militia, I think you said—the only training they have is 12 days annually?—Yes, a regiment of country Militia is an aggregate of independent companies, practically speaking, until they come into camp; they do 12 days' training. The city regiments train, like our Volunteers, at home, in the evenings in their drill halls, and so forth, but they are paid for 12 days, and so many drills constitute a day. I think four drills of so many hours constitute a day for pay, so that a man has to do 48 or 50 drills to entitle him to his 12 days' pay.

8488. As a rule, they are educated and very intelligent men, are they not?—Very much so.

8489. Especially those in the towns—a class quite equal to the Volunteers in this country?—I should think absolutely so. I think they are most intelligent people, the town regiments; and so, in fact, are the country regiments as a class; they are very intelligent men. If they were not, they could not do in 12 days what they do.

8490. So that the material there, under proper training, would become good soldiers in every way?—As good as you could wish to have; I think the material is as good as you could find in any country in the world. Of course, it is not so easy to make cavalry in that country as it is to make the other arms, because the Canadian, as you know, does not habitually ride except in the West; when you get to the North-west they are as good as you could wish to have.

8491. I think you mentioned that you had organised two regiments of mounted infantry?—Well, we call them mounted rifles there. Do you mean for service in South Africa?

8492. Yes?—Well, I organised five.

8493. But as a permanent institution?—I organised a permanent depôt for the training of mounted infanry of the Militia as mounted rifles.

8494. It is proposed to have a larger number of mounted men now than formerly, is it not?—I think so in that shape, because I organised a very considerable number of mounted rifle units all over the country, and the force was in its infancy, so to speak. I hope it will develop very much; in point of fact, I believe Lord Dundonald is abolishing all the cavalry, and converting them into mounted rifles, but that I only know from hearsay.

8495. How do you look upon the Canadian forces as marksmen? Do you consider them good rifle shots in Canada?—No, not as a class, but you do find splendid shots. We saw at Bisley that they were splendid marksmen, and at the various rifle associations there you find most admirable marksmen, but it is only within the last two years that rifle shooting has been taken up practically. I was fortunate enough to be able to start a school of musketry, and to largely increase these rifle clubs, but, as a rule, the shooting is not of a very high character. I do not think it would be superior to the ordinary British Volunteer regiment; certainly the shooting of the country regiments is very poor, but the city regiments would be about equal to the average city Volunteer regiment in this country.

8496. Would you not say that those in the North-west are good riflemen?—They might be; the number of Militia in the North-west is very small, and I cannot speak practically about what they may be there. I have no doubt they are.

8497. There is an idea that those in the Western prairies would compete very well with the Boers, for instance?—Well, I think it is possible, because my information is that the Boers could not shoot at all well. I was told their marksmanship was extremely poor.

8498. How are the men as to physique, as a whole? Are they physically fit?—Admirably fit; I think the 1,200 men we sent out to the South African Constabulary, which was rather the pick, including a great number that had been in the war, were physically as fine a body of men as anybody could see anywhere in the world.

8499. And you could have got a great many more equal to them?—We could have got a great many more; but, of course, we only took the best, and each successive contingent was what had been picked over for the previous one.

8500. As to the equipment of the men who went to South Africa, do you consider it was quite equal to that of those from the mother country—from here?—Well, I am not prepared to say that it was quite equal; of course, it is impossible to say so, because in cloth, for instance, it is difficult to speak positively until it has been in wear. I know that the khaki and things that went out with the first contingent were not good, but that was the first attempt. Now they are making very much better stuff. The dye is the difficulty; they do not seem to be able quite to dye the cloth to stand so well, and I doubt myself whether the leather work is quite as well tanned. I will not speak positively, but I know this much, that the British Government ordered an enormous number of saddles to be made in Montreal and Toronto, and I do not think any complaints were received about them. My officers that were in command made no complaints whatever.

8501. We have heard that in some cases the boots supplied to the Regular forces were not good; was there any complaint in Canada with regard to the foot gear?—None came to me, but I know that Colonel Otter reported that he preferred the Canadian boot to the English-made boot, and I may say that during the time I was there I was able to get a much better class of boot issued from the Slater Company than they had had before, and the Canadian Government have been paying a much higher price for the permanent force for the last eighteen months for their boots. The Slater Company supplied all the boots for the two contingents I sent out, the third and fourth. Of course, the constabulary were not clothed in Canada; they wore their own boots, and all we supplied them with was a jersey and a sea cap, and something of that sort.

8502. Were there attached to each battalion some light firing guns—Maxims, and so on?—No, not those I sent out; the first contingent took out Maxims, and I think Strathcona's Horse had Maxims; but the third contingent, and the fourth contingent, had no quick-firing guns.

8503. Was any of the ammunition supplied from England?—I think that which the first and second contingents took out was all supplied from the Small Arms Factory at Quebec. That is to the best of my belief. The later contingents did not get their ammunition until they got to South Africa—at least, I think not; the arms were put on board at Halifax for them packed, and there was a certain number of rifles issued for practice on the voyage.

8504. Where were the arms manufactured?—They were British.

8505. The small arms?—The small arms were all British.

8506. Everything was British—all the arms?—Yes, all the arms were British, but the first and second contingents were supplied out of the Canadian stores, and the others were supplied at Halifax from the Imperial stores.

3507. The Government has now contracted, has it not, to have a supply of rifles made in Canada?—Yes.

8508. Of a particular type?—Yes.

8509. Do you know what it is?—Oh, yes.

8510. Do you consider it to be a good rifle?—I think it is a good rifle; I do not think it is superior in any respect to the Lee-Enfield.

8511. There is some peculiarity about it—a new invention—is there not?—Yes, there are some peculiarities about it, but I do not think anything very remarkable.

8512. (*Viscount Esher.*) Does it require special ammunition?—No, it fires exactly the same ammunition. I may mention that the contract for the supply of these rifles contains a clause that in the event of its being necessary to change the type, either to conform to the British or otherwise, the contractor is bound to supply whatever type of rifle is required. The present one uses the same ammunition and everything as our own.

8513. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) How does the pay of the permanent Force there compare with that of Great Britain?—It is double nearly.

8514. About double?—Nearly double.

8515. Do you know the exact figures, the cavalry, say?—A cavalryman gets, I think, 50 cents a day.

8516. Two shillings?—Yes, and the British cavalryman gets 1s. 3d., I think; so that is about double.

8517. And an infantryman?—An infantryman draws 40 cents in Canada.

8518. And the artillery?—He draws the same as the

cavalry, about 50 cents or 52 or 53, something of that sort; it is higher than the infantry.

8519. What is the allowance to the Militia?—The Militiaman when out draws 50 cents a day for the twelve days.

8520. No other allowance?—He gets his rations and groceries, but that is all the private soldier gets in money.

8521. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) In the permanent Force do they get free rations?—Yes, free rations and groceries.

8522. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) There are no stoppages?—None at all; and he draws good conduct pay in addition.

8523. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You heard Sir George French speak of a Reserve; he recommended that there should be a Reserve of men and officers in the Colonies?—Yes.

8524. Do you approve of that? Do you think it would be well that under the conditions that he mentioned they should be paid by the Imperial Government?—I am not prepared quite to support that idea.

8525. Perhaps you would say that Canada, being a self-governing colony, anything of that kind must be entirely with the concurrence of the Canadian Government?—My idea is that in the big self-governing Colonies it would be impracticable to impose conditions of that sort—that is my conviction.

8526. But you have recommended a Reserve under the Dominion Government?—Quite so, but I do not see that it would be possible, nor do I think that you would find, so far as the Canadian Militia are concerned, that they would be willing to engage under the War Office at all.

8527. But you do think that it would be not only possible, but quite practicable, to have a Reserve of the Dominion Forces?—I think so, and I have every reason to hope that it will take shape, that it will materialise, in some way.

8528. How many would you recommend?—I did not recommend any specific number; my recommendation was that each regiment should bear upon its rolls a sufficient number of men raised compulsorily under the Act to complete it to its war establishment, the 900 men, and that might run to probably 500 men for each infantry regiment, roughly speaking.

8529. And really, practically, there is no difficulty in getting most of these corps up very much to the full complement, especially in the cities; is not that so?—In the cities, yes; but it is not so easy in the country districts.

8530. Not the rural districts?—There is a difficulty in keeping up the rural regiments; it depends very much, of course, on the agricultural conditions that are existing at the time.

8531. Roughly, how many men would you say there might be on the Reserve, looking to the facilities of getting men to join voluntarily?—About 60,000 or 70,000; if my suggestions were carried out it would raise a disposable force of about 100,000 men, so that they would have to enrol about 60,000 men.

8532. What inducements would you give them—what retaining fee?—None whatever; they would be compulsorily raised under the Act by ballot, and there would be no retaining fee whatever; they would have to serve under the Canadian Militia Act.

8533. Would they have no privilege at all as Reservists?—No, they would be simply Reservists raised under the Militia Act.

8534. And they might be called upon at any time?—They might be called upon to join the colours, and to serve in the event of a national emergency, war, but not otherwise. My scheme would not entail a cent's cost to the country.

8535. Do you think there would be no insuperable difficulty in raising these?—I should not suppose so; there would be nothing imposed on a man except to report himself once a year, and to fire off his specified number of rounds to render him efficient with his rifle. Those are the only two conditions he would have to fulfil.

8536. But he would be paid while doing so?—No, he would not; it would be just as if he belonged to a rifle club. He would be supplied with free ammunition.

8537. Rifle clubs are very generally being formed now throughout the country?—All over the country.

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8538. And you consider that a very excellent move?—I do; it is my own bantling, so to speak—it was my suggestion—the organisation of these clubs. I think at the time I left there were enrolled as members of these clubs something like 13,000 or 14,000 members.

8539. (*Sir John Edge.*) Who were not in the Militia?—Not necessarily. The clubs were of two kinds; there was the military club, which was affiliated to a unit, and the civilian club, which was absolutely unconnected with any organised Force of the Militia. The only difference between the two was that the club formed in a corps, the military club got rather more free ammunition than the civilian club.

8540. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) How many men, do you think, could be got, in a case of emergency, to assist the Forces here? How many men could they look for from Canada altogether? You speak of a Force of Militia and Reserve together of 100,000 men?—Yes.

8541. How many do you think could be counted upon?—For what service? Do you mean for local service in defence of their own soil?

8542. No?—To go abroad?

8543. Yes, such as during the last war?—It is a little difficult to say, but I think I would undertake to raise 10,000 men without difficulty.

8544. Not more?—Well, I am not prepared to say I would raise more.

8545. How many were there during the last war?—Altogether 7,000.

8546. Looking at the fervour and spirit of the Canadians at the commencement and throughout that war, do you not think we might look for more than 10,000?—I suppose we might.

8547. If the same feeling prevailed and continued as was shown then, do you not think so?—I think very likely you would be able to raise more than 10,000 men, but I doubt if you could officer them.

8548. Then how would you provide officers apart from those that you can get from the permanent Force there, from the Mounted Police, which is a very excellent body of men, and gives great experience to men and officers, and from the military college? How would you propose to get officers?—You could only get them from Great Britain; that is the only way to get thoroughly trained officers.

8549. I thought you said a little while ago that you thought it would be well that some provision should be made for sending a certain number yearly of their officers to this country?—Yes.

8550. Then how would you propose that it should be done?—I would send them yearly.

8551. Who would bear the cost of that?—My suggestion is that that is the form that British help to the Canadian Militia should take; let the British Government bear the cost of educating a certain number of the senior officers in a manner which cannot be done in the country.

8552. And that would occupy in each case how long?—I would give them from four to six months; I would give them the summer or a season at Aldershot or Salisbury, or somewhere where they could see more than they can see in their own land.

8553. Have you any idea what the cost would be to the Imperial Government—the average cost?—I cannot say that.

8554. I thought you might have looked very closely into it?—I could approximate it with a little working out.

8555. There is no other way in which you think it could be provided?—This special training?

8556. Yes, the special training on this side?—It does not occur to me at present, because you cannot train the senior ranks without men.

8557. Have you ever thought of interchanging battalions as between Canada and the home country, making a provision that there should be an interchange annually of one or two regiments from Canada—regiments going out from the mother country to replace them?—No.

8558. That has been suggested, has it not, and seriously suggested?—I have heard it suggested, but

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Canada does not possess a regiment to interchange; they have only these five companies of infantry. Of course, they have recently had a regiment at Halifax taking the place of a British regiment, but that has been disbanded; besides which, I do not anticipate that it would be very successful. They tried it with the artillery; they tried to interchange a battery of Canadian artillery from Quebec with a battery of British artillery from Halifax, but it was not altogether a success, because the one man has got 50 cents a day and the other 25 cents a day, and there was a certain amount of discontent. When the British artilleryist went to Quebec and into a Canadian fort, he thought he ought to be paid his 50 cents a day, so that the experiment, I believe, was not considered sufficiently successful to warrant its being repeated, and it never has been done again.

8559. Can suitable horses always be found in Canada for the troops there, and for the number of mounted men you would propose to have in this Force of 100,000?—Yes, there is no difficulty; there are plenty of very good horses, although not so good as they were 25 or 30 years ago.

8560. From what cause?—Principally I take it from breeding from the wrong stock; breeding from the American trotter; they have used the American trotter so much for breeding that, although the speedy horse is there, the solid weight-carrying horse has rather deteriorated compared to what it used to be.

8561. But you are aware that they have introduced very good blood indeed into the North-west within the last six or eight years?—Yes, but I am only talking about the horses that you ordinarily see and purchase in the country, because I had to buy a considerable number.

8562. I am looking more to the ranches in the North-west than to the Eastern provinces?—Of course, I am speaking of Canada proper, not so much the North-west.

8563. I believe in the North-west they would say they were very much Canada proper?—But in what we call the old provinces of Canada, Ontario, for instance, all round St. Catherine's they had a magnificent breed of horses 30 years ago.

8564. Do you know much of the horses in the North-west Provinces?—No, I have never got to the North-west yet; I was stopped. I have only seen the horses that we have in the permanent Force, and they are very good horses.

8565. You know the horses there are very hardy?—Yes.

8566. And that they are not housed in the winter at all?—That is so.

8567. They are out in the winter time, with the thermometer down even 30 degrees and 40 degrees below zero, so that they are very hardy?—They are very hardy, and they are excellent horses.

8568. You are aware that in the United Kingdom there is a system of registration of horses for the service?—I believe there is. I do not know anything about it.

8569. I think we had evidence in connection with the Yeomanry that they got very good horses in the first instance by drawing on the registered horses?—Yes, I think that system has been in existence for some years; the London General Omnibus Company, for example.

8570. That could not be done in Canada, but do you think from your knowledge of Canada, and the horses that could be obtained, it would be of advantage to the Imperial Service that there should be remount depôts there? It has been suggested that the Canadian Government might form those remount depôts at their own cost, on the condition that a certain number—it might be a comparatively small number, 1,000 or more horses—might be taken annually, with not quite an obligation, but an understanding that about that number would be taken yearly from Canada. Under these circumstances do you think it would be of advantage to procure horses in that way for the Service in this country? Of course, I speak to you as an Imperial officer, knowing so much as you do about Canada. The horses would be bought at such prices as would be determined by the Government here in conjunction with Canada, as being the reasonable prices?—Of course, it is a little difficult, speaking as an Imperial officer, to answer that question without having some data as to how the horse supply of the United Kingdom is going, but I personally cannot see any reason why the Canadian Government should do anything of the kind.

8571. Supposing they were willing to do it?—If they were willing to do it there is no doubt that the horses that would come from there would be excellent horses. They would, no doubt, be very useful.

8572. Thousands of horses have been drawn from South America, from Texas, and other parts of the United States; if suitable horses can, to a very considerable extent, be furnished in Canada, would you not think it would be well that they should draw from there or from the other colonies in the first instance, when they find they cannot get sufficient in the United Kingdom?—Yes, that seems perfectly sound, but I do not think there is any necessity for the Canadian Government to take the question up. I think if you want to buy horses in Canada there is no difficulty in sending a competent agent who will buy as many as you want. I think it would be rather an interference with the ordinary working of the trade and commerce of the country to do as you suggest, and I do not think there is any necessity for the Government of Canada to touch it.

8573. But you know the disadvantage with regard to horses on the ranches in the North-West is that they are not broken, and if you had a remount depôt there would always be a considerable number of horses broken in and ready at any moment for service?—My own opinion is that if you were to enquire of the cavalry experts they would tell you that they would prefer to get the young horse and break him.

8574. I mean the young horse, of course?—It is not a matter of much importance, the horses being broken beforehand; I think it would be scarcely worth doing.

8575. I thought it was?—I fancy these horses would hardly be accepted as thoroughly trained cavalry chargers without being put through the mill, as it were, when they got them.

8576. From what you have seen, and what you know of Canada, do you think that the Government could get many supplies from Canada on favourable terms, such as flour of the best quality and other provisions for the Army?—I did not quite catch your question. Did you ask if I thought they could get them?

8577. From what you know of Canada and its resources, do you think that the Government here could get from there, for the supply of the Army, flour and other provisions of the very best quality, and at very reasonable prices?—Well, really, I am not prepared to answer that question. As regards the quality, I know that everything you can get there is of the very best; but as regards the prices I really am not in a position to speak.

8578. Of course, you know that the wheat grown in the north-west of Canada is the finest of all, and worth from one to two shillings a quarter more on the exchange here than ordinary wheat?—There is no question of the excellence of everything you can get there.

8579. About the coaling of the Navy, may I ask this question: You know there is a very great supply of coal in Nova Scotia and British Columbia?—Yes.

8580. Do you not think it would be of great advantage that they should find means for using that coal generally for the North Atlantic and North Pacific Squadron of the Navy?—I do not know whether it is steam coal or not; my impression is that it is only soft coal, but I am not an expert, and I do not know whether it is suitable for steam purposes or not.

8581. It is used for all domestic purposes?—Yes, I think it is used, but I do not know to what extent.

8582. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) You raised altogether, I think you said, 7,000 men in Canada for service in South Africa?—Yes.

8583. And all but the first lot were mounted men?—All except the first lot were mounted; the first lot was an infantry regiment pure and simple.

8584. Could you have raised the first regiment as mounted men if you had not been restricted from home?—I was not there, and I do not know, but I believe so; there was absolutely no difficulty in getting the others.

8585. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I think you heard Sir George French say they had so much difficulty and delay in getting ammunition and equipment generally from England after the Government had allowed it to be indented for; that does not so much occur in the

case of Canada, but you had to get something, as you had to obtain some ammunition. Did you ever hear of delays on the part of the War Office in giving supplies?—There have been delays on the part of the War Office, for instance, in the supply of guns for the field batteries, newer guns to replace the older type, but at the time I can speak about there were such demands on the War Office for South Africa that rendered it absolutely impossible for them to fulfil the demands from Canada. With regard to small arms ammunition, indeed, the ammunition for field guns also, Canada provides itself, so that practically, unless there was some extra demand for ammunition, they do not rely on the War Office.

8586. I think you said they could supply all they wanted in time of peace?—Yes.

8587. But not in time of war?—That is so at present, but I think eventually as they enlarge the output very much, they will be able to get up a sufficient reserve.

8588. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) That is from the new factory?—Yes.

8589. Which is not yet in operation?—Not to the full. I hope there is a prospect of having a second factory in Western Canada.

8590. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Were those guns which you asked for, and which there was a delay in sending, of a pattern already in use?—What we asked for were the 15-pounders which are replacing the 12-pounders.

8591. And they could not supply them?—Well, they wanted all they could turn out themselves.

8592. You told us the strength of the permanent Force, but could you say how many officers there are in that Force?—I could not tell you exactly; I have not any return by me that would give that information, but I think I could put it pretty nearly.

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8503. Are there 50 officers?—I think about 65. (*The witness subsequently ascertained that the actual number is* 64.)

8594. And you think a considerable portion of those 65 officers have passed through the Military College at Kingston?—All the artillery officers have to pass through it; they are not accepted otherwise, and even if they have not been cadets they have to go through what they call the long course, which lasts the best part of a year, before they can get a commission. They have all practically been trained at the Military College.

8595. Do you appoint officers direct without having passed through the Military College?—They get direct appointments from the Military College.

8596. But without having passed through the Military College?—Occasionally. There are not always candidates from the college; if there are vacancies, and no cadets are candidates, officers of the Militia may be appointed, but, if they are, they have to go to the college and take the long course, which lasts about nine months.

8597. (*Viscount Esher.*) Do you keep large reserves of ammunition in Canada?—No, no large reserves at present; the output is not sufficient to do much more than supply what is required for the annual work of the troops. There was a considerable reserve, but it was used up with the first and second contingents that went to South Africa.

(*A Statement showing the Organisation, Equipment, Despatch and Service of Canadian Contingents during the War in South Africa will be found in Appendix Vol., page 172.*)

Lieut.-Colonel A. Pole Penton, R.A., called and examined.

Lieut.-C A. P. Penton, R.A.

8598. (*Chairman.*) You have been good enough to come here to-day to give us some evidence with regard to the New Zealand contingents?—Yes.

8599. What connection had you with the New Zealand contingents?—I was Commandant of the Forces out in New Zealand from the 19th October, 1896, to the 19th October, 1901, and during that time seven different contingents were sent from New Zealand.

8600. The first one, I suppose, was in October, 1899?—The offer as to the first one was made by the Government on the 28th September, 1899, and an answer came back on the 4th October, saying that the Imperial Government accepted the troops.

8601. That is the one which defined what nature of troops they required?—There was a telegram came before that, I believe, saying that infantry were wanted, but the telegram of 4th October, to which I have referred, was sent from England on the 3rd, and I got it on the 4th, and it laid down the composition of the contingent that had been accepted, which was practically two mounted companies of 100 men each.

8602. Your telegram must have been different to that sent to the other colonies?—No, we got one telegram first of all about their wanting dismounted men—infantry soldiers.

8603. That telegram, when it was sent to the other colonies (I have it before me), was dated 3rd October?—Here is one dated 3rd October, send from Mr. Chamberlain to the Governor at 4.35 p.m. Telegram No. 16 was the cable we acted upon.

8604. I see it was the same date as the other one, and there were five minutes between them; it was upon that telegram that you proceeded?—It was on that telegram we acted. At that time we had absolutely no stores of any sort or description in the colony, no equipment to give these men, and we had to do the best we could to equip them. The colony is divided up into five military districts, and we took a certain number of men from each district. The men and officers for the first contingent all belonged to mounted Volunteer corps, and we laid down that the men themselves should be between the ages of 21 and 35, not under 5 feet 6 inches high, or weighing more than 12 st. 7 lbs., and having the proper proportion of chest measurement. The horses, I think, went from 14·3 to 16 hands, and 5 to 10 or 11 years old, and any colour except greys.

8605. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Why did you not take the greys?—At that time the greys were supposed to be more visible at long distances, and if you have grey horses mixed up with other coloured horses in a troop, you can pick them out at once.

8606. (*Chairman.*) Will you proceed with your statement?—We collected a certain number of men from each district in the colony, and we had to get horses from where we could. We first of all told the men that they could bring their own horses, subject to passing a veterinary examination, and if they passed we would buy them, and I think we fixed the maximum price at £25. Many of the horses would not pass, and we were rather hard pressed to get horses. Then a good number of private gentlemen and ladies came forward and made presents of horses, and I bought every horse I could. The Agricultural Department helped us, and we managed to get the number of horses we wanted. We had great difficulty about the uniforms, because we had no store of khaki in the colony at all, but it happened that some of the corps had got private supplies of khaki out to make uniforms for their corps, and they very kindly came forward and gave us a supply of khaki. Then in the store I found some old belts and braces that had been out many years, and we got those out and made them into belts and braces to hold up the pouches for the ammunition. We borrowed saddlery, water-bottles, waterproof sheets, and haversacks, and everything we could from the corps that had got them; we took as many greatcoats as we could get from the permanent force, and we managed to get them properly equipped. The order was given me to equip these men on the 4th October, and they sailed on the 21st with full equipment. The contingent consisted of one major, two captains, six subalterns, and 203 non-commissioned officers and men, with 250 horses and a medical officer and a veterinary officer in charge. This contingent I had entirely under my own control as to getting it together and sending it off, because the House of Representatives passed a vote that after equipment and getting together by the Commandant, the Government were authorised to send the men and horses to South Africa. On the 21st December I got orders to prepare another contingent on the same lines as the first contingent. At that time the House was not sitting, and the appointment of officers was made by the Defence Minister. We had had an offer from the Elswick firm to let us have four Hotchkiss machine guns, provided we would send men and horses to take charge of these guns in Africa, and, accordingly, with the second contingent, in addition to two companies of Mounted Rifles, we had a machine gun detachment of one officer and 38 non-commissioned officers and men. We had a good deal of difficulty in equipping these men, owing to

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the want of a store of equipment and clothing, but we got them off on the 20th January, and we put on board over 300 horses. The whole contingent consisted of one officer and 38 non-commissioned officers and men for the Hotchkiss detachment, and one major, two captains, six subalterns, and 206 non-commissioned officers and men of the Mounted Rifles, with a medical officer and veterinary surgeon. Whilst the second contingent was being prepared a proposal was made by some gentleman residing in the Canterbury district to start a subscription for equipping more men and horses, and sending these to Africa without any cost, either to the Imperial or the Colonial Government; this started with a proposal to send only 50 men and horses from Canterbury, but the scheme became so popular that all parts of the colony came forward and took it up, and we sent, I think, two contingents, the third and fourth, which were practically horsed and equipped at the expense of private gentlemen.

8607. What was the number in those contingents?—The third contingent consisted of one major, two captains, six subalterns, 264 non-commissioned officers and men, and 277 horses; and the fourth contingent consisted of 228 non-commissioned officers and men, who sailed in one ship with 220 horses, and in another ship there were 245 non-commissioned officers and men and 440 horses.

8608. You have not told us the number of officers?—They had practically the full equipment of officers for each company.

8609. What was the date of that fourth contingent?—The third contingent sailed on the 17th February, 1900, and, as to the fourth contingent, the one ship sailed on the 24 th March and the other on the 31st March. I am not quite sure if all the fourth contingent were equipped by private enterprise, but I think certainly the majority of them were.

8610. Is that in both cases, the third and fourth?—Yes, there was so much money left over and so many more people came forward after the third had been sent, that they decided on sending a fourth.

8611. (*Sir John Edge.*) The third was entirely equipped by private people?—Yes, and I think the majority of the fourth, but I am not quite sure whether some horses were not given by Government.

8612. (*Chairman.*) Will you please proceed with your statement?—Those contingents all went on the same agreement with the Imperial Government.

8613. What was that?—They were enlisted for service in South Africa, and they came under the Army Act as soon as they sailed. Their rates of pay were laid down as for privates, 4s. a day, and varying rates from that upwards, and they were not enlisted, as far as I can remember, for any specified time.

8614. Not for a year?—No, not the first contingents.

8615. You said that the men came from the Volunteer mounted regiments?—For the first two contingents, but not for the third and fourth.

8616. Does that mean the Regular Force of the Colony?—The Regular Permanent Force is only about 350 men; all the rest of the troops are Volunteers pure and simple.

8617. And those are the troops you refer to?—Yes; a few of the permanent force went, men I knew could ride, and good men.

8618. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Are the permanent force artillery?—All artillery and submarine miners.

8619. (*Chairman.*) Are the rest of the force Militia?—No, there is no Militia; there are 350 men now who are called the permanent force—they are artillery and submarine miners, and they form a nucleus for garrisoning the forts and working the mine fields.

8620. They are permanent soldiers?—Yes, and the others are all Volunteers.

8621. What sort of training do they get?—They have to put in very much the same training as our own Volunteers at home do.

8622. Have they to go to camp?—The artillery and submarine mining Volunteers go to camp for a fortnight every year, but they camp in their own towns; they are what we call at home semi-mobilised; that is to say, they drill in the morning and then they go to their ordinary work; they go back to camp at night, and drill and sleep in camp. The infantry do the same, but only for a week. The Mounted Rifles come out for a week, altogether away from their homes, and you can train them in the field for a week.

8623. Do you think the amount of training those men get gave them any advantage over the other men you enlisted who were not Volunteers?—Certainly, because, of course, some of these men had done a good many trainings.

8624. (*Sir John Edge.*) You have not told us the arrangement as to pay?—We guaranteed that the soldier should get his 4s. a day, but the Imperial Government paid the men, I think, at the Imperial rate of pay, and the Colony paid the difference.

8625. (*Chairman.*) Were they good men?—Excellent men.

8626. In all the contingents?—In all the contingents.

8627. What about the officers?—There was a great difficulty about officers; for the first contingent they were all right, because I chose the smartest officers I could get to come forward. After that, all the officers' names who volunteered had to be submitted to the Defence Minister, and he made his choice, and I am afraid it did not always agree with mine.

8628. And, of course, you had none, or very few officers who had served in the Regular Army?—For the first contingent I got leave for my own staff officer to go. He was a captain of Royal Artillery, and he went in command of one of the companies. For the second contingent there was an officer in New Zealand who had served in the Imperial Cavalry, and he volunteered to take the command of a contingent, and it was given to him. As to the third contingent, my predecessor out there, who was also a Royal Artilleryman, wanted very badly to go in command, but he was not taken, and they put a local officer in. An ex-Imperial officer went with the sixth contingent. There were two captains from the Indian Staff Corps on leave in New Zealand, and I got them included in two contingents, but all the others were local officers.

8629. Had they had any training at all, except the same training as the men?—No.

8630. You have no school for instruction?—Just before I left I started a school.

8631. There was none before the war?—No, none at all.

8632. Had you any reports as to how those officers got on?—Some of them did extremely well; the first contingent was the first purely Colonial contingent that arrived in Africa, and it was sent straight up to De Aar, and went all through the fighting up there, and did uncommonly well under their commanding officer, who was mentioned several times, and who got a C.B. at the end of the war. I think most of the commanding officers of the first four contingencies got rewarded. The fifth contingent was started on different lines altogether

8633. How was that paid?—I think that was paid wholly by the Imperial Government; it was enlisted for Imperial service in South Africa, and had a different rate of pay. It was one of the contingents that went through Rhodesia, and the fifth, sixth, and seventh came on the Rhodesian scale of pay.

8634. That is 1901?—No; the fifth contingent sailed on the 31st March, 1900.

8635. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Were they under Carrington?—Yes; they went under Carrington. The fifth contingent sailed on the 31st March, 1900, and it consisted of 523 men and 523 horses. In addition to that, we sent about 70 Reserve men with that contingent. That ended the contingents for 1900. The next contingent we sent away was the sixth contingent, which sailed from Wellington on the 28th January, 1901, and it left Auckland on the 30th January. That consisted of 578 men and 580 horses. The seventh contingent were sent away without horses at all, and they sailed on the 26th March.

8636. (*Chairman.*) 1901?—Yes.

8637. That was your last contingent?—There were two more after that, but they did not leave until 1902. I got home in December, 1901, and when I got home I heard there was another contingent being prepared, and I think that must have sailed in January, and another one after that again.

8638. The seven were during your time?—Yes.

8639. Do you happen to have the total of the seven?—Yes, 2,552 men, and, including extra horses, we sent about 2,700 horses.

8640. All the latter contingents were very good men?—Yes; the sixth contingent was, physically, quite as good as the first.

8641. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) And the seventh?—The seventh were very good, too.

8642. (*Chairman.*) And you had good reports of them?—Excellent reports; I was over in Australia at the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and I met some Australian officers, who told me that my men had done better than any Colonials out in Africa.

8643. What class of men are they?—All classes; taking any one of these contingents, for instance, I find labourer, groom, farmer, engineer, clerk, school teacher, mill-owner, shunter, porter, nurseryman, miner, contractor, blacksmith, butcher, assayer, saw-miller, bullock driver, store-man, plumber, painter, agent, engineer, cadet, traveller, solicitor's clerk, bush-man, boiler-maker, warehouseman, farmers, students, contractors, stockmen, salesmen, school teachers, bakers—all classes.

8644. Some of them, I suppose, could not ride much?—Every man who came up had to pass a riding test; we had any number of men to choose from for every contingent, and they came up far in excess of what we wanted, and the spirit in which they came up was simply excellent.

8645. And a medical test also?—Yes.

8646. Did you have any men invalided home early after their arrival in South Africa?—No; I heard of two men who ought not to have been sent, but they did not come back directly.

8647. Only two?—Only two, I think; there was something wrong with the heart of both of them. The men were supposed to be examined in the out-districts, and when they came down to headquarters we had a strict examination again. Of course, at the commencement, when we were so hurried in getting away all these men and equipping them in three weeks, we almost expected something to go wrong.

8648. But, as a matter of fact, it did not?—No; everything went off very well.

8649. Is there any other point you would like to mention?—General French was talking about an Imperial Reserve this morning. When General French was considering the matter originally, the Premier and Defence Minister, Mr. Seddon, of New Zealand, was also considering the matter, and he issued a memorandum, saying that he thought an Imperial Reserve should be maintained in each Colony. When we were amending the New Zealand Defence Act, we made provision in it for an Imperial Reserve to be raised for service outside the Colony.

8650. On what conditions?—Well, the conditions were not quite gone into when I left; they were waiting until the war was over. The idea was, I think, that the men should get a retaining fee of £5, and that out of a force of 20,000 men, we should have 7,000 or 8,000 included in the force of an Imperial Reserve; that these 7,000 or 8,000 should get a month's training every year, instead of the week's training the ordinary Volunteer gets, and that during the month they were training they should be paid at Volunteer rates, so that they would not lose anything.

8651. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Who was to make those payments?—That also was rather indefinite; but there was some agreement to be come to with the Imperial Government as to what burden the Colony was to bear, and what burden the Imperial Government were to bear.

8652. (*Chairman.*) Do you think you could get good men on those sort of terms?—I was very doubtful about it; I think there are a good many difficulties. In the first place, when the force has been raised, the consent of the New Zealand Parliament has to be got when it is to be sent out of the country. In the case of a big war, I think the Colony would be very loth to let all its best trained men go away, because you cannot make any man think that the place he lives in is not the most important part of the earth.

8653. Do you think the men themselves would have come forward?—I am perfectly certain, under existing circumstances, you could get 7,000 or 8,000 men for service voluntarily.

8654. During war?—Yes.

8655. In ordinary times, what do you say?—I would not say in ordinary times, but if a war was on—if the Mother Country was in any danger or difficulty—I think the feeling out there is such, that you would get any such number.

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8656. It would not be much use as a reserve, unless you established it before a war began?—You would so establish it, but my own doubt was whether the New Zealand Parliament would allow those men to go after you had got them.

8657. I was asking whether the men themselves would come forward if all these difficulties were got over, on the terms?—I think that is rather doubtful, too, because a labouring man in New Zealand can make 8s. a day, and the Government would not pay him anything like 8s. a day to come out for a month, and there are very few idle men, and very few who can afford to give up 8s. a day for a month, and come and take 3s. or 4s.

8658. Is there anything else?—There is the question of preparedness—the Colonies being prepared for war—and I think there is a very great danger in the Colonies not keeping up reserve supplies. Certainly, in the Colony I was in, there was no reserve supply of stores at all, and, as I stated, when the contingents were going away, we had to do all we could, trusting to private enterprise to get things made in a hurry, and, of course, we had to send men away with equipment which was not quite as it should be. This applies more particularly to ammunition. The supply of heavy gun ammunition is a very expensive item, and the Colonies do not like to lock up a lot of money in ammunition, which may become obsolete at any time; for instance, the change from powder to cordite, you could not fire away 200 rounds of powder that you had in store for each of your guns, and that 200 rounds per gun would become obsolete. This reserve of ammunition in war time is a very important question indeed, because you can get no heavy gun ammunition anywhere nearer than England, and I think one way the Imperial Government might help the Colonies would be to supply them with the gun ammunition at the cost price, and also certain necessary equipments, and only charge them the interest on the capital value of the ammunition and stores supplied. That is the only way I can see that you can get an adequate reserve of stores for the Colonies, because they cannot afford to lock up a large sum of money. The people of the Colony of New Zealand look on the Defence Vote with great suspicion, and it is not a popular Vote by any means.

8659. That would mean an Imperial reserve of ammunition?—That would mean that the ammunition was supplied by the Imperial authorities, and that the Colonial authorities paid a percentage on its cost.

8660. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Would they go on paying accumulated interest on every fresh supply?—No. Suppose the equipment of a gun was a hundred rounds, the Imperial Government would supply them with that, and charge them interest on it, but the ammunition expended for practice every year from that gun would be kept up by the Colony. It is only the reserve I am talking about.

8661. When that becomes obsolete, and fresh reserves come out, would you be charged interest on the old supply?—No, I think that would have to be wiped off, as in the case of our own obsolete stores.

8662. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Are you speaking of guns of position or field guns?—Field guns would come in the same class, except that their ammunition is not so expensive.

8663. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) The interest would be a very small amount?—Yes, but still looking at it from the point of view of a Commandant, that is the only way I see of getting the Colony efficiently equipped.

8664. (*Sir John Edge.*) If that system were adopted, it would be to the interest of the Colony to use up as much ammunition as they could, and as quickly?—No, because it would not interfere with the practice ammunition; there should always be a certain number of rounds for every gun available in time of war.

8665. But if their liability for the interest was to cease with the expenditure of the ammunition, it would be to their interest to use up the ammunition as fast as they could, and to use as much for practice also?—No, because they would have to pay for what they used

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for practice; it would be like a sum of money on fixed deposit—you have so many rounds a gun on fixed deposit for which you have to pay so much interest.

8666. And when they drew a round they would have to pay for it?—They would have to replace it at their own expense. As to small-arm ammunition, they have an ammunition factory in the Colony, and they put together all their ammunition, but all the component parts, the cordite, the bullets, the cases and caps, and everything of that description, they have to get from England. Then there is the question of the officers; I quite agree with what General French said, that the Colonial officer needs a great deal more education, and if the Imperial Government could see their way and help to educate him it would be a very excellent thing. At present, in my own Colony, the senior officers can get very little military education at all; they only come out for the short time during the training. The corps very rarely get brigaded together, and the senior officers get very little chance of learning their duties.

8667. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I think you said the men who went from New Zealand were not enlisted for any particular period?—The first four contingents were not; the fifth contingent and the later ones were enlisted for a year, or during the continuance of the war.

8668. Were those men who went out with these contingents relieved; for instance, one contingent replaced another until the war was over?—Yes, they came back as the contingents were relieved; for instance, a contingent through sickness, men being killed, and that sort of thing, dwindled down a good deal, and then the authorities in Africa thought it was time to send them away, and they sent the remainder of them back to the Colony. I found that all my men were strongly of opinion that a year was the maximum time that you should keep a Volunteer in the field; after a year they begin to be unsettled, and to think that their home business is going to the bad, or, if appointments have been kept open for them, they think they will probably be filled up at the end of a year.

8669. So that you do not think it would be wise to rely on a force sent from a Colony in this way for more than a year?—Not unless you have made very good provision for the people who stay behind.

8670. I suppose they did make allotments for their wives?—Yes, they were allowed to leave so much of their pay.

8671. Are you aware whether any reports came from the General Officer Commanding in South Africa as to the behaviour of the Colonial contingents which were out there?—During the war?

8672. Yes?—Yes; we had very flattering reports all round; during the time I was out there was not a single complaint from any General Officer of the way our men behaved.

8673. So that the Colony was kept informed of the good conduct of its troops?—We did not get reports from the General Officers, but I got reports from the officers commanding the troops in the field. We got a report from General Hutton once, but I cannot remember any others.

8674. There was no system of informing the Colonies how their men were behaving?—No.

8675. Do you not think that would have been a good thing?—A very good thing.

8676. The Colony should know that its contingent had done good service in such-and-such an action, instead of being left to gather this information from despatches which very often are not published for many months afterwards——

8677. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Have you any fortified positions in New Zealand?—Yes; we have four fortified ports.

8678. Who manages those forts?—The permanent Militia form the nucleus of the artillery garrison. The Naval Volunteers come in as the artillery garrison.

8679. I think you said there were only about 200 of the permanent force?—About 350; they form the nucleus of the artillery *personnel* for the forts and for the mine fields.

8680. What are the fortified positions?—Auckland, Wellington, Littleton, and Dunedin (Otago).

8681. Is the number of men you speak of sufficient in case of emergency?—I do not think so at all; when I first went out there I asked for a large increase in the permanent force, but they would not give it to me.

8682. Do you separate the men—these 350 men—into four parts?—Yes.

8683. And send one part to each place?—Yes; we send detachments to each place.

8684. So that the whole of the 350 are never trained together?—Never; at Wellington I have had 100 of them.

8685. There is a long distance from Auckland to Dunedin?—Yes; but of course I could change the men about now and again.

8686. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) In your defence system it was always intended, as it is in Queensland, that the partially-paid force or the Volunteers should reinforce those men of the permanent force?—Yes. Every man in New Zealand is liable to service, and can be called up at any time.

8687. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Are there any of these partially-paid men, Volunteers, trained to artillery?—Oh, yes; and very well trained, too.

8688. In each place?—Yes.

8689. So that they can be called upon to sustain the others?—They all form a part of the artillery force for these places, just the same as in England.

8690. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) All the troops you sent from New Zealand were mounted men?—Yes.

8691. Did you find any difficulty in officering them?—Yes; the officers were rather scarce.

8692. Is there any solution for the training of officers in ordinary peace time for these sort of contingents?—I do not think there is. If you start from the beginning of the New Zealand officer, he is elected by his men. The Commandant or the Minister have no voice in saying, "We will take this man for an officer," so that you get a certain proportion of officers who are absolutely unfit for the position.

8693. And there is no way out of that, because it is part of the system?—It is part of the system.

8694. (*Chairman.*) Is there anything you wish to add?—I think not.

(*Also see Evidence by Sir Arthur Percy Douglas, Bart., Under Secretary for Defence in the Government of New Zealand. Questions* 10,018–10,181, *and Appendix Vol., page* 175

TWENTIETH DAY.

Thursday, 27th November, 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E. (*Chairman*).

The Right Honourable The Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable The Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary*.

Field-Marshal the Right Hon. the Viscount WOLSELEY, K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., and Major-General Sir COLERIDGE GROVE, K.C.B., called and examined.

Field-Marshal the Right Hon. the Viscoun Wolseley, K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., and Major-General Sir C. Grove, K.C.B.

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(*The Minutes referred to in Viscount Wolseley's Evidence will be found in Appendix D. of the Report Vol.*)

8695. (*Chairman.*) Lord Wolseley, as we all know, you became Commander-in-Chief in succession to the Duke of Cambridge in 1895?—Yes.

8696. And continued to hold that office until 1901?—I think it was at the end of 1900, but I am not exactly certain of the date. I took over the duties, as well as I remember, in November, and I kept them on one month beyond the term of five years. That is my remembrance.

8697. We were particularly anxious, of course, to have your opinion with regard to the subject remitted to us, and, more especially, if I may say so, to the first head of our reference as regards the preparations for the war. You have been good enough to write to us to say that you would prefer to divide your evidence under three heads: "(1) Recommendations connected with the competency of the Army to fulfil its duties. (2) Recommendations in connection with the war in South Africa. (3) Recommendations regarding the administration of the Army, and the constitution of the War Office." That division will quite meet our purposes?—That followed very much upon the division which you mentioned.

8698. We will take then, first, what you would like to say with regard to the "Recommendations connected with the competency of the Army to fulfil its duties"?—I think in one of the letters I wrote to the Secretary for the use of the Commission, I referred to a number of confidential, many of them secret, documents that I wrote from time to time in the War Office, not only when I was Commander-in-Chief, but also when I was Adjutant-General of the Army, under the Duke of Cambridge; many of them are of a secret nature, although they do not all deal with matters which, if published, might be useful or offensive to Foreign Powers. They were confidential as departmental papers, and in all I have got to say I shall have to allude very often to them. I say they are secret and confidential papers, but, of course, they are to be made use of by the Commission as they think fit; you are the best judges as to the extent they can be made use of.*

8699. We have so arranged that they can be used for examination purposes, so that you are perfectly free to allude to them?—I think I had better begin by saying, that very early in the year 1898 and spring of 1899, the information that was in the possession of everybody in England, obtained, not from any secret agents but from the newspapers and the current reports from South Africa, impressed me, and, I think, most people, with the conviction that a war with the Boer Power was sooner or later inevitable.

8700. In 1898, did you say?—Yes, in 1899, and as early as 1898, too.

8701. I wanted to get the earliest date?—Certainly, in 1898, and, of course, it was still more evident in 1899. As I have pointed out in some of those papers to which I have already alluded, I said it was quite evident that Mr. Kruger was determined to make war, and that those who knew South Africa tolerably well, even as well as I did from having been there once or twice, realised that the ambition of the Boers was first of all to sever their connection entirely with England, and then to declare themselves an independent Power; eventually they looked forward to making a great Dutch Power in South Africa. During, I think, a part of 1898, and certainly in 1899, we had in South Africa a number of officers, selected by myself and the staff about me, I think ten or twelve clever, intelligent men, whom we sent there without any ostensible orders. They travelled throughout the country, and it was from them that we very largely obtained our best information with regard to the condition of things and the preparations that were being made for war. From them we obtained, I think I may say, very reliable information as to the extent to which the Boers, Mr. Kruger especially, had laid in preparations for the war in the shape of guns and warlike materiel of various sorts—ammunition and so on. They also obtained for us a very fair estimate of what the Boer strength was. To put it in round numbers as reported on several occasions, taking the sort of average and mean, I think it might be put down as 54,000 mounted Boers. That was the force we generally assumed we should have to contend with in the event of our being forced into a war with both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The two together would make up about that force.

8702. Are you referring to information collected in the Intelligence Division afterwards?—Yes, it was focussed there. These officers all reported to the Intelligence Department.

8703. I mention that only to say to you that we have had the Intelligence Division before us and have seen their papers?—Then you know all about the strength. I merely refer to that point to show for what we were preparing. We were preparing for a war, as far as we were allowed to do so, with a people who would turn out 54,000 men in the field, very well provided with ammunition and with a certain amount of very good modern guns. At the beginning of the business, down as late as June, 1899, the information given to me officially by word of mouth was to the effect, that probably the Orange Free State would remain neutral. I am only giving you my impression on this point, for I was not taken into full confidence by the Cabinet on these points—in fact, I was very seldom present at any Cabinet meeting during the whole of the business. What percolated to me came from the Secretary of State, and he told me—I presume—as much as he felt justified in telling me. What he gave me to understand up to as late as 15th June, 1899, in an ordinary minute he wrote in reference to some expressions made use of in a minute from the Intelligence Department, was, that it was by no means certain, and he warned us not to assume too hastily that we should have the Orange Free State as well as the Transvaal in arms against us. I cannot say that we soldiers agreed in that view, but that was the warning we received on the part of the Government as far as it came to us in any official form whatever. I find that even as late as 28th September, 1899, I asked the Government—that is, the Secretary of State—officially to be informed of the intentions of the

* The Papers will be found in the Appendix to the Report Vol. *Vide* page 211.

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Orange Free State, and I cannot remember having ever received any positive reply upon that point. Amongst the papers I referred to, before coming here to-day I specially mentioned one I wrote on the 8th June, 1888 (*vide Appendix to Report Volume, page* 217), in which I pointed out what was, I thought, a very curious fact regarding a nation like ours, and that is so often at war in different parts of the world. It was, that we had never formulated to ourselves as a Power, as a people, or as a Government—we had never put on paper to be transmitted from one Government to another what were the objects for which our Army was created and maintained. In that paper, I say this at the beginning, and go on to say: "As it has never been done I will do it for you." I accordingly put down under five heads what I conceived to be the objects for which the Army was maintained. That paper was very seriously considered, I know, by the Government, for I pointed out that the standing Army was then too small to fulfil those objects.

8704. (*Viscount Esher.*) Was that in 1888?—8th June, 1888. My enunciation of the objects for which the Army was maintained was practically accepted by the Government in a paper I received from Mr. Stanhope, then the Secretary of State for War. In this official answer, as I may call it—he recognised that we were always to be able, as one of the duties for which the Army existed, to put into the field at home three Army Corps for the defence of this country. That was the number of Army Corps I had specified, but I said they should be composed of Regular troops; whereas, Mr. Stanhope, though he recognised all the national objects I had specified for which the Army existed, and recognised that three Army Corps were required to secure them, laid down that only two of them were to be all Regulars, and the third was to be partly composed of Regulars and partly composed of Militia It was a very self-evident fact to anybody who knew the Army at that time that the reason he interpolated the Militia was because he shrank naturally, as most Ministers do when they are called upon by soldiers to increase the Army, from the responsibility of going to the country and asking for the extra battalions, the number of troops I asked for, in order to be able to fulfil that very important duty. Ever since 1888, as far as I know, the Government and the Military Departments of England have accepted my list of the five objects for which the Army existed, and the responsibility, that they were always to have the three Army Corps ready for mobilisation for home defence, of which two Army Corps of Regular troops were always to be ready for mobilisation for any foreign expedition that might be required. It is very advisable that the Commission should remember that, included in the specified objects for which the Army was supposed to exist, one was, that the Army intended to leave these shores for any hostile purpose, was to be of two Army Corps, and two Army Corps only. I mention that because, as you know very well, we sent a considerably larger force than two Army Corps—we sent over four—to South Africa. In some of those Army Corps there was a proportion of Volunteers, Yeomanry, and Militia. But we had 84,000 Army Reserve men to put into the Divisions of those Army Corps; that was the outcome of the new system when short service was adopted. With regard to the Paper in which I pointed out how small our Army was to perform the duties for which it was invented, in referring to it I ought to say that the Duke of Cambridge, in whose name I wrote that Paper, and whose Staff Officer I was at the time, fully concurred in all the views that are expressed in it, and was even, I think, stronger than I was as to the insufficiency of the Army at that time to fulfil the duties for which it existed.

I have classed the notes I have made under two heads. First, the insufficiency of the establishment of our standing Army to fulfil the objects for which it was maintained, and secondly, the inadequacy of our reserves of military stores of all sorts and of war material generally. In referring to those two points, I would impress upon the Commission a point which I think is not generally known, not even thoroughly understood by ourselves, I mean the impossibility of getting the different articles which go to make up war material, manufactured quickly in England. We were sorely in want of guns, ammunition, carts, wagons, tents, clothing, boots, shoes, saddles, and 50 other different articles that I might easily mention. Every manufacturer of those articles in England was working in full blast for us, and still they could not keep us supplied with all we wanted. We had at that time, and I am glad to say we still have as the Director-General of Ordnance, one of the very ablest men we have in the Army, Sir Henry Brackenbury. He knows foreign countries well himself, and did everything he could to obtain those various articles abroad. But the foreign markets were positively closed to us because we were at war with the Boers; at least, it was because we were at war, and I assume it was because we were at war with the Boers. This very important fact I would like to impress upon the minds of those who constitute this Royal Commission, for it proves the absolute necessity of having always in England all the military stores required for the mobilisation of whatever force the country decides to have always at its hand ready to send into the field. We must not depend upon outside countries for help in this matter.

8705. (*Chairman.*) I might, perhaps, inform you that we have had the Director-General of Ordnance before us?—I have no doubt he told you that.

8706. He told us of the calculations which he made at the end of 1899, showing a deficiency of reserves and the steps which were taken afterwards to amend the state of matters, in consequence of a Committee, presided over by Sir Francis Mowatt; that, I suppose, in a great degree, met the case?—It would have met the case for the future.

8707. But he did tell us how the matter stood in some detail in 1899, and showed that there was a considerable deficiency of reserves in a great number of articles?—I have some notes here to illustrate what I mean.

8708-9. I thought it might help you if you knew that that information we have already got?—Did he inform you on the difficulty he had in getting the things from abroad?

I think he said he got certain things from abroad. I do not remember myself that he said he had very great difficulty in the matter.

(*Sir John Edge.*) He did not leave the impression on my mind that the markets were closed to us; he merely alluded to some things he did get from abroad?—For instance, Krupp refused absolutely to supply guns; he ought to have told you that, at least, I must not say he ought to, as I am sure he would have told you if you had asked him.

8710. (*Viscount Esher.*) We did purchase some batteries of guns in Germany?—Yes, I think we purchased two batteries, or something very small, at a late period, and they were not the guns we wanted; that is my impression, but I am not now prepared to enter into these details.

8711. I think it was eighteen batteries that we bought in Germany?—At what period of the war, do you remember?

8712. That I do not remember?—Of course, that is a very important point.

(*Sir John Edge.*) Speaking entirely from recollection, the impression upon my mind was that he said we could have got what we wanted abroad, but not of the proper material, inferior articles.

(*Viscount Esher.*) I do not think he laid any particular stress upon the point.

(*Witness.*) I am sorry he was not cross-examined about that, because it is a very important element, as far as I know, in this inquiry.

8713. (*Sir John Edge.*) He represented that as to certain things they sought abroad they were unable to get them, except of an inferior quality?—He was perhaps referring to a number of saddles, some thousands of saddles, which were offered to us, and which were useless old things, but practically we were not able to get help from the great foreign manufacturers. Krupp, whose name I mentioned, is one of the most important. That was in 1899.

8714. (*Chairman.*) That is your evidence with regard to the matter; we can, of course, make further investigation?—Yes; my information was derived from the reports given to me from time to time by the Director-General of Ordnance. I am not talking of the time of Sir Francis Mowatt's Committee; I refer to the preparations made for the war. Now, with your permission, I should like to refer back some years, to show that this question of a war with

the Boer Power was always a factor in my mind. I would like to go back as far as 1896, for I pointed out as early as then that we ought to take precautions, and to take certain measures to prepare ourselves for eventualities. In a paper I wrote then, called "The Strategical Importance of the Cape," for the Secretary of State, dated 14th February, 1896, together with a paper on the increase required for the Army, I wrote as follows: "In considering the future distribution of our small Army, it is, I think, very desirable we should reconsider our military position in South Africa, and especially as to the extent it has been, or soon may be, affected by political events." That is a quotation; and further on in that paper I said—another quotation: "I would recommend adding to the troops in South Africa, including the battalion recommended by the Colonial Defence Committee, the following: One regiment of Cavalry, one battery of Horse Artillery, and two battalions of Foot." That was as early as 1896, and I pointed out that if this was done the Cavalry regiment and the battery of Royal Artillery should be stationed in Natal. I need not go into details, but I said this reinforcement would give us a force that we could send to the front, and make a good show with, at any time, whilst we were preparing to send out a larger body of troops if we thought the condition of things was more threatening.

8715. Is it not the case that the main point in that paper was that the Cape was a central position, generally speaking?—I made that a point in order to impress the Government also, but the main object I had in view was to have a force actually on the spot in South Africa. I dwelt upon the point that it would be a useful force to have, as you could send it either east or west according to what was required.

8716. The other point, the effect upon the Boers, was brought in rather incidentally at the end of the paper?—I said: "To anyone who knows South Africa well it must be evident that the present state of things," (this is in the same paper), "the existing distribution of power in South Africa cannot long continue. To give any future redistribution of it an English character we should be strong there. At present, and, indeed, ever since we pulled down our flag after our defeat at Majuba, the Africander has believed the Boer Power to be superior to ours, and Dr. Jameson's recent surrender and the policy it has forced upon us, will inevitably tend to strengthen this belief." I think that shows you that I had in my mind the one point of strengthening our forces in South Africa, although I did incidentally use the argument, as an extra inducement for the Government to send troops there, the possibility of our being able to send troops from there east or west, as we might require for other purposes.

8717. But the addition proposed was two battalions, one battery, and one regiment of Cavalry?—Yes, and I pointed out then what that would amount to.

8718. Would that really have had much material effect upon the preparations as against the Boers?—Well, it would have enabled us to have held some defensible position, and it would have enabled us to protect what we had, I think. Of course, we could not expect the war to come like a clap of thunder suddenly out of the sky, we should have some warning, and we should have been able with that power, because it would give us a Brigade of Infantry, a Brigade of Cavalry, and two batteries of Artillery, to hold certain positions, one in front of Ladysmith on the Biggarsberg.

8719. Of course, before the war broke out, we had a larger addition to the normal force at the Cape than this one?—Yes; we went on adding to it bit by bit. That was on the strong recommendations I made from time to time.

8720. I only wanted to know whether, at the time you wrote this in 1896, you thought this addition would have made the position in South Africa a safe one, as regards the Boers?—No, surely not, I could not think we should fight the Boer power with a weak Brigade of Cavalry, a Brigade of Infantry, and two batteries of Artillery, but it would be a very good advance guard to hold your advanced position until you could send reinforcements to it. I also said in my paper: "The presence of this Cavalry Brigade, etc., in Natal would have a steadying effect upon the Boers, and joined to a strong Brigade of Infantry from Cape Town, and the battalion now at Maritzburg, would always enable us, in case of need, to take up a strong forward position, either near Ladysmith in Natal, or on the Transvaal territory beyond Newcastle, on what is locally known as the Berg, or at Harrismith in the Orange Free State." Those were two strong little positions for such a force.

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8721. Looking to what happened afterwards, would it have been a safe thing to do, to hold those forward positions with a force of this character?—Well, of course, the man commanding on the spot would have to judge of all that; it would be impossible beforehand to know to what extent the Boer turn-out would render these forward positions impossible, but it would give you the nucleus of a force to which you could send others to hold the positions you intended to defend eventually in the country.

8722. I do not want to interrupt the account of your evidence, but we shall come at some time or another, no doubt, to the actual position when the war broke out in Natal, and we had probably better resume this point then?—Very well.

8723. (*Viscount Esher.*) When was this warning given?—That was on the 14th February, 1896.

8724. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I have a date of the 22nd February; is that the same one?—No, that is another paper that I now refer to; it was dated the 14th February.

8725. (*Viscount Esher.*) You say it was the 14th February, 1896?—Yes. It is a paper entitled, as I said, "The Strategical Importance of the Cape."

8726. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) That paper was not included in the document of the 22nd?—It was a printed paper, and I will give you mine (*handing in the same. Vide Appendix to Report Volume, page* 225).

8727. Is that not one of the appendices to the document of the 22nd February?—I have no doubt but it was an original paper sent forward on the 14th. Then five months afterwards, again in 1896, I addressed the Secretary of State on the subject of increasing the Natal garrison, and I pointed out that in order to have a full Brigade of Cavalry and a Brigade of Foot to occupy the position known as the Biggarsberg, we still required a regiment of Cavalry, a battery of Horse Artillery, and two battalions of Foot. Then in another paper in the same year, on the 30th October, 1896, I reminded the Secretary of State that in the minute I had written on the 22nd February, the one you have referred to, sir, I pointed out to him that the Army was not strong enough to do all that was required of it, and that to enable it to do so, certain additions were necessary. In those minutes I pressed the Government to make the Army strong enough to do the military business of the Empire; that is really what I was always trying to induce them to do. The Secretary of State, or the Cabinet rather, did not take my view of the matter, and they entered into many serious difficulties, both political and financial, and others, objecting to these additions being found. I did not question the statements, but I urged the necessity of this increase in order, as I believed, to make the Empire secure, and it was not, as I pointed out to the Secretary of State at the time, lessened by the existence of the difficulties to which he referred. In that paper, which I think you have got before you, I urged that the necessity for the increase was due to external causes, whilst the difficulties he urged as the reason for not satisfying the demands were mainly of an internal character. I illustrated my meaning by a very simple simile: "That a man may be too poor to pay for coals, and if he is he is quite right not to order any. But the fact that he is right will not prevent his being frozen if the temperature goes too low—the coals would." That is a quotation from the paper I forwarded. (*Vide Appendix to Report Volume, page* 232.)

8728. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) What was the date of that?—The 30th October, 1896. In the following year, on the 3rd November, I again pressed the Secretary of State to make the Army able to meet the demands which the country might at any time have to make upon it, and I think I may say that I was always hammering at this one chord, and pointing out whenever I was asked, and even at times when I was not asked, that increases were necessary in order to bring up the Army to what I had laid down as the minimum which I thought we always ought to have ready for home defence, and to enable us to send a small Army of two Army Corps abroad. I would like to call your attention to that memorandum of mine of the 3rd November, 1897, because I reminded him in that that on a previous occasion, dating some years back——

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8729. (*Chairman.*) That was one which the War Office could not trace?—This is a quotation: "On previous occasions, some dating many years back, and the latest being early last year, I strongly urged the necessity of adding to our Army"; and I went on and pointed out that I thought, and still think conclusively, that we urgently require an addition——

8730. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) As we have not got copies of those, may I ask whether they refer specifically to South Africa, in any way?—I think South Africa is quoted in most of them; I do not know whether it was in that one or not, but the general tenour of my correspondence with the Government at that time, was to increase the Army; that is running through almost all my papers of that time, and I was constantly referring to South Africa. I do not carry in my head the whole of the words, or whether I mentioned South Africa in that particular memorandum or not, but it was one of the series, and I have already read you out many of the other papers of the same series, in all of which I quoted South Africa. Whether it occurs in that one or not I do not remember.

8731. (*Viscount Esher.*) Did those subsequent minutes go further than the one of the 22nd February, 1896, or does that practically contain the whole of the recommendations?—In 1897 I went further, because I pointed out in that paper of the 3rd November (this is the note I have made from it), that we urgently require an addition of nine Brigades of Artillery, that is 27 batteries, and 12 extra battalions of the Line. In all, the additions I demanded at that time amounted to 16,515 rank and file. With that same minute, I forwarded a short sketch of the rise and progress of the mobilisation scheme, drawn up by Sir Coleridge Grove at the time, and, I think, if you read that, the Commission will obtain a great deal of information as regards the general scheme of our Mobilisation Department.

8732. (*Chairman.*) We have not been able to obtain these papers; if you will kindly let us keep them we will take charge of them?—And you will give them to me back?

8733. Certainly?—You may keep them as long as you like.

8734. If we wish to have them printed, you have no objection?—Not the slightest; they come under the same category of their being private and official papers.

8735. May I put this point to you? I want to quote one sentence out of your minute of the 22nd February, 1896: "If there is one point, truth, fact, principle, call it what you like, on which more than any other our present military organisation rests, it is that for every battalion of foot abroad we must have one at home." Is not that the principle that underlies most of the papers that you are referring to?—That underlies the whole of our military system in England. I am now really talking to you more with regard to South Africa, and I am dealing with the question not with regard to the military organisation of the country, except so far as that organisation bears upon the affairs of South Africa, and as they are touched upon by the various minutes I read, almost all of which were written with South Africa in view.

8736. The reason I put that question was, that you mentioned the differences in the number of men required at different times, and looking at those minutes, I find at different times the numbers of the increases vary considerably?—They never go back, I think.

8737. Perhaps not, but they are always regulated by this principle which I have quoted, that you require in your opinion, in order that the Army may be properly equipped, to have one battalion at home for every battalion abroad?—Practically, that was so; but I would describe it differently: I would say that although it constituted the basis of our military system, it was subject to change in the event of war. The regulations which describe the principles upon which our military organisation is based, provide for the position when both the Regular battalions of a regiment are abroad. In that case, one or more of the Militia battalions of that regiment are to be embodied, and the depôt of four Regular companies is to be expanded into a battalion of Regulars.

8738. Quite so; but I meant that, as I understood your memoranda (I have not had much time to study them very minutely, but I did my best), reading them through I came to this conclusion, that the differences of numbers in them arose from this fact, that our requirements abroad increased, and as they increased a larger number of regiments were employed abroad, and the number of regiments which could be quartered at home decreased, and it was to make up that deficiency in the regiments at home that you put forward these propositions as affecting the Army generally?—No doubt that was a very strong element in my calculation.

8739. And according to the statement which I quoted from your document that was the principle upon which you had to proceed to have the same number of battalions at home as abroad?—We increased our Indian establishment considerably—I forget by how many battalions, and I think we did it twice or three times since the Army was organised.

8740. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Do you consider that that system by which one battalion should be at home and one abroad is entirely practicable in time of peace?—Yes.

8741. In great wars you must expand your depôts and make them a sort of reserve battalions for the two battalions abroad?—I daresay you may remember the original paper on which all that was based, General MacDougall's Committee, and if you refer to that you will see it laid down. There was a Militia battalion to be called out with the depôts to make up an equivalent force.

8742. And in point of fact you have at times had provisional battalions?—Many times.

8743. To meet the circumstance of two battalions being abroad of the same regiment?—Yes.

8744. (*Chairman.*) I do not want to interrupt your statement. Will you proceed?—As I said at first, for many years before the war, for some considerable time it seemed to me, and I think to most people who were studying the South African question very closely that everything seemed tending towards the war, which eventually came off in 1899. As I also said, all the reports we received from our officers, upon whom we depended very largely for our information, and also those from the Governor of the Cape, Sir Alfred Milner—everything, as far as I could gather from what I was told and what I saw in the way of papers—seemed to show that this war was inevitable, and was being hurried forward by Mr. Kruger. On the 20th April, 1898, I addressed the following minute to the Permanent Under Secretary of State: "I fully endorse the serious views taken by the Government of the Cape upon our position in South Africa." I do not know whether you have got this or not.

See Q. 8

8745. I do not think that was mentioned in the list you sent us, and we have not got it?—"I fully endorse the serious views taken by the Government of the Cape upon our position in South Africa. We may go on for some years as at present, but sooner or later we shall have a violent explosion there. Were we now or at any time in the near future to have any serious trouble with a foreign Power that explosion would take place at once. Are we prepared for it? Any student of the Staff College would say, 'No' to such a question. There is no reason that I am aware of why we should not be thoroughly prepared for it. As long as there is a probability of our having trouble with either France or Russia there may be some good reason why more troops should not be sent to South Africa, but there can be no valid reason why we should not send the stores and supplies and transport which I believe to be necessary in order to make us safe there until troops could be sent from home both to Natal and to Cape Town. I will therefore deal with, first, the question of stores, and then with that of transport, and lastly with that of the addition which I think should be made to the strength of our garrisons in those two Colonies. Our troops in Ladysmith have no adequate supply of provisions. Two months' food for man and beast should be at once collected there for a regiment of Cavalry, three batteries of Field Artillery, a Mountain Battery, 120 Mounted Infantry, and a battalion of Foot. This is absolutely essential to prevent any force at Ladysmith from being starved out before help could reach it from England. Ladysmith is one hundred miles from Maritzburg. If I were allowed to do so, I could send out much of this food with the shipment I am to make to the Cape in the "Dunkeld," on the 29th instant. Without going into detail, I may say that for the supply of the forces now in South Africa with requisite mule transport and wagons to carry two days' food for men and one day's grain for

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animals, we should require 75 riding horses, 3,240 mules, and 324 wagons. To organise and conduct this transport we should send out a cadre of five transport companies. A proportion of these mules, to be determined by the General Officer commanding on the spot, might be let out to farmers in Natal and near Capetown. The mules can be obtained in South America and landed in South Africa at a total cost of £15 per mule; the wagons to be delivered in South Africa can be obtained from America at, say, £55 each; the harness can be supplied from England. At this moment our troops are immobile, and consequently only effective as a purely stationary and defensive force, and by the moral weight which their presence in the Colony affords. This is not as it should be, and I would press on the Secretary of State for War to insist on converting them into an efficient movable force. If the Government at home believe the statements and views set forth in the dispatch of 23rd February, 1898, from Sir Alfred Milner, I cannot see how they can avoid sending out at least one regiment of Cavalry and three batteries of Field Artillery to the Cape Colony, to make the force there complete in all arms."

8746. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) What was the date of that letter from Sir Alfred Milner?—That was a dispatch of his of the 23rd February, 1898. My minute proceeds: "I would also recommend the despatch of 5,000 magazine rifles and 300 rounds per rifle to increase our reserve of infantry ammunition in that station." That was the end of my minute of 20th April, 1898.

8747. (*Chairman.*) What followed upon that?—I do not think I ever had any answer to it; I am not quite certain, and unless I looked over the papers I could not remember.

8748. Were any steps taken to carry out the recommendations?—I cannot remember any being taken.

8749. As a matter of fact, I think at the time the war broke out there were two months' supplies in Ladysmith?—Yes; but that is further on; I will come to that. None of the wagons or mules or provisions or stores that I mentioned were purchased or sent out there. On the 6th September, 1899,* I pressed that more batteries of Field Artillery should be placed on the higher establishment. I suppose you know that we have two establishments for all our troops, the higher and the lower establishment; and the higher establishment, of course, more nearly comes up to the war establishment. I pressed on the 6th September* that more batteries of Field Artillery should be placed on the higher establishment, and that, according to my views, as soon as we sent a brigade division to South Africa we should raise another at home to war strength. That was carrying out what you referred to, the principle that underlies the whole of our military establishments, that if you take anything from England you ought to replace it again. The answer I received was that the question should be deferred for the Estimates of 1900. That was postponing it to the Ides of March.

8750. (*Viscount Esher.*) Whose reply was that?—It must have come from Lord Lansdowne. I have not got it here, but it was the official answer I received.

8751. (*Chairman.*) Do you know the date of the answer?—No, I have not got it here.

8752-3. But it was subsequent to the 6th September, 1899?—Yes. Then I pressed the point further.

(*Viscount Esher.*) Are you sure it was not 1898, because you see the war began on the 11th October, 1899?

(*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) And in September, 1899, you were hurrying troops in from India and the Mediterranean?—I am sure it was 1899.

8754. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) There is a memorandum which you have not referred to of the 8th June, 1888, a very full memorandum?—I referred to that at the beginning; that is the memorandum in which I described the objects for which the Army was invented and maintained. I thought I explained that at the beginning of my evidence.

8755. (*Chairman.*) This question of date is rather important; are you quite certain it is 1899, and that it was the Estimates of 1900, because it seems almost incomprehensible in September, 1899?—I should like to verify it hereafter, but I am rather inclined to think it was correct.

8756. (*Viscount Esher.*) The Viceroy of India was instructed to send troops to South Africa on the 8th September?—There is no doubt about that, but they were not prepared to expend money in England.

8757. (*Chairman.*) The authority to expend money in England was given on the 22nd of September?—Yes; but that was some time afterwards. This is the 6th, and things marched very quickly. I think we will come to a question of hours by and by.

8758. It seems very strange to us, and that is why I put the question?—It may be a misquotation of mine, but I think I am tolerably correct.

8759. (*Viscount Esher.*) There is such a gap between the 20th April, 1898 and September, 1899; perhaps you are coming back on that directly?—No, I am not.

8760. There were no recommendations of yours between April, 1898 and September, 1899?—There were no important ones. The answer I received was that the question should be deferred to the Estimates of 1900. The Estimates are always made up very early in the beginning of the year, but they are not passed until April.

8761. The Estimates are generally framed in December?—Yes, December of the year before. I pressed the point, and was told that "If a larger force leaves home it will be considered how far it will be advisable to replace it." It is desirable to remember that at any period in 1899, I could have despatched to South Africa 10,000 men without calling upon any Army Reserve whatever, which the Government naturally shrank from doing, and I think I may say that all Governments shrink from calling up the Army Reserve, as it influences the funds; that is a matter for which they are responsible, and they are much better judges than a soldier can be, although it is a soldier's duty to recommend them to do so.

8762. (*Chairman.*) With regard to this matter, I should like to ask a question or two before we pass on. Was it not the case that there was a Committee formed which was originally called the Commander-in-Chief's Committee, in July, 1899?—There was the Army Board.

8763. It became the Army Board afterwards?—Yes; but I do not think it had more than one or two sittings, because it was merged into the Army Board almost immediately.

8764. It was only to make the sequence proper that I put it in that way?—I cannot carry the dates in my head. (*Sir Coleridge Grove.*) It had a certain number of sittings, and then was merged in the Army Mobilisation Board.

8765. It does not much matter what the name was; it was a body consisting of the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, the Director-General of Ordnance, and the Military Secretary, under the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief, and afterwards I think there were two civilian members added to it?—(*Lord Wolseley.*) Yes, the Permanent Under-Secretary, I think, was one, and the Accountant-General.

8766. The Accountant-General and the Assistant Under-Secretary?—Yes, the Assistant Under-Secretary.

8767. That body had under consideration from time to time after its first meeting on the 13th July, 1899, and it met very frequently, questions with regard to South Africa?—Yes.

8768. And they were sent forward to the Secretary of State?—Yes; I am going to quote a great number of them.

8769. I only asked that because you gave us the date of the 20th April, 1898, and then went on to the 6th September, 1899*, and I wanted to point out that in the interval, at any rate, after 13th July, 1899, there were recommendations with regard to the preparations in South Africa coming from the Army Board under your presidency?—There were many.

8770. For instance, I see paragraph 4 of the Army Board Proceedings for 13th July, 1899: "Decided to ask the Secretary of State that this Brigade Division of the Royal Artillery should proceed on the 15th August to Cape Colony, not to Natal; that it should go at war establishment, and take its horses"?—I am coming to that. See Q. 8779.

8771. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) That explains the discrepancy of the date about the guns; it was a question of sending out a certain number of guns in your memorandum of the 6th September, 1899*, that you quoted just now, was it not?—Yes, I pressed for mo

* The Minute of the 6th September 1899, referred to by Lord Wolseley, appears to be that of the 5th September 1899 which will be found on page 268 of the Appendix to the Report of the Commission.—B. H. HOLLAND, Secretary.

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batteries of Field Artillery to be placed on the higher establishment.

8772. I see that on the 6th September, at the Army Board, the Director-General of Ordnance asked for instructions as to sending out six 15-pounders, as requested by the General Officer Commanding in Natal. Were those the guns you referred to?—No, I do not remember what guns they were.

8773. That would hardly be a sufficient number?—The two things are quite separate; they were all about the same thing, wishing for an augmentation of their Artillery for South Africa; but they did not refer to the special batteries at the moment.

8774. (*Chairman.*) The reference you gave to the 6th September was more for an increase of the general equipment of the Army?—That is so.

8775. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) It seems rather strange that the Army Board should have passed a resolution of that sort for six guns when the request was for a larger number?—I pressed that more batteries of Field Artillery should be placed on the higher establishment, and added: "According to my views, as soon as we send a Brigade Division to South Africa we should raise another at home to war strength." The answer I received was that the question should be deferred to the Estimates of 1900; I pressed the point, and was told that "if a larger force leaves home it will be considered how far it will be advisable to replace it."

8776. (*Chairman.*) That was postponing the consideration of it for about a couple of months?—Yes.

8777. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) The Estimates would not be passed until the following April?—No. I had a discussion at the War Office on the 14th August, 1899, at which Mr. Balfour and Mr. Wyndham were present, and I said that if I were given the order I could put 10,000 men into Estcourt in 60 or 65 days; but I added that it would be a tight job to do so. That is a very important date to remember. It was at the end of a meeting we had, and that was the statement I made; it was an informal meeting, because Mr. Balfour and Mr. Wyndham were both present. Mr. Wyndham, at that time, was the Under-Secretary of State for War.

See Q. 9250.

8778. (*Chairman.*) That was at a time when the Army Board had not met apparently; it had no meeting between the 1st August and the 31st, so that you probably dealt with those matters without referring to the Army Board at that time?—That was merely the statement I made to the Minister and the Under-Secretary. On the 8th June, 1899 (I am going back a few months now, and I am sorry to say I ought to have put this in before), I strongly urged the immediate mobilisation of an Army Corps on Salisbury Plain. I knew the Government were very anxious to avoid war, and I thought such a show of preparations for war on our part might somewhat influence Mr. Kruger, and might possibly deter him from the war towards which all his proceedings at that time seemed to point. I felt that even if this mobilisation had no deterrent effect on Mr. Kruger, it would at least make sure that we should, in the event of war, have in hand a thoroughly organised Army Corps ready to embark for South Africa at the shortest notice, and certainly ready to embark before the shipping could be supplied by the Admiralty for it. Had my advice been acted upon then, this Army Corps could have been in South Africa, and, very possibly, on the Orange River before Mr. Kruger declared war in October, and he declared war on the 11th October. There was no danger that our mobilisation of this Army Corps should have hastened Mr. Kruger's declaration of war, and this is a very important point, because I know people would at first say that if we had done so Mr. Kruger would have declared war immediately; but my answer to that is a very simple one, and it will be understood by anyone who knows the condition of things in South Africa, that Mr. Kruger could not have taken the field before the time he did, and he took the field upon the very earliest date that the Boer forces could take the field in South Africa, because all their men were mounted and were dependent entirely upon grass, and they have no grass to eat until early in October, in fact, the 10th is a very early time for grass; and, I think, that is the answer to the point I am sure would be made by people who heard my statement about this Army Corps being put down at Estcourt at the time I have mentioned; they would immediately say: "That would have hastened the war," and my answer to that is that I do not think it could have done so.

See Q. 21180.

8779. (*Viscount Esher.*) Would that have involved calling out the Reserve—the mobilisation of that Army Corps?—We could have sent an Army Corps without calling it out; but it would have been a much better Army Corps with the Reserve.

You referred some time ago, my Lord, to the different orders that were given for the embarkation of the Division of Field Artillery, and you quoted one of them. I am coming to that now, and I wish to do so because I think it points out the indecision, if I may say so, which existed on the part of the Government at that time as to whether they would make serious preparations or not. I think these dates will give you a very fair indication on that point. On the 5th June, 1899, the batteries of a Brigade Division of Field Artillery were ordered to embark about August 15th with their families; that is the paragraph you quoted just now.

See Q.

8780. (*Chairman.*) No, that was not the one I quoted, because that date was the 13th July; the Board did not meet until the 13th July?—Perhaps there was another one. On the 22nd of the same month, of June, the order we received was that they were to embark as early as possible in July *without* their families; perhaps that is the one you quoted from?

8781. Not yet?—On the 27th June, five days after that order, the original order was to hold good, and the families were to be taken. On the 4th August the order was that the equipment to be taken was to be sent out in freight ships for this Brigade of Artillery, and the batteries were to embark on the 7th, 8th, and 9th of August without their horses. On the 4th, later in the same day, we got another order to say the horses were to go. The day following, the 5th August, we were ordered that the families were to be left behind, and some days later the embarkation was suspended for the present.

8782. On what date?—I have not got the exact date, but it was in August. As I say, the embarkation was suspended for the present, and at a Committee meeting in the Commander-in-Chief's room it was "Agreed to recommend to the Secretary of State that this Brigade Division should be sent out with its horses complete." The Secretary of State decided it must go without its horses. I have not got the date, but it was in August; it was after the 6th. That was the decision come to.

8783. And it never went?—It went eventually.

8784. With the Army Corps, but not before?—That is it. I merely brought this forward as an instance of the hesitation that was then evidently in the minds of the Government. They did not want to take any steps that would be construed into declaring war, and I hope it will be quite understood that what I tell you before this Commission is intended in no way whatever to bring any accusation against the Government for want of energy in this business. I merely want to point out that the system which prevails is a system which I consider to be injurious to the interests of the country, that great dislike to taking anything like a decided step when war seems absolutely inevitable to make a preparation for it, lest the world should say, "Oh, you are preparing for a war."

8785. (*Viscount Esher.*) As to the shilly-shally about detail which you have just described, were those orders given by the Secretary of State to you?—Yes.

8786. Without consultation with you?—Without consultation with me. What I feel, my Lord, is that I am justified in finding fault with the refusal to spend money from the very first, and especially at such a moment and in such a crisis, upon the military preparations required for a war which all people who knew the Transvaal well and knew the condition of Mr. Kruger's Government and his rulers, firmly believed, as far as I could judge, at the time to be inevitable. I know that the Government did their best, and I am sure that every Government, no matter who was in office, would do the same; that is to say, they would do their best to avoid the horrible necessity of war, but, as I have indicated just now in what I have said, those measures that they take in a case like that are more creditable, as far as I am able to judge of those sort of matters, to the humanity of the Ministers than to their prescience and knowledge and power as Ministers of State or as Statesmen. In the Proceedings of the Confidential Mobilisation Committee of the 17th of June, 1899 (*vide Appendix Vol., page* 426) a minute was read from the Secretary of State for War

dated 13th June, 1899, upon the subject of providing land transport for the troops then in South Africa, which began thus—this was on the 13th June, remember: "Although there is no present intention of reinforcing the troops now in South Africa," etc., etc. Well, that of course, coming to me after the many attempts I had made to reinforce our Army in South Africa, led me to think, if anything could do so, that we were either not going to war or would not go to war. In the Committee's report of that day's proceedings to the Secretary of State it was stated (this was the report we made to the Secretary of State) that it would take three months at least from the date of the order to purchase before the 6,200 mules we required for a supply-park for the force then in South Africa could be ready to leave, and this was reported to the Permanent Under-Secretary on the 30th June. There was a very interesting and confidential paper published by the Mobilisation Branch of the War Office, called Branch D, dated 5th August, in which it was pointed out that it would take three months from the date of the order to purchase before the transport animals could be landed in South Africa and ready for the troops. That was the 5th August, 1899. This was brought by the Commander-in-Chief to the notice of the Secretary of State. In a paper dated 31st August, on transport in South Africa, it was explained to the Permanent Under-Secretary that if it were in contemplation to send reinforcements to South Africa, it was of cardinal importance as a matter of time that authority to spend money for securing transport animals should be given at the earliest possible date. On the 9th September the Quartermaster-General asked to spend money on mules, but on the 16th September the Secretary of State declined to enter upon any expenditure in connection with these services at present. I think that is rather an important date to remember.

8787. (*Viscount Esher.*) That was the date Sir George White embarked?—That was about the time he embarked; I do not remember the exact date. Very soon after that, on the 22nd, sanction was given to proceed with the purchase of a portion of the mules for the transport of the Army Corps and Cavalry Division. I think we wanted 6,000, and we were allowed to purchase 1,300 odd, and on the 2nd October permission was given to buy the remainder of the mules we required. On the 6th September, 1899, I recommended the Secretary of State to send a Brigade of Guards to Natal, and I may say I selected the Guards, because we could send them as a very efficient brigade without calling out any Reserve at all. The condition of the Guards is such that you can always do that. I wanted also to send out two Line battalions from home, and two more from the Cape. That would be an augmentation of eight battalions of Infantry.

8788. (*Chairman.*) What was the answer to that?—It was not agreed to. Looking back to the whole of the summer of 1899, I may say I was constantly asking for the expenditure of public money upon services which would be necessary in the event of war, and I may again say that war at that time seemed to me absolutely inevitable. I could see no way out of it, as far as I was able to judge, but, of course, I was not in the secrets of the Cabinet. As a soldier, it seemed to me to be madness to go on as we were from week to week, not making preparations for an eventuality, which to me seemed a certainty. I could get no money for the purchase of clothing, equipment, transport, or any military stores, and without money, of course, I could do nothing in the way of preparing stores for the mobilisation of an Army for Field Service.

8789. With regard to clothing, we had some evidence, and, of course, as to stores generally, from Sir Henry Brackenbury, and he referred us to some of the minutes of the Army Board on that subject; perhaps I might just refer you to that evidence?—I think I know them all, unless you wish to refer to them for any other purpose.

8790. I will just put one case: On the 31st August "the Adjutant-General pointed out the unsuitability of khaki drill, and the Committee considered it unwise to postpone any longer the provision of clothing and equipment for the Field Force." (*Vide pars.* 85 *and* 86, *Army Board Proceedings*, 31*st August*, 1899.) On the 6th September, paragraph 100, "Director-General Ordnance reported that he had asked for authority, but had received no reply"; and on the 8th September it was in the same position; so that you on the military side of the War Office were urging at that time that there should be additions to the supplies, but you could not get any authority?—We had no authority and no money at all at our disposal.

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8791. As soon as the sanction was given on the 22nd of September, I think everybody is agreed that after that no difficulties were raised with regard to the provision of money?—No, we got £640,000, I think that was the amount; we got that sum of money, and that supplied our immediate wants.

8792. And then, of course, afterwards, on the declaration of war, the funds were increased *ad libitum*?—I fancy so; I do not think there was any stint of money after that.

8793. But during the period, up to the 22nd of September, your evidence goes to confirm the evidence that the Commission have received from Sir Henry Brackenbury and others, that there were many occasions on which demands were put forward, from you and other heads of departments, for supplies that you considered were absolutely necessary for the equipment of any force, if you had to send out a force without delay, and that you could not get authority for them?—That was so. It will be quite understood, of course, that those decisions were not the decisions of an individual. They were the decisions of the Cabinet. That, I think, is an important thing to remember. It was not the fault of any particular Minister or any particular man; they were the deliberate decisions of the rulers of England.

8794. We shall, of course, get evidence with regard to that?—At a meeting of the Army Board on the 20th September, 1899, the Assistant Under-Secretary informed the Board that, although the Secretary of State was disinclined to sanction the heavy expenditure necessary to complete all the requirements for the despatch of an Army Corps and a Cavalry Division to South Africa, he was prepared to consider the expenditure necessary to meet the most pressing requirements, and he proposed to draw up, in conjunction with officers representing the Quartermaster-General, the Director-General of Ordnance, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and other military officials, a schedule setting forth the most urgent requirements which he would submit to the Secretary of State. That was done, and, as well as I remember, that was the statement upon which the £640,000 or £650,000 was based. I think it came to that. That was dated the 20th September, and it was done forthwith; and a schedule having been framed and considered by the Army Board at the next meeting of the Board, it was forwarded to the Secretary of State with a minute saying: "The Board recommend that this statement be at once submitted to the Secretary of State for his approval to the immediate expenditure of £645,000" (that I see was the sum), and I think that same afternoon we got full permission to say we might spend it. The Board went on to say in this minute "that this sum is the minimum expenditure necessary to meet immediate requirements, and our opinion is that if it is contemplated to give orders shortly for the mobilisation of an Army Corps and a Cavalry Division, authority should be obtained without delay to defray the expenditure necessary to meet the preliminary mobilisation requirements of that force." That was the original force we recommended for mobilisation, namely, this Cavalry Division and a complete Army Corps.

8795. I am not quite clear at what date it was settled by yourself or the War Office that that should be the force, if a force did go out?—I think that they asked for the smallest amount at first.

8796. You mentioned the force just now of an Army Corps?—An Army Corps, a Cavalry Division, and the Line of Communication troops, which amount to seven battalions.

8797. When was that force indicated as the one likely to be sent out? Was it in July?—I cannot tell you that.

(*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) It must have been prior to the first meeting that we have mentioned here of the 13th of July, because it says, paragraph 5 (2): "If a force is sent to South Africa in advance of the Army Corps and Cavalry Division, such force to be a component part of the Army Corps and Cavalry Division."

8798. (*Chairman.*) It is just because it is put indefinitely like that that I should have liked to get from you whether it was a recommendation of yours when it was made?—I cannot tell you.

8799. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) We have not got the minutes of the Confidential Mobilisation Com-

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mittee, which merged into the Commander-in-Chief's Committee?—I think there were only three meetings.

8800. One meeting we know was held on the 29th of June?—I know I had one or two of them. There were very few of them. I think that the origin of the Army Corps was really taken from the first recommendation that I made to the Secretary of State, that an Army Corps should be mobilised for war on Salisbury Plain. I have already given the date of that; that was in June.

8801. (*Chairman.*) This is the statement of the Mobilisation Division that was put in: "Between the 1st January, 1899, and June, 1899, the Commander-in-Chief held many consultations (chiefly with the then Assistant Adjutant-General for Mobilisation), in regard to the preparation of a field force, should such be required. As most of these were verbal and confidential, but little record remains; but, so far as can be ascertained the following was the state of the case at the end of June, 1899." (*Vide Appendix Vol., par* 10, *page* 18). And then the composition of a field force of one Army Corps, and so on, was agreed on?—Yes; and I think it was then accepted from the fact of my having recommended that this Army Corps should be molilised on Salisbury Plain.

8802. So that it was before June, 1899, that you had it in contemplation that an Army Corps might be required?—Yes, that it should be mobilised.

8803. (*Viscount Esher.*) You fix the date, I suppose, to the 8th of June, which was the day on which you recommended the mobilisation of an Army Corps on Salisbury Plain?—Yes, I should think that was the nearest date I could give.

8804. (*Chairman.*) May I ask just one other question before you go on. Did those other recommendations to which you referred during July and August, partly from yourself and partly from the Army Board, which did not receive sanction for expenditure, cause delay when the Army Corps came to be sent out?—No doubt. We could have sent the Army Corps out much earlier if we had had the money to spend.

8805. Assuming that war was not declared, and the expedition was not ordered till the time at which it was ordered, do you think that there was delay in consequence of these previous refusals?—Of course. The Army Corps was not ready to go until we had the money given to us. The men were all ready.

8806. We were told that there was no delay in the actual mobilisation?—No, I suppose there was none.

8807. But you think that the delay in getting the equipment did delay the sending out of the force?—It certainly delayed its usefulness. No doubt it postponed the sending out of the force. You see at the present moment, supposing the Secretary of State were to send to the Commander-in-Chief, and tell him to embark an Army Corps in, say, 10 days, he ought to be able to do it as regards the men most certainly; and, if he had the reserve of horses we had then, 14,000, he could send an Army Corps complete, and, I should think, almost complete in transport.

8808. We have had some evidence that there was not much delay in consequence; that the Army Corps did sail within the time specified, and that the only question of delay was in certain parts of the equipment. All the units could not take all their equipment with them?—No doubt. As soon as it was decided to send out an Army Corps there was no delay after that order was given, which affected any material that I can remember. The Army Corps embarked.

8809. There may have been some delay in certain articles?—There may have been, no doubt. Remember we sent out with the Army Corps three Divisions, and we had already been sending troops out. I think before we sent out the Army Corps at all we had over 20,000 men in South Africa, and the force at Ladysmith was supposed to be—we called it the 4th Division—and then we sent out very soon afterwards the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, all following in very quick and rapid succession, one after the other. But the men in many cases were badly provided; we had great difficulty in getting khaki clothing for them to begin with, and helmets in many cases. But I think most probably the Director-General of Ordnance has told you all those points better than I could tell you.

8810. Yes, he has?—I see I have made a note here which bears upon that subject, that when at last the mobilisation began we soon came to the end of our available military stores, and I think I may say of all sorts of stores. On the 11th of October, that was the day of the declaration of war, I find that a demand for 250 sets of saddlery could not be complied with as early as that. The trade was already then fully occupied with work for us, and we could not buy saddles abroad. I urged the purchase of some saddles in America, and we got some from there, but not the quantity that we required. On the 8th of November, 1899, that is some four weeks after the declaration of war, the Director-General of Ordnance informed the Army Board that there was neither clothing nor saddlery for the Mounted Infantry of the 5th Division (that was the next division after the Army Corps that left England), if that division were orederd to embark in the month of November. He merely made that statement. I think these are all important points with regard to the laying in of stores. They bear very strongly upon our Army system, which I think is very radically wrong on all those points.

8811. But those points were all taken up by the Committee which sat subsequently, were they not—the Mowatt Committee?—I do not know. They laid in a large supply of stores, but I do not know that they laid down that the stores for our two Army Corps—which is our Army Corps for foreign service, which we intend always to keep up, were always to be ear-marked and kept in store in our magazines. I am not at all certain that that is laid down as an article of faith in the War Office at the present moment.

8812. That is what you think is necessary?—I think certainly. I think you ought to have the power of mobilising your three Army Corps for home service at once, and all your Militia and all your Volunteers and all your Yeomanry. And if I am not outside my rights in saying so I might remind the Royal Commission that whilst this war was going on in South Africa, if we had had anything like serious trouble from abroad, and we had mobilised our Army at home for service, we scarcely had any guns in England, a very small proportion of regular guns, and that the whole of our Volunteers and Militia and Yeomanry remaining at home would have had guns of such an obsolete pattern that it would have been almost dangerous and criminal to ask men to stand up to them in the face of modern artillery, although that was a point which had been urged on the Government by myself over and over again long before the war. I do not know whether that is an incidental point that you would like to take notice of, but it is a very important one in an inquiry into the condition of our military establishments in England for fitness for war.

8813. That is a point which the operations of the Mowatt Committee met to a certain extent, is it not?—I have never seen the report of the Mowatt Committee. It was a secret Committee, and all I was told of it was what the Director-General of Ordnance told me himself verbally. I know they laid in a great number of stores and got a lot of money, but I do not think they ever took money to provide the Volunteers and Militia of England with modern rifled guns. I am not certain, but I do not think so. The old guns in existence in those days which were used by our Auxiliary Forces were the old 16-pounder muzzle-loading gun—a very bad gun at any time, and a muzzle-loading gun, too; and we had a few Armstrong guns, which were breechloading 20-pounders—I think they were—which were very dangerous guns. We had no modern guns of any sort, kind, or description. Whether we have any now I do not know—I doubt it.

8814. I think the purport of the Director-General of Ordnance's evidence on the subject was that he thought his recommendations, which were the origin of the Mowatt Committee then assembling, had been met?—I am very glad to hear it. I can only speak about the Army, of course, as I knew it, and as it existed during the time this war was going on. The Army at home was in a helpless and hopeless condition.

8815. ((*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) But you were Commander-in-Chief at the time the Mowatt Committee sat?—Yes, but it was a secret Committee. I was not consulted about it at all.

8816. Not at all?—No.

8817. Nor informed of the results?—No; I was informed of them verbally by Sir Henry Brackenbury. He very loyally told me a good deal about it, that was all. I had no report of it sent to me. Sir Henry Brackenbury told me a great deal at the time verbally of what took place, but I cannot remember ever having seen the report of the Mowatt Committee or of its having been sent to me.

8818. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Was Sir Henry Bracken-

bury on that Committee?—He was Director-General of Ordnance. Yes, he was on it. It was a small Committee. I am only referring to the condition of things as they existed when I was in the War Office.

8819. (*Viscount Esher.*) The Committee reported on the 31st March, 1900, and you were neither called as a witness nor was the report submitted to you as Commander-in-Chief?—I was not asked any opinion. Of course, I had to send forward the application to get the Committee established, but I did that upon the urgency of the Director-General of Ordnance's reports to me about the condition of things. But I cannot remember ever having seen any report of what they recommended, although I have no doubt that Sir Henry Brackenbury told me a good deal.

8820. Anyhow, you have no recollection of having seen it or the evidence?—No.

8821. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) The Chairman asked Sir Henry Brackenbury this question: "That provision fairly met the necessities of the case, which you represented in December, 1899?" and Sir Henry Brackenbury replied, "It did. There was only one item in which in my opinion and that of the Army Board sufficient provision was not made, and that was the moveable armaments for fortresses." That, I think, settles the matter?—Yes, I remember that. It is so long ago now that I had practically forgotten it.

8822. Then, practically, that Committee did give everything that was necessary, except the moveable armaments of fortresses?—That has since come. I am only referring to the time when that did not exist. My point is, that I had nothing to do with it.

8823. Except that you were Commander-in-Chief at that time?—Except that I was Commander-in-Chief at that time.

8824. (*Chairman.*) But being Commander-in-Chief at that time you never saw the report, dated the 31st of March, 1900?—I should be sorry to say I did not. Might I look at it? (*The report was handed to the witness.*) I could not possibly say, at the moment, whether I have seen it, but I am quite certain that I have never read it—that is all; I cannot say whether I ever saw it.

8825. (*Viscount Esher.*) Anyhow, you were not asked to give evidence?—No, and the impression on my mind is, that I never saw that paper before, but I should be sorry to commit myself to that. At that time, you remember, if those papers came to me or through me (if they ever did), I was a very busy man, working night and day, and I had a great many other more important matters to deal with.

8826. (*Chairman.*) It seems so important a paper for the Army, that it almost naturally would have gone to the Commander-in-Chief?—You see there is no record of my ever having been asked an opinion about it. The only thing that I do know, is about the formation of the Committee originally; I was asked about that.

8827. (*Viscount Esher*). There were only three members of it?—Yes, only three members, and I am sure that Sir Henry Brackenbury was not a man who would not have come and told me, from day to day, what had taken place at it. I have no doubt he did, and I know he did. I can remember quite well the figures, the very large figures he gave in, that he asked for. He asked for eleven millions of money. That I remember quite well.

8828. (*Chairman.*) What point have we now reached in your evidence?—I was pointing out, that when the mobilisation began, we very soon ran short of stores, and I gave you some instances—running short of saddlery, and that we had no modern guns at home for the Volunteers. As a general remark, I may say that during all our inaugural preparations for the mobilisation which took place for South Africa, we were checked, and seriously hampered throughout for want of money. For a considerable time expenditure on preparations for the mobilisation of the Army was forbidden. I have given one or two instances. As early as the 26th July, 1899, the Mobilisation Board had urged that the alterations necessary to fit the vehicles sent out from this country with pole-draught and screw-frame brakes, should be done in this country, and also that the new harness with the vehicles which would be sent out from this country, should be provided here—the cost would be about £17,000. On the 31st of August, the Mobilisation Board wrote that they considered it unwise to postpone any longer this service, and pressed for money required. That was more than a month afterwards. On the 5th of September, the Director-General of Ordnance reported that this work would take from the date of the sanction ten weeks to carry out. He said, sanction to these items should be given at once, on account of time required to manufacture and obtain. Yet, it was not until the 22nd of September, 1899, only 18 days before the declaration of war, that the expenditure was sanctioned by the Secretary of State for War. It was not until the 30th of September, as you know, that we were allowed, that sanction of the Cabinet was given, to mobilise the Army Corps and Cavalry Division, and troops for the lines of communication—that is seven battalions; and looking at the date when I first urged the mobilisation of one Army Corps, and to the insistence with which I urged it for three months, and to the answers received to my minutes on the subject, I think, I may say, that had I suggested the mobilisation of two Army Corps, which I should like to have done, instead of one, my proposal would have received very little consideration. From the military point of view, it would have been as easy to mobilise two Army Corps as it would have been to mobilise one Army Corps. Of course, our stores would not have enabled us to do so.

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8829. Your stores would not have enabled you to do so, you say?—No. I should like now to give you the numbers of troops at different times that were in South Africa.

8830. If you please?—At the beginning of August, 1899, the combined garrison of the Cape Colony and Natal Colony consisted of two regiments of Cavalry, about 800 sabres in all, and six and a half battalions of Foot, 5,600 bayonets, three batteries of Field Artillery, 18 guns, and a Mountain battery of guns, which were six mountain guns. There were besides some small detachments of Garrison artillery for the works we keep at Simon's Bay for the defence of the harbour for the Fleet; those I do not refer to—they are fixtures, and will not count as regards a mobile Army. Between the 1st of August, 1899 (that is the date that I have been referring to) and the date when Mr. Kruger declared war, the above force was raised to five regiments of Cavalry, 17 battalions of Foot, nine Field batteries, 64 guns, and one Mountain battery, which made up a force of over 20,000 fighting men with 60 guns. On the 7th October, 1899, orders were at last issued for the mobilisation and embarkation of one Army Corps, one Division of Cavalry, eight companies of Mounted Infantry, and also the seven battalions of Foot for the lines of communication; and I should like to call the attention of your Commission to one point about that, because it is worth noting. So far as I am aware, this is the first instance of any modern army having ever sent a body of Mounted Infantry into the field. We had had many experiences on a small scale in India. My friend, Sir Henry Norman, knows that in the Indian Mutiny we had some camel corps, which proved the most admirable adjuncts to our forces that were ever used. But no regular Army, so far as I know, ever sent an army into the field with a regular body of Mounted Infantry before we sent that Army Corps abroad with 800 Mounted Infantry as part of it. That force that embarked, that Army Corps and lines of communications, amounted to 41,000 fighting men of all ranks and 108 guns, besides a very large number of etcetera in the way of medical departments. I do not even reckon the Royal Engineers—they are departmental. Those forces, when landed, raised our fighting strength in South Africa to over 60,000 fighting men. So far as we could understand, on the very best authority we could get, namely, our own officers, and, I think, from all the civil authorities also at the Cape, it was estimated, as I said before, that the total Boer force that they could put into the field was 54,000.

8831. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) That includes, I think, the force in the Orange River Colony?—Yes; I mean the two States. Whilst the embarkation of this Army Corps was in progress, we received the news of the unfortunate affair of Nicholson's Nek, and arrangements were at once made to replace the losses; we sent out an extra battery of Artillery and three extra battalions of Foot to make good the losses at Nicholson's Nek. As regards those reinforcements and this Army Corps, as I have told you, the orders were issued for their mobilisation on the 7th of October, and they were all on the sea on the 15th of November, 1899, and I believe we are the only nation in the world that could

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have done it, that could have secured such a very rapid embarkation as that. A siege train was sent out on the 9th December, 1899, the 5th Division of Foot embarked on the 13th December.

8832. (*Viscount Esher.*) That is breaking into the second Army Corps?—Yes. That is the beginning of the second Army Corps, as you may call it. We counted the force out there, as you know, as the 4th Division, so we then began with the 5th; but after that we never talked of an Army Corps.

8833. You never talked of it. You never suggested the mobilisation of a second Army Corps at that point?—No; I cannot remember ever having done so, but I always did this, I said the very moment we sent out one Division the other Division behind it should be mobilised always. When we sent out the 5th Division I pressed for the immediate mobilisation of the 6th Division, and when the 6th Division went out I pressed for the immediate mobilisation of the 7th, and so on, so that we should always have a Division in hand to send.

8834. But it was not the idea then, or the scheme that you had in your mind then, to mobolise a second Army Corps the moment the first Army Corps left for service?—No.

8835. Why was that?—I do not think they would have done it. I could not get them even to mobolise those Divisions as quickly as I wanted them to do. We never talked afterwards, after having sent out the one, of a second Army Corps, although it was part and parcel of the original scheme. But then that original scheme was a paper one, it was never seriously taken, except by soldiers, into account. The eighth Division followed shortly after the seventh. Twelve more batteries of Field Artillery, 72 guns, and three more batteries of howitzers embarked on the 1st of February, 1900. So far as the men were concerned, there was no military reason why all these three Divisions—the fifth, the sixth, and the seventh, which practically constituted a second Army Corps—should not have embarked before the 1st of December, 1899, but we were already badly off for clothing and military equipment. On the 6th November, 1899, the Director-General of Ordnance reported to the Army Board that there was neither saddlery nor clothing available for even the Mounted Infantry of the Fifth Division, then the next to embark. In addition to these regular troops there were sent to South Africa before the end of January, 1900, seven selected Militia battalions, followed by six more Militia battalions and two regular battalions, which embarked about a fortnight afterwards. The eight Division was mobilised as soon as the seventh Division embarked, being dispatched to the same destination, and large bodies of English Yeomanry, and splendid contingents from the Colonies, were also poured into South Africa, and placed at the disposal of the General Commanding there. The question was referred to the Army Board by the Secretary of State as to whether any restrictions should be imposed as to the number to be accepted, or as to the proportion of mounted men that should be included in the numbers accepted from the Colonies, the splendid contingent from the North-West Territories of Canada, and the contingents that were sent generally from the Colonies, which were certainly of the very first quality. The Army Board answer was that as regards mounted troops all who were likely to be of use should be accepted without restriction as to numbers.

8836. (*Chairman.*) What date was that?—I cannot tell you.

8837. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) About what time?—It must have been January or February, 1900. The Army Board's answer was that all who were likely to be of use should be accepted without restriction as to numbers, and that whenever possible we should try to get Mounted Infantry, but in no case Cavalry. Especial attention was called by the Army Board to the advisability of securing the services of all such men as the Canadian North-West Mounted Police and the Australian Mounted Police.

8838. (*Chairman.*) We have had evidence from the Colonies yesterday, and a telegram was referred to dated the 3rd of October, 1899, in which it was pressed that as many Infantry should be sent as possible?—I do not remember that telegram.

8839. That was a telegram from the Colonial Office?—I remember hearing of it, but I cannot tell you about it. I remember quite well being told about it. But we had great difficulty so far as we were concerned in getting horses.

8840. (*Sir John Edge.*) "Infantry preferred"?—Dismounted men preferred.

8841. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) That telegram was sent from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of every Colony likely to send troops?—Yes, I remember the expression "Dismounted men preferred."

8842. (*Chairman.*) I will give it to you in one moment?—I do know that at that time we were in great difficulty about horses. That is the only thing that I can think of.

8843. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) But that would hardly have influenced the Colonies?—But they might have got horses in South Africa; you get dismounted men much quicker. I do not think we asked for Infantry; we asked for dismounted men. You see everybody knew that men coming from the colonies would be able to ride.

8844. (*Chairman.*) This is the telegram that I was referring to that was sent to South Australia, New South Wales, Victoria, and a separate one in the same sense to Canada on the 3rd of October, 1899: "The Secretary of State for War and Commander-in-Chief desire to express high appreciation of Her Majesty's Government for the patriotic spirit exhibited by the people of Australia in offering to serve in South Africa, and to furnish following information to assist organisation of forces offered in units suitable for military requirements. Firstly, units should consist of about 125 men. Secondly, may be Infantry, Mounted Infantry, or Cavalry. In view of numbers already available, Infantry most, Cavalry least, serviceable," and so on. That was the point?—Yes, that was the point. You see they did not preclude Mounted Infantry; it is only Cavalry that they did not want.

8845. "Infantry most"?—Yes, "Infantry most." My impression was, of course, that it was on account of the scarcity of horses. As you say, we could have got horses from the Colonies, but we should not have got them as quickly.

8846. The evidence yesterday was that each contingent took its horses with it?—Yes, those that came did bring their horses.

8847. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) So that practically every man was mounted?—Yes.

8848. If he was not mounted when he arrived at the Cape he got a horse, and became mounted?—Yes.

8849. There was practically no, or very little, Colonial Infantry at all employed in the war?—No, because nearly all the Colonials were mounted when they reached the Cape if they had not brought horses with them. We had great complaints I know in the early part of the war as to the difficulty of finding food for our horses; that was a great difficulty out there; there was little grass, and our men were not skilled in feeding horses on the veldt as the Boers are themselves.

8850. (*Chairman.*) But please notice the date; this was the 3rd of October, 1899, before the declaration of war, and these were general instructions to the Colonies as to the terms on which the Imperial Government were willing to accept contingents; and these are words which have been commented upon very largely: "In view of the numbers already available, Infantry most, Cavalry least, serviceable." Under those instructions, I think, with the exception of New South Wales, who sent half Mounted Infantry, all the other Colonies, for instance Canada, sent a thousand men as an Infantry regiment, and what I want to ask is this: this telegram says "the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief desire to express"—I want to know whether it was on your advice that those instructions were given?—I have no doubt it was. I cannot recall it; but I have no doubt that would be a point which I should be consulted about.

8851. And you recommended those word: "Infantry most, Cavalry least, serviceable"?—Yes, I remember quite well saying that Cavalry would be quite useless.

8852. But you did not mean by that to exclude Mounted Infantry?—No, it was Cavalry I had in my thoughts all the way through, because I know what irregular Cavalry, if I may say so, our Yeomanry are. As Cavalry they are of no use; they are very good mounted troops, but they are no use as Cavalry.

8853. The result was, as I said, that the first contingents went composed almost wholly of Infantry;

but all the other contingents went as Mounted Infantry?—Yes, but I have no doubt that the contingents that went as Infantry were mounted after they got there.

8854. That is what we were told yesterday; that immediately they arrived——?—They were put on horseback.

8855. But they also said that it rather discouraged them, in the first instance, to receive those instructions?—I cannot imagine that, at any time, there was any wish to preclude Mounted Infantry, or even to demur to Mounted Infantry being sent out. It was Cavalry that was always in my mind.

8856. It was a little unfortunately worded?—It was if it conveyed that impression.

8857. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Do you not think it would have had a discouraging effect on the Australians? I speak of those especially, because they are very fond of riding, and they would not make very good Infantry soldiers; they are not accustomed to march, but they are accustomed to ride, and I presume it had rather a discouraging effect. But they took the bull by the horns, if I may say so, and went mounted?—Yes.

8858. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) May it have been from a feeling that there might be difficulty in getting the horses in sufficient numbers, or in the transportation of them at the moment—may that have been the feeling which induced this message to be sent?—I know there was a difficulty about horses, but I cannot go beyond that. I do not think there was ever in the minds of any authority at the War Office any wish to diminish the number of Mounted Infantry; but certainly against Cavalry there was, because it would be a second-rate Cavalry, which would be of no use to one out there at all.

8859. But the home Government would have had difficulty in providing horses for them?—No doubt they would have.

8860. And the authorities here may have thought it would be difficult to get the horses from the Colonies at the moment?—No doubt.

8861. (*Viscount Esher.*) So far as I understand, what it meant was, not so much that you preferred Infantry, as that you did not desire Cavalry—irregular Cavalry—to be sent out to Africa?—That was the whole pith of it—that we did not want Cavalry.

8862. (*Chairman.*) I do not know that it is necessary to pursue the subject further. We have got your explanation of the motive that was in your mind in any share you had in that telegram?—I may as well wind up as regards the numbers we sent out. Between Mr. Kruger's declaration of war and the 31st of January, 1900, we had sent out to South Africa the following troops:—Ten regiments of Cavalry; Horse Artillery, 9 batteries, 54 guns; Field Artillery, 30 batteries, 180 guns; howitzers, 6 batteries, 36 guns; mountain guns, 1 battery, 6 guns; siege train, 74 guns; Infantry of the Line, 59 battalions; and Militia, 7 battalions. The above means a Regular force of about 75,000 combatants of all ranks. There were besides a considerable body of Royal Engineers, about the most valuable men we have got, who were used all over the country for constructing bridges and various other works on railways; and a very large host of Departmental corps connected with transport, commissariat work and the Medical Department, who were all landed in South Africa between the 10th of October, 1899, and the 31st of January, 1900. The Generals Commanding in the Field were in no way, so far as I know, interfered with by any order from home as regards their plans or their operations. One of the very few instances where even a caution that I can remember was conveyed to officers in the field was sent at the end of September by myself with reference to the proposed forward movement upon Glencoe. I always thought those forward movements were dangerous, and I pointed that out; but, at the same time, a man sitting at home in his office in England is very chary naturally of trying to prescribe to anybody in the field as to what operations he should do. But at last I thought it was so serious, pushing this force on, that I did send the General Commanding a warning telegram. I warned him against such a position until reinforcements in sufficient numbers had arrived. He was desired to keep a month's provisions always with him at his advanced posts, and subsequently he was told that he should keep two months'.

8863. What date was that?—At the end of September. I cannot tell you the exact date.

8864. Before the outbreak of the war?—Yes.

8865. (*Viscount Esher.*) To whom was that telegram sent?—To the General Officer Commanding in Natal. Sir Coleridge Grove tells me it was sent to Sir George White, but it was intended, of course, for General Symons. He was the man it was intended for, and I think it went to General Symons.

8866. It would go through the General Officer Commanding at the Cape?—It would go through the General Officer Commanding at the Cape.

8867. (*Viscount Esher.*) What Sir Coleridge Grove is thinking of is perhaps the telegram of the 31st of October. That is the telegram in which you say: "White's telegrams lead me to fancy he means to hold on and let himself be besieged in Ladysmith"?—To what effect?

8868. Practically, very much the same as what you have been saying now?—I have not got that telegram here. (*The telegram was handed to the witness.*)

(*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) In this telegram you say you warned him before he left of what seemed to be the importance of Colenso.

8869. (*Viscount Esher.*) This is the only telegram we have got direct from you to the General Officer Commanding in Natal?—Yes, I remember that telegram well, of course.

8870. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Was there an earlier one?—No, I do not think there was one on that subject.

8871. (*Chairman.*) There is one I also find in the same connection from the Commander-in-Chief at the War Office, dated 17th October, 1899, to the General Officer Commanding, Natal: "Have you complied with order to put 60 days' supplies in Glencoe"?—Yes, I mentioned just now that I sent those orders to him. I told him first of all that he should always have a month's supplies if he was remaining on. I sent him a subsequent order, making it 60 days instead of 30 days, to prevent him being cut off from all supplies.

8872. Of course, the holding of Glencoe, or that district, at any rate, was part of the local scheme of defence?—Yes; but it was never intended, if I may say so, and I cannot fancy any scheme of defence for Natal in which it could be contemplated for a moment to hold on at Glencoe with a small advanced post when 30,000 Boers were coming down to attack it. Advanced posts must fall back or be cut off when seriously attacked.

See Vol. II. page 146, Col. 1.

8873. I asked purposely as to its being a part of the local scheme of defence, because, as I understand it, the practice is that the General Officer Commanding in a station submits schemes of defence, which are then accepted at home; is not that so?—I do not think so. I think the General Officer Commanding on the spot makes his own plans. I do not think he ever sends them home; not that I am aware of.

8874. I mean general schemes of defence, such as are prepared for all countries in all parts of the world?—Yes, they come home—a sort of standard scheme.

8875. I understood that in the case of Natal there have been demands sent from home to the General Officer Commanding, General Goodenough, in the first place, and General Butler afterwards, for schemes of what the operations would be in the case of an outbreak of war, and that those schemes in both cases involved the holding of Ladysmith and an advance post, either at Glencoe, or Dundee, or Newcastle?—Yes; I have no doubt of that; but it was not intended, I presume, that a man should allow himself to be cut off at Glencoe. He was, of course, to fall back on his main support, which would be in the neighbourhood of Ladysmith. No one ever thought that the troops would occupy Ladysmith. The district in front of Ladysmith is called Biggarsberg, a very strong position. Ladysmith is in a hollow. It is no position at all.

See Vol. II., page 146, Col. 1.

8876. But it was surely the distinct intention that the force in Natal should hold Ladysmith?—I do not know. I think that telegram which you have just shown me now, reminding Sir George White about Colenso, rather proves the other way.

8877. But I am going back to the schemes of defence. Surely those schemes of defence, which went on the supposition that two months' supplies should be accumulated in Ladysmith, involved the holding of Ladysmith on an outbreak of war?—I should not think so.

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8878. You did not interpret it so?—No. I should think if ever the enemy forced their way down into the neighbourhood of Ladysmith, and he was unable to hold the Biggarsberg (I am only expressing an opinion), he would fall back behind the next position, which was not Ladysmith, but Colenso.

8879. Did you see the correspondence with the General Officers Commanding, who sent home those local schemes of defence?—I may have, but I cannot remember.

8880. Because my impression from reading them is that they were all on the intention of holding these advanced posts in the event of a war as being the only means of protecting the Colony until reinforcements came from home or elsewhere?—I do not know that. I never heard of anybody proposing to hold Ladysmith that I am aware of.

8881. (*Viscount Esher*). This was General Goodenough's report, which was afterwards accepted by Sir John Ardagh: "If these views are concurred in, I would recommend, when actice preparation for hostilities may be decided on, (a) The concentration of the main body of Imperial troops, Infantry, and Artillery at Ladysmith; (b) the occupation by a company each of Colenso and Estcourt; (c) that a strong detachment of one battalion, with its Mounted Infantry company and Maxims and two or four guns and No. 10 Mountain battery, to be kept ready at Ladysmith to proceed, taking the necessary tools, to occupy and entrench itself at Van Reenan's Pass on receipt of authority; (d) that the preponderance of Cavalry with one battery of Field Artillery and a half battalion of Infantry, including its Mounted Infantry company, be sent forward north of the Biggarsberg about Glencoe, 36 miles from Ladysmith"?—Those are evidently intended to be outposts, all of them, and the main force was at Ladysmith for the occupation of the Biggarsberg. That is what I understand by that statement.

8882. Major-General Cox describes in rather more detail the troops that he would propose should be located at Maritzberg, Ladysmith, Newcastle, and Eshowe. Then Sir John Ardagh, in the minute dated the 3rd of September, 1897, practically accepts those recommendations?—Yes. I think that would be a very fair description of a force of men occupying Ladysmith as the central place for the main body, and that they would send out these detachments in front as outposts to see what was going on, and to do what they could, as long as they were not being cut off or prevented from retiring. There is this point also, that at the beginning of this business, and so far back as 1897, when those orders were given, it was not contemplated that the Orange Free State would join; it was looked upon that the Orange Free State would remain neutral, and it was at that time hoped and thought that the war could be confined to the Transvaal. And if that was the case, the left flank of your position coming from the Drakensberg was protected; you only had to protect yourself from an advance from the front and possibly from a raid from Zululand.

8883. (*Chairman.*) I think Sir John Ardagh in his memorandum, while he said that it was doubtful whether the Orange Free State would take part in the war, always maintained that they had to count upon very large assistance to the Transvaal from them?—Yes, that they would sympathise with them.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

8884. (*Chairman.*) We were speaking before the memorandum, while he said that it was doubtful of Natal, which had been submitted by the general officers commanding at different times. They, of course, proceeded on the footing of the garrison of Natal, which was the regular garrison of Natal?—I do not know what you would call the regular garrison of Natal.

8885. The garrison that had been in Natal then?—I should presume, not. If I had put myself in the position of a man called upon, being in a command like Natal, to give a scheme for the local defence of the country, I should give what I considered was necessary for the local defence of the country. I should not tie myself down to say, if there was only one battalion in the country that I could defend the country, which might be an impossibility.

8886. We were told, distinctly, by both Sir William Nicholson and Sir John Ardagh that it was the duty of the General Officer Commanding, under those circumstances, to base his scheme of defence on the troops that were available to him?—He would have to do that in the case of war or an attack.

8887. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) No, that is laid down in the regulations; he is to base his scheme of defence only on the troops he has at his disposal then, or the allotted garrison?—Has it ever been decided for any part of the world what the allotted garrison is to be, absolutely, and by whom?

8888. (*Chairman.*) The allotted garrison, I understand, is actually, and as a matter of fact, the garrison that has been allotted, and is ordinarily kept there?—Even that is a very variable quantity. The Colonial Defence Committee did, of course, lay down certain garrisons for all the Colonies, as far as I remember, but those proportions are not always kept up; so far as I know they vary.

8889. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) But you see in the defence scheme sent from Natal, they assume that they have a certain garrison, and on that they work out their scheme?—Yes.

8890. Of course, it was a very insufficient force for the defence of Natal, and, therefore, they had to put companies in places more in the front?—Because they had not got the troops you mean?

8891. Yes?—If the garrisons that were laid down as constituted garrisons at these places were maintained, but very often they vary very much. You know at the beginning of the war we had sent troops from India to Natal.

8892. (*Chairman.*) But it is the case, as Sir George Taubman-Goldie has mentioned, that according to the regulations, the General Officer in Command at a place like the Cape, if he is required to put forward a local defence scheme and send it in to the Intelligence Division, bases his recommendations on the allotted garrison which is the garrison which it is customary to maintain in the command?—There is no such expression in the King's regulations.

8893. (*Viscount Esher.*) Yes, in the instructions sent to an officer when he is asked to prepare a defence scheme. Let me read you the words in which General Goodenough answered these questions. He says: "It appears to me that the aim of a force such as that now in Natal"; that is July, 1897?—Yes; he merely takes it as the basis, and of course he goes upon it.

8894. (*Chairman.*) All I can say is that I did put this question very distinctly to Sir William Nicholson and Sir John Ardagh, and they said that these schemes were based, according to the regulations, by the General Officer Commanding on the normal garrison, and here are the regulations; Number 168: "Schemes of defence should deal only with the men and material actually available"?—What regulations are those?

8895. The King's Regulations, Number 168. That being so, I say that the scheme for Natal was drawn up by these local officers on that footing?—I presume so.

8896. And therefore they had to provide for the holding of places on the frontier of Natal by the limited garrison that was then the normal garrison?—Yes, which was the only garrison provided for.

8897. And those schemes did provide, as a matter of fact, as Lord Esher read out before, for holding Ladysmith, Glencoe, and Eshowe, I think?—I should regard Glencoe as a detachment, as an outpost; it must have been considered by anybody who was in command of the troops there as an outpost from Ladysmith.

8898. General Goodenough's letter from which Lord Esher has just been reading says: "It appears to me that the aim of a force such as that now in Natal, while waiting for reinforcements, should be (1) To place itself in a secure position as to its communications while keeping the enemy in uncertainty as to the ultimately intended line of advance; (2) to reserve to itself the power of making, at will, offensive raids or sallies under favourable conditions, profiting by any mistakes the enemy may commit; and (3) to cover and protect as much of the railway towards the frontier as can be reasonably effected." And in order to do that he provides for holding Ladysmith and Glencoe by an entrenched position. That would mean holding them surely?—Yes; but I think that a man who had that scheme in his head never would have contem-

plated that he was going to be attacked by 25,000 men. It would be absurd for a man to think he was going to hold Glencoe and make an impression upon the enemy, that he was going to hold it as a place to be held to the last, if he were attacked by such forces as those which were brought into play by the Boers at the beginning of the war.

8899. But I am not sure when the idea that the Boers would bring such large forces into play did emerge?—You are quite right; that is the point.

8900. I am not quite sure that the authorities at home had any idea that the proceedings would take that form?—No; we had those 54,000 men in our mind as the whole force that we should have to fight. Beyond that we had none.

8910. I only want to clear up what I had in my mind in asking you questions about holding these posts. Then part of the scheme was that 60 days' provisions should be put into these places named?—Yes.

8902. And we have had it in evidence that in the case of Ladysmith 60 days' supplies had been put into Ladysmith before Sir George White arrived in the country?—Yes.

8903. Of course, at the same time as his arrival the Indian Contingent began to arrive, and the supplies for that contingent were also thrown forward, and we were told that they were at once thrown forward into Ladysmith. At the time of the telegram which you referred to, of the 31st October, 1899, in which you suggested the line of the Tugela, the supplies were complete in Ladysmith; the full amount of supplies had been thrown forward into Ladysmith. Would it have been a practicable operation at that date to have withdrawn from Ladysmith to the line of the Tugela, without, at any rate, great loss of supplies and munitions of war which were concentrated there?—I can only answer from what I would do myself if you will put it in that form. If I was in command of such a force as was then in Natal, and having at that time fully realised (because they did) that there was a large force of the enemy coming for me, nothing in the world would have induced me to stay in Ladysmith; I would have burnt my supplies sooner than have stayed there. I would have fallen back behind the next line, which is at Colenso, and behind the river.

8904. And what date are you speaking of?—At the date you refer to.

8905. 31st of October?—At that time when the Boers were moving in such great force upon Ladysmith that they could evidently cut off and invest its garrison.

8906. (*Viscount Esher.*) It was within two days of the investment of Ladysmith?—I can only say what I should have done myself. I should have fallen back before the enemy could have invested Ladysmith, and when the attacks which took place at Glencoe by a large force of the enemy made it quite evident they were coming down, and also coming from Van Reenan's Pass on the left flank in large force, to turn you out of the country if they could. That is my own view. I should certainly have fallen back then to the strongest position I had.

8907. (*Chairman.*) Was there any information or report in the War Office, showing that Ladysmith, while it might have been tenable by a small force against a comparatively small force, was not tenable against a large force?—I think all who had ever been at Ladysmith knew that, and I think that anyone who was on the spot must have realised that it was a very bad position, whereas the position in front of it, the Biggarsberg position, is a strong position indeed, and was always, so far as I remember for a long time before the war took place, looked upon as the best defensible position for an army in the North of Natal.

8908. But it was never recommended as a position to be held?—I do not think, so far as I am aware, that any instructions emanating from this country were sent to any General Officer Commanding in the field as to the positions he was to hold, and where he was to defend himself. That must always be left to a Commander's own discretion. If you look through my memoranda you will see "The Biggarsberg" often referred to.

8909. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) But is not the Biggarsberg exposed to an attack on the rear from Van Reenan's Pass?—No, not on the rear.

8910. On the flank?—Yes, it would be. But then, if you are attacked by such superior forces that they can cut you off, you must fall back from the Biggarsberg, too. If you are not strong enough to hold the Biggarsberg, you must fall back behind Colenso. But you have these several positions, one behind the other, for carrying out a certain resistance, and prolonging the resistance and detaining the enemy until your reinforcements came up from the rear. That is, in my opinion, the only method to be followed by a small force based on the sea when acting in Natal in face of overwhelming numbers coming from the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.

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8911. (*Chairman.*) We have had a good deal of evidence about the necessity of strengthening the Intelligence Department of the Army in this country. Is not that for the purpose of drawing up schemes of operations in the event of war?—I think the local schemes for defence must be made up by the general officers and the people on the spot.

8912. For the normal garrisons?—Yes, for the normal garrisons, and even for operations in the country. If I was told that it was very desirable that we should have a scheme for the defence of Natal, I should write to the General Officer Commanding on the spot, and say: "With your present garrison, or with an augmented garrison of certain given numbers, what positions would you propose to occupy, and what would be your scheme," and then he would give me a scheme under, perhaps, one, two, or three conditions; under the normal garrison, under the garrison I would propose to send out to him, and under the garrison he thought would be necessary.

8913. You would do so with the assistance of the Intelligence Department?—The people out there would make the schemes.

8914. Would you not send them to the Intelligence Department?—After I had got the schemes? The scheme might be sent there, and they might be the depository; they might have it to look after it and to guard it, and it would be a very good place for it.

8915. Not for any other purpose?—If the head of the Intelligence Department found fault with it, it might be a matter he would bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief, but, assuming the man on the spot was a good man, he ought to be able to draw up a scheme for the defence of the country he is given command in.

8916. We have had a good many comparisons drawn between this country and Germany, on the ground that the German General Staff is so much more fully equipped than ours; would the German General Staff have anything to say to papers of that kind?—They have no executive duties to perform. You mean the staff which corresponds to our Intelligence Department?

8917. Yes; would they not draw up schemes for operations?—I have no doubt they have schemes for all sorts of operations; they are always drawing up schemes for rather impossible operations, in order to practise their officers.

8918. But our Intelligence Department does not do so?—No, I do not think they have ever been called upon to draw up schemes for the defence of different countries.

8919. And you do not wish them to do so?—I should think it would be a very good thing for them if they did, and I do not see why they should not, but we have never employed them for that yet. Of course, it would alter the constitution of our staff, and I think the Headquarters Staff might be altered a good deal in that direction.

8920. I only say that in the case of Natal I should have thought it might have been the duty, or that it was the duty of the Headquarters Staff to have some idea of what the nature of the campaign would be, based, no doubt, upon the local schemes?—The first thing the Intelligence Department, or any man who is asked to draw up such a scheme for the defence of a Colony like Natal, so many thousands of miles from England, would do, would be to ask for a large augmentation of the Garrison there, and I think I need scarcely say he would not get it. No Government I know of would give it in time of profound peace.

8921. Assuming that military operations have to take place, I suppose the Government have to get information from somebody, and, as the Commander-in-Chief is the principal adviser of the Secretary of State on military matters, I suppose the Commander-in-Chief primarily

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should have some idea as to what the nature of the operations would be?—You mean that the Commander-in-Chief would have to give the Secretary of State some advice if he were asked for it?

8922. Yes?—If he were contemplating operations in any country, I have no doubt he would ask the Commander-in-Chief what number of troops would be necessary for those operations, and perhaps he would ask him for a general outline of a scheme for it, and very likely such a scheme might be in the Intelligence Department.

8923. In the case of these operations in South Africa was any advice given by you before the Indian Contingent was sent to South Africa?—I do not think I was consulted about any particular scheme at all. I was very anxious to get all the troops I possibly could to South Africa, and, without doubt, Lord Lansdowne mentioned that the Indian people told him they could supply certain troops, and that he had immediately accepted them, and I have no doubt he asked my opinion about it.

8924. But the troops sent at that time raised the number in South Africa to about 20,000 men?—The troops sent from all quarters did, not only from India. I think the Indian Contingent amounted to 5,600 altogether.

8925. I say the troops sent out at that time?—Yes.

8926. There must have been some idea what those 20,000 men were sent to South Africa to do?—To do the best they could until the larger reinforcements reached Natal from England.

8927. That implies some scheme of defence, does it not?—Yes; but I am afraid it was not acting on any particular lines of a scheme that those troops were sent there. In other words, I may put it in this way: I do not think it was ever imagined or contemplated by the Government or the people in authority that the Boers would take the field and come down into Natal with the large force they did.

8928. I rather gathered that from the papers?—Remember that the whole of our military system—it is necessary to bear this in mind—the basis of our military system in England was that we should be able to put into the field, to send away from England, two Army Corps complete. That is all we ever aspired to; that is all we were ever asked to do, and that was proposed by the military people to the Government in 1888, and was practically accepted.

8929. If anybody employs a certain number of men they do it for some purpose and with some idea in their head as to what the men are to do?—With those two Army Corps?

8930. I take the two Army Corps if you like; but in any case, in the case of the 20,000 men, I should have said there must have been some idea as to what the 20,000 men were to do, and you say the only idea was that they were to hold on until further reinforcements came?—Yes.

8931. That means, I suppose, that no special instructions were given to the Generals at that point?—Not that I am aware of; I should think not.

8932. There was no advice of yours?—None of mine.

8933. Take the case of the Army Corps; when the Army Corps went out, was that with any definite scheme of operations?—No; it was sent out to South Africa and placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding in South Africa to do whatever he liked with, and it was left to him entirely whether he would operate through Natal or through the Orange Free State.

8934. No preference was expressed as to the best scheme of operations?—None; I think he was given *carte blanche* entirely, and, if I may say so, when Sir Redvers Buller went to Natal himself, he went there on his own hook entirely, and at his own instigation, and I do not know that I even knew, until he had started, or was about to start, that he was going there.

8935. I was not thinking so much of that particular operation, because, of course, that arose out of the circumstances after he arrived; but he did not go to South Africa with any scheme of operations?—None. He had discussed and talked over with me the relative merits of marching through the Transvaal or through the Orange Free State; these were the two alternative lines of march in operating against the enemy, and these were discussed between us; but it was left entirely to his own discretion.

8936. That was a personal discussion between you and him?—You can call it personal; he was a great friend of mine, and I believed in him, and we discussed it in the military sense.

8937. It did not take the form of instructions?—None whatever, and I am sure he did not gather from what I said that I intended them as instructions.

8938. And it was not so formulated as to be put by you before the Government?—No. I have no doubt I have discussed many times with the Secretary of State for War also those two specified modes of invasion of the Boer territory, as to which line should be taken, but nothing was ever decided by me, or, as far as I know, by the Government, which would, in any way, hamper the operations of the General Officer Commanding in South Africa.

8939. Or any formulated instructions from the Government to Sir Redvers Buller?—No, there are none I ever heard of, and if they had been given, I should have known of them.

8940. (*Viscount Esher.*) Did you have any similar discussions with Sir George White before he went out?—I have no doubt I had—I cannot remember personally having any.

8941. Did you ever discuss with him the question as to whether he should or should not adopt the position of Ladysmith?—Never; I fancy he felt himself forced at the last moment to remain at Ladysmith; he found this enormous accumulation of stores there, and he probably thought he should not leave them. You will find a telegram amongst those, which I have no doubt you have from Sir Redvers Buller, in which he says something to this effect: "As I expected, General White is shut up in Ladysmith, because he finds it impossible to get away."

8942. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Is there not a telegram of yours to the effect that you advised White before he left England not to hold Ladysmith?—I cannot remember that.

8943. (*Sir John Edge.*) There is a telegram referring to Colenso?—Colenso is a different thing.

8944. (*Viscount Esher.*) "I warned him before he left of what seemed to me the importance of Colenso, where I wish he was now, with the river rising from the rains." That is the telegram to Sir Redvers Buller, in which you expressed a regret that Sir George White was besieged in Ladysmith, and you add those other words I have read?—Just before that you will find the telegram I have referred to, in which Sir Redvers Buller mentions the fact of White being cut off, as he expected he would be. I have no doubt whatever that before General White left—he was a man I knew and he had been on my own staff—in talking over matters, as he was to take command of troops in South Africa, we very frequently discussed points of offence and defence; that goes without saying, but there is no record of it that I am aware of, nor can I remember any details of the conversation.

8945. (*Chairman.*) To what point would you go on now?—I think I have already referred to the various efforts I made to strengthen the garrison in South Africa from time to time, and I have given the dates upon which I did so; that is on the evidence, and I would again wish to repeat the fact that always in my mind I had the only scheme that I knew the Government had with reference to warlike matters, which was the scheme drawn up by myself in 1888—three Army Corps for defence of home, out of which we should send two abroad, and those two to go abroad were the only two that, as far as I was concerned, were ever assumed as possible to be sent from England. As regards the men those two went to South Africa; the difficulties we had in sending them arose, not from the impossibility of finding the men or finding the ships to take them there, but from the fact that we could not obtain the warlike material which was necessary to equip them, which warlike material ought to have been in store, and was not. I may say that in talking of the strength of the Army, which, after all, is one of the principal points under consideration, when that scheme of June, 1888, went before the Government they accepted it in appearance, but they did not give the extra number of troops which would have been necessary to make the scheme a living reality. They substituted for a number of the troops I wanted Militia, which

we know, of course, anxious as the Militia are to do their work, are not equal to Regular troops as fighting units. The additions that would have been necessary to have brought up the Army in 1888 to what I said it ought to be, and which the Government accepted as regards numbers, amounted to 21,279 men which I then asked for; the Government combated none of the reasons I gave for asking for those numbers of men, but they merely said, "We will give you the men, but instead of giving you soldiers we will give you that number of Militiamen." I think that that statement very clearly carries out the general drift of what I have been trying to bring before your notice, namely, the great difficulty in time of peace of really extracting from any Government the money that is necessary for the support of the Army which is supposed to be essential for the internal defence of the country, and to carry out whatever policy abroad it may be the intention of the Government to carry out in the various parts of the world where we are open to attack. I would emphasise the national risk and the danger to our country that is entailed upon us by the insufficiency of our home establishments of Regular troops as laid down in 1888, and the great paucity, the great lack of our reserves of stores—various military stores, such as vehicles, harness, saddlery, clothing, accoutrements, guns, and even ammunition. As to supply all those things would mean a very considerable outlay, every Government that I have ever known in England has always shrunk from it. They give you a little addition every year, but very small, and the result is that we were found in 1899 without those supplies we required for the mobilisation of the Army, and we had great difficulty in obtaining those supplies at the time. Now at the present moment, as I understand, in the present condition of things in England, our magazines are full, we have plenty of military stores and plenty of military supplies of various sorts, but if the past is to be an indication of what we may expect will be done in the future, you will find that in another five or ten years we shall have a very different condition of things. The temptation is so great from the political point of view that when it comes to the time every year for the Secretary of State for War to send in to the Cabinet or to submit to the Cabinet a note of the money he requires to maintain these magazines up to the very full point for war at which I assume they are at the present moment, he is very apt to be driven to fall back upon his reserves. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, I suppose, brings great pressure to bear on the War Minister, and he is very liable to say, "Oh, you can get heaps of cloth in the market, and you can buy powder to any extent you like here and there," and so on, and the result is that we do live upon our capital after every war I have ever known anything about. If we go on in the future doing that, you will find, if another serious war overtakes us this day five years or this day ten years, we shall have the same thing over and over again.

8946. I am afraid that involves a reformation of human nature?—Not unless our human nature is different from the human nature of all other nations in the world. There is no other nation I have ever heard of that presumes to call itself an independent and strong power, which adopts that course.

8947. You said it was such a great temptation to draw from the Reserves, and I say that the temptation will exist as long as human nature exists?—The temptation will exist, but it will not be given way to, I hope.

8948. How are you going to strengthen human nature against the temptation?—If you will allow me to say so, I am quite prepared for that as well. I think that human nature is human nature, and when it is mixed up with politics it becomes—I will not say more human, but perhaps more difficult to deal with upon the point of military preparations for war in time of peace. I believe it to be quite possible to make certain that we are at all times ready to mobilise at home three complete Army Corps, and to embark two of them for foreign service as soon as ships can be provided to receive them. Make the Commander-in-Chief, as long as
c 446. he is, as at the present moment, a non-political man, submit to Parliament every year over his own signature
c 665. a certificate to say that he, on his own responsibility, certifies to the country that those three Army Corps are absolutely complete in every store that is requisite in order to mobilise them at the shortest possible notice, and the same thing as regards the two Army Corps being ready for active service abroad.

8949. And if he is not able to do so?—Let him say so, and let him specify what is wanting, and I think the English people will supply it very quickly. That is what I should judge as to the future, from my experience of the past.

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8950. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) How would the English people hear of it?—The English people would hear as the certificate is to be addressed to Parliament.

8951. Not to the Government?—Oh no; that would be no use.

8952. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Having regard to foreign powers, would it be a wise thing to address it to Parliament if we were in a bad condition?—No, not if we began now, because I think we are in a good condition now, and we have our stores complete.

8953. But assuming that at any time you got into a weak position from that point of view, it would be hardly a wise thing to address to Parliament?—If this thing is kept up every year there will be no difficulty about it.

8954. Assuming that it is kept up?—What I complain of is that the English people are never taken into the confidence of the Government, as far as the condition of the Army is concerned—they are only told part of the truth, and the result is that when war is forced upon us we find ourselves with an insufficient amount of reserves of all sorts and kinds.

8955. When war is declared, and the English people find that money has to be provided, you think there is never any hesitation in providing it?—It is too late then.

8956. But, so far as the feeling of the British people goes, when it comes to that stage you do not find any hesitation on the part of the people in providing the necessary funds?—Never, and I do not think there would be the slightest hesitation in the English people supplying the money annually to keep up that condition of things.

8957. (*Chairman.*) But the strength of the Army and the amount of the stores is not a constant quantity?—It is constant as far as I know, because the statement of what we require was accepted by the Government in August, 1888, and it has never been disowned by any subsequent Government.

8958. But the whole series of papers you put before us shows that the necessities of the Empire have grown?—Yes, of course, it is very easy to increase the preparations to meet them; if you think now that the two or three Army Corps are not enough, and that you ought to have four Army Corps, it is very easy to make an increase. I only argue on what has taken place.

8959. It is not only the question of the Army Corps; as I drew to your attention earlier, the question is the number of battalions serving abroad and the necessity, therefore, of keeping up a corresponding number at home, and it was based upon that, I think, that in all your memoranda you suggested increases of the Army—in order to increase the number of battalions serving at home?—Yes.

8960. Following out what Sir John Jackson was saying, under those circumstances the increases are necessitated by political action in various parts of the world, and it might not be quite so easy for the Commander-in-Chief to put in a paper to be publicly presented to Parliament, all the reasons on which he would justify the increases he would be bound to demand?—You mean to permanently increase the military establishments of the country?

8961. That is what you propose in these papers?—I propose to do it up to a certain point to make these three Army Corps complete.

8962. But that has grown?—I do not contradict you by saying it has not grown; assuming it has grown, add on whatever force is necessary.

8963. In the course of years, I say it might grow again?—Certainly.

8964. Then the Commander-in-Chief would be obliged to say: "The establishment of last year has been kept up, but that establishment is not sufficient now"?—Yes.

8965. And he would have to justify that statement?—Certainly.

8966. That I suggest to you would be rather a delicate matter for him to put forward in a statement to

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be publicly presented to Parliament?—You think it would be?

8967. It might be?—In other words, to take an analagous case, supposing France conquered half of Germany to-morrow, she would immediately say that she required her Army establishment enlarged by half what it is now, and in the same way, if we added to our responsibilities by taking some other country, as we have taken the Transvaal and Orange Free State, we should say to ourselves: "We have increased our military responsibility, and we require additional troops to those we have hitherto maintained, on account of this extension of territory."

8968. You have held the office of Commander-in-Chief, and are therefore much better able to judge what could be said than I am, but I was taking up the point that you said you were now in a good position to begin the system, because we have got our full supplies complete, and I was suggesting to you that that does not follow over a course of years; even if you keep up to the present point, in the course of years you may come to require additions which would have to be justified, and it would not be sufficient, merely to put in a certificate to say: "We have kept it up to the amount previously supplied"?—I quite agree with you that as regards the military responsibilities of the country that would be open to revision from time to time, but the great thing would be for the Commander-in-Chief to assure the English people, and that the English people should know that the force they paid for was prepared, and in a condition to go into the field on the shortest possible notice, with all its supplies and stores and everything it required. The question is, whether the argument with regard to the number of the force required, can be separated from the political considerations which must, under the present system of Government, be in the hands of the Secretary of State.

8969. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Would you not be satisfied that the certificate that the Commander-in-Chief should submit to Parliament should say, that the force sanctioned by Government for that year was properly equipped for service?—Quite.

8970. Without any reference to your having a desire that there should be more troops?—Quite.

8971. You would accept what was accepted by the Government?—Up to the present moment the Government has accepted three Army Corps, and I would accept it on that basis entirely, that the Commander-in-Chief should certify that those three Army Corps were ready for mobilisation, and that everything was complete, as regards their stores and equipment, if it was necessary to send them into the field on short notice.

8972. And, although, you might think 30,000 more men were desirable, you would not allude to that?—No, that would be a separate thing to be represented to the Government.

8973. (*Chairman.*) Do I understand that any questions like those raised in these papers, in which you say that the military force of the country is insufficient for its requirements, would not come into consideration in your certificate at all?—No.

8974. You would not propose to lay that before Parliament?—No, but I have not stated anywhere that the force that was fixed as the military requirement of the country at the present moment was too small.

8975. You have just told us that in 1888 you asked for an increase of 21,000 men?—Yes; I wanted 21,000 Regular soldiers, instead of 21,000 Militiamen. I am afraid I have not made myself quite plain; the military force I had in my mind was three Army Corps of Regular troops for the defence of this country; the Government seriously consider this question, and they come back and say that practically they accept the whole of my papers *en bloc*, with the three Army Corps for the defence of the country, and two to go abroad, and the only difference is that instead of having these three Army Corps of Regular troops, one of them would be partly composed of Regulars and partly of Militia.

8976. (*Viscount Esher.*) Have you ever thought of the form that certificate you spoke of should take?—No, I have never gone into the words of it.

8977. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Supposing there is a difference of opinion as to what would satisfy the certificate between the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief, and the Ministry in power only had a small majority in the House of Commons, what might happen then?—I have nothing to do with politics.

8978. The Government, before accepting any such proposition, must necessarily consider that question, whether they could put it into the hands of the Commander-in-Chief to turn them out at any moment?—I am only telling you what I consider is the only possibility, as far as I know, of securing for England as a nation that she should always be able to have what her military people tell her is the force that is required for her home defence, and in order to enable them to send two Army Corps abroad.

8979. You cannot suggest a certificate that would carry that out, and also enable us to maintain our Parliamentary institutions?—As far as I know the Parliamentary institutions, I do not see how that opposes them.

8980. An adverse certificate?—No; supposing the Commander-in-Chief says: "I cannot certify that you have enough guns in the country, and you say you will not buy them," if the Government think they are not necessary, that question should go to Parliament.

8981. With the inevitable result?—Yes; but would any sensible Government do that?

8982. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) If there is any difference from the previous year's certificate, it might run that the Army consists of so many men, and there are sufficient stores for that number of men?—The Army Estimates tell you that; there is no certificate needed for that at all.

8983. That is a fixed quantity by the Army Estimates?—Yes.

8984. That being so, is there any difficulty in the Commander-in-Chief simply giving a certificate: "For the number of men in the Army Estimates the stores are sufficient"?—No; I think it is absolutely necessary that he should certify that the force that is required, and which has been recognised by previous Governments as the essential force for the defence of England, is ready to take the field.

8985. The three Army Corps?—Yes; and if the Government think three Army Corps is too much, it is for them to change it; let them come forward and tell Parliament that they wish to change the condition of things, and that they think that instead of three Army Corps, which are supposed to be necessary for the defence of England, only two are required.

8986. Or if through increase of territory it is considered by the Government and the people that four Army Corps are necessary, then the certificate ought to be that the four Army Corps had sufficient stores?—Yes, whatever may be the establishment that Parliament and the Government fix as the necessary military establishment of the country.

8987. (*Sir John Edge.*) Did the Estimates provide for three Army Corps at that time?—Yes; we could always put three Army Corps into the field on the conditions which I laid down, but a considerable portion of one of the Army Corps is made up of Militia.

8988. Would the Estimates, for instance, for 1899 cover all the expenses of putting those three Army Corps into the field?—No.

8989. It would not do merely to certify that the men mentioned in the Estimates were there; you would have to certify that the three Army Corps, which the Government considered necessary, were there?—The certificate that I think the Commander-in-Chief ought to give is to this effect, that the three Army Corps (it is three Army Corps that the Government has accepted at present) for the defence of this country, and out of them the two Army Corps intended for an expedition abroad, could be mobilised and fit for service at any moment, and he gives that certificate over his own name that they are complete with stores and equipment.

8990. You would not confine your certificate merely to certifying that the men mentioned in the Estimates were ready?—No; that is in the Army Estimates, and that would be of no use at all.

8991. Just one other question: How would you get exactly at what the Government had decided was a sufficient number of Army Corps?—At the present moment they have fixed it at three, and I suppose if our responsibility were increased——

8992. I suppose that is a question determined by

minute, which could be referred to?—Yes; you have already got the papers before you about that.

8993. What I mean is this: That the Commander-in-Chief would know that there could be no dispute as between him and the Government as to what the Government had decided was a sufficient force?—That would not be touched upon in this memorandum I am referring to at all. That was a specific point he brought forward. The other point is very important also, but I have not dealt with that, as to whether the three Army Corps in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief were sufficient for the wants of the country. That is another point; but I have not touched that.

8994. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You assume they are sufficient?—I assumed they were sufficient before this Boer War.

8995. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Up to a certain extent we have more than the three Army Corps properly equipped for service at once?—I think the Commander-in-Chief should certify that these three Army Corps could be put into the field at once.

8996. They have been accepted by the Government?—Yes.

8997. You do not bring up the question of their sufficiency or insufficiency, but are they equipped?—Yes, are they available at a moment's notice?

8998. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Where a discussion might come in would be as to their fitness for taking the field, and there can be no doubt that very often there would be a divergence of opinion between the Commander-in-Chief and Members of the Cabinet as to what constituted fitness at that time?—You mean the individual fitness of the men?

8999. No; chiefly armament?—That is another point. He could easily bring forward that in a different form.

9000. Would that be included in your certificate or not?—I do not think so.

9001. The words "Fit for taking the field" imply that they are thoroughly well armed?—Yes, up to modern requirements.

9002. Did you intend in your idea to include armament?—Well, I meant that they were to be thoroughly and efficiently armed according to the best modern ideas.

9003. And that is just the point where a discrepancy would occur between the views of the Commander-in-Chief and the Cabinet?—I do not think so.

9004. There is some discrepancy in these memoranda?—As regards the armament?

9005. Yes; a difference of opinion between yourself and the Secretary of State?—As regards the guns for the Militia and Volunteers—they are a disgrace.

9006. My contention is that if the Government had a small majority of, say, 20 in the House of Commons, as we have seen the case, on a bad certificate the Government would go?—Would it not be a very good thing if they did under those circumstances?

9007. (*Chairman.*) I understand that your certificate, although it would not deal with increases that the Commander-in-Chief might think necessary to the Army, would deal with all questions as to the proper guns or proper equipment of various kinds, and that his certificate, if he was of opinion that they were not the most modern form of gun or equipment, would so bear?—I fancy those questions of the character of the arms in the hands of the troops would be a point that every Commander-in-Chief would take up constantly and bring to the notice of the Secretary of State, but it would not be dealt with in the certificate I propose.

9008. Supposing it was brought up with the Secretary of State, and you did not come to an agreement with him, what would you put in your certificate?—Nothing, unless I found there was something very glaring. We have got a very good arm for the Infantry at the present moment, but in five or ten years there may be an invention of a better arm, and yet the difference between the two arms will not be so enormously marked as to warrant you immediately in sweeping off all the arms you have got and re-arming the whole Infantry afresh. It is a question of degree with regard to all arms.

9009. With regard to those Militia guns, for instance?—But they are Noah's Ark guns. They are things of a past generation.

9010. You would not sign the certificate now unless those guns were replaced?—No; but as regards my three Army Corps, they would not come into it. The thing I want to get is the small end of the wedge, at any rate. I want to get this one point before the country, that these three Army Corps are complete and ready.

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9011. But you restrict yourself to the three Army Corps, and you leave out the Militia and Volunteers?—I would like to include them too.

9012. But if you did you would have to settle these outstanding questions about the armaments?—Yes, you would have to go in for loans in the same way as the £11,000,000.

9013. There are many ways in which it might be done?—The certificate is an annual one to the country. It certifies to the country, and the country can go to sleep, feeling that there are three Army Corps fully equipped, assuming that three Army Corps is the amount that the Government in consultation with their best military advisers have laid down as sufficient for the defence of this country, backed up by the Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry; for remember these three Army Corps are not sufficient by themselves.

9014. May I go back to the point from which we diverged?—If the Commander-in-Chief thought that owing to the other calls on the Army abroad he had not enough Regulars at home to keep up the drafts—which is, as you say, one of the main principles, and therefore there must be an increase of the Regulars of the Army—that is a question which he would take up separately with the Secretary of State, and which would not come in any way into the certificate at all?—No, I think not. I should be satisfied with the certificate. Of course, I would like to go beyond that certificate, I tell you candidly; but my object would be attained if that certificate was allowed, because I should then know that we had these three Army Corps ready to defend this country.

9015. Then it might amount to this, that the Commander-in-Chief would give a certificate in the form you have described, and yet there might be questions pending between him and the Secretary of State with regard to the actual numbers of the Army which the Commander-in-Chief would think insufficient at the same time that he signed the certificate to Parliament?—Yes, that is quite possible.

9016. That certificate, therefore, would, I suppose, be sent with the Estimates or at that time?—The certicate that I refer to?

9017. Yes?—Yes, because it would be addressed to Parliament.

9018. And it would really be a matter of account to show that the equipment of the forces detailed in the minutes had been in your opinion provided?—Yes, that the men and all the equipments and stores, the military clothing, and everything that was required, to the last button—transport and everything—were ready; not that they were all on the spot, but that we could get transport, as, for instance, in the case of the 14,000 horses we had as a reserve at the beginning of this war which were called in.

9019. It would not give any assurance to the people of this country that, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, the Army was adequate for the requirements of the country?—No.

9020. (*Viscount Esher.*) It would be like the report of an auditor?—It would be exactly like the report of an auditor. That is the word I was trying to remember.

9021. Do you think you could draw up for the Commission the form of such a certificate, that if you were Commander-in-Chief you would be prepared to give, taking your own basis of 1888?—Oh yes, I will do that with pleasure. (*For form of certificate see Question* 9196.)

9022. (*Sir John Edge.*) Supposing the Government decided that of the three Army Corps one was to be composed partly of Militia, how would you deal then with your certificate if the Militia armament was imperfect?—I would say it was not perfect; I would say there were only two and a half Army Corps perfect instead of three.

9023. It would be necessary to say that, otherwise your certificate would mislead the country?—Naturally; I would follow the recommendations laid down on the 8th June, 1888. That is the basis we went upon, and it was the minimum.

9024. I only wanted to see how you would deal with

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that particular case, because you were putting it as three Army Corps backed up by the Militia and Volunteers outside the Army Corps, and only certifying as to the Army Corps, and I was putting the case to you of the Government having decided that one of the Army Corps should be partly composed of Militia?—That is so.

9025. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You would simply certify to the actual facts of the case at that moment?—Yes, as an auditor.

9026. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Need the certificate say more than this: "I hereby certify that the three Army Corps of regular troops are fully equipped and are ready for service at a moment's notice, and that the two Army Corps of those three are prepared for embarkation," or words to that effect? That might be the whole certificate?—Almost all, I think; of course, you might amplify it to much more useful purposes.

If the certificate you refer to is given with regard to the three Army Corps and the two to go abroad, you would have to make some reference to the places where the two Army Corps were to be sent, because there might be a difference if they were to be sent to different countries.

9027. (*Sir John Edge.*) That might be awkward, if you were not actually at war?—Yes; but you would have to certify to the best of your ability; if you will allow me, I will do what Lord Esher suggested, and send in a draft of what I consider would be the necessary certificate. (*The form of certificate is shown in Question* 9196.)

9028. (*Chairman.*) What is your next point?—Do you wish me to dwell any further upon the fact that we found great difficulty in obtaining stores? Is that at all necessary, because I would like to call attention to some official minutes sent to me by Sir Henry Brackenbury, unless you have already examined him upon all these points.

9029. Sir Henry Brackenbury gave us full evidence on that subject, and, in fact, read the minutes on the subject to us?—Then I have very little more to say, and all the other things are rather more in the form of suggestions based upon opinions that I have long entertained; they are not very long, and you might like to hear them. Looking back to the time when the war hung in the balance during the summer of 1899, I feel that national interests suffered because the Commander-in-Chief was not brought into direct and constant touch with the Cabinet. He had no opportunity of learning from day to day the collective views of the Cabinet upon the position in South Africa, and he could only obtain a glimpse of its policy and its views, and on the other hand the Members of the Cabinet only learnt his military opinions upon the position from day to day through a third party, the Civilian Secretary of State for War. In other words, the Cabinet generally, as a body, were not brought into contact with any military opinion whatever during the progress of the war.

9030. So far as you knew?—So far as I knew, and, of course, I was the military adviser of the Cabinet at the time.

9031. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Would you not say "Any responsible military opinion," because I have no doubt they were flooded?—They may have been by outside opinion, but I am talking of "responsible" opinions; I quite agree with you.

9032. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Did you attend the meetings of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet? I have been to one or two; I may have been to more, but not many.

9033. During that long period when the Boer war was pending, the last two years particularly, after the Raid did you only attend one or two meetings?—I could not tell you offhand, but I was very seldom at them.

9034. (*Viscount Esher.*) With regard to what Sir Henry Norman said, you have no reason to suppose that the Cabinet asked officially for any other military opinion except your own?—None.

9035. (*Chairman.*) What I meant was that any written opinion of yours might be before the Cabinet without your knowledge?—Yes; or without my being there to explain my meaning. As far as I can express my opinion, and I do so merely, perhaps as a prejudiced soldier, I think it is a great national mistake, and I might almost say a national folly, to entrust the control of our military affairs during war to any civilian, no matter how brilliant his talents may be. But that is a very big question connected with the constitution of our country, and it may be absolutely impossible for us to follow the example of every other nation in the world except America, which has only a very trifling Army of 30,000 men altogether; but every nation that I have ever heard of, every civilised nation, has a soldier to superintend and look after the military affairs of that nation. And I cannot understand why we should positively say we object to that. If we do object to that, and if it is supposed to be the case that we cannot possibly have a soldier as the Secretary of State for War, then the only alternative I have to suggest is that, certainly during war time, the Commander-in-Chief should be a member of the Cabinet. That is the only half-measure which I think would secure to the country the direct influence upon the Cabinet and the rulers of the country during a war, of a soldier, a man who is a professional soldier, a man whose life has been spent in trying to master this very complicated question of war. In no other way that I can think of, can a collective body, like a large Cabinet, obtain and be brought to realise what are the military views as to the condition of things in any particular phase of a campaign. Such a result is not possible unless the Cabinet is brought into something like constant touch and contact with the Commander-in-Chief, and the more the Commander-in-Chief of the time being is regarded as the colleague by those in the Cabinet, the more effect it would have, and the better it would be for the country.

9036. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Do you say only during war?—No; I say that it is a great mistake, a serious inconvenience at all times that the Commander-in-Chief should not be in the Cabinet, as I have described, and that in time of war it is a positive misfortune to the nation.

9037. And the preparations for war are almost as important as war itself?—Yes; you might include them too.

9038. (*Chairman.*) In what way would you bring the Commander-in-Chief into the Cabinet, which is a political body?—Is not that the same case in France, and is it not the same case in Germany, and in all the great countries I know which have Parliamentary institutions?

9039. In the case of France, is there a Commander-in-Chief in the Cabinet?—There is no Commander-in-Chief in France, but there is a soldier Minister of War, who is, of course, in the Cabinet.

9040. The War Minister in France, although I believe lately he has been a soldier, is not necessarily a soldier?—I think the only instance where he was not a soldier was one where he was a very great failure, and he lasted only a short time. I am talking of since the Revolution.

9041. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You propose that the Commander-in-Chief should be *ex officio* a Member of the Cabinet of any Government that might be in existence—he would be non-political, but a Member of the Privy Council, and could thus also be *ex officio* a Member of the Cabinet?—Yes, that would be to a very great extent a step in the right direction; it would not go so far as I would like to see it, but even that would be an enormous improvement on the present condition, which, I think, is dangerous to the country—it is keeping the Commander-in-Chief, the man you look to for advice on military subjects, apart from the body of men who are actually governing the country at the moment.

9042. Everything being entirely confidential within the Cabinet, you think he could be a Member of the Cabinet *ex officio*?—That would be the lowest position you can safely give him. The best arrangement would be to do away with the Commander-in-Chief altogether, and to have a Military Minister of War, as they have in all the great nations of the world—they are not fools remember—England does not contain all the wisdom of the earth, and the other Great European nations have their Minister of War, but no Commander-in-Chief, except the nominal Commander in-Chief, the Sovereign. They have such Commanders-in-Chief as we might have here, a man commanding in Ireland, another in Scotland, and another in England.

9043. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) And in that case he would go out with the Cabinet?—If you like, yes.

9044. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Would you not confine

his attendance at the Cabinet to occasions when war matters were being discussed?—I should not like to do that, because I assume that the Military Member of the Cabinet, being a military man, would be a sensible man, and assuming he is a sensible man, I think it would be quite certain that he would not like to mix himself up with politics. I think, however, it would be a mistake to draw a big line of cleavage, and say to him: "You are to go out of the door now because we are to talk of a matter of a different sort."

9045. (*Chairman.*) There is another difficulty there also, because the subjects intermix?—Yes.

9046. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Such as discussions on the negotiations with the Boers in 1896, 1897, and 1898?—Yes.

9047. Undoubtedly, on those occasions under the other scheme the Commander-in-Chief would have been asked to retire, because there was no actual question of war, of course?—Yes.

9048. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You would not have the Commander-in-Chief discussing education questions, for instance?—I do not suppose he would want to do that himself.

9049. (*Viscount Esher.*) He might be forced by the necessities of the case to take one side or another in a Cabinet Division?—In a Division in the Cabinet itself—Yes, if it was thought necessary.

9050. (*Sir John Edge.*) Would it not place him in a very great difficulty, supposing that the question which arose in the Cabinet was during the Bloemfontein Conference as to whether we should put pressure on, or whether we should not put pressure on, and then as to the results, whether there was any necessity for sending out men to the Cape, and whether we should send out three Army Corps or one: Would not that really force him to take a side in politics to a certain extent?—Yes, if you call that politics, but I think when we are talking of politics generally, in a case like that, we mean party politics. The great questions of peace and war scarcely come under such a head.

9051. (*Chairman.*) I understood you to say that you would favour an arrangement by which the head of the Army was the War Minister, who might go out with the party to which he belonged?—Yes, if the party coming in wished to get rid of him, certainly.

9052. Might not that be rather a disadvantage to the Army?—His going out?

9053. Yes; possibly constant changes, and possibly his retention of office being determined not so much by his efficiency for Army matters as by other considerations?—You see, at the present moment, all our offices in the Army are held for five years, and Governments generally last but for six, do they not?

9054. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) I thought you favoured the Commander-in-Chief being non-political?—I think so; I think it would be a most injudicious thing to make him a politician, or that he should make himself a politician.

9055. Then he would not go out with the Ministry; he might be a member of any Ministry?—He might, or might not; it would depend upon circumstances.

9056. (*Sir John Edge.*) If he did not go out he would carry all the secrets of the out-going Cabinet into the in-coming Cabinet, which would certainly be a very awkward position for him?—Well, that does not hurt my general recommendation, because I base my recommendation on the practice of all the great European Powers.

9057. Your recommendation really comes to this: That the Commander-in-Chief should have the opportunity of going before the Cabinet and placing his own views on all Imperial subjects before the Cabinet?—I think he ought to be a member of the Cabinet, in order that he should do so with commensurate weight.

9058. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Would it not serve practically the same purpose if there was a real Defence Committee of the Cabinet, and he were a member of it?—Then the other members of the Cabinet do not hear his story.

9059. Still, I think a real Defence Committee of the Cabinet would carry everything that they wanted in the way of national defences?—I do not think it would be as effective as the other; but any improvement would be thankfully received.

9060. (*Sir John Edge.*) Would it not be sufficient for you if the Commander-in-Chief had the right of going before the Cabinet and expressing his views, not taking part in the debate, but putting his views personally before the Cabinet as a body?—I think that would be a great improvement.

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9061. That would keep him clear of all questions of politics?—I do not see why, when it works well in every other part of the world, it should not work with us.

9062. You really want, not that one particular Minister, or the Ministers, who constitute the Defence Committee of the Cabinet should alone know the Commander-in-Chief's views, and the reasons for them, but that every member of the Cabinet should hear his views?—Yes, and I think the fact of the Commander-in-Chief being a member of the Cabinet would steady him a great deal; he would know the working of the Cabinet and the conditions of the country, and he would be in a much better position to express valuable military opinions than if he were an outsider.

9063. (*Chairman.*) Of course, all the Cabinet would get under those circumstances would be the opinion of the one officer—I speak with all respect in your presence—who is serving as Commander-in-Chief; is not that so?—They would only get one.

9064. Would it not be of advantage to the Government to be able to get a collective opinion?—I do not believe in collective opinions but I believe if the Commander-in-Chief was not up to the mark you would be quite right to get somebody else to give you their opinion also. A board is the very worst possible government for anything in war.

9065. We have heard of the meetings of the Army Board, to which you have referred several times, and at that Army Board, as I understand it, collective opinions were arrived at by the heads of all the great Departments in the War Office under the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief; would not the opinion of a body like that be very valuable if it was put forward for reference to the Cabinet, if necessary?—It really depends on who your Commander-in-Chief is; if your Commander-in-Chief is a weak man, yes; but if he is supposed to be an expert, as he ought to be, I would sooner have the opinion of one man than I would have collective opinions. If he was a very strong man, and a man generally recognised as a man of superior military ability, your board would recommend what he recommended to begin with, and I do not think you would get anything fresh from them.

9066. A good many of us have had experience of a board, and I should have thought it was possible for a man to be president of a board and to be a man of some worth, and yet not to have all the expert opinion which his colleagues might prepare, and the collective opinion might be of very material value?—That is as to details. I thought you were talking of great matters like peace and war. That is a matter of life and death sometimes to the country.

9067. Peace and war I imagine in all cases would be determined by the Government of the country?—Yes.

9068. But the specific opinion from the authorities at the head of the Army would be given on what you could scarcely call matters of detail, I should think—the organisation of the Army, the nature of the armament, and various other things of that kind?—But that is worked out by military boards.

9069. It does not at present take a collective shape which could be used effectively for the advice of the Cabinet, does it?—I think so, because it is always recorded.

9070. Where does it find expression?—In the Army Board; you have only to look at the Army Board's opinions.

9071. The Army Board, I believe, was very active during the war, but it only came into existence on the 13th July, 1899?—The Mobilisation Committee had existed before that, and it was only another name for the Mobilisation Committee.

9072. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) We had it in evidence that from 1877, when there was friction with a certain Power, and when it met once or twice, to June, 1899, the Confidential Committee on Mobilisation never met at all?—The Mobilisation Committee met, and there are printed proceedings of their meetings.

9073. (*Chairman.*) Surely it is the case that until July, 1899, there was not so organised an Army

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Board of the heads of departments under the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief as there was after that date?—No; I thought it began in 1898 myself—the Mobilisation Committee.

9074. These (*exhibiting a print*) are the minutes, and the first date is the date I have given you. It is called the Commander-in-Chief's Committee, and it became the Army Board afterwards?—That is in 1899. I thought it was in 1898. Would you let Sir Coleridge Grove explain that? (*Sir Coleridge Grove.*) It is rather complicated, as there were two Army Boards, and one succeeded another.

9075. We are quite aware of that?—Then you will know the whole history of them. First of all, there was an Army Board, which met to consider promotion and selection, and such questions as might be referred to it by the Secretary of State; it had no initiative with regard to any question, but questions were referred to it by the Secretary of State. Then when the war was going on there was the Commander-in-Chief's Committee, which used to meet in his own room to consider mobilisation questions and the preparation for war.

9076. But obviously the first one did not answer the definition which I gave to the Board I was speaking of; it had no initiative, and it met for very limited purposes?—That is so, only the term, "Army Board," it so happened, applied to it; then there came the Army Mobilisation Board, in which the Commander-in-Chief's Committee was merged, and that is the Board which began its sittings, I forget exactly when, but about the middle of 1899.

9077. It was the 13th July, 1899?—Yes, only there was an Army Board existing before that.

9078. I know that, but it was not the true predecessor of this one?—No.

9079. It was only this one, and the character assumed under this one, that I was speaking of, and I wanted to put it that the proceedings of that Board led up to a certain collective opinion, which I can conceive would be of very great value, and, even with all deference, might be considered comparable to the opinion of a single officer holding the office of Commander-in-Chief?—(*Viscount Wolseley.*) That is quite possible; you have to get the best men you can to give you the opinions. With reference to this particular question I am talking about, it is like a sick man calling in a number of quacks the one after the other, and then at last the professional doctor is called in, and he is, perhaps, called in too late, and I look upon the professional man as the best soldier you can find to give you advice.

TWENTY-FIRST DAY.

Friday, 28th November 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable The Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable The Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

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Field-Marshal the Right Hon. the VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., and Major-General Sir COLERIDGE GROVE, K.C.B., further examined.

9080. (*Chairman.*) (*To Viscount Wolseley.*) In your evidence yesterday, I think, that so far, at any rate, as the examination in chief is concerned, you have gone very completely into the questions regarding the military preparations for the war and the stores in reserve and so on, and also in connection with matters in the organisation of the War Office, to which you wished to call our attention. I would not desire to trouble you further, so far as I am concerned, on those points, but there remains, and I think we endeavoured to bring them out in the short memorandum that we sent you of points for consideration, the consideration of any lessons, if I may so call them, to be derived from the war, on which I think it would be expected that we should obtain, if possible, from you, as a high authority and as Commander-in-Chief at the time, any opinions that you might have formed. Before you speak to them, I should first like to inform you of two opinions which the Commission have formed in regard to that matter. In the first place, with regard to questions of strategy and tactics, we do not think we should be serving any useful purpose if we endeavoured to pass any judgment upon points of that kind constituted as we are; and also on any questions in which the personal conduct of officers has been enquired into and adjudicated upon by proper military authority, we do not think it would come within our sphere to pass judgment again on those matters either. But, of course, it is necessary, or it may be necessary for anybody who desires to inform us as to the military results on either side, and the lessons to be deduced from them, to touch upon any one or more of those points, and we would not wish to throw any obstacle in the way if you find it necessary to do so; subject, of course, if you will allow me to impress it upon you, that we shall not deal with it in any other way than the manner I have described. What I would ask you to consider, therefore, is whether there are any things connected with the steps taken in connection with the war which have induced you to form opinions about mistakes, shall we say, that have occurred, and the causes to which those were due—as regards the quality of the men, the quality of the stores, or in any other respects. That is the sort of general line that I should like to indicate to you, as you asked me to do last night?—Before I say anything upon those points—I do not wish to say very much upon them—after I went away yesterday evening, I thought I might have conveyed to the Commission an impression that during the course of the war I ever attempted, as Commander-in-Chief, to exercise any control whatever over the operations in the field. I never did.

9081. I quite understood you to say that?—That is a point I hoped you would be clear about. In thinking it over since then I came upon a work which General Von Moltke published, and that I should like to refer to on that very point.

9082. Certainly?—It is to be found in the introduction to the "Official Account of the Franco-German War," page 50, Volume 1. He says: "No plan of operations can with any safety include more than the first collision with the enemy's main body. It is only the laity who believe that they can trace throughout the course of a campaign the prosecution of the original plan arranged beforehand in all its details, and

observed to the very close. The Commander-in-Chief" (that is not the Commander-in-Chief as he exists in this country; but he meant by the Commander-in-Chief the General Commanding in the field of operations) "most undoubtedly will, in spite of the changing fortunes of war, always have the main object of the campaign before his eyes; but the means by which he hopes to attain it cannot be sketched out with certainty beforehand." I was very glad to have this quotation to read to you, because it describes the lines within which, from the first, I thought I ought to confine my duties as Commander-in-Chief with reference to this war. The duties that I conceived devolved upon the Commander-in-Chief were to supply the men required, and, of course, with the men, so far as possible, to supply also whatever was required for those troops in the way of military stores, ammunition, etc., pointing out to you that as regards those provisions of stores and ammunition the constitution of the War Office at the time I was Commander-in-Chief took away from the officer who holds that position in the Army very much of the control of those affairs. As I suppose every one of the Commission is aware, when I was Commander-in-Chief, the War Office was divided into four great departments—the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the Director-General of Ordnance. Now, of all those four officers not one of them was an officer belonging to the Commander-in-Chief; they were all officers belonging, I might say, to the Secretary of State for War, and went to him, and saw him without any sort of knowledge whatever of the Commander-in-Chief. They were, in fact, to a very great extent, each a sort of water-tight compartment of the War Office. I am glad to say that, from personal knowledge of all the officers concerned at the heads of those departments, they were all old colleagues of mine, and I do not think in any single instance they ever kept from me personally anything that they told to the Secretary of State for War. I have no complaint to urge against them whatever; they were most loyal to me throughout; they invariably told me, when sent for by the Secretary of State for War, what the Secretary of State for War had said to them. But, as I conceive the duties of a man in the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Army, especially an Army constituted as ours is, scattered all over the world, it is most essential that all the military functionaries carrying out the various duties in connection with the Army should be absolutely staff officers of the Commander-in-Chief, and not of the Secretary of State for War, unless you adopt the course that I pointed out to you yesterday, which I think is the true course, which is to have the Secretary of State for War a soldier himself.

9083. I quite understand that that was your position?—Of course, since that, in one of the functions there has been a change, I believe. I have not followed all the changes that have taken place. I do not really know what has been going on in the War Office or the Army at all since I left it, but I know that in regard to one of those officers, the Adjutant-General, there has been a change in relation to the discipline of the Army which I always complained of, so much being taken out of the hands of the Commander-in-Chief and being put into the hands of a subordinate officer responsible to the Secretary of State—that is the Adjutant-General. That has been annulled, and now the discipline of the Army has once more gone back into the charge of the Commander-in-Chief. I suppose you have had before you, or have seen, a paper that I drew up very shortly before I left office; in fact, as I was leaving office I was desired by her late Majesty the Queen to do so. She personally told me to do so, and it was not done from any motion on my own part; she desired it herself, as she took a very great interest in all these things, and she asked me, as I was going to leave, if I would put on paper for her information what I conceived to be the position of affairs in the War Office, of which, so far as she was aware, she did not approve. Accordingly, I wrote the paper, which I think is an official paper—I know it is, because it was presented to Parliament. In that paper you see the answers that were given by the late Secretary of State and also the present one; but, having carefully read them over again last night, because I had never seen the last one until last night—the one from Mr. Brodrick—I cannot say that in any way whatever they meet the points which I called attention to in the paper I wrote for the Queen. I would like to make it very clear to everyone here that the explanations that they give of my paper do not meet the main point that I make out in my paper, or tried to make out, which was the absolute necessity of making the Commander-in-Chief supreme in the Army. Whether you make him a subordinate or not to the Secretary of State for War, whatever may be the position you give him, he must be, according to my notions of Army matters, supreme upon Army matters within certain limits, that is, outside questions of increased expenditure that must be dealt with by the Secretary of State for War. I do not know whether I have made my meaning quite clear.

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9084. Yes; I think I quite understand. May I just refer for one moment to the extract you read from General Von Moltke, because I think you have quoted it in consequence of some questions that I asked you. I, of course, so far as I am concerned in putting those questions, never meant to suggest that the Commander-in-Chief at home would deal in detail, as he says, with the operations of a war; but I did think (and I do not think that the extract you have read contraverts that opinion) that a force sent out from the country might go with a scheme of operations generally speaking, and with some sort of instructions to the General in Command. I should have imagined that General Von Moltke, as Chief of the Staff of the German Army, in sending out a force, certainly would have sent it out with some general plan of operations from his office?—You must remember the very great difference that there is in sending an expeditionary force thousands of miles out to the Cape of Good Hope, quite away from all touch with home, and merely invading a country like Bohemia, or an adjoining country like France, from Germany.

9085. My main object was to elicit your opinion—first, as to what happened, and, secondly, as to what ought to happen, and I have received it?—You see, the very moment that the man sent out to command the troops in South Africa arrived there, he had to take things as he found them. But before Sir Redvers Buller went out, he had discussed with me many times the various problems that might require to be solved immediately: he could not know even then what might be before him. But the two great problems to be decided with regard to the war in South Africa were, first of all, how you would invade the two States. Of course, we were for some time left in uncertainty, as I tried to point out yesterday, whether we should have to fight both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. I confess, in dealing with that question, so far as I can express the opinion of our best soldiers at the time, and several of them knew South Africa, we all felt from the first that we should have to fight those two Powers, not the Transvaal only; but that did not seem to be, as I tried to prove yesterday from quotations from Lord Lansdowne's minutes, the exact impression of the Government at the moment. But at any rate, the question pointed out and discussed by Sir Redvers Buller with me very often before he started was the line of invasion to be adopted: whether he should advance directly to the north from Cape Colony and across the Orange River, to make for Bloemfontein. We all felt that the great object, the strategical point to aim at, was the occupation of Bloemfontein. It really was the great objective of any campaign in that part of the world. An invading Army, as ours was, should have advanced across the Orange River by one of the great railway bridges leading to Bloemfontein: not where it was eventually crossed, at the Orange River Station, but where the direct railway ran from Cape Town to Bloemfontein. If our advancing Army had caught hold of, and obtained possession of that railway, and advanced upon Bloemfontein, such an advance would inevitably have relieved Ladysmith on the right hand and Kimberley on the left. The Boers must have concentrated to defend Bloemfontein in the first instance, and then to protect the country from any further invasion. That was the main feature of the campaign that was in my mind at that time, and, as I thought, in the mind of Sir Redvers Buller also, although he did diverge from it afterwards owing to what he thought was the immediate pressure brought to bear upon him for the relief of Ladysmith. But the direct march upon Bloemfontein was the great feature of the projected campaign, or, if I might so call it, the strategical plan. I am glad to bring this to your notice, to show you how impossible it is, or would be, for any man, no matter who (even for Von Moltke, were he in this country) to have laid down beforehand in such a war, what were to be the operations to be

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absolutely followed, or the main line of communications to be adopted during the campaign.

9086. But the strategical plan was, as you say, to advance to Bloemfontein?—By the direct railway to Bloemfontein.

9087. And though that apparently was not formulated, it was discussed between you and the officer in command?—No doubt, amongst many other conversations with Sir Redvers Buller, but his hands were left absolutely untrammelled.

9088. He may not have had instructions from you, but he had advice?—He knew my opinion, and I believe thought likewise. He was quite as cognizant of it as I was; no man, I am sure, felt it more than he did then.

9089. That it was the proper way of advance, supposing the Orange Free State should join with the Transvaal?—Yes, because for a considerable time, whilst it was uncertain as to whether the Orange Free State would or would not, there was a great question as to whether we should force the neutrality of the Orange Free State, so necessary was it, we thought, to advance along those open plains, instead of over that great range of mountains, the Drakensberg, which is a very difficult line of mountains indeed to force.

9090. Of course, when Sir Redvers Buller was at Cape Town, there was no longer any dubiety about the position of the Orange Free State, because they had declared war?—Yes, they had declared war.

9091. Therefore, except for other considerations, he would have adopted that scheme of operations?—I presume he would.

9092. But the course he took was entirely, according to your view, within his discretion, as the General Officer Commanding on the spot?—Yes. I think that illustrates what I was trying to impress, the impossibility of laying down the line of campaign at such a distance from the scene of operations, or of controlling the General in Command in any way whatever. He exercised his own discretion entirely. I do not think I knew of it beforehand even. I may have known a few hours or a day before he was going (but I do not remember that I did), that he had made up his mind that it was absolutely necessary to go round to Ladysmith.

9093. And it is the position that you take up, that that was the proper course; that he should not be trammelled in any way by the Commander-in-Chief at home?—Certainly; it would be impossible—it would be fatal to try and control him in any way. The movement made by Sir Redvers Buller, when he transferred his headquarters from Cape Colony to Natal, was entirely done off his own bat, and entirely done by his own inspiration, and his own view of the condition of things at the time. And I am not criticising, remember, the decision that he came to in any way.

9094. You do not wish to criticise it?—No; I should prefer not criticising the operations of all the officers that took place; they would be very long and deep criticisms, and, perhaps, of very little value—at any rate, I have no wish to criticise any operations that took place. If you ask me any questions, of course, I will tell you whether I could answer them or not.

9095. As you know, the third term of our reference is as to the military operations up to the time of the occupation of Pretoria. It is a very wide expression, but I suppose it might be taken to include questions of that kind, and, if we are to put questions of that kind, I do not see anybody whom we could more properly put them to than yourself?—It is a very invidious task after the war to come forward and speak quite plainly your views, because there would be no use in any half expressions of opinion, giving one half, the other half being kept back, if your opinion is asked whether you conceive that the operations, as they were carried out when the Army crossed the Orange River, or whether there were delays, or whether there were circumstances with which experienced soldiers would find fault. I think that would be rather invidious for one officer to do to another. I have no longer any connection with the Army, you see, and I should dislike it myself; but if you would put any question to me in the concrete, I would be very glad to tell you at once whether I would like to answer it or not.

9096. I may say that, personally, I have great sympathy with what you have just said. I do not see much advantage to be got by detailed criticism. At the same time, of course, we shall be criticised if we do not get out any material facts, which caused the war to be either prolonged or to be more costly in men or otherwise?—Those questions could be best put to the officers concerned by a skilled soldier, if I might say so, by a man who understood thoroughly, and was quite *au fait* with the great principles of strategy, which are unchangeable.

9097. Quite so; but, then, as we cannot ourselves alter the constitution of the Commission, and we are bound, those of us who are laymen, to deal with the matter somehow, the next best thing to do is to appeal to an officer, like yourself, who was in supreme command at the time here, to vindicate if there is anything special to which you think our attention ought to be directed in this matter ——

9098. (*Viscount Esher.*) But the moment you say that you do not consider that you would have been justified in interfering with the operations of Sir Redvers Buller or the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, do you think there can be any public advantage in your now criticising their plan of operations?—From my point of view, I do not, because I think it would be an invidious thing to do. That is my only reason. The history of this war will be written by some outsider, I hope, eventually, not an official one, and treated by some man in a position to criticise, and who I have, no doubt, will freely criticise. I do not disguise at all that there were a great many circumstances in the war that I think are very much open to criticism, but I should not like to come forward merely in my present position to be the man who should criticise them. At the same time, if any question is asked of me, I shall be very glad, either to answer it in full to the best of my ability, or else to say I would prefer not to express any opinion about it.

(*The witnesses withdrew, and the Commission deliberated in private.*)

9099. (*Chairman*) (*To Viscount Wolseley.*) The Commission have considered the very important point raised by you in your last answers to us, and I am to say from them that we quite accept the position that, as Commander-in-Chief, you did not interfere, and properly did not interfere, with the operations on the spot. Further, we should not wish to ask you questions as Commander-in-Chief with regard to the conduct of individual officers, but we do desire to have from you your opinion, as one of the highest military experts that we can hope to have before us, on one or two outstanding points in connection with the war; but to follow out your desires—and, I may say, desires with which we sympathise—we wish to limit them as strictly as possible. The first question, therefore, that I want to put to you specifically is: Did you, at the time when Sir Redvers Buller deviated from the plan which you told us you had discussed with him of an advance from Cape Colony direct upon Bloemfontein, form any distinct opinion that he was right or that he was wrong in abandoning that scheme, and in place of it himself going to Natal and sending Lord Methuen to Kimberley?—In the first place I should like to say that in the discussion and the discussions that I had with Sir Redvers Buller before he left, with reference to the general outline of the plan for operations, that were evidently in the future, that were coming, I do not wish to say for a moment that it was ever recognised by him as the absolute plan that he ought to adopt—that advance on Bloemfontein; but it was the plan that was always in my mind as the one operation by which the war could be brought to a speedy conclusion. I do not for a moment say that he accepted all the views I gave him, because he never expressed any opinion that I am aware of about them; but, so far as my memory goes, and so far as his general line of conversation with me went, he certainly left upon me the impression that he believed in the same plan that I did. I think I should not like to make it stronger than that, but that was quite convincing enough to me that he went away from this country intending to cross the Orange River somewhere in the neighbourhood of the bridges—the railway bridges which led to Bloemfontein.

9100. Then my question is, was he right or was he wrong in not doing so, but in going to Natal, and sending Lord Methuen to advance on Kimberley?—In the answer that I gave you also about that I said that

I did not remember that he had spoken of that in his writings or in his telegrams. I think he did mention in some of his telegrams, which arrived before he left Cape Colony, that he was going to do so-and-so, but it did not come like a shot out of the blue when he told us he was going to Natal. Without looking at the papers I could not tell you, but I should think the telegrams which you must have from him on the point will tell you exactly the date when he communicated to the Government his intention of leaving Cape Colony and going to Natal.

9101. No doubt we can find information about the dates, but the question is, whether you formed a judgment, as a military expert, at the time that that course was right or was wrong?—Well, I thought it was wrong, but I never told him so. I did not think it was my business to do so; it would have been improper for me to do so.

9102. That is what we want to know?—It was a misappreciation of the position, and it was a departure from what I conceived and understood to be the line of operations that he intended to adopt, which was that line, as I told you, which was the main line, *the line* by which the war could have been brought to a speedy end by a direct advance along by Aliwal; but that was what caused all the subsequent delay to Lord Roberts on the way to Bloemfontein. The destruction of all his cavalry and transport forces, in getting from the Kimberley line over to the Bloemfontein line, arose from the fact that the advance was not made direct to Bloemfontein at the time.

9103. And that was your judgment at the time that the alteration was made?—Yes.

9104. The Commission also wish me to ask the following upon that question: Have you seen any reason subsequently to alter that opinion which you then formed?—None. Everything I have learned since has told me that the line of advance upon Bloemfontein was the true advance, and that any departure from it was dangerous, and certainly prolonged the war.

9105. Then I have to follow that by one other question, and that is one which really follows from what you have just said. Take the next stage of the war, after Lord Roberts assumed the command: Were you of opinion then, and are you still, that the advance ought to have taken place direct, or that the advance as it was actually undertaken was the correct line of advance?—Certainly, his advance by the line he took was, to my mind (I thought so then, and I think so still), the wrong one—that the real line of advance was by the bridges, by either of those, the Aliwal Bridge or the Norval's Pont Bridge, to keep on the line of railway going to Bloemfontein. He then would have been able to feed his Army day by day, all the way he went, whereas, by going by the other line, he had to make that awful march from the Kimberley Railway across to the Bloemfontein Railway, which march, if I may say so, was the cause of the practical destruction of his cavalry and the loss of an enormous amount of transport, and to which I attribute (I have never heard from him that it was the case) the great delay which subsequently took place to the Army when it halted at Bloemfontein, and did not advance.

9106. You asked me to put specific questions, and I have put three?—I hope I have answered them as clearly as you would like me to.

9107. Yes, and is that all you wish to say?—Yes, I wish to avoid details; I have merely told you the broad line.

9108. That is all you wish to say on those three points?—Unless you wish to ask me any other question.

9109. If the line of advance direct to Bloemfontein, which you advocate, had been adopted, do you think it would have ensured the relief of Kimberley?—The relief of Kimberley and also the relief of Ladysmith. I go beyond your question, because, if I might say so, when Bloemfontein was occupied, it relieved Ladysmith. The relief of Ladysmith was effected by Lord Roberts' occupation of Bloemfontein, and had Bloemfontein been occupied earlier by a direct march along the line of railway, from those bridges that I refer to (they were broken, remember, by the enemy, but they could have been repaired), Kimberley on the west would have been relieved, and Ladysmith would have been relieved on the right.

9110. That is your opinion, which I have asked you as a military expert?—Yes, as a matter of strategy I say that certainly.

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9111. Then, if I might go back to what I said at the beginning of the day's proceedings, we should also like very much to hear from you what you think the lessons of the war are with regard to the quality of the men, to take that first?—I think that the men we sent out were the finest that England has ever produced upon any occasion for war; that our officers were more highly instructed, and our men were better trained, than they have ever been at any previous period of our history which I am aware of.

9112. In referring to the quality of the men, I was dealing with the rank and file?—Yes. I say from the point of view of the quality of the men and the education of the officers.

9113. We have had some evidence that the men were full of zeal and endurance and pluck, but that they were somewhat lacking in intelligence. Is that a lesson you would draw from the war?—I think the intelligence of the private soldier keeps pace with the intelligence and education of the people of England

9114. It depends a little upon the class from which you draw them?—The class you get your soldier from is the same, and has always been the same class. Remember he is the worst paid labourer in England. The wages of the private soldier, so far as I know, are the lowest wages that are given to any recognised calling, and therefore you cannot expect for the pay that you offer the private soldier to get a better class of man than you do get.

9115. You think it is a question of money?—Entirely.

9116. But taking things as they stand, we have evidence that the class from which he is drawn is a low class?—It is not so low as it used to be. It is a great mixture, remember; we get all sorts of classes, but the bulk of the men are drawn from the lowest class.

9117. I do not know whether you recollect a memorandum that was drawn up by the present Adjutant-General when he was Inspector-General of Recruiting, which was submitted to you, I think, in August, 1898, but was not published; it was submitted to us by him when he came and gave evidence?—In which he pointed out that we might get better men?

9118. That the class was not at all satisfactory?—Yes, "that we might get better men," his words were, so far as I remember; that is the impression left upon my mind. I remember the paper coming to me quite well, but I cannot remember the particulars of it, except that that was the general drift of what he said. At the same time, I think even he would confess that, taking the Army generally at the very time that he wrote that memorandum, the men as a body were better men than when he entered into the Army—better behaved, fewer crimes, less courts martial, and less drunkenness, and a much larger proportion, of course, could read and write; the great bulk of them could read.

9119. But in the war as it was fought in South Africa, there was a great demand for higher qualities than pluck, endurance, and so on, was there not, more individual fighting, and more call on individual intelligence of the men?—As regards taking cover and being good shots, yes; but I do not know of any other phase. As regards the ordinary duties of a man in action, I do not think there was any extra call upon him for his intelligence.

9120. And you would not think there was any evidence from the operations of the war to increase the demand for such inducements being held out in recruiting, so as to get at a higher class?—Yes, I think so. I think the whole history of our Army for as long as I have known it (and it has been proved to me because I have often brought the thing forward myself) shows that the inducements to men to enlist were not sufficiently high to get a better class of men into it, and that it was most desirable to get a better class of man into it.

9121. And still more desirable under the conditions of modern warfare?—Yes, because I think the soldier requires more self-confidence and more knowledge, and more of that reasoning power, which comes from education.

9122. You say that for entrenchment and cover there were special calls upon them in this war. Does that mean that the training of the men in that respect ought to be altered?—No; I think the men are trained, at

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least so far as I am aware, continually at it—taking cover, to avail themselves of cover. But this is the first time that any army has fought, that I am aware of, with these new rifles, with these new weapons. Even the great Franco-German War was fought with a rifle of much less power, infinitely less power, than the rifles that were in the hands both of the Boers and ourselves in this war, and, of course, with the very great improvement in the offensive weapon naturally calls for different description of tactical skill.

9123. Some witnesses have said that the Regular soldier, if we had to meet him, would in those respects also be a more formidable opponent than even the Boers were?—I believe that throughout, so far as I am able to judge from the stories I know of the war, that, man to man, the English soldier was the better man. He had not the same power of mobility, because he was not mounted, but actually, man for man, he is the better man. And I think it is an exaggeration to imagine that the Boers were even better shots than our men.

9124. And we were told that if we had to meet a trained Regular army, instead of the army that the Boers brought against us, our difficulties and the demands upon our soldiers would be increased?—No, because the Boers were mounted. As regards the tactical skill, I think the tactical skill and training which are given to our men compare very favourably with the instruction in musketry and the instruction in drill that is given to other nations. I might illustrate it in this way: Take the great war of 1870. If either side, either the Germans, or supposing, we might say, the French—as they were the beaten side—had the French been in the same proportion—mounted troops to the Germans—that the Boers were to our Army, the French, I think, would indubitably have won that war. I do not know whether that conveys my impression to you or not. But the great difference between the Boers and our Army, so far as I am able to judge, during the late war, was the fact of their immense power of rapid mobility from one place to another.

9125. Then the argument would be for increasing the mobility of our Army?—Yes, certainly, by mounted infantry.

9126. And that is a change which you think will have to be made?—I think so, from the tendency of modern days. To show you, in fact, that that is the tendency, as I think I mentioned yesterday, the first time that any Regular Army ever took the field with any proportion of mounted infantry was that first Army Corps that was sent abroad, with which we sent 800 men trained as mounted infantry with their horses, and in which in every battalion there was a considerable body of men trained as mounted infantry soldiers ready to go out.

9127. Then in that respect do you think that there ought to be a change in the organisation of our infantry regiments?—Yes, I think they ought to be all well taught to act as mounted infantry without supplying them all with horses. You could easily do that, because the riding part of it is very simple.

9128. A considerable part of our forces in South Africa, as you said yesterday, consisted of Yeomanry and Colonial troops and Volunteers. What is your opinion with regard to the quality of those forces?—There is no doubt that the men who came from the Colonies were first-rate. You could not have any better men in every way. They were handy men, they were men of a superior class to our soldiers certainly, of superior intelligence, and they were almost all mounted troops I might say, because those that came without horses were, as I understand it, given horses after they arrived there, and therefore if you compare them with our troops I should say they were better than any troops that I know of in Europe, not only of our own——

9129. We had one witness before us who said that, admitting the merits of those troops as shown in South Africa, they would never have stood against Regular troops?—Our troops, do you mean?

9130. The auxiliary troops: the Volunteer troops would never have stood against a Regular Army. Is that your opinion?—Do you mean Colonial contingents?

9131. The Yeomanry?—Do you mean our Yeomanry from England?

9132. Yes?—I think it would be unfair to pit them against Regular troops. I do not think they would.

9133. I want to get at how far you regard the troops from the Yeomanry, the Colonial contingents, and the Volunteers, as a real substantial addition to the Regular Army of this country?—I have answered you as regards the Colonial contingents; I think they are superior to anything we have got, or anything the Army has got, so far as I have been able to judge.

9134. Then you do not agree that they would not have stood against Regular troops?—I think the Colonial contingents would have fought anybody, but I should not extend that same expression of opinion to the very large bodies of men we sent out from here. I think we picked them up from the highways and byeways; they were neither able to ride nor shoot, and we sent them out by hundreds, and almost by thousands. I think those poor men would certainly not be able to stand against any Regular troops.

9135. Do you include the Militia and Volunteers in that?—The Volunteers are a force in England I think I know thoroughly well. I have the greatest regard and respect for them. The Volunteer movement has done an immense amount for the Army—it has popularised the Army and made people think of soldiering. But if I am asked my opinion how I should characterise it, it is almost impossible to express an opinion generally about the value of the Volunteers, because it varies so much. There are some corps that are admirable; good shots, drill well, and have a good military spirit; and there are others that are very inferior indeed. As regards the Militia, the material of the Militia is exactly the same material as the men of our battalions as a rule, and all they want is to be better trained, and to be better shots, for they are very bad shots, and they have very little opportunity of learning to shoot; their training is very imperfect, and still more imperfect as regards shooting. And I would even say, without wishing to be offensive to the officers of the Militia, that throughout the Militia the officers are not as well instructed in military matters as our officers, and therefore a Militia battalion can never be usefully compared to an ordinary Line battalion or a Guards battalion.

9136. With regard to the Volunteers, I understand that those who represent the Volunteers would accept the proposition that you put forward at the beginning of the war, that a full regiment of Volunteers could not be sent into the field, but what they maintain is that you can get battalions formed from the Volunteers which would be effective troops?—You mean collected *ad hoc* for the war?

9137. Yes?—But then you would have no military spirit amongst them. After all, the basis of all armies is regimental spirit, *esprit de corps;* take that away from the Army, take that away from the integers of the Army, the battalions, and you will ruin it, I think.

9138. Do you apply that remark to the City Imperial Volunteers?—I think they had great spirit; they were a better class of men as a rule.

9139. But that is exactly the class of men you would get from the Volunteers?—Yes, you would out of some corps, but it is a mistake to imagine that that applies to all corps of Volunteers. But the basis of military efficiency is discipline, and the greater the *esprit de corps* the better the discipline of the battalion. That is my experience of battalions. I hope I do not convey any impression that I wish to depreciate the value of the Volunteer Service, because I attach the very highest and greatest importance to it. It is a magnificent reserve for our Army.

9140. In what way?—In the case of invasion they certainly would be a most valuable adjunct to the Regular troops; they would occupy positions and places of defence. I suppose it is no secret that we have plans for the defence of this country both out of London and at different distances from it, which they would occupy, where they would construct certain works which have been designed already and laid out, and where it would be very difficult indeed to turn them out of. But for a manœuvring Army—that is, an Army with which we would have to tackle a thoroughly disciplined enemy, or to manœuvre with against a Regular Army. I think it would not be fair to call upon the Volunteer Force, such as it is, to do that.

9141. You mentioned the Yeomanry in rather deprecatory terms?—Our own Yeomen, do you mean?

9142. Yes?—The Yeomanry that I have inspected throughout the country for the last good number of years were mostly men who wished to make themselves look like Regular cavalry. Well, it is impossible to make a man into an efficient cavalry soldier under about

two or three years' constant training. He requires to be a good horseman, a good swordsman, and understand rapid drill, and to have many other qualifications that he cannot acquire as rapidly as the infantry soldier can acquire a knowledge of his duties. For a long time, even before I became Commander-in-Chief, it was my endeavour (because I was head of the auxiliary forces of England for some time, two or three years ago) and my ambition to make them into mounted infantry always; but with the exception, I think, of Lord Harris' corps, I am not aware of any corps that ever took it up. They would not listen to it, and when I saw them go through the cavalry sword exercise on horseback, my sympathy was with the horses, whose ears were seriously endangered thereby. It was not because the men had not thrown all the energies they possessed into the work, but with the amount of training they had—six or eight or ten days' training in the year—it was impossible to give them sufficient drill to make them good cavalry soldiers, whereas the training they were called out for would have made them very fairly efficient as mounted infantry, as Lord Harris' corps proves; his men constitute a most effective and efficient corps.

9143. As mounted infantry?—As mounted infantry.

9144. Of course the Yeomanry that went to South Africa did go as mounted infantry?—Eventually they were used as mounted infantry, but if you had asked them when they went, they would have told you that they were Yeomanry cavalry.

9145. They were not equipped with swords, I think?—I think so; I do not fancy I am wrong.

9146. No, they were not?—Were they not?

9147. But, of course, although the existing Yeomanry regiments acted as a nucleus, as you are aware, the Yeomanry that went out to South Africa were recruited outside the actual regiments of Yeomanry?—They were partly, I know. You mean the Imperial Yeomanry?

9148. Yes?—When they took them out, they were never intended to make themselves into cavalry at all: they had no swords.

9149. I was mentioning them, the Imperial Yeomanry?—I beg your pardon.

9150. I do not know that any Yeomanry went, as a body, to South Africa at all. They were all Imperial Yeomanry. I think that the impression at the time, and the impression of some of the evidence is that when the offers of assistance were made on behalf of the Yeomanry, they did not receive much encouragement at the War Office?—I think that is quite possible, because they were not trained then; they had not been trained up to that time to be mounted infantry; in fact, they shot abominably badly; they were armed with an inferior weapon, the carbine, and some regiments I know, from having inspected them, hated going to the butts and shooting. What they wanted to drill as cavalry and do was sword exercise.

9151. But do not let us be under a misunderstanding. I am speaking of the Yeomanry force sent out to South Africa; they were all called Imperial Yeomanry, I think; there was no body of the old established Yeomanry that went out?—No; but I suppose a great number of Yeomen went into it.

9152. About a third, we were told?—Yes.

9153. But at the beginning of October there were applications made to the War Office by Lord Chesham and others to raise a force of Yeomanry, no doubt counting on the county Yeomanry as a nucleus?—He, being a Yeomanry officer himself, and a very good one.

9154. Yes; and what I say is that the impression at the time, I think, and also in the evidence, was, that the War Office did not encourage the idea?—I think, so far as I know, that Lord Lansdowne did certainly, because he made use of them.

9155. Yes, but not at first?—I am reminded that the first notice I got of it officially was, that the matter was brought before the Army Board by Mr. Wyndham. He proposed that we should make use of the Yeomanry force, and the feelings of those present were all entirely in favour of it.

9156. Do you know of what date you are speaking?—I cannot say, but it was on Lord Chesham's proposal.

9157. After it?—When he proposed it.

9158. At the time of Lord Chesham's proposal; this is what we were told. I think the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces is an officer under the Commander-in-Chief, is he not?—Yes.

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9159. General Borrett?—Yes.

9160. He was interviewed, and stated that there was no intention whatever of employing the Yeomanry?—I cannot tell you that, of course. I remember what I have been reminded of now, which was that Mr. Wyndham proposed this to the Army Board with reference to Lord Chesham's proposal, and that the Army Board at once acceded to it, and gladly acceded to it.

9161. After the disasters, when it was a matter of importance to send out additional men, then the proposal was renewed, and even then the assistance given was not very cordial?—That I do not think is the case. 28 Nov. 1902.

9162. I am telling you that as what has been represented to us, and I want to know what your view is?—I do not think so at all, at least I am not cognisant of that. I never heard it before, and I do not think it was the case. I know myself, that I thought that the way in which a very large proportion of the Yeomanry was collected together was injudicious, because they took anybody. I used myself to see here as I walked along Pall Mall every day the most horrible-looking corner boys being taken into that place for inspection.

9163. I think you are referring to certain proceedings, of which we have had a good deal of evidence, with regard to the second contingent of Yeomanry?—I am talking of the Imperial Yeomanry.

9164. The second contingent of Yeomanry. The first contingent of Yeomanry (there is no disputing the facts) were raised in the county centres, and were not raised in the manner you describe?—They were not; I had forgotten that.

(*Sir Henry Norman.*) Except for London, they were raised in the country.

9165. (*Chairman.*) I want just to make sure of the attitude of the War Office, or of your own, at any rate. At the beginning, when the first contingent was being raised, the whole arrangements and the whole equipment of the force were thrown on the hands of the committee in charge of the operation?—It was taken entirely out of the hands of the Commander-in-Chief.

9166. At any rate, what was told us is this: "The War Office could not supply us with a single article of any sort or description"?—"Could not," or "would not"? *See* Q. 6493.

9167. "Could not" are the words used here?—Very likely; we had very little to give them. We had not enough for our own people.

9168. That shows the attitude that you took with regard to the force; that you did not regard them as your own people?—No, it was the absence of stores, because we were so hard run for everything, we had no clothing. If you go back you will find the difficulty we had even in supplying the Regular Troops with clothing. It was considerable, and I think it must have its origin in the difficulty we experienced in supplying them with arms and with clothing. We had no saddles for a long time; I suppose they wanted saddles if they were going to be mounted.

9169. They had to get a supply of saddles from the trade?—Well, we could not get them. The Director-General of Ordnance reported to me on two occasions. I know, during the war that he could not get in any more saddles.

9170. But I suppose, at any rate, the Staff which was authorised for those Imperial Yeomanry battalions must have been settled under the officers at the Horse Guards?—So far as I am aware, it was entirely settled between Lord Lansdowne and Lord Chesham by personal interviews between themselves, at which I was not present or summoned, and I really only learnt what had taken place indirectly.

9171. But the officer of the department who would regulate that would be the Adjutant-General, would he not?—Yes, the Quartermaster-General would come in for supplies.

9172. I am speaking of the Staff?—Yes, for the appointing of the Staff.

9173. This is the statement: "I think the worst part of the organisation was that the regiments or battalions, as they were called, of Imperial Yeomanry were not provided with an adequate staff. The staff *See* Q. 7009; Q. 21547-8.

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that was proposed by the Imperial Yeomanry Committee was exactly the same as that told off to Regular regiments, and in almost every detail that staff was cut down by the then Adjutant-General of the Forces at home, so that no Yeomanry regiment went out to South Africa of the first lot with an adequate staff". —I can give you no information about that, because I never was consulted.

9174. Then the next question, I might also read: "In what particulars was it cut down"; and the answer was: "There was no paymaster to the regiment; there was no paymaster-sergeant to the regiment; there was a quartermaster to the regiment, and no quartermaster sergeant-major, and no quartermaster-sergeants to the respective squadrons; and the regiments were sent out in most cases entirely without transport." That was the evidence given to us by Lord Valentia, who is an officer?—I think it is very likely. I have no doubt it is perfectly true.

9175. Is that a matter that did not come under you as Commander-in-Chief?—Not at all.

9176. I only put the question to you, because I thought that it probably would have done so?—It ought to have done so, but it never did. I think if any application had been made to the War Office I should have known of it, but I never heard of any application being made by the Imperial Yeomanry or Lord Chesham for anything.

9177. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) My impression is, that there were no applications, because a large sum was subscribed, and they were found out of that?—That would be the reason why applications were not made to the War Office.

9178. (*Chairman.*) We have been speaking of the quality of the men, the rank and file; what about the quality of the officers?—The British officers of the Regular troops are, I think, the finest men in the world, without any exception. They are the gentlemen of England. They are not always, perhaps, as highly educated as the officers of the German Army, but, taking them all in all, I think they are a very efficient body of men.

9179. Are you speaking of the regimental officers?—Yes, I am speaking of all the officers.

9180. All through?—All through—I think so. You require, of course, to go on improving the system and the quality of education as times go on and as new inventions take place. For instance, at the present day we pay much more attention, of course, to musketry than we did formerly, when we had an inferior weapon, and I think perhaps we ought to spend more money still in instructing them in musketry and in many other ways, but it would all cost money to do that. Remember, if I might say so, that the worst paid man in England is the young officer; he gets the work, but he has not got the same pay that my butler has when you take into account what the butler gets in the way of feeding, housing, and clothing. I have been in the unhappy position myself, so I ought to know what it is.

9181. But, of course, the training of officers has been criticised in consequence of the war?—But I will tell you the reason why I refer to this small matter of pay, because it is, after all, an important matter for most young men going into the Army. I will put it in this way. A man has got, say, two sons to provide for in life; he has not the means of giving them fortunes; he says to himself, "Jack is a stupid fellow, and Thomas is a very clever fellow." He will start Thomas, the very clever fellow, in some profession where talent will come to the front and where great emoluments and great positions and great rewards are in store—take the law, take any great profession you like, the medical profession or any other; whereas in the Army the inducements for young men to enter are very small indeed as regards their future. Take the London Clubs here—they are swarming with officers of about the age of 40, 50, and so on; they are poor people who have perhaps served in the Indian Army, and have retired on perhaps some £150 to £200 a year, or £300 a year at the outside—and they are very fortunate if they get £300. In what profession is an ordinary hard-working gentleman so badly paid? Therefore the clever men really do not come into the Army. I do not say there are no clever men in the Army, because there are many, but the great bulk of the young men of ability in England do not come into our badly-paid profession, the Army.

9182. But for the officers that are there, are they, in your opinion, sufficiently trained?—I think they do their best to train themselves, and I think those over them do their best also in this respect. I think they might be more frequently and constantly instructed in musketry. But if you go, as I have often done, down to the ranges and see the men being taught at the ranges, they are very well instructed in musketry. They might perhaps get more instruction and practice in shooting, but the instruction that the young officer gets in musketry is very good.

9183. But I think it has been said very often that the training that they receive at present does not encourage in them individuality and readiness to take responsibility, which is necessary in modern warfare?—It really demands a certain amount of superior ability and natural confidence to readily accept responsibility, but I think the young officer of the present day is very much superior to what he was 10 years ago, and infinitely superior to what he was when I was young myself in the Army. He takes a much deeper interest in his profession. He has to instruct his own men to a much larger extent than he ever had to do before, and in order to instruct his own men he must be instructed himself.

9184. Then there is nothing you would wish to suggest to us as a consequence following upon the war in regard to the training of young officers?—I think they might be better trained. I should be very sorry to say that the training was perfect; it has to keep pace with modern inventions as well as modern ideas.

9185. Can you amplify that in any way, or would you leave it simply as a general statement?—I think I would prefer to leave it as a general statement.

9186. And with regard to superior officers, either in command of battalions or of brigades or divisions, have you any remarks to make respecting them in consequence of the war?—I should say with regard to all the officers, and down to no matter what position in the Army, you ought to introduce selection much more largely than you have ever done before. I am quite aware of the difficulties, and how invidious it would be to people who had to make the selections. Take the commander of a battalion. It is a very important position. The man has got in action a thousand men under him, and it is a most important thing that every major under him should be very well instructed, and a man who should thoroughly understand what I might call the art of war—that is, tactics. And I think you might insist upon a much higher tactical examination for those higher regimental officers than exists at the present moment. As regards the superior ranks of Brigadier and Major-General, I think you cannot be too particular in selections there. The idea of promoting a man to be a General simply because he is the senior colonel, to my mind, is a monstrous process; it is out of date, and certainly is not calculated to give you an efficient Army. So that I would really answer you generally again by saying that for all grades of officers the more you can introduce selection into your system of promotion the better.

9187. With regard to the medical service, have you anything to say?—I think the same thing ought to hold good of the medical profession as regards selection. I think they have always done their work remarkably well. Perhaps in some cases the heads of the Medical Department are a little too old—that is the only criticism I would pass upon them; but, taking them all round, I think the Medical Department are a most devoted body of officers.

9188. And the service did well in the war?—So far as I know, they have done very well indeed.

9189. There is only one other point that I would like to put to you, and that is with regard to transport. Some argument has been raised before us as to the respective merits of regimental transport and general transport for the Army. Have you any remarks to make as to that?—I have a very strong opinion in favour of regimental transport.

9190. As you are aware, that was superseded in the campaign?—I know, but I think that was quite contrary to all the spirit of the English Army; I think it was a very great mistake.

9191. Would you state your reasons?—I think that as long as you have regimental transport every man in the battalion concerned has an interest in keeping it thoroughly efficient, looking after it, taking care that it is efficient. Every private soldier knows that on the

efficiency of his regimental transport depends very often his getting his food, whereas if you club the whole thing together and make it brigade or, still worse, divisional transport, a man never knows where his own things are, and he has to go and draw his supplies from people who are comparative strangers to him, who do not take any direct interest in him. It is not nearly as efficient. The experience of the Army, I may say, is that.

9192. It was represented that there was a great loss on regimental transport if the regiment was halted for a considerable time at one place—that that transport was lost for the general movement of the Army?—That may be the case, but that is easily got over, as I have seen very often, in this way—if you have a halt for any length of time you club the regimental transport together to carry stores and use it under the superintendence of brigade organisation for the time being; but the very moment that any battalion moves it should move with its own regimental transport, and in that regimental transport you almost always carry either a day or a day and a half, and sometimes even two days' provisions.

9193. And you consider that the best organisation for the Army?—Certainly.

9194. Is there any other point bearing on what I called at the beginning lessons from the war upon which you would wish to speak?—I have expressed my opinion upon the strategy of the war, I think, quite fully.

9195. Yes?—I think the great lesson that I would learn from the war is that we were not prepared for war, and are not prepared for war at all times. I promised yesterday that I would give you a draft of what I thought the certificate ought to be for the Commander-in-Chief to place before Parliament once a year. I have got it here. Shall I read it?

9196. If you please?—This is to be signed once a year by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army; it is only a rough draft, but it gives the general indication of the lines upon which I think it ought to be done:—"I have the honour to report that the position as regards the forces which it has been decided we are to be prepared at all times to put into the field for service abroad or for home defence is as follows: (1) The two Army Corps for service abroad are complete in *personnel*, equipment, and stores, except as follows: First, any special equipment or stores required by the special conditions of the country in which they may have to operate. This cannot be provided until that country is known; secondly, there are the following deficiencies in the men and stores required, independent of the special equipment referred to above" (and then, of course, follows statement of them). "These two Army Corps would be ready to embark as soon as the necessary sea transport could be provided for them, or so many days after the order to mobilise had been given." Or if that was not the case it should be stated. "The three Army Corps for home defence are complete in *personnel*, equipment, and stores, except as follows" (then would follow the particulars as before.) "These three Army Corps would be ready to move to their appointed stations in (so many) days after the order to mobilise had been given." To be signed by the Commander-in-Chief.

9197. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) You always worked on the Stanhope Minute, ready to send out two Army Corps abroad, and I gather from your minutes to the Secretary of State that, in your opinion, in the event of those two Army Corps being sent abroad the country itself would have been left in an insufficient state of defence?—Yes; and might I add that in the regulations there were provisions made for calling out all the Militia, Volunteer, and Reserve Forces.

9198. I quite understand that, but what I really want to ask you is this: You said just now that you had not followed Army matters so closely since you had left office; but as you have referred in your evidence to the new system of Army Corps, may I ask you whether, in your opinion, supposing the three smaller Army Corps now liable for foreign service were sent abroad, the country would be in a reasonable state of defence?—What three Army Corps do you mean?

9199. Three out of the six new ones?—But are they is existence?

9200. No, I mean when they come into existence. Will you please assume that they are in existence. You have read the scheme I know, because you have referred to it?—Yes.

9201. And under the scheme as laid down, when it is completed and is an actual fact, I ask you as an expert, whether you consider that when those three Army Corps are abroad the country will be in a reasonable state of defence with three Army Corps composed chiefly of the auxiliary forces left at home?—No, they must be entirely composed of Regular forces.

9202. Therefore, under the new Army Corps scheme you think that the country in such an event will not be in a reasonable state of defence?—I think they would be most inefficient and most dangerous to the country. My opinion is expressed in as plain terms as I could express it in that paper of the 8th June, 1888, to which I referred yesterday, which was the origin, I may say, of the then Army organisation; and in that I put as the minimum that the country required for its own internal defence three Army Corps, composed of Regular troops, in addition to all the Militia, Volunteers, and Reserves of the country.

9203. And that paper of the 8th of June holds to-day as much as when you wrote it?—Entirely.

9204. As regards home defence, do you think we shall ever obtain the requisite number of sufficiently trained men without some kind of compulsion, either by ballot or otherwise?—You can always obtain them if you pay for them.

9205. You think that money will do it?—Certainly. As an illustration of my answer that the requisite number of sufficiently trained men might be found without compulsion, I may say that one of the largest armies that has been raised in modern days was raised in America at the time when I happened to be there, in 1862 and 1863, and it was raised entirely without compulsion, simply by offering men the current wages of the day.

9206. But that was a moment of great enthusiasm?—No doubt; but a great many men from outside were raised.

9207. What rate of pay did they get at that time, do you remember?—I think they got very much the same as they get now; but I think they got more liberal free allowances of clothes and provisions. I think they got 30 dollars a month. I will not be certain that it was 30 dollars; but, at any rate, it was the current rate of wages.

9208. And you think that that rate of pay would get us all the men that we want? As you have touched on the American Army, I remember reading once, perhaps more than once, an expression of yours in public speeches that you thought the American Army, for its size, one of the best armies in the world?—Yes, and I think so still.

9209. Can we do anything to assimilate our methods to their methods?—I think you could. If you adopted their plan of enlistment and payment for your soldiers I think you would have the finest army in the world.

9210. And you would recommend that being done?—Certainly; it is the only real practical business-like alternative.

9211. Then, you are not, I gather, in favour of any kind of compulsion?—If you put the question to me in that broad way I must think of other things besides the Army. I think the fact of compelling every hale man to go through a military training is of the most enormous benefit to any nation from an Imperial point of view, from a national point of view. I think it is impossible to estimate the great value to a nation which is given to it by every man being put through a sort of military mill, as is the case in Germany.

9212. Or in Switzerland?—Or in Switzerland.

9213. Do you approve of the Swiss system?—In Switzerland it is in a less severe form.

9214. You think it is a good one?—Yes.

9215. And that it might be more adapted to our country?—Perhaps.

9216. And do you think it would be sufficient for this country if it were adopted?—It would be an immense improvement.

9217. I think neither the Cardwell Scheme, as ultimately laid down, nor the Stanhope Minute of 1888, provided for our sending out of the country on an emergency a small expeditionary force, say, of 15,000 to 20,000 men, without having to call out the Reserves or disorganise our linked battalion system. Is that so?—Yes, I think so; but I would not say absolutely. It

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must be a small force, of course, and not followed by a big war. You could always put two battalions in place of one.

9218. But we have had evidence that it would disorganise our military system. Would it not rather do so?—It would merely mean that you had on paper almost two Army Corps abroad instead of one, or, in other words, a nominal force of 40,000 men, although in reality it was only 20,000.

9219. But am I to gather that you do not think it is really necessary to have in this country, considering the way in which our Empire is scattered all over the world, a small force of, say, 20,000 men always ready to take the field?—I think it would be an enormous benefit to the country; but it is a question of relative importance; whether the money that it would cost would not be better employed upon other military objects.

9220. Do you think it would be better employed?—My mind is so much influenced by the difficulty that I have always had to get any money for anything in the Army, that I feel it is rather difficult to answer such a question straight off.

9221. Would it be a very costly process? The men would be there. You are getting your value for it. You could do with fewer soldiers in the Army Corps?—But there would be a difficulty about your reserves for those men; you would have very few reserves for them. But, still, it is to be done. It would cost a great deal of money, and it would be a slight disarrangement of your military system.

9222. The special subject that raises the matter in my mind is this: Before the Bloemfontein Conference, before we presented those franchise proposals to the Boers, it would have been a great advantage, would it not, if we could have put 20,000 men into the country without having an Order in Council to call out the reserves, and create a general hub-hub throughout Europe?—Yes, I think so; but, then, you must remember, as regards calling out the reserves, that you can always have your troops put on board as soon as you can get your ships ready.

9223. But do you not think that it would have rather a demoralising effect; I am speaking of the political effect? Calling out the reserves is a big thing in this country?—But you would only call out the reserves for those particular battalions that went abroad; you would not call out the reserves for the whole of the Army. I am reminded by Sir Coleridge Grove that you must have a proclamation, of course.

9224. Exactly, that is what is in my mind. That means great publicity?—Yes, that would be a difficulty, but that might easily be altered by law. It has to be a Parliamentary Proclamation.

9225. I am aware of that fact, and that is what I meant by asking whether it was not a question of publicity?—No doubt. (*Sir Coleridge Grove.*) The Parliamentary Proclamation has to declare a state of emergency.

9226. I quite remember that. That is the gist of my questions to Viscount Wolseley. It seemed to me (and I am very anxious to ask you the question) that seeing that our Empire is scattered so much over the world, which causes us so many small wars, it would be only a natural thing that we should have a small fighting force ready to go anywhere at any time?—It would be an enormous advantage to England, and a great power in the hands of the Government.

9227. There is only one other question I wish to ask you; you will understand that I am not asking it in any hostile spirit, but simply because I think it is only fair to you to put the question to you. In the course of the Debate on the Queen's Speech, in January, 1900, Lords drew a broad distinction between the force needed for offensive operations against the two Republics and the late Secretary of State for War in the House of the force needed for the temporary defence of Cape Colony and Natal, pending the arrival of the army of offence, and he said that the Government had put into South Africa before the outbreak of hostilities a force which their military advisers considered sufficient to make the colonies perfectly safe. A similar statement was made by the present Prime Minister in the House of Commons, and I think it may be taken for granted that that statement will be repeated by future witnesses here. It is, therefore, only fair to give you an opportunity of making any observations that you have to offer upon that subject?—You mean, of course, the force that was in South Africa at the time was sufficient to hold its own until the arrival of support from outside.

9228. That, I understand, was the view taken by both Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Balfour?—Of course it was a small force for that purpose; but it would have had considerable effect. In other words, I should say that the force itself was quite safe in the country until the arrival of reinforcements. They could not embark on any offensive operations against the enemy until the arrival of the reinforcements, but they might, for instance, have held Cape Town, the seat of government; it was quite safe; and Durban was quite safe; that was our port in Natal. But I should be very sorry to say that beyond that we were in a position of safety. A very gallant defence was made by Sir George White at Ladysmith; he held his own there against a very large proportion of the whole of the Boer Army, and held it for a long time.

9229. But the statement which was made in both Houses of Parliament went a good deal further than that, you see; and that statement is certain to be made again before the Commission—at least, I should say so?—The events, as they turned out in the result, are in favour of that statement, because we did hold our own.

9230. In favour of your answer?—In favour of the statements made by those Ministers.

9231. But they did not state that the colonies were defended; they stated that their military advisers told them that the colonies were perfectly secure with that force?—I do not remember the expression.

9232. That was the expression used by Lord Lansdowne. The expression used by Mr. Balfour went beyond it?—I should like to see when that was said by the military advisers.

9233. That is what I want to get at. Do you wish to offer any further observations upon that?—No, I cannot; it is liable to be read in so many different ways. We certainly did hold our own until the reinforcements arrived.

9234. But you see that was not what they said their military advisers had told them. What Lord Lansdowne said was that what their military advisers had told them was that the colonies were in perfect security?—It would be impossible for me (I do not like saying these things) to accept such a position as that, because I think I have told you in my evidence yesterday of the numerous times that I asked for larger reinforcements to be sent out, and that they were not sent out. Is not that the best answer I can give you—to refer you to my evidence of yesterday as to the number of times I asked for larger reinforcements to be sent out, and they were not sent out?

9235. But they might reply to that that in the interval before the war, between August and the beginning of October, they did send 10,000 more troops into the country?—I know.

9236. And they might contend that that was exactly what you told them to send?—But I gave you word for word in yesterday's evidence, so far as I remember, the actual dates on which I asked for these various reinforcements.

9237. Shall I read you that sentence from the debate? I could read the whole thing if you like, but I will read that sentence especially: "We were advised that it was possible for us to send out reinforcements of moderate size to make the two colonies perfectly safe. We took the best military advice obtainable as to the number of reinforcements which it was necessary to send out for that purpose. We sent out those reinforcements, and they arrived in South Africa before British territory was invaded by the Boer forces." You understand that I am not asking this question in any sense hostile to you, but in order that you should give an answer?—I think that the best answer I could give would be to refer you to the evidence which I gave yesterday, in which I detailed the different occasions on which I asked for large reinforcements to be sent out to South Africa, and for which I gave you the dates.

9238. But the reply to that might be: "It is true it was at the eleventh hour, but even at the eleventh hour we did send out what the Commander-in-Chief advised"?—But they did not.

9239. In fact, you traverse that statement?—I traverse that statement.

9240. That is all I want?—I think the best proof of

that is my evidence of yesterday, in which I gave you, so far as I could remember them, the dates when I asked for these various reinforcements to be sent out.

9241. (*Chairman.*) But those reinforcements that you speak of now, which I think are stated in these memoranda of yours which you gave us, amounted to two battalions and a cavalry regiment?—That was upon one occasion, but on many other occasions I gave much larger forces. I can only refer to the various times that I asked for reinforcements when they were not sent out. It is quite possible that I may have said to the Secretary of State for War: "I believe that the forces out there and at present on the spot will hold their own until reinforcements arrive," and I think they did so.

9242. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) But this is making the Colonies perfectly secure. You remember at that time Sir Alfred Milner had given an assurance to the Governors of Natal that Natal would be defended by the whole forces of the Empire?—Yes.

9243. And that was known, of course, to the Government at home?—Yes.

9244. The Secretary of State for War, in saying that he had been advised that the Colonies were perfectly secure, must have had that in his mind, of course—it was a perfectly recent occurrence, and was in everybody's mouth at the time?—Yes.

9245. The present Prime Minister in the House of Commons does not use the words "perfectly secure"; he goes a little further; he says, "they were advised that the forces sent out then would be in excess"?—What date was that?

9246. That was before the outbreak of war?—Up to the outbreak of war?

9247. Yes?—Because, you see, the forces were largely augmented from the first moment when we thought war was coming.

9248. It is to those augmentations that both these Ministers were referring in talking of the reinforcements needed, which their military advisers thought necessary, and both of them affirmed that they sent out all that they were advised to send by their military advisers?—I should like to look over my evidence of yesterday, and see the different dates that I gave regarding applications for reinforcements to be sent out.

9249. What would really be useful to me would be if you could point to any recommendation that you made to them at that time, during that summer, in August or September, to send out more men, which was refused or disregarded?—My answer is that I was always pressing the Government to increase the force out there from the very first, before the war broke out, and throughout the year 1899 up to the date of war being declared.

9250. And may I also take it on that that the question of time has a great deal to do with it; that is to say, that the fact of 10,000 or 20,000 men being sent into the country at an earlier date has very much more effect than those 10,000 or 20,000 men being sent into the country at the last moment?—Yes, even if those 10,000 men had gone out as I recommended at that time, which I mentioned in answer to question 8,777. I said: "I had a discussion at the War Office on the 14th August, 1899, at which Mr. Balfour and Mr. Wyndham were present, and I said that if I were given the order I could put 10,000 men into Estcourt in 60 or 65 days; but I added that it would be a tight job to do so."

9251. As a matter of fact, you did do so?—That was an indication of what was in my mind, and showed that I was fairly pressing the Government to send out 10,000 men. So far as I can read anything, I meant it to read in that way—as one of the many applications which I had made to send out more troops. But if the Commission would like it I should be very glad indeed to look over the notes of the evidence which I gave yesterday, and send you a paper showing what were the recommendations, and the dates on which I made them, for sending out more troops.

9252. (*Chairman.*) We shall be much obliged to you?—I will send it to you by post if I may. (*The paper was subsequently sent in. Vide Appendix to Report Vol., pages* 265–6.)

9253. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Would it not be an advantage if you could mobilise a part of the Army Corps for immediate operations?—There is no reason why we should not.

9254. We have had it in evidence that you cannot mobilise a part?—I do not see why. You can mobilise a brigade even.

9255. The reason given to us was because it was a question of sending a comparatively small number of troops from here to South Africa; as you know, at the commencement of the war they took these troops from India and the garrisons in the Mediterranean?—As I have already pointed out, in order to mobilise any part of your forces you have to make a proclamation.

9256. And that must be the Act of Parliament?—Yes, it has to be done by Parliament.

9257. But the reason given for picking up troops from here, there, and everywhere, and sending them to South Africa, was that they could not mobilise part of the Army Corps at home?—You can mobilise any part of an Army Corps after proclamation is made, or you can mobilise all your Army.

9258. But you say that you can mobilise even a section of the first Army Corps?—Yes, there is no restriction laid down at all as to what forces are to be mobilised.

9259. (*Sir John Jackson.*) With regard to the condition of the Army, and its state of military preparedness immediately preceding the war, you have told us that it was not prepared, and in point of fact had not been in a state of preparation, to meet any large Army during the whole of your experience as Adjutant-General and Commander-in-Chief. We have seen from your evidence, and from the evidence of others, that constantly those representations as to the inadequacy of the Army have been put forward. May I take it that the chief objections to carrying out the ideas of the military authorities have been on account of finance?—I assume that that is the case; I should say that it is the natural conclusion to come to.

9260. Now, with regard to the reserves of stores, I see that on November 8th, 1899, the Adjutant-General reported upon the saddlery, and on the clothes for the Army Corps then going out. Is there any reason why large stocks of saddlery and clothes, and other Army stores, should not be kept, except the one objection to the sinking of the money necessary?—There is every reason why they should be kept, and none why they should not be kept.

9261. The only objection can be to the sinking of the capital?—To the original outlay.

9262. And that would apply, of course, to guns?—Yes, it applies to all our military stores, to everything that is required to put an Army into the field.

9263. During the two or three years, say two years, preceding the war, it would, of course, be within your knowledge, that the Boers were making large purchases of guns, not only on the Continent, but in England; is it within your knowledge that the Government knew that those purchases were being made by the Boers?—I do not think there were purchases made by the Boers in England to any extent.

9264. Proposed purchases?—By the Boers in England?

9265. Yes?—I do not remember any.

9266-7. I think, as a matter of fact, the Boers had some Vickers-Maxims?—I think they purchased some of their pom-poms originally, but very few; their purchases were very small in England.

9268. Does the Government encourage the study of every new type of gun that is brought out, either on the Continent or in this country; are they ready to incur a little expenditure in the way of making experiments with any new guns?—I think they are fairly well prepared to do so, because the expense is not very great, as a rule. The question is gone into by the Director-General of Ordnance and the Commander-in-Chief, and, if the thing promises well, I think most Secretaries of State would be prepared to give it some sort of trial, unless it was something that came to a very large expenditure indeed.

9269. As a rule, it would not be a large expenditure?—No, I think not.

9270. Did the Government know anything much about pom-poms before the war?—I think we had all seen them tried. I think everybody had seen them tried, and thought them a very good sort of thing.

9271. They had not been purchased?—No, we never owned one.

9272. How long after the commencement of the war

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was it when the Government decided to purchase pom-poms?—I do not remember.

9273. Two or three months, possibly?—I cannot tell you.

9274. At any rate, when they did decide to purchase them, the pom-poms had then to be made?—They had to be made, but I do not remember that we ever sent out any large quantity of pom-poms to South Africa at all.

9275. Do you consider that they are good guns?—Yes; they are most effective and useful in many ways.

9276. Had we many quick-firing guns when the war commenced?—We had all our own Regular artillery armed with them.

9277. In South Africa?—I think all of them were.

9278. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) I do not think so?—No, I do not think they were quick-firing. I had really forgotten.

9279. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I suggest that they were not?—I cannot remember. The newest guns that went out from us, that I remember we sent out, were the howitzers; they were the latest invention of guns for use in the field.

9280. At the time of the commencement of the war?—Yes.

9281. You spoke, in your evidence of yesterday, of the difficulty, which, of course, everyone appreciates, of getting stores in a hurry in the event of war being declared. You do not suggest, I suppose, that the British manufacturers did not do their absolute best to meet the difficulties of the emergency?—Oh, no; I am sure they did their very best, but they had not got the plant ready for a very large output of the kind of stores that we required.

9282. That is the point I am coming to. In England at the present time we have two large firms, I understand, of ordnance manufacturers—the Elswick people and Vickers. Of course, in peace times the machinery that these firms have to deal with ordnance is to a great extent out of use; there is not the demand?—They are always working. If you go down there you will see them always working very hard.

9283. Even in peace times?—Yes, they work for foreign Governments, you see.

9284. Do you think it would give the Government an advantage in the event of their requiring an extra output if more work could be given to these private firms during peace time, so as to enable them to keep a larger stock of machinery for dealing with guns, and rather to keep Woolwich more or less as a reserve?—You see, if you did not keep your men at Woolwich employed in the making of guns and the manufacture of carriages for them, when the time came that you wanted them to be in full blast they would not be experienced or skilled enough to do the work.

9285. But on Government work is it not the practice in peace times to do practically everything in Woolwich?—We buy a great number of guns in the open market.

9286. Even in peace times?—Yes, that is my impression, whenever we have to re-arm the Army with guns, etc. Almost all our big guns come from manufacturers; there are certain big guns that we do not make at all.

9287. Is it customary to keep a large store of inner tubes in stock, to provide for the repairs of guns that are sent back?—That I could not tell you. I presume that that would be an article that they would keep. For instance, now, I suppose, all our guns will require to be retubed.

9288. That is the latest method, I understand—that you retube?—Yes.

9289. Just on the question you raised of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army having a seat in the Cabinet, if, say, it came to be a question of peace or war, do you not think that there is just a slight risk that that Commander-in-Chief might be a little too much inclined to favour war?—I think he would be rather inclined the other way.

9290. I suggest, at any rate, that a man in that position with a great prospect of making a tremendous reputation for himself, must incline rather, if there is a doubt, to give the benefit of that doubt in favour of fighting, rather than otherwise?—No; I think a man in the position of Commander-in-Chief, assuming he was a man who has had experience in war, is the least likely to embark on war.

9291. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Ladysmith seems to have been selected as the place for stores in Natal, does it not?—Yes.

9292. Do you know the reason for that?—The only reason that I can think of is, that it was a town where storage accommodation could be provided, and it was a place where we kept a garrison.

9293. It is said to have been a railway junction?—Yes.

9294. Had that anything to do with it?—No doubt, looking to the future, that would have a good deal to do with it, too; it was a central position with regard to railways. But, I think, it followed upon the fact that our garrison had been there a good number of years, and we had established cover for them, we had kept a cavalry regiment there, and three batteries of artillery, and so on.

9295. I gather from something you said yesterday, that Ladysmith was not a place that could be held; at least there were better places?—No, it was not a position for troops.

9296. Then, if it was not a position for troops, how could it be a position for stores?—The position for troops is immediately in front of Ladysmith.

9297. On the Biggarsberg?—Yes, on the Biggarsberg; so that your supplies would be immediately behind you.

9298. But if you had to retire from Biggarsberg, then you must sacrifice your stores?—You would be fed, of course, from your stores all the time you were at the Biggarsberg by the supplies from Ladysmith, and if you had any very large accumulation of stores, and were beaten out of the Biggarsberg, you would have to fall back behind the Tugela.

9299. And, as you would have to fall back behind the Tugela, would not behind the Tugela have been the best depôt for stores, and not Ladysmith?—There was not a place with such good accommodation for stores there. And the same thing would hold good with regard to the position behind the Tugela; by degrees you would be turned out of that, too. A retaining force is only a power for acting in front of a much superior force, and making the advance slow; it cannot prevent the advance of the troops.

9300. But, as I understand it, behind the Tugela you really could have thrown up defensive works there effectively, but at Ladysmith you could not have thrown up defensive works with any effect?—But you could not prevent the enemy from crossing the Tugela; they would have crossed at the very places where Sir Redvers Buller crossed it. There were many places where he could have crossed.

9301. Then it is your opinion that Ladysmith was on the whole the best place for stores?—It was the most convenient.

9302. But, from a military point of view, apart from convenience, was it a good place for stores?—As regards stores, convenience is really one of the principal elements in the question. Our garrison, you see, was there, and had been for some years at Ladysmith; it is always a convenient thing to keep the garrison, if you have a garrison in the country, near a big town.

9303. I understand that besides 60 days' food there were large quantities of ordnance stores and ammunition at Ladysmith?—I should not think much. There was no great quantity of ammunition that you could not carry away wth your troops. You had the railway behind you, going back all the time; you could convey any amount of ammunition on your trains; that would have been easily disposed of. The ordnance stores there, I think, must have been very small, except ammunition, but the principal stores, the bulky ones, would have been food, and it is quite possible that you might not have been able to remove all of them if you had 60 days' provisions there.

9304. Did not the fact of the stores being at Ladysmith almost compel the General commanding that district to remain to defend the stores?—That is always a question, of course, for the General on the spot to decide at the moment—the question of merely preserving stores, which chiefly consist of food, as they did in that case. It is, of course, very disagreeable to lose them, but that would not influence a General

very much, I think, in his decision as to whether he would abandon the place or not.

9305. You stated that, in your opinion, at all times the proper course in an advance on Bloemfontein would have been across the Orange River. Would the fact that the bridges had been destroyed, and the fact that the Boers had at that time invaded the Cape, and had a considerable force on the Cape side of the Orange River, alter your opinion at all?—No, it does not. The force was not large that the Boers had in Cape Colony.

9306. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I gather that you thought that if there had been sufficient troops, and so on, the line of the Biggarsberg would be the best line of defence to take up?—Yes, in Natal.

9307. Are you aware whether there is a sufficient supply of water there for a considerable body of troops?—Yes, there is plenty of water.

9308. Then you think we could have fallen back and taken up successive positions, when the overwhelming force of Boers came against the comparatively small force of British. Sir Frederick Darley has taken you through what I was going to put to you about clearing away the provisions, and so on, but supposing that Sir George White had at the last moment, when he found the Boers were coming in such considerable force, determined to take up a position across the Tugela, or somewhere in his rear, I think you admit that he would not have been able to take his provisions?—He might have been obliged to destroy the provisions that he could not carry away with him.

9309. It would have been a great inconvenience, at all events?—He would have the railway behind him from his base in the South of Natal.

9310. And you think he could have brought up sufficient provisions when he crossed the Tugela to enable his Army to resist?—When he retired do you mean?

9311. Yes?—No doubt of it.

9312. Provisions existed at Durban, Maritzburg, and those places sufficient to maintain the Army?—Oh, yes, you had the whole province of Natal behind you, besides what you had in store.

9313. To go back, because we are given an opportunity of asking questions on the whole of your examination, so that I go back in rather a disjointed sort of way, was it ever proposed to erect any defensive works for the protection of our frontier, or to take up positions on the frontier for protective works, or even works for the protection of stores and ammunition in Natal?—You mean, further away, nearer the Tugela even than Ladysmith?

9314. I mean anywhere?—I do not think it was ever suggested.

9315. It was mentioned in evidence, I think, by the Director-General of Ordnance, that just about the time that the war commenced, there was a good deal of inconvenience, owing to the change of ammunition, which he seemed to think was necessary to be made, owing to objections raised on the Continent, and elsewhere, to the kind of ammunition that we were using, the Dum Dum. You are aware of that?—Yes, I am aware of that. That was very inconvenient to us.

9316. That at once caused a very large number (which, I suppose, ran to millions) of rounds of ammunition to be thrown out of use altogether?—Quite.

9317. But, practically, no real mischief arose from that?—No; I do not think the troops were ever short of ammunition in the field.

9318. You said something about the Militia—that the Militia were inferior to the Line. It was brought to our notice that one of their great defects was a deficiency of officers; that a regiment that actually went out, and which had an establishment of 24 officers, had only eight ready to accompany them, and had to get gentlemen to take Commissions, and fill them up in some way or other. Are you aware of that?—I do not know that there was anything like that proportion. I had no idea it was so large as that.

9319. General Borrett told us so?—I know there is always a certain amount of difficulty in keeping Militia regiments always full of officers, because a considerable number of young gentlemen, as you are aware, go into the Army through the Militia now; it is an easier process, and by that arrangement we obtain a greater number of subalterns for the Militia. That was one of the reasons why we allowed a certain amount of reduced examinations to be imposed upon the man who did his two years, I think it is, with the Militia as a subaltern, and then went into the Army.

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9320. Do you know of any plan, by which that evil could be diminished, at all events, by which officers could be induced to go into the Militia in greater numbers, and remain there?—No; except money, I do not know any system that would do that.

9321. You think the Militia require more training, especially more target practice?—Yes, a great deal more. I should like them to have more training, but I think I must say, for the short training they get, they are a most wonderfully efficient force; but I should like to see them get more training, and especially more musketry training.

9322. When you were Commander-in-Chief, after the war commenced, did you have any report as to the usefulness of the Militia force?—I know the Militia force very well; I used to inspect them, and I have been in the habit of seeing them all my life.

9323. Did you hear anything of their conduct in the field?—During the course of this year, do you mean?

9324. Yes?—No; I have heard officers talk about them when they came back. They were not equal to our troops, as a matter of course. It is not derogatory to their efficiency or usefulness to say that. They cannot be as good as our men, as a matter of course, because there are many places at this present moment in England where we have no ranges and no suitable land for training purposes. I suppose it goes on up to the present moment. When I ceased to be Commander-in-Chief, there were places in England where we had been negotiating for land for rifle ranges for over two years—for many years—and the thing was still hung up. As you know, the process of taking land compulsorily from individual people is a very long one, owing to our peculiar laws. If you have decided upon the site, and say, "This is the site we require for musketry," and you make up your mind what is to be paid for it, to compel the man to sell it, and to get possession, to be able to use it as a musketry range, create butts, and level it for musketry purposes, is a very long process. I do not know whether it is going on still, but I can name one case when I left the Army, at the town of Stafford. There we had a large camp and a large common, and it is quite possible that we are still trying to obtain the land in question as a range. I do not know; but for two years in my time certainly we were trying to get that land. That is only one instance, but there were many others; and, as you may imagine, in a small country like England, a very thickly populated country, it is not easy even to find good sites for musketry practice.

9325. Am I right in the assumption that, so far as you know, when the Militia got to South Africa they were not much employed in the active operations of war, but were mainly employed (no doubt very usefully) on the lines of communication?—I presume the General on the spot used the best troops for the front that he had.

9326. There has been a return called for by the Commission about that unpleasant phase of the war, the surrenders. Of course, we have only to inquire into the operations of the war up to the occupation of Pretoria. Have you heard, or do you think, that surrenders were unduly large?—Yes, I do.

9327. That the men surrendered when they might have made a fight of it?—I think they were not creditable to the Army.

9328. Do you think that holding up the white flag had much to do with it?—I think it is an unfortunate thing, and I think it ought to have been checked much more severely at first. That is how I have always regarded it. If there had been some very severe measures taken at first with the men who did hoist the white flag, if they had been all shot, as I think they ought to have been, that, perhaps, would have created a different feeling in the Army employed there.

9329. Surrenders are very little known in our Army in one's own experience, and from what one has read. Have you formed any idea in your mind as to the reason why they should have been so much more ready to surrender on this occasion than before?—I cannot explain it.

9330. You mentioned what I must call the extra-

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See Q. 4315; 21429.

ordinary arrangements that prevailed at the War Office that the Adjutant-General and the Quarter-master-General, who, in all previous times, had been supposed to be officers under the Commander-in-Chief, had direct access to the Secretary of State?—Were directly under him.

9331. Which has now been altered again?—Yes.

9332. But Sir Evelyn Wood spoke about that; he said that he received instructions not to go to the Secretary of State without your orders. Was he correct in saying that? Would you like me to read exactly what he said?—Yes, if you please.

9333. I put to him: "Did I understand you to say that in the period between 1895 and 1900, though you were supposed to be more or less free, as a staff officer holding a very high appointment, to go to the Secretary of State, you did not feel yourself able to go, except with the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief?" and his answer was: "I was told not to go by the Commander-in-Chief." Then I asked him, "Does not that seem one way of getting round an order?"—I think it is very possible that I did. I do not remember the circumstance of having ever said these words to him, but it is quite possible that I did. I should think, if I did say it, I told him in very different words. I should have said it was very desirable that he should always come and tell me what had taken place between him and the Secretary of State upon any subject under discussion; that it was necessary that I should know of any discussion that took place between the Secretary of State and any officers supposed to be serving under me. I am sure that was the way I should have put it to him.

9334. He put it a little more direct?—Yes.

9335. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) But, as a matter of fact, by the Order in Council, he was under your supervision?—"Supervision" is a curious term; I do not quite understand what it means.

9336. But that would quite justify you in suggesting it to him?—Yes; I was acting within my rights entirely.

9337. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I think you are of opinion that it would be almost impossible, usefully, to employ a Volunteer Battalion as a battalion on service, even when you had weeded it out considerably. Do you approve of the system, which was adopted during the war, of having a company of selected men from the Volunteer regiments attached to the Line regiment, to which it is supposed to be affiliated?—Yes, I do, entirely; I think it is an admirable plan.

9338. Do you think that it succeeded?—Not being on the spot, I cannot tell you. I have never seen any reports about it; but my common sense tells me that it would be a very successful thing. In most Volunteer battalions in Great Britain that I know anything about, they would be able to supply you with a company, say, of one hundred men, and remarkably good men in every way all round, although they were not, perhaps, as well trained in shooting as our regular soldiers, or as accustomed to discipline. But they very often, in large numbers of instances, would have come as a body from a superior class of men to the ordinary rank and file of our Army, and, as such, I think they might be a very valuable addition to a battalion of the Line.

9339. And you think they would soon shake down and become perfectly efficient as soldiers?—Yes, I do. I think it is an admirable way of disposing of a large portion of the Volunteer Force in the event of war abroad.

9340. You consider that on the whole, so far as you know, the medical officers were efficient?—I have never heard any reliable information to the contrary.

9341. But they were insufficient in point of numbers for the immense Army that we threw into the field?—I presume so; but then, of course, they were largely supplemented by civilians.

9342. All of whom were qualified medical men who had passed all the necessary examinations?—Yes; I think the medical profession came forward in every rank and grade of them to help us during the war.

9343. I think you have been asked one question to-day as to whether, under the Army Corps system, it would be possible or easy to take a small force for a small war, which is what we are so often having. That question was asked of another officer, and he said that it would be very difficult to do it, that it would disorganise the Army Corps system. It did not seem to me, if I may say so, to have been a very good answer, but do you think that in any degree it need disorganise the Army Corps system?—Not in the least. I cannot understand how it could.

9344. If half, or a quarter, or an eighth of an Army Corps were mobilised?—Not the slightest; you could soon fill it up.

9345. (*Viscount Esher.*) You made two suggestions yesterday, either of which would, if adopted, materially alter the constitution of the War Office. Your first suggestion was the abolition of the Commander-in-Chief and the substitution of a soldier for a civilian Secretary of State. I daresay you saw that Lord Rosebery made very much the same suggestion the other day in a speech in which he referred to Lord Kitchener?—No, I did not see the speech; I did not know that. I am very glad he did.

9346. Has it occurred to you that with an arrangement of that sort it requires an agreement between the Minister and the soldier, and the Minister would have to obtain a soldier willing to accept such an office?—I thought you said that the Minister was to be a soldier.

9347. I say the Prime Minister would have to find a soldier who would be willing to accept the office of Secretary of State?—Yes, he would have to find one.

9348. I will ask you to go back to 1886 or 1893, when Mr. Gladstone was in office, and when he introduced the Home Rule Bill; do you think it would have been very easy at that time to have obtained a distinguished soldier as Secretary of State?—We had, of course, a Royal Prince then as Commander-in-Chief.

9349. I am asking you whether you think at that time, assuming there was no Commander-in-Chief, it would have been very easy to have obtained or retained a distinguished soldier as Secretary of State?—Assuming that His Royal Highness was not there?

9350. I am putting to you a case where a very unpopular measure is before the country, and adopted by the Government, a measure which might not, and probably would not, be popular amongst the soldiers of the Army. I am only putting this to you as a difficulty that has occurred to me. Do you think that under those circumstances, if your plan were adopted, it would be easy for the Prime Minister either to find or retain the services of a distinguished soldier as Secretary of State who would be responsible as a member of the Cabinet for that particular measure?—It is a very large area that you have chosen from, and, of course, at certain times you have better men to choose from than you would have at others. You may pick out a time when there were fewer men well known to the world as distinguished soldiers to fill the office than there would be at others, but it is very rarely indeed that you have not got some man well known in the Army who would make, I think, a very good Minister of War.

9351. Then do I rightly understand from you that you would not think it necessary that either the ablest, or one of the ablest, of soldiers should hold the office of Secretary of State?—I think it ought to be the ablest man you have got.

9352. Then I put to you a case in which you might find difficulty either to get or retain the services of the ablest man you have got as Secretary of State for War?—On account of the paucity of men?

9353. No; on account of the fact that he would have to be responsible for a policy of which he might disapprove?—I do not think that. He would have to come to some understanding.

9354. I will put it to you direct. Supposing you had been Secretary of State for War in 1886, would you have remained in office and accepted the Home Rule Bill?—That is a political question.

9355. I am only putting the difficulty to you?—That is a political question which I do not think the soldier Secretary of State ought to mix himself up with at all.

9356. Then you understand that under those circumstances our political institutions would have to be modified very considerably in practice. You see the difficulty?—I know the difficulty. I have thought of those difficulties many times.

9357. You see it is a considerable difficulty?—I know it is a difficulty.

9358. But you may not think it insuperable?—No.

It might be a very serious difficulty, I grant you, under certain circumstances.

9359. As regards the other point, your suggestion was that, assuming the present system to be maintained, the Commander-in-Chief should every year, as I understand, certify to Parliament direct that whatever had been settled to be the military organisation of the country, say two or three Army Corps, was complete and satisfactory?—Yes.

9360. Do you know any example in the administration of the country where a permanent servant of the State reports direct to Parliament without the intervention of a Minister?—I know of none.

9361. I think I can suggest one to you. There is the Comptroller and Auditor-General?—Yes.

9362. You know that the Comptroller and Auditor-General does report direct to Parliament, quite irrespective of the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the First Lord of the Treasury?—Yes, I know that—I had forgotten it.

9363. Then do I rightly understand that your suggestion is that the Commander-in-Chief should have a power similar to that of the Comptroller and Auditor-General?—Quite so; that is exactly my view, that his certificate should be drawn up in the same spirit as the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

9364. Do you think that there would be any objection to such a certificate being given from the fact that foreign Powers would know, or would realise, by a public declaration of the Commander-in-Chief, that at a given moment there were deficiencies in the equipment, say, of the forces of the country?—No, I do not think so, because after the first certificate had been sent in by the Commander-in-Chief there is no doubt whatever that the deficiencies he pointed out would be filled, so that, assuming that it had been in force last year, this year, I have no doubt whatever, that all those deficiencies would be filled up, and if there were any remaining still they would be of such a small amount and of so little value and importance that I do not think any foreign Government would be much the wiser.

9365. I suppose that your suggestion is to a great extent based on your recollection of what successive Secretaries of State have said to Parliament as to the state of the Army and our national defences?—Yes; I think the tendency of every Secretary of State—it is the natural tendency of a man in office, I might say, certainly a political man in office—to take a roseate view of the condition of things.

9366. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You mentioned, I think, that the Generals sent out to take the command-in-chief in South Africa were left entirely untrammelled by any specific instructions from home—from yourself. You chose the best men available in whose good common-sense and high judgment and experience in military affairs you had confidence, and then you considered that, having a knowledge of what was transpiring day by day, indeed, hour by hour, they could judge better of what was wanted than anyone at a distance?—Certainly; and I shall go beyond that, and say that if a man were to attempt to control a general in the field like a general in South Africa from home as to the plans he was to follow with regard to a campaign, it would be a fatal system, and, I might perhaps say, an impossible system.

9367. And what was the course followed in your own campaigns, that is to say, Ashanti and Egypt. You went there with a free hand and acted on your own discretion?—Entirely; absolutely.

9368. And that is the course you think is the only proper one to adopt and to follow?—Certainly.

9369. Without touching at all on the question of the policy, or the expediency of General Buller moving his base of operations to Natal, do you not think that it was an immense advantage to Lord Roberts that those Boers who invaded Natal were kept in check there, and that they were so withheld from joining their friends in the Transvaal and the Free State?—There is no doubt that in the early part of the war it was an immense advantage to Lord Roberts in his advance, as he advanced towards Kimberley at first, and, then, afterwards, upon Bloemfontein, that a large proportion of the Boers were in front of Ladysmith, so much so, that, as I have already pointed out, the occupation of Bloemfontein meant the relief of Ladysmith. If you have followed the course of the proceedings of the war, as it took place, you will find that the very moment that Lord Roberts began to move and got near Bloemfontein, the force in front of Ladysmith began to diminish at once, and that the railways were used to bring round a much larger force than even we had calculated as a possibility that they could move round in case of emergency to Bloemfontein. And that was what relieved Ladysmith, it was that the force was taken away to face Lord Roberts at Bloemfontein.

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9370. From your great knowledge of Canada and its people, and the character of the people there, you consider, I understand, that those troops from Canada, and especially those from the North West, are particularly adapted for scouts, and for mounted infantry work?—Certainly. I think I would even go beyond that, and say that the men from the agricultural parts of all our great Colonies, New Zealand, and Canada especially (because I know that best), and Australia form the best soldiers we could have for the Army.

9371. You refer to the North-west Mounted Police; you look upon them as being a very efficient body of men?—Yes, I do not think you could have a finer body of men in every way than they were.

9372. And, as regards the officers, there are a good many, indeed, a large number, in the British Army, who have been educated and trained in the Military College of Kingston. Do you consider that from their special training they are more efficient than they otherwise would be, and that they make good and useful officers?—I certainly think that all the men that we have had from that school have been admirable, so much so, that one of the most useful officers we had during the whole of that war, and who did splendid and valuable service to the country, was a Major in the Royal Engineers, who was at the head of all the railway reconstruction, whose name you know, Sir Percy Girouard. He was educated at the College of Kingston.

9373. Do you not think that in the education and the examination required of officers, it would be well that they should have a knowledge of applied science—not only those of the Engineers, but all others, so that they might be resourceful in emergencies; in connection with restoring bridges, and anything required when it might not be possible to have the Engineers at hand?—I think the more highly-trained and the more highly-instructed, and the abler the officers of the British Army are, the better, but at the same time I think the inducements held out for very able men to go into the Army are not sufficient to lead them to do so very often. Great numbers do go in, but the bulk of young men who have got very great and high abilities, I think, carry their abilities to a better market than the Army.

9374. And that really the remedy is to pay them better?—Yes.

9375. (*Chairman.*) Is there anything else you wish to add?—No, I do not think there is anything that I have thought of worth adding. I think I have endeavoured to tell you all my views and opinions, and I shall be very glad to supplement them in any way you like hereafter, if you wish to call for me again. I cannot think of anything I have omitted.

(*Viscount Wolseley withdrew.*)

(*After a short adjournment.*)

9376. (*Chairman.*) (*To Sir Coleridge Grove.*) You were Military Secretary, I think, to Lord Wolseley?—Yes.

9377. And you have held other appointments in the War Office?—Yes.

9378. With regard to the military secretaryship, will you tell us what the duties of that post are?—The duties of the Military Secretary are, first of all, to supply the Army with officers, and lay down the qualifications requisite for the candidates. He then deals with the promotion of officers, with the selection of all officers for staff, and other appointments, and with all the rewards to officers, the promotions and honours given for good or distinguished service in the field or elsewhere, and everything of that sort. He also has some minor matters, such as the distribution of what are called the good service rewards, annual pensions given to officers who have done well, and one or two minor matters, but his main functions are the

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career of an officer, from his entry into the Army until he leaves it, apart from his military training and discipline. The Military Secretary has nothing to do with the military training or discipline of an officer after he has joined the Service, but he has to deal with him in all other respects.

9379. That part is under the Adjutant-General?—That part is under the Adjutant-General.

9380. The first branch is the supply of officers?—Yes.

9381. What do you desire to say with regard to that?—Do you wish me to go at once into any lessons to be derived from this war, because, I think, there is a very great lesson to be derived from it, with regard to the supply of officers, which I am prepared to indicate if you wish me to go into that at once. I will take first the preparedness for war. I would say as regards the supply of officers, and our state of preparedness with regard to that supply, before the war, we were prepared for the supply of what may be called the establishment laid down for us, namely, the supply of the officers for two Army Corps for foreign service. But we were not prepared for the very much larger demand which came upon us from many directions during the course of the war, as it developed. I should like to say further, that unless our existing system is changed in a very important particular, we never can be prepared for any large extra demand, because an officer is the one thing that is absolutely impossible to improvise. If he is to be of value as such, when you want him on emergency, he must have had training as an officer beforehand, and, therefore, you require, in order to meet any extra demand, to have some form of reserve upon which to draw. Now, the Reserve of Officers, as it is so called, although useful up to a certain point, fails to meet the great requisite that comes as this demand for officers extends, namely, the demand for officers in the junior ranks. The officers in the Reserve, as you know, are most of them senior officers, or, if they are not senior officers by rank, they are in a large proportion oldish men; they have left the Service for some time, and apart from the fact that they are more or less out of touch with the later developments of training, and weapons, and military law, and all those sort of things, they are also unfitted by their age to be subalterns and junior captains, and it is in subalterns and junior captains that you want this great supply. Just to show what the supply required really may amount to, I may mention that during the 18 months between 1st January, 1900, and midsummer, 1901, I had to find over 3,000 officers in excess of the normal supply for the British Army.

9382. That is including the auxiliaries?—No, not including the auxiliaries; for the Regular forces I had to find over 3,000 Regular officers, and I had to get them from somewhere other than the usual channels. The wastage of the war, the enormous demand for officers on our long lines of communication, and for the many staff appointments that grew up in South Africa, the use, I have no doubt, in a great many cases in South Africa, of Regular officers with the various auxiliary forces there, all this produced a tremendous demand, and the consequence was that I had to obtain officers to carry on the war where I could. I turned in many directions, and obtained them from many directions; but, of course, the very first direction in which I turned was that of the Militia and the Volunteers. I asked Militia Commanding Officers to recommend to me the young fellows in their regiments whom they considered most suitable for appointment to the Regular Army, laying down certain conditions, and asking them, of course, to recommend their best men. The result of that was that, just at the time that the Militia was being embodied, and wanted officers the most, we were taking away some of its officers, and some, possibly, of the most promising young fellows, for the Regular Army and similarly for Volunteers. But if the auxiliary forces—the Militia and the Volunteers—are to be of their best value when they are embodied, we ought rather to help them by turning into them some good Regular officers at that time, to enable them to shake into their places, and to show them the way that things ought to be done, and to help them along in that difficult first period of embodiment. When a Militia battalion has been embodied for six months or longer, it can, more or less, take care of itself; but it is in the first days of embodiment, and especially if that embodiment is succeeded by embarkation for foreign service, that it wants help, and, if the auxiliary forces are to form a large part of our defensive scheme in the future, we ought to be prepared to give them Regular officers on embodiment.

9383. The result, we heard from the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces, was that some Militia regiments appeared with about eight officers, all told, and they had to fill up the ranks of officers, when they failed abroad, with almost anybody who offered?—I can well believe that, especially as the auxiliary forces are always short of officers in peace, so that any drain is more severely felt. I found myself, during this time of pressure, face to face with the fact that the demand for officers—and it ought to have been for trained officers—had immensely increased, and that the supply was absolutely exhausted. Once you have taken away the men from Sandhurst and from Woolwich, and exhausted the lists of the candidates who have passed the last examination and have not yet gone to Sandhurst, and a few other very limited sources you have used up your trained material, and by no power that I know can you add to it. You can go out into the open market, and you can get gentlemen, but those are not officers, and the only way, it appears to me, in which you can meet this difficulty is by having with your various military units in peace a very large excess of the officers that are absolutely required for the duty connected with that unit. You must have your Reserve "serving," if I may use the expression; you cannot let your officer go back to civil life, as you can your Reservist, and leave him there to forget what he knows, or if you do, he will not be as good as he ought to be when called up. You ought to have with all your Regular forces at home—I say it advisedly—at least twice their present establishment of officers.

9384. And especially in the junior ranks?—Especially in the junior ranks—twice the number, and the increase to be, in the main, in the junior ranks. I have already mentioned this in my evidence before Mr. Akers Douglas' Committee about education. It will have an indirect result as regards the education of the officer, which I will come to in a minute. At present I would say that this is the only way I can see in which you can meet the very great demand that there is for extra officers (whenever we are engaged on any war), and also by which you will be able to help the auxiliary forces, when they are embodied, with trained officers to start them in the proper direction.

9385. Would you keep these Reserve officers with the regiments abroad, as well as at home?—No; I would keep them, in the main, at home, for this reason—that the fact of having this larger number of officers at home will enable a good many of them to be always away from their unit, attending classes of instruction, or with their affiliated Militia or Volunteers. One of the difficulties at present in the way of instructing an officer in his profession is that he is wanted with his regiment, and that when he applies to go to the School of Military Engineering, or some similar school, his Colonel says, "No, I cannot spare you." If you had more officers you would be enabled to have a good many of them always away, and you could then increase your schools, and much more largely develop your system of military schools of instruction, and have some officers going through these various schools and obtaining certificates of merit of different qualities, which would affect their promotion and their career.

9386. You would almost be obliged to have them away, or you would not have enough men for them to be occupied with at the regiments?—In the larger camps, there would always be men. Where you have battalions out at minor stations, and possibly one or two companies on detachment, you are met with that difficulty, that there are not enough men, but in camps like Aldershot and the Curragh there are always plenty for them to learn with.

9387. At all events, you would desire to have a good number of them away at classes?—Yes; and I should also wish to see some of them away with the Militia battalion when they were training. I should like to see an interchange between the officers of the Regular battalions and the officers of the Militia battalions. Some of the Militia officers could come up to the Regular battalion and serve with them at a time, and some of the Regular battalion could go to the Militia batta-

lion and serve with it, so as to keep up a sort of continuity of feeling between the two, and similarly with the Volunteers.

9388. Of course, that would cost a good deal of money?—It would; but I can see no other way, and, as I say, when you think that in this last war I had to put into the Army some 3,000 and odd officers without any qualifications, except that they had been, some of them, selected from the Militia and Volunteers by their Colonels, and that others had been selected by Colonial authorities, I think it evidently shows a state of things which, if we are to be prepared for war, calls for serious effort.

9389. What number of officers are involved? You mentioned 3,000 that you had to find, but what would the number of officers involved in your proposition be?—Well, what the total would come to I cannot say, because I have not worked it out in detail. I left that till there appeared some likelihood of the scheme being accepted. Taking the total number of officers at present in the Army at 8,000—which is about what it is—and, restricting the increase to the units on the Home establishment, I think you might take it roughly at between 3,000 and 4,000 officers.

9390. Would those officers be on the same scale of pay?—Yes; they would be absolutely identical with the others; it would not do to make any distinction betweeen them.

9391. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Would not that greatly retard promotion?—It would depend upon how the increase was adjusted between the different ranks, but promotion has been very rapid lately; it might be retarded without becoming much slower than it used to be a certain number of years ago.

9392. Double the number of subalterns would make a very great deal of difference in the time a man took to become a captain?—I would not put the whole increase into the subaltern ranks; I would distribute it, but the most of it would be in the subalterns and the captains.

9393. (*Chairman.*) At any rate, that is the only way you can suggest for finding trained officers on the occurrence of an emergency?—I can see no other, my Lord.

9394. And the supply, as it stands at present, is a serious danger?—Certainly—well, "a serious danger" is a strong expression, but it is a serious weak point. We cannot consider ourselves properly prepared for war when we have not got the officers we know we shall want in war.

9395. To have any defect of officers is a danger, is it not?—Yes, it is.

9396. Is there any other point with regard to the supply of officers?—No, I do not think so. I think I ought to say, as I have been rather laying stress on the fact that these extra officers were untrained, that, taken altogether, they did not do so badly. I endeavoured to find out, as well as I could, how these officers, on the whole, turned out, and I confess they turned out better than I expected. I think that ought to be said, and it ought to be before the Commission, but I also think it is very evident that it would have been very much better if they had had previous training.

9397. (*Viscount Esher.*) The war was of exceptionally long duration?—Yes, it was.

9398. You would not, probably, expect the same result with a war which lasted three months?—No; but the shorter the war the less time it gives you to adjust yourselves to its conditions.

9399. (*Chairman.*) The next point you refer to is the education and preparation of candidates?—Yes.

9400. As you have said, you have been examined lately by Mr. Akers-Douglas' Committee, and of course we do not ask you to repeat the evidence more than you think necessary?—That Committee dealt with the question of the education of candidates for the Army, and also the education of officers after they have joined the Army. With the latter part I have nothing to do. I do not know whether the Commission would wish me to give my views with regard to the education and preparation of candidates for the Army, because I am unable to find myself in agreement with that Committee on one or two not unimportant points.

9401. I think we should distinctly prefer to have that expression of opinion?—It may be said that there were two schools with regard to the preparation of candidates for the Army; there is one school which holds they should be as highly militarily trained before they join the Army as possible, and that they should join the Army practically completely trained as officers, and take their place as such at once; and there is another school which thinks that it is not advisable to specialise a boy too young, and that it is better on the whole to give him a good general education up to a certain point, and then add to it the military or other training which his particular profession may require. Well, I may say that I myself belong to the latter school entirely, and the recommendations of the Committee will be found to point rather in the direction of the former; and one reason why I belong to the latter school is, not only my own experience, but if you look through the evidence of the various witnesses examined before that Committee you will find there is practically universal agreement that, take it altogether—all round—the best candidates we get for the Army are the university candidates, and they are precisely the people whose general education has been kept up to the latest date. Then you come to another point, which is that if it is determined to give an extended military education to officers before they join, so that they may join completely equipped, you must have some places of education—Sandhurst, Woolwich, or whatever they may be; and as the need for officers becomes greater, and as you want more officers, these places must be expanded. Now, passing by the question of expense, there is one great difficulty we are met with, and here I must repeat to a certain extent what I said before that Committee, namely, the very great difficulty that we have in finding in the Army officers who have the qualifications which make them into good teachers. The whole training and nature of the military life brings out qualities which are very much the opposite of what are wanted in, say, a good schoolmaster. You get decision, you get great quickness of action, you get self-reliance, you also get the habit of expecting what you direct to be done being done at once without argument, and that kind of thing, but you do not get the quiet patience required to develop another man's nature, and to train another man's mind. As a matter of fact, nothing is so difficult in the Army as to find men qualified to send to the Staff College, or to Sandhurst, or Woolwich, as professors or teachers. We produce a good article, and we produce a good many different kinds of article. If you want a man to go out to Somaliland, or somewhere else, and organise native levies or get a district into shape, or do all sorts of generally useful, strong, common-sense work, the Military Secretary for the time being will be able to find him for you. But if you asked for a man likely to make a good professor, he would probably tell you he does not really know of one, and this seriously influences the question of how far we should establish larger military training schools for candidates for the Army before they come up for examination. My view is that it would be far better for us not to try to undertake that which we are not properly qualified for, I mean the training or the education of boys, but leave that to the great educational institutions of the country which have been at this work for years, and I suggested to the Committee that these large educational bodies—the universities and the schools—should join in what might be called a sort of national service, and that we, having indicated to them the qualifications wanted, they should train the boys up in these qualifications, and that we should place a considerable number of commissions at their disposal for allotment by examination or otherwise to the boys so trained; but that view did not find favour with the Committee. I, however, still adhere to it. At the present moment Cambridge has got a military educational system of a very excellent kind, capable of large development; it has got a composite volunteer force of mounted infantry, and, I think, artillery and engineers, too, although I am not quite sure; it has also got a kind of military school in the same sense that it has got a classical school, and the men trained in those volunteer corps and also trained in the military subjects will probably be the men who will go up from Cambridge to compete for university commissions. That is the germ of a system that I should like to see very widely extended, and which I believe would help us, and do more to give us satisfactory officers and a large supply of them than our extending Sandhurst and Woolwich, and trying ourselves to take the boys at 16 or 17, as the case may be, and train them.

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9402. The Committee reported that the entrance of university candidates into the Army under revised regulations should be encouraged?—Yes, they did, but that is a very much smaller recommendation than I should like to see.

9403. That is only a summary?—Yes.

9404. (*Viscount Esher.*) Practically, your view would lead to the abolition of Sandhurst?—Yes.

9405. While, on the other hand, they recommend the extension of Sandhurst?—Yes.

9406. (*Chairman.*) Would you like to have no Sandhurst at all?—I would do away with Sandhurst.

9407. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You would not do away with Woolwich, where there are special subjects taught?—Well, there again, I have gone into that; the inclination of my mind is to do away with Woolwich also, but at the same time, at the present moment, no doubt, Woolwich turns out very good young officers to go into the Army, and, therefore, I have before me the fact that the system is working well. That makes me hesitate to a certain extent, but I must say the inclination of my mind would be to do away with Woolwich too.

9408. (*Chairman.*) Would you get the necessary technical education without Woolwich?—Yes, I think you could, and what is more, the special technical education in big guns and that kind of thing could be given after the candidate had joined. I should like to see the age for joining made a little older; of course, the parents would object to that; but, from the point of view of the Army, I think it would be better.

9409. What age would you fix?—I would let them join from 20 to 23, as I think they are then more fitted to take up the position; an extra year at that time of life means a great deal, and they come with greater confidence in themselves, with a better power of commanding others, and a rather more mature judgment.

9410. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Do you consider foreign languages to be a military subject, or one of general education?—General.

9411. And do you get that at the universities?—No, I do not know that you do.

9412. (*Viscount Esher.*) These lads who are specially trained in the Eton Army class, and who go to the special military side at Cambridge have, at any rate, some knowledge of French and German?—Possibly, and, as I say, we could indicate to the authorities at Cambridge or elsewhere what we wanted the boys to be trained in.

9413. (*Chairman.*) Is that all you wish to say just now upon that point?—Yes; nothing else occurs to me.

9414. The next is the appointment, promotion, and reward of officers?—The appointment is a mere routine thing, and I do not think there is much special to be said about that. I will take the Infantry as an example of how the system works, and assume that a candidate has passed his examination and is qualified for appointment. He is asked to say whether he wishes to be appointed to any particular regiment, and, as far as we can, we meet his wishes. He explains whether he has any special connection with that regiment, in the sense of having had a father or other relation who served in it, or a territorial connection, and similar points; and the matter is weighed and judged according to this connection and the position he has taken in passing out of Sandhurst. The object is to appoint the boy as far as possible to the regiment he wants to go to.

9415. You say he is appointed on the examination passing out of Sandhurst. If you did away with Sandhurst it would be as the result of a general competitive examination?—In the case of an officer coming up from the Militia, he is now appointed on the place he takes in that examination, coupled with the other things I have mentioned; I mean his connection with the regiment.

9416. If you did away with Sandhurst you would have boys coming up straight from school or the university, and they would be examined direct, I suppose?—They would be examined direct, as the Militia officers are now.

9417. Then promotion?—Then when you come to promotion——

9418. (*Viscount Esher.*) Before you begin upon that, might I read you this sentence from the Report of Mr. Akers Douglas' Committee, par. 132, p. 29: "From the evidence laid before them, the Committee are driven to conclude that the dominant cause is that the promotion of the young officer is not dependent on the zeal and ability which he may show." I wanted to remind you of that before you came to the question of promotion?—Well, all I can say is that so far as it is not, it is mainly because the opportunities which enable a man to show marked superiority over others, do not present themselves in peace. The performance of the ordinary regimental duties in peace does not give a man a chance of showing whether he is very much better than other people. It is not until you come to active service that you can find that out, and one of the greatest difficulties of promotion and of selection is the fact that we are not always on active service. If we were the thing would be simplicity itself. There is no difficulty whatever in selecting a man, as far as I know, on active service. In war a good man gets pushed on very quickly, because you have the chance of really judging of his qualifications; but in peace you have not the same opportunities for testing and judging of a man. All you can do is to have him reported on carefully, to keep back the men who show themselves distinctly lazy, or careless, or bad; to push on the men who show themselves exceptionally promising or brilliant; and in the other cases, to do, as we have done, to promote by seniority. I am a strong advocate for selection, and when you come to the higher ranks it becomes easier to exercise it, because you know more about the officer concerned; but with the lower ranks, promotion from second lieutenant to lieutenant and from lieutenant to captain, there really is very often very little to distinguish one officer from another. I cannot help feeling that some of the recommendations of that Committee are, to a certain extent, counsels of perfection; they would be admirable to carry out if it could only be shown how they could be carried out.

9419. Did you ever take notice of the courses of instruction through which young officers pass?—Yes.

9420. There are seven or eight through which they can pass?—Yes. You have seen a confidential report on an officer, I suppose, and you know that all those things are put down? I can assure you that no officer is ever promoted without his confidential report being very carefully gone over, and if there is any question a further reference is made; but I must also add that, of course, in the large majority of cases the confidential reports are favourable to the officer.

9421. (*Chairman.*) As to these courses of instruction which Lord Esher has referred to, if a man did not pass them would that retard his promotion?—It would depend upon the extent to which he had failed; the fact that he had gone to a course and not got a certificate would not necessarily of itself retard his promotion, but if that was coupled with the fact that he was reported upon as being rather indifferent to his work, and lazy, and so on, it would. It would be a question of degree.

9422. If one man had passed none of them and another had passed five or six, might the one who had passed none be promoted to a company and the other be left out?—The probability is that it would be very much against him; it would depend on the written report on the man's character and his qualifications.

9423. (*Viscount Esher.*) These courses are, to a certain extent, voluntary; the young officer need not, unless he chooses, go up for one of them?—They are voluntary in that sense, but non-attendance at them does not necessarily mean that the officer has not tried. Officers not infrequently apply to go up for courses, and are not sent because they cannot be spared, and therefore one must not infer because an officer has not gone through a certain course that he has not wanted to go through it. One must not carry that too far; there are a good many cases—it not infrequently happens—in which officers want to go through courses, and they do not go because their colonel thinks he cannot spare them from the regiment.

9424. But the confidential reports are couched, as a rule, in pretty general terms, are they not?—Of course, the confidential reports are matters of great difficulty, there is no doubt of that.

9425. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) He must pass the professional examination?—Yes.

9426. That is a *sine qua non*?—Yes, he must pass

his professional examination for higher rank. After you have read a certain number of confidential reports you get to read a great deal between the lines, and they really do give you more information perhaps than the writer always thinks. You get to see that while there is a good deal of general praise, there are certain omissions. I do not know how to put it, except that you form your own conclusions from the reports, and I hope and believe those conclusions are generally sound ones, but it would a great deal help the Military Secretary in that very difficult and puzzling question, when, and when not, to pass over a man, if the confidential reports were more explicit and more direct, and my perpetual endeavour was to get commanding officers to give fuller and more complete information in the confidential reports.

9427. (*Chairman.*) Does the promotion of all officers from the lowest ranks come up to the Military Secretary?—All from the lowest ranks.

9428. And they are examined on the confidential reports?—Of course, in all this, you understand, the Military Secretary is only acting for the Commander-in-Chief, and he submits to the Commander-in-Chief any case he considers sufficiently important to be brought to his attention, but in the mass of cases he deals with them himself.

9429. Does the Commander-in-Chief see them? Does it want his signature, or initials, or anything?—No, not now; they used to be initialled by the Commander-in-Chief, but it was found, during Lord Wolseley's term of office, that that meant a considerable amount of pen-work, without any corresponding result, and he, in place of having all the promotions put before him, ordered me to deal with them, and told me at the same time to put before him any case that I thought required his attention. Of course, I should never have passed over an officer without putting the case before him; but in connection with what I might call the ordinary routine promotions which went on, those I used to deal with without communicating with the Commander-in-Chief. They had, of course, to have the Queen's approval, and the schedule submitted was signed by the Commander-in-Chief, but as regards the question of office work the Military Secretary dealt with them.

9430. (*Viscount Esher.*) Would an energetic and hard-working young subaltern have a better chance of getting his company than one who merely goes through, quite quietly and without disgracing himself, the ordinary routine?—Certainly; and I will tell you how. It not infrequently happens that you have a company vacant in a regiment, and there is something against the senior, or something wanting in the senior officer for promotion of that regiment, which makes you think it is not desirable to take the senior, or the next senior, and put him into that vacant company. Then you look about in other regiments, and you pick out somebody who has been well reported upon, and you say: "Here is a very promising young fellow; he has done so and so, and is very well reported upon; here is a chance, I will offer him this company"; and that is a matter, I may almost say, of every day occurrence. "Every day" is perhaps too strong an expression to use, but it is quite usual to have what is called extra-regimental promotion.

9431. (*Chairman.*) Are you satisfied with that system?—I should like to see it extended; I should like to see the system of selection based on knowledge of the officers extended as far as possible. I should like to see, if I may say so, exactly the same system obtain in the Army that obtains in any good office. What happens when a place is vacant in an office, as far as I know, is, that the heads of the office consider the various clerks, or whoever they may be underneath them, and they take all their qualifications into consideration, including their standing in the office and make their selection. Selection does not mean, to my mind, the rejection of seniority, as it is often supposed to mean, but it means considering a great many other qualifications side by side with seniority, and not letting seniority alone be the turning point. Seniority however is an important factor, as I think anybody who has had to manage an office will know. It does not do always to take a young man quite at the bottom, even if he is very brilliant, and put him over the heads of a lot of people. What selection means to my mind is taking the man who, all things considered, you think will fill the place best. That is selection according to my ideas, and, as far as I could, consistent with the condition of the Army, when I was Military Secretary, that was the system under which, under Lord Wolseley's direction, I worked; but it had to be introduced somewhat by degrees, because, previous to Lord Wolseley's time, selection hardly existed at all. During his five years it gradually grew and grew, until towards the end of the time the exercise of selection had assumed no inconsiderable size.

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9432. You have been speaking now of regimental promotion chiefly?—Yes.

9433. Up to the top?—Yes.

9434. Now as to the rewards?—Well, of course, they are based entirely on the special actions which the men have done, and the special services which they have rendered, and they can only be judged on the merits of each case. You obtain recommendations from the officers under whom those whose cases are being considered have been serving, and the cases are dealt with on their merits.

9435. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) You have seen statements made by people of high authority that Parliamentary influence is enormously used in putting pressure on the War Office, and, of course, one knows on all public offices. I want to ask you whether, in your experience, Parliamentary pressure was much used?—I know the statement you refer to, and I confess I felt exceedingly indignant, and I should have liked to ask the author of the statement to give me instances to justify it. I do not mean to say that pressure—in the sense of one being approached—was never exercised, but I think I can honestly say that it never had an undue result.

9436. I was not asking whether you ever gave way to it, but just whether it was tried. I may tell you that I had a considerable number of Parliamentary Members coming to me at one time, and I wanted to know whether you had suffered in the same way?—I have had a good many people come to me, but, after all, it was part of one's duty to hear what they had to say in favour of any officer. I must also say that occasionally a good man was brought to my notice, by the personal intervention by his friends or relations, whom I should not have known of but for the fact of being approached privately. There have been some instances where my attention has been called to a good man, who would otherwise have escaped my attention, except for private influence, or pressure, or whatever you may call it.

9437. (*Chairman.*) Then, as to selection for the staff?—That is, perhaps, the most interesting of the whole of the Military Secretary's work. That is done with very great care, and, with regard to the higher appointments, it is done with the help of the Selection Board. Now, the selection for staff appointments above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel is dealt with by a Board called the Selection Board, which acts under the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief and consists of the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, Inspector-General of Fortifications, the Director-General of Ordnance, and the Military Secretary, and the question of the suitability of various officers is discussed, and the Board, not the Commander-in-Chief or the Military Secretary, comes to a conclusion, and I think myself it is a system that works exceedingly well.

9438. Then, I suppose it goes to the Secretary of State?—Then it is recommended by the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State. When I first became Military Secretary, what is now termed the Selection Board, was called the Army Board, and it used to deal in the same way with the staff appointments, and with promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and above, and I was rather against it, because it somewhat added to the work of the Military Secretary's branch, and prevented his dealing with matters as directly as he might otherwise have done. To put it quite simply, it poaches, if I may say so, a little bit on the preserve of the Military Secretary. At first I was rather against it, but, having seen the thing at work, I have changed my opinion, and I have had most valuable help as Military Secretary from that Selection Board. The officers who are on it have almost always, one or other of them, served with the officer whose qualifications are under discussion, and you get a variety of views, and a general judgment, which is better than the judgment of any one man. I think that system at present works about as well as any-

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thing could; I cannot think of anything that would work better. When it comes to the selection of the staff for an expedition or war, then the selection is made independently of the Selection Board, because it is a business which has sometimes to be worked through quickly; a large number of officers are involved, and the machinery would be too cumbersome, so that is done by the Commander-in-Chief—the Military Secretary, in the first instance—then the Commander-in-Chief, and, as a general rule, in consultation with the officer who is going to command the expedition. In the case of the war in South Africa, the whole list of staff appointments for the staff to be sent to South Africa was drawn up, first of all, in my office, and then considered by the Commander-in-Chief, and it was then submitted to General Sir Redvers Buller for any alterations or changes he might wish made. He made a few, but very few.

9439. Does the General in command of the Army Corps not have anything to say with regard to the composition of his staff?—The Commander of an Army Corps in peace time?

9440. Yes?—Only with regard to his personal staff.

9441. But not with regard to the other?—No; our rule, ever since I have known the Army, has been that General Staff appointments were made by the Commander-in-Chief, and not by the General Officer Commanding the particular cadre himself.

9442. With regard to the personal staff?—That is made by the General or Governor, as the case may be.

9443. Subject to any approval?—Subject to approval, yes, and there are certain qualifications laid down in the King's Regulations for aides-de-camp.

9444. They do not go before the Selection Board?—No.

9445. They would only come to the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

9446. And you think that the present method of selecting officers for the staff is satisfactory?—To a certain extent I am personally concerned, but I do, and I venture to think that the staff we sent out to South Africa, taking the material available at the time, was the best that could have been selected. I am bound to think that, because I did everything I could to get the best staff, and I hoped I had, and, therefore, you must understand, when I answer this question, I am speaking of my own work, and I may be influenced by this.

9447. Of course, on the occasion of a big war, there is a pressure for officers with staff experience, just as there is a pressure, as you have described, for officers with experience later on?—Yes, very great pressure.

9448. Is there no method by which you could increase the number on which you could draw for staff appointment?—I should like to extend the Staff College system as much as possible. As a sort of rough sketch of what I should like to see, I should like to see the schools of instruction in the different subjects very much extended; I should like to see a very considerable extension of the system of schools of instruction such as our present school for military engineering, our Hythe course and so on. I should like to see our existing schools extended and others added.

9449. (*Viscount Esher.*) Compulsory?—No, voluntary; but, as you will see, they would be an advantage to an officer. Those schools could, all of them, have either two or three classes of certificates—I think three myself—a first, second, and third class, that a man could take, and the certificate that he obtained at those schools would be considered, together with his other qualifications, when the question of promotion came up. Then, besides these schools, I should like to see the Staff College extended also, so as to take in more officers, and that no officer should be qualified to go up for the Staff College who had not gone through a certain number of these schools, so that he would be, before he went to the Staff College, well grounded in the general knowledge that you want a staff officer to have. Then he ought to go to the Staff College for two years, and have that knowledge improved, polished up, and extended.

9450. Do you adhere to two years now after your experience of the war?—Yes, I do; I think two years is not a bit too long. The time a man spends at the Staff College is of the greatest possible value, and it is of value to him, not simply from what is taught to him by his professors, but from the men he is thrown with; he meets there able men of branches of the Service, other than his own, and he begins to discover—say he is an infantryman—the value of cavalry and artillery from talking them over with cavalrymen and with artillerymen, and it widens his horizon enormously.

9451. (*Chairman.*) Is there not a tendency for a man who gets on to the staff to continue in a staff appointment?—Yes, there is.

9452. Would there not be an advantage if he was sent back to his regiment, and another officer brought in?—I think there would, and I think it ought to be compulsory that after a certain number of years of staff employment an officer should go back to his unit.

9453. It was suggested to us that there would be no hardship in that, if the officer who had been on the staff, supposing he had done well, got promotion on return to his regiment?—I do not think he should necessarily have promotion unless he had done his staff work exceptionally well; but I think he should go back. It is a very good thing for a regiment to get a man back into it who has been serving in the Staff office; it brings in a wider knowledge, and I am sure it is a good thing for the man. I myself felt very seriously the disadvantage of not going back to my regiment. I served for a great many years continuously on the staff, and I have no hesitation in saying that at the end I was not so fit for a general command as I should have been if I had been back more, doing everyday work with the men.

9454. I may say the evidence I was referring to was given to us by Lord Kitchener, who was complaining of the want of a sufficient number of trained staff officers, and he gave that as a possible remedy—that an officer who had done well on the staff should revert to his regiment with promotion.

9455. (*Viscount Esher.*) He thought that would be an inducement to get more officers to pass through the Staff College, but the difficulty now is that if your course is two years, that limits to such a very great extent the number of officers who can pass through the Staff College; if you shorten your course by one year, at any rate, you would get double the number of men through the Staff College?—I would enlarge the Staff College; if you want a greater output you must make your factory bigger. I think the number of officers who can go to the Staff College should be increased, and the Staff College should be enlarged to receive them.

9456. The reduction of the course by one year would be a practical remedy, which could be applied at once without further outlay?—Yes, and I do not wish at all to say that there might not be advantages in this, but I should prefer two years and a larger Staff College.

9457. (*Chairman.*) You were going to speak to the provision of officers for various colonial appointments?—The only thing to be said about that is to draw attention to its great growth of late years, and its tendency to grow. I am very glad and very proud of the fact, because it shows that an officer is being considered a much more useful man than he used to be. It will probably—it may or may not—surprise the Commission to know that at the present time, without counting officers employed as aides-de-camp to governors, we have between 700 and 800 officers employed by the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office in the various Dependencies and Colonies of Great Britain. During the time I was Military Secretary the demand for these officers steadily increased every year, and I hope it may go on increasing. I think the officers are getting very valuable experience.

9458. Of course, the Foreign Office carries on little wars of its own?—Yes, and it generally comes to us, I am glad to say, to find the officers.

9459. And the Colonial Office also; but does that in any way come under the office of Military Secretary?—Yes; he practically has the selection of all of them; they all pass through his hands.

9460. Not the Board of Selection?—No.

9461. Had you any difficuty in getting officers for those appointments?—After a certain point, yes; it is not always easy to find a good man, for the simple reason that, of course, the good men are rare; but still, take it on the whole, the Army can supply them, and the more there are the more the Army is likely to be able to supply them, because these opportunities given by service in the Hong Kong Regiment or in the

Egyptian Army have a tendency to attract good men to the Army. I should explain that in that number of between 700 and 800, I did not include the officers in the Egyptian Army, and that would be another 150. These things attract young fellows, good young fellows, and fellows with enterprise.

9462. Is there a list kept of these appointments ?—Yes.

9463. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Is it not difficult to get suitable officers for West Africa ?—Not more than for anywhere else; but it comes to the old story, that it is always difficult to get a good man.

9464. Is the climate not a great deterrent ?—That does not deter them a bit; it makes rather a greater supply necessary, because some of them may have to come home, poor fellows, to recruit, and you want another man, but there are always applicants.

9465. (*Chairman.*) Those are the main heads connected with the work of the Military Secretary ?—Yes.

9466. Besides that, you were also head of the mobilisation branch for six years ?—Yes.

9467. We have evidence before us that at the time of the war the mobilisation scheme worked without a hitch ?—Well, I think it did; I was at the War Office at the time, although, of course, not in the mobilisation office, and I think it did work well.

9468. I do not know that you would find it necessary to go into that question in detail ?—I do not think so.

9469. The only other thing, as you said you had been connected with the War Office in several capacities, is to ask you if there is any matter that you would like to mention with regard to the organisation of the office ?—Well, I have served in a good many different capacities at the War Office, and I have served on both sides of the War Office, as private secretary to three Secretaries of State, as well as in various staff appointments, and I have formed certain very definite conclusions in my mind with regard to the organisation of the War Office itself, and if the Commission would wish to hear them, I would be very glad to put them before you.

9470. I think we should like to hear them ?—The first thing I should like to say, is, that there are two points involved, first of all, the general principles on which the War Office should be organised, and, secondly, some more detailed points of organisation, and I will go into the general principles first. There is nothing, of course, that one has seen or heard more often lately than the advantage of running the War Office on business principles—it has been a sort of cry all round. I have tried, and I did before this cry when people talked of the want of business organisation of the War Office—to think out what business principles meant, and to see how far they could be applied to the War Office. Well, now, if you take business principles; if you try to gather them from the habit and practice of our large business institutions in this country, our railways, our banks, our mines, or anything else, you do find that there are a certain number of governing principles which run through all of them. The first of these is, that all these bodies are managed either by one individual, or by a board of partners, or proprietors, or directors, who have control over the whole of that particular business undertaking, over its administrative arrangements, its executive action, and over its expenditure and finance. That I think you may say is universal in all our large business institutions. The second is, that that board, and especially the chairman of it, is more or less permanent or semi-permanent; its members and its chairman are not altered at short intervals. The third is, that their interests are, to a large extent, bound up in those of the concern that they administer; and the fourth thing is, that they know perfectly well what it is the object of their business and of their company to do, and they know to a considerable extent, the extent to which they want to do it A manufacturer, for instance, knows pretty well what his output, under existing conditions will be, and if the business improves he puts up further machinery, and prepares for a larger output, knowing clearly what he is aiming at; a railway company, or a tramway company, works in a similar way. And you have, you may say, four main principles: First, the complete control centred in one board; secondly, more or less permanency in that board; thirdly, its interest being identical with the concern; and, fourthly, a clear knowledge of what the concern is intended to do. Now when you turn to the War Office, you find that almost all these things under our present arrangements are absent. How is the control of the Army managed ? First of all, it rests, or is supposed to rest, with the Commander-in-Chief, but you have probably had quite enough evidence before you, without my going into it, to show you that the command and control exercised by the Commander-in-Chief is of a very limited nature, that it does not go very far, and is subject to complete veto, or change, at the wish of the Secretary of State. The Commander-in-Chief may put forward a proposal with regard to the administration or the organisation of the Army, which has been the result of considerable thought, and the Secretary of State has simply to write at the bottom: "I am unable to approve of this," and initial it, and the matter is closed. Therefore, it cannot be said that the control by the Commander-in-Chief over the Army is a real one. Then you come to the Secretary of State, whose control is much more real, and in whom much more power centres, but he himself is subject to an irregular, an informal sort of control by the Treasury, which can review a good many of the actions he has done, and stop a great many of the actions he wants to do. There is again a body whose functions, I think, have never been clearly defined, the Cabinet Committee of Defence; and, lastly, there is the Cabinet and the Government itself, and the consequence is that you have proposals and plans for improvements, and changes, wandering up and down, and backwards and forwards between these various bodies, with the result of a great loss of clearness of action, and quickness of doing business, and, very often, of things getting smothered, or mixed up more or less with other things from which they should be kept separate. Therefore, that directness of control which you have in a large business institution is completely absent from the War Office. The permanent element is also to a great extent, absent. The Commander-in-Chief only holds office now for five years, and the Secretary of State, the Under-Secretary of State, and the Financial Secretary change office with the Government. Now, I think I am right in saying that within the last 30 years the War Office has had either ten or eleven Secretaries of State, and the other Parliamentary officials as well; or, in other words, the average duration of the Secretary of State's official life is three years, and, of course, if the average duration is three years, in a good many cases it has been less, and sometimes considerably less. Therefore, the most important person in the whole institution is changed on an average every three years, and, not infrequently, in a less period. Well now, would the London and North-Western Railway Company, or would any institution change its head once every three years ? I doubt whether it would. I do not say that it may not be necessary under our Constitution, but I say, that if it is so, it is hopeless to think of running the War Office on business principles, because this frequent change of head alone is in violation of one of the chief of those principles. Then you come to the fact that the Secretary of State, although, no doubt, anxious to do everything that can be done for the Army, is swayed by a good many other considerations; he is pulled by a good many strings in every way, and a good deal of his time has to be devoted to matters that are not Army matters. His interests are not absolutely bound up with those of the business, in the sense that the proprietor or the very large shareholder is; and, lastly, you come to what, to my mind, is the most important thing of all, and that is, that neither now nor at any other time that I can remember has the country really made up its mind what it wants its Army to do, and in consequence what Army it wants to have. It is quite true that there is a minute of the late Mr. Stanhope's, which has more or less occupied the ground. That minute has however, always been one that has only been half acted upon by the Government, and the various Secretaries of State for War who have held office since it was drawn up and, moreover, it has never been made public, it has never received, if I may use the phrase, the approval of the nation. The country, at the present moment, does not know what Army it wants, and it does not know what objects the Army which exists is expected to fulfil. Until that is done, until we arrive at making up our mind what we want our military machine to do, it seems to me not very much use going into detailed questions of the particular organisation of a Division, or an Army Corps, or anything else. We want to begin at the beginning, and to reason out, and think out, what we consider under normal conditions should be the Army which this

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country is to keep up, or, if you like to put it so, what shall be the duties which that Army should be prepared to fulfil—it may be put in that way—and in that case, the military experts would very soon be able to work out what Army is wanted. How little this is being considered you can judge from the simple fact which is before us, that when, at the present moment, as far as I know—of course, I am not at the War Office now, and only speak from outside knowledge—what we still call the scheme of two Army Corps for foreign service and three Army Corps for home defence still holds the ground—and, as far as I know, that is the only authoritative pronouncement on the part of the Government as to the Army the military authorities should be prepared to produce—at the very time the Secretary of State is promulgating a scheme for six Army Corps. Which is it to be? And how are the military authorities generally, the Secretary of State, the Commander-in-Chief, and the various officials under them, to work with any requisite clearness and definiteness, proceeding gradually up to the end which they aim at, until they knew what that end is? The very first requisite, to my mind, in any War Office reform, as it is called, or any alteration in our system is by the assembling of the strongest possible Commission that can be got together, or some similar means, to determine what shall be the Army which in normal peace times this country shall maintain, and, as a necessary corollary and consequence from that, what shall be the Army it is to put into the field in war. That seems to me the preliminary to anything else. Let us give up this wandering on in a fog, as we have done for years and years, getting a little bit here and a little bit there, but with no definitely laid down, clear and clean plan to work up to a previously determined upon and settled organisation; and the first thing I think we require is for that point to be determined. When that point is determined, then the other things can go on.

9471. (*Viscount Esher.*) I do not want to interrupt you, but is not that what the Defence Committee of the Cabinet were instituted to determine?—My knowledge of what the Defence Committee is intended to do is of the mistiest, but it certainly has never determined this; besides which, one thing I hold to very much is that whatever is determined should not be a confidential matter between the Government and the War Office authorities; it should be a thing which is received and adopted by the country, and is known in exactly the same way as we have a naval programme. The programme for the Navy is that our Navy is to be equal to those of any two combined foreign Powers. The country knows that, and accepts it; it is satisfied, and proceeds on it. Let us have something similar for the Army, and let the country approve it. Do not let us be in the position that we were in at the beginning of this war, in which our instructions were, so to say, that we should be prepared to put two Army Corps in the field for foreign service, and when we put not very far from four into the field, and had done a great deal more than had been laid down as its duty, the War Office was held to have broken down all round. Let the country know what it is that is proposed, and approve it, or, if it is not approved, have it altered, and then we shall work with support all round and work independently, it is to be hoped, of any political considerations or changes of the Ministry.

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9472. (*Chairman.*) But the minute of Mr. Stanhope, or the effect of that minute was known?—Very little, I think; I think I am right in saying that it was never authoritatively published. It was known inside the War Office, but for a long time it was highly confidential.

9473. It may have been, but surely it was accepted by the Governments on both sides that the two Army Corps and a third for home service were what the War Office should be prepared to produce?—As we soldiers went on modelling our arrangements more or less on this, it gradually grew to a sort of semi-acceptance; but how little accepted it was can be seen from the fact that we were perpetually asking for things in order to be able to provide these forces and not getting them. Therefore it was not accepted in the sense of being put into force; we did not get the stores for the two Army Corps, and we did not get some of the men, and we had not the three Army Corps for home defence.

9474. The provision of stores no doubt, as we have had evidence to show, was not sufficient; but with regard to the demands for men, which were put forward from time to time, was it not the fact that those grew out of the growing necessities abroad, and that circumstances always must tend to alter?—No doubt they do; but it is a curious fact, and I think attention is drawn to it in one of the Minutes of Lord Wolseley—it so happened it was only an accident—that the increase which was required to meet our greater liabilities abroad would have fitted in singularly well with the increase required for home defence. I think you will find that point gone into in one of Lord Wolseley's Minutes; it was merely an accident, but it did so turn out that the 18 battalions, if I remember rightly, speaking now from memory, which he asked for on one occasion, and which would have given us sufficient to maintain our foreign garrisons at what was then considered their requisite strength, would also have enabled us to put into the field very nearly three Army Corps of Regular troops for home defence.

9475. Very likely, but the point I wanted to bring out was, that in all you have been saying, it seems to me, with all respect, you leave out of consideration the fact that the political science cannot be so exact?—Of course, I would not propose that this Army, once laid down, should be an absolutely fixed quantity, and that there should be no elasticity, and no power of developing it further, or altering it as circumstances went on; that must, of necessity, take place as circumstances change every year; minor changes must occur from time to time, and always do, and always will in any working machine, if I may use the phrase; but it would make an extraordinary amount of difference if we knew, within a reasonable margin, what it was that should be aimed at, and also if the country knew that too, and approved of it, to the extent of saying: "Yes, we want this Army provided, and we want this Army which will do so-and-so, provided with its stores." We should never go back then, as we have often done since I can remember the War Office.

9476. The country expresses its views, I suppose, through the Government, which is the accepted Government of the country at the time?—Yes, when it has got them, but I am sorry to say that my experience is that the country has got no clear views about its Army at the present moment. It does not know what it wants.

9477. I say, the country expresses its views through the Government?—Yes, but I say the country, at present, has got no views.

9478. The Government?—The country; I do not think the country knows what size of army it wants. I do not think it knows at the present time whether it wants to be ready to put three Army Corps abroad, or four, or two.

9479. Personally I am not quite sure how one would get at an expression of the views of the country on a point like that except by the election of a party and a Government, which then forms a certain programme, as Mr. Stanhope did in 1888?—Do you not think a Royal Commission would to a considerable extent condense and focus a question of that sort, and that its report when published would command a great deal of attention?

9480. Speaking to-day I cannot do otherwise than agree with you, of course; but at the same time there are limits, I think, to the effect of the reports of Royal Commissions, as one always finds?—That is so.

9481. (*Viscount Esher.*) Would there not be a danger of stereotyping the sort of army which had been suggested by the Royal Commission, and a very great difficulty in expanding it? Fancy what an argument it would be in the hands of the Government of the day if it was asked by the soldiers at the War Office for a necessary extension of that scheme if they were able to reply:—"Oh! but this is going beyond the report of the Royal Commission." Have you considered a point like that?—I have considered that, and the point I was going to come to was that supposing you had that report, that report could be reviewed every three years. I should not review it in a shorter time than that, but the Army Estimates should be based upon that report, and it should be considered as stable for three years, barring a special emergency.

9482. (*Chairman.*) The Royal Commission would have to be in perpetual session?—You need not necessarily reassemble the Commission. Minor changes might be made by the Government. But any changes made, and the reasons for them, should be known to the country. That is the important point.

9483. (*Viscount Esher.*) Do you not think the country would accept the verdict of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet on a question of that kind?—I do not hold strongly to the Royal Commission; as long as the thing is laid down and is known to the country I do not hold to its being specially done by a Royal Commission. Let it be done by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet if that will in any way make the thing work more easily, certainly.

9484. (*Chairman.*) Admitting that point as to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet brings the thing back to what I said before, namely, that the accepted Government of the day is the body that must speak for the country?—Yes; I do disagree with that. The object I want to arrive at is that the Army to be maintained should be known, not only within the walls of the War Office, but to the country. As to the means by which that is arrived at I do not wish to express a very strong preference, though I think a properly constituted Commission would be the best.

9485. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You think it should be known to Parliament?—Yes.

9486. And through Parliament to the country?—Yes.

9487. (*Viscount Esher.*) I suppose you do not desire under those circumstances to go into any questions of detail as to the reorganisation of the War Department; your views are covered generally by the statement you have made?—There is only one more thing I should like to say, and that is that all satisfactory working of the War Office must to a great extent depend upon a certain amount of self denial on the part of members of Parliament. At the present moment the War Office is blocked with small questions, and real decentralisation is impossible, because it is open to any member of Parliament at any time to ask a question about a very small matter of military administration. I will give one example which will do as well as a dozen, which, however, might easily be given. Take, for instance, the place where a Militia battalion is to train, nothing is more within the special functions of the General Officer who commands the district to which that battalion belongs than to settle this. He decides that instead of training at the particular town where it is in the habit of training, it is to go into camp. What happens? The various publicans and tradesmen of the town concerned see they are to lose a little custom, and they go to their Member and get up a certain amount of agitation, and the matter comes up either as a question, or maybe on a motion to adjourn the debate, in Parliament. The Secretary of State is obliged to go into that matter himself; he may have the greatest possible wish to decentralise, and to let the General Officer in command of the district alone, but he cannot help going into the matter, because he has to defend the case in Parliament. That is a thing that is not an unusual occurrence; it is happening, when Parliament is sitting, I do not know how many times a week, and the result is that not only the larger control of the Army is managed by the Secretary of State, but its detailed executive action is determined by him.

9488. When you say he is obliged to go into it, do you mean before the decision is arrived at or after the decision is arrived at, in consequence of the question?—First of all he is obliged to go into it after the decision is arrived at, but what not infrequently happens is that after a time, if this sort of case recurs more than once, in self defence he says: "I have really so much trouble about these matters in Parliament that I must ask the General Officer, although I do not want to interfere, before deciding another case like this to refer it to me." That is the sort of insidious way in which the thing works.

9489. In point of fact it is true that the Secretary of State is overwhelmed with detail which possibly, if it were not for questions in Parliament and other reasons, he could leave to his subordinates?—If it were not for that and for the references to the Treasury. I do not know whether the Commission would think it worth while, but if they would get the papers that go before the Secretary of State in one week they would be quite astonished at the paltriness of a great number of the questions that go up to him. And that means that both he and the Commander-in-Chief are spending their time on these minute things—time which ought to be given to the thinking out of larger questions.

9490. I put a question to a late Under-Secretary of State on that point, and he denied that an unnecessary number of papers were laid before the Secretary of State. I had always understood, and, in fact, I knew from my own personal knowledge of the War Office, that what you have said more nearly approximates to the truth, and you hold a very strong opinion on that point?—Very strong indeed, and I have been private secretary to three Secretaries of State; the smallest possible questions come before him.

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9491. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) How would you stop that?—I am afraid it can only be stopped to a great extent by the exercise of self denial on the part of members of Parliament; under the present constitution of this country, whereby it is open to any member of Parliament to raise a debate on anything connected with military administration, I do not see how it is to be stopped by other means.

9492. (*Viscount Esher.*) Do you think a little more moral courage on the part of Secretaries of State would do it?—That would help; if you could get the two things, the feeling on the part of Parliament generally that this intervention in details requires to be restricted, and courage on the part of the Secretary of State, it might be broken down. At present it certainly is a great evil, and nobody outside the office can know how much time is wasted over these Parliamentary questions.

9493. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You are aware that officers of the Army consider it a very valuable privilege that they can get a member of Parliament to ask a question, and very often very useful results have arisen from these questions being asked in the House?—Like many things, there is good in it, but it may be carried too far, and I think at present it is carried a great deal too far. I do not want to abolish the practice altogether, but I want more self-restraint.

9494. Would it not be almost insuperably difficult to lay down what questions were to be asked and what questions were not to be asked? There has been some attempt made to restrict these questions, I think, in the last few months?—There have, I believe, but I have not followed these attempts closely.

9495. For instance, there is a regulation as to certain questions not being orally answered?—But, although a question is not orally answered, it takes up time all the same, and goes up to the Secretary of State.

9496. Is it not the case that very often these answers are evasive, and that they are, in many cases, not a real answer?—I can hardly pass an opinion upon that.

9497. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) With respect to the promotion of officers, you say that a good deal depends upon the Confidential Report?—A great deal.

9498. Does that Confidential Report affect officers above the rank of subaltern?—Yes.

9499. Captains and majors?—Captains and majors and colonels, too—up to colonels; after that it ceases.

9500. Do you think that these Confidential Reports can always be safely relied upon? May there not be bias sometimes, perhaps even unconscious bias, against a junior officer?—It is possible; that is human nature; and I do not mean to say they are always taken for gospel. But you must remember that if a Confidential Report is of a nature which it is considered will affect prejudicially an officer's chances of promotion, it is always communicated to him; that is laid down in the King's Regulations, and he has an opportunity of putting forward his side of the case.

9501. Then, again, with respect to promotion, does not a good deal depend in the promotion of a junior officer upon his apparent power of controlling men?—Yes.

9502. For instance, if you take the cavalry, some men are much better Squadron leaders than others by having more power and control over the men?—Yes.

9503. And that goes a long way, no doubt, to securing promotion?—Yes, all that would be mentioned in his Confidential Report.

9504. And a man, although a very junior officer, might show that he is a man fit to command men?—Yes.

9505. As to the evidence you have just been giving, do you know whether Mr. Stanhope's five propositions have ever been before Parliament?—I am as certain as I can be that they have never been formally before Parliament. I am speaking from general knowledge, as I have not watched the proceedings of Parliament, but I feel quite sure.

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9506. Parliament has never been taken into the confidence of any Cabinet as to what they think the requirements of the country are?—Not in the sense of being told the dangers to which the country is exposed and the power of the Army to meet them.

9507. If so, Parliament must really be asked to vote in the dark the amount that may be required for the military Estimates?—Yes, it is in the dark as to what protection that amount will give. I fancy that the Two Army Corps scheme and the Three Army Corps scheme have been alluded to by Secretaries of State for War in their speeches on the Army Estimates, but I do not think Mr. Stanhope's Minute has ever, as such, been communicated to Parliament.

9508. With respect to the Military Estimates, Parliament in voting the money simply places its trust in the Cabinet for the time being that the money will be sufficient for the maintenance of the Army of the country?—And it also has the speech of the Secretary of State for War, in which he explains to them what he has in view.

9509. That is in time of war?—In peace also. When the Army Estimates are taken, the Secretary of State makes a statement; in fact, there is a memorandum published with the Estimates, and he also makes a speech, in which he explains to Parliament what he proposes to do, and how the Army will be organised for the next year.

9510. But whether that army is a sufficient army for the requirements of the country or not Parliament does not know?—No, not as far as I know.

9511. It is otherwise, you say, with respect to the Navy. Parliament knows that the scheme is to keep up our Navy so as to be able to meet any other two Navies of any other two foreign nations?—Yes, but it is no definite standard for our Army.

9512. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) But any member of Parliament can ask any question he pleases as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the force laid down, and that frequently takes place on Supply. Do they not do so?—I have no doubt a member of Parliament can do what he pleases in Parliament—it is for Parliament to decide.

9513. Do they not habitually in all the discussions on the Estimates ask why alterations are not made, and why there are not more troops?—The discussions on the Estimates, as far as I have seen, are apt to go off on rather minor points.

9514. They accept the great points practically?—They accept the great points generally.

9515. (*Sir John Jackson.*) With your long experience at the War Office, do you think that the general business of the War Office would go on better if it were carried on more on the lines of the Admiralty business—by a Board, or, to go a little further, more on the lines of, say, the London and North-Western Railway Company, with the Secretary of State as its chairman?—It is a question I have thought about very often, and while I see strong arguments in favour of having this Board, my experience makes me think it would go on better under the Commander-in-Chief, with complete power over all the departments under him.

9516. Of course, it has its Army Board and that sort of thing, but that is a board that does not go into the general business of the department in the way that I think the Board of the Admiralty does?—I am not sufficiently familiar with the inner working of the Admiralty to know how that Board does work, or to what extent the First Sea Lord is supreme. I fancy the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty has much greater power really than the Commander-in-Chief at the War Office. I think it is a very good thing that a Military Board should assemble once a week, or some time like that, so that the one department may know what the other department is doing; but I would put that Board under the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief rather than the Secretary of State. You might have, if you like, two Boards, the one a supreme Board under the Secretary of State of both civil and military officials, the other a Military Board under the Commander-in-Chief. I would certainly have the purely Military Board.

9517. Taking the illustration of a railway company again, that would be like putting a railway board under the presidency of its general manager, which would hardly work; in your opinion it is not altogether unlikely that if the business were managed by a Board on those lines it might go on better?—I will not at all say that there is any inherent impossibility in its going on as well or better; but you must remember one thing, which is, that the Army has been for years accustomed to a Commander-in-Chief, and looks up to him, and takes decisions from him, or what it supposes to be so, although very often they are decided by the Secretary of State, with greater confidence and readiness than it would from a Board the composition of which was, perhaps, rather strange to them. At the same time I am not prepared to say that it would not work on the same system as obtains at the Admiralty.

9518. (*Chairman.*) Is that all you wish to say, Sir Coleridge?—Yes.

TWENTY-SECOND DAY.

Tuesday, 2nd December 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable The Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable The Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

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Mr. STEPHEN J. GRAFF, C.B., Assistant Director of Transports, called and examined.

9519. (*Chairman.*) You are the Assistant-Director of Transports?—Yes, and I have held that position since 1895.

9520. I understand that you have given evidence lately before the Court of Inquiry on the Administration of the Army Remount Department, at which time you dealt with some branches of this question?—Yes.

9521. I should just remark with regard to that evidence, that we are not at these sittings taking up the question of remounts, and, therefore, we should not wish you to repeat the evidence which you then gave. What we should rather desire from you is a statement as to the general position with regard to the management of the Transport Service by the Admiralty?—I have drawn up some notes here of the general position which the Transport Department bears to the War Office, and perhaps it would be satisfactory if I were to read them.

9522. I think that would do very well?—The Board of Admiralty as the agents, and on the requisition of the

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Secretary of State for War, carry out all the sea transport work of the Army, except coastwise conveyance in the United Kingdom. Since 1st April, 1888, the cost of Army Sea Transport is charged to Army instead of to Navy votes, but the transfer was only made on the understanding that the control of the Admiralty over the transport service remained unimpaired. The Admiralty have always held that the work can only be efficiently and satisfacorily carried out by an Admiralty Department in connection with similar work for the Navy. For convenience sake the Director of Transports is placed in direct communication with the War Office as regards all ordinary matters. An officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department visits the Transport Department frequently in peace time, and in time of war is located at the Admiralty, to assist the Director of Transports in military questions. All claims chargeable to Army Votes, after examination in the Transport Department receive the concurrence of Army examiners, who visit the Admiralty daily, before being passed to the War Office for payment. The Director of Transports is responsible for the whole work, administration, claims and accounts, including custody of Army transport stores, such as troop bedding, horse gear, etc. That is a general statement of the position of the matter.

9523. That was the position at the beginning of the war?—Yes, and the position remains the same practically. I do not know whether you would care for me to state what I think are the disadvantages and the advantages respectively of the position?

9524. Certainly?—The disadvantages of the present system are—Firstly, the natural wish of the War Office (who find the money) to increase their control, which the Admiralty hold cannot be done with safety; secondly, the fact that preparations involving the direct expenditure of money, although recommended by the Admiralty, cannot be carried out without the sanction of the Secretary of State for War. The advantages on the other hand are the removal of a very disturbing factor from the Navy Estimates, and fuller consideration on the part of the Army authorities of the financial aspect of contemplated moves. As an illustration of the disadvantage, a proposal was made just before the war—in July—to purchase some horse stalls; that was not acceded to by the Secretary of State for War, he did not see his way to it, and that is one of those things which might have been carried through by the Admiralty if they had had the whole management.

9525. Did that cause delay in the proceedings?—It caused great inconvenience; I cannot say that the ships were actually delayed as regards the embarkation of troops, but it caused great inconvenience.

9526. In what way?—The stalls had to be prepared at very short notice, and in a great hurry, whilst the work was being carried out, instead of being all ready to be carried alongside the ships and fitted on board them. Captain Pitt could speak more particularly as to the disadvantage of that.

9527. When you say amongst the disadvantages, that these questions have to go to the Secretary of State for War, I suppose that is the remaining inconvenience, that it does cause delay?—Yes, that is the only inconvenience, and I am bound to say that I think as the result of the war experience, as far as I can judge, the disadvantages will be minimised in the future. I think the Army authorities now thoroughly recognise that the work can be satisfactorily carried out by the Navy, and will probably wish to interfere less in the future than they have given indications of doing in the past.

9528. You hold strongly that it can be best done by the Admiralty?—Very strongly.

9529. Will you give your reasons for holding that opinion?—I think the carrying of troops by sea and the fitting up of ships is essentially a naval service, and best carried out by naval officers, and under naval control. By the transport service being under the Admiralty the co-operation of naval officers all over the world is secured, and the ready assistance of naval officers under the control of the Admiralty at any moment; for instance, on the outbreak of war a large number were appointed to the different ports to assist Captain Pitt in carrying out the work of fitting up the transports. I think that could hardly be done if the work were transferred.

9530. And in the actual taking up of ships?—In connection with that work the naval officers and naval engineers inspect the ships.

9531. That would be necessary in any case?—Yes, and I do not think it would work so well if the work were placed under the War Office. Those are the main points.

9532. At the beginning of the war could you say what steps were taken as soon as you were called upon to act?—Perhaps I might mention the state of preparation in which the Transport Department was?

9533. Yes?—The Transport Department really has been organised with the view of shipping a considerable military force over sea at short notice since 1876. Before that the preparations were somewhat inadequate, but preparations were then made thoroughly.

9534. When you say "preparations were made," what does that mean?—I will mention that later on. The office establishment, both clerical and professional, is intended to be a sufficient nucleus to admit of rapid expansion in time of war; full particulars of all ships suitable for the conveyance of men and horses are recorded in books, based either on information obtained from owners, or, where possible, by actual inspection. Captain Pitt would speak as to the nature of those inspections and the details. A stock of horse fittings, horse gear, and troop bedding is kept in the Government depôts, and the Government Contractor for fittings is bound to keep on his premises a certain quantity of material for troop-fittings ready prepared. Arrangements are made with the Director of Victualling and the War Office respectively with regard to the victualling of the troops to be embarked, and the forage of the horses, and we keep a special stock ready prepared of the printed forms connected with the work, ready to ship on board the different transports. Those stocks of Army transport stores have been revised from time to time in concert with the War Office, according to the numbers of the force which the Admiralty was expected to be ready to convey at short notice, which never exceeded one Army Corps. We were never supposed to be ready to convey at one time more than one Army Corps, and for a time the number was rather less, but at the commencement of the war practically there was troop-bedding in hand for 55,000 men and horse fittings of the old pattern for 10,000 horses. Just before the war, at the instance of the Admiralty, a committee was assembled to consider the sufficiency of the stocks of Army transport stores, in view of its having been recently intimated by the War Office that two Army Corps were held in readiness. Having considered that, they drew the attention of the Secretary of State for War to the necessity for further provision. One of the matters with which they dealt was the modification of horse stalls to admit of the utilisation of cattle ships as cavalry transports, and their interim report on this point was acted on in fitting up ships during the war. They suggested on the 19th July, 1899, the purchase of 6,000 new pattern stalls, but the War Office declined sanction until 21st of September; that was the point I alluded to in the beginning.

9535. We have heard of that already?—No reasons were assigned, and we thought at the time it was possible that there might be political reasons why they did not wish us to make preparations.

9536. When did you first have any notice to make any preparations?—About the beginning of July the matter began to be discussed. On the 17th of July steps were taken by the Director of Transports to have all the Indian and Imperial bedding prepared for use; that was a thing within our own competence, and all the dirty bedding was washed, hammocks slung and prepared, and bed cases filled. In July and August the number of hospital ships likely to be required was discussed with the War Office, and Captain Pitt arranged a plan for fitting them up.

9537. Was that number based on an Army Corps?—It was based on the special requirements of South Africa. The War Office considered two ships were sufficient, and the Director of Transports was rather inclined to think more would be required to keep up a continuous service, but only two were decided upon. Ultimately a larger number of ships had to be fitted up as hospital ships in South Africa; they were wanted in the end. Then on the 7th August the probable strength of the force likely to be moved to South Africa was intimated to us—49,000 men and 7,900 horses—and the Director of Transports was asked to say what would be the shortest time in which he could prepare transports for it. His reply was that from four to five weeks would be the shortest time for its dispatch in the then state of the labour market, and working overtime, everything being in order, and with no mishaps or set-backs. There was no mention at

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that time of any other animals being conveyed. Early in September the Director of Transports was asked how long it would take him to get freight for 2,000 mules from the Mediterranean, and he answered that it would only take a few days.

9538. Those communications in July, August, and early in September I suppose were only a sort of tentative enquiries?—Entirely; it was always stated as the numbers of the force that might *possibly* be sent, and so on; no action could be taken on it except in a very general way. Of course, the Director of Transports, Captain Pitt, and I, all foresaw that war was very likely, and naturally made as much enquiry as we could and as much preparation as we could, without positive official preparation; that we were not allowed to do.

9539. Did you point out anything except the horse fittings in which you considered that it was desirable to take action at once?—No, I think not. I think that was the only point.

9540. That brings you up to near the date at which you did receive orders?—Yes. The Secretary of State authorised the expenditure of £25,000 on the 23rd September. That included the provision of the 6,000 stalls, and we at once set to work to order the various articles of horse gear and other stores which that represented. On the same date, the 23rd September, a Saturday, in the afternoon, a requisition came in for the conveyance of 7,000 mules, and that was really the first war service we were asked to carry out. They were to be conveyed from the Mediterranean and New Orleans, and to be carried (if in any way possible) at inclusive rates per head, and it was all arranged by the 26th. Then on the 28th the Quartermaster-General sent details of the force proposed to be embarked, but it was only mentioned as proposed, giving all the ports of embarkation, the whole thing mapped out, and upon receipt of that their Lordships decided right away, without waiting for a formal requisition, to engage tentatively two large freight ships belonging to the Union Castle Company. Those ships would carry 1,500 men each, and would otherwise have gone to the Continent and embarked cargo. They were engaged and held in readiness. It is impossible to engage a ship beforehand without incurring expenditure, of course. The owners will not keep a ship waiting simply on the off-chance of an engagement, because most of the ships employed on transport service for the conveyance of men and horses are ships belonging to good lines and are in full work, and have to be taken off their own lucrative work to take up the Government work.

9541. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) And in this case they did incur responsibility?—Yes, absolutely, and a very heavy sum, naturally.

9542. (*Sir John Edge.*) To the shipowner or to the Admiralty?—The Admiralty incurred the responsibility; and on the same evening, also at the Admiralty initiative, their Lordships approved of the issue of a confidential circular to about 35 leading shipowners asking them what ships now ready, or which will be ready shortly, they could place at the Government disposal for employment as hired transports for two or three months certain, and on what terms, asking for a reply the next day. All that was done in anticipation of a requisition, and on Admiralty responsibility. I have no doubt their Lordships were pretty convinced by that time that war was certain. That brings one down to practically the outbreak of war as far as the Transport Department is concerned.

9543. (*Chairman.*) What was after that?—On Saturday, 30th September, there was a conference held at the War Office, at which Lord Goschen, Sir Bouverie Clark, and myself were present, and verbal authority was given by Lord Goschen to the Director of Transports at the conference to engage vessels for the conveyance of the force. It was stated by the Commander-in-Chief (Lord Wolseley) at that conference that the troops would not be ready to commence embarkation before the 21st October, and that same night, out of the offers we received, we had engaged 20 ships, and the engagement went on continuously from that time.

9544. From the 30th September?—Yes.

9545. Is this a convenient time for you to tell us the method in which you arranged about the engagement of transports?—Perhaps, if you would allow me, I would just complete the preparations. Immediately that order was given by Lord Goschen the necessary additions to, and re-arrangement of, the clerical staff were carried out. We got some fresh rooms, turning out another department, and Captain Pitt's staff was increased by a large number of Naval officers at the various ports, and everything of that sort was carried through, and a military officer was appointed by the Secretary of State for War to assist Sir Bouverie Clark. On the 9th October we got the official requisition, which was for 46,000 men and 8,600 horses, and Lord Lansdowne stated that he understood that 24,000 men and 4,000 horses would be ready to embark between the 21st and the 25th. By the middle of November the whole force was embarked, although there were strikes and very considerable difficulties from time to time; and, speaking roughly, I think I may safely say that the War Office were never kept waiting for ships; the whole tonnage of the ships required was in hand by the third week in October. As to the method of engagement, as regards the transports and troop freight ships in time of war, it is impossible to receive tenders on a given rate, and to adjudicate upon them in the ordinary way. That confidential circular was issued to all the large firms likely to have the ships, and as the offers came in they were dealt with on their merits, and accepted. If a ship were sufficiently well known, that ship was at once accepted, subject to survey, and if there was any doubt about a ship, we just held over until Captain Pitt could be consulted as to whether it was at all a likely ship to answer the purpose. Of course, a very great many ships were offered which were clearly quite unsuitable; shipowners have very singular opinions very often as to what ships are suitable for the conveyance of troops. Of course, the question of the height between decks and the amount of saloon and cabin accommodation and all kinds of subjects come in which Captain Pitt will explain fully; but, roughly speaking, that was the principle. The owners or their representatives came up, and the whole thing was carried on verbally; there was verbal negotiation in the first instance, and as soon as the terms were arranged they would reduce them to writing in a form we keep, and they were given a temporary acceptance, subject to survey.

9546. You have no standing engagements with shipowners?—No, we find it impracticable, unless they were subsidised, and then, I think, the cost would be quite incommensurate with the gain.

9547. Because you are always able to get the ships you want from the trade?—Yes. Of course, the difficulty in getting hold of the ships was due to several reasons. One was that the freights were at that time good, and the ships we wanted were in lucrative employment. Another was that we were only able, in view of the likelihood of the short continuance of the war, to promise two or three months certain, and that is rather a short time for shipowners to take their ships off their own trade for. If we could have promised them a longer engagement we would have had greater ease in getting the ships at the beginning.

9548. And less cost?—And less cost. Of course, the rates were rapidly reduced afterwards; but at the beginning no doubt the rates were high for that reason. A shipowner when he first charters a ship to the Government has a great many very heavy expenses to incur in the way of lighting arrangements, cutting scuttles, laying decks, and so on, to prepare the ship—owners' work and not Government work under the Transport Regulations—and they do not care to face that unless they see their way to a good profit.

9549. The rates were high in this case?—Just at the beginning, undoubtedly. I started with the idea of trying to limit them to 17s. 6d. per ton per month, but it was soon found that no owner would come under £1, and they went up higher as the demand got greater. Of course, practically, the demand was in excess of the supply considerably.

9550. All through?—Not all through, but at the beginning. The Government Charter is very much more stringent on the shipowner than the so-called Government Form in mercantile life; it puts a great many responsibilities and expenses on the shipowner that he would not have under an ordinary mercantile charter. We think it the best plan, and it works well in the end.

9551. They must take that into account in the question of the freight?—Yes. We were able in most cases, with the horses and mules, after the very first, to have competitive tenders; the case was rather different, and the area of choice was very much larger. Perhaps I might explain that in all cases the ship has to be fitted and altered very extensively to admit of carrying large bodies of troops and horses; ships do not exist

ready fitted which could carry them, and in the case of most of the cavalry ships, scuttles had to be cut, decks had to be sheathed and sometimes laid, and even saloon and cabin accommodation built. I might mention, as an illustration of the difficulty of getting hold of ships, that there were some ships that would have made extremely good cavalry transports belonging to the Atlantic Transport Company which the Director of Transports was very anxious to get hold of, and he pressed the company several times to tender them, and finally, at his request, they did tender, but it was at the rate of 40s. per ton per month, and the Government to take all the responsibility of any American lawsuits in which they were involved by cancelling their meat contracts. which, of course, was prohibitive. Many of these lines, especially the lines of large cattle boats, have standing contracts long ahead which they have to deal with in some way or another, either by supplying other ships or cancelling and paying compensation. That was the case with the large Leyland boats which were chartered for the conveyance of horses.

9552. You said the rates varied at different periods. Can you give that in averages?—Yes, I can. The total number of transports employed since the beginning of the war has been 116, including two engaged for a short period in carrying mules, which were much smaller than any of the others.

9553. They are all included in this statement, showing the engagements made by the Transport Department of the Admiralty in connection with the conveyance of troops, animals and stores to and from South Africa between the 1st June, 1899, and the 30th September, 1902, which you have been good enough to hand to us?—Yes. Excluding these, the average size has been 6,400 tons gross, the range of size being from 12,600 tons—the "Cymric"—to 3,500 tons.

9554. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) That is gross tonnage, not displacement, is it?—Yes, gross register tonnage. The range of speed was from 19½ knots to 11 knots. No transports were engaged for the conveyance of stores, which were all carried in freight ships for the first time in any warlike expedition. We had always had transports before. The average rate of hire all round over the whole period to the 30th September, 1902, has been 18s. 3d.; that is, taking the whole cost of hire and dividing it by the tonnage multiplied into the time.

9555. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Is that on the gross tonnage?—Yes, the payment under the transport regulations is always on the gross tonnage. The averages have been, on the 31st March, 1900, when the largest number was employed and no reductions had yet been possible, 22s. all round; of course, they varied from 15s. up to 35s., 35s. being paid to the high speed ships, like the "Majestic" and the "Umbria" and the "Kildonan Castle." On the 31st December, 1900, the rate all round had been reduced to 17s. 6d.; by the 31st December, 1901 it had been reduced to 15s. 5d., and on the 30th September of the present year it stands at 15s. 2d. But, the whole of the ships now in employment, with one or two exceptions, are first-class infantry ships of an expensive type, so that is really a very low rate for the kind of ship we now have. They range from 16s. 6d. to 14s.

9556. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) When you speak of a rate, do you mean everything except coal and troops' provisions?—It includes the provisions for the crews and includes the ship as a running ship; it does not include the messing or victualling of the troops or coal. All port dues or harbour dues are also paid by the Government, and all labour, shipping and landing stores and troops and everything of that sort is borne by the Government. The Government form of charter imposes on the shipowner the liability of negligent navigation, which is unlike a mercantile charter.

9557. The insurance is borne by the owner?—Yes, and he insures against the negligent navigation risk.

9558. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Then the ship supplies nothing but the crew?—The crew and the stores for working the ship, of course.

9559. The crew and their provisions?—Yes.

9560. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Does the ship find the engine-room stores?—Yes, and we even adjust with the owners the cost of the culinary coal consumed in connection with the messing of the crew; they are paid at a rate per head per day for messing.

9561. (*Sir John Edge.*) Who pays for the coal for the running of the ship?—The Government; all coal is paid for by the Government, excepting just the little item of culinary coal that I mentioned, and all the arrangements for coaling are made by the Government.

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9562. (*Chairman.*) Are there any particular engagements which you would like to mention?—Not unless you wish to ask me a specific question as to any particular one; for instance, the "Umbria" and "Majestic," which are high speed ships I could mention. In the opinion of the Director of Transports those very high speed ships are not so satisfactory as troop transports as vessels of a lower speed and of a more roomy character. The coaling is a difficulty, and the necessity for coaling largely at intermediate ports really does away a good deal with the advantage of their high speed. They are built specially for a short journey, coaling only at each end, and being full of costly passenger fittings, which have to be removed to make room for the troops, the whole thing turns out rather an expensive affair, and the troops are not carried with any extra comfort, nor, in our judgment, is there very much gain in the matter of speed.

9563. They all have to stop for coal?—Yes; for instance, the "Umbria" on her first voyage outwards had to stop both at Las Palmas and St. Vincent to coal. She was occupied 33 hours altogether coaling. She took in 346 tons at Las Palmas, and 1,464 tons at St. Vincent. There was a Naval officer, I may say, in one of His Majesty's ships stationed both at Las Palmas and St. Vincent to superintend the coaling and generally to father the transports, and he reported that he had been obliged to order the "Umbria" to St. Vincent to complete coaling there, as he was unable to do so at Las Palmas without inadmissible delay on account of unsuitable facilities for coaling the ship and bad weather, and Captain McAlpine, the captain of the "Umbria," reporting from St. Vincent, said: "The whole of the time the 'Umbria' was in the harbour of St. Vincent there was a heavy sea, which made coaling exceedingly difficult. The 'Umbria' is not an easy ship to coal at any time. The coaling ports could not be opened, the lighters had to be kept clear of any of these ports, and so we were unable to get the coal hoisted in at the most convenient place. I ordered the 'Umbria' to go at 17 knots per hour, with a consumption of 235 tons per day, which would enable her to get to the Cape in 9 days 15 hours. If she had gone 18 knots the expenditure would have been 270 tons per day, and she would have arrived at the Cape in 9 days 3 hours. Had she remained in harbour another day to take in the remaining coal there would undoubtedly have been much more sickness." She was tendered as a 19-knot boat, so it is evident that you could not get the full speed out of her for a voyage like that; in fact, her average speed on the first voyage was 17·66, and on the second voyage it was under 17.

9564. (*Sir John Edge.*) Does that include the delays for coaling or merely the running hours?—That was her average speed.

9565. Is that merely the running hours or from port of departure to port of arrival?—The running hours. In the first voyage the steaming time was 15 days 2 hours, and the time from port to port 17 days 18 hours. The average consumption during the voyage was 239 tons a day, and the largest number of tons consumed in any one day was 274. On the homeward voyages she was slower. The "Majestic," in a similar way, roughly speaking, lost from one to two days always in having to take in so much coal. She had to take in 1,097 tons on the first voyage and 1,120 tons on the second voyage.

9566. Could you give us the average of the next class of boats that had not to coal on the road?—I have not got that.

9567. (*Chairman.*) If you do not approve of the high speed boats, what is the boat you do approve of?—Boats like the "Bavarian" and the "Kildonan Castle," and so on.

9568. Have you any particulars of any of those?—I have not got them here; I could easily get them for the Commission. All I say about the high speed boat is that you pay very heavily for her and on a very large tonnage, and you do not get a gain in proportion, it seems to me.

9569. You were paying 35s. for those two boats, I think?—Yes.

9570. And for the "Kildonan Castle" and that other class what is the rate?—The "Kildonan Castle" was paid for at the high rate, but she worked out particularly well.

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9571. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) What did you pay for the "Bavarian"?—20s., and she was a very satisfactory ship.

9572. (*Chairman.*) I see the "Kildonan Castle" was 35s., too?—Yes, her case was rather a special one; she was a new ship just on the point of completion, and a crack ship of the Union Castle Company, and they volunteered to take out the whole of the cabin fittings, to entirely gut the ship and to convert her to our purposes; but Sir Donald Currie would only do it on those terms. She was a most favourable ship to carry so many troops; she carried 2,600, and did it most satisfactorily. The "Bavarian" carried 2,200 and 170 officers and warrant officers. What I mean is that the gain in speed, comparing the voyages, say, of the "Bavarian" or the "Kildonan Castle" with the "Majestic" and "Umbria," is hardly worth the high sum you have to pay for them.

9573. Unless speed is a *sine qua non*?—Unless the gain, say, of a couple of days is everything.

9574. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) What was the difference between the time occupied in going to the Cape between the "Kildonan Castle" and the "Bavarian"?—The "Kildonan Castle" took 18 days on the voyage out; she left on the 4th November and arrived on the 22nd. The "Umbria" took 17 days 18 hours.

9575. (*Sir John Edge.*) And the "Majestic"?—17 days 2 hours on the first voyage, and on the second voyage she took 16 days and 16 hours.

9576. And the "Bavarian"?—On the first voyage 18 days.

9577. Do you know what the "Bavarian" took on the second voyage?—21 on her next two voyages, so that apparently 21 days is her normal figure.

9578. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) What is the maximum speed of the "Bavarian"?—She was tendered as a 15 knot boat.

9579. And her average running?—I cannot say that.

9580. She is capable of 15 knots?—Yes. The "Kildonan Castle" was tendered as 15 to 16 knots.

9581. (*Sir John Edge.*) What were the other two tendered at?—The "Umbria" was tendered as 19 knots, and the "Majestic" as 19½.

9582. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) The "Bavarian" carried 2,200 troops, and all the stores required for them?—Yes.

9583. Any cargo besides?—No; it was from the first arranged with the War Office that it was unwise to ship cargo on the troop transports, because the cargo on arrival might be wanted at some port where the troops were not wanted, and it might lead to great delay and confusion.

9584. (*Chairman.*) Therefore, there might be a difference or there was a difference between the "Bavarian" and the "Majestic" and the "Umbria" of something like 4 to 5 days—between 21 days and 16 or 17?—There was a difference of 4 days on some voyages, but of less than one on the first voyage.

9585. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Could the "Bavarian" go to the Cape without coaling, or had she to coal on the road?—I think she coaled. The "Umbria" was a particularly awkward vessel for coaling, I do not quite know why, but I daresay Captain Pitt will be able to explain. It is the somewhat peculiar way in which she is arranged which does not suit the coaling arrangements at Las Palmas and St. Vincent. I think the "Bavarian" took in some coal. I know they mostly coaled. A great deal of coal was required at the Cape, and a little coaling on the way prevented the depletion of the stocks at the Cape.

9586. (*Sir John Edge.*) Do you know whether any of these boats were capable of carrying enough coal to run from the port of departure to the Cape without coaling?—Some of them are, I know.

9587. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Was it chiefly Welsh coal, the anthracite, or the ordinary coal that was used?—Welsh coal at all the intermediate ports and in England for the most part, but a great deal of north country coal was sent out to the Cape for the transports. The demand was very heavy, and the Lord of the Admiralty who deals with that matter considered it wiser to send out north country coal. There was a the transports. As a rule, the general idea is to supply great deal of north country coal supplied at the Cape to Welsh coal in any case, as giving the best results.

9588. The soft coal requires some different arrangement of the furnaces; does it not?—Yes, some transports I know prefer it; for instance, I believe the Leyland boats are able to burn Yorkshire coal, and some of the Glasgow boats prefer the Scotch coal.

9589. And they can be adapted for that; their speed is not greatly diminished, at any rate, through using the soft coal?—I believe so; but, roughly speaking, I have always understood that the Welsh coal gives better results in almost all cases.

9590. (*Sir John Edge.*) Do you know whether at any time during the war there was a difficulty in getting Welsh coal?—Getting it in England to send out?

9591. Yes?—I can hardly say that. The coaling arrangements rest with the Director of Stores, under the direction of the Junior Naval Lord, and he took them entirely out of our hands, so that I could not quite say.

9592. I only asked the question because we know that large quantities of Welsh coal were shipped abroad?—Captain Pitt reminds me that some of the vessels were sent to Cardiff, and there was no difficulty in getting coal there. Of course, in many cases when a ship is first taken up an arrangement is made with the shipowner to supply the coal at a rate. He coals on behalf of the Government, and the nature of the coal supplied is determined very often according to where the ship is lying; for instance, if the vessel is at Liverpool, North Wales coal is often taken, and at Glasgow often Scotch coal. I remember, in the case of the Leyland boats, the owners particularly asked that they might be allowed to supply Yorkshire coal, because it suited their furnaces best, but in the bulk of cases, either by the owners at the Government's request or by the Government contractor, Welsh coal is put on board.

9593. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) What would the relative cost of Welsh or anthracite coal and the soft coal be?—I am afraid I could not say that; the Welsh coal would be more expensive undoubtedly; but whether it would not be cheaper in the end is another matter, and I think it would.

9594. And the relative consumption of the one as against the other per hour or per day?—The consumption of north country coal and the softer kinds of coal is very much heavier, and, therefore, of course, you require more of it, and you want to take in larger quantities of coal at the intermediate port, which would be an inconvenience and delay.

9595. But you cannot say whether there would be any great saving in using the soft coal as against the other?—No, I could not say.

9596. (*Chairman.*) Arrangements for coaling were made by the Director of Stores?—Yes.

9597. Could you state generally what the arrangements were?—The contractors at St. Vincent and at Las Palmas were specially communicated with, and laid in very large quantities of coal; a King's ship was sent to each of these ports generally to superintend the arrangements; colliers were sent out in a continuous stream to the Cape in accordance with the estimated demands of the transports, and, generally, that is an outline of the arrangements.

9598. That was all under the Director of Stores?—Yes, he came to the Director of Transports to know what were the numbers of transports, and what they were likely to burn, and he instituted a system of special returns, which were made by the masters of the transports, on which he worked. He estimated what the likelihoods were, and laid in stocks accordingly, and there was never any difficulty in obtaining coal that I know of.

9599. The stocks were always sufficient?—Sir Edward Chichester will be better able to say that, because he knows what went on at the Cape.

9600. (*Sir John Edge.*) Was that the Director of Stores at the Admiralty?—Yes. The whole of the sea-transport work is managed by the departments of the Admiralty.

9601. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) The soft coal is being more generally used now than it was some time back for ships, is it not?—I can hardly say that.

9602. (*Chairman.*) As to the victualling of the troops, what were the arrangements?—Prior to this war in the case of all transports the victualling of the troops has been put on board from the Naval Victualling Yards, and has been done by the Crown. The victualling is considered by medical experts to be perfectly wholesome and satisfactory, but it has never been very

popular with the soldier. The soldier specially does not like the salt beef, and in June, 1899, the Admiralty recommended the Secretary of State for War to adopt victualling by the owners in all cases, on the ground of the satisfaction that it would give to the troops, that it would have to be the rule during a naval war, and that it was better to have one plan for both peace and war. At that time the Secretary of State for War did not see his way to it, as it would have led to increased cost, and he declined. At the beginning of the war, therefore, all transports were victualled by the Crown, the Victualling Departments putting on board, roughly, supplies for 43,000 men for 35 days. In the case of the freight ships the owners victualled always.

9603. These you are speaking of sailed in October and November?—Yes. The hired transports were victualled from the victualling yards, but where the freight ships came in at much the same time they were victualled by their owners. After the despatch of the first Army Corps it was decided on the 15th November, 1899, that in future the owners of all transports, except the cavalry ships, should be called upon to victual at rates per head on account of the Navy being unwilling to deplete the stocks by further issues. Subsequently, in January, 1900, in consequence of complaints made with regard to the Government salt meat, which, although wholesome, was much disliked, victualling by owners was adopted throughout the sea transport service in connection with the war, and as soon as that was done all complaints ceased. The cost relatively is about one-third more, roughly speaking, but it is a little difficult to say, because we have no statistics of what the Government victualling is in time of war, and, of course, the losses of condemnation and wastage, and so on, are heavier then.

9604. (*Sir John Jackson.*) What was about the cost per day paid to the ship owners for victualling?—Roughly speaking, 1s. for the Regular troops, and 1s. 6d. for the Yeomanry and Volunteers; a superior scale is given to the Yeomanry and Volunteers, practically the same as the best third-class victualling on board a good liner, and they are supplied with crockery and glass, and so on, instead of the tin mess utensils which the ordinary Regular troops have under the transport regulations. In all cases where there are two classes of troops on board ships, the superior victualling is given right through; the two kinds are never issued on one ship simultaneously, to prevent unpleasant feeling.

9605. (*Chairman.*) And you think that change of system was a success?—Undoubtedly; and I believe it is definitely intended to adopt it for all time in future. Probably when it is thoroughly introduced into the transport regulations the cost may be somewhat reduced, but I am afraid it will come to nearly a shilling a head, and, of course, the Government victualling in time of peace is very much less than that, something more like 7d. or 8d.

9606. Does Government victualling entirely depend on salt meat?—Oh, no; if the ship has a refrigerator, they take in large quantities of frozen meat, and fresh meat is drawn at every port the ship touches.

9607. Then, why do you say the salt meat was a great objection?—That seemed to be the item that was most in disfavour, and about which the complaints particularly arose.

9608. It is not invariable to use it?—It is always used on certain days, not right through, except in the case of a few special ships which have large refrigerators, where they can take in a stock of fresh meat at the beginning of the voyage sufficient to last. Some of the P. and O. ships can do that, but it is the exception.

9609. How do the owners manage to avoid the salt meat?—They issue more preserved meat.

9610. Could not the Government do that?—The doctors are against it, they said it would make the ration too monotonous.

9611. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Is the preserved meat popular?—I do not think they object to it; as far as I can judge one of the leading objections to the Government scale of rations was its want of variety and elasticity. Owners in their victualling give the men porridge and jam, and things of that kind, and puddings of different sorts in addition to the ordinary meat.

9612. (*Chairman.*) I do not quite understand why the Government cannot do the same?—They could not.

9613. If it is a question of doing the thing on the most economical system, why could not the Government adopt the scale of rations which the owners use, and reduce the cost which they have to pay?—It would involve a special machinery, because at present the bulk of the articles issued for the troops are similar to those used for the Navy, and to have a special stock of other articles kept in the victualling yards would be very awkward, because they would not be required except on a small scale in peace time.

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9614. It is more a question of the reserve stores?—It is largely.

9615. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) There were not many serious complaints of the quality and character of the food when supplied by the shipowners?—No, there have been no complaints as to the victualling of the shipowners, roughly speaking.

9616. No serious complaints?—No serious complaints.

9617. Were there more complaints with regard to some shipowners—I do not ask names—than to others that the food was not quite so good?—No, I do not remember any case in which there was a serious complaint against the shipowners' victualling. There were a good many complaints at the beginning of the war about the Government victualling, but Sir Edward Chichester inquired into the matter at the Cape, and I know he was of opinion that the thing was good, but unpalatable, and that the soldier did not like what the sailor was quite satisfied with. I think it would be very awkward, and the victualling department of the Navy would find great difficulty in undertaking to store articles of a totally different description to those used in the Navy; the simplicity of victualling both services on practically the same description of provisions is very great.

9618. (*Chairman.*) My object in asking the question was to get at how the matters really stood. Is there any other point you would like to mention?—I do not know whether you would wish to ask any questions with regard to the few losses that occurred?

9619. You can mention them if you please?

9620. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) There were two vessels in particular at the beginning, as to which there was some delay?—In regard to those, all I have to say is——

9621. (*Chairman.*) Which ships were those?—The "Zibenghla" and the "Zayathla": they were taken up from the British India Company, who had purchased them from the New Zealand Steamship Company. They were being sent out by the British India Company to be permanently placed on the Indian station to run between India and Australia with horses, and, therefore, appeared to be specially suitable for the conveyance of cavalry. They were surveyed by all the usual officers, the Naval officer and the Engineer officer, and were passed in every way, fitted up in the usual way, and there was no ground, as far as the transport department was aware, for any doubt as to their capacity for what they had to do. The engine-room repairs in connection with their Board of Trade certificates appear to have been somewhat hurried, and some defects in the furnaces arose, which led to delay and difficulty, but the ships in themselves were good ships, and one of them was specially selected, and very highly praised when used during the China war. I think General Gasalee went in her.

9622. What happened to them?—The furnaces leaked, and there was delay. Captain Pitt has a long memorandum with regard to the whole thing, and you can get it from him probably. One vessel was lost entirely, the "Ismore."

9623. Under what circumstances?—Negligent navigation; she ran on shore at St. Helena Bay, north of the Cape, and 315 horses were lost.

9624. (*Sir John Edge.*) And a battery of artillery?—No men were lost.

9625. But the guns of a battery of artillery were lost?—Yes. The sum of £28,000 was recovered from the owners, as they were liable under the Negligent Navigation Clause The full assessment was £31,000, but at the advice of the Admiralty solicitor it was compounded for £28,000.

9626. I suppose there was an inquiry into the case?—Yes, a regular Board of Trade Inquiry.

9627. What was the result?—Negligent navigation.

9628. By whom?—By the master of the ship; he was caught in a fog, and did not make the proper allowances. I have no doubt Sir Edward Chichester knows more about it than I do as he sent up ships to look

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after her. There was one other case, the "Persia"; she broke her shaft off Cape de Verdes, and the troops that were in her had to be taken out of her and brought on by other means; she was brought home and repaired, and was afterwards employed, and the Government claim against the owners, at the instance of the solicitor, was confined to the stoppage of pay from 8th November to the 13th December. There was no fault in that case on the part of the ship; it was pure accident.

9629. (*Chairman.*) What troops were on board of her?—A squadron of the 6th Dragoons and a detachment of No. 2 Stationary Hospital.

9630. That was in October, 1899?—Yes.

9631. (*Sir John Edge.*) Was the ship that was lost with the battery of artillery insured?—I imagine so by the owners; the Government do not insure, of course.

9632. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I understand the Government lost nothing but £3,000?—That was all.

9633. The whole of the balance was recouped to them?—Yes.

9634. (*Sir John Edge.*) You know nothing about whether she was insured or not, or how she was insured?—No; that was the owner's business. I know, as a matter of fact, by hearsay, that she was insured.

9635. And probably insured against this very loss?—No doubt. We made some inquiries at the time as to the master who was in charge of the vessel, and the chairman of the Pacific Steamship Company, in one of whose ships he had served for many years, spoke very highly of him. He said he had been transferred to Sir Edward Bates' Company to better himself, and not from any fault. He appeared to have had a thoroughly good character and certificate, but to have miscalculated; of course he was out of his ordinary beat at the time.

9636. I suppose he was an Englishman, holding a British certificate?—Yes; they are all British crews in the case of the transports.

9637. (*Chairman.*) Have you any other losses?—The "Carinthia," a mule ship, went on shore off Cape Gravois, in Hayti, and she lost 435 mules. They had to be taken on by another ship, the "Montezuma," which was engaged in America. In that case the owners have been charged with the Government loss to the extent of £10,000. We could not recover from them the extra cost incurred of engaging fresh freight—but the value of the lost mules and the collateral expenses connected with them was recovered.

9638. Was the ship lost?—It became a total loss.

9639. Those were all the losses?—Yes, among the vessels engaged by the Transport Department for the conveyance of troops, horses, or mules.

9640. (*Sir John Edge.*) Was that ship, the "Carinthia," lost through negligence?—Yes; it is only in the case of negligence that the Government can recover. I have not mentioned, and, perhaps, you would like me to mention, the method in which the stores are engaged and sent out on freight?

9641. (*Chairman*). Yes?—The Admiralty system, which has been in force ever since 1870, is to employ a firm of shipping agents in the City, Messrs. Hogg and Robinson. The requisitions from the War Office come to the Transport Department, and are passed on to the shipping agents, who make the engagements, reporting them to us, and all engagements over £100 require the Director of Transports' approval before they are actually clinched. Just prior to the war, at the suggestion of the Director of Transports, it was arranged that instead of endeavouring to take up ships on time for the conveyance of stores, which is an expensive plan, the shipping agents should be employed to take them up on freight at a rate per ton or a lump sum, and the whole of the stores carried throughout the war have been carried on this basis, and in a very satisfactory way. There has been no difficulty, and although the pressure at times has been very great with the shipping agents, they have met the demands thoroughly, and the losses in connection with them have been very few. I have a list of a few cases in which losses have occurred.

9642. It is not necessary to go into details?—The whole number of losses is only four, and one of those is a comparatively small quantity.

9643. Does that cover all the heading of "Freight Ships" in this paper?—The store ships at the end, beginning at page 35.

9644. Now what is the distinction between store ships and freight ships?—A "freight ship" in this return is a ship engaged for the conveyance of men and horses at rates per head.

9645. With regard to the store ships, you are not responsible for the ships at all; you do not engage the ship, but you only send out the stores by the ship?—The Transport Department is responsible in this way: that the shipping agents work in close touch with the Transport Department; the Transport Department lays down the conditions as to the sort of ship which is to be engaged, and the speed, and so on, but the shipping agents are responsible for engaging the ship, for the terms, and for seeing that the stores are properly loaded.

9646. But do you engage the store ships for definite periods?—No, simply for the voyage.

9647. So that there is no question of demurrage in that case?—There is demurrage if a ship is detained for more than a certain time.

9648. For unloading?—Yes.

9649. But not for being kept doing nothing?—No, she would simply turn round and come away; once the stores are landed the ship is free, and the Government ceases to have any lien on her.

9650. The rest of this list, up to page 34, is all for the conveyance of men and horses?—Yes, men, horses, and mules.

9651. And in those cases the ships are engaged for periods?—No; those that are called freight ships are simply engaged for the voyage, those called transports are on time.

9652. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Is that the one distinction between the freight ship and the store ship?—Yes.

9653. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Do you mean the round voyage or the single voyage out?—The single voyage; for instance, for the conveyance from England to the Cape, at so much per head.

9654. They did not take any round voyage out and home?—No, there was very little coming home.

9655. Late in the war there was?—Yes, but we found it better to engage the Union Castle boats, which run over the ground, at rates per head.

9656. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) The freight ship can become a troopship, or vice versa?—No, not without a fresh special engagement, and special fitting out, and all the rest of it; practically they are never interchangeable. The freight ship ceases to be in Government employ the moment she has landed her troops, horses, or mules as the case may be.

9657. Would it not be possible to make a new arrangement with the freight ship so as to make her a troopship?—I do not think it would be advantageous to the Crown; it is more convenient to take up a transport here at headquarters, where we can inspect her thoroughly, and fit her out according to our ways.

9658. It is not the practice to do what I have suggested?—No, but, of course, it would be possible.

9659. (*Chairman.*) It is only the transports from page 4 to 11 which are on periods?—Yes, on time.

9660. And in their case it might happen that a transport might lie unoccupied for a considerable time?—It happened a good deal at the beginning of the war; for instance, 20 of the ships that are marked here, amounting altogether to 96,000 tons gross, were retained at the Cape for military reasons after a very careful investigation and decision from December, 1899, to October, 1900, practically unemployed. Sir Redvers Buller considered that that force, which was carefully arranged to convey so many men and horses, was necessary to be kept on the coast ready to move a division of the Army.

9661. And it was done advisedly?—It was done advisedly; both the War Office and Admiralty thoroughly knew what the cost would be, but it was looked on as a military necessity, and it was so stated by the Commander-in-Chief on the spot. Of course, that came to something like a million, I suppose.

9662. In consequence of their lying unoccupied?—Yes, in the way of hire; it is nine months' hire of a large fleet. That was quite out of the possibility of the Admiralty to control; it was simply looked upon as a military necessity.

9663. You do not know of any case in which a ship was delayed either at the Cape or at home otherwise than as a question of military necessity?—Not unduly I think; of course, it is frequently advantageous to keep a ship waiting a little while if a homeward freight is in

prospect; it is better to keep her for a few weeks lying rather than bring her home empty.

9664. But not for several weeks?—I think they were frequently lying there for a good many weeks.

9665. Have you anything else to add?—I do not know whether you wish anything said about the question of demurrage, or whether you would prefer to question Sir Edward Chichester about that?

9666. I suppose that arose chiefly at the Cape?—Yes; I should say almost entirely, and here again it was more or less a military necessity; the stores could not be received on shore.

9667. I suppose we could more conveniently get that from Sir Edward?—I think so. I do not know whether you would wish to ask any question about the Colonial engagements?

9668. Yes?—With very few exceptions the whole of the Colonial contingents were carried out by the Colonies themselves under arrangements made by them; they made the bargains, and arranged and fitted up the ships entirely without concert with the Admiralty. I cannot say what the result was, because we did not get voyage reports in those cases; they are quite independent. But we had one case which might interest the Commission; there was a vessel called the "Gulf of Taranto," which was engaged in New Zealand to bring the Seventh New Zealand Contingent to South Africa in May, 1901; it was engaged at rather high rates; the cost turned out at £30 per officer and £22 per man; and there was a kind of tacit understanding that she was to take back the contingent that the Seventh Contingent was relieving, and unfortunately between the New Zealand Government and the Military Commander-in-Chief that was more or less made a promise; but when the vessel arrived she was inspected by the Naval Transport Officers and by the Army Medical Officers, and was considered to be wholly unfit for the conveyance of troops from our point of view; the Government declined to put troops into her, and the troops were sent back in a transport.

9669. What happened to the contract?—An amount had to be paid for compensation.

9670. By the New Zealand authorities?—No, by the Crown; it was all at the expense of the Crown. The cost of these contingents has all been recovered from the Crown.

9671. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Had you one standard for horse fittings throughout, insisted upon on all vessels?—Oh yes; I think Captain Pitt would best explain the detail of the horse fittings, as the ships are fitted out under his directions; but it is all laid down as to the height of decks, and the space to be occupied, and there is a regular specification according to which all the ships are fitted. They have been fitted in two ways, with the old and the new patterns, which Captain Pitt will explain.

9672. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Did I understand you to say just now that in the Colonies they supplied all their own transports?—As a rule, yes; not in all cases, but in all the earlier contingents they took up their own freight, fitted their own ships, and sent them out, merely recovering the cost from the Imperial Government.

9673. I think with respect to the troops sent from Sydney that was only so as to the first two or three contingents, but as to all the others transports were sent for them from the Cape?—The number conveyed under engagements made direct by the Colonies came to about 15,000 men.

9674. The Admiralty had an officer in command there who saw to the shipping of the troops, and everything?—No, he had nothing to do with the freight of ships taken up by the Colonial Government.

9675. But with the Admiralty ships?—Certainly, wherever transports were sent it was entirely under the Admiralty arrangements. I was speaking of the freight ships taken up by the Colonies.

9676. Were there not a large number of transports sent to Sydney?—Yes, and there were a good many freight ships also taken up by the Colonies. This is a War Office printed return, and I find that the New Zealand Mounted Rifles were conveyed on the "Englishman"; the "Medic" took the Victorian Rifles and the Tasmanian Infantry; the "Kent" was engaged by the Colonial Government, so was the "Cerdic," the "Cornwall," "Langton Grange," "Myra King," and others. All those were Colonial engagements in October and November, 1899, and January and February, 1900; and then later on in February there is the "Maplemore," a transport, the "Atlantian," and so on. There were a great many engagements made by the Colonial authorities.

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9677. But at a later date I think all the vessels were sent from the Admiralty?—Yes, a good many of them; this particular one which I mentioned, the "Gulf of Taranto," was rather a late one in 1901, and that was engaged by the Colonial authorities.

9678. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Was it a condition of the charter that all services for the troops on board should be attended to by the ship's complement, say the whole of the cooking, distribution, and service of meals, and everything of that kind?—In the case of regular troops, the regular troops keep the decks clean, and fetch their own food, and put it on the tables.

9679. And that was understood in making the contract?—Certainly.

9680. That it did not fall to the shipowner to provide them?—No. In the case of Yeomanry and Volunteers, in many cases a special arrangement was made by which a little more service was given on board ship, and the owners entered some extra stewards, because the men were considered not to be quite accustomed to keeping their places clean as an ordinary regular soldier is supposed to be.

9681. And that, of course, entered into the cost in each case?—Well, I do not think the owner charged it to the Government. I think they were willing to enter a few stewards, and they threw it into the rate per head for victualling.

9682. A larger number would be needed to attend to the ship in that case?—Yes.

9683. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Are you perfectly satisfied with the present arrangements of the Admiralty with regard to the taking up of ships for the conveyance of troops, barring what you have told us?—Yes, I think the test of this war has shown that the system works well, and that there is no undue or avoidable expenditure or delay.

9684. With regard to the City Imperial Volunteers, did the first contingent that went out commence by taking up their own transport?—I think the City Imperial Volunteers were carried all through in the "Ariosto," a boat given by Mr. Wilson, of Hull, but the Yeomanry began by taking up their own transport, and they got into difficulties, and at Admiral Hext's suggestion the work was turned over to the Transport Department, and, as far as possible, the Admiralty carried on the engagements they had made; but there was one ship we were obliged to reject, the "Lusitania"; she had already been declined on several occasions for troop work, and it was not considered consistent for the Government to use her on that occasion, and compensation had to be paid to her owners by the Yeomanry Committee.

9685. We had it from one of the officials that they paid a less rate of freightage than the Admiralty were paying. Do you happen to know anything about that?—I do not think, on the whole, it was less; it was a very fair rate, a pound a ton, which they paid, and rather less than we were paying for some of our ships; but Sir Alfred Jones was rather anxious to do a patriotic thing, I think, on that occasion.

9686. With regard to the ship that was returned on the owners' hands as not fit for carrying Yeomanry, was there any compensation paid to the owner?—Yes, I think a couple of thousand pounds; but I am not quite certain; the document would not come before us.

9687. When you obtained the official requisition from the War Office for the conveyance of 46,000 men and 8,600 horses, from the date you got that till the ships were ready, roughly speaking, what time elapsed?—When the ships were ready, not when the troops were embarked?

9688. No, when the ships were ready, as we had it in evidence, or, if not, in Lord Wolseley's pocket-book, that "by the time the troops are ready to embark the ships will not be ready," that is, that the troops will be ready before the ships?—So far as I know, unquestionably the ships were always ready when the troops were ready to embark.

9689. You were given a certain date?—Yes.

9690. And you were ready for the troops by that date?—Unquestionably.

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9691. So that in no case, as far as you know, were the troops kept waiting for the ships?—No. Of course, there were two or three little incidents. You will remember that the "Manchester Port" came round, and there was a complaint made about the hay she had on board, and there was a ship called the "Sicilian," which came from Belfast, and when she arrived in London Captain Pitt did not think she was quite suitably arranged, and he had to re-arrange her, which led to a day or two's delay.

9692. These are only isolated instances?—Yes. I might, of course, mention that the great contrast between the preparations of the War Office and the Admiralty is this, that we cannot possibly, without incurring very heavy expense, get the ships ready until we are allowed to engage them. You can only get them ready by engaging them. The stores can be collected, and the troops warned, and all the rest of it, with great ease.

9693. I think you have informed us that there would be no use keeping at the Admiralty a list from various owners, and so on, of ships which would be placed at your disposal as troop or freight ships in case of war?—My own judgment is dead against subsidising merchant ships for transport service. I think we should be paying money for no real value.

9694. In fact, the ships might be elsewhere?—And in many cases would be; many of the best troop vessels are run on long distance voyages, to China and Australia, and the very ships you are subsidising might be at the other end of the world when they were wanted.

9695. And even without subsidy, supposing certain owners gave you certain ships, there is the same probability of those ships being away when wanted?—Certainly and that happened; frequently the ships were engaged where they were, perhaps, in America or elsewhere, on the understanding that they were due on a certain date.

9696. I put that question in the view of paying no subsidy whatever; as would it not be advantageous to have ships on your list which owners would hand over to you when you required them for the conveyance of troops or stores?—I do not think it would be any particular gain. We have not found any serious reluctance on the part of the shipowners to let the ships go to the Government when the time comes. It is really a question of price, and I think it is better to pay perhaps rather a high price just at the moment, which can be reduced afterwards, than to pay a subsidy for a long term of years, with no result.

9697. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I suppose we may take it than on an occasion like that of the 30th of September, when a great number of ships were required practically at a moment's notice, we could hardly expect the British shipowner to be so much of a patriot as to let them go at current rates?—No. I do not think it is reasonable to expect it.

9698. In fact, he will look for war prices?—Yes.

9699. Having regard to Sir John Hopkins' question as to the idea of the Government obtaining a call on ships for freightage just the same as I understand they do for armed cruisers, you are of opinion that that would be too expensive, and that the shipowners would want too much in the shape of subsidy to make it worth while?—I think it would be too expensive, and I think it would also tend to hamper the Transport Department. The armed cruiser class is a very limited class, whereas the numbers we require for moving an Army Corps are very considerable, and I am inclined to think that it would not be worth while.

9700. Of course, they might be out of England, but still I suggest an arrangement might be made by which the Government could have a call on any suitable ships belonging to any large firm if required; of course, undertaking to pay any demurrage losses the firm might incur?—To my mind, unless the system of subsidies was very extensive, when I think it would be very costly, you would only get a promise which would be of comparatively little value; all the earlier ships you would have to take up under some other conditions.

9701. Of course, you would make a definite contract for them?—Yes.

9702. If you take the view that such a plan would be too expensive, and have certain inconveniences attached to it, there is the alternative that if you want twenty big ships at a moment's notice you are absolutely in the hands of the owners of those ships, supposing they put their heads together and say: "We will not let the Government have these ships at any reasonable price"?—My own experience of the shipowners is that they never do so.

9703. I agree that may be, and I have no doubt the shipowners would be fairly reasonable, having regard to the circumstances; but still you are put in that position, that if you have no pre-arrangement you are absolutely in the hands of these shipowners if the Government want ships, that they can ask their own price?—I cannot think that the whole of the shipowners in England would combine.

9704. Not even a half dozen of the big liners?—We deal with a great deal more than that; even the present number of ships is divided amongst a considerable number of owners. The 23 ships we have now are divided among nine owners, I think, but originally we had a very large number of shipowners.

9705. Of course, we have seen lately a combination of shipowners, say half-a-dozen firms, and we could easily imagine a combination of nine; and if such an arrangement were brought about I suggest that the Government would be absolutely in the hands of those shipowners?—If you only want 23 ships you will get competition at once. It is when you want a much larger number than that that there is really no competition; but I think you would make an apparent gain which would not be found to be of much value.

9706. Of course, there would be a chance that if you were not able to get quite the ships you wanted you could go a line lower down?—Yes.

9707. What was about the average rate of demurrage per ton per day paid on these ships?—The store ships?

9708. Both?—There was no such thing as demurrage with a transport, the transport being on Time Charter. Demurrage is generally 4d. per ton on the gross register.

9709. That is the usual thing in mercantile arrangements?—That is what we usually pay.

9710. On the question of the advantage of the Welsh coal over the north country coal, of course the north country coal being cheaper for land purposes, it would be very often advantageous to use it; but in considering it for long voyage purposes you have to consider that if in going to the Cape you use 500 tons more coal you are carrying 500 tons less cargo?—Yes; but space is not of so much importance in a troop transport.

9711. That is what I wanted to get at?—Practically the cargo space is largely empty.

9712. But even away from that, your idea is that it is generally found advantageous to use the more expensive coal, the Welsh coal?—Yes.

9713. (*Sir John Edge.*) Of course, all the transports were on time charter to you?—Yes.

9714. Then how did you manage to reduce the rate of freight?—As soon as there was a possibility of sparing any transports, and a ship was going to be appropriated for a fresh lot of service, I wrote to the owners, and said if she was appropriated for another voyage, would they reduce the rate, and they, knowing that some ships had to go, were all ready to reduce.

9715. You offered them a fresh time charter?—It is not a fresh charter; I do it by means of a rider to the existing charter. The charter runs on continuously, but we reduce the rate, and have a signed rider attached to the charter.

9716. There is a power of breaking the charter?—Oh, yes; all the conditions remain the same, but the terms are altered.

9717. She is chartered to you for a certain number of months?—Yes; on the Government charter terms the Government can have the vessel as long as they like. The owners can give no notice.

9718. But the Government can?—Yes.

9719. And by means of that you are able to reduce the rates of freight?—Yes. There were two cases, I think, in which the owners stipulated that the period certain was to be absolute, and the vessel was to be re-delivered at the close of the period; one was the "Yorkshire," I think, and the other the "Majestic"; but, roughly speaking, there is no such power under a Government charter, and we can keep the vessel as long as we wish.

9720. That is an extraordinary power you have in a Government charter, that you do not generally get in a charter in the trade?—That is so; but, of course, the

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Government, as a rule, does not exercise it tyrannically, and if the owner of a boat, which had been chartered for some considerable time, said that he was very desirous of getting the boat back, if it could possibly be done it would be done. For instance, the Union Castle Company intimated that they wanted the "Hawarden Castle" back and the "Kildonan Castle," after they had been on charter for a good many months, and the Director of Transports endeavoured to meet their views.

9721. Roughly speaking, it appears to me that most of these boats that were chartered as transports were boats that were running on regular lines?—That is so right through, and that is why we are obliged to pay comparatively high rates.

9722. I am coming to that in a moment; they were running and carrying their freight and passangers on regular lines?—Yes.

9723. They had to be taken off those lines and some other provision made?—Yes, in many cases the owners chartered inferior boats to carry on their work.

9724. I suppose that is an element that would be taken into account at any time whether there was war or not?—Yes.

9725. If the Government wanted to charter a vessel which had to be taken off a regular line, they would have to pay more for her than for a vessel which was open for a time charter?—Yes, roughly speaking, the boats engaged as troop transports are rarely boats on the market for hire.

9726. They are not boats open for time charters, as a rule?—That is so.

9727. They are plying in a regular trade?—Yes, and consequently the rates quoted for time charters in the trade papers are really no guide at all.

9728. These rates apply to vessels which the Government would not think of taking up?—Yes, tramp cargo boats, as a rule.

9729. Taking all these facts into consideration, and taking into consideration also the fact that the owners had to alter the interior construction of their vessels, removing cabins and so on, in your judgment were the rates of freight under which the charters were obtained excessive?—Not on the whole. I think there were cases in which the owners might have let us have the ships a little bit lower; but, taking them as a whole, I should say they were not excessive looking at the demand and conditions of freight at the time—the conditions of their own business. Of course, the rates that we actually arranged were frequently somewhat less than they first asked. I always tried to get them as low as I could.

9730. Did you see any indication at any time of a combination to raise freights against the Government?—Absolutely none; you see there is a good deal of competition between the Liverpool and the London shipowners.

9731. Looking at this list of owners in this statement, I think that a combination of these would be practically impossible?—That is my own view.

9732. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Under whose superintendence were the vessels taken up from foreign countries, as from America, with horses and mules? Who arranged that?—As to the vessels that carried remounts and mules, if they were taken up when abroad, they were taken up from our general knowledge of what the ship was. The actual looking at the accommodation rested with the remount officer on the spot, the military officer who purchased the horses or mules.

9733. Had the arrangement as to the rates, etc., to be referred to the Admiralty?—The arrangements were made by the Admiralty in the case of mules right through the war; in the case of horses, the Inspector-General of Remounts arranged the rates up to a certain point, and then the work was transferred to the Admiralty, and from that date all the engagements were made by the Admiralty.

9734. That applies to all the vessels that came from foreign countries?—Yes, except the vessels that came with stores that were engaged on the c.i.f. principle.

9735. Who arranged these?—That the Director of Army Contracts would arrange. There the rate is a rate per ton on the hay, oats, or whatever it may be delivered, including the freight.

9736. As regards India, were all the arrangements made by the Indian Government, and then the charge repaid by the Admiralty?—That is so.

9737. There was no question as to what was arranged by the Indian Government?—None at all; they were given a free hand to make their own arrangements. The charge would be recovered from the War Office as Army transport is taken under the Army Votes, but the claims would be examined by the Transport Department.

9738. Were there any complaints, as far as you know, about discomfort or crowding of the troops on board any of those transports?—No; there are minor complaints always. For instance, the medical officer may consider the hospital accommodation is not quite up to his ideas, but the medical officers have such varying ideas on that point. Captain Pitt would speak best as to the results of the voyage reports throughout the war.

9739. And perhaps he could speak better as to the sufficiency of the amount of space allowed the troops?—Yes; he would give evidence on the whole of that.

9740. (*Viscount Esher.*) There have been a certain number of letters in the papers about the overcrowding of troops coming back from Africa?—You mean going to Australia?

9741. No, returning from Africa?—I was not aware of it.

9742. Your attention has not been drawn to any of the complaints that have been made?—No, I should say there had not been any. The Australian cases I know well—the "Drayton Grange," and so on, but I was not aware that there had been any complaints as to overcrowding in the transports returning to this country. I thought the returning troops had been conveyed with great satisfaction.

9743. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) No complaint has reached the Admiralty?—No.

9744. (*Chairman.*) You agreed that Sir Edward Chichester should give evidence about the demurrage in South Africa, but I suppose the accounts would be more in your department?—Yes, they would.

9745. Is it the fact that the accounts amount to £276,000?—Really I have not the figure with me.

9746. I have the Report of the Committee on Public Accounts before me?—Of course, that probably deals with the demurrage on the c.i.f. ships engaged by the War Office, in addition to the ships engaged by our Department. My idea is that there is nothing like that figure on the Admiralty ships.

9747. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) What was the million you mentioned just now?—That was the cost of the hire of troop transports kept unemployed at the Cape.

9748. That is demurrage?—Not from our point of view.

9749. (*Viscount Esher.*) Were you examined before the Public Accounts Committee?—No.

9750. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) It is really demurrage from the finance point of view?—It is not really demurrage, and it is from a very different reason; that was expense incurred with the full knowledge of everybody concerned as a military necessity.

9751. I am not speaking of the object of it, but if it was stated that the demurrage only cost us £276,000, and no further statement was made, the country would be under the impression that the laying-up of ships had only cost us £276,000, whereas it really cost us £1,276,000?—I should be sorry to confine demurrage to that; that was only one particular thing. I cannot say how long the ships were in port; the ships were in port frequently for weeks and weeks together, waiting for returning troops, or something of that kind. If you call that demurrage, that would have to be added to the sum I have given.

9752. I was rather on the wider basis of what the laying-up of ships there cost us. I think that is the practical position from which we must look at it, whether you pay that away to the shipowners in actual money or whether you pay it away in the cost of transports, it comes out of the national pocket in exactly the same way?—It was because I thought that that would attract the Commission's attention that I introduced into the printed statement the contrast between the total days' steaming and the total period of employment.

9753. What page is that on?—All the pages relating to transports. Of course, the period the ship was kept would always be considerable.

9754. (*Chairman.*) I think when you were speaking of

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them before, you drew a broad distinction between the transports, the laying-up of which was due to military necessities which you explained, and the store ships on which there was demurrage, owing to delays which might or might not have been avoided?—Yes.

9755. I suppose it is with regard to the "demurrage" under the second heading that this statement refers, although the explanation of your not knowing of it is that "The heavy sum of £276,000 is included in these accounts for demurrage charges against the War Office, in consequence of the delays in unloading ships at Port Elizabeth and Capetown," refers to ships with which you had nothing to do in the Admiralty?—It probably means both. The full cargo ships engaged by the Admiralty incurred demurrage to an extent which I have here; over the whole of the 208 ships engaged, demurrage has been incurred to the extent of 1,687 days, which gives an average of eight days per ship, but the demurrage was actually incurred only in ninety cases, and the average for those ninety is 19 days.

9756. There is one case mentioned here, and perhaps it will show whether it is one of yours: "In one case, a forage ship, the 'Hyson,' was detained four months at Port Elizabeth before unloading. From the evidence it appears that the officers responsible for the delay in regard to any ship are the supply officers at the port of disembarkation"?—That is a vessel engaged by the Director of Army Contracts at a c.i.f. rate.

9757. And that is not one under the Admiralty?—No. The demurrage incurred on Admiralty ships was, I should think, not one-fifth of what was incurred on the War Office forage and oats ships. I have the figures in the Transport Department, and I could supply them.

9758. Why should there be that difference?—The ships are more numerous, and for some reason or another there seemed to be more difficulty in receiving the supplies. The supplies sent out in the full cargo ships by the Admiralty were general stores, which seem to have been more required than the hay and oats, which came in other ships. I am afraid the Director of Army Contracts would have to explain it, as I could not give a full explanation.

9759. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) You have not the sum total there?—No.

9760. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that this report deals with War Office charters outside the expenditure through the Admiralty?—I should think so mostly, but I cannot say; possibly I might be able to tell you if I saw the document.

9761. (*Viscount Esher.*) I suppose you have seen the last report of the Public Accounts Committee on the Admiralty?—I cannot say that I have. (*The report of the Public Accounts Committee was laid before the witness and examined by him.*) I should say that practically that was entirely War Office, by the look of things. It refers particularly to forage, with which we were not concerned, and most of the forage came from abroad.

9762. But you do not know whether the Public Accounts Committee made any reflections in their Report on the Admiralty?—I have not heard of it.

9763. (*Sir John Edge.*) No demurrage arises in a time charter between the charterer and the shipowner; the demurrage, I understand, is a claim for expense or loss incurred by the shipowner by reason of his vessel not being loaded according to contract, or not being discharged according to contract?—Certainly.

9764. A delay for which he is not responsible over the contract time?—Yes.

9765. In the case of a time charter, the charterer can keep the boat within the terms of the charter party where he likes and as long as he likes?—Yes.

9766. He merely pays for the time?—Quite so.

9767. Under a trade charter if the cargo is not loaded or discharged within the time specified, demurrage has to be paid?—Yes.

9768. Unless in excepted events?—Yes.

9769. (*Sir John Jackson.*) After what Sir John Edge has said just now, if the ships were on time charter and were delayed at Cape Town, of cousse there would be a loss to us?—Undoubtedly.

9770. And really that ought to be considered in looking at the item of demurrage amounting to £276,000?—Yes.

9771. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) That is the point I make about the Government transports, too; what one wants to discover is not the technical demurrage altogether, but the loss through delays altogether?—Yes.

9772. (*Chairman.*) Does that conclude your evidence?—There was one use to which some of the transports were put, namely, as depôts for the Boer prisoners for weeks and months, lying at Cape Town, and I might perhaps say that the cost to the Crown of unemployed transports was always present to the mind of the Director of Transports, and that the movements of the transports were very carefully watched, and as far as possible the vessels were brought home without delay, but as Sir Edward Chichester will explain, the military necessities, of course, had to be paramount, and in many cases the transports were necessarily kept for long periods. I do not think it can be said that there has been any delay that was avoidable in connection with the employment of transports.

9773. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) May I ask what you mean by the total days' steaming of each ship, from pages 4 to 9 of your statement?—The actual period the ship was at sea.

9774. I see that here there are four ships employed altogether for 35 months 14 days, 35 months 14 days, 35 months 13 days, and 35 months 9 days respectively, making altogether 4,200 odd days that they have been employed, while the days of steaming is only 2,200 odd, half of the actual time employed; how is that difference made up—in port?—It would be made up in port and the time fitting and the time waiting. When a vessel arrives in England she has to be re-arranged and refitted for her next voyage, and possibly the troops that are to go back in her are not ready for a fortnight or so.

9775. So that they were only really half the time actually steaming?—I think that is very likely.

9776. I have taken these four ships, as they were employed for almost similar periods?—From what page are these particular ships taken?

9777. The ships here are first, the "Wakool"?—That was one of those specially selected to be retained at the Cape.

9778. The "Englishman"?—So was the "Englishman."

9779. Then there is the "Britannic" and the "Bavarian"; I took those, because they happened to be together on the list and employed for 35 months, and so many days each, which, as already mentioned, would make some 4,230 or 4,240 days of actual employment with only some 2,200 days of steaming, or roughly one half the time they were actually employed. If you take the "Wakool," she was employed for 35 months and 14 days; that would be 1,050 days of actual employment, and only 447 days of these steaming?—Of course you will remember that all kinds of cross voyages were required from these transports; they had to be sent to India, Australia, and Bermuda, and as there is no possibility of getting vessels on the spot to take up those unusual journeys they had to be kept on for that purpose. In fact, in Sir Edward Chichester's instructions he is particularly enjoined always to have sufficient transport on hand to meet all possible requirements of the commanding officer in the field.

9780. The fact is that with regard to these ships they were not actually employed steaming at sea for one half of the time they were employed altogether?—Yes, I daresay that is so. I daresay in some cases they ran closer than that.

9781. I merely took those cases as they happened to be for the same length of service and together?—Yes; but as I said before, I do not think you will find that there was any really avoidable delay. The cost if you discharge a ship and have to re-enter another is very much enhanced, because the fitting out of a ship is a very costly business. As a ship costs possibly £5,000 or £6,000 to fit all through, that is a large item, and there are a lot of other initiatory expenses under the Transport Regulations, all of which would be incurred again if you took up a new vessel, and you would have to pay an additional rate instead of a reduced rate for the ship, so that it is cheaper to keep on a ship even if you have nothing at the moment for her to do, than to discharge her and re-enter another.

Captain FRANCIS J. PITT, C.B., R.N., Naval Assistant Director of Transports, called and examined.

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9782. (*Chairman.*) What is your exact office at the Admiralty?—Naval Assistant Director of Transports.

9783. And the duties of that office?—The duties are the inspection, surveying, and fitting out of ships, and seeing to all the wants and requirements outside the office.

9784. You actually survey all the ships?—Yes, and select them.

9785. Are there any records of ships kept in the department?—Yes, we keep records of all suitable vessels that are likely to be wanted for troops, horses, mules, and also for naval requirements, if it is a naval war.

8786. When you say "all ships," what does that mean?—We look on the ships that are most suitable for the conveying of troops, as ships at about 5,000 tons, if we can get them, ranging from 5,000 to 7,000 tons, because a 5,000 tons ship will carry comfortably some 1,200 men, and the officers that go with them, their hospitals, and all other necessary arrangements.

9787. You have records of all those belonging to the United Kingdom?—We have records of every ship suitable for troops in a book I have to keep in the office.

9788. So that if you are called upon to prepare ships you make a selection from those records?—We have to get the ships first, and then we find out from our records whether they are suitable; generally speaking the ships are away, and it is only what we can lay our hands on at the time.

9789. If you are asked for ships, what is your first step?—I have some notes here which you might allow me to read: All suitable vessels are inspected from time to time by officers of the department, and the particulars are entered in registers kept for this purpose. Plans are also obtained when possible. By this means the capabilities of each can be ascertained without having to pay a visit to the respective ships. The vessels most suitable for infantry are those which have good and plenty of accommodation for first class and a fair proportion for second class passengers, with clear space between decks, which can be fitted for men, such as general passenger steamers. For horses those employed in the horse and cattle carrying trade, or vessels of a similar type. From the knowledge possessed by the department vessels can be selected for definite services, and the approximate numbers fixed for which each can be fitted. They are then surveyed as regards their general state and efficiency, accommodation, etc., and planned for the service for which they are to be employed, the contractor for fitting being present, and receiving instructions relating to same. The machinery, etc., is inspected by a naval engineer officer. The time taken to survey a vessel occupies from three to four hours. After acceptance each vessel is visited daily by an officer of the department, and a report made as to progress of fittings, equipments, etc. As a rule an infantry ship occupies 10 days in fitting, and a cavalry ship 12 days, after the ship is clear of cargo. The owners have to carry out the following work at their own expense: to provide a Board of Trade passenger certificate for the ship, to put the ship into dry dock for examination, etc., and for coating her bottom; to sheathe the iron decks where required, to ballast the ship to requirements, to take down and rearrange the saloon and cabins where required, to provide boats, etc., in accordance with Board of Trade requirements under the Merchant Shipping (Life-saving Appliances) Act, 1888; to provide awnings, to provide crew according to the requirements in each case, to provide efficient services of fresh and salt water for troop purposes throughout the ship, to provide fire engines, etc., to clean and paint the ship throughout, to carry out such other work as may be required at the time of the survey, and as is embodied in the conditions of acceptance, and to generally carry out in detail all the work enumerated in the Transport Regulations. You have allowed me to read that, but I wish to point out at this time that the owner has a very great deal of expense when a ship is first taken up; in fact, it has generally been calculated that he gets nothing out of his first month's hire, in consequence of having to do all these things. Cattle ships are generally adapted for carrying horses, being structurally arranged to meet the necessary requirements. They have also advantages over the other vessels, having good drainage ventilation, and water supply, observing that apart from these there are not now many of a suitable class of ships left from which a selection may be made. The cattle ships have only just come into use during this last war for carrying artillery and cavalry.

9790. You did not use them before?—They hardly existed with very few exceptions. They were first brought to the notice of the War Office and the Admiralty on one of my visits to Liverpool, perhaps five years ago. I then visited a lot of these ships, and came to the conclusion that all our cavalry, artillery and remounts should in future be carried in these vessels.

9791. What did you use before?—Cargo ships, but they were not fitted in any way for horses as the cattle ships are; the cattle vessels have all kinds of appliances, as I have just read to you, and are very suitable; they have water laid on, and are specially constructed as regards ventilation. When I made the visit I have just referred to, I took General Sir Evelyn Wood and the Director of Transports there, and they were quite convinced that we were suited at last, and that the horses should be carried in these vessels.

9792. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) These are the cattle ships used in conveying the cattle from the United States, South America, Canada, and the other colonies?—Yes.

9793. And for some years that has been so?—Yes. Then having selected the cattle ships, we found that for carrying horses we had a difficulty to deal with, that we had in store in Burscough, near Liverpool, and at Deptford, some 10,000 horse stall fittings, which were practically useless to us for fitting the cattle ships, and I got out a model to show how the cattle ships should be fitted, and some few months before the war broke out there was a Committee of the War Office, which sat in my room, and they generally adopted it for fitting cattle ships.

9794. (*Chairman.*) But you could not get money to procure them at that time?—No; the Committee of which three War Office officials and myself were members, had come to the conclusion, however, that that was the way they would have to be carried, and when the time came we had something to go upon.

9795. And you were able to provide them?—We were able to provide them when the time came.

9796. The old fittings were suitable for the cargo ships you used before, but not for the cattle ships?—Yes, we utilised the old fittings for the upper deck; we found we could put horses into them on the upper deck. Of course, the horses were not carried so comfortably in a 6-foot stall as they would be in an 8-foot stall, but we put them on the upper decks, and used a certain portion of the old fittings.

9797. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Were you satisfied with the standard of horse fittings in the cattle ships?—Undoubtedly; they suit admirably.

9798. They were quite equal to your requirements?—Yes.

9799. And you did not demand anything further?—We have never altered our pattern from the time we designed it before the war.

9800. (*Chairman.*) You put in special fittings; I think Lord Strathcona meant that the fittings in the cattle ships were sufficient?—Oh, no. I beg your pardon.

9801. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You were not satisfied with them as you found them on the cattle ships?—No, the cattle are carried in pens.

9802. But I meant those that were adapted for carrying horses in cattle ships?—We had very few ships that had already carried horses.

9803. As to such as there were, what have you to say?—In the case of those we had we found that the whole ship was not fitted for them, but only a portion of her. For economy of space we had to remove them, and put in our own, because they were of a different pattern, and would not fit in with the shape of ours.

9804. (*Chairman.*) So that all the horse fittings in these cattle ships were your own pattern?—All of them. With the old pattern fittings we were accustomed to sling horses at sea, and to use pads under their chests and haunches, but we have done away with all those. We never sling a horse at sea with the new pattern fittings, the horses stand up, and we rarely have any report as to any horse having been injured.

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9805. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Are the fittings such, and is the space on the deck sufficient, to permit of moving of the horses, and giving them a little exercise?—In some of our best horse ships we have been able to have every horse in the ship out for certainly part of an hour every day walking round the decks, day and night, by electric light, under a stable guard.

9806. And that has been found very desirable for carrying them in good condition?—Most beneficial. Of course, I am not alluding to remount ships, which were filled with horses, but horses that have been accompanied by the troops, such as artillery and cavalry; the men have had their horses out every day, and even sometimes when the ship has been rolling the horses have accustomed themselves to it.

9807. And where there are troops as well on board each man looks after his own horse?—That would be so. In the case of these cattle ships that we have employed in carrying horses they all had the advantage of bilge-keels, water ballast, and ballast tanks, a thing we cannot find in any other ship. I may say that is so especially as regards the ballast tanks, because we have been obliged to take ships during this war without bilge keels or water ballast, and they have been ballasted with all kinds of things—sand, shingle, and rock, and anything one could get.

9808. (*Chairman.*) Is there some advantage in the water ballast for horses?—It enables us to take in a very great amount of fresh water, which is put into the water ballast tanks, and as we use it we replace it by letting salt water in. Horses infinitely prefer the fresh water that we are able to get at the port of embarkation from the shore to condensed water. Shall I go now to the arrangements for carrying on the work at the home ports?

9809. Yes, please?—With a view to the great increase of work, arrangements were made to meet the requirements by appointing special staffs for duty in various districts, consisting, at the Thames, of two captains, four lieutenants, and paymasters and engineers, and the same at Liverpool, and also at Southampton, with all the staff they require. The advantages of the various ports are that the Thames district has the Albert Docks and the Tilbury Docks, which are excellent for fitting purposes, having plenty of facilities for such work, and for embarkation of troops and horses. Southampton is about the best port for embarkation of infantry, but not for horses, owing to the rise and fall of the tide. Liverpool and Birkenhead are good for cavalry purposes, being the centre for cattle ships and vessels of a similar type. It has, on the Birkenhead side, Victoria Wharf and East Float, and on the Liverpool side, Langton, Brocklebank, and Canada Docks, which are places where horses can be embarked at all times, as vessels are stationary, being locked in, and not dependent on the rise and fall of the tide. Embarkations can also take place at landing stages on either side of the River Mersey. Visits were made to Liverpool in July, 1899, and particulars obtained of many classes of steamers, and prior to this a general knowledge of the class of cattle steamers trading from Liverpool and adaptable for horses. Later it was visited with a view of acquainting various contractors of necessary requirements for fittings for troops, horses, etc.; also to obtain tenders for making new pattern horse stalls. In July we had it that the war was coming, and we knew that our peace arrangements—we were employing one contractor just for our own requirements—would not be sufficient; we wanted to widen the circle of our contractors, and we went up to Liverpool, and got some three or four men there, giving them the patterns of everything we should be likely to want in view of what was coming, and the consequence was that when we got orders to go ahead, these men knew exactly what to do. We wired to them, and they got everything out as hard as they could work. Not only was this done in Liverpool, but in two or three places in London. I may say that we entered into no agreement or anything else; it was only a kind of preparation and warning to them, which they easily grasped.

9810. Were those the only three ports—the Thames, the Mersey, and Southampton?—London, Southampton, and Liverpool have been the only three ports the ships have really departed from. We have had one or two from Glasgow, but those have been the principal ports throughout the war which have been so busily at work.

9811. And when a ship is fitted you again inspect it?—The first inspection is held to ascertain if all the arrangements required by the Transport Regulations have been carried out. The Board consists of one or two naval officers and two military officers, the military Medical Officer of the District or his representative, and the military Medical Officer in charge of troops, accompany the Board, and express their opinion on the sanitary arrangements, etc.; and in the case of horse ships a veterinary officer likewise accompanies them, and gives his opinion on veterinary matters. After the embarkation of the troops, horses, etc., and the ship is ready for sea, a final inspection is held to ascertain whether arrangements for troops, horses, stowage of baggage, equipment, etc., have been carried out. This inspection consists of the same number of officers as the first inspection, with a military medical officer to accompany the Board, and veterinary officer, if horses are carried. As a rule, at embarkations, the troops arrive and embark about 11 a.m., the ship leaving about 3 to 4 p.m. the same day. The horses arrive during the morning, and are embarked as they arrive, the ship leaving during the afternoon. In some cases the time of departure is governed by the tide. As a general rule, the voyage reports have been satisfactory, both as regards the accommodation for men and horses. In some instances there have been suggestions made on minor matters by individual military officers and medical officers, but on the whole the reports have been very satisfactory.

9812. There has been no serious complaint?—No serious complaint.

9813. Have you found any difficulty in working with the War Office in these matters?—Not the slightest. We are on the most intimate terms, and I may say that I think that has been so, not only at home, but abroad all through the war.

9814. Does your evidence deal exclusively with the arrangements in this country?—Exclusively—all ships fitted out at home.

9815. And your opinion is that it has worked well?—I think it has worked very well.

9816. Is there any other point you wish to allude to?—Would you like to know the points as regards the space that the troops have?

9817. Yes?—The general rule is that in measuring the transport you allow for every man having a seat at the mess table. When you are carrying Regulars, the space allowed is 1 foot 6 inches, but in the case of Yeomanry and Volunteers we are a little more liberal, and the space allowed is 2 feet. The space between each mess table, from centre to centre, is 5 feet 6 inches. As to the hanging space for hammocks, the Regulars get 16 inches, sergeants 18 inches, and Yeomanry 18 inches. You must recollect that a hammock, with two blankets and a man in it, does not take up very much room; it is a very narrow thing indeed. Seamen in the Navy have in their hammocks a bed and blankets, but with troops they have their hammocks with two blankets, so that the room taken up by them is very little indeed.

9818. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Does that provide for the whole of the troops sleeping below at once?—It is a reminiscence of the days when ships had sails to work, and there was always supposed to be one-third of the troops as a watch on deck; the sails have gone, but the space remains the same, and the one-third of the troops who were supposed to be on watch have nothing whatever to do, and they amuse themselves during their watch by sleeping on the mess tables, stools, and everything else, and that allows every man not on watch to sleep in a hammock.

9819. The men on watch sleep below now?—Yes, because there is nothing for them to do; it is gone. They sleep on the mess tables and stools, and on the deck.

9819*. Are they not overcrowded at night with all being below?—No, I should say not; of course, it would be much better if the third were always on deck, but there is nothing for them to do now.

9820. In hot climates are they not overcrowded?—As a matter of fact, going through the Tropics, most of the men sleep under awnings on deck; they bring their blankets up and sleep on deck. In the case of Regulars, as many sleeping berths as possible are fitted, but never less than two-thirds. The remainder sleep on tables and stools, and there is always a watch on deck, consisting of one-third of those embarked. For Yeomanry each man has a sleeping berth. As to the hospital arrangements, there are 3 per cent. of cots to the number carried, with dispensary, baths, water closets, and lavatories. The washing arrangements for troops are five troughs and basins for 200 men. In the latrines for troops there are 2 per cent. of seats. For rough pur-

poses you can calculate the tonnage that a horse will take in a transport, and we give a horse 11½ tons. We give a man 4 tons. In the remount ships we give 6½ tons to a horse, and to a mule 3 tons, and we have found by experience that that is a very fair average gross tonnage at which men and horses can be carried.

9821. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Do you say a mule is allowed 3 tons?—Yes.

9822. Only about one-fourth of a horse?—Yes, but they are put into pens instead of stalls.

9823. The horse does not lie down then?—No, the horses do not lie down.

9824. (*Chairman.*) Have you any other point?—I do not know whether you would like to ask me any question about those ships which we call the two Z's—the "Zibenghla" and the "Zayathla"—that are always being thrown at us. We are very happy that they have only the two Z's to throw at us.

9825. What have you to say about them?—Really, as a matter of fact, those two ships were the first start of the Transport Department; they were foreigners in the port of Liverpool. As they did not belong to that port, they were watched with the greatest possible interest by different gentlemen with pencil and notebook, and I do not think that from the beginning they had very much good to say of them, as they were foreigners. Every little trifle that otherwise in the fitting out of ships we should not have taken the least possible notice of was multiplied, and taken a great deal of notice of on that occasion. I was up in Liverpool shortly after they had been fitted up, and the Liverpool papers were filled with the iniquities of these two ships, but when you come to summarise it, it consisted in the one case of a leaky condenser, and in the other of some wet coal which began to smoulder. That is really the whole thing; they carried their horses well to the Cape, and they only lost four in the one instance and two or three in the other. They did not make a very long voyage. At Las Palmas they met with difficulties; it was the first time a transport had gone into Las Palmas, and the Spanish authorities there were not very anxious, apparently, to supply us with water. There were little difficulties with the owners as they had not been accustomed to it, and I think one vessel made something like 24 days, and the other 26 days from the time they left Liverpool.

9826. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Where were these vessels owned?—They were owned by the British India Steam Navigation Company. The history of them is that they were bought by the British India Steam Navigation Company from the New Zealand Shipping Company, and I think they were formerly known under other names.

9827. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) What names were they known by when they belonged to the New Zealand Shipping Company?—I have not got a note of them. Looking through all the telegrams that passed on that occasion between the Admiralty and the officer at Liverpool, they all point to those two things that I have just mentioned and, of course, people at that time(there were three batteries of artillery on board) were very nervous. and said, "If this is what the rest of the transport is going to be, what will become of us?" That is really the state of matters with regard to those two vessels. I daresay if they had been anything else, or not labelled 11 and 12 transport, we should not have heard very much about them.

9828. (*Chairman.*) You think the defects were not serious?—The fact of the matter is you never have time to give any of these transports a trial trip; you have not got the time to do it No doubt if they had had a run it would have been different, but they had lain up for about three months. They had been tested by the Board of Trade, however, for a passenger certificate, and the Board of Trade certificate they possessed is a very severe one; they had been inspected by our own naval engineers, and everything was done to see that they were all right, but there was what I might call a slight breakdown.

9829. You maintain that the defects which did cause the breakdown were not defects which ought to have been discovered by your officers beforehand?—My own impression is that the defects arose from putting new wine into old bottles; the Board of Trade insisted upon certain things being renewed, and in the condenser especially a lot of new arrangements were put into old fittings. I think that was the real cause of it. I have no doubt if they had let them alone they would have done very well.

9830. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You think they ought to have been all new together, instead of being patched up?—It would certainly have been better.

9831. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) You speak of the condensers of the main engines, I suppose?—Yes.

9832. (*Chairman.*) That is all you wish to say about those two ships?—Yes.

9833. Is there anything else?—I can give you all the preparations for the Transvaal War, if you like. There were all kinds of people that we employed.

9834. At what date do you mean?—That would be August and September previous to the October of 1899.

9835. You were making preparations in August and September?—We made certain preparations.

9836. In the way of employing additional officers?—It was in the way of getting all kinds of horse-stall fittings, and we were making some arrangements with the Castle Line Company to clear out their vessels.

9837. But I think from what Mr. Graff said those were all preliminary negotiations, and nothing was actually done which involved the expenditure of money?—That is so; nothing was done which involved the expenditure of money.

9838. But you made all these preliminary arrangements?—Yes, but no money was spent, because we had not got any; we did everything we could, in fact directly we got the money we started an hour afterwards.

9839. And I understand you to say that having made these preliminary preparations you were able to carry out the actual fittings without very serious delay?—No delay at all.

9840. I do not think it necessary for us to get all the details of it?—I should like to mention one thing in connection with fitting out those vessels, namely, that often we took up vessels that were at sea when we were perfectly acquainted with them. Take these vessels of the Cunard Line, the "Pavonia," the "Cephalonia," "Aurania," "Servia," and "Catalonia," these five vessels were all at sea, but we engaged them. I went down to Liverpool and I saw their marine superintendent, who was a most efficient officer, and I said: "Look here, I want the Cunard Company to fit the whole of these vessels up for troops; our contractors are all full." I went into his board room with him, and we got out all the plans, and planned all these vessels out, and he sent me round to Southampton the whole of those five vessels perfectly fitted; they were never altered from the detailed plans that I gave him, and not one of our officers had ever seen them until the time of inspection took place.

9841. And they were quite satisfactory to you?—Most satisfactory; I only mention this to you to show the resources of the country.

9842. (*Sir John Jackson.*) How long did they take to do that kind of thing?—About ten days.

9843. (*Chairman.*) And it shows also the cordiality with which you were met by the shipowners?—Yes, by all the shipowners and their marine superintendents; the marine superintendent of the Cunard Company was as good as any officer to us.

9844. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Did you provide ships as well for the troops and horses from the Colonies?—No.

9845. You provided none of them?—I think agreements were made in London and some of our transports ran from the Cape to the Colonies, but I had nothing to do with the fitting out of any ships abroad.

9846. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You were speaking of the hammocks and the sleeping accommodation for the men on board; the Board of Trade requires so many cubic feet for the seaman serving on board merchant vessels?—Yes, they do; but they sleep in bunks, they do not sleep in hammocks, as a rule.

9847. Taking the ship as a whole, and the circumstances of so many tons to a man, had each soldier that number of cubic feet which I have indicated as the Board of Trade requirement?—No, they have less than the crew; the crew live there as their home; they live on board the whole year round, whereas I do not suppose any troops are ever much more than three weeks on board any troopship.

9848. You have not found their health deteriorate in

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any way from the want of sufficient cubic space?—No, I have not; there might be a few cases where the men have gone to sleep in a draught, or something of that sort. It is so carefully worked out that I do not think you could ever say in connection with a troopship where we give them that tonnage, that the men have anything but plenty of room.

9849. Had you any reports about overcrowding of a transport going from the Cape to Australia, the "Drayton Grange"?—I have read the report of the inquiry.

9850. There was a complaint there as to want of sufficient cubic feet?—I do not think in the report that it was borne out that they did consider so.

9851. There was a very great loss of men there?—Yes, there was; but in reading the report of the inquiry that took place I do not think they considered the ship was overcrowded.

9852. There were two inquiries?—The one I mean was the one into the "Britannic" and the "Orient."

9853. You did not see the one as to the "Drayton Grange"?—No, the "Drayton Grange" would not come to me, but the "Britannic" and "Orient" were both transports fitted out in England. The "Drayton Grange" was fitted out at the Cape to convey troops, but that vessel we never saw.

9854. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I suppose even in peace times, with the best regulated ships, it is not altogether unknown that you may have a little failure similar to that failure of the condenser at Liverpool?—Taking up the daily papers and seeing the report of the trials of our men-of-war, there is constantly something going wrong, although not so much as there used to be.

9855. And even with merchant ships?—Merchant ships, generally speaking, on their trial come out pretty well.

9856. And, of course, as you said, in this case you rely mainly on the Board of Trade certificate?—Yes, and on the certificate of our naval engineers and our own officers. Of course, it was a defect in the engine-room, so that it was a Board of Trade and naval engineers' matter.

9857. Why should a Yeoman or a Volunteer take one-third more room than a Regular? Is he fatter, or what is the reason?—I can only put it down as a little bribery.

9858. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) With regard to hospital ships at the Cape, when they are taken up as hospital ships is a requisition made to the authorities in England in connection with the matter?—A telegram came home from Durban saying that the military wished other hospital ships, and they proposed that certain ships like the "Nubia," the "Simla," and the "Dunera," and another one, should be fitted as hospital ships, and we approved of them.

9859. And that was done in the case of most of the ships out there?—Yes.

9860. But you sent out two completely equipped?—Yes, and they were used as patterns for the larger ones when the time came that they were wanted.

9861. With regard to the cattle ships, I am not clear about this: do you remove the fittings for the cattle when you fit them up as horse ships?—We had to take out the whole of the pens.

9862. With regard to the water-troughs and things of that kind; do they remain?—They have to go, too, because they are wooden. We clear away everything. We have very great conveniences; the whole place is lit with the electric light, and they have all fresh water laid on overhead at their stalls, and they are splendidly drained; they have scuppers every ten stalls, and all those things in any ordinary ship we should have to put in ourselves, whereas we find them ready to hand here.

9863. Your recent form of horse-fittings, the acceptable form practically, has to take the place of the cattle fittings?—Yes.

9864. And with regard to that, is it less costly than the old one?—The new pattern stall is less costly than the old one.

9865. And you will in future, I presume, keep the same supply ready for an Army Corps, as you did of the old pattern?—The last meeting of the committee decided that we would keep 10,000 of the new pattern stalls in stock for future requirements.

9866. And that will take more than a cavalry division I take it?—It will give us the first start which we can work up with. We could not do very much more than fit up for 10,000 horses straight away, and in the meantime we have discovered the resources of the country, and we know where to go, and can turn out as fast as ever we like sufficient for our requirements with the plant which the contractors have put up.

9867. I presume we may take it as approximately the fact that if an order is given for the mobilisation and the embarkation of an Army Corps and Cavalry Division, you can be ready for them in, say, from 10 to 14 days?—Yes, 10 to 12 days. May I give you what we are prepared for?

9868. Yes, I think it would be interesting?—We are prepared to take an Army Corps, Cavalry Brigade, and lines of communication troops, which consist of 1,577 officers, 43,471 men, 15,338 horses, 1,762 vehicles, and 147 guns. It will run into 57 ships for the Army Corps, 9 ships for the Cavalry Brigade, and 6 ships for the lines of communication, a total of 72 ships of 395,500 tons, in 10 to 12 days. Do you wish me to say anything about my trip to South Africa at all?

9869. (*Chairman.*) I did not understand you had been there?—Yes, I was sent out by the Government to report upon various things. It was really a question as to the prisoners. It is not very generally known that the Transport Department, by ancient regulation, have charge of all prisoners; happily, we have not been troubled with them in this war, but we still have in my Pattern Room the pattern of a prisoner of war's uniform, and I suppose it is the only one in the country. We are supposed to have charge of them all, but this late war will likely lead to some different arrangement.

9870. What did you do?—I was sent out to South Africa to find out what regulations were made for them, how they were arranged for, and everything else, in case the Transport Department might be at any future time told to take up their duties, so that I might be able to know what arrangements were made for them.

9871. What was the result of your inspection?—I discovered how they were fed, how they were photographed in groups, how they were clothed, and what money was given to them, and what quarters were provided for them, and also how they were treated when they were put on board transports.

9872. A good many were on board?—Yes, a great many. The first lot of Boer prisoners was sent on board the "Penelope" in Simon's Bay.

9873. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) She is the guard ship at the Cape?—Yes. Would you like me to read my report on it?

9874. (*Chairman.*) Is it a printed document?—Yes.

9875. Would you put it in?—Yes, I will put it in. (*Handing in the same. Report of Captain F. J. Pitt, Naval Assistant to the Director of Transports, on his visit to South Africa.—Admiralty, 8th December* 1900.)

9876. If there is any special point you want to draw our attention to you can do so?—The only point was that the Transport Department have charge of all prisoners of war, and during this war we have not had one of them.

9877. You did not have charge of them?—No.

9878. Although they were on board the transports, you did not have charge of them?—No, they were under military guard.

9879. I do not think it necessary for us to ask you to read the report, if you give the reference.

9880. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) When you say you had not charge of them, do you mean that if you had taken charge of them you would have had them under a naval guard?—We must have had.

9881. But they were kept under a military guard?—Yes, they were under a military guard on board the transports. I can imagine instances in which having that military guard on board a transport in charge of the prisoners might clash with the authority of the master of the transport.

9882. (*Chairman.*) Did anything arise?—Nothing. For instance, I know the military officer of the guard on board the transports had orders to fire on approaching boats at night; well, the master of the transport appears to me to be the best judge of whether an approaching boat is to be fired on or not.

9883. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Had the officer in command of the military guard authority over the master?—No, no one on board has authority over the master of a ship; he is in command.

9884. (*Chairman.*) When the prisoners were put on

board the "Penelope," I suppose they were in charge of the naval authorities?—They were under a naval guard. The summary of my visit to South Africa would I think, bear on the matter before the Commission, and I will read it with your permission:—"The rapidity with which transports on arrival have been berthed, the troops disembarked, horses, guns, ammunition, and stores landed, and the vessels sent out to make room for others is a special feature of this campaign. They arrived in quick succession, but never accumulated sufficiently to cause inconvenience. This was owing to the foresight at home, and also to the policy laid down that the vessels were to be considered merely as platforms for horses and men with their necessary equipment. Beyond carrying 14 days' provisions for the troops to be landed with them and forage for horses, there was no attempt to make them store ships in addition. Such a course would have led to inevitable delay and confusion on arriving at their destination, besides affecting the mobility of the force on board as regards being available for despatch to any port to which it might ultimately be convenient to send it. Conveying the enormous quantity of stores required by other means, we availed ourselves of the resources of the country, and the way in which these stores have reached their respective destinations without delay or difficulties, reflects the greatest credit on the shipping agents employed. The success of landing this large number of men and horses is the result of despatching them from this country in rapid succession so as to keep on feeding judiciously the place of disembarkation, and to prevent overlapping at the coaling stations and terminal ports. All this was foreseen, and on examining the programme of departures already published, it will be observed how the Transport Department had borne in mind the fact that the other end could not probably bear the strain of landing and getting away at the rate of more than a thousand men a day. The moral to be drawn from this is that in the despatch of expeditions from these shores—the most frequent service on which British soldiers will be employed in war—you will have to consider, in the first place, the capabilities of your railways and ports of departure; you must bear in mind the facilities of your coaling stations en route; and, lastly, the local resources of your points of disembarkation, otherwise there will be confusion and general embarrassment which have been conspicuously avoided in the present operations. After many inquiries made on the spot, I cannot find that in operations of such magnitude there has been any loss of life, either to man or animal, that can be directly attributed to the way in which the transports have been fitted. The unanimity existing between the officers of the two Services was a pleasure to witness, and prevailed at all the ports I visited. This has proved most beneficial to the public service. Every assistance was afforded me by the Naval Commander-in-Chief and his staff. All the correspondence relating to the Boer prisoners and other suspects was placed at my disposal, from which I derived much useful information. Nothing could exceed the courtesy and kindness which I received from the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications, the Commandants at the Base, the officers of the Remount Department, and also the Principal Medical and Veterinary officers with whom I was brought in contact, and who supplied me with every information I wished to obtain. It is almost needless to say that Sir Edward Chichester and the Naval Transport officers afforded me every asistance in my mission. Finally, with the experience we have gained during these operations, I feel convinced that the demand made on the sea transport in the next war of any magniture will be, firstly, for remounts with forage and for hospitals, with their equipment both for ashore and afloat; secondly, it will be for stores, troops, cavalry, and artillery, with their horses and guns. Anticipating these demands, the Transport Department should give considerable attention to suitable ships, and designate them beforehand. The *primary* calls will be met by carrying animals in large numbers with trade fittings, embarking in foreign ports under selected officers of both Services; while the hospital ships will convey the medical staff and everything required to establish hospitals on shore. The *secondary* demand will be met by the stores being sent through shipping agents to the exact port for which they are intended. The troops will embark in the large passenger and cargo steamers, while the cattle ships will convey the cavalry and artillery to their respective bases in the manner which has been such a success in the present campaign."

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(*After a short adjournment.*)

Rear-Admiral Sir EDWARD CHICHESTER, Bart., C.B., C.M.G., R.N., called and examined.

Rear-Admiral Sir E. Chichester, Bart., C.B., C.M.G., R.N.

9885. (*Chairman.*) You were in charge of the transport arrangements in South Africa, I believe?—Yes, I was principal transport officer for the first 13 months.

9886. After the outbreak of the war?—Yes.

9887. That is to say, from October, 1899?—Yes, I was sent out on the 15th September, 1899.

9888. Will you tell us what was the nature of your duties?—I first went to Natal when the Indian troops had been landed—the troops from India; and when the war broke out the Admiralty wired to me to go to Cape Town; so I left a Captain at Durban, and dropped a Divisional Officer at East London, and also at Port Elizabeth, and I went to Cape Town, and there resided until I left, for over a year.

9889. And there were four ports under your charge?—Four ports.

9890. And you and your officers were in charge of all the disembarkations and of all the ships calling on behalf of the Government?—Yes.

9891. What was the method pursued?—I commenced at Durban, where I was first, which is a capital port, the best of the lot. The ships came in there, and we got even as big a ship as the "Majestic" in at one time. They went in alongside the wharf, and we got men and horses wharved practically out of the ship alongside. The native labourers there are wonderfully good men—the Zulus; they would tear their fingers off for the English, and there was hardly ever a ship kept outside. Occasionally we had to keep a ship outside if there had been a gale of wind (there is a bar there that silts up sometimes) until they got the suckers; they have some very good suckers for clearing the bar. But there was very little delay there all the time. East London is a very bad port. The ships were constantly detained outside for several days, and long ships could not go inside at all because there is a very sharp bend getting round the corner, over the bar, to get up the river. I never landed there myself. At Port Elizabeth there is a large open roadstead, and everything was landed in lighters. There were two piers there, but except for very small craft, it would be dangerous to put transports alongside; you could not do it with any safety. The lighterage is done very smartly at Port Elizabeth. At Cape Town all the ships were brought inside as they arrived, and on the requisitions of the military authorities. It did not matter to me what ship I brought in. Perhaps a cavalry ship, an artillery ship, and an infantry ship arrived on the same morning, and I would say to the staff embarkation officer: "Which ship do you want brought in and disembarked first?" And he would tell me; he would get instructions from the General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication, and very often, as happened in a case later on, a ship would be up there for some time waiting for a communication from Lord Roberts, who had gone up to the front, as to whether he wanted certain troops dropped at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, or Durban. We had the greatest delay there because ships coming out from England which were wanted for Durban and Port Elizabeth, had to coal at Cape Town; some ships came in very short of coal—the Cunarders, for instance—and it certainly caused delay in having to coal these ships.

9892. Had you to bring them in to coal?—Yes, I tried coaling some ships in the bay, but I found it was only waste of time. I might coal for three or four hours, and then some sea would come in and knock the ship about, so that I had to stop altogether.

9893. And a good many of the ships went out to the Cape to wait orders, was not that so?—Yes, after they were cleared.

9894. No, I mean even to decide their destination after they came out to the Cape?—Yes, it was decided at Cape Town whether they should go and be discharged there or at Port Elizabeth or at East London or Durban.

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9895. So that there was some delay in those cases?—Not in the ships going to the eastward; that was on account of the coaling.

9896. But at Cape Town, as I understand you, you always could bring in transports pretty regularly as soon as they arrived?—Yes, I had berthing there. We had the South Arm. I have a chart of it here, if you care to look at it. It is very clear. (*Handing in the chart and describing it.*) The military got *those* berths from the Harbour Board. They arranged the payment; I had to regulate all the transport work. The Port Captain was practically under my orders, and if a transport came in, or at least, anchored outside, and the military authorities wanted it in, I would telephone to the Port Captain: "Please bring in 'Orotava' at once," and he would send a pilot out to bring her in, and berth her where I told him to berth her.

9897. Had you full control of the harbour?—Fairly so. We had the whole of the South Arm and those other coaling berths, which you see there. You will see four coaling berths marked.

9898. Does the port belong to the municipality?—It is the Harbour Board who have control over it. I had a good deal of difficulty there at first.

9899. The Government had not full control?—Yes, I fancy the High Commissioner had. If I had any difficulty, which I had once or twice with the Port Captain and Harbour Board, I used to appeal direct to the High Commissioner, Lord Milner, and he would send the Harbour Board down to me, and pretty soon put things right. But there was a great difficulty about the labour and one thing and another at Cape Town when we first started there; the docks were half full of rebels, and they did not work—they were sullen; in fact, we had a lot of difficulty at starting.

9900. What did you do with them?—We got them into line at last. The Harbour Board were rather uppish; they thought the Government had too many berths. One day, for instance, this sort of thing would happen. I would have a wire sent down to me: "Action at the front, such and such ammunition ship wanted in at once." And I would reply: "All right." I would switch on to the Port Captain and say, "Please bring in so-and-so at once." He would telephone back, "Her turn comes in 12 days' time." I would then telephone to the High Commissioner requesting that he would, through his military secretary, direct the Harbour Board to order the Port Captain to obey my orders at once, and Lord Milner always used to send to the Harbour Board and send them down to my office, and I had to explain to these gentlemen that we were at war, we could have no "turns," and other things in the same way.

9901. And you got the ship in?—Oh, yes, of course, it had to come in. But then they hoped I would not appeal to the High Commissioner again, and I said, "As long as you go on in a proper manner I shall not." Well, the Port Captain did become unpleasant respecting something about a ship four months afterwards, and I telephoned again, and went through the same process. His Excellency sent the Harbour Board again down to me. He did not mince matters at all, and, of course, I had my way, but they had had control of the port so long that they did not like the principal transport officer taking charge of the docks there, *i.e.*, the large portion of the docks over which I had control.

9902. I suppose there was some trade going on in the port independently of the Government ships?—Yes, at all those other berths, and whenever I could not fill up the South Arm and those other berths, I always let one of the ordinary traders come in there.

9903. Quite so; you met their convenience as far as you could?—Certainly, we could not play dog in the manger at all; at every chance we could we let them in. And even to the big liners I have lent coals sometimes. The Union Castle Company were so short of coal at times that I lent them some.

9904. Do you know the nature of the Harbour Board—how it was appointed?—I think it was appointed by the Government. I was up at the Cape Parliament House when there was an inquiry into the Harbour Board. Mr. Merriman was president, and he asked me to go and give evidence on the working of the docks. I think it is a Government appointment.

9905. (*Sir John Jackson.*) It is practically a Government body, at any rate?—You would know.

9906. I understand it is a Cape Government body?—So I believe.

9907. (*Viscount Esher.*) Were they Dutchmen or Englishmen?—On the Board I think there were one or two Bondsmen there. There were a lot of rebels, I know, wearing crowns in their caps down there.

9908. (*Chairman.*) At any rate, subject to those occasions, you were always able to get in the transports and ammunition ships?—Yes, directly I let them know that the High Commissioner was at the back of me. In fact, the High Commissioner said to me one day, "I think, Chichester, you have it pretty well your own way in the docks now," and I said, "Pretty well, but not perhaps quite as much as I should like," but I said, "Thanks to you we have got the Harbour Board down from that exalted pedestal," and there they remained.

9909. Now, with regard to landing stores, had you any difficulty?—Yes. If a store ship came in, each head of a department first wanted to land his own stores—the commissariat stores, say; another wanted horse-shoes, the Army Service Corps' stores, and that sort of thing. I did start conveniencing the heads of departments, but I found it did not answer, because the cargoes were so mixed up sometimes that the head of a department, say the Army Service Corps, would come to me and say, "This ship is urgently wanted at Port Elizabeth; will you send it on?" and I sent her on—on one occasion only. Then another head of a department said, "This ship has gone on to Port Elizabeth; she has some stores in her that are urgently wanted at Cape Town." I could see that it would lead to confusion if I carried on in that way, and took each man's ideas as to where the ship should go; so I told the Embarkation Staff Officer everything must come through the General Officer of the Lines of Communication. He will find out from the heads of departments where the ship ought to go, and what is wanted here, and I will send her on; but I must have some head man to give the directions as to the requirements at the different ports. And that was always carried out afterwards.

9910. Then had you a difficulty in bringing them in?—Oh, yes, there was no room. The greatest difficulty was with the hay ships. When a jam ship came, or general service stores, horse-shoes, and all that sort of thing, very often the military authorities would take them at once, but so many hay ships came there that we had to keep them out in the bay sometimes for weeks, I may say months.

9911. Because you could not get them in?—No, we could get them in, but they had no place to stow the stuff. They had enormous stacks at Cape Town all round the docks at the South Arm, and outside the docks they had an enormous stack. So much used to be sent away by the railway, but as Lord Roberts advanced to Pretoria later on the trucks got fewer and farther between at Cape Town; they had very few trucks down there, they were all used up the line, and there were the hay ships, and they had to stay there sometimes for weeks.

9912. But you had large stocks of hay all round the docks?—Yes.

9913. There must have been a risk of fire?—We had sentries all round. Of course, there would have been risk of fire if the Boers' agents had been more alert than they were. I often thought that they would have set fire to those ricks, because the stores had to be very strongly guarded on the South Arm, where the ammunition was landed, and that sort of thing. We had a tremendous amount of ammunition in store along the South Arm sometimes, and then we had a proper guard of sentries.

9914. Were they always strongly guarded?—There were several sentries there.

9915. Because one has read stories of large piles of ammunition lying unguarded on the quays?—I have never seen it lying unguarded on the quays, not at the South Arm—not at Cape Town.

9916. Then that was the reason for delaying some of the ships unloading, and I suppose demurrage had to be paid?—Certainly. A ship would come out, and in her charter party it would be stated, "This ship is to be unloaded in seven days from the time she is ready for unloading." The captain would come and report himself to me, and say, "I am ready to start unloading to-morrow morning," and I would say, "Well, the military authorities do not want you; they cannot take your stores, and I am afraid you will have to stay in the bay until further

orders." At the end of the seven days allowed for unloading they started demurrage. At first when I went out there I rather went against this demurrage, because the charter parties said, I think in most cases, "according to the custom of the port," and the custom of the port at Cape Town is that the ships come into dock to unload in rotation, but there is no demurrage charged at all. Suppose a ship anchors in Table Bay, and there are nine ships riding there to come in before her, she comes in No. 10, and all that time she is kept waiting there is no charge for demurrage, that is according to the custom of the port. Of course, as there was no routine about the transports, they only were brought in as the contents of each were required; the freight ships I mean, just according to the military requirements.

9917. Therefore, the demurrage was fairly payable?—It was, no doubt.

9918. But it was necessary, because you could not otherwise store the hay in the ship?—No, we had piled up every available place. I was looking for some photographs that I have at home last night, which I thought might be interesting, to show how it was piled up there, and outside the docks, too, as these forage ships dropped in.

9919. You have been speaking of the landing arrangements at Cape Town. Were there similar difficulties at Durban?—No, never at Durban; they would do anything. It is quite a different place. I know Durban well. I was transport officer there in the first Boer war for a year. There is quite a different style at Durban from that at the Cape.

9920. Then you had no difficulty about landing there?—Not a bit.

9921. Were there no ships kept waiting there on demurrage?—I think very few. There might have been a hay ship or two.

9922. But there were large accumulations of stores at the port?—Yes, I think Durban got the stores away better; they had a large stock up there, and at Port Elizabeth, too; but I think there was less trouble about Durban than anywhere else.

9923. Our attention has been called to some allegations that at Durban there were great accumulations of tinned meat that went bad, and caused a nuisance in the place. Were you aware at all of that?—That is a military matter.

9924. You were not stationed there?—No, only for two or three weeks.

9925. Would you not have heard of it if anything of the kind had taken place?—Yes. I would have heard of it.

9926. But you do not think anything of any importance did take place?—I have seen putrid tinned meat there at times—the boxes having broken in spiking.

9927. But there was nothing to cause a great public nuisance at Durban?—No.

9928. You would have heard of it if there had been?—I should think so.

9929. And with regard to the other two ports, have you any other details to give as to the arrangements there?—No. Port Elizabeth, as I say, is a very smart place for working lighters, and I do not think there was any hitch there at all.

9930. Not so much kept outside there?—Yes, at Port Elizabeth the forage ships were very often kept out.

9931. Was there much forage kept there?—Yes, a good deal.

9932. And was there any accommodation for it?—I believe they stacked it; they stacked a lot outside the town. I think a lot of it was burnt on one occasion, too.

9933. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) Where was that big fire; was it at Port Elizabeth?—Yes.

9934. (*Chairman.*) But there also the ships may have been kept waiting because of there being no accommodation?—Yes, they were, I know.

9935-6. There is a case which was mentioned in the report that I called Mr. Graff's attention to this morning, of the Committee on Public Accounts—it is the case of a forage ship, "The Hyson," which was detained for four months at Port Elizabeth before unloading. Do you happen to know of that case?—Yes. I remember her name. I know she was kept there a long time, but she was not wanted. We only went on the requirements of the military authorities. They said, "Please stop landing; we cannot do anything with it, we cannot forward it, and we cannot stack it." I have often spoken to the military authorities at the Cape, and said, "Here are these captains complaining bitterly about not being unloaded"; they said, "Well, we cannot help it, we cannot stack it, and we cannot receive it, we cannot forward it."

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9937. They could not have made any special arrangements to receive it?—I do not think so. They had tremendous stacks as it was, and as I say with the stores sent up country there were so few trucks down there when Lord Roberts advanced.

9938. (*Chairman.*) The Committee's report is not very long, and I think it is pretty well in accordance with what you have been saying. I might just read it to you. It says: "From the evidence it appeared that the officers responsible for the delay in regard to any ship are the supply officers at the port of disembarkation. Their action depends upon the rate at which they can send their goods up country, and upon the class of goods most urgently wanted. The explanation of the delay in unloading given by these officers was want of suitable storage place at the port; want of steady supply of trucks to prevent congestion; insufficient facilities for unloading vessels quicker, and the recent disuse of Cape Town for unloading supply ships consequent on the outbreak of the plague. It must also be remembered that the main proportion of supplies of forage were coming from foreign ports, and it was difficult to regulate their arrival, and that there was only one line of railway to relieve the congestion at the base"; do you agree in all those remarks?—Yes, except that I was not there after the plague. I left before the plague broke out.

9939. Otherwise you agree in those reasons that they did justify the delays that took place?—Yes.

9940. The next point I think will be the local conveyance of troops and stores?—Yes, that would be, say from Cape Town to Durban, and Cape Town to intermediate ports.

9941. I am taking it from your *précis*. What have you to say about it?—If there was a small amount of stores required, say at Port Elizabeth from Cape Town, I would take up freight from the Union Castle Company, or any convenient ship going up there, if it was a small amount; but it was enough to justify telling off a transport, that is to say, taking into consideration the amount of coal she would burn—if it was a large amount we should send up a transport. All local freight was paid by me out there.

9942. You made all the arrangements?—Yes, for all the local freight. All freight from England to the Cape, and from the Cape to England for the long trips was provided at home.

9943. Had you any serious difficulties about it?—Not the slightest.

9944. Had you any difficulties about rates?—No, they wanted to hold out for primage, I think they call it. There is a custom out there for big lines, as they call the big rings out there, to charge so much per cent. extra on orders for freight which is repayable at the end of six months. This is to prevent the tradespeople in the Cape going to, what they term, pirate ships, ships plying between the intermediate ports and carrying at lower rates. That I did not pay. I said the Government were not going to be bound to any ring. On one occasion I had to take stores up to Walfish-a, and in that case I had to pay these primage rates; there was a little German firm, and I could not get it done without, practically. It was not much.

9945. Then as to discipline in the transports at the Cape, can you tell us anything?—I think it was very good taking it all round. The seamen, like most merchant seamen, would get the worse for drink sometimes, but no more than I have seen them at other ports, and I do not think quite so much really, because directly I had finished with them at the docks I used to send them out of the way, so that they had not much opportunity. Several deserted at one time, but I wrote a letter to Lord Kitchener, and he soon stopped that. They deserted to join Kitchener's Horse, and some of those irregular services. A good many firemen I think went, but I said to Lord Kitchener, "One of these days you will want steam to be raised to move your Army Corps, and you will not have enough stokers left." However, he issued strict orders that not a man was to be taken from the transports. He returned me three stewards that one of his captains had induced to desert, and he took away the captain's commission, so that practically stopped that.

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9946. And had you any authority in the matter of discipline?—No, only over the captain.

9946*. The captain was responsible to you?—Yes.

9947. And the captain was responsible for his crew?—The captain was responsible for his crew. If they committed themselves he would take them up before the police at Cape Town.

9948. Then, as to prisoners of war in transports, what do you desire to say?—I used to embark them, and then they came under the military authorities.

9949. The prisoners of war were under the military authorities in the transports?—Yes, I used to tell off a deck space for the prisoners—a suitable deck space for the guards to be away from them, and so on. They used to settle down very well.

9950. And you had a good number at one time?—Yes, we used to send them away in thousands.

9951. But you had a good number remaining in the transports at the Cape?—Yes, we had three lots at Simon's Bay. We always used to send them round to Simon's Bay. It would not have done to keep them at Cape Town.

9952. And you have not anything special to say about those arrangements?—No, I used to see the captains from time to time and say: "Have you any trouble?" and they said "No." On one occasion the Government sent 400 mutineers off to sea in a gale of wind, and I think it did them a world of good; they had been stoning the sentries, and that sort of thing. That was at Green Point, Cape Town. General Forestier-Walker asked me if I could give them a transport and take the mutineers on a sea voyage, and I said, "Certainly," and they went to sea in a gale of wind, a north-westerly wind, to Simon's Bay. They remained there for a day, and then came back again. They were sea-sick the whole way there and the whole way back, and I think it had a very good effect, because when they were landed again they told their friends what they might expect.

9953. There was not so much trouble afterwards?—No, I do not think there was.

9954. What were your relations with the military authorities?—Excellent. I never had the slightest difficulty in any possible way; we had an excellent staff down at Cape Town Docks, and everything went along smoothly.

9955. Was there a military staff in correspondence with you at the docks?—Yes, all working together with my staff—the Military Embarkation Officers they used to call them. I had a Major Lascelles, he was the head down at the docks, and it was rarely that I saw the General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication, because Major Lascelles was a sort of medium between us. He would bring me down word what the General wanted done, in the disposition of the troops, troopships, transports, stores, and everything.

9956. But if you had occasion for it you told us that you had access to the General Officer Commanding?—Yes, and the Chief of the Staff, Lord Kitchener, and the High Commissioner. I was well protected, you see; and, after a time, Cape Town got much better after they found that Ladysmith was relieved, because these rebels began to talk to us.

9957. Then, altogether you think that the system of the Admiralty being in charge of the transport for the military authorities worked well in the case of the Cape?—Certainly. Some people think that the military authorities could take charge of the whole transport service. I do not think it is possible myself. In the case of the docks, for instance, at Cape Town, I used to have to order the Port Captain to bring in these ships, and he would jib sometimes; he would say it was blowing too hard, and one thing and another, "Leave it till to-morrow." I am certain he would bounce a soldier, because the soldier does not know, and is not supposed to know, as much about a ship as a sailor, in the ballasting, in coaling, and all sorts of things.

9958. Then you are satisfied with the system, and you have no suggestions to make as to the future for any alteration?—No, I found the thing worked very well. I have had a lot of experience in transports; I have had more than any naval officer, except those at home. I was principal Transport Officer in Egypt for 14 months, and a year at the first Boer War, and I was captain of H.M.S. "Himalaya" (Troopship) for two and a-half years, and so on. I know a good deal about the service of transports. And we have a much better lot of captains now than we had 20 years ago, I think. In fact, we used to have transport officers on board.

9959. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Are you speaking now of the merchant captains?—Yes; there were several transport officers sent out in the ships that ran to India and back; they came out to the Cape. I wrote to the Director of Transports, and I said I thought they were quite unnecessary; I did not get any work out of them And besides the captains nowadays are so superior to what they were some years ago, and they get on much better, I think, with the military authorities by themselves. There is only one point about naval transport officers being aboard, and that is to make any remarks, after the remarks of the Military Commanding Officer, on the voyage to the port.

9960. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) You had the landing of all these things in your hands, had you not?—Yes.

9961. And nobody interfered with you there; there was no military interference there. They told you, of course, what they wanted, and you got it landed for them?—Yes.

9962. And your functions ceased when the things were landed?—When they were practically what we call high-water mark.

9963. And you had to determine the site they should be placed on?—Yes; I used to say, for instance: "Here are Numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 berths at South Arm, where do you want the ship?" and they said, "At No. 2." I said, "I cannot put it there, there is not enough room between there and another ship; but I will put it as near as possible." That sort of thing.

9964. In fact, the military authorities had no responsibility till the stores had all been put on shore?—No.

9965. Was it ever suggested, or did you ever think yourself, that some of that hay could have been landed, say, at Simon's Town, and stacked there, so as to avoid all that demurrage?—No, it never struck me.

9966. I do not mean to say that it would have helped the disposal of it, as it would have had to be taken up to Cape Town eventually?—I suppose they could have stacked it somewhere.

9967. So far as the transports were concerned, from what you saw of the ships that came there, were those belonging to any one company better than those of another—take the Cunarders, for instance?—I think they were the worst lot, because they were dirty, and carried in a few cases barely enough coal to take them from St. Vincent to the Cape; in fact, had a dangerously narrow margin for safety.

9968. And those that served you best were probably the lines that ran between England and the Cape?—Yes, the Union Castle are very good—all their ships. Then we had several very good transports—the "Bavarian" the Orotava," and several others. I mean that you might say it was the exception to have bad ones; and the horse transports nowadays are splendid. I have seen some of the horses land. I saw one battery go straight away in splendid condition from—I forget the name of the ship now, something like the "Maplemore" or "Templemore."

9969. They came from England, I suppose?—Yes; the "Manchester Merchant" Yeomanry horses were beautiful horses. The men are used to carrying cattle and horses, and the captains take a great deal of interest in the horses themselves.

9970. We have had it in evidence from Captain Pitt that he preferred a ship of between 5,000 and 7,000 tons, because the disembarkation was so much easier at the berth, and probably it was easier to coal. Does that fit in with your view?—Yes, I would sooner have that size.

9971. (*Sir John Jackson.*) Cape Town Harbour, as it stands at present, is rather a bad harbour if you have a gale of wind from the north-west, is it not?—Yes; but I sent transports round to Simon's Bay.

9972. If you got a north-west gale?—No, I sent most of them. When it came on to the winter months I sent those I was not using, that were standing by, round to Simon's Bay.

9973. Then, if you got a cargo up in a heavy north-west gale, I suppose you could do nothing with her at Cape Town, unless you got her alongside the docks, inside?—No.

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9974. Did you ever unload into barges in the bay?—No.

9975. You always took them alongside the quays?—There were one or two barges, and those were lost when I sent the transport round to the wreck of the "Ismore Castle." They were thinking of getting some more, but they do very little work.

9976. At present the accommodation at Cape Town is not very ample, is it?—No. I think they were beginning to dig it inside to make more dock accommodation.

9977. On the question of Simon's Town, if there had been any landing quays there a good deal of the traffic might have been taken to Simon's Town and put on to the railway there, instead of at Cape Town; might it not?—It would have had to join up again at the junction.

9978. Yes, you have got in mind that there would be a congestion on the railway?—Yes.

9979. So that, in that sense, there would not have been any advantage if you had been able to discharge at the two ports?—No; you see there is that junction there for the railway to Cape Town.

9980. Except for that, of course, there would be a great advantage in having a place where you could discharge material at Simon's Town?—The more places the better, of course.

9981. It would practically double your discharging power?—Yes, naturally the more places the better.

9982. Were not the dues exceptionally heavy in Cape Town Harbour?—I think, perhaps, compared with other ports, they were.

9983. Take a mule, for instance; do you happen to know what they charged for allowing a mule to walk ashore?—I do not know whether they made any charge at Cape Town.*

9984. I was told it was a pretty big one. You do not remember?—No.

9985. Then on this question of what they term primage, I think in these big lines, I suppose if you fixed a definite rate per ton they could not charge a primage in addition?—It is the custom.

9986. It is the custom that a rate is quoted, and then they add on to that 10 per cent., or whatever it may be, for primage?—Yes.

9987. Then the idea is that if the charterer, if the merchant at the end of the year, has not carried his goods by any other line, the ship-owning firm return the primage?—Yes, quite so.

9988. So that the whole system is just a means of a more or less imposition upon the merchant to compel him to carry his goods by a particular line?—Yes.

9989. Of course, in your case you did not agree to that?—No.

9990. Now, with any local freightage arranged locally there, for instance, say, from Cape Town to Port Elizabeth, what would have happened under your powers if you had not been able to strike a bargain with a little ship to take those things round. What is in my mind is that you had no power to compel a vessel to take goods leaving the freight to be fixed at a reasonable figure, had you?—He is only too happy to take it.

9991. But assume for the moment that he wanted something absoluely ridiculous?—Then I had the coast rates, you see.

9992. But you could not compel him to take the freight, could you, under your powers?—No, I could not compel them; but they were only too happy to take the goods. There would be one of them coming to me every day and saying: "Here are steamers going up, have you anything to send?"

9993. There was no lack of supply?—No.

9994. (*Sir John Edge.*) I suppose the Harbour Board kept turn books at the Cape, did they not?—Yes, for the ordinary merchant ship.

9995. They do at Liverpool and Bristol, and all the ports here?—Yes, that is always done.

9996. They did not keep your vessels out of turn; they did not deprive you of your turn?—They had nothing to do with our turn.

9997. I am coming to that, but I say that they did not deprive you of your turn?—I never wanted a turn.

9998. You wanted to get in whether it was your turn or not?—Certainly, because I had so many berths always at my disposal.

9999. What I want to understand is this: In ordinary times, and putting this war out of the question, they would be liable in damages if they let a vessel in out of its turn?—Yes, the Harbour Board would be.

10000. The Harbour Board would be liable in damages for breaking the turn?—Yes, but they acted straight in that way with outsiders.

10001. Then, whether it was obstructive or not, they were merely carrying out their own system of turn when they objected to your vessel coming in?—Yes, when they objected to my supply ship coming in.

10002. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Were the English Government called upon to pay port dues upon military material?—The only things paid were the port dues on the ships. I do not know what the military authorities paid.

10003. Wharfage rates, for instance?—They paid for the wharves.

10004. Who did that?—The military authorities.

10005. They had to pay for the wharves?—Yes, they had to pay for the wharves and stores on the wharves.

10006. Were the wharves Government property there?—They belong to the Harbour Board, which is practically the Cape Government.

10007. Then the Cape Government got paid by the English Government for the use of their wharves in landing military stores?—Yes.

10008. (*Viscount Esher.*) When was martial law first enforced at the Cape, do you know?—I think it was after I left.

10009. You had no experience of that?—No.

10010. You know, of course, it has been said that after the declaration of hostilities shiploads of ammunition were landed by the Boers at Cape Town, and sent up into the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Do you think that is true?—Not at Cape Town.

10011. You do not think that any were landed at Cape Town?—No, I should not think so.

10012. But did you ever hear it. I daresay you have heard it said?—I have heard it said that they were landed on the West Coast up at Saldanha Bay and that way, but not at Cape Town itself.

10013. And you do not think it likely that they were landed at Cape Town?—No, I do not think so at all myself.

10014. (*Chairman.*) Is there any other point that you wish to refer to?—We had to fit up six hospital ships out at Durban. Durban is an exceptionally good place for carpenter's work. I could not have fitted those ships up, for instance, at the Cape. I could not have got the men, and the rates would have been probably most exorbitant. But at Durban they fitted up those ships in a very short time; they were excellently done.

10015. They were fitted on the pattern of the two that came out from home, we were told?—Yes, practically the same. The "Princess of Wales" came out—she was a hospital ship—and also the "Maine." The "Maine" is running in the Mediterranean now.

10016. But the other five were required afterwards?—The other six. The "Spartan" and "Trojan" were first sent out with the idea of moving the wounded from Durban to Cape Town, and putting them on shore in Wynberg Hospital, not for running home; just for local transfers, but they were rather small.

10017. Is there anything more that you wish to say?—No.

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* The Witness subsequently informed the Commission in writing that "there were no charges for landing animals at Cape Town. At Durban the charges were certainly heavy, and at the commencement of the war I expostulated with the military authorities who made the landing contract as to the preposterous charges in the contract for landing animals."

TWENTY-THIRD DAY.

Wednesday, 3rd December 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable The Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

Sir ARTHUR PERCY DOUGLAS, Bart., called and examined.

(*For other Evidence respecting the New Zealand contingents, see Questions* 8598–8694).

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See 8598–8694.

10018. (*Chairman.*) You belong, I believe, to the Defence Department of the Government of New Zealand?—I am Under-Secretary for Defence.

10019. We had some evidence the other day from Colonel Penton, who told us in some detail the manner in which the contingents from New Zealand were enlisted and sent out and equipped. If you have any statement that you desire to submit we shall be very glad to hear it?—I would ask that I might be allowed to see what Colonel Penton said, perhaps.

10020. It is a series of questions in the evidence, but he simply gave us all the details, so that it is not necessary for you to go through that. He gave us the details of the manner in which the contingents were raised and how they were equipped in the Colony?—They were raised in the first instance by calling for Volunteers for service, and a large number of these men, of course, were Volunteers in the Colony at the time. The equipment of them was a thing that had never been attempted in New Zealand; we had never attempted anything of the sort before, and we did not keep large stores—in fact, we practically had no stores of special things. The clothing, for instance—that we had to purchase by contract throughout the Colony.

10021. Yes, Colonel Penton told us that the first three contingents and the majority of the fourth contingent were equipped by private effort?—Oh, no, that is not so.

10022. Will you say, then, how they were equipped?—The first two contingents were equipped entirely at the cost of the New Zealand Government in every detail, and it is for reasons such as that that I would like to be allowed just to see what he did say; it may be of great assistance to me and to the Commission.

10023. But you cannot in the time read through the whole of his evidence?—Very well; I do not wish to delay the Commission.

10024. But I think the distinction that was drawn was between the Colony and the Imperial Government. It was not so much a question of private effort, perhaps, as I put it, but the other contingents, I think, were equipped by the Imperial Government?—Beginning with the 5th?

10025. That is what I meant?—Yes, the first four contingents were equipped by the Colony, and the first two entirely by the Government.

10026. Would you say, then, exactly what part the Government, for which you were partly responsible, took in the matter?—We provided everything in regard to the equipment and clothing for the whole of the contingents; I may say from the first contingent up to the tenth. I am not now talking of at what particular cost it was done, but I mean to say that our department called for tenders and supplied everything.

10027. And you had the management of it?—Yes, I was solely responsible for the work under the Minister. We called for tenders generally right throughout the country for everything.

10028. And you were able to get them in the country?—We got everything in the country except towards the end, when we asked the Imperial Government to supply certain military stores which we either had not got or which we could not supply from our own stores without denuding our own local forces.

10029. What sort of reserves do you keep in the Colony?—Well, it is rather difficult to say that, because at one time, so far as accoutrements and all that sort of thing are concerned, we used to keep a considerable reserve; but since 1899 our Volunteer forces, which are practically the forces of the country with the exception of a few permanent men, have been raised from somewhere about 5,000 to, including Rifle Clubs, now upwards of 20,000, and the difficulty in obtaining the stores has been very great, of course, during the pressure of the war, and we have of late kept a reserve. We have got a considerable number of rifles in reserve at the present time, somewhere about 5,000 magazine rifles, but we never provide clothing for any forces. The Volunteers get a certain capitation, and they provide everything of that nature themselves.

10030. Have they a uniform?—Yes.

10031. Which they provide themselves?—Yes; they have to provide it for themselves out of the capitation grant, and of course when we had the contingents we had to start on a new thing and purchase everything. In some cases we had a great deal of difficulty; in fact, I was cabling myself to Australia continually during the despatch of the contingents to see if we could get some of the things there; but we found that, if anything, they were almost more denuded in Australia of stores than we were, so that there was great difficulty in getting them, especially considering the pace at which I had to turn them out.

10032. Had you ammunition to send with the men?—We were asked not to do so. We used to send a certain amount of ammunition on board ship purely for practice.

10033. During the voyage?—During the voyage. We were asked not to send ammunition by the Imperial Government.

10034. You say, as Colonel Penton states also, that a good many of the men were members of the Volunteer Force?—Yes, a large number, especially in the earlier contingents, because the men were all very anxious to go, and the selection was confined, so far as it could possibly be done, by the Minister's instructions, to Volunteer corps. After that our number began to get rather large, and it was somewhat of a difficulty to carry that order out. And a great many, of course, were enlisted because they were bushmen and stockmen, and that class of men.

10035. Of what class of man are the ordinary Volunteers?—They are of all sorts. In our country corps, of course, they are all country men, stockmen, bushmen, farm hands, and all that sort of thing; and, of course, nearer the towns we get to the clerks, labourers, and everybody that goes to make up the population of what we call a big town.

10036. Are they intelligent men?—Yes, very; I think, as a rule, they are very intelligent.

10037. Are the country corps or the town corps the

more numerous?—The town corps are the more numerous. The spread of the corps in country districts has been more recent since they have been raising the numbers of the Volunteers so much out there.

10038. And did they volunteer as freely from the country as from the town corps?—Quite as freely; in fact, the difficulty was to keep a number of men back.

10039. You got them from both?—Yes; everybody wanted to go, I think.

10040. Was it the service or the rate of pay that attracted them, do you suppose?—I do not think it was exactly the rate of pay. I think it was the service. I think that the idea of doing something for the old country animated a very large number of men with a desire to go; and, besides that, there is perhaps also the spirit of adventure which has done so much for all the nation.

10041. The rate of pay was 4s. a day, was it not?—Yes, for the first three contingents; in fact, the first four contingents were enrolled at 4s. a day, but after that, from the fifth contingent up to the tenth, by instructions from the Imperial authorities, in accepting the services and laying down the rates they fixed 5s. a day for privates and for the other ranks proportionate rates.

10042. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) That rate is not higher than their wages in New Zealand?—No.

10043. Not so high?—No; many men working as labourers in our Defence Stores are getting 8s. a day.

10044. (*Chairman.*) Then it could not have been the rate of pay that specially attracted them?—No, I do not think so. I think it was the desire to go over.

10045. And that desire, you think, would obtain in any case of emergency?—I think so.

10046. There is a strong feeling in the Colony?—Yes, I think there is a very strong feeling indeed. Of course, naturally everybody was very much excited about the Empire's troubles at the time, and the men were only too anxious to go.

10047. What do you say about the officers?—I think they were animated by the same desire as the men.

10048. But no doubt there were difficulties in getting officers with any amount of training?—That, of course, must be so, because we were sending out men at a great pace, and highly trained officers are not to be got at the moment. We could not order anybody away, you see.

10049. You had not very many in the Colony, I suppose?—No; of course, the men took great interest so far as I see from communication with the General, and all that sort of thing: he always reported that they were taking great interest in their training, and so on. Of course, this was quite a new thing.

10050. But any training that you can give to officers in the Volunteer force in New Zealand would be very insufficient for the actual work of warfare, would it not?—That is rather difficult to say. I should say it would be so to a certain extent, but all the exercises that they do, that the military authorities now and for some time past have been given, as stated by the various commanding officers, is in the way of giving them mounted infantry work in rough country, and that sort of thing; teaching men to take advantage of all those things which are desirable of that nature, and to be able to act and to show their capabilities of acting when they are thrown on their own resources to a great extent; but we had no great training school. There is a school now which has been instituted; I think it has been in existence about one year.

10051. Is there a training school?—Yes, there is. It is called the school of Military Instruction, and an Imperial officer, who originally came out as the Adjutant there, travels from district to district, and lectures and gives courses of either a month or six weeks in one part of the colony, and a month or six weeks in another, and all the officers and non-commissioned officers have an opportunity; in fact, they are invited to attend to make themselves perfect; and although I have not the figures by me, and do not remember them, I am told that they are taking great interest in doing so.

10052. But we have had a good deal of evidence, even with regard to our own Yeomanry force, say, in this country that it is most desirable that a considerable proportion, at any rate of the senior officers, should be officers who have served in the Regular Army and had a Regular Army training. That, of course, you cannot have in New Zealand?—No, we cannot have that. They get a certain proportion of officers out, I will not say every year, but from time to time, as their engagements expire, a certain proportion of officers come out from the Imperial Service for District Adjutant and Instructor, and that sort of position, besides the Commandant and his staff, to instil sound principles into the men of the colony.

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10053. Can you tell us the number?—I think we have three out there now. I am not talking of the Commandant's staff. I think we have three Imperial officers out there now, one a Major Bingley, who served in the eighth contingent, and did not go back, and they were asking the War Office about nominating some other officer in his place; there were certain proposals which the Commandant has put before the Minister which had not been settled when I left New Zealand; it was for an extension of that. I do not remember the exact numbers.

10054. The Commandant is an officer of what grade?—Our present Commandant, General Babington, is a local Major-General. He is a Colonel in the Imperial Service.

10055. And he has control of the whole force?—Yes.

10056. And what is the next officer under him?—At present there are officers in command in each district. But it is the continuity in line between them and others that he is trying now, in certain proposals, to get arranged with the Minister. But there is an officer commanding in each district. They are not Imperial officers, they are officers, some of them, who served in a contingent, one at all events who served in two; one who had commanded our first contingent; and one who had command of our fourth and eighth contingents—he is in Auckland. The others are officers who have been in the Colonial Service for a good number of years.

10057. But they are not Imperial officers?—No.

10058. I was only asking about Imperial officers?—Then we had no Imperial officers in any district command under the General.

10059. But you said you had other Imperial officers?—Yes, but they occupy the position of, as it is called, District Adjutant.

10060. What position had they held in the Imperial Service?—I think they were all Captains in various infantry regiments.

10061. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Have you no military instructors?—We have one artillery officer out there, a Captain in the Garrison Artillery.

10062. (*Chairman.*) What is the cost of the Volunteer Force to the colony?—Speaking from memory, it is rather hard to say the exact cost of the Volunteers. Our Defence Estimates, which were passed in this last Session, and will come on the Consolidated Fund, were £237,000, I think.

10063. And that includes, besides the cost of the force, what else?—There is in it the 300 permanent Volunteer men that we have. We have 300 artillery and submarine miners, it includes them. It includes, of course, all the salaries of District officers and clerks, and that sort of thing. It would be rather difficult to say what the exact cost is, taken out in that way.

10064. Is it an increasing sum?—Yes, it has increased very much in the last few years. When I first became Under-Secretary, in 1895, I think our Vote was somewhere about £80,000. And this, of course, does not include munitions of war and things of that sort.

10065. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) It does not include armament?—No. I think last year, taking the total cost of armament and everything of that sort, we spent £349,000.

10066. (*Chairman.*) £349,000, inclusive of the £237,000?—Yes, and that has been a considerable rise since 1895.

10067. Is there any other point with regard to the contingents themselves that you would like to draw attention to from the point of view of the Government?—Of course, it is rather difficult, speaking generally, but if it could possibly be anticipated that necessity should arise, which I hope it will not, for having to send large bodies of men out of the country again, we should have to make much larger preparations than we have done in the past. Clothing is a thing that we have nothing whatever to do with, and I do not know whether the Colonial Parliament would accede to any large quantity of clothing or equipment being kept; but that would

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be a thing that is most desirable, of course to have if it was only for that reason, if you understand, for sending men out of the country so as to ensure despatch. Our difficulty was that we had in this case to send men at such a tremendous pace, the pressure was so great and the work was so great, that it was a great difficulty, of course, to ensure absolute efficiency in every case. For instance, sending 1,100 men away in 14 days takes a lot of thinking out.

10068. We quite understand the strain upon you, and also appreciate the efforts which you made?—Still what I mean is that if we could have had longer time it would have enabled things (although I believe they were all efficient) to have been done with greater ease.

10069. In order to do things to your satisfaction, you ought either to have longer notice or else to have equipment in reserve?—Yes; but I am afraid keeping equipment in reserve for such an eventuality would not meet with approval in the Parliament.

10070. It would be easier to act on the spur of the moment, as you did before?—I think so.

10071. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) It means too much money?—Yes, they would not like to see several hundred thousand pounds standing in clothes or in stores when it might never be required.

10072. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) And there was no serious inconvenience in your not having had it?—No, just a little work, keeping going; that was all.

10073. (*Chairman.*) I suppose you officially had reports of your men that were sent out?—Yes, there were reports.

10074. And satisfactory reports?—Yes, I was only looking at one to-day, but I really forget the date of it, in which General Hutton was so highly praising the men he had under him from New Zealand.

10075. The men that he had under him in the war?—Yes, that is one that just simply happens to pass through my mind.

10076. Have all the men returned now?—I think there were just a few details to come when I left; we had practically got back all the main contingents, but there were a few details, sick men, I fancy, and so on. I do not think there was anything more. There might have been 200 or 300 perhaps, but that would be the limit. It would have been easier for us in some cases in regard to pay questions if we could have got a little more accurate information from South Africa at times.

10077. I do not quite follow what you mean?—Sometimes men came back, and, of course, there was a question of paying them; and I had to take some responsibility to see how we could do that, because we had not always got, at all events, what we thought were sufficient data. Men would come back with practically no accounts at all who had to wait a long time, and that caused naturally a good deal of irritation. Men come back and they want their money. That was one of the most difficult questions that we had, I think, in connection with the return.

10078. That was from deficiencies in the way of making up the accounts?—We often used to get men sent back to us who brought nothing at all, absolutely nothing.

10079. Was that their own fault?—That is a thing I could not tell you. I have not sufficient knowledge to say what the Imperial custom in those days was. I only know that I had to pay them when they came back.

10080. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Was any particular inquiry made under those circumstances?—Yes, we used continually to write on these matters.

10081. (*Sir John Edge.*) Did any paymasters go from the colony with the contingents?—Not with the first five.

10082. Were these complaints confined to those contingents?—Oh, no, it was not so. With the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th contingents we had paymasters, but we frequently used to find men coming back; perhaps we would get 40 or 50 men coming in one ship who had nothing at all, and we had no means of knowing whether the man was owed a penny.

10083. They had no regimental papers with them?—They brought nothing. That was the difficulty. Eventually we got the information from the Cape, but in the meantime the men were saying that they could not get paid.

10084. (*Viscount Esher.*) Was there much dissatisfaction?—No, I do not think so. We did what we could. Of course there was a certain amount of dissatisfaction; as long as there are newspapers there always will be.

10085. (*Chairman.*) But you were able to settle matters in the end?—I believe when I left that every man had been paid. I knew we were paying them as hard as ever we could go all day.

10086. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I daresay you took a very liberal view of it?—No, I should think the losses over it would be very small indeed; there might be some. It is impossible to avoid it if you send away between 6,000 and 7,000 men.

10087. You would not allow the men to be much inconvenienced, I mean?—No, of course not. We had to keep a separate account for each man.

10088. (*Viscount Esher.*) On the whole, what is the feeling of the men who went to the war?—In what way?

10089. Did they come back satisfied with themselves and the time that they had had?—Yes, I think so.

10090. The account which they would give of South Africa would not produce any bad feeling in the colony from their experiences?—No; I should think they would have every reason to be satisfied from what I have heard the men say. Of course, they did not see the country at the most pleasant time, and therefore the country itself, I daresay, was not quite what they thought it might be, although I hear that a good many are going back.

10091. They got a good reception when they got back, I suppose?—Yes, always.

10092. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) What amount of training do the New Zealand forces have in the course of the year?—It is according to the different arm of the Service that they belong to.

10093. The permanent force, of course, is always embodied?—Yes, they are always in barracks, and always in training.

10094. I think you said that they amount to 300 men?—Yes, I think 320 is the real number, or 350. We increased it a little during the last session of Parliament.

10095. What is the distinction between the Militia and the Volunteers? The Militia are receiving payment when being drilled, I suppose?—The Militia is practically non-existent. It is a force, which is provided for by Act, which may be called out, every man between certain ages being liable to serve in the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd class; but it has never been in force since the Maori wars of 1860 to 1870.

10096. Then that force, among whom I see a sprinkling of retired officers of the Imperial forces, is practically non-existent?—Practically.

10097. Those officers in the Militia do not come out for any sort of training?—No, none whatever. Some of the officers who have been recently put on the Militia list out there are officers who have been serving in our contingents.

10098. And what is the annual training for the Volunteers—what amount of training?—They have to put in 30 Government parades each year. The mounted corps have to go into camp every year for eight days in addition—that is besides the Easter camp, or anything of that nature. The Artillery put in, in the same sort of way, eight parades, and they have to spend 16 days in camp in the forts.

10099. The Artillery?—Yes, the Volunteers.

10100. Are they all garrison artillery or field artillery?—They call themselves naval artillery, I believe, but they do the garrison work in the forts; that is what their real business is—garrison artillery work.

10101. Are there no field artillery?—Yes, we have some field artillery.

10102. A field battery?—Yes; they are making field batteries now, and raising them, and since we have been getting out recent guns, 15-pounders and that sort of thing, the strength of that is increasing. I could not say exactly from memory what the strength is, but I know it is increasing considerably.

10103. Is there more than one battery?—Yes, we have five batteries; two of them have been armed with the 15-pounder equipment, and the others will be armed as soon as the money can be voted.

10104. Is it intended to furnish horses to these field batteries, or have they horses?—No, it is done by hire.

There has been no regular plan for horsing the batteries hitherto. They hire from furniture people and people who do a large carrying business. I forget the exact regulation just at this minute, but the Government give them so much a year.

10105. But you have had nothing of the kind hitherto in the Volunteers?—There has never been any regularly organised plan of horsing the batteries, and I do not know that there is now. The question was under consideration when I left as to what should be done, but what we have done up to the present is paying accounts to them. Their ideas are considered. The commandant has the question before him when the corps is going into camp of what he thinks necessary should be given to their assistance in providing horses; I am now talking of the artillery, of course. Those recommendations come forward, and I see whether they come within the vote, and what the amounts are that are required. Then I submit them to the Minister, and then he approves of a certain amount being supplied for horsing the batteries, and then the commandant has practically an opportunity after that of seeing that it is divided out for that purpose as he thinks best.

10106. Then I suppose the Volunteers are expected to ride and drive those horses if you have guns?—Yes. In Wellington recently they have been taking on a certain number of men as drivers, and these are reckoned in the permanent force. That is with the object of their being able to impart the necessary instruction to the Volunteer artillery. These men are brought in, and trained first in Wellington, under the instruction of the artillery people, and then they are sent out to the different districts as occasion requires during the year to train the Volunteer artillery, and show them what they should do.

10107. What is meant by 30 days' Government drill?—They have to carry out 30 Government parades—that is to say, they have to carry out 30 parades during the year, of which the inspection is always made by the officer commanding the district, or a district adjutant—that is to say, they are Government parades at which a certain number of men have to be present—two-thirds of the corps have to be present—of which the inspection is absolutely carried out by the officer commanding the district or his staff. And besides that, they put in a great number of parades. I do not know how many in the year, but, of course, a great number.

10108. But with regard to these compulsory Government drills, how long does each drill last?—Two hours.

10109. Are they dependent for capitation allowance, or for any form of grant upon attending so many times?—Yes, they must have attended the Government parades—they must have attended these camps that I spoke of just now, and they must have carried out a certain amount of class, volley, and independent firing to enable them to earn the capitation grant.

10110. Can you tell us what that capitation allowance is per head?—Infantry £2 10s., mounted men £3 10s. A question had arisen just before I left as to the artillery getting an increase, but that had not been decided. That means a large sum of money now that the Volunteers are getting up in number.

10111. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) What do they get now?—Two pounds ten shillings.

10112. The same as infantry?—The same as infantry. All the mounted forces get three pounds ten shillings.

10113. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You said something about cavalry. A portion of the Volunteers are in cavalry, are they not?—When I said cavalry I daresay I used a wrong military term. They were originally called cavalry in the earlier days of the colony; now the whole forces of mounted men are being brought into the mounted infantry.

10114. Could you say what proportion of the whole force are mounted infantry?—I am afraid that I could not tell you that exactly. I had not anticipated coming here when I came home on leave, and I have not got all the data with me, but I know the proportion of mounted infantry is greatly on the increase.

10115. And all the mounted men are to be mounted infantry?—That is as I read the advice of the Commandant.

10116. And you think after this recent experience of service that if there should be war in a few months the men would come readily forward to go abroad again?—I think so.

10117. I suppose a great deal of the difficulty that has arisen in the accounts when the men came back would have been obviated if every man had a small book, as they used to have in the British Army, and which I believe has now been introduced again, which contained all particulars of payments, and so on, so that if you saw that book you could at once see what was due to the man, or what you might advance?—Yes, I should think so. Of course, I never have been in anything connected with pay, at least to any extent, except our own men, or until I had to do with these contingents, and so I do not know what was the previous custom; but, as you say, I should think it would be a most excellent plan.

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10118. You have served in the Royal Navy, have you not?—Yes, for some years.

10119. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Did you find that a number of men who returned from South Africa volunteered to go out again?—Yes.

10120. A large number of them?—Yes, a great number of the men who came back with one contingent were very anxious to go away with the next if they could get permission, but we were very careful in the control of that—that none of them had been down with enteric for a year previous; that was very closely watched.

10121. That shows that they were perfectly satisfied with the treatment there?—Yes, I think the men were very satisfied. Of course, there are always some grumblers who come back, and say they do not think they got enough, or did not get it quick enough.

10122. How many places are fortified in New Zealand?—Four—Auckland, Wellington, Littleton, and Port Chalmers.

10123. Do you happen to know what those fortifications have cost the colony?—Upwards of half-a-million. I ought to know, but I have forgotten those details. They all came under me as Under-Secretary. I get all these things through me.

10124. But you think in round numbers you can safely say half-a-million?—Yes, quite. I am certain of that. I know the guns cost when they first came out a very large sum of money.

10125. The guns and the mountings?—Yes.

10126. Then these 320 or 340 men that you speak of I suppose are the men who man the fortifications?—They are specialists practically. They make the training of the permanent Militia as high as it possibly can be, so that in case of necessity these men shall be specialists. Of course, they train up a great many of the best men of the Volunteers to do the same thing, but they try to bring as high a training into the permanent force as possible to enable them to take all special duties.

10127. So as to form a nucleus?—Yes.

10128. But, of course, with regard to these fortifications there must be always men there to look after the guns, and so forth?—Yes, there are always district gunners in every work.

10129. And I suppose an officer to each work?—No, they have not got enough officers for that. They have an officer in each district.

10130. But not for each work?—No; they have not got enough officers out there for that.

10131. Do you know whether any of your men returned through Sydney by the "Drayton Grange"?—No, I do not think we had any man on board the "Drayton Grange." I do not remember one; it was purely the Australian forces that went in her.

10132. Then none of your men came back in overcrowded ships; you had no complaints of that sort?—I should not think so, but we had a Committee of Inquiry out there with regard to the "Britannic" and the "Orient."

10133. In New Zealand?—Yes.

10134. They went to Melbourne, I think?—No, the "Britannic" and the "Orient" came to Wellington.

10135. Did they not go first of all to Melbourne?—No, they went straight from Durban to Albany. I am not sure whether some did not call off Sydney, but they had nothing but New Zealand troops on board.

10136. Were they alleged to be overcrowded?—Yes, they said so; the men said so, and there was a Parliamentary inquiry, in fact a Royal Commission, on the subject.

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10137. What was the result of that. Were the ships exonerated?—Yes, the ships were exonerated.

10138. They found that they were not overcrowded?—They found they were not overcrowded. You see untrained men sometimes do not like all the little things which have to be kept to make them do what is right.

10139. However, there were no deaths occurred from the alleged overcrowding?—No, not from that. We had a good many deaths, and I should not like to express an opinion about it, but there was nothing that I saw in the documents that came through the department to show that that was in any way due to overcrowding; in fact, I am sure it was not. It was pneumonia, and so on, that occurred after measles; and I believe I am right in saying also that a great many men came back who naturally, as soon as they arrived, did not want to go to quarantine, and they thought if they could by some manner of means manage to hide that they had measles in an acute stage they would be able to go home; and, of course, many of these men afterwards, from carelessness of that sort, did develop pneumonia.

10140. I suppose you have heard of the "Drayton Grange"?—Yes.

10141. There the loss of life was very considerable?—I believe it was. That was in Australia, and I used to see the telegrams, but we were occupied at that time with our own Commission.

10142. (*Sir John Edge.*) Are the rifle clubs well supported?—I think they are going to be. Until last year the Rifle Clubs were not a portion of the Defence Forces of the Colony at all; they were purely private institutions; but by an amendment of the Defence Act, which was passed in 1901, power was given to bring in the Rifle Clubs under a portion of the defence forces of the colony.

10143. You have subsidised them, I suppose?—They do not give very much in that way. They get a grant of free ammunition, and they get carried free on the railways to parades, and all that sort of thing; and up to the present time they have to purchase their own arms, but we supply them at 25 per cent. less than cost price to us.

10144. So that you do encourage them as much as you can?—Yes, and I have no doubt they will get better terms eventually.

10145. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) What is the character of the military school that you referred to; is it modelled somewhat after Sandhurst here?—I should think not. I should not think it was on anything like such a big scale; it is simply brought in to give our men out there an opportunity of knowing, I should say, their rudimentary duties perhaps as officers. There are a great many lectures. I was reading an account of the report by the Officer Commanding that school, and I see that they devote a great deal of time to musketry matters.

10146. Does it comprise instruction in all arms?—Yes.

10147. With regard to the pupils, or the cadets, are they nominated, or do they enter on competitive examination?—No, they are all officers on the Volunteer forces, who take advantage of this wandering school of instruction to attend courses, for six weeks we will say, of lectures and instruction, and so on, and then they get certain certificates according to the way in which they pass through this school.

10148. It is quite recently that it has been established?—I do not think it has been in existence more than 14 or 15 months, something like that.

10149. And that arose from the feeling that it was very desirable that there should be more thorough educational training in military matters?—That is so. We had a school many years ago. When I say many years ago I mean (I was secretary of it then) about 16 years ago; but one of the curious things in the colony is that there was a drop in military desires at the time, and I suppose expenditure was rather high, and the school disappeared.

10150. Are there Volunteer battalions as distinct from Militia in New Zealand?—We have no Militia. The Militia is existent and non-existent, if I may say so. It seems rather a curious way to put it, but the law exists which makes everybody in the colony subject to serve, and that Militia law is always in existence.

10151. Then is there any period of service for the Volunteers?—Three years. If a man joins a corps he is sworn in for three years.

10152. I ask that, because in Canada, of which I know more, the Volunteers are really a Militia body; they are all engaged for certain periods, some three years, I think it is?—Every Volunteer on joining enrols practically for three years—that is the law.

10153. He is enrolled practically for three years?—Yes.

10154. But it is not the practice?—I should not like to say so. I am not sure about it.

10155. It is merely so on paper?—I think a great many men do serve the time.

10156. But there is no obligation?—Except their oath on joining; they enrol for that period. It used to be for one year.

10157. Are rifle clubs general throughout the different districts?—They are spreading very fast now. The rifle clubs were practically only instituted by the Act of December, 1900, and there has been only one year in which to allow the system to be considered through the country, but there are a great many men joining.

10158. Do you recollect what is the total number of men in the contingents who went to South Africa?—6,343.

10159. And the population I think is between 700,000 and 800,000?—It is 866,000, I think, now.

10160. That is really the largest proportion I think from any colony; from New Zealand they sent a larger proportion of men?—Yes, we sent out a great many, I know.

10161. Did they come generally equally from all parts of the two provinces—of the two islands?—Yes, I should say that the proportion was about equal from both islands; we tried to keep it so, at any rate.

10162. It is the case, or it was so, I think, that one island might be called English more than the other; the settlers, at any rate, originally were colonists from England, while in the other they were chiefly from Scotland: was it not so, in a large sense?—Otago was a Scottish colony—that is right in the south

10163. Dunedin?—Yes. And then there was a large Church of England settlement. Lord Lyttelton had a great deal to do with it. I forget exactly who they were, it was so many years ago, but there was Christchurch; it is practically the most English part in New Zealand now. And then Wellington was settled in somewhat the same way. I do not know that they were not all Church of England, but a little of everything, as long as they were Britishers.

10164. But those who went out to South Africa came really very generally from all parts?—From every corner of the colony—from Three Kings down to Bluff.

10165. (*Chairman.*) Is there any other point?—No. If there is any information that I can give to the Commission I shall be only too glad to do so. There is one thing, I do not know whether it would be of any interest, that up to the 31st January, 1902, on the part of the colony alone we had spent £195,000 on the contingents.

10166. You mean the Government?—Yes, that the Government had, and that giving pay to the men on their return to New Zealand, we had contingent liabilities of £27,000.

10167. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Over and above the £195,000?—Yes, and our liabilities for pensions we estimate at £3,000 per annum; that is, for pensions for men and officers, and so on, and families.

10168. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Which will be a decreasing charge?—Yes, I suppose it will. People will die off. But that is what was calculated out from the number of men we were getting back, and the families of these people.

10169. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Has it ever been worked out actuarily what that pension is worth—what the capital value of it is to-day?—The contingent liability for pensions we estimate at £3,000 per annum, which is equal to the interest on a capital of £100,000 at 3 per cent. per annum.

10170. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Can you tell the Commission the number of men of your contingents who were killed and wounded?—I cannot tell you of the later contingents, except from memory. I see by a return that was prepared by myself here that there were 169 up to the 1st of April, 1902. That is killed wounded, and died from disease.

10171. 169 casualties?—Yes. Then I should not think that those numbers could be brought up very much, but I remember that there was a train load of our eighth contingent killed at one time, but I do not remember how many men were in it; 36 men were killed, I think.

10172. You mean in addition to that?—Yes, in addition; and, of course, there must have been a few men in the eighth, ninth, and tenth contingents who died. I do not think any were wounded, but one lot were killed, I remember, in a train accident somewhere in Natal.

10173. But up to the 1st April of this year the number was 169?—Yes.

10174. That is, killed, wounded, and died of disease?—Yes.

10175. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Can you say how many were killed, how many were wounded, and how many died of disease?—Yes. In the first contingent there were five killed.

10176. Have you the total?—Yes, I have the total; 61 were killed. I have not got those wounded, I have only got those who died of wounds. 61 were killed, 13 died of wounds, and 95 died of disease; that makes the 169.

10177. Then that 169 does not include the wounded?—No. I understood the question to be asked me as to the number who had died.

10178. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) No, killed and wounded?—I could not tell you the number wounded at present. I have no doubt that by looking through some of our records at the Agent-General's Office, I might be able to give you the information, and I will make a point of doing so. Those which I have given were only deaths.

10179. You gave the number, I think, of the whole strength of the contingent?—Yes, 6,343.

10180. (*Chairman.*) Is there anything else you wish to bring before us?—No, thank you. Perhaps I might hand in this statement, entitled "Sacrifices made by New Zealand in connection with the War in South Africa"; it might be useful to the Commission.

10181. If you please. (*The Statement was handed in. Vide Appendix Vol., page* 175).

Sir A. P. Douglas, Bart.

3 Dec. 1902.

TWENTY-FOURTH DAY.

Thursday, 4th December 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable The Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable The Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

(V.C.) Field-Marshal The Right Hon. Earl ROBERTS, K.G., K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., called and examined.
(Lieut-General Sir IAN S. M. HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O., was also in attendance.)

(V.C.) Field-Marshal The Right Hon. Earl Roberts, K.G., K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

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10182. (*Chairman.*) Lord Roberts, the main part of the evidence which we have been taking hitherto has been concerned with the various Departments of the War Office, and, of course, we should desire to have your opinion on any points emerging in regard to the military organisation of the War Office in some part of your evidence, but I understand that you would prefer to take the terms of reference as they have been given to this Commission, and to deal with them in order, beginning, therefore, with the military preparations for the war in South Africa?—That would be convenient, I think.

10183. What is the first point you would desire to mention?—The first point in the paper of reference is military preparations before the war, but about these I am afraid I cannot give any information, as I was at that time commanding in Ireland, and was not referred to in any way. What I realised after I took over the command of the army in South Africa was that indifferent strategy had quite as much, and perhaps even more, to do with our mishaps in the early days of the war than inadequate numbers. When affairs became critical in that country there were present, including Militia, Volunteers, and Police:—

	Men.	Guns.
In Natal	13,630	42
In Cape Colony	14,031	9
	27,661	51

The task which this force had to perform was to keep the enemy in check until the field army of 50,000 men arrived from England and was ready to carry out the plan of operations decided on, viz., to advance on Pretoria on three separate lines through Cape Colony, and then through Orange River Colony, keeping throughout along the railway. This movement could not possibly be commenced for two months after war was declared, and for this period the troops on the frontier of Natal would have to hold their own against perhaps 50,000 or 60,000 Boers. The manner in which these 13,630 men were disposed—in good positions or bad, dispersed or concentrated, supported by fortifications or exposed in the open—was of the greatest consequence. In short, everything depended on the way in which the problem of their distribution was dealt with. Unfortunately, the actual solution was not good. The men in Natal were split up into two detachments, one at Dundee, the other at Ladysmith, while of the 14,031 men which held Cape Colony a small isolated force was pushed as far north as Kimberley. When Sir George White arrived in Natal he had no instructions in regard to the wishes of the Government as to any particular plan of campaign, nor was he aware of any general plan of operations in South Africa. At that time Dundee was held by our troops. Sir George White was opposed to this arrangement, as he felt that, having part of his force so far north in the triangle of Natal, was to expose it to the risk of being cut off by the enemy, who threatened his line of communication to that town both from the east and the west. Major-General Symons, however, who had been commanding in Natal prior to Sir George White's arrival, and Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, Governor of the Colony, both strongly maintained the necessity for holding on to Dundee, the former on the military ground that the Boer armies were contemptible, the latter on the political ground that if we abandoned it (1) Natal would lose its valuable coalfields; (2) a strong feeling of distrust would be raised amongst the Natal and Cape Colonists; (3) such an abandonment would lead to a native rising. Sir George White most reluctantly yielded to these representations. The risk of the rising of 750,000 Zulus and the natives in Natal im-

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pressed Sir George White deeply. He had only been a few hours in Natal, and was diffident about acting on his own judgment in a purely political matter against the strongly expressed opinion of the local authorities. The question then is, did Sir George White make the best of the situation as he found it? This is a most difficult point to decide, but it has always seemed to me that it was still possible for Sir George White to give effect to the great military principle of meeting the enemy with massed forces whilst they were still separated. I think the various actions and movements of Sir George White's troops must be regarded from that point of view, and that if so regarded they cannot be considered altogether satisfactory. It seems certain that Talanâ might have been fought with a much stronger force, although I admit that Ladysmith would have been in some danger of attack by the Orange Free State troops for the space of a few days. Again, it might have been possible within 48 hours of Brigadier-General Yule's return from Talana to Ladysmith for Sir George White to strike a blow with his whole force against either the Orange Free State troops or those of the Transvaal. This was not done, and the battle of "Mournful Monday," the 30th October, was fought after the Boer forces had effected a junction, and within sight of the outposts of Ladysmith. For any shortcomings in Natal at this period the War Office cannot, I think, be held responsible. The disposition of the troops was left to the generals on the spot, acting in concert with the High Commissioner and the Governor of Natal, and, at a time when the political situation was so full of danger and continually changing, this would appear to have been the most practical arrangement. For a War Office 6,000 miles away, with no intimate knowledge of the local conditions, to have attempted to dictate to the generals on the spot would have been contrary to every principle of command. One cannot, of course, speak with certainty as to what might have been the result had a different line of action been adopted in Natal, but perhaps the most important lesson to be learnt from the war is that an initial mistake in strategy has far-reaching effects, and is practically irretrievable. It is impossible to ensure that the strategy of our officers shall at all times be equal to every situation, but the necessity for the study of strategy should be carefully instilled into them, and they should be encouraged by practice at manœuvres, staff rides, etc., to put theory into practice, and to accept the responsibility of initiative rather than to be daunted by the chances of failure. So far as the War Office is directly concerned, the main defects in preparation, in my opinion, were:—(1.) The selection of Ladysmith as the principal military station and advance depôt in Natal and leaving it absolutely undefended. Sir George White was forced to hold on to it, for had he abandoned it an immense amount of supplies and ordnance stores, which there was not time to remove, would have fallen into the enemy's hands. (2.) The plan by which General Buller's force was to advance in three columns through Cape Colony towards the Orange Free State. (3.) Having no properly organised Transport Department, the absence of which prevented any movement being made away from the several lines of railway. (4.) The failure to foresee the necessity for employing a large force of mounted infantry. (5.) Under-estimating the possible strength of the enemy, the magnitude of the theatre of the war, and consequently the number of troops that would be required for the long lines of communication. (6.) Neglect to supply the Army with a proportion of heavy artillery, sufficiently mobile to accompany the troops in the field. Guns of this description have always formed part of the armament of an Indian Field Force, and even in a mountainous country like Afghanistan they did good service. (7.) The want of suitable maps. Whether the fortification of important points in the lines of communication was suggested by the War Office, I am not aware. It certainly would have been a wise precaution had measures been taken while there was still time to place certain localities, such as a position behind the Tugela in Natal, and De Aar and Naauwpoort Junction in Cape Colony, in a state of defence.

10184. That is all you wish to say on the first term of reference, the military preparations before the war?—Yes.

10185. Just a question or two on that statement: I understood you to say that Sir George White had no general instructions when he went to Natal?—No instructions.

10186. Nor any plan of campaign or defence, did you also say?—Yes; I made sure of that. I telegraphed and asked him the question, he gave me that answer, and this morning I heard from him by letter confirming it.

10187. Of course there was what was called a local scheme of defence for Natal, was there not?—Not that I am aware of. Sir George White's answer that I have here was quite clear. I have copied his answer exactly: "When I arrived in Natal, I had no instructions in regard to the wishes of the Government as to any particular plan of campaign, nor was I aware of any general plan of operations in South Africa." That is what he telegraphed to me.

10188. That refers to a general plan of operations for South Africa, but my point was whether he was cognisant of the local scheme of defence for Natal. I suppose he had that before him?—I think the idea was, and I think it is borne out by what General Symons did, that he should advance to Glencoe, and I have always understood his idea was that he would advance still further; his great hope indeed was to be able to meet the Boers somewhere about Laing's Nek.

10189. We have had evidence from the Intelligence Division that both General Goodenough and Sir William Butler were, as is customary under those circumstances, asked for a local scheme of defence, and that those schemes of defence were submitted; these, I suppose, were in possession of Sir George White when he went to Natal?—Well, they ought to have been, but I do not know that they were; he does not refer to them in any way in his telegram or his letter to me this morning. Sir Ian Hamilton was his Chief Staff Officer, and perhaps you would ask him? (*Sir Ian Hamilton.*) He was furnished with the ordinary intelligence books, sir, but I never saw any local scheme of defence. I may say the idea of a passive defence of Natal was not entertained in these discussions, and I think the idea was to move up and attack the Boers the instant they crossed the frontier. That was the idea in the local people's minds at the time we arrived.

10190. The schemes of defence were certainly formulated by the two officers I have mentioned, and the reason I allude to them is this, that according to them, Ladysmith and some point about Glencoe were two of the points which were to be held in the case of a defence of the colony?—(*Lord Roberts.*) Well, Ladysmith was not in any way defended for that purpose; there was no protection round Ladysmith, not a sod turned when Sir George White arrived there, and I have been to Glencoe myself (it is a basin surrounded by hills), and I cannot conceive a worse place for anything like a depôt or frontier station.

10191. The point I want to get to is, who was responsible for the selection of these two places which, certainly, were mentioned in the local schemes of defence which we have seen, and which were submitted by the two general officers in command?

10192. (*Viscount Esher.*) These (*handing some papers to Sir Ian Hamilton*) are the papers relating to the scheme of defence, and, perhaps, Sir Ian Hamilton would look at them, and see if he ever saw them before?—(*Sir Ian Hamilton.*) Having examined them, I do not think that these papers would ever have been considered applicable by Sir George White to the situation he went out to face.

10193. (*Chairman.*) (*To Lord Roberts.*) Of course, these schemes were under the King's Regulations, drawn up by the General Officers in command on the normal garrison of the Colony, but they did provide for a base at Ladysmith, and for an advanced post at Glencoe, and, also, some of them, for a post at Eshowe?—Even when Sir George White had the additional 10,000 men from India and elsewhere, he certainly could not have held on to Glencoe, much more Eshowe; he could only just protect Ladysmith. He could not possibly have managed to do that with the ordinary garrison of Natal.

10194. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) These schemes of defence were drawn up under the system, which was started some years ago, that every Dependency of the Empire should send in plans for a scheme of defence with the means at their disposal, and I know in the place I was connected with, schemes were drawn up by the senior military officer, sent home and approved or criticised by the Intelligence Branch here, and those criticisms were sent out for a reconsideration of the scheme. That was done in South

Africa, in Natal, and the Cape, but, of course, the force at their disposal, with which they were dealing, was absolutely inadequate to meet any sort of real attack by the Boers. I think, one or two places were to be held by two or three companies, or something of that kind, and the circumstances so entirely changed when they came to have to meet a great Boer Army coming down, that those schemes were naturally inapplicable. And, moreover, it was brought out—I put the question several times—that nothing was ever done to throw up out-works or defences at any place whatever?—No, there were none, I believe. Schemes of defence are considered for all our distant possessions, as you have mentioned just now. We are constantly having reports and changes made with reference to the different nature of the armament, far-reaching guns are replacing the old ones, and that necessitates, sometimes, a change in the arrangement of the fortification and defences.

10195. Supposing Sir George White had seen those schemes, it does not seem to me that they would have been very useful to him under the entirely altered circumstances.

10195.* (*Chairman.*) I have before me a paper presented to Parliament in 1899, a despatch from the Governor of Natal, who sent on a scheme of defence from the Colony (*Vide App., Vol. No.* 54, *page* 358), and that sums it up in this way:—"*General Outline of Defence.*—The general outline of defence takes the following form, viz.: (*a*) A base at Maritzburg, with auxiliary sea base at Durban; (*b*) A line of communications from Durban and Maritzburg to Ladysmith and Glencoe Junction; (*c*) Concentration of regular troops in two bodies at: (1) Ladysmith, guarding the railways from Colenso to Sunday's River Bridge (inclusive), and from Ladysmith to Van Reenens; and observing the roads leading into Orange Free State to the north-west. (2) Glencoe, holding Biggarsberg passes and Dundee coalfields, observing roads into Orange Free State and South African Republic to the west, north, and east, guarding railway from Sunday's River to Newcastle, and as far north as possible. From Ladysmith and Glencoe columns could move and concentrate in any direction to oppose the advance of the enemy's forces from the passes of the Drakensburg, or the drifts over the Buffalo River." That, of course, is one of the schemes, as I said, based on the normal garrison?—That seems to me a very ambitious scheme with the very small force at their disposal in 1899 to carry it out. When Sir George White took command, ten thousand extra men had arrived, and even then it was a very small force to defend Natal against the 40,000 or 50,000 Boers, who very soon assembled.

10196. But the point I wanted to bring out was, that the existence of that scheme of defence would influence the action of the local authorities, and possibly of Sir George White, if it was before him, in holding Glencoe in the first instance, and Ladysmith in the second?—I think so. Ladysmith he was forced to hold, I do not see that he could have avoided that, but Glencoe was held before Sir George White arrived, by Sir Penn Symons.

10197. And, probably, under this scheme?—Very likely, and I also rather gathered from what Sir George White wrote, that he and Sir Penn Symons had not very much confidence in the Boers being able to do much.

10198. But still, these schemes having been formulated by the General Officer, and sent home by the Governor would, to a great degree, account for the action taken by the officers on the spot?—Certainly.

10199. Ladysmith, you think, was a bad selection as a base?—I think Ladysmith was a bad selection in this way: That it had a practically impassable river a few miles behind it, and was not in any way fortified for protection.

10200. Would it have been possible to hold Ladysmith with the small force that was the normal garrison of the Colony?—I do not think so, and Sir George White mentions in the letter I received this morning that if the Glencoe garrison had not come back he could not have possibly held Ladysmith, and without them he would have had a much larger force at Ladysmith than the original force in the colony.

10201. The question has been raised whether it would not have been practicable for Sir George White, when he found the Boers advancing in great force, to have abandoned Ladysmith and retired behind the Tugela. I gather from your despatch of the 28th March you thought he was right in holding it?—What I said in my despatch was that Sir George White was forced to hold on to Ladysmith, for, had he abandoned it, an immense amount of supplies and ordnance stores which there was not time to remove would have fallen into the enemy's hands.

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10202. The point was put to us very strongly that even if he had abandoned Ladysmith, and it had been necessary to destroy the stores, it would have been desirable that he should have retired?—I put myself in Sir George White's place before I wrote that despatch, and I did not consider it possible, considering he had this advanced post at Glencoe and had decided to leave it there.

10203. But this is after the retirement of the garrison from Glencoe?—I do not think it would have been possible then. The Boers had by that time come over from the Orange Free State, and he had the Transvaalers immediately in front of him as well; I do not think he could have possibly come away then.

10204. My attention is called to a telegram from the Colonial Office in 1897: "Ladysmith approved by War Office," which means the selection of Ladysmith as a post.

(*Viscount Esher.*) As a new station selected in 1897?

(*Chairman.*) From what you have just said, I imagine you would not agree with that selection?—I think it had a great fault, that it was just in front of an unfordable river, and there were no steps taken to protect it in any way. I do not think it is a good position to put an advanced post in front of a river, but if it is there every precaution ought to be taken to protect it.

10205. The justification, I think, has been stated that it commanded the junction of the railways?—The junction to the Free State and the Transvaal does really come close by Ladysmith, but, on the other hand, Ladysmith could be turned either from the Orange Free State or from the Transvaal; the Transvaalers to the east and the Orange Free Staters to the west could quite well have come down behind Ladysmith and cut it off.

10206. As they did?—Yes, as they did. I do not think that junction of the railway should have weighed in selecting Ladysmith as a frontier station.

10207. And as to the position behind the Tugela, was that capable of being turned in the same way?—No, the Tugela itself prevented that, to a certain extent.

10208. I think Sir George White, in his despatch, argues that question, and thinks that the Tugela could not have been held as a line?—Quite so, but I suppose he could have taken some place behind it. I do not know sufficient of the country to be certain, but I think Chieveley, or somewhere behind the Tugela, could have been held, and could not have been turned as easily as Ladysmith was turned.

10209. With regard to the accumulation of stores, I would just like to drawn your attention to this: we had evidence in regard to it from Sir Edward Ward, and that brought out that the accumulation of stores at the time Sir George White arrived in Ladysmith was sixty days' supply for the normal garrison of Ladysmith under the local defence scheme, a comparatively small force of, I think, some 1,800 men. I suppose when you speak of a large accumulation of stores you have in mind the amount of stores which they eventually had in Ladysmith?—Yes, I was thinking of that. They hurried up all that it was possible to do in the time.

10210. Those stores, it was explained to us, were on the sea or were being landed at the time Sir George White arrived in Natal, and were hurried up; and a question has been put whether it would have been a possible operation either not to put those supplies into Ladysmith or to have carried them back again?—I think that ought to have been considered before the war began, and I do not think it was possible after Sir George White arrived in Natal, and was suddenly confronted by the Boers coming across the frontier. Ladysmith was in existence, with everything there, and had been approved as a place to hold on to, and I do not see how he could have attempted to leave it. His one object would be to get every possible supply he could into the place, so as to be able to defend it.

10211. That was the natural result from the previous preparations which had been made under these local defence schemes and otherwise?—Exactly.

10212. And when that natural result had followed, you think it would have been an impracticable proposition that he could have retired with his stores, at

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any rate?—I do not think it would have been possible for him to leave Ladysmith after he arrived in the country.

10213. I also gathered that you would not have been in favour of any interference from this country after the scheme for the defence of Natal had been decided upon?—Not after Sir George White had taken over command; I think he was bound to be left to himself. Any plan ought to have been prepared before the war began. He went out to South Africa straight from this country without any consultation as to what should be done when he got there.

10214. You say, that if any alteration was desired, it ought to have been made before the war began; does that mean that this question of the suitability of Ladysmith to be held with the larger force which was then being thrown into Natal, ought to have been considered in this country, and instructions given to Sir George White in relation to it before he went out?—I do not suppose it ever struck anybody in this country that Ladysmith would be besieged, and I do not think the idea ever entered anybody's head that the Boers could ever get there. It was not until they had come some distance inside our frontier that people discovered Ladysmith was not a good place to hold on to, and wondered why Sir George White had not retired from it.

10215. The one scheme which was considered in this country was one which turned out to be erroneous?—I think so.

10216. There was one other point in your statement, which I am not sure that I quite caught, about Sir Redvers Buller's advance in three columns, I think you said?—I propose to deal with that in my memorandum on "The military operations up to the occupation of Pretoria."

10217. You summed up your statement in seven points, and I think I have dealt with two of these. Your third point is transport; would you like to deal with that question later?—I have also dealt with that question later on.

10218. Then, as to the question of mounted infantry?—I have also dealt with that later.

10219. No. 5. "Underestimating the possible strength of the enemy, the magnitude of the theatre of war, and, consequently, the number of troops that would be required for the long lines of communications"?—I think that all comes out in the subsequent operations.

10220. Heavy artillery also?—Yes.

10221. And maps?—Yes.

10222. (*Viscount Esher.*) If you had been Commander-in-Chief at the time Sir George White left England, do you think you would have discussed the question of Ladysmith with him before he left?—I think I should have discussed the general situation with him, as far as we knew at the time before he left.

10223. And he has not told you, whether in point of fact he ever discussed that question, before leaving, with the Military Authorities at home?—No.

10224. He has rather indicated the contrary?—Yes.

10225. We can get it from Sir George White himself, of course?—I gave you his own words in reply to a former question, that he had no instructions for the defence of Natal, and no general plan of the campaign which might take place throughout South Africa.

10226. You see, Sir George White left England on the 16th September, and the probability of war was then foreseen; do you not think it would have naturally occurred to the Military Authorities here that there would be an attack, in any case, on Natal?—Yes.

10227. Then, under those circumstances, is it not rather strange that the question as to whether Ladysmith should be held or not, was not discussed here with the officer who was going to take command?—It was because I wanted to be quite sure that Sir George White had, or had not instructions, that I telegraphed to him when I was preparing to come here. I thought it was very essential for me to know whether Sir George White had instructions with regard to the defence of Natal, and so I asked the question, and whether any information had been given him, as to the general plan of campaign. His answer was in the negative to both questions. They had apparently not been discussed with him at all.

10228. It strikes you as strange?—I think it very strange that the authorities should not have talked this question over with the officer appointed to command in Natal, but I think the explanation is, that they never dreamt that Ladysmith would have to be abandoned.

10229. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Was Ladysmith a place which could be fortified, so as to be held by any reasonable number of men, say, by the body of men then in Natal?—It is not an easy place to fortify as it is in a basin surrounded by hills one behind the other, and it is a difficult place to hold with a small number of men. Of course, fortifications would have helped it materially, but still it is a very large place to hold.

10230. It would have required a very large body of men to man the fortifications if fortified?—Yes; there must have been a good many. I speak without knowing the place very intimately, but it struck me as a large place, and a difficult place to hold.

10231. In view of that, is it your opinion that the place ought not to have been chosen for the deposit of a large quantity of stores?—Yes; I said I thought a place in front of a river ought not to have been selected.

10232. (*Chairman.*) What is the next point you wish to take up?—The next point is the steps taken in connection with the campaign.

10233. Under the heading, "Steps Taken in Connection with the War"?—Yes. I understand that to mean keeping the force up to strength, and so on.

10234. Whether the number was deficient, and, if so, up to what date, and the method of supply?—The method of supplying the casualties in the Regular regiments by drafts from the depôts, and by drawing on the residue of the Reserve, could not be improved upon, and the system of interpolating companies of Volunteers in their regular territorial battalion was most successful. In few instances, within my own experience, were the units below strength for a needlessly long period, and it was always possible, in forecasting the strategical situation at a future date, to calculate on the numbers which would then be available. In addition to the drafts and the Volunteers, large reinforcements were furnished by corps raised for the emergency, both at home and in the Colonies. The value of these depended largely on the amount of previous training and experience of the men in their ranks, on the class from which these men were recruited, and on the character and qualifications of the officers. Some were so good, that we were able to employ them at the front within a few weeks after they were raised or landed; others were long before they could be trusted. To such corps, as, for instance, the Imperial Light Horse, the South African Light Horse, the first contingent of Imperial Yeomanry, Strathcona's Horse, the Scottish Horse, and Lovat's Scouts, discipline seemed to come naturally; but it must be remarked that the general standard of intelligence among these troops was very high, that they had a strong leaven of experienced officers, and that their officers possessed the entire confidence of the men. Troops of this character are the very finest material for an Army, and all they need is training and organisation. In Colonial corps, generally, it was noticeable that their efficiency was materially increased by attaching to them officers of the Regular Army. I have also reason to believe that the men preferred being commanded by such officers, rather than by locally commissioned Colonials, who were often drawn from the same class as themselves, and had but little practical experience of their military duties.

10235. What we rather intended to ask was whether at any period in the war you think the numbers of men supplied from home—or up to what period in the war at any rate—the numbers were deficient for the purposes of the Army in South Africa?—Not after I took command as regards numbers. The country in which we were engaged was of such an enormous area that more men could have been employed, but it would have been very difficult to have done so usefully. I should have been glad at one time to have had a great many more thousand men, but I do not think it would have been practicable to have transported them, or to have fed them, or to have utilised them in a satisfactory manner. For all I could do, I think, I had sufficient men.

10236. After your arrival?—Yes.

10237. Of course, they undoubtedly were deficient at the outbreak of the war?—Certainly.

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10238. When the First Army Corps went out, was that a sufficient force to have sent out at that time?—Certainly not; but I think it goes back to the same thing that the authorities never anticipated what the troops would be called upon to do.

10239. But, as a matter of fact, it was an insufficient force to deal with the situation?—Yes, quite so.

10240. After your force went out it became sufficient, as you state, and any reinforcements you required were always promptly sent to you?—Yes.

10241. With regard to the Volunteer and Yeomanry forces, are you going to deal with them separately, or is that all you intended to say about them?—I have got a paper about the Volunteers and Yeomanry under the heading of "The provision actually made of men and supplies." Do you want the numbers, or the efficiency, or what?

10242. I was thinking more of their efficiency and their value as a fighting force?—I think I have got remarks upon that under the supply of men.

10243. As that comes next, perhaps you would go on with it, and treat it as part of the same matter?—Previous to the war the force which the War Office, with the sanction of the Government, had organised for expeditionary action amounted to two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division. Behind these 90,000 men stood the Army Reserve, and also a large number of troops, home and colonial, on most of whom the Government had no claim for extra-territorial service, but who might be expected voluntarily to contribute to the reinforcement of a field army engaged in protecting the Empire against attack. In numbers these supplementary troops were adequate, but in many cases they were only partially trained, and their composition and conditions of service involved considerable delay in despatching them in sufficient strength to assume a vigorous offensive in the theatre of war. Moreover, the fighting strength and resources of the Boers were at first underestimated. Before the war the force readily available at home for expeditionary action abroad, was, in my opinion, inadequate, and efforts are now being made to remedy this defect by increasing the Army Reserve and adding a Third Army Corps to the two previously organised for such action. When a serious war is undertaken, I regard it as essential to hold in reserve, prepared for embarkation, such reinforcements as may be needed in the case of a check or reverse. The absence of an organised reserve at the end of 1899 was, undoubtedly, unfortunate. In January, 1900, I found it difficult to assemble a force of men and guns large enough for the march on Bloemfontein, and I should have been relieved of many anxieties if I had felt justified in calling on the Government to send me immediate reinforcements of Regular units. At the time, however, the Regular Army in England (excluding the recruits at the depôts) had dwindled down to nine battalions and 18 field batteries, and I was reluctant to put forward demands which would have caused a still further reduction. Speaking after the event, it is not hard to see that the force in reserve might have been made stronger, and also more readily available. From the large number of men who had served in the Army, and had finished their time in the Army Reserve, a sufficient temporary force for home defence might have been raised, and, by previous arrangement, the Colonial Contingents might have been available at an earlier date than was actually the case. I must admit, however, that in improvising fresh units from ex-Reservists, a difficulty would have arisen owing to the lack of Reserve officers, and how in future to provide an adequate number of such officers is one of the hardest problems which the War Office has to face.

10244. When you speak of the absence of Reserve in 1899, that means behind the regular Reservists?—Yes; I mean those who had passed through the Reserve.

10245. Would that be a practical thing?—I think for home purposes.

10246. (*Viscount Esher.*) Your phrase is, "An organised Reserve"?—Yes.

10247. What did that mean exactly?—I mean some system by which we could lay hold of the men and call them up. Our Reserve at that time was about 80,000 men; I do not think it was quite 90,000. A large number of those had at once to be put into the Regular battalions to make them fit for service, and what was left behind was the untrained men in those battalions and the older Reserve men; that is to say, the men of the D section. When those were used up, there was nothing left.

10248. (*Chairman.*) The purpose of the Reservists at present is to fill up the Regular battalions, is it not?—Yes, a large proportion of them. It is admitted that the younger men would have to be left behind.

10249. But the organised Reserve, which you speak of as being deficient, is a second line of Reserve, the people who have passed through the first Reserve?—Yes; unless, as we hope now, to have a much larger Reserve by our shorter service system. At that time there was not a sufficient Reserve to meet the very large demands.

10250. But the larger Reserve, under the new system, will, like the former Reserve, be available for filling up the battalions going to the front?—Yes; but we hope that we shall not require to use so many of them.

10251. What I want to understand is, do you advocate a second line of Reserve men who have passed through that period of service, as a Reserve for service at home?—I would not, if we could get a sufficiently large Reserve of the younger men, which I hope we may succeed in doing.

10252. If you had to fall back upon that second Reserve for home service, would it be in connection with the Militia, or in what way would it be brought into operation?—I thought of forming provisional battalions with them.

10253. There, no doubt, the difficulty of getting officers would be very great?—Certainly. That will be our great difficulty throughout, as I have said.

10254. And, as you said a little while before, the presence of Regular officers with a regiment is of primary importance?—It is very important for newly-raised men to have officers of experience.

10255. Had they a sufficient number of officers in the Yeomanry regiments that went out from this country?—We should have been much better off with more Regular officers. The first lot that went out had a fair number of officers who had served in the Army.

10256. Of course, in the later contingents, there was more difficulty in getting them?—Much more.

10257. And we have had some evidence from the Colonies that it was almost impossible to get Regular officers for them in the Colonies themselves?—I suppose so.

10258. Do you think it would increase the value of the Colonial contingents in the future, if some arrangement could be made for a supply of Regular officers?—I think so, unless their own officers can undergo certain training, either at home or in their own countries.

10259. Would any training that they could undergo make up for that?—It would not be so valuable as if they could be attached to some of our Regular regiments for a certain time.

10260. But the quality of the men, both in the Yeomanry and the Colonial forces, you thought very good?—Excellent.

10261. No doubt they were enlisted from a higher class than the ordinary soldier?—Yes; they were very intelligent, excellent material for soldiers.

10262. Did they stand the fatigues of the campaign better?—Very well indeed.

10263. Did the soldiers, as a whole, stand the campaign well?—Yes, very well.

10264. A question has been asked about the younger men; did you find any difficulty with the younger men in the Army, the younger soldiers?—I think the younger soldiers are more susceptible to enteric fever, and other diseases, but otherwise I think they did very well.

10265. It was not brought specially under your notice that they did badly?—No, it was not.

10266. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Do you think it would be a distinct advantage to have officers of the Colonial forces attached, for a certain period of service, to a regiment here, at Aldershot, say?—I think so.

10267. For what period of service would you say it might be necessary—how long?—Perhaps a year.

10268. About a year?—Yes.

10269. And more especially those of the higher ranks of officers, would you say?—It would be an advantage

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to all of them. We are trying to do the same with our own auxiliary force officers, the Militia and the Yeomanry, to get them, as much as possible, mixed up with the Regulars.

10270. Have you had an opportunity of judging of any of those officers, say, from Canada, who were trained at the Royal Military College there?—Yes, I know some—Colonel Girouard and Captain Joly de Lotbiniere, both of them excellent officers, quite unusually good officers.

10271. Do you think that the military education and training that they got at that college was of very great benefit?—Yes. I am not sure whether they went to Woolwich or got commissions direct?

10272. They got commissions direct?—When they got the commisions, they joined at Chatham, and they have done most excellently well, both of them.

10273. And not only so, but I believe that there are a great many such officers in the Service here?—In the Line, do you mean?

10274. In the Line?—I daresay. I do not know them by name.

10275. Still, you think such establishments are really beneficial?—I have heard so from Colonel Kitson, who has told me what a good college it is.

10276. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I suppose the question of getting officers, like most other questions, is a question of money—getting officers in time, I should say?—It is a question of numbers.

10277. But is not that a question of money?—What we chiefly want for mobilisation purposes are junior officers. We want several hundreds. Officers are required at once to complete the war establishment of the Cavalry and Infantry regiments, for ammunition columns, for, in fact, all kinds of purposes, signalling, transport, increase in the Army Service Corps, special service, etc., etc. There is no Reserve to fall back upon, as regards the junior ranks. Older officers sometimes go into the Reserve as Captains, Majors, and Lieut.-Colonels. Some of them may be available, but the great demand is for Subalterns, and there are very few of that rank in the Reserve of Officers.

10278. But one sees periodically in the papers the heading, "What shall we do with our sons?" There are a great number of unemployed men in England, are there not. It is a question of money in employing them, and training them, is it not?—I suppose some go into the Militia, and some from that service into the Army, but that does not make a Reserve.

10279. Supposing, for instance, it was worth our while (I do not say it is) to double our cadres of officers, could we do it?—I do not think it would be advisable permanently. The officers would not have enough to do.

10280. We have lately had it in evidence that doubling the cadres would be almost advisable?—The cadre of a regiment permanently, do you mean?

See Q. 9389.

10281. (*Viscount Esher.*) The late Military Secretary suggested that 4.000 officers should be added to the Army, which practically doubles the number of officers below the rank of Colonel?—My idea is that in peace time there would not be sufficient employment for them unless they were passed through the Army rapidly in some way. Did he mean to make a permanent increase of the cadre, or to pass the officers through?

10282. His suggestion was to make a permanent increase?—So that, instead of having three subalterns, you are to have six subalterns to a company. I do not think that would be advisable.

10283. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Would you say an increase of 50 per cent. upon the total number?—I would rather see more officers pass through the Army into the Reserve, than keep too many with regiments.

10284. That makes a great difficulty. How are they to employ their lives?—I cannot say. Mr. Brodrick and I are now talking over whether we can get Militia officers to come and serve for a certain time, say three months one year and six weeks the next, with their regular linked battalion, so as to let them get more information of the Regular Service duties.

10285. But it does come back to a question of money in the long run—offering sufficient pay and pension?—I suppose you would have to give some kind of retaining fee.

10286. The point that I want to get at is this: Is it not the fact that a smaller force, if led by thoroughly good, well-trained officers, is more than equal to a considerably larger force where the officers are not sufficient, or do not know their work? Put it in this way: If you were taking an Army into the field, would you rather have a certain force with officers such as Militia officers and Yeomanry officers and Regular Force officers such as you had, not sufficiently trained, would you, or rather have a force, say, 20 per cent. smaller in numbers, and have all the officers thoroughly trained?—Of course, I would rather have the more efficient officers a great deal, but then the question is whether you would have a large enough force for your work.

10287. That is just my point. The question is whether a rather smaller force, fully equipped, with well-trained officers, would not be a more effective force for its work than a full force with untrained officers?—Whatever training the men had, your casualties would probably not be materially reduced.

10288. Is that so?—You cannot help sickness; that is what kills men more than anything else in war.

10289. But even then officers could be trained to take care, for instance, that men did not drink water that was not fit for them?—That is a very difficult question. I have heard it talked about a great deal; but it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to arrange for in war time, more especially when on the march. The first thing on reaching the halting-place is to send out pickets, some two or three miles off, or cavalry a still further distance off. How is it possible for officers, however careful they may be, to see what water the men in such cases may have to drink? I am in favour of taking every practicable precaution, but those who know war will, I think, bear me out when I say that no efforts on the part of officers could prevent soldiers at times drinking impure water.

10290. But still, a great many casualties would be avoided, of course, by having good officers, who would not lead their men into wrong places?—I do not think a six-officered company would make it any more efficient as regards drinking water than a three-officered company.

10291. You think not. But that is only one detail?—I think not, if you have intelligent officers; it is not many men to look after; it is only 100, and you have four officers, that is 25 men for each officer.

10292. My only point is this: Supposing that we got to a certain limit of expenditure for the Army beyond which the nation would not go, would you rather expend that money in having a rather smaller force with a full complement of well-trained officers than in a larger force with untrained officers?—In estimating what the strength of our Army should be you must calculate what its requirements are. If you send a force abroad say 70,000 in India and 30,000 or 40,000 to the Colonies, you have to keep them up to the established strength by drafts, and this you cannot do without a certain fixed establishment in this country. That is the way to look at it. When a reduction in the strength of the Army is proposed, the responsibilities which the Army has to meet must be considered. I doubt whether our existing responsibilities can be met by our Army at its present strength.

10293. But, as we managed before the war, not exactly, but fairly, to make those at home correspond with those in India and the Colonies, under your present scheme, when it came into full working order, we ought to have a surplus for home?—But we have more abroad than we had before the war. We have South Africa.

10294. That is, assuming that it is going to last?—It must last for some little time.

10295. I was looking at the normal state of things?—Even without South Africa we should have more battalions abroad than we have at home.

10296. The only point I wanted really to get from you was how far you considered the question of numbers over-weighted that of the training of officers, or on the other hand, how far the training of officers overweighted the question of numbers?—I would rather have trained officers, of course, than untrained officers, but I think you could put too many officers to a battalion, a regiment, or a battery—more than are necessary, and more than you could make use of. And they would not be properly trained if you had too many.

10297. You understand that I am not fathering the doubling of cadres. I am only on the question of increasing the number of officers?—Yes.

10298. (*Chairman.*) I think there is a little misunderstanding. The proposition that was put before us by Sir Coleridge Grove was an increase in the number of officers on the peace establishment, but not a permanent increase of the establishment of the regiment for war purposes—it was only in order to have a reserve of officers who could fill up in the Yeomanry and other forces, the Militia, and so on, at the time of the outbreak of the war; but, in order that they might be there, and might be properly trained, he advocated an increase of the peace establishment of the battalions kept at home?—Not in officers?

10299. Yes?—That is to say, that you would have more officers to a company, or a troop, or squad, than you have now.

10300. Yes, but only for training during peace?—Yes; they would not be permanently attached to the regiment; they would pass through it.

10301. (*Viscount Esher.*) No; his idea was that they should be permanently attached in peace, but, of course, they would be available in war for all purposes?—I think I would only have them attached to the regiment to learn their duties, but not to be permanently with it. You would have too many officers for the number of men to be trained if you did that.

(*Chairman.*) There were other points, of course, in the scheme. There was the possibility, under a scheme of that kind, of sending officers from the regiments to attend courses of instruction, and things of that kind. I think that Sir Coleridge Grove's idea was, speaking from recollection, that the actual establishment with the regiment might not be very largely increased, but that there would be a supply in this country of double the number of officers, particularly in the subaltern ranks, available at the outbreak of war, but that, as regards pay and all the rest of it, they would be on the same footing as other officers of the Army.

10302. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) And rank also; he laid special stress on rank—that they should enter as subalterns and rise to Field Officers?—If you increase the number of officers in the lower ranks, you will necessarily increase the number of officers in the higher ranks to keep up the proper flow of promotion. Otherwise, you will get old Captains and old Majors, which would not be at all a desirable thing.

10303. He did propose that they should rise to the higher ranks, too?—Then you would have a very large number of officers; and I certainly think that many of them would not have enough to do. I think we have a sufficient number of officers in our batteries, squadrons, and companies to do the work now. But I would like, if possible, to have some arrangement by which officers of the Auxiliary Services should be efficiently trained by being attached to Regular battalions for a time, and being paid while with them.

10304. (*Chairman.*) I think Sir Coleridge Grove found from his experience as Military Secretary that it was almost impossible to get the subaltern officers that you require by passing them through in that form—that that would not provide you with an actual subaltern staff for the Army on the outbreak of war?—But every year you would have a certain number of officers efficiently trained, and each in the course of ten years would not be very old.

10305. I only wanted to make quite clear that Sir Coleridge Grove did not propose to permanently increase the establishment from three to six officers in a company in war?—No; I am talking of peace, too.

10306. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) We also had evidence from a former Adjutant-General that there is a great shortness of officers, even for the ordinary regimental work—that they are always being taken away for various duties. He was speaking of the past, not of the present?—That was true; officers were taken away for the Staff College and other courses without being seconded. This was undesirable, as the officers left with the regiment suffered, and commanding officers often objected to letting their best officers leave, but it has now been remedied so far as the Staff College is concerned—all officers joining it are now seconded. I would gladly see all officers who go away on the staff, whether for a short or long period, seconded. It passes more officers through regiments, and more officers are consequently available when war comes.

10307. Does that apply to other duties besides the Staff College—for instance, an officer going from a Line regiment to the school at Chatham?—I think it is so at the Ordnance College.

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10308. Then that is increasing the number of officers?—Yes, and I think it is very desirable in that way. You do not increase the number with the cadre, but you increase the number that pass through it.

10309. (*Viscount Esher.*) That very much coincides with Sir Coleridge Grove's view, because his idea was, as the Chairman has said, that at least half of these officers, or certainly a large proportion of them, would always be going through courses of instruction at the Staff College, and so on?—I am quite in favour of that, but I would not like to see more officers absolutely doing duty with the regiment.

10310. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) There has been a question raised about the second batch of Yeomanry that were sent out to South Africa. Would you give us your opinion of them in contrast with the first lot?—They did not arrive until after I had left South Africa; in fact, they were not recruited until after I came home, and I never saw them. But I can speak greatly in favour of the original Yeomanry that went out—they were most useful; and Lord Kitchener told me that after these other men had been out for some time a great many of them improved very much.

10311. That is what we have heard, and I wanted your opinion?—I never saw them.

10312. Did you see any of the City Imperial Volunteers out there?—Yes, they were with me, and they were a particularly useful body. I put that down first of all to the fact that they were probably picked men—they came from a great number of Volunteer regiments, and they had a Regular Officer commanding the battalion, and a Regular Officer as Adjutant of the battalion—a Regular Officer commanding the mounted infantry battalion, and a Regular Officer as Adjutant of the mounted infantry battalion. I saw them when they arrived in Cape Town, but I did not employ them for some three or four weeks.

10313. You nursed them?—Yes, I nursed them as much as possible. After that they were excellent. As Sir Ian Hamilton will tell you, when we were entering Johannesburg, they were brigaded with the Gordon Highlanders, and they did magnificently. They were extraordinarily intelligent fellows. (*Sir Ian Hamilton.*) They got better and better every day, and at the end they were famous. (*Lord Roberts.*) They were quite excellent.

10314. (*Sir John Jackson.*) With regard to the provision of subaltern officers, there must be a very large number of young gentlemen in England to whom the Army would be very attractive if it cost a little less to take up a position in the Army as subaltern, if they got a little more pay?—But we have no difficulty in getting officers. We have now more applications than we have places for.

10315. But assuming that this system of increasing the number of officers were carried out, do you anticipate that you would not have any difficulty in getting subalterns?—I do not think we should, judging by the number of applications that we have. I dare say more pay would make it still more attractive.

10316. I take it, that it is practically impossible for any young man to live on his pay—he must have some private means, even in a Line regiment?—Certainly. It varies very much, but he need not have a great deal now.

10317. Do you not think generally, both with regard to the officers and with regard to the ranks, that the Army is somewhat underpaid?—I think the officers are certainly underpaid, and, perhaps, the higher ranks of non-commissioned officers should be better paid. As regards the men, we are doing pretty well now with this new rate of pay. That gives them a very fair amount. If you take their pay, provisions, clothing, and housing, they are not badly off for young men.

10318. But still you only appear to attract what one might call the lowest stratum of the labouring classes. You get the man, do you not, who finds it a little difficult to earn a living, and who finds in the Army a place of refuge, as it were?—Many of them are of that sort now.

10319. Do you think it would add to the efficiency of the Army if, by an increase in pay, you could attract, as I say, men from the labouring classes—men of a grade higher than we get at present—what I would term a high-class labourer?—Of course, it is a question I have often thought of, and I have often heard it discussed, whether you would actually be able to get a

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sufficient number of that class by any rate of pay that could be given.

10320. I suggest that if the pay were materially increased you would attract men from the class that I am speaking of. We have had it stated in evidence with regard to the Regulars in the late war that while they showed any amount of pluck, they showed a want of head in working when they had to rely more particularly upon themselves individually. Was that your experience?—I think that is partly the fault of our training.

10321. If you got men a little more intelligent than you usually find the men to be of the class from which the Regulars are now taken you would get over that difficulty?—I should like to have an Army composed of men like the City Imperial Volunteers, certainly. I do not know what they would cost, but I should like to have an Army of that sort. In a very few months they would be as good as our best soldiers.

10322. I suggest that now your soldier is paid about 1s. to 1s. 3d. a day?—Yes, that is pure pay that he gets besides his food.

10323. What is the net amount he gets?—It used to be 1s. It is now 1s. 3d. after two years' time.

10324. But are there deductions?—No, there would be no deductions from that.

10325. He will get a clear 1s. 3d. a day?—Yes.

10326. That is 10s. 6d. a week?—Yes, and all his food and clothing, medical attendance, and housing.

10327. Perhaps altogether it is equal to 14s. or 15s. a week. The class of man I refer to would be a labourer, probably earning, making deductions for wet days and so forth, £1 a week, and I suggest, if you could give that man another 2s. or 3s. a week, about an extra 6d. a day, you would secure him. He would feel in the Army that he was provided for, that he had not to look out for his work; and do you not think that if men from that class could be secured it would be a great help towards an efficient Army?—Do you think that men of that class would come into a profession that is only a temporary profession? It is only for three years or seven years, and at the end of that time they would be adrift again.

10328. What I mean is this. I come a good deal in contact with men of that class, and I think that what one finds is that in the average Englishman of that class you get a man who has a liking for the honour and glory of the Army, who would like to be a soldier, but he cannot afford to be a soldier. He can earn a pound a week as a labourer, and he cannot afford to go into the Army for the 10s. or 12s. a week?—Of course, I do not for one moment deny that the better paid men are the better men you are likely to get. But whether you could give sufficient pay to attract a sufficient number of that class of men I am not sure. But of this I am sure, that everything that is possible should be done, whatever men we get, to make them comfortable in their barracks. I am in favour of giving the men cubicles. We are trying the experiment now in one or two places to see if it answers. I would make the regimental institutions and reading and writing rooms as comfortable and attractive as possible, well fitted, and the canteens in every way respectable. I think that would have as much to do with attracting good men as anything else.

10329. Have you found in your experience that the illiterate man is as good under discipline as the man who has a little education?—Certainly not. I think the educated men are undoubtedly the best. I am rather astonished to find how many illiterate men come to the Army now—men who can hardly read, or write their names.

10330. Then they must come from a very low stratum of the working classes?—They do not seem to. Whether the system of education is bad I do not know, but I am much surprised at the number of men recruited lately who can neither read nor write.

10331. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) We have heard that soldiers are employed very largely in barracks doing what one may call civilian duty, such as carrying coals, cleaning windows, and working in gardens, so much so that in many cases there are not sufficient men really to drill so as to give the officers who are responsible for their drill sufficient instruction themselves. Is it your experience that that is so?—I think we have a great many men on fatigue duties, such as carrying coals, cleaning up the barrack squares, and doing work generally. It is greatly to be regretted. It is a question of money.

10332. Do you not think that it would be well worth while, even if it is a question of money, to get rid of that and to employ civilians to do civilian duty, leaving those men, not only to be trained themselves, but for the officers to be trained in commanding them?—I think we might have reservists, not civilians; in fact, it has been proposed. I proposed, not long ago, to the Q. Secretary of State that we should take the matter up, but it was found to come to a very large sum, and consequently made the Secretary of State hesitate to agree to it. In the winter time particularly when there are very few men left behind in the company or troop for the officers to train, it would be an immense advantage if we could get rid of many of the fatigue duties.

10333. We were told also that in our Army the captains are not trained to take the initiative, whereas in the German Army the captains are trained to take the initiative in action. What is your opinion about that—as to whether captains in our Army, officers of that rank should be trained in that way?—I think the whole of our system of training hitherto—and it has come from the conditions of war in old days—has been too much to treat officers and men like machines. Take the time of Wellington, for instance. A battalion, as a rule, was seldom broken up; the colonel, and majors, and captains, and subalterns, and men were all together; they formed a square if cavalry threatened to attack; they moved as a machine, there was no need for anyone but the commanding officer to think and give orders. The conditions are now completely altered, but it is very difficult to change a system which has been so ingrained in the military training, and to make people understand that cannot go on as before. When a battalion now goes into action and is deployed into line, it very soon becomes so separated that the commanding officer loses all control over it. The colonel himself is of necessity on foot, and is obliged to leave the command of the companies to the captains, while the captains have to trust in a great measure to their subalterns and section leaders. What we try now to make all officers understand is that the most junior and even the non-commissioned officers have responsibilities, and must think and act for themselves. Towards the end of the war they were getting more and more efficient in that way.

10334. I am told that the captains in the German Army are actually trained from the very start, and the captains themselves train the men under them to enable them to take the initiative in case of emergency or when they are scattered as you say?—That is what we are doing now, and, as I have said, the officers responded very well after they had had experience in the war.

10335. And that is one of the lessons of the war?—Yes.

10336. You spoke of men just now, I think, of ex-Reservists, being organised for the purposes of home defence only?—Yes.

10337. Would they be men of the same standing as what is known in the German Army as the Landsturm?—I think they would be even older. Those men that I alluded to would generally have been over sixteen years in the service; they would be men of 36 or 37.

10338. The Landsturm, I think, are men of 40 years of age?—Then that would be about the same age as the men I mean.

10339. It is men of that class that you spoke of?—Yes. At that time, when we had a very small Reserve, I thought it would be very advisable if we could have had some system by which we could have called upon men who had even passed through the Reserve for home defence purposes.

10340. And those men, you think, ought to be organised?—Yes, I think so, unless we can succeed in getting a very much larger Reserve than we had before the war broke out—80,000 or 90,000 men.

10341. And they ought to have some few days, some short period, of drill in the year, I suppose?—That is a most difficult question. If you cannot get the Volunteers to come for seven days into camp once in two years, I do not see how you can expect a Reservist to be able to leave his employment. His employers will not let him go. While in the Reserve a man is practically a

civilian he is earning his own living, and must carry out the orders of his employers.

10342. But war is such a progressive science now, and so progressive that a man after 40 years of age, if he does not get any instruction, I am afraid would be a very inefficient soldier?—For garrison duty at home, I think he might do, while we were engaged in a war abroad. But the great difficulty we are having with the Volunteers is on this subject; they are up in arms because they are asked to do seven days' training in two years.

10343. Had you an opportunity of seeing the Australian men in the field?—Yes, several times.

10344. What was your opinion of them as to intelligence?—I thought them very intelligent and very quick; some of the Colonials did extremely well.

10345. Would you rank them as high as the City Imperial Volunteers and the First Division of Yeomanry that went out; would you put them upon the same footing as those?—I think I would rank them as high as the first contingent of Yeomanry; not the City Imperial Volunteers. I think the City Imperial Volunteers were quite a peculiar class. There were a large number of gentlemen among them.

10346. So there were in the Colonial contingents?—All the Colonials did extremely well—the West Australians, New South Wales, the Canadians, and the New Zealanders—they all did well, especially those that came out first.

10347. Had you any opportunity of seeing the Army Medical Corps that was furnished by New South Wales?—Yes. I do not remember the name of the Colonel.

10348. Colonel Williams?—Yes.

10349. And Major Fiaschi, he was there?—Yes, I met them there, and they were most useful and serviceable. (*Sir Ian Hamilton.*) They were both with me; they were splendid men. (*Lord Roberts.*) Yes, they were excellent fellows.

10350. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I think you were good enough to do the Artillery Corps that went from New South Wales the honour of reviewing them on their arrival at the Cape?—Yes, I did.

10351. They were a permanent corps in New South Wales?—Yes. I saw them on board ship, when they came into harbour, and I saw them afterwards in the field; they were very good.

10352. They were under the command of an Imperial officer, I think—Colonel Smith, of the Artillery?—Yes.

10353. And they were a fine body of men, you thought?—They were very good, indeed.

10354. And they were perfectly efficient?—Yes, they became extremely efficient.

10355. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Do you think there was any difference between the Reserve men and the men in the regiments, after the Reservists had joined. Were they as efficient in taking up their places readily?—After a few days they were quite as efficient.

10356. You do not think it is necessary that they should be occasionally trained during the period that they are not on service?—I was agreeably surprised with them. It is almost impossible, as I have endeavoured to explain, to train them.

10357. Do you think that that applies to the Cavalry as well as the Infantry—that a man who has been in the Cavalry Reserve is suitable for a foreign expedition?—I did not hear any complaints about them; they seemed to do as well. The only thing I noticed about them was that they were perhaps a little heavier—a little thicker and heavier than is desirable for Cavalry; otherwise they did as well.

10358. There is no avoiding that, I suppose?—I am afraid not.

10359. With regard to what Sir John Jackson asked you, I think he is of opinion that if you gave sufficient pay, you would get better men into the Service than you do now, men of a higher class. But, on the other side, is it not a fact that short service is a great deterrent to them from enlisting, in this way—that a man might like to be a soldier, but if he is to be a soldier for three years only, and then he has to go back to some handiwork or trade, it is rather a disadvantage to go into the Service?—That is the answer that I gave. I said that I thought many men would think twice of coming into the Army if they had to leave at the end of three years, and then to seek for a livelihood.

10360. He would have lost a good deal of his position in whatever trade or handicraft he had?—Yes.

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10361. Evidently, you are of opinion that the greatest difficulty is the supply of officers, especially for the Militia and the Volunteers. They are very short of officers, are they not?—Yes; some Militia regiments and battalions, when the war broke out, had only eight officers.

10362. And you have not been able at the War Office to discover a system by which you could get over that difficulty, and keep up a sufficient body of officers?—It is a matter that has given us most serious consideration how to do that.

10363. A good many difficulties would be got over if you could keep the Militia especially, and also the Volunteers, more complete in officers?—Yes; and if we could be sure that the officers were efficient.

10364. Do you think that the present amount of training that the Militia receive—I believe it has been rather increased—is sufficient?—No, not for the officers. The officers must have additional training, and so must the Volunteer officers if we are to be able to trust them.

10365. In fact, you could not take any Volunteer battalion into the field as a battalion now?—No.

10366. And you very much approve of the system by which a company came to be affiliated with the Regular battalion?—Yes; a company at once got over all the difficulties that an untrained battalion has, because on joining the Regular battalion they had the great advantage of all the knowledge of the Regular officers and of the Regular soldiers. It was quite wonderful, the way in which the Volunteer companies did when they joined the Regular battalion; they fitted themselves into it, and in a very few days they were excellent.

10367. I gather that you think the Colonial Contingents were certainly not well trained; but do you think it is possible that they can be well trained when they have only 16 days' drill in a year? They have a system in some of the Colonies of having a half day's and a quarter day's drill; but the total is 16 days, of which, perhaps, but not always, six days are spent in camp. Could you expect them to have been better turned out than they were under such circumstances?—Not with that training. But even that is better than our Volunteers get as regards camp. They cannot go, as I have said, for six days in two years. The Colonials go for six days in every year, is it not?

10368. It has varied from time to time; in some Colonies it is 12 days; but if there is a deficit in revenue they very often do not have the camp at all. The officers who have some training at the headquarters of the permanent force, which is a little better; but you think they ought to have more training?—My opinion is that if we are going to trust the Volunteers and Militia, we are bound to have them properly trained; and if the patriotism of the nation is not sufficient to let them go to camp often enough, we must have some other system by which we shall have properly trained officers and soldiers. It is impossble under the present system to rely upon the Volunteers as they are now, or upon the Militia. Some change must be made; either they must have more training, or we must use some other means to create an Army.

10369. You found, I suppose, a considerable difference between Militia regiments and Line regiments on service?—Yes, the greatest difference.

10370. There are certain duties to which you are almost compelled to confine them?—They were chiefly used at first on the lines of communication. They improved considerably after they had been on service for a time.

10371. You would not like to see a Militia regiment attacking the enemy in the way you described?—Not without more training than they have at present.

10372. And that applies still more to the Volunteers?—Yes; there is no disguising the fact that you cannot trust them as they are at present trained—it is impossible.

10373. You thought rather well of the first contingent of Yeomanry?—I think they were excellent after a very short time. Of course, we gave them all the training we could. I kept them in Cape Colony at first, and brought them up by degrees. And they had a good sprinkling of Regular officers with them. We were fortunate in having at their head Lord Chesham, an old Adjutant of Cavalry, himself a very keen soldier; and many of their Commanding

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Officers had been Regulars, Cavalry men; and the Adjutants, as a rule, were Cavalry soldiers. I took care at first that they were only used sparingly, but after a bit they became excellent.

10374. Do you think that their training here in England had very much qualified them for scouting duties and patrolling?—No; that is what we are trying to remedy. Instead of a great deal of the ordinary parade work, such as marching past, etc., the Yeomanry are now instructed in scouting, reconnoitring, taking care of their horses, and finding their way about country. That is where I found the Colonials were so far ahead of our men; they could find their way about the country. They did two things better than our men could do, they could scout and find their way about country. But they were not so good as our men in looking after their horses.

10375. The tendency now is to look upon the Yeomanry more as Mounted Infantry?—That is what I hope they will be.

10376. Will that be popular among the men, do you think?—Yes, I think so. Mounted Infantry is a most useful Service. With the small amount of training they can get it is impossible for them to become efficient Cavalry. They had much better be good Mounted Infantry than indifferent Cavalry.

10377. (*Viscount Esher.*) I understand you to say that, if under our present system of a Volunteer Army, we cannot get a sufficient number of trained men, some other system will have to be adopted?—I think so.

10378. What conclusion does that point to?—It points to some sort of conscription for the home Army.

10379. Are you, on the whole, favourable to compulsory service for the home Army?—I would far rather try any other way first.

10380. Can you see any other way?—The only other way is for employers to show sufficient patriotism to let the men be trained for a certain number of weeks every year.

10381. Do you think it is probable that you could get a practical agreement among the whole of the employers?—Perhaps, if they were threatened with conscription themselves they might do it.

10382. From the point of view, not only of the training of the men, but of the numbers of the Army generally, do you think that under the present system you get as many men as you require?—You mean for the Regular Army?

10383. For the Regular Army and auxiliary forces?—For the Regular Army we are in our Cavalry some 5,000 men over our numbers; in Horse and Field Artillery we are slightly over; in the Infantry we are below, and in the Garrison Artillery we are also below. But, on the whole, we are not much below the establishment.

10384. Then, to come back to the question of officers, when you arrived in South Africa, were you short of officers on the lines of communication and the staff, special service, and so on?—Yes; many times I should have been very glad if I had had more officers.

10385. And yet you had denuded every possible supply in this country, had you not?—Yes.

10386. You even went so far as to draw from India a certain number of officers?—Yes, a good many came from India.

10387. Yet India is not overstocked with officers?—No; an Indian regiment has only nine officers with the Native Cavalry or Infantry, and they have no reserve officers at all to speak of.

10388. For years you have pressed for an increase in the number of officers of the Indian Staff Corps, have you not?—I have not pressed for an increase of officers to the units, for the reason that I do not think too many British officers are required with a native regiment in peace time; the duty can efficiently be performed with the assistance of the native officers, of whom there are 17 with each Cavalry and 16 with each Infantry Regiment. And I have always thought that if we had too many British officers, as in the old days before the Mutiny, they would not have sufficient to do. I believe the number is now again being increased by three more, making twelve instead of nine. We began with four, then went on to seven, eight, and nine. More, as I have said, are not required in peace time; but as in the home Army, additional officers are needed in war, especially is the case in India, because it is the British officer who suffers.

10389. Do you approve of calling upon a considerable number of Indian officers, in case of a European war, to supply the deficiencies in the British Army?—I do not think it is possible; indeed, in the event of the Indian Army being engaged in a big war, officers would certainly have to be sent from England.

10390. Then take, again, the Militia. You complain that the Militia battalions sent out to South Africa were under-officered?—Yes.

10391. Was not that partly owing to the fact that the Militia was largely drawn upon to supplement the officers in the Regular Army?—I think that some Militia officers went out as special service officers and some joined the Imperial Yeomanry, but I do not think any were put into the Regular Army, except those who were given commissions.

10392. Quite so; but was not that the case?—Yes; we get Militia officers every year.

10393. Were there not an exceptional number of Militia officers in the Regular Army?—Yes; no doubt in the same way that we took nearly all the cadets from Sandhurst and Woolwich.

10394. Then the effect would have been to have denuded the Militia of a certain proportion of its officers?—Undoubtedly.

10395. Do you see any alternative, if you require a large number of special officers—staff officers, and so on, in time of war—to the proposal of the late Military Secretary, that you should increase the number of officers in the Regular Army if you are not to draw upon the Auxiliary Forces in time of war to supply good officers?—But I think that we must draw upon the Auxiliary Forces. We should require more officers, but I do not want more officers added permanently to the battalion or regiment for duty in peace time. I think the present establishment is sufficient, and that if we had more there would not be enough duty to occupy them. I would welcome any plan by which Auxiliary officers could serve for a time with Regular units, but I do not want to see more officers with a regiment, battalion, or battery than there are now.

10396. (*Chairman.*) Just one question with regard to the Volunteer service companies. We have had some evidence that it was, perhaps, a little hard in some cases on a Volunteer service company that came out fresh after the battalion had been on service, and joined a battalion, which was hard enough, and had to do all the duty exactly as if it had been out throughout the campaign. Did you find anything of that kind?—That would be unavoidable. I never heard any complaints of it.

10397. Then you said that at present you could not trust the Volunteers and Militia. I suppose that would mean for service abroad or in the field?—Well, I should say for service at home, too.

10398. Would you say that they were inefficient at the present time for home defence?—I think they are inefficient mainly because the officers are not sufficiently trained to command the men, and the men themselves have not had sufficient training.

10399. Then you do not consider it a satisfactory establishment in the meantime for that purpose of home defence?—No.

10400. Then one question about the Yeomanry. We have had evidence from one distinguished officer which threw some doubts on the value of the Yeomanry as a mounted corps for the future for service at home, on the ground of this country being so much an enclosed country?—Do you mean as Cavalry?

10401. As a mounted corps. I think the way it was put was that really cyclists would be more use than mounted men in this country?—I do not agree to that. We tried in 1901 a large body of cyclists at Aldershot, and it was found that cyclists cannot be used in anything like a large body; they are most valuable for scouting purposes, or for taking despatches, or communications, but in large numbers cyclists in a road are most inconvenient; and they cannot go off the road. I would always have a certain number of cyclists. For the purposes I mentioned—messages and scouting—they are excellent; but the Yeomanry, I consider, in this country ought to do the rôle of Mounted Infantry, for which I think they are eminently suited, and I think the country is well suited for that. It is not a

Cavalry country, but it is eminently a Mounted Infantry country.

10402. A comparison was made between the cost. The Yeomanry are estimated to cost about £19, and the Volunteers about £6?—I do not think you could replace Yeomanry by cyclists.

10403. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I am very glad to hear that you do not approve of conscription, if any other satisfactory method can be adopted. I take it that your opinion is that you cannot have a man who is fighting under compulsion such a good-spirited man as the man who is fighting as a volunteer?—One feeling of mine against conscription is that you cannot have conscription for a foreign service Army; it cannot be for the regular Army. Every man in the regular Army has a chance of being sent abroad, and you could not do that. You could have conscription for the Militia, I suppose?

10404. I take it that Lord Esher was referring to the idea of conscription for the regular Army?—No; that is impossible.

(*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Lord Esher distinctly stated for home defence.

(*Viscount Esher.*) I do not think I used the word
79. "conscription." I used the word "compulsion."

10405. (*Sir John Jackson.*) What are the limits of age for enlisting now? Between what limits do you enlist young men for the Army?—Eighteen is the youngest; I think to 24 or 25.

10406. Referring to Sir Henry Norman's remark, may I suggest that at that age there could be no material disadvantage to a young man, because if he went in at 21, if he is an artificer, he has got through his apprenticeship, and he goes back to his work at 24 quite satisfactorily. Are you strongly of opinion that there would be a disadvantage in a young man going away from his work at the age of 21?—If you mean from a civil point of view, I cannot tell you, of course.

10407. I suggest that at that age there would not be any material disadvantage. Referring to Sir Frederick Darley's question, you said that the tendency in modern warfare was for even the junior non-commissioned officers to have to act individually?—Yes.

10408. That would be all the more reason for getting a more intelligent class in the ranks?—Certainly. I am all in favour of that.

10409. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) There was a question which some of our witnesses answered about the arming of Mounted Infantry or Cavalry. They said that, in addition to a rifle or whatever fire-arm they have, they ought to have some weapon of offence, and various suggestions were made as to what sort it should be—a lance, or a sword, or, I may say, a tomahawk. Have you any strong opinion about that?—Yes, I have a very decided opinion upon that point. The principal weapon that all our mounted men must have is the rifle. For the cavalryman, Hussar, or Dragoon, the rifle must be the principal weapon, and he must have a sword as well. It may be desirable to have a very few Lancer regiments, but of this I am not sure, but even the Lancer's principal weapon must be the rifle, and he should have no sword. I think I can give good proofs. I hope to be able to prove to the satisfaction of Cavalry soldiers from history that under the existing conditions of warfare the rifle must necessarily be the cavalry soldier's principal weapon, and the sword the weapon they may have to use occasionally. They should, of course, be perfect in both.

10410. And the Mounted Infantry?—They only want the rifle and bayonet.

10411. The ordinary bayonet?—Yes; in fact, they are Infantry, as a rule.

10412. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Reverting for a moment to the City Imperial Volunteers, you have the very highest opinion of those Volunteers, both for intelligence and good physique?—Yes.

10413. Was much owing also to their better training, in that they were superior to the other Volunteer regiments from this country—from their superior training?—We had no other Volunteer regiments from this country.

10414. To the Militia and the Yeomanry?—I think the City Imperial Volunteers were superior to all.

10415. They were exceptionally good?—Yes.

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10416. You have also spoken very well of the Colonial regiments. Do you think from what you have seen of them in South Africa that with experienced Army officers they would have been quite equal to the City Imperial Volunteers as fit and good soldiers?—I found them as they were extremely intelligent. What they lacked was, I think, a little want of discipline. They were, on the other hand, more successful at scouting and finding their way about country. For fighting generally, it is very difficult to draw a comparison one way or the other. I think some were better than others; some Colonials were better than other Colonials, but they were all most satisfactory, and I was very glad to have them.

10417. They are drawn chiefly from the same class of men as the City Imperial Volunteers in the Colonies, I believe; we regard them as men of great intelligence and also of good physique?—Certainly, they are that, and I found that commanding officers were greatly pleased when they heard that they were to be accompanied by a certain number of companies of any Colonials.

10418. In short, you would prefer to have a thoroughly trained Army, composed of such men as the City Imperial Volunteers, to almost any other?—Yes.

10419. I think you mentioned that the Colonial troops were not very careful of their horses—not good horse-masters?—That was the general complaint about them.

10420. Do you know if such was the case?—Yes, I think so; it was often brought to my notice. One reason given was that they had so many horses in their own country, it did not matter whether a horse had a sore back, as they could always get another to ride. They did not, as a rule, look after their horses well.

10421. Speaking from my own knowledge of those from the North-West of Canada, for instance, they are really some of them much more at home in the saddle than on foot, and they have to care, each of them, for his own horse, so that I should have thought they would really have been very careful and good horse-masters?—I was not alluding to the men from the North-West of Canada particularly. I am only speaking generally. It was pointed out to me, generally, that the Colonials did not look after their horses. Our own men were not over careful, but the Colonials were still less so.

10422. In the class of officers for Reservists, you would wish, I take it, to have those from the Militia and Yeomanry, and, perhaps, also civilians to have training as officers?—Yes.

10423. And to be as a Reserve?—Yes.

10424. Would you propose that they should have any pecuniary advantage beyond what officers in the Militia and Yeomanry have at present—that they should have something, say, as a retaining fee, some advantage of that kind?—It might be advisable, and it might be necessary, that some advantage should be offered to them.

10425. Something as to pay?—Yes, I think so. While they were attached to the Regular unit they would have to be paid as Regular officers; but whether they should have any retaining fee besides is a little difficult to say. It might be necessary to do that.

10426. As an inducement to them to be always ready when required?—Yes; I daresay it would be necessary.

10426*. (*Chairman.*) We might pass on to the next point now. Have you anything to say with regard to the shooting of the men?—I think there is room for considerable improvement. They were better at long distances than they were at short distances, but they were nothing like as good as the Boers at the short distance.

10427. You think the Boers were better?—Much better.

10428. We have had different opinions expressed with regard to that?—I think they were. (*Sir Ian Hamilton.*) I quite think so.

10429. (*To Lord Roberts.*) Was the shooting of the Regulars better than that of the auxiliary forces?—It was better than that of the Militia. Some of the Volunteers were very good. The City Imperial Volunteers were excellent, and so were some of the Volunteer companies.

10430. And what about the Yeomanry and the Colonials?—The Yeomanry were not good at shooting

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and I think there was great room for improvement in the Colonials, too—they were not very good.

10431. That arises, I suppose, from their not having had so much practice?—I should think so.

10432. In the case of the Regulars, there is a considerable amount of practice, is there not, under the present system?—It is very difficult. At many places there are no ranges near the barracks, and the men have to be sent to ranges at a certain time once or twice a year. Take Dublin, for instance. There is no range within several miles, and the men have to be put under canvas for two or three weeks in the summer, and not to shoot again until the next summer. You want to improve the shooting. You must either have long ranges, which is, perhaps, not possible in many places; or, if you have not, you must have miniature ranges. But it is very necessary that there should be some range, either large or small, in proximity to the barracks to which the men can go constantly and shoot.

10433. Is there enough ammunition supplied to them?—Yes, I think the amount of ammunition is fairly good enough now. But it has to be shot off in many cases at once. The men go and shoot at regular parades, and then they never shoot again perhaps the whole year.

10434. Is it not one disadvantage in war that a man has to judge his own distance?—Yes. It is more so now, because they are so separated. We fail a good deal in judging distances.

10435. How would you remedy that?—It is very difficult. The only way, of course, is practice in judging distances. Even if you do not shoot, you could take the men out and practise them. They are practised in it now, but not sufficiently.

10436. There are very few places where you could let them shoot. Salisbury Plain is practically the only one?—But even when you cannot shoot you can teach them to judge distances.

10437. Were you satisfied with the marching of the troops?—Yes, I think the marching was excellent. They never failed in marching.

10438. They showed their endurance?—Yes, they showed great endurance.

10439. In that particular was there any difference between the younger men and the older men?—No, I do not think so. The battalions were certainly half full of Reservists, and I did not notice any difference or hear any complaints made at all.

10440. What do you say as to horsemanship?—In horsemanship, as a rule, our men are good horsemen, but they are indifferent horse-masters. I think that is where our officers and our men failed. The Artillery are far better than the Cavalry in that respect.

10441. Is that from a difference in training?—Yes, I think in the Artillery the training is better. The junior officers in the Horse and Field Artillery have absolute charge of the section to which they are posted, as regards everything connected with the horses and the men. In the Cavalry I do not know whether the squadron commander makes the same arrangement with the captains of troops and sub-lieutenants of certain sections. We are arranging this shall be done, but I rather gather that it has not been the case hitherto.

10442. I think you said that you had a memorandum in regard to their behaviour in the field in the matter of taking cover and entrenching work?—Yes. I have a few words to say about entrenching, and also with regard to the quality of the men which you asked me about. The highest praise I can give the Regular soldier of to-day is to say that he is in no single respect inferior to his predecessor, and that in some he is greatly superior. He is more intelligent. He is more temperate. He knows his duties better. He has more self-respect, and he is more readily amenable to discipline. As a fighting man, however, he was not so expert when he first met the enemy as he might have been. His individuality had been so little cultivated that his natural acuteness was checked, and his want of resourcefulness, especially at the beginning of the campaign, was marked. He was the exact opposite of the Boer, especially in his want of knowledge of ground and how to utilise it, and also in his defective powers of observation. His shooting cannot be described as good. Steadiness and a disinclination to waste ammunition were always observable; and there was no real marksmanship, capable of seizing fleeting opportunities, and attaining good results under difficult and unfamiliar conditions. The shooting at short ranges, where battl generally resolves itself into a long fire-fight between two parties of skirmishers more or less under cover, was ineffective, and at long ranges the distance was seldom accurately estimated. The marching was excellent in the Infantry, and the mounted troops did some remarkable performances. But the latter would have been attended by less waste had the men been better horse-masters. It is not sufficient that Cavalry or Mounted Infantry should be able to ride, but they must know how to get the utmost out of their horses by good treatment and never failing consideration of their wants. The discouragement of individuality and the practice of training men to work under all circumstances in numbers and to follow precise rules is to blame. A man should be taught to ride as an individual, and not as one of a squad, and the same with horse management. Until the soldier is held directly responsible for, and so takes a personal interest in, the condition of his charge, until he learns to rely on his own common-sense and experience, not merely on the orders of his superior that this condition is maintained, our horse-mastership is sure to be indifferent. Nor is it to be expected that he will excel either as a scout or skirmisher, that he will attend to sanitary precautions, or become a master of his weapons, if he is not accustomed to use his own common-sense and to take a personal interest in his own training as a skilled fighting-man. It follows from what I have just said that our men show very little judgment or skill in the use of entrenchments or cover. Entrenchments planned by the officers, and constructed systematically under their supervision, were generally satisfactory; but when the work had to be left to the initiative of the men, it was exceedingly badly performed. Individual skill in improvising cover, so conspicuous among the Boers, was altogether wanting in our regulars, whose only idea in building entrenchments seemed to be to obey orders, and not to secure their own safety. A most notable instance is Nicholson's Nek. The stone shelters raised by individual men, or by small groups of men, were almost pitiful; they were so insignificant and badly placed—I heard this from an officer who was there. In the attack the men were even more oblivious of cover than on the defence; and in scouting and on outpost duty it was long before they learned the importance of invisibility. This was certainly not as it should have been. Defiance of danger is a fine attribute, but a force attacking a position, if it takes every advantage of the ground, and takes care not to expose itself, will probably attain its object with half the loss it would otherwise incur. In most of these respects the improvement as the campaign went on was marked; and it was very clear that the men wanted only practice and experience to become first-rate. In the later stages they showed far more resourcefulness than at first; they were not so dependent on their officers, and they seemed to have grasped the spirit of individual fighting. And at the same time their discipline remained excellent. This, I think, is a clear proof that insufficient training, and not any want of intelligence or keenness, was the reason that they still had something to learn when they took the field. Too much attention was given to the maintenance of uniformity and good order; too little to the development of the individual. It was not everywhere realised that the skill and aptitude of the scout and the skirmisher are not less important than the steadiness and precision of the mass.

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10443. If it is due to deficient training, are you taking steps now to remedy that state of things?—Yes, I hope we are, and I hope it will be carried out. Our new drill-book is all in the direction of making the soldiers think more for themselves, and to exercise their individual intelligence.

10444. Is that a new drill-book which has been adopted?—Yes, it has been adopted. The drill-book has been out in its provisional form for some months, and we are now completing it with any improvements which have been brought to notice during the last few months.

10445. Is that all you have to say about the men?—Yes, and entrenchments and cover.

10446. Then, as to the officers?—I divide the officers into three classes: the staff officers, subordinate officers, and commanding officers. Taking the regimental officers first, there were certainly failures among them in South Africa, but, so far as my experience of history goes, the general standard of practical knowledge, of devotion to duty, and of readiness under difficulties, was

at least as high as in any Army which I have known, or of which I have read. A certain percentage of failures in war is inevitable; but among the subordinate regimental officers in South Africa it was extraordinarily small. It was seldom that they displayed any want of initiative, and their knowledge of their duties in the field left little to be desired. A good many people, I think, are inclined to judge of our officers as they see them in the United Kingdom, where, owing to the want of training grounds and men to train, they often have a good deal of time on their hands, and many opportunities for amusement and frivolity. It is not in England, however, that our officers are trained, but in India, in Egypt, and in Eastern and Western Africa. It is there that they become familiar with war, accustomed to command and to organise, and to adapt their means to their end. Our campaigns for the last 20 years show the value of this training. In Burma, Uganda, Ashantee, and on the North-west Frontier of India, and in Egypt, our unbroken success has been due in great part to the energy and ability of the younger officers. I should be the last to say, however, that there is no room for improvement. The first point is that officers should take their profession more seriously than has hitherto generally been the case, and that they should be able to instruct their men in every detail of their duty. The second point is a wide knowledge of war, especially in the higher branches, such as strategy, organisation, etc. It can hardly be said that before the war our officers were encouraged to study. Generals and Commanding Officers were not held responsible for the intellectual development of their subordinates, and very little was done towards raising the standard of professional acquirements. Education in the Army stopped short at the drill books; history was a closed volume, except to those who opened it for themselves; and the officers' mental education, to a very large extent, was a matter which concerned himself alone. I am not of opinion that our regimental officers, as a general rule, are averse to acquiring professional knowledge. The third point—and this is a most particular point, in my idea—is knowledge of ground. Nothing can be more important both for officers and men. The intelligent use of ground, combined with accurate shooting, is the secret of tactical success, whether for the individual scout, the officer who directs, the skirmishers in action, or the General who frames the plan of battle. Knowledge of ground is an attribute the Boers have acquired from their habits of life. It is more difficult for our soldiers to attain the same high standard, and every endeavour should be made in time of peace to improve them in this very important matter. In face of the excellent administration of our regiments, of the strong *esprit de corps*, and of the eagerness of each unit, from the company to the battalion, to outstrip all others in smartness, I cannot question the zeal of our officers. If knowledge were put before them, and the men in a practical and an attractive form, they are quite ready, and even anxious, to acquire it. I have a very high opinion of the younger officers. The proportion of failures among Commanding Officers and Brigadiers was considerably larger than that in the junior ranks. This I ascribe to several causes.

See 144. 10447. You mean by Commanding Officers, Commanding Officers of regiments?—Yes. First, as men get older they are often less inclined to accept responsibility, and they lose their power of decision. Secondly, many of those who held these positions in South Africa had had very few opportunities of practising the duties that devolved upon them during the campaign; and, thirdly, manœuvres on a large scale were so infrequent that it was impossible to ascertain by this practical test whether the senior officers had kept their knowledge, whether they could handle troops in accordance with the principles of modern tactics, and whether they to a certain extent had retained their nerve. With troops who are not Regulars it is especially important that Commanding Officers should be strong, clear-headed, and well acquainted with their work. These troops are more susceptible to personal influence than those who are used to discipline, and their efficiency depends to a very great extent on their confidence in their leader. Under modern conditions the responsibilities of Brigadiers and Commanding officers have become more onerous. Troops in action cover such a wide front, and so great a depth, that the control of a battalion to-day is more difficult than that of a brigade a few years ago, and mistakes made at the beginning of an attack, so far away as 1,400 or 1,500 yards from the enemy's position, cannot now be rectified. Such being the case, we cannot be too careful to give our officers, of all branches of the Service, continual practice in handling troops across country, and also to subject them to frequent tests at manœuvres of the three arms combined. I think you have a paper which I showed you, on discipline power; it shows how many commanding officers failed in the very first few months. As regards staff officers, the combatant staff of the Army in South Africa can hardly be said to have been entirely satisfactory. Shortcomings, to a certain extent, were unavoidable. The outlook for and unprecedented expansion of the Army affected the staff in the same way as all other departments. For an Army of 90,000 men, we had, probably, as many trained staff officers as were required. But when the Army grew to 250,000 and 300,000 men, the appointments had to be filled by men with whom want of experience was the rule, rather than the exception. Those officers who had received previous training, either in active service, or at the Staff College, generally did well; but the absence of a definite system of staff duties, leading sometimes to an over-lapping of responsibilities, sometimes to waste of time, and sometimes to a neglect of indispensable precautions, was undoubtedly prejudicial to the smooth running of the military machine. Officers were often called upon to take up duties of which they had no previous knowledge; and while it was remarkable in the great majority of cases how quickly they became efficient, the mistakes that were made by the staff had most serious consequences. Many instances of indifferent staff-work might be quoted, and it seems clear that the entire staff should be thoroughly trained; that a definite system of carrying out staff duties should be laid down; and that we should have enough trained staff officers to supply, in case of emergency, a large Army. On such occasions there is no difficulty in obtaining men of such good quality, that they very soon become trustworthy soldiers. But staff officers cannot be improvised; nor can they learn their duties, like the rank and file, in a few weeks or months, for their duties are as varied as they are important. I am decidedly of opinion that we cannot have a first-rate Army, unless we have a first-rate staff, well educated, constantly practised at manœuvres, and with wide experience. Brains are even more important in war than numbers; and in an Army, which may contain a large proportion of men who are not soldiers by profession, trained leaders are especially important. The provision of such leaders is a point to which we can hardly pay too much attention. In the South African campaign, raw troops of good class, who were officered by men who knew their business, rapidly became efficient; and those units which had really good staff officers did far better work, at a much smaller cost of life and health, than those where staff officers were either injudiciously selected or inexperienced. The General Staff of the Army labours under a great disadvantage, in consequence of the organic change in its constitution, and introduced with the most praiseworthy intentions, in the year 1889. Up to that time the Combatant Staff had been divided into two distinct branches: the Department of the Adjutant-General, and that of the Quartermaster-General, each with clearly definite duties. The arrangment worked admirably in the earlier campaigns of the last century, including the Peninsula, and it is within my own experience, that in the Mutiny, in Abyssinia, in Afghanistan, in Burma, and elsewhere, it proved eminently adapted to the character and organisation of our Army. Undoubtedly, a weak point in our administration, from the Peninsula onward, was the unsatisfactory condition of the Transport and Supply Department. This, so far as the "Supply" was concerned, was corrected by the reform of 1899, the officers of this Department being made combatant, and becoming eligible for appointment to the General Staff. With this innovation I have no fault to find. But it is not easy to understand why the distinction between the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's Department—a distinction sanctioned by the authority of Wellington, familiar to the Army, and tested in so many successful campaigns in all parts of the world, should have been so completely obliterated. Because a new department, that of A.G. "B," had become necessary, it did not thereby follow that the two existing departments should be interfered with or their efficiency lessened. The duties of transport and supply are of great importance, but certainly not more so than those which have to do with the direction of operations, with marches, battle and dis-

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cipline. Under the regulations of 1889, the Adjutant-General's Department (except at the War Office) completely absorbed that of the Quartermaster-General; duties which had hitherto been entirely separated being now carried out by that branch of the staff, which was entitled A.G. "A." It was not, however, without exceedingly good reason that the experienced soldiers, who framed the old system, made the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's Departments so entirely distinct. The duties of both were such as to give ample occupation, especially in time of war, to the officers who discharged them; and they had so little in common, that an individual, well suited to one Department, might be quite useless in the other. Thus the merging of these two Departments into one, for the sole purpose of raising the status of a third department, can hardly be called administratively sound. This opinion is strongly borne out by my experience in South Africa. Under the old system, the duties of the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's Departments were very clearly defined. In the Peninsula, roughly speaking, they were as follows, and they underwent but little change until the appearance of A.G. "B":—"Quartermaster-General: Operations marches and outposts, encampments, etc., reconnaissance, and intelligence, issue of operation orders, transport, and supply. Adjutant-General: Discipline, administration, issue of general orders and regulations, returns." Referring to this table, it will be seen that the duties of the Quartermaster-General's Department were largely of an active character, while those of the Adjutant-General's Department were the opposite; and I think that the wisdom of keeping the two separate, in different hands, can hardly be questioned. The practical result of assigning the performance of the whole of them to the same branch of the staff has been unsatisfactory, both in peace and war. In peace, discipline and administration have so pre-occupied the staff, that they have had very little time to give to their active duties, to the tactical instruction of the troops, to field-firing, the study of country, to the preparation for, and discussion of, field days and manœuvres. The tendency of the new measure has been to confine men far too much to their office, and thrust the importance of practical training into the background. It would seem to have been forgotten that to work out exercises over broken ground, which will give useful instruction to the troops engaged, demands much hard work, and that lessons which have not been thoroughly thought out by the instruction are certain to be wasted. If our Army is to be properly trained in peace, we must have a department of the staff, which can give its whole time to the business of instruction, to the study of ground, and to observation of the effects of fire. The officers belonging to this department should have a sound practical knowledge of both strategy and tactics, so that they would form a body of capable and useful umpires; and they should be constantly with the troops. In war, the merging of the duties of the Quartermaster-General's and Adjutant-General's Departments cannot fail to have a bad effect. Under a good chief of the staff, the initial confusion caused by officers not understanding the exact scope of their duties may possibly be reduced to order, and each individual made aware of his special functions. Yet the first few days or weeks before the staff settles down may be the most critical of a campaign, and there is always the danger of men being put to the work for which they are least suited. Beyond this, however, is the important fact that if the staff is run on an automatic and familiar system, with definite duties attached to each post, friction, delay, and misunderstanding are much less likely to occur than when men are quite at sea as to which particular officer they should refer to for information, or should report to. Things in war cannot be too simple or too clear. Moreover, if on every staff there were officers who had devoted their whole attention to strategy, tactics, and ground, and who were perfectly at home in directing the movements of bodies of troops, and in looking after camps, water, and security, it would be of very great assistance to the Generals. I attribute a great many of our mishaps in South Africa to there being no officers specially trained in Quartermaster-General's work. As I have stated, under the regulations of 1889 the titles of Assistant-Quartermaster-General and Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General were dropped, and all staff officers became Assistant or Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-Generals, and the particular work of the Quartermaster-General's Department—so supremely important in war—was lost sight of, or supposed to be performed by Army Service Corps officers, who had shown no special fitness for it, and had not even had the advantage of Staff College training. It is quite a mistake to suppose that because an officer can carry on the duties of an Adjutant-General in an efficient manner, he can equally well perform those of a Quartermaster-General. In some particulars there are certain qualifications necessary to both, such as intelligence, common-sense, tact, and a knowledge of regulations; but in addition, to be a good Quartermaster-General an officer must have a quick eye for country, and he must be able to rapidly appreciate the relative value of positions; he must be an expert at reconnaissance, a bold rider, insensible to fatigue, and full of resource. These are also the qualities which are required to make a good General; indeed, I much doubt if there ever has been a great commander who did not possess them, and yet they are the very qualities which have not hitherto been sufficiently recognised in the selection of officers for the staff. For my own part, I am convinced that if the Army in South Africa was not, at the outset of the war, so efficient as it might have been, it is to be largely attributed to our departure from the staff system which served us well in even greater conflicts. The system of 1889, I am aware, is almost identical (excluding A. G. "B") with that of Germany. But the British Army, in organisation, discipline, and tradition, and in the character and prejudice of its officers and men, is so different from all others, that we ought to be very cautious, to say the least, in seeking models for imitation among the conscript Armies on the Continent.

10448. You have been speaking of the organisation of the Army in the field, I suppose?—Yes, and in peace, too. I alluded to peace. I said, of course, it began in peace time. This change in the organisation took place in peace time.

10449. But not especially at the War Office?—Yes, in the War Office, I allude to the same thing. There was the Quartermaster-General and the Adjutant-General at headquarters. They took away the duties of the Quartermaster-General, and put them on the Adjutant-General.

10450. In 1889?—Yes, in 1889, except one thing they left, which was very curious; they left with the Quartermaster-General the movement of troops, but, on the other hand, they gave the Quartermaster-General all questions of supply, Pay Department, Transport, all, what I would call, spending Departments, were left under the Quartermaster-General, but the others went to the Adjutant-General, and I find now at the War Office that those have been again separated in some sort of way, inasmuch as the Inspector-General of Fortifications now does a great deal of the old Quartermaster-General's work, and the Director-General of Military Intelligence does a great deal of it also, so that there is no man who does really Quartermaster-General's work. What I found in South Africa, was that, with few exceptions, staff officers could not give me a report of a position, or an intelligent idea how the ground lay, how the troops should be moved, the very work a Quartermaster-General should be especially trained for. I recognised the mistake of the change when I was in India, and, as Commander-in-Chief there, I protested against it.

10450*. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Does not that come in Intelligence?—Yes, in a way it does. The Intelligence Department should undoubtedly be under the Quartermaster-General, both in India and in England. In India it is so, and in this country it was so at one time, and it was removed and put under the Adjutant-General. Then, after a time, it was removed again, and put under the Commander-in-Chief, and there it is now. The Quartermaster-General's duties, which are for war the most important of all, are divided now amongst several departments, and the special duty of the Quartermaster-General in the field is not now learnt by anybody. I think Sir Henry Norman will remember the line between the two.

10451. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) And I know how well it worked in various campaigns?—I think I can give you an example of the difference between the two Departments. When I joined at Delhi as a boy, the question was, how I was to be employed. There were two appointments vacant, one in the Adjutant-General's Department, the other in the Quartermaster-General's, and I remember begging you to get me appointed to the Quartermaster-General's. It was the one I wished throughout my career to belong to.

10452. (*Chairman.*) Then, how would you get the

training that you want for Quartermaster-General?—You must in the first place recognise the necessity for a Quartermaster-General's Department. Now there is no such Department. There is an officer called Quartermaster-General, Sir Charles Clarke, but he is really Director-General of Supplies and Transport. He has nothing to do with the work of Quartermaster-General except as regards the movement of troops. The officer who is nearest to it is the Director-General of Military Intelligence. Then he has only the bureau, as it were; he has nothing to do with the field; that is divided between the Adjutant-General and the Inspector-General of Fortifications—I do not know exactly how it is divided, but I do know that in many matters, such as encampments, water supply, etc., Quartermaster-General's training is needed. I remember finding a hospital at Bloemfontein pitched immediately over the main water supply. In order to have all such matters done well in war officers must be trained in peace time.

10453. But how would you train a man to do those duties now?—He should be constantly with the troops, especially during manœuvres. He should select ground for camping purposes, report on the best position for outposts, make any sketches of the neighbouring country that may be required, etc. There is no one officer now told off for these particular duties or for operations in war, reconnaissances, and intelligence. They are all divided now amongst different people. Marches now go to the Adjutant-General. Encampments—I do not know who does it. Intelligence to the Director-General of Military Intelligence.

10454. Are not encampments done by an Engineer officer in charge of encampments?—They ought not to be. Engineer officers have to do with the water supply, but the selection of ground is distinctly the duty of a Quartermaster-General.

10455. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) He used to have in old days?—It certainly is not his duty.

10456. We have had evidence on that subject, and it was rather complained that certain duties were taken away?—The Engineer officer's duty is to construct barracks and prepare for war by being trained in railway, telegraph, balloon, pontooning, fortifications, and such like work. He is not a Staff officer.

10457. (*Chairman.*) Then in the appointment of Staff officers, you take them in the beginning from the junior officers of the Army?—You take them from the Staff College, and what the Staff College authorities should and do say, is: "This officer is very well fitted for general Staff purposes, but he is more of a sedentary character perhaps than another one, and I recommend him to be Brigade-Major or Assistant-Adjutant-General. This officer on the other hand shows great capacity for map-reading, an eye for the country; I should make him a Quartermaster-General."

10458. Are you assuming that all officers of the Staff go through the Staff College?—They all go through now, except those who, by their services in war, have got a certificate to say that they are fit for the Staff. There were a certain number in the "Gazette" about two months ago who had not been to the Staff College, but who were said to have done so well on service that they might be considered qualified for the Staff.

10459. But officers are sometimes taken from their regiments and appointed to the Staff, are they not, without going through the Staff College?—I do not think so now, except as an Aide-de-Camp or Military Secretary.

10460. Only on the personal staff?—I think so.

10461. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You had certain officers on the Staff from the Colonies. How were they chosen, may I ask?—Do you know who they were?

10462. Well, one was, I think, Major Denison?—I had him on my own personal Staff as Aide-de-Camp.

10463. But can you rely on a sufficient supply of officers in that way through the Staff College?—I think so now. The Staff College has been going on now a great many years.

(*Sir Ian Hamilton.*) We have a small margin, really.

(*Lord Roberts.*) I think eighty come out every two years.

(*Sir Ian Hamilton.*) The eighty is made up of two lots—forty and forty.

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10464. (*Chairman.*) We had this expression of opinion (*Vide* Q. 183)—"I think it ought to be a rotation of officers, that they should come from their regiments and learn Staff duties, and if they have been thoroughly satisfactory in those duties, they might go back to their regiments with promotion"?—That is the case now.

10465. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Not with promotion?—No, not with promotion. I beg your pardon. I thought it meant that they go back to their regiment. I do not think it would be desirable at all; that would place the regimental officer in a very inferior position.

10466. (*Chairman.*) Perhaps I ought to have read the question that that was the answer to. The question that was being answered was this: "I quite understand that there might be a rotation of officers from regiments; two things might happen, either you might take a man definitely from his regiment and employ him continuously on Staff work, or you might have a rotation of officers from regiments, each getting a term of Staff work"; and the answer was the one I read?—Would you read it again?

10467. The answer was: "I think it ought to be a rotation of officers, that they should come from their regiments and learn Staff duties, and if they have been thoroughly satisfactory in those duties they might go back to their regiments with promotion. Then they would be available as a reserve to call upon at any time"?—I quite agree to all that, except the words "with promotion." I think it would be most unfair to the regimental officers, and, moreover, the other officer, if he has done well on the Staff, has the chance of being taken away again for further employment.

10468. The object rather was not to keep them continuously?—I quite agree to that answer. He should go back to his regiment, and we have now made staff duty three years instead of five years, so that they shall not be so long away from the regiment, which is a great matter for the efficiency of the regiment.

10469. But you think it is not necessary to mark his good performance of staff duties by promotion?—He is better paid for staff duties, and has a better chance in war of Army promotion by being a staff officer, and if he has done well on one staff and regimental duty he is certain to be taken again. That is enough reward for him, I think.

10470. But the object, I think, in this question and answer was that he should not be employed again, but retained with the regiment in order that there might not be a deficiency on the outbreak of war in the number of regimental officers, which I understand you did find?—There is no reason why he should not be employed again, if he goes back to the regiment, and if he is second in command, he can not be employed again—they make him stay with the regiment. I do not think it would be desirable that the man should be only once employed with the staff, and go back to his regiment, and gain promotion in the regiment on that account.

10471. Only if he had done well?—If he had done well you might want him for the staff again.

10472. Then you would not have him as a Reserve? The object was to increase the number in Reserve?—Somebody else would be learning staff work in his place. I do not think it would help the Reserve very much.

10473. (*Viscount Esher.*) I think Lord Kitchener's idea was to encourage the man to do his best. That, I think, was the origin of his suggestion?—I think it would be good for the regiment that the man should go back to his regiment for a time, and then, if he is a good staff officer, you can take him away again.

10474. (*Chairman.*) Then as regards regimental officers, I understand that you are fairly satisfied, subject to improvement in training?—Yes, improvement in training.

10475. But with regard to commanding-officers of regiments and senior officers, have you any suggestions to make?—I have told you what I thought, that many of them have not had sufficient experience, that they should be younger men, and that they fail sometimes from not taking sufficient responsibility.

10476. How would you avoid that in future?—I think only by this improved training. The staff officers you see will go, and do go, back more to their regiments now than they did before.

10477. Must there be a more close selection of commanding officers?—Yes, that is desirable. It is very

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difficult, of course, to say what a man who has never been tried on service will do when he gets upon service, but every commanding officer is selected by the Selection Board at the War Office, which is composed of all the heads of offices, and everything known about him is discussed, and if he is not thought fit he is not appointed.

10478. I suppose it comes very much to this, how much seniority is to count in the matter?—To a certain extent, of course, the seniors are brought forward; but if the senior is not well reported upon he does not get the command. We have had many instances lately of officers being passed over for command, certainly in the last three months.

10479. But, of course, one can understand officers being passed over for a command if they are not well reported on, and yet an officer being appointed to a command if there is nothing outstanding against him. There is a considerable difference in the way in which selection works under those two alternatives?—It is very difficult to get two men to report upon a man in the same way. I really do not know of any system in the world which would be perfectly certain of getting the best men until they are tried.

10480. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Would any system of examination, based on modern requirements, be possible and practicable?—That is done; an officer has to pass that before he can become a commanding officer. I think the examination might be more practical, and we are trying to make it so.

10481. A post-graduate examination, so to say?—Yes.

10482. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) No examination or knowledge of an officer in time of peace, if that officer has never seen war, will secure his being a good officer on service?—You cannot tell.

10483. And some of the best officers in time of peace have turned out very bad in time of war; they have not had the nerve, the quickness, and all that sort of thing?—That is so. An officer may be a very good company commander, and on service make a very bad battalion commander; or an officer on service may make a very good battalion commander, and yet make a very bad brigadier. What kills officers on service is responsibility; it just depends upon whether a man has sufficient nerve and sufficient power to bear responsibility.

10484. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) But would not the examination embrace all those points?—Examination will not answer for a man being able to incur responsibility. You may have the cleverest fellow in the world, and he may not be able to incur responsibility; that is what weighs men down.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

10485. (*Chairman.*) The next point is the Medical Service; have you any remarks to make about it?—I think the Medical Department suffered under, perhaps, greater disabilities than the other Army Departments. It was very far from being prepared for expansion, and yet, within a few months, it was called upon to provide officers, non-commissioned officers, orderlies, and nurses for an Army three or four times the size of that for which its establishment had been estimated as sufficient. It had been calculated that it would be enough to arrange for medical aid for 4 per cent. of the troops employed in war, whereas it turned out that the calculation should have been for 10 per cent. Nevertheless, had it not been for the sudden outbreak of an epidemic, which is inevitable in war, the Department would, in all probability, have proved equal to the occasion; and that the outbreak should have reached dimensions with which we were unable to cope was due, rather to the arduous character of our operations, and the nature of our lines of communication, than to want of efficiency and zeal on the part of the medical officers and their assistants. It was impossible, under the circumstances, to give the medical supplies precedence on the railway, and to bring up reinforcements of *personnel*. The experience of former wars has shown, that during the vicissitudes of a long and arduous campaign, the victims claimed by disease are far more numerous than those that fall from the enemy's shot and shell; and the records of history tell of appalling losses from sickness, often from preventible causes. In the Crimean War, where in February, 1855, out of a mean strength of 30,910 for the month, 13,608 men were lying in hospital, and where during a period of only seven months, from October, 1854, to April, 1855, out of an average strength of 28,939, there perished in hospitals or hospital ships, 10,053 men from sickness alone. If we compare these figures with those from South Africa, I think it will be seen that the Army Medical Department carried out its arduous work in such a skilful manner, that the rates of mortality were thereby lessened. The South African troops were in the field for two-and-a-half years. From first to last we sent out nearly 400,000 men, and for a long period, an average of nearly 250,000 men under arms. The total deaths from sickness, up to 31st May, this year, were, in round numbers, 13,750, and the numbers invalided during the war were 66,500.

10486. Of course, the Army Medical Service in itself was not sufficient to deal with the requirements of the war?—No. A large number of civil surgeons were sent out, and also St. John Ambulance men.

10487. I think we had evidence that the civil surgeons who went out did their work admirably, but that it was of great consequence for the military hospitals to have a proportion of Army Medical Corps men?—Yes, I know that is always found to be necessary, and it is so for many reasons, such as returns, discipline generally, and carrying on the work in an Army manner.

10488. The point is whether the Army Medical Service is sufficiently strong, or was before the war, to give that proportion?—If I am not mistaken, the Army Medical Corps before the war was below its establishment.

10489. I think it was a little, but even with its establishment, I gathered the impression that some of the witnesses thought it was too weak?—I think that has been proved by the fact that it has been increased since, and there is a proposal to increase it still further.

10490. In order that it may be able to cope with the requirements of war?—To cope with the needs of a great war.

10491. I suppose the greatest pressure was at Bloemfontein?—Yes, in the months of April, May, and June; May, I think, was the worst.

10492. That was chiefly due to the epidemic of enteric?—Mainly; I have got a note of the number of cases of enteric and other diseases, and the deaths in those months; but you have probably got this information already.

10493. Of course, in this matter we have taken into account that there has been a Commission inquiring into the matter in South Africa, so that we have not gone through the evidence in the way which would have been necessary if that commission had not sat?—I go to Bloemfontein on the 13th March, and during the firs week there were no deaths from enteric; it began oı the 2nd, and it increased gradually, very nearly ır regular proportion, until about the middle or end o. May. The total number of admissions from the 13th March to the 13th June, 1900, for all cases was 16,167, and of those 4,667 were enteric cases; that is to say, one-fourth were enteric cases, roughly speaking. The deaths from all causes were 1,050, and of those 891 were enteric, all but 159 were from enteric within that time. When we arrived at Bloemfontein we were without tents, and every endeavour was made to find buildings to put the sick men into. There was no great difficulty the first week, because no great number were sick, but when they came pouring in afterwards there was tremendous difficulty, not only in finding accommodation, but in finding sufficient beds, hospital clothing, and everything necessary for hospitals. We took every available space, and the people themselves helped us very much indeed; the nuns gave up all their space available for hospitals. We took the Raadzal, the great public meeting place, and filled it up also; as far as I could judge, everything was done that could be done, but the railway was not open, and we had to wait, and get things up by degrees.

10494. That was your real difficulty in bringing up equipment, at any rate?—Yes. Everything had been collected by railway from Cape Town as far as Naauwpoort, the junction of the two lines from Port Elizabeth and Cape Town; and when the railway was opened there was the greatest difficulty in arranging how the things should be forwarded on; some articles, not perhaps so urgently required as others, had to be brought away first, because they had to be got rid of before the others could be got hold of, but, as far as could be managed, hospital comforts were brought up without delay.

10495. Of course, you had a very short supply of all

kinds of provisions?—Yes, of everything; also of supplies of ammunition, clothing, and tents; we had to get all these up by degrees.

10496. The evidence we had was that for a long time there was a short supply of provisions, and that in fact that was what delayed you at Bloemfontein?—It was to a great extent the provisions, but I think the main thing which delayed me was the remounts—provisions and remounts.

10497. The remounts also had to come by the railway, I suppose?—Entirely.

10498. I think the witnesses agreed that as regards the demands for actual hospital necessaries, they were met throughout?—Yes; I never heard of any complaint as regards medicines or necessary things in hospital.

10499. And the same remark applies throughout the war in other places?—Yes; I heard nothing as to the want of them.

10500. You think the whole Service worked satisfactorily?—Yes, I do. I gave that as my evidence before the Royal Commission which came out to Pretoria.

10501. Then the next point is supplies of ammunition and equipment?—Yes. Supplies of all sorts were generally sufficient, but occasionally difficulty arose, and delay occurred, owing to the limited capacity and great length of the single lines of railway, and also to the injury done to those lines by the enemy. The theatre of war in South Africa embraced a territory comparing in extent with continental Europe; in the earlier phases of the war, the railway lines were broken up and the bridges destroyed by the retreating enemy; and in the later phases of the war the lines were frequently interrupted and damaged. The theatre of war was sparsely inhabited, towns and villages were few and far apart, and the country generally was destitute of supplies, except as regards live stock forage, and a limited amount of Indian corn and other grain. It resulted, therefore, that the supply of the troops was a difficult matter, requiring much forethought and administrative ability, and that the men were not always as well fed as they would have been under peace conditions. But, on the whole, I consider that no complaint can be made on this point. Liberal rations were given whenever possible, and the periods during which the rations had to be reduced below the normal field service scale were of short duration. The Army Service Corps did well throughout, and deserves great credit.

Ammunition and Equipment.—The supply of ammunition was adequate throughout the operations, and the arrangements for its distribution were satisfactory. The same may be said as regards equipment, although some difficulty arose in the substitution of bandoliers for ammunition pouches, and in the provision of saddlery for the large mounted force which was found to be necessary. The saddlery furnished by the War Office was of good material and workmanship, but that supplied locally and from the Colonies hardly reached the proper standard. In other respects, such as harness, boots, clothing, etc., the original equipment was suitable and serviceable, and the later supplies showed no falling off in quality. A large number of excellent boots and warm coats were obtained from India. On the whole, it may be said that the requirements of the Army in the field were met promptly and efficiently by the Ordnance Department.

10502. The next point is with regard to sea and land transport?—With regard to the sea transport I have really nothing to say, but to refer to the Admiralty and the Quartermaster-General's Department, and to express my opinion that everything was most admirably done. I visited a large number of ships when I was in Cape Town. I came home in a transport myself, and I really did not see any fault to find—on the contrary, I think everything was done as well as could be for the comfort of the men. They were well fed and had plenty of room, the ships were clean and nice, and the officers looked after the welfare of their men as much as they possibly could.

10503. There have been questions as to whether the War Office could do their own sea transport. Is it your experience from the war that that matter should be altered or not?—I would leave it where it is. I do not think you could beat the present arrangement. The War Office have their transport officers to see the men embarked and take charge of them when they disembark, but I think the engagement of the transports and the fitting of them out should rest with the Admiralty.

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10504. We had witnesses from the Admiralty the other day, and they explained that certain cases of delay in unshipping goods arose partly from certain articles—hay and forage particularly—not being capable of being stored at the ports, and therefore they had to be kept on the ships until you wanted them up country?—Yes. In Cape Town and the other ports the docks are of limited size, and they soon became crowded. When I was coming round from Durban to Cape Town I could not make out what it was that I saw on the shore; it turned out to be large areas covered with forage. At times ships could be unloaded quickly, and then stores accumulated in the docks; at other times the ships had to remain unloaded. It was simply that the ships arrived quicker than they could be unloaded.

10505. And quicker than the railway could carry up the stuff?—Much quicker. It had to be stored at the port.

10506. With regard to the land transport, what have you to say?—I will take the railway first. Our task of establishing railway communication throughout the theatre of war was greatly facilitated by the good will and administrative ability of the managers of the Cape and Natal systems, by the fact that most of the employees of the Free State railways were Englishmen, and by the number of men in both the Regular and Colonial regiments, who were accustomed to railway work. It is certain, however, that the management and maintenance of the lines of communication would have been far less effective, had it not been for the administrative capacity and technical knowledge displayed by Royal Engineer officers trained in practical railway work in Egypt and India. The direction of lines in the enemy's territory was taken over by Colonel Sir Percy Girouard, and his assistants, and an enormous amount of reconstruction was carried out by the Railway Pioneer Regiment and the Railway Companies Royal Engineers. The Pioneer Regiment consisted almost entirely of civilian refugees, mostly mechanics, from Johannesburg, and it rendered excellent service. To its aid, and that of the Royal Engineer officers and men, we were indebted for the fact that the railways very seldom lost close touch with the fighting portion of the Army, and that we were able to seize Johannesburg and Pretoria, distant about 1,000 miles from our base upon the coast, and 260 miles from Bloemfontein, our advanced depôt, with such rapidity, that the enemy were unable to concentrate their resources, and offer a strongly organised resistance. The moral, to my mind, is the importance of having *personnel* available for war, which in peace has been practically trained in the construction and maintenance of railways and in traffic management. Our best schools for military railway engineers are India and Egypt. Nor should we ignore civilians, whose aptitude under military guidance to meet the requirements of a campaign has been proved by our experience in South Africa. With regard to the land transport, ox and mule, my views on this subject are embodied in the appendix to my dispatch, dated 2nd April, 1901, which was published in the "London Gazette," and I have brought a copy here, which I will put in, as I do not think it will be necessary to read it all (*a copy of the "London Gazette," dated 16th April, 1901, was handed in, vide Appendix Vol., page* 234). I cannot add to that in any way, and I entered into it as fully as possible at the time. The only alteration I make in the dispatch is an error in the amount of groceries which I took from Modder River to Bloemfontein; it is put in here that I took with me ten days' supply, but I really took a month's. As I shall explain in my narrative of the operations leading up to Pretoria, the main difficulty when I landed was land transport, from the fact of there being no transport scheme recognised in our Army for service away, as it were, from railways. The only transport we had was what we call the regimental first and second line, which is that carrying the ammunition, the regimental supplies for two days, and the regimental water cart; we had nothing else but that, and, of course, it was impossible with that to carry on war in a country where there was no railway to speak of, where we must operate at a distance from the line, where we must have transport for a certain number of days' supply for the men and horses, and carry a certain amount of kit for everybody. It was the want of a proper organised Transport Department that mainly delayed me in Cape Town.

10507. But the provision made at Cape Town was in

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accordance with the regulations obtaining at the time?—It was according to the regulations in force, and it is what is called regimental transport, but it is quite unequal to the demands for war.

10508. We had evidence from the officers in charge, that they did make up the regimental transport to each unit as it came out?—Yes, it was quite complete.

10509. And, indeed, they had forestalled it by sending transport up country before the regiment arrived, so that it might find it on the spot?—Yes, there was no difficulty about that, and it was all done very well.

10510. In addition to the regimental transport proper, is there not, under the old system, a supply park, and a supply column?—No, I do not think so.

10511. Nothing at all?—I think all they arranged for was two days' supply, and they had no idea of going beyond the line of railway, I think.

10512. Was that the organisation of the British Army at the time?—I think so. I think that is how I began my report, by saying: "In describing the transport arrangements during the South African campaign, it will be convenient, first, to explain in general terms the War Office system of transport, under which the troops were equipped when they first landed in the country, and, secondly, to show what modifications in that system were rendered necessary by the strength of the force employed, and the development of the military situation."

10513. Yes; but if you look a few lines lower down with regimental transport, "there are also supply columns for each brigade, for divisional troops, and for corps troops carrying one day's supplies of food and forage, and a supply park for each Army Corps"?—Yes, one day's supplies.

10514. "And a supply park for each Army Corps, calculated to carry three days' supplies of food and forage for the troops composing the Army Corps"?—That would be four days' supply. I think so far it was all right, and I think that was all done. What I had to do was to carry at least ten days' supplies, and to be really independent of the railway. I could not be certain when I could get to the railway, and when we moved up country afterwards, I had to have columns on my right and left flank to keep the main body secure, and those were at a considerable distance from the railway. (*To Sir Ian Hamilton.*) How many days' supply had you to carry? (*Sir Ian Hamilton.*) I existed for 14 days, but I really had eight days' supply with me. (*Lord Roberts.*) We had to make arrangements for many more days' supply than was ever contemplated.

10515. (*Chairman.*) The system of the British Army at that time was regimental transport with the addition of supply columns and supply parks?—Yes, I put that down here.

10516. And all that had been included and provided by the officers on the spot?—Yes, I think I found that quite complete.

10517. Your despatch, which you have referred us to, gives the reasons why you found that inadequate for the circumstances of South Africa, and why you altered it?—Yes.

10518. Your experience since confirms you in the opinion that that was the proper course to take?—Yes, I think so. You see, the great difficulty of the Transport Department is that we can never know what parts of the world we may be required to fight in. In Africa we were fortunate in having a country where you could use large ox-waggons and mule-carts, whereas in other places like in Egypt and Afghanistan you are entirely confined, perhaps, to pack animals. In India they have very complete and excellent Transport Departments; and I think what we must do at home is to have some sort of data, so as to know, wherever we may be employed, how many animals we require for each unit, and for 10 or 12 days' supplies in addition to regimental transport.

10519. That is what I was leading up to. As stated here, the arrangements were made "according to Regulations as laid down in War Establishments, 1898." Are you going to alter these War Establishments?—I hope we shall have some arrangement by which we may be able to meet the requirements of war in almost every locality we can possibly be engaged in, so as to know how much transport we require for each unit. We must be prepared to carry supplies for a certain number of days.

10520. (*Viscount Esher.*) You alluded to the number of officers you had to remove from their commands; you removed five Generals of Division, six Brigadiers of Cavalry, one Brigadier of Infantry, five Commanders of Cavalry regiments, and four Commanders of Infantry battalions. Considering the number of troops engaged, do you consider that a very large number to have had to remove for incompetency?—Yes. I do not remember, even in the Indian Mutiny, anything like that occurring, and they were very much older men out there than we had in South Africa.

10521. Nothing of the sort occurred in your Afghan campaigns?—No; in my Afghan campaign I was fortunate in having very good officers, except, perhaps, at the first start. I had one or two Brigadiers to get rid of then, and after that I was very well off.

10522. In 1870, did you ever hear whether many of the German officers were removed for incompetency?—No, I could not say.

10523. The principal fault, I think, you have said, that you found with the officers in high command was their want of initiative?—Are you talking of Generals of Divisions?

10524. I was only thinking of something which I had read of yours, where you say: "Whether it is inherent in the British character, or whether it is owing to something faulty in the training of our officers, I cannot say, but the fact remains that surprisingly few of them are capable of acting on their own initiative." Those are your own words?—That is the case; many of them do very well if you can tell them exactly what to do and how to do it, but left to themselves they fail.

10525. Then you also say: "The ordinary routine of military life certainly does not tend to fit an officer to accept responsibility; it has, indeed, served hitherto rather to stifle than to encourage self-reliance, and it behoves us to do all in our power to remedy this defect, and to teach officers to think and act for themselves"?—Yes, I think there is too much red tape and too much finding fault if little mistakes occur; moreover, our officers do not get the chance of command when they are younger men, and they are not put in positions of responsibility as younger men.

10526. Are you proposing to take any steps to remedy that state of things?—Well, as far as one can, but it is not an easy matter. In India, on the frontier, and in Egypt, I understand, too, young fellows are sent out in commands, where they have not only to look after their men, but to feed their horses and get into communication with the people and look out for troubles arising all round them, and they learn to think and act for themselves. Of course, under our regimental system in peace time, nothing of that sort goes on unless they happen to be in some out-of-the-way place.

10527. Do you draw any distinction between officers of the Royal Artillery and others in that respect—their capacity to take the initiative?—No; I think they are most excellent as regimental officers, but I have not found the senior officers, as a rule, any better than the others.

10528. And yet there is some difference between the training of the young Artillery officer and the young Infantry officer?—Regimentally, the Artillery officer is excellent. I think the Artillery is the best school I know, but it is rather a curious fact that the senior officers of Artillery have not, as a rule, come out as great commanders. I cannot really account for it, and I have often discussed it with people, because I do not think anything can be better than the management of a battery as regards the subalterns, captains, and majors. I do not think you could beat them; they are quite excellent.

10529. And the young subaltern of Artillery does, in point of fact, have more independence of command and superintendence than the young Infantry officer, has he not?—Yes; and that tells extremely well in his career as an Artillery officer.

10530. You would have thought that tended to produce initiative in the officers as they got into higher commands?—Yes; but it does not. There are one or two officers, like Colonel Benson, who did right well; but there are few very marked men amongst them.

10531. As regards that division of duties between the Quartermaster-General and the Adjutant-General, that was an alteration made in 1899, was it not?—Yes.

10532. Have you contemplated going back to the

old system?—I want very much to go back, and I proposed that when I first became Commander-in-Chief.

10533. Then it is not within your power, as Commander-in-Chief, to make that alteration yourself?—No; the Secretary of State, and I think the Cabinet, have to agree to it, because the present system is under what we call an Order in Council, which cannot be altered except by an Order in Council.

10534. Yet, if in a future campaign some serious difficulty were to arise in consequence of what you consider to be a bad piece of organisation or a bad division of duties there, would you be held responsible, as Commander-in-Chief?—I do not think I could, because I have represented it.

10535. Not fairly responsible; but would you, generally, in the eyes of the world, be held responsible?—I certainly should not blame myself in any way.

10536. In point of fact, you wish to make this alteration, but you cannot make it?—Yes.

10537. Then you said something about the difficulty of expanding the Army Medical Corps in time of war. Do you think that difficulty could have been foreseen?—I do not think they ever intended to have such a large Army in the field; that is the real foundation of it.

10538. And, again, as to the deficiency of highly-trained staff officers for service in South Africa, is that a difficulty that could have been foreseen?—I do not think so; the idea was that two Army Corps would suffice for any war that we could get into, whereas at one time we had the strength of five Army Corps in South Africa.

10539. It is now generally admitted that we are short of highly-trained staff officers—not at the present moment, because you have had an opportunity of training them in South Africa, but apart from them?—As a rule, we certainly should not have sufficient highly-trained staff officers for an Army of that size.

10540. Take two Army Corps?—I think for the Army Corps we are very well off now, and we always should be well off for two Army Corps.

10541. Would you be well off for highly-trained staff officers if two Army Corps were to be sent abroad, without denuding regiments and Army Corps that might or might not be mobilised at home, and that in any case would remain at home?—Yes, I think there are sufficient highly-trained staff officers for a very large Army.

10542. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Do you think it is possible to have very highly-trained staff officers, and very efficient staff officers, without war?—I think war is far the best training-ground.

10543. Supposing we had 20 years of peace, you would be without such officers?—That is so; but I think you can, by manœuvres and staff rides every year and efficient training at Aldershot and Salisbury, help them a great deal. You cannot, however, tell what officers will be like without war, whether for staff or commanders, and you must do your best to train them in peace time.

10544. You said that it was very satisfactory that your men marched so well. Do you think they marched long distances very well?—The Guards Brigade were most anxious to be with me to march into Bloemfontein, and I told them I hoped I should be able to wait for them, but I found I could not wait, and when they arrived late in the evening, they had done 40 miles with scarcely a halt. They walked as briskly as possible, and it was hottish weather then.

10545. Did many men fall out?—No; not as a rule

10546. That seems to me most satisfactory, because in late years I was on an Army Commission, and a great many officers were examined who had just served in South Africa (in 1879 and 1880), and several of them complained that the men fell out on the shortest possible marches, and it was attributed then to their being short-service men, with no old soldiers, but the short service system has worked now for many years, and apparently that could not have been the real cause, and there must have been some other cause?—That is so. We had a mixture of short service and Army Reserve men, about half and half at first, and certainly they marched extremely well.

10547. In that previous war to which I have alluded they were mainly young soldiers, with no Reservists at all?—Yes.

10548. To turn to a different subject, there was a statement made before this Commission the other day about how very much inferior the English boots were that the men wore—I do not think that complaint applied to the Indian boot—compared to those the City Imperial Volunteers purchased for themselves, which were excellent, and even when they condemned their boots Line regiments were anxious to get hold of them. I think you said you did not have complaints about the boots?—I had some trifling complaints, but nothing very great. I often inspected the boots, and, as a rule, they were good, the Indian boots particularly. I saw some bad boots that were brought to me, and as to which I was told that after a few hours' wear the soles had come off, but once or twice I found it was from a man sticking his boots into some hot place when they were wet. I think, as a rule, the boots were good.

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10549. And the men were not made footsore by them?—I do not think so.

10550. Another change was made, besides the one made in 1899, about the Quartermaster-General and Adjutant-General's Department, which has now been altered, that the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General ceased to be, in the old sense, staff officers of the Commander-in-Chief, and became more or less staff officers of the Secretary of State for War; what have you to say about that change?—Well, it is altered as regards the Adjutant-General, and that I made a distinct request for when I was appointed, namely, that the Adjutant-General should be brought under the Commander-in-Chief. The Quartermaster-General still remains as he was before; he is called "under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief," and he does not bring me all his papers, but deals more directly with the Secretary of State. I do not know that in his case there is any objection to it, because he is not Quartermaster-General, but Director-General of Supplies.

10551. If he was Quartermaster-General under the old system, you would prefer that he should come to the Commander-in-Chief?—Undoubtedly.

10552. You never heard that that system failed as a system?—No.

10553. It is rather odd that it should have been altered?—Very peculiar, and I could never understand it.

10554. You said something about the Artillery officers as subalterns having entire control of their sections, and I think you thought that a very excellent system, and one that added greatly to the efficiency of the Artillery?—Yes.

10555. Do you not think the Indian system is a good one, of putting comparatively young officers in command of squadrons and double companies, and making them responsible for those?—Yes.

10556. It is much the same style of thing?—I recommended that when I got the command in India; I thought it was an excellent arrangement for the Indian Army.

10557. And it follows the Cavalry system, in which all the squadrons are commanded by separate officers?—Yes.

10558. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) We have heard that in the Intelligence Department there are only 25 officers, or 28, whereas on the German staff, which has to do the same work, there are some 150. Do you think that the officers of the Intelligence Department ought to be increased?—I do not think you want them increased to that extent, but I think there is a slight increase wanted.

10559. Not to bring them up to the German standard, but still is there not too great a difference?—I rather think the German Intelligence officers are used for other purposes than ours, because when I was at the manœuvres the other day, many of these officers were really doing Quartermaster-General's work, they were doing the work that I advocate we should bring up staff officers for, they were looking after encampments and the movements of troops, and how they were supplied in the field, just the very thing that our Intelligence Department does not do. Our Intelligence really now is more a bureau for office work, and I think the German Army must have that as well as the other. If the Quartermaster-General's officers were attached to the Director of Military Intelligence, as I think ought to be done, he would then require more officers for the outdoor work.

10560. Would the Intelligence Department be under

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the Quartermaster-General?—Yes; I think the head of the Intelligence Department should be the Quartermaster-General.

10561. And then you would give him a very much larger staff?—A larger staff, yes.

10562. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) You mentioned just now that there was a sufficient number of staff officers for the two Army Corps, according to our old system; of course, it is not only a question of numbers, but a question of how they are organised, and on the 8th March, 1901, Mr. Brodrick made a statement, saying that, under your new system, you were bringing the Army Corps together in a new way, and on that point I just want to ask whether you endorse, generally, the statement Mr. Brodrick made on that occasion?—What was the occasion?

10563. When he brought forward the Army Estimates on the 8th March, 1901; I will just read two or three sentences from what he said, and ask whether you endorse them entirely: "The British Army Corps of the past, as has been often pointed out, is got together in a moment of emergency; the Commanders have been summoned and hastily appointed; their staffs have often never seen their commanders; the brigade has been made up by taking a regiment from Malta, and then from Edinburgh, a third from Dublin, and a fourth from Shorncliffe; these four have been dumped down together in South Africa or elsewhere, the Colonels not knowing each other, and, perhaps, none of them knowing their Brigadier. That is an organisation which cannot be considered an organisation at all." I do not ask if you wrote that for him, but do you endorse it?—Quite so.

10564. (*Chairman.*) Then what shall we pass on to now?—There is a question of Artillery. Our experiences in South Africa have shown us, that in the way of Artillery *matériel*, we were considerably behind other European nations at the commencement of the late war. Our field gun, though a good serviceable weapon, was wanting both in range and rapidity of fire, whilst the fact of the enemy employing heavy Field Artillery against us at the commencement of hostilities, placed us in a difficulty which we could not have avoided without calling on the sister service for the assistance of naval guns. It is now recognised, however, that in modern warfare, some kind of heavy Field Artillery must be used; and a satisfactory weapon is, I hope, being devised which, whilst it throws a projectile of 30lb., is at the same time more mobile and less cumbrous than the 4·7 gun which has recently been in use. This gun will, in future, form one of the recognised weapons of our heavy Field Artillery. With regard to the Field Artillery proper, the gun that has lately been tested by our Artillery experts, has proved very satisfactory. It is an 18-pounder, and a much more effective weapon than the 15-pounder, for, in weight of projectile and rapidity of fire, it is superior to the German guns, which were recently purchased by us from Erhart. It is worth while noting that it was not until these German guns were placed in the hands of our Artillery officers, that they recognised how far the German experts were in advance of ourselves, in the adoption of the quick-firing field gun.

10565. What is the range of the 18-pounder, as compared with the 15-pounder?—The range of the 15-pounder is 3,500 yards, and these 18-pounders are 4,800, or 5,000, you may say. I saw the weapon at Okehampton, and it is a marvellous improvement on the present one; it is about the same weight, about 38 cwt. behind the team, and a quick-firing gun. There is wonderful precision, and the rapidity of fire is very great, too. We could not quite decide on the one gun, because the gun we have taken is manufactured by Elswick, but certain parts of it were rather better as made by Vickers-Maxim, and we have now arranged that they shall combine the best parts of each, and that, I think, will be a satisfactory gun. In the case of the Horse Artillery the result is not quite so good. Whilst recent experiments have produced for us the above-mentioned satisfactory field gun, it has been found impossible to improve the Horse Artillery 12-pounder on similar lines. Our experience in the war teaches us that the 12-pounder is of very little value against moving targets, and practically useless when the enemy has any kind of cover—the shrapnel is so small, and the cone of dispersion so limited, that I am inclined to think we shall be unable to produce an effective weapon of this nature, within the specified limits of weight and mobility. The rapidity with which an automatic gun can be brought into and taken out of action, coupled with its extreme lightness and consequent mobility, seems to me to point to some modification of the Vickers-Maxim automatic gun being adopted as the future Horse Artillery weapon. I may tell you that the Artillery officers do not go quite with me about that; they are very much in favour, if possible, of getting the present Horse Artillery gun improved. For many years I have advocated an automatic firing gun, but that does not commend itself generally to the officers of my regiment. There is not the least doubt that our Horse Artillery gun in South Africa was very little use against the Boers, when they were in any position. I was always asked by cavalry commanders to send a 15-pounder battery if possible. You want something for Horse Artillery which can be fired quickly, without any delay in fixing fuses, etc. Then with regard to tactics (massed batteries). The question of dispersion, or massing of batteries of Artillery on the battlefield, is one which has been much discussed. Artillery officers have always held that whilst dispersion may have many advantages, still, those advantages are outweighed by the sacrifices in discipline, and fire effect which wide separation of units entails. However, it has been now settled with the concurrence of the senior Artillery officers, that, as a rule, the battery shall be the tactical unit, and not the Brigade Division; that is to say, that whilst the battery will be preserved intact still the units of a Brigade Division may be used on a broad front, and worked as one command. This, of course, entails free and reliable communication between batteries, which some years ago was carried out by signallers, and it is curious to note, that prior to the war in South Africa, and when the Brigade Division was introduced as the Artillery unit, all signallers in the Royal Artillery were done away with. Now they are being re-introduced in order to obtain that close touch between battery and Brigade Division commanders which is essential to efficient fire effect, and I am convinced that this dispersion of batteries under the above conditions will be a great advantage. I would even go further, and under certain conditions, more especially when by doing so cover can be obtained, allow the battery to be divided tactically into three sections of two guns each. These sections, each under an officer, to be used at the discretion of the battery commander. By this system we should obtain the maximum of fire effect at a minimum of risk. At my suggestion they had experiments and trials made at Okehampton, Shoeburyness, and Salisbury Plain about this very tactical question, and I confess the majority of Artillerymen were rather in favour of abiding by the present arrangement and keeping to the division of batteries intact; but we saw in South Africa that the Boers separated their guns, and did all they could to get a gun behind cover. We very often could not see where the gun was, and, of course, you could not then touch them.

10565*. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) But you are not going as far as them. You are keeping your batteries intact now?—If you disperse them under one commander you must have signallers to communicate what you wish done, either to alter the range or to fire quickly, or whatever it may be. Curiously enough, the signallers were all done away with before the war, and now we are reintroducing them.

10566. (*Chairman.*) These experiments with the new guns are going on now, are they not?—They have practically finished, and we are getting this new gun—the combinaton of the two manufacturers, Elswick and Vickers-Maxim. They are now making the new gun with what we thought the best parts of each.

10567. We had a considerable amount of evidence from Sir Henry Brackenbury about guns, and as I understood his evidence he maintained that the gun which we had at the beginning of the war was fully up to the guns in any European army?—I think that was proved not to be the case, because in the middle of the war we bought 18 batteries of guns from Erhart, and I saw those guns fired with our guns at Okehampton in 1901, when I came back, and they had a longer range, could be fired as quick-firing guns, and were not heavier behind the teams than our 15-pounders.

10568. He gave us a considerable argument upon the question of ranges, and I understood it to come to this, that Artillery officers have some doubts about the value of very long ranges for artillery?—There could be no doubt about it when we could not reach the Boer guns at the range at which they were effective against us.

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10569. I only refer to the evidence which was given us, and he said this after giving us some figures:—"Thus it is seen that the main teaching of the late great European wars as regards the range of artillery fire was that long-distance shooting was to be deprecated, and that the guns should commence work at effective ranges. But whilst European artillery generally accepted this main lesson and learnt it, it would seem that a subsidiary effect which artillery is capable of was to some extent lost sight of, and that is the effect of long-range fire. Instances can be quoted from probably every war of the tendency to use weapons up to their extreme range. The effect of this fire is principally moral, and, as moral effect goes for nothing in peace time, it is not to be wondered at that our officers who had no experience of being under hostile artillery fire from modern guns readily accepted the lessons of 1866, 1870, and 1877, that long-range fire should be checked and effective ranges sought"?—I will tell you an instance about the moral effect, and it happened, I think, under Sir Ian Hamilton. A Volunteer company of Gordon Highlanders were marching in column, never dreaming that they were anywhere within range of the enemy's artillery, and suddenly a shell came amongst them, and 18 men were killed or wounded in this one company, and that shell was fired from seven miles off, and at that distance there was even more than moral effect.

10570. In justice to Sir Henry Brackenbury, he used the word "principally." He said: "The effect of this fire is *principally* moral." I suppose, as a general rule, shots at that distance are not quite so lucky?—What I mean is that the extreme range of our present 15-pounder is about equal to what the moderate range of the new gun will be, so that the moral effect of the new gun would be a great deal more than the other, and its practical effect would be greater.

10571. I was not pretending to say that the new gun was not an improvement; all I thought I would like to bring out was that, according to Sir Henry Brackenbury, who was responsible, the artillery which went out to South Africa was up to the standard, at any rate, of the European countries, and was based on their experience?—Of course, I do not know whether the Germans had Erhart guns, but if they had the same guns as we bought from Erhart our artillery was certainly inferior to their guns.

10572. He gives us the returns about the guns from various countries. Is the new gun modelled on this German gun?—It is something like it, but there is one great difference, and I am not sure that it is an advantage in some ways—that in the Erhart gun the buffer is underneath the gun, which looked safer and better to me, while in this gun of ours it is above the gun. When I adverted to it the manufacturers (Vickers-Maxim and Sir Andrew Noble) both agreed that you could not get stability of the gun unless the gun itself was lower down and you had the centre of gravity nearer the ground, because the firing is a tremendous shock, and you have to keep it so steady that it does not get off the target while you are firing. Therefore, I think our buffer will be above, but that is the only difference I know of.

10573. And you regard it as a distinct improvement?—Yes.

10574. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) With respect to the guns, have they made an improvement with regard to the length of the fuse?—Yes, during the war; they made the 15-pounder range better by having a longer fuse sent out.

10575. With respect to the rifles, we heard that some incorrectly-sighted rifles were sent out to you?—Yes, there was some incorrect sighting.

10576. And that mistake was corrected?—Yes.

10577. And did not practically make any difference?—No; I do not think it did.

10578. (*Sir John Jackson.*) We had no quick-firing guns, I understand, at the commencement of the war. Had we quick-firing guns in South Africa when you went out?—No. These 18 batteries did not come out at all; they were kept in this country, and they were only bought during the war.

10579. Of course, there would be great advantage in the quick-firing guns?—Yes, but there is some disadvantage, as you spend more ammunition.

10580. I suppose you fire three times the number of shots?—Yes. I saw these 18-pounders I am talking about being tried the other day, and they fired 30 rounds in 1 minute 17 seconds.

10581. And an ordinary gun would, I suppose, fire five or six?—Yes, or at the outside, nine.

10582. In firing the 30 rounds you speak of, would they be able to take good aim?—Yes; their aim was accurate, and it was so quickly done. The man who was sitting by the trail had, only after each shot, to move the wheel a little to get the gun direct on the spot, and it took so short a time that he fired the 30 rounds very correctly in 1 minute 17 seconds.

10583. I think, if I remember Sir Henry Brackenbury's evidence, he indicated that there was not such a great advantage in these quick-firing guns, because they could not take aim in the time. You do not agree with that?—Oh, no. If you get the necessary stability which this 18-pounder has. With the Horse Artillery gun we tried it had not got it, and it jumped off the target each time, consequently we condemned it.

10584. Are you of opinion that the pom-pom was an efficient weapon?—Well it was in a way, and it has been advocated that we should have a sort of improved pom-pom for Horse Artillery. There is not the least doubt that it has certain advantages. You get the range immediately, and there is no trouble about fusing; but it is not a very deadly weapon.

10585. You think it has a good moral effect?—Yes, I think it had at the beginning, certainly. Sir Redvers Buller telegraphed home and said that our men were greatly frightened at the pom-poms.

10586. That was Buller's message?—Yes.

10587. I suppose the Government authorities knew of the advantages of quick-firing guns and pom-poms immediately preceding the war?—(*Sir Ian Hamilton.*) They had been offered the pom-pom, and refused it. (*Lord Roberts.*) They had been talked of, any way. The present field-guns had not been long introduced, and there was an idea not to wish to spend money on another armament again.

10588. That is what it always seems to come back to; but if the Government had been inclined to spend a little money in the year before the war, they could have got these quick-firing guns?—They might have got them in time, but we have not yet got out the patterns of the new gun, although we started the moment I came home. It took a considerable time to get the plans ready, then they had to make the guns, and we only got the guns last June to try; we tried them all last summer, and now they are preparing a new gun with the combination I have told you about.

10589. Still, if you had had the guns manufactured it would have been a benefit to have had them?—Yes.

10590. Do you find that the Department is always willing to incur moderate expenditure for experimenting with any new guns that come before them—foreign inventions?—I think so.

10591. You think they take a fairly wide view of that, and see the advantage of it?—Yes.

10592. As to these modern guns, having regard to their number of shots, they do not last a great time, do they?—The heavier ones do not, owing a great deal to the cordite, which had a very erosive effect; but the committee of scientific gentlemen, which has been sitting lately, have, I believe, discovered how to remedy that in great measure. Two hundred rounds was considered quite sufficient to use up one of the heavier guns, like the 9·2 gun. That could not be the case with our 15-pounders, because we have fired hundreds of rounds out of those, and, although some came home to be condemned, a large number of them are serviceable still.

10593. If you had a lot of guns practically unserviceable at the theatre of war, do you think it would be a practicable plan, in circumstances such as we had in South Africa, to have a local shop, where those guns could be re-tubed?—I do not think so; it would have been impossible to make one out there in the time.

10594. Of course, the tubes could have been manufactured in England and sent out. I merely put it as a suggestion, and you think it is too far fetched?—Yes.

10595. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) The Boer guns were

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generally manned by foreigners—Germans, were they not?—I think Hollanders, as a rule.

10596. You say they separated their guns?—They did a great deal.

10597. Have you any reason to suppose that that is German tactics now—to separate the guns?—I should not judge so by the manœuvres. I think the Boers had not many guns to start with; that was one reason why they separated them.

10598. And for that reason they separated them as much as possible?—Yes.

10599. So as to cover as much ground as possible?—Yes, and they were very clever in taking advantage of cover; they used to hide their guns very cleverly.

10600. As to these 18-pounder guns you speak of, do you find they get very hot from this very rapid firing?—Yes.

10601. How is that rectified?—It does not much affect them; all you have to do to load them is to undo the breech and put the shot in. The shot is quite cold, and, if the handle of the breech is hot, using a glove will remedy that. You do not handle the gun in any other way; the man who is working it does not touch the gun itself, but a wheel attached to the gun, and that does not get hot.

10602. There is no water jacket, or anything of that kind necessary?—No.

10603. (*Viscount Esher.*) Do I understand that the whole of the Artillery is to be re-armed with the new gun?—Yes, I think so. The Field Artillery will certainly be, the moment we get this new gun settled upon.

10604. You are not entirely in agreement, personally, with other Artillery officers as to the sort of gun with which the Field Artillery should be armed?—I think they have all come round to this conclusion now.

10605. You are quite in agreement with them?—Yes, I think so, entirely.

10606. Whose is the actual responsibility for the arming of the Artillery?—It is the Ordnance Department who are supposed to keep the Artillery in efficient order.

10607. Do you consider that the real responsibility lies with the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes; I considered it was my duty, when I came home, to point out that our guns were inferior to those I knew of, and I got permission at once to have a Committee assembled to inquire into the matter, and we called upon the different companies for plans of guns according to the specification we gave them. I had no difficulty at all about that, and the Secretary of State agreed to it immediately. We called upon these companies, and we gave them a specification, and in time they sent in estimates and plans for a gun; these were discusssed, and then we gave orders for the guns to be made.

10608. You treated the question as if the responsibility was yours?—Entirely.

10609. (*Chairman.*) I think, as I quoted Sir Henry Brackenbury, there is another answer of his I ought to mention to you. He says: "I am bound to say in that connection, that up to the present time, so far as I know, and certainly up to 1899, no European power had got a real quick-firing gun except France, and France had kept hers most tremendously secret. Germany has not got one yet; she is like us; she is using the gun with a spade." After saying he was authorised by the Cabinet to go abroad for equipment, he says: "I had any amount of rubbish offered me, but there was one equipment which seemed good, so I sent out my chief inspector and somebody else to see these guns, and to see them fire, and examine them, the result being that we got from a firm in Germany 18 batteries of real quick-firing guns, and we are at the present moment, I believe, the only people who have got them, except France. We got those 18 batteries of quick-firing guns, and that caused the gunmakers here to wake up, and taught them a lesson. Now we are trying better quick-firing guns than those; we have just been experimenting with them, and I hope we shall have a still better quick-firing equipment for the whole Army"?—Well, of course, the Germans have got now, as he says, the guns with a spade, but these guns are made in Germany, and I do not know whether they have any more in store. I was not round their arsenals. We got 18 batteries from a German firm in 1900, but whether the Emperor has got a supply of them or not, I do not know.

See Q. 1955.

10610. (*Sir John Jackson.*) What is the spade?—The spade is behind the trail, to prevent the recoil, to keep it as much as possible on the target.

10611. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) We had evidence here that one of the Corps of Artillery that went out, either with a Yeomanry Corps or the City Imperial Volunteers, had a special gun of their own and took out ammunition of their own, a Vickers-Maxim gun, which had not been accepted by the Army, but which they found a most excellent gun. Had you an opportunity of seeing it?—It was a gun made by Elswick, not Vickers-Maxim, and, curiously enough, this battery was sent out as a present to me by Lady Meux; the whole battery came out as a present from her to me. It consisted of six 12½ pounder quick-firing guns, a great improvement on our 12-pounder gun. It was made by Elswick and manned by Elswick men; we had an Artillery officer in charge of it, but the men were all men from the Elswick firm. The battery was attached to the City Imperial Volunteers, and that is probably what the witness you have referred to meant. It was a very efficient battery.

10612. Would not that gun be answerable for the Horse Artillery?—It is too heavy.

10613. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) It is a Naval gun really?—Yes; it was too heavy for the purpose.

10614. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) There is only half a pound difference in the weight of the projectile between the two, the one gun being a 12-pounder and the other a 12½-pounder?—Yes; but it is a very weighty gun.

10615. (*Chairman.*) Will you deal now with the question of the maps?—For detailed information on this subject I would refer the Commission to the printed statement put in by the Intelligence Division, sub-head E. (*Vide Appendix to Report Vol., page* 160.) I know you have got that. Even so late as January 10th, 1900, when I landed in South Africa, maps of the theatre of war on a scale suitable for military operations were practically non-existent, except as regards Jeppe's map of the Transvaal, and the deficiency had already proved embarrassing. Sir Redvers Buller on the Tugela, General Gatacre at Stormberg, and Lord Methuen in his advance to Modder River, were all greatly hampered by the want of maps. Even our own frontiers, with the exception of the northern corner of Natal, had not been surveyed, and detailed information of the enemy's territory was scanty in the extreme. Almost our first step after landing was the construction of sketch maps of the Free State and Transvaal. These maps were compiled from plans supplied by local surveyors and the reports of transport riders and others. They were naturally not very accurate, but they showed the drifts over the rivers, the roads, the farms, and the watering places, and our operations would have been greatly hampered without them. I must remark, however, that a survey of the theatre of war, before hostilities commenced, was practically impossible. Surveyors could not have been sent into Republican territory, and, apart from political considerations, the mapping of our own frontiers by the Imperial authorities would have taken a long time and involved heavy expenditure. The first thing I asked for was maps, and Colonel Henderson, who was the head of my Intelligence, set to work and got hold of all the scraps he could get in Cape Town; and he certainly furnished me with maps as we moved along. I always had something sent up behind by him that would do; but it was a great difficulty at first to determine what movements should take place, how the rivers actually ran, where the drifts were, and where the difficulties were.

10616. Naturally, from the state of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and the position they were in, it would have been difficult to make maps?—Of course it would.

10617. The Intelligence Division gave us a good deal of evidence with regard to that, and also as to their want of staff to undertake similar duties. Do you agree in that matter?—I do. I think we ought to have had one of Jeppe's maps, because they were in existence. I think they were published in Switzerland. They were extremely good for the purpose, as they marked every little farm.

10618. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) How long have they been published?—I cannot tell; they were only for the Transvaal part, and there was nothing for the southern part. Those were invaluable to us.

10619. (*Viscount Esher.*) You were not given one before you started?—No, I never heard of them until

I got to Cape Town. They were already printed when we got to Cape Town, and Mrs. Jeppe came to me afterwards for compensation for the maps, and I settled with her. These (*exhibiting certain maps to the Commission*) are the maps Colonel Henderson got out for me, and the Kimberley and Bloemfontein sections were the two I first had, as I wanted these for moving in that direction.

10620. (*Chairman.*) Those were maps compiled after you got to Cape Town?—Yes.

10621. (*Viscount Esher.*) He did those for you while you were in Cape Town?—Yes; and after we had gone on, we had them sent up sheet by sheet—as we were moving along.

10622. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Were those maps based on larger maps by triangulation?—Yes; he got them from the surveys of the farms, and so on.

10623. The Intelligence Division did not seem to think much of that system?—Still they helped me very considerably.

10624. They said that very often the railways or canals did not meet in the different sections?—But for general purposes they gave me a sort of idea how to move.

10625. (*Viscount Esher.*) There was no reason why those maps or maps of that character should not have been got ready beforehand?—No. I think these should have been got ready. We got some of them ready in the first four or five weeks I was there.

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10626. And for your purpose that was sufficient?—Yes. Where I was puzzled was when I crossed the Orange River. I was considering what way I should take in going to Bloemfontein, and I could not tell from any map what was the nature of the country between that point and Bloemfontein. I was told it was very hilly there, with a great want of water here, and so on, and I was tremendously puzzled to know what to do.

10627. Were those maps in the possession also of your Divisional Commanders and your Brigadiers?—Yes.

10628. They were produced in sufficient quantities?—Yes; everybody had them immediately. We had no difficulty about that. They were not bound up like those I have shown the Commission, but were all in sheets.

10629. As the probability of war was foreseen about the month of February, 1899, there would have been ample time to prepare all these maps, I take it, with a little foresight?—Yes, I think it might have been done. I put Colonel Henderson on to it the moment we arrived.

TWENTY-FIFTH DAY.

Friday, 5th December 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Honourable The Earl of ELGIN and KINCARDINE, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., *Chairman.*

The Right Honourable The Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
The Right Honourable The Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Honourable Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

(V.C.) Field-Marshal The Right Hon. Earl ROBERTS, K.G., K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., further examined (Lieut.-General Sir IAN S. M. HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O., was also in attendance).

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10630. (*Chairman.*) We have asked for, and have received, some statements about surrenders in South Africa. Those papers include a complete schedule of all surrenders prior to the occupation of Pretoria. Those you put in?—Yes. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 372).

10631. And there is also an account of 12 important surrenders which you also put in?—Yes. (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 372).

10632. On the general matter of surrenders there has been an idea that surrenders have been more frequent during this war than in any other. Have you anything to say on that subject?—I think they undoubtedly have been so, and I think it is owing a good deal to the altered conditions of warfare. As I said yesterday, the troops are very much more scattered now, particularly in a place like South Africa, where a great feature of the country is the kopjes. Very often small parties, either under junior officers or sometimes even under non-commissioned officers, had to hold a kopje or a little rising ground, and were cut off from the rest of the force by the nature of the ground. These small parties sometimes were attacked by a large body of the enemy, and if one gave way it endangered the position of the others. I know, when I read the account of what
3148. occurred at Lindley, that was quite my impression. There the commanding kopje, which was held by a small party, was overwhelmed by the enemy, and the moment they got possession of that they really commanded all the other places. Instead of being a compact body, as used to be the case in the old days, with the enemy coming up to it within 100, 80, or 60 yards, itself a compact body, and a charge taking place, the strongest winning, nowadays these small parties are attacked a mile, a mile and a-half, or two miles off, until at last the enemy gets close enough to overwhelm one of them, and in this way get command of the positions held by the others.

10633. And the improvement in the weapons also, I suppose, has something to do with it?—Yes, with long range weapons the enemy commence firing a mile and a-half or a couple of miles off, and keep up a heavy fire, gradually approaching nearer and nearer; the ammunition of the defenders may be running short, and it may be impossible to reinforce them.

10634. So that the conditions would be quite different from those obtaining, say, in the Peninsular War or towards that time?—Yes. That I think is the main cause for so many surrenders.

10635. In the history of warfare, have there been instances of surrenders in other wars?—You remember, no doubt, in the Franco-German War large forces surrendered like that of Bazaine's, and there was the famous surrender before Sedan. As a rule, in the Franco-German War the Germans were always victorious, and they beat the enemy in large numbers. The conditions of war were not the same as they are now. The weapons have improved enormously since

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then, and that necessitates these great separations of each unit.

10636. It has been suggested that there were surrenders in the American Wars?—Yes, I believe there were in the old American War, more than there have been in the later ones.

10637. At any rate, you do not attribute these surrenders to want of spirit on the part of the men?—No, I do not. As I mentioned yesterday, I think that both the officers and men are as good as they ever were. The surrenders were mainly, I think, from the change in the mode of fighting. At the same time I think the officers require to have more responsibility given to them, and to be trained more efficiently.

10638. Then this schedule of surrenders shows that there were a large number of Courts of Inquiry held, but as I understand it, the Court of Inquiry, as it was held in South Africa, was more a question of pay than anything else?—Yes.

10639. And that it was an inquiry before which the evidence was not taken on oath?—No, it was not. In those days, according to the Regulations, the evidence at the Court of Inquiry was not taken on oath. That Regulation was altered after I came back, and now it is so done.

10640. As the great majority of these Courts of Inquiry exonerated the men, it was done principally with a view of allowing them to draw their pay?—Yes, and not only that, but they could not be employed again unless some expression of opinion was recorded that the men were not to blame for their capture.

10641. And you required their services?—Yes, I required their services.

10642. If there was a case of serious misconduct or want of military spirit, I suppose the Court ought, in your opinion, to have been one of a more formal character, and the evidence ought to have been taken on oath?—Yes, and that is the reason why the procedure was altered after I came home.

10643. You have altered it, have you?—Yes, it was altered in the April after I came home.

10644. What is the condition of things now in that respect?—The evidence is taken on oath now in the case of surrenders. Instead of being merely by question and answer, the whole thing is done on oath. I can get you the actual wording of the Order if you like; it was very carefully drafted so as to enable the examination to be taken much more carefully.

10645. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) And substituting courts martial for Courts of Inquiry?—Practically. It is still called a Court of Inquiry, but you can try them by court-martial, of course, after the Court of Inquiry. For a Court of Inquiry you do not necessarily frame charges; for a court-martial you must; therefore you must have a Court of Inquiry first, in order to frame the charges.

10646. (*Chairman.*) You have also given us a paper (*Vide Appendix Vol., page* 419, which contains a Minute of your own on the subject of trying an officer by court-martial, with certain appendices, and in Appendix A it is mentioned that an Army Order, No. 110, was published in May, 1901, on the subject of surrenders, under the provisions of which any officer or soldier who, when in the presence of the enemy, displays a white flag or any other token of surrender, must be tried by court-martial under Section 40 of the Army Act?—Yes.

10647. That is a distinct alteration in the law?—Yes.

10648. So that in future if any such case arose it must be tried by court-martial, and the evidence must be taken on oath?—Yes; and that has been done since.

10649. (*Sir John Edge.*) Have you any doubt that the officers who composed these Courts of Inquiry into the surrenders before the occupation of Pretoria came fairly to their decisions on the statements before them?—No. The opinions of all the Courts of Inquiry were submitted to me, and I went through them as well as I could, but the number of men was enormous—there were several thousands of them at one time.

10650. The reason I asked the question is because from the way in which a question was answered just now it would appear rather as if these Courts of Inquiry absolved the men, not because they ought to have been absolved, but to let them get back into service?—Neither officers nor men could be employed again until they were exonerated. The first thing I did was to send them before Courts of Inquiry, in order to see if they could be employed again.

10651. But, of course, a Court of Inquiry would be entirely useless if it merely exonerated the men because you wanted to employ them?—The courts were not aware that I wished to re-employ the prisoners.

10652. I know that, but your answer would rather read in that way?—The instructions given were merely to inquire into the cases, whether these men wilfully surrendered.

10653. Whether you agreed with the findings of the Courts of Inquiry or not, you have no doubt that they were honestly come to?—Undoubtedly.

10654. And not merely for the purpose of having the men again for service?—No; the court knew nothing about their coming back for service when I put the case before them.

10655. Your answer would read the other way?—Yes. I see what you mean.

10656. (*Chairman.*) We might now proceed with the two papers which you have still to bring before us?—Might I read a letter that I have got about the mapping, about which you asked me yesterday?

10657. If you please?—This is a letter from Colonel Henderson: "Before we left for the front, a certain forwarding agent in Cape Town came to my office and said that he had received a parcel of maps from Europe, consigned to a burgher of the South African Republic, and asked for information as to how he was to send them to their address at Pretoria. Finding the maps were of the South African Republic, I told him I should take them over from him as contraband of war. After a little argument he yielded, and we came into possession of 1,000 of Jeppe's excellent maps. The maps of Cape Colony were based on the sketches of the Intelligence Department, which were fairly accurate as regards roads and distances—on local maps, farm surveys, and local information. To make the maps of the Orange Free State, I collected all the surveyors, transport riders, and commercial travellers I could find at Cape Town who had any knowledge of the Orange Free State. We found a few farm surveys in the Surveyor-General's Office, and we had a very indifferent blue print map of the roads and rivers which had been captured, I think, from some Boers. We had also a few Intelligence Department sketches. From these we made our maps, relying principally for roads, drifts, and kopjes, on the information of the surveyors and transport riders. Our great difficulty at first was plant and draughtsmen. There were only two sappers in the Intelligence Department who could draw, and there were no means of producing large maps in a few weeks or even months. With your approval, therefore, I took over the whole establishment of Messrs. Wood and Oortliep, the Cape Town map-makers, and arranged with the "Cape Argus" newspaper to do the printing. Three weeks later, when we went to Modder River, we had maps of the whole country covered by your operations for the march on Bloemfontein, and were able to issue copies to almost every officer in the Field Force." I thought you would be glad to have that information which I got from Colonel Henderson.

10658. (*Viscount Esher.*) Then you were not given Jeppe's map before you left this country?—No, we got them in the Cape; but I did not quite remember how they were got. I remember that they arrived there in a parcel addressed to some person in Pretoria, and a man came to Colonel Henderson, who was my Intelligence officer, and asked him how he was to send them on. Colonel Henderson saw at once what they were, and took charge of them.

10659. All I want to make clear is that the Intelligence Department did not furnish you with Jeppe's map before you left the country?—No, they did not.

10660. (*Sir John Edge.*) Do you know at all when Jeppe's map was published?—I do not know.

10661. (*Chairman.*) I think the first paper deals with the power of this country to meet such an emergency as that of the late war?—Yes. Since I became Commander-in-Chief the Army at home has, with my concurrence, been organised in six Army Corps, of which three Army Corps, with three Cavalry Brigades, are intended to be eventually available at short notice for service abroad, and the remainder to be in readiness for home defence. Owing to the war in South Africa, and the large force still quartered in that country, this organisation has not yet been completed. Having in view the advantages which have resulted from the introduction of the com-

mand system in India, I am in favour of the Army Corps system at home, because it tends to decentralisation, and teaches our generals and staff officers the duties which they would be called upon to undertake in war should any considerable force be employed. For most of the operations in which a British force is likely to be engaged it may be admitted that the most suitable tactical unit is the Infantry Division, or Cavalry Brigade, or mixed division of all arms; but if in peace time our organisation is confined to a number of commands rarely exceeding the strength of an Infantry Division, we fail to train our generals and staff in the control and administration of the larger bodies which they may have to handle in the field. Moreover, the appointment of Army Corps commanders with extended financial and administrative powers ought to relieve the War Office of the mass of detail which at present encumbers it. The question arises whether, in the event of a serious war, a force of the strength of three Army Corps, or, say, 120,000 men, would meet our military requirements outside the United Kingdom. This matter has been carefully considered under my orders in the Intelligence Department, but no authoritative decision has yet been arrived at by His Majesty's Government. The papers laid before me tend to the conclusion that we might possibly need 350,000 British troops for our foreign garrisons, including India and expeditionary operations, and that we want at least the same number for home defence. This total of 700,000 men would be exclusive of the reserves and depôts which would be required to make good losses in the Field Army and Colonial garrisons. Our normal peace establishments may be roughly estimated as follows:—Regular forces, British Establishment, home, 154,000; Regular forces, Colonies and Egypt, allowing 15,000 as the present garrison in South Africa, 49,000 (I should say that the 15,000 is really much less than the present force in South Africa, but it is calculated to be the normal garrison in some few years' time); Indian Establishment, 73,500—making a total of 276,500; Army Reserve, 90,000; Militia, 130,000; Militia Reserve (new), 50,000; Yeomanry, 35,000; Volunteers, 375,000; making a grand total of 956,500. It must be remembered, however, that the Army Reserve, Militia, Militia Reserve, and Yeomanry are not at present up to strength; that the Field Artillery for the 6th Army Corps has not yet been provided; and that the Militia, Militia Reserve, Yeomanry, and Volunteers cannot be ordered abroad in war time without their own consent. It should also be noted that until the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers are better trained and organised than they now are it would be impossible to rely on them exclusively for home defence, and that in any case the Regular units serving abroad would require depôts at home to replace casualties. I should estimate the number of Regular troops which would have to be kept at home in the event of a serious war at not less than 130,000. It follows, therefore, that with our present establishments we should be short of some 120,000 troops for service abroad, while we should have a large excess of troops available for home defence, although a considerable proportion of these would be imperfectly trained and organised. Two methods of strengthening the Army suggest themselves. The first is to enlarge the Army Reserve; the second to reorganise the Militia and render it liable to foreign service in the event of war. In the Regular Army new terms of enlistment, including higher pay, have recently been sanctioned. Men now enlist for three years' colour service, with the option of extending that service to seven years at home and eight years abroad, the total period of service with the colours and in the Reserve being, as before, 12 years. We shall thus have a certain number of men serving for three years with the colours and for nine years in the Reserve, others for seven years with the colours and for five years in the Reserve; and others again for eight years with the colours and four years in the Reserve. The main object of the change is to create a larger Reserve by means of the three years' colour service men. Here, however, we are met with a difficulty, consequent upon our large foreign garrisons, which no Continental power has to face. We have not only to provide drafts of trained and mature soldiers for India and most of our Colonial stations, but we have also periodically to relieve the units abroad by similar units from the United Kingdom. It has been calculated that two out of every three recruits, if not three out of every four, must elect to prolong their colour service, in order to carry out the present system of drafts and reliefs. If this calculation be correct, it follows that the new terms of enlistment will not increase the Army Reserve so largely or so rapidly as might otherwise be the case. The creation of home and foreign service armies would greatly simplify the problem, but such a measure would be distasteful to the Army, and, in my opinion, detrimental to efficiency and *esprit de corps*. Another difficulty in our organisation is the dearth of Reserve officers, especially in the lower ranks. Theoretically our system of mobilisation is as follows. On the Army Reserve being called out for service, the men rejoin the corps in which they have served, or affiliated corps, a portion of them taking the places in those corps of immature or imperfectly trained soldiers, and the latter, with the balance of the Reservists, forming fresh units. For example, suppose we had 50 battalions at home, each 1,000 strong, and 50,000 Reservists; suppose also that half of each battalion consisted of immature or imperfectly trained soldiers, then on mobilisation each battalion would be completed with 500 Reservists, and be ready for immediate service abroad, while 50 new battalions could be formed for home defence out of the remaining 25,000 Reservists plus the 25,000 immature soldiers. But unfortunately there are at present no means of properly organising these fresh units, because, although the Reservists may be forthcoming, we have no Reserve of officers at all adequate to our requirements. In Continental armies this difficulty does not exist, because under a system of conscription it is comparatively easy to provide a proper proportion of Reserve officers as men of superior social standing and intelligence can be selected from the recruits and trained for the purpose. I have already mentioned our possible requirements for expeditionary action and for strengthening India and the Colonies in the event of a serious war. These requirements would be met if the Army Reserve were 210,000 strong instead of 90,000, and if the proportion of Reserve officers for this number of Reservists were forthcoming. It is difficult to predict how the new terms of enlistment are likely to work out in practice, but I should doubt the Reserve reaching a total of even 150,000 for some time to come. How Reserve officers are to be obtained in sufficient numbers and with the requisite qualifications is, I confess, a problem which so far I have been unable to solve. The question then arises whether, by a modification of the present Militia organisation, our requirements in the most serious war that can reasonably be anticipated might not be met at comparatively moderate cost. While I am in favour of making the Militia liable to foreign service in time of national emergency, I regard it as very questionable whether that force can be materially increased in strength or raised to a high state of efficiency without having recourse to a compulsory Ballot Act not admitting of the purchase of substitutes. At the same time I recognise the difficulty of inducing the nation to consent to any form of conscription, and of enforcing compulsory military service in a country where no machinery exists for identifying and registering the movements of the population. Nothing is easier than to draw up a theoretical scheme for raising any given force by conscription, and I have had such schemes prepared in the case of the Militia. But in practice we should find it difficult to obtain the men without interference with the labour market, and without causing a good deal of social disturbance and ill-feeling. At present, therefore, I am hardly prepared to advocate compulsory Militia service. It must also be remembered that, in the event of a serious war, we should have to assert our naval predominance before we could despatch troops from the United Kingdom. Such predominance having been acquired, the United Kingdom would be safe from invasion, and during the interval we might have time to augment our regular forces and to organise our auxiliary forces to such an extent as to meet the requirements of the situation. I admit that this is a makeshift arrangement, and that we should have to pay largely for the additional troops needed, but such expenditure would, I think, impose a lighter burden on the country than compulsory Militia service. As already pointed out, the normal military establishments amount to about 950,000 officers and men. To these must be added about 14,000 Colonial troops, paid by the War Office, 4,000 paid by the Foreign Office, and 4,000 by the Colonial Office, besides the Native Army of India, numbering about 150,000. The Colonies also maintain a force about 89,000 strong, and the Channel Islands a force about 3,000 strong. The total, therefore, is 1,214,000. We cannot complain of want of men, but a considerable portion of them are insufficiently trained and organised, and would be at a serious disadvantage if opposed to the troops of the Continental Powers. Our main deficiencies are a lack of officers for the Army

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Reserve, Militia, and Volunteers, and an insufficient number of troops liable to foreign service in the event of a serious war. I trust that these deficiencies may be made good by the patriotism of the mother country and its over-sea possessions—possibly also by the adoption of more attractive and elastic terms of service in the auxiliary forces at home and abroad. Efficiency is the main object to be aimed at, and the problem is how to secure efficiency without undue interference with the conditions of civil life. If we cannot obtain the force which we require for the defence of the Empire under the voluntary system, we may have to fall back upon conscription; but I would not adopt the latter alternative until every effort had been made, and every expedient tried to provide for our military requirements at home and abroad by taking full advantage of the patriotic spirit which was so apparent during the late war.

10662. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) During the eighty-four years from the battle of Waterloo to the South African War there have been very few occasions on which we have had to send a large number of troops out of England for a great war?—That is so.

10663. On the other hand, we have had to send out a large number of small expeditions?—Yes.

10664. A subject which has occupied the minds of a good many people for several years, especially people interested in the Colonies, is, whether it would not be possible to have an expeditionary force, say of two divisions, 20,000 men, ready to be sent abroad without having to go through the troublesome process of having a Parliamentary Proclamation for calling out the Reserves, and otherwise creating a great deal of political disturbance in the country and on the Continent; can you give us any opinion with regard to that?—The difficulty, of course, is in the composition of our units. Every unit, no matter whether it is the First or the Second Army Corps, has to send a certain number of men abroad every year, which really takes out the pith of the unit; and that number has to be replaced by recruits. So that if at any particular time that unit went abroad for field service, you would have a large number of untrained men in it, and you would either have to leave them behind, and let the units go much weaker, or you must replace them out of the service reserve. A short time before the war began, as you will remember, 5,000 reservists were given 1s. a day instead of 6d. a day in order that they should be available for that purpose. It would be some help.

10665. Would it need a Parliamentary Proclamation?—I am not sure about that.

10666. That is the thing. The real point of the question is whether the thing could be done so as not to require great publicity in the way of previous preparation?—The small party that was sent out to Ashanti was merely one battalion made up of detachments, a most unsatisfactory arrangement. And I do not see how you could send out 20,000 men made up in the same way.

10667. But could not something be devised by which a fighting force of 10,000, 15,000, or 20,000 men should be always ready to be sent out?—It would be a very good thing, but the foreign service obligation meets us everywhere. If we have 73,000 men for India, the picked battalions in this country have to send out 167 men on the average every year to replace casualties. Supposing there are 50 battalions of infantry out there—I think there are 52, but we will say 50—and you have to send 167 men from each battalion each year to India, that at once prevents you having anything of the kind.

10668. I quite understand that. The question was rather whether we could not have a force of 10,000, 15,000, or 20,000 men, and that we should treat that body of men at home as if they were in India, and keep them up as a fighting body?—Then you must have more units to feed India, or more depôts, and that would be a matter of expense.

10669. I am bringing the matter up on this occasion when we are dealing with the subject of the preparation for war, because it does seem to many people, rightly or wrongly, that if the Government had had at the beginning of 1899, before the Bloemfontein Conference, such a body of men to their hand, without having to go to Parliament at all, they might have shipped them off quietly to South Africa?—I suppose that was one reason why India was called upon. About 10,000 men were obtained from India without any difficulty. It was a little quicker also from Bombay than from Southampton to Durban, but there is not much difference—about 15 days instead of 20.

10670. Would the expense be very great of keeping up a body of that kind?—I could not tell you without reference what each battalion costs, but it would take a good sum of money to increase the Army by 20,000 men.

10671. But then you might diminish the total number of battalions altogether to correspond; they need not all be in excess?—But you cannot decrease the battalions in this country, if you have to feed those abroad, unless you increase the strength of the battalions, and then the question of barrack accommodation comes in. The barracks are built for a certain number, and if you increase the number, where are they to be put?

10672. I quite see the difficulties but the subject I suggest to you is well worth consideration?—Yes, it is.

10673. (*Viscount Esher.*) Do you see any objection to drawing 10,000 men for a specific purpose, as they were drawn in 1899, from India?—Not in the least, if India can spare them.

10674. That is really one of the conditions of our Empire—that we should be able to do so on an emergency?—Yes, it is an excellent idea. The finest regiments that we have are always in India—they are the pick of the Army.

10675. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) But, as a matter of fact, India only spared us 5,000 men in 1899?—10,000, was it not?

10676. No, the rest came from the Mediterranean, half and half. If you could get 10,000 men, that would pretty well satisfy me?—You might not be able to get the men from India.

10677 (*Viscount Esher.*) Exactly; it has always been understood, that assuming that the troops were not required in India at the moment, the force in India is available?—Yes.

10678. But would Sir George Taubman-Goldie's proposal of having a force of about 20,000 men ready in England, not involve adding something like 20 battalions?—Undoubtedly.

10679. Because, under your battalion system it is absolutely necessary, is it not, to have an equal number of battalions in this country to correspond with the number of battalions stationed abroad?—That is what we ought to have.

10680. That is the theory?—That is the theory. We never have had it, and, therefore, we have to send more men, from the battalions which are at home, which weakens them still more.

10681. At the present moment you have not got an equal number of battalions in this country to correspond with the number of battalions stationed abroad?—No.

10682. Have you pressed for that?—What we do now is to raise provisional battalions, which are really large depôts. Supposing a regiment has both battalions abroad, and no battalion at home, then a provisional battalion is raised to supply the required number of drafts.

10683. But, surely it is contrary to the whole theory of the organisation of the Army that you should have two battalions of the same regiment abroad?—But we cannot help it.

10684. At the present moment you cannot, because of South Africa?—Yes, it did not very often happen before the war.

10685. Just now you are only meeting an abnormal state of things?—Exactly.

10686. But assuming that the normal state of things has reasserted itself, would you then require additional battalions to make up an equal number in this country to those stationed abroad?—When the proportion was settled of an equal number of battalions at home to those abroad, the question of South Africa did not exist, except for the very small garrison in Natal, and the still smaller one in Cape Colony. Whether additional battalions will be required will depend upon what is to be the eventual strength of the garrison in South Africa.

10687. But are you satisfied with the present number of men? You have not been pressing the Government, you say, at the present time for fresh battalions?—No, we have managed to keep the battalions in India at full strength, at the sacrifice of the Reserve. We could not send drafts out, but by giving a bounty to the men in India, who would extend their service, some for one

year, others for two years. We have managed to keep the regiments in India up to their strength, but the Reserve has suffered in consequence. Next year, and the year after, these Reserve men will come home, and we shall have to send out to India many more drafts than we had to send before, and that will try us very considerably. I hope we shall be able to manage it.

10688. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) With reference to a remark which fell from Lord Esher just now, we have had evidence from a competent authority that during the four years from 1895 to 1899 there were two battalions of the same regiment abroad in several cases?—Not in a great many cases, I think.

10689. (*Viscount Esher.*) In the Mediterranean?—But that was because the Mediterranean was looked upon as a home station.

10690. One result of that was, was it not, that you had immature recruits very often stationed at Malta and Gibraltar?—Yes, it was a makeshift business. When they found that they had not the number of battalions at home to meet the number of battalions abroad, in was decided to include Malta and Gibraltar as portions of the home garrison.

10691. But with regard to the Militia, the Yeomanry, and the Volunteers, you are not satisfied that that at present is an efficient force?—No, I said so yesterday.

10692. I know you did. Do you see any way of making that force an efficient force under existing conditions?—The Volunteers is essentially a Volunteer force, and we cannot do anything with it unless they all agree to our terms as to more training.

10693. Then, take the Militia?—The Militia is, in a measure, voluntary. The present system is to train them for three weeks every year. I do not think the difficulty is so much about the men; it is the officers of the Militia who want more training. In the discussion we had yesterday I told you that we were trying to get a certain number of Militia officers to be attached to regular battalions temporarily during the summer at Aldershot and Salisbury.

10694. But supposing that you were to enforce the Compulsory Ballot Act, which after all exists, as you know?—Yes, I know it does.

10695. It is not a new departure?—No.

10696. Do you think that would enable you to increase the number of weeks for which you could keep the Militia in training?—I suppose it would.

10697. What will be your idea as to a sufficient time in which to make the Militia efficient?—To embody them for a year to commence with.

10698. Embody the whole force?—Embody a certain number for one year, then return to civil life for a time, and replace them with another lot the next year.

10699. Would you not be met there with a great difficulty as to barrack accommodation?—Yes; that difficulty would, of course, have to be met. They might be put into huts.

10700. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Would billeting meet it?—I do not know that it would. You must have good accommodation for every man you raise, except perhaps in the summer months, when they might be in tents.

10701. (*Viscount Esher.*) But the method under which that ballot is to be enforced, I assume, has been considered originally by the authors of the Act?—Yes.

10702. You said just now that it would interfere, as it might, with the labour market and so on; but all those are questions which have been considered?—I suppose so. I imagine that they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to have it.

10703. In time of war?—Yes.

10704. Then the one step further would be not to wait for war, but to enforce the Ballot Act in time of peace?—Yes.

10705. Then, if that was done, do you not think it would to some extent solve the question of officers?—Yes, I have said that I think so, because you would have a certain number of educated men who would necessarily come into the Militia under conscription, who could be trained as officers.

10706. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) It was stated just now that when this compulsory Ballot was first started and made law, all these questions of the labour market and so on, must have been fully considered; but was not that compulsory ballot for the Militia started very many years ago, when the labour market and everything else was in quite a different condition from what it is now?—In what way different do you mean?

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10707. Has not the compulsory ballot for the militia been the law for very many years?—Yes, for a great many years.

10708. And then the labour market and every circumstance of the country was in quite a different condition?—More favourable to it, do you think?

10709. I do not know whether it was more or less favourable; but it was in quite a different condition?—No doubt.

10710. And because the thing might have been introduced in 1750 or 1780, it does not follow that it would be quite applicable to the present time?—Certainly not. I am not advocating it at all, I am only pointing out what the deficiencies are, and how it is possible that they might be remedied.

10711. Do you think it has ever been considered what the result of a compulsory ballot would be?—I do not think it has been.

10712. (*Viscount Esher.*) My only point is, that the Ballot Act is an Act, and has to be suspended every year—it is the law?—It is.

10713. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) It may be the law, but have its effects ever been considered?—I imagine that the Government think it would be very difficult to carry out.

10714. And, in your opinion, it would be almost impracticable?—Yes.

10715. But supposing it were carried out, do you think you would get officers?—I should hope, if it were carried out, and nobody could escape, you would get a certain number of educated men.

10716. Under the present conditions, supposing you were able to call out a fair proportion of the Militia every year for several months' training, do you think that you would get the officers?—I cannot tell you whether they would be able to stay for so long. If we could get them, that would be the way to train them, undoubtedly.

10717. Have you any idea in your own mind as to what would induce them to come?—I am inclined to think that some of the officers would come. The mere fact of pay, I think, would induce them to come. Some of the officers have nothing else to do, and are glad to come up even for a short time every year; but I know there is a difficulty about officers, particularly in Ireland, where county gentlemen are gradually dwindling down. Even in England officers are scarce. In some of the battalions the number had dwindled down to a very small number, as few as eight out of 24.

10718. Would the mere pay cover their expenses, do you think?—Not altogether, certainly.

10719. You could not find permanent employment for any number who came forward and absented themselves from their work for any period?—No, I admit that it is a very difficult question.

10720. And it would be more satisfactory still to have the volunteers in a state of real efficiency?—Yes, What I want to make quite clear to the country is that, because we have some hundred thousand Volunteers enrolled, it must not be thought they are all fit to take the field.

10721. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) That it is a paper army?—Yes.

10722. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) And no scheme has yet been devised to make that paper army really efficient?—No; I think Sir John Jackson said yesterday it is a question of pounds, shillings, and pence.

10723. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) It has been suggested that the formation of the Army into Army Corps is not so convenient a course as the formation of the Army into divisions; what is your opinion about that?—I am entirely in favour of the Army Corps. The divisions exist as they did before, but it is an immense convenience for Head-quarters to deal with six units instead of dealing with 24 or 25. It is also a great advantage for the Army Corps commander to have large responsibility, and a large force to deal with; and I do not think it in any way interferes with the efficiency of the smaller units, the division, or brigade. Army Corps have been tried in India, and answer admirably.

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They were, in a certain sense, in existence before, and instead of having three Presidential Commands, there are now four Army Corps. They have done well out there, and I think they will do well here. Take the case of the commands at Aldershot and in Ireland; they are precisely the same as they were before the word Army Corps was applied to them, except that a little more financial power is given to the corps commanders. This apparently is not understood by those who object to the title, "Army Corps."

10724. And you think it is a great advantage to have a large body of men under one commander, so that he can, in point of fact, train himself?—Yes.

10725. Would there be any difficulty in mobilising a division of an Army Corps, leaving the other division?—Not the least; you can mobilise any portion of them.

10726. Would not that meet the difficulty if you could mobilise one division or two divisions, as the case might be, so as to have, say, 20,000 men always ready for foreign service?—As I have explained before, 20,000 men could not be mobilised without assistance from the Reserve. Only 5,000 men were available for this purpose before the war. And I do not know whether they could be called out without Parliament.

10727. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) That is the question?—You could have any number of men if you give them a sufficient retaining fee, but I do not know whether you could mobilise them without an Act of Parliament.

10728. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) It requires some proclamation at present?—Yes, it does.

10729. (*Sir John Jackson.*) I suppose we may take it that under that old Act of Parliament men have never been called out during the last 80 years, have they?—I believe not.

10730. I suppose they were called out at the time of Waterloo?—I think so; they must have been.

10731. Then, shortly, I suppose, your opinion is that in order really to meet this difficulty it comes to be a question of very material increase in the Regular Army?—Either in the Regular Army, or by a sufficiently large Reserve, or by some arrangement by which the auxiliary forces can be made more efficient.

10732. I mean with regard to the difficulty of getting sufficient training for the Militia and Volunteers. I suggest that it does look as if it came to be a question of a big increase really in the Regulars?—Yes.

10733. There does not appear to be much likelihood of getting the necessary training for the auxiliary forces under present circumstances without, at any rate, a very great interference with the ordinary business of the country?—That is what I certainly have experienced up to the present time.

10734. It is perhaps repeating the question, but I will put it again. If it comes to be a question of materially increasing the Regular Army, in the main that is a question of pay?—I suppose it is.

10735. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Under the Ballot Act it is not altogether a question of personal service on the part of the individual; he may name a substitute, and such was very often the case, was it not, during the early years of the last century?—I believe so. I have said that if you could do it without naming a substitute you would probably get a large number of men in the Militia who would be capable of becoming officers.

10736. In short, it often resolved itself into the payment of so much money when a person was ballotted in substitution of personal service, and there were many such substitutes during the continental wars?—I believe so.

10737. (*Chairman.*) Now, you have a paper to put before us as to the War Office?—Yes. The great blot on the War Office organisation and administration, in my opinion, is that the Secretary of State, owing to his being responsible to Parliament for everything that goes on in the Army, considers himself obliged to attempt more than it is possible for any one man to do, however capable and however hardworking he may be, the result being that his time is taken up with more or less trivial matters, while important questions which demand much thought and study, are either delayed or indefinitely postponed. Up till 1895, when the present system was introduced, all the military departments of the War Office were under the control of the Commander-in-Chief; an arrangement abandoned on the ground that it was impossible for any one man to command the Army, and also to carry on the work of the departments satisfactorily. Assuming this view to be correct, how is it possible for one man to be responsible for all the military departments (even if three of them are under the subordinate control of the Commander-in-Chief), besides the whole of the civil branch of the War Office, including finance, and, in addition, attend to his duties as a Member of Parliament and a Cabinet Minister? I should like to see the War Office divided into three branches—Military, Spending Departments, and Financial—each with a head who, while acting in consultation with each other, would be responsible to the Secretary of State. The Military Branch should comprise the offices of the Adjutant-General, Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence, Director-General Army Medical Service, and Military Secretary. The Spending Departments would include the offices now under the Quartermaster-General, Inspector-General of Fortifications, and Director-General of Ordnance, the head being an officer of recognised administrative ability, and without any political functions. The Financial Branch should be as at present. This sub-division of labour and responsibility would, I believe, greatly simplify the work now devolving on the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief, and give them more time to devote to the more important problems of military efficiency and Imperial defence. The arrangement will probably be objected to on the ground that the Secretary of State having frequently to answer Parliamentary questions on all sorts of subjects connected with the Army, it is essential that he should be acquainted with everything going on in the Army. But, to this I would reply that, under the present or any conceivable system, such detailed knowledge and responsibility are impossible. No one could carry in his mind such a mass of heterogeneous minutiæ; and when questions are asked in Parliament the Secretary of State is bound to get the information to enable him to reply to them, from subordinate officers, who have no responsibility. Surely if it were explained to Parliament that decentralisation, which is being so constantly advocated, involves delegation of authority and responsibility, the impossibility of the Secretary of State being conversant with and responsible for every detail of Army administration would be recognised. It seems to me that the proper course for the Secretary of State to accept when questions are asked would be to inform Parliament that the action under discussion was taken by such or such a subordinate official, acting within the power delegated to him, who must be held responsible for his own action, the Secretary of State at the same time expressing his approval or disapproval of that action, and, if the latter, stating that he is taking steps to rectify it, instead of conveying the impression that no course could or should be adopted without his cognisance. There is another change I strongly advocate, and that is the transfer of certain duties now performed by the erroneously styled Quartermaster-General to the Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence who is, strictly speaking, and ought to be called, Quartermaster-General. The Quartermaster-General has of late years been converted into a Director-General of Supply and Transport, and has hardly anything to do with the duties of the General Staff of the Army. He controls the Army Service Corps, the Pay Department, and the Remount Department. The more legitimate staff duties connected with organisation, mobilisation, distribution of the Army, military intelligence, schemes of offensive and defensive operations, reconnaissance, etc., are assigned to the Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence. Thus, while this officer carries out the work properly appertaining to the Quartermaster-General, the so-called Quartermaster-General really performs the duties of a Commissary-General-in-Chief. In one particular only is the Quartermaster-General entrusted with General Staff functions—namely, as regards the issuing of orders for the movement of troops; but this duty should be transferred to the Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence, who is at present charged with a cognate duty, viz., the distribution of the Army at home and abroad. I am in favour of calling officials by names descriptive of the duties assigned to them, and I am of opinion that the Director-General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence should be styled Quartermaster-General, and the head of the present Quartermaster-General's Department Director-General of Supply and Transport.

10738. You mentioned that the organisation was altered in 1895?—Yes.

10739. And it remained under that Order in Council, I think, until 1901, after your acceptance of the office of Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

10740. Therefore you came, in the first place, under the system of 1895?—I did; but when I accepted the post of Commander-in-Chief, I wrote and begged that the alteration might be made, that the Adjutant-General (I did not refer to the other officers) should be under the Commander-in-Chief, and not the Secretary of State, as he had been before.

10741. Then you practically had no experience of the working of the system of 1895?—No, I had not. In the first year I was here, Sir Evelyn Wood, who had been Adjutant-General under the old system, was more independent of me than the present Adjutant-General, but he acquiesced in the change very readily.

10742. The main alteration made then was the bringing of the Adjutant-General under the control, as well as the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

10743. The other heads of departments remaining under his supervision?—Yes, and the Director-General of Mobilisation and the Military Secretary remained under the control of the Commander-in-Chief.

10744. The Director of Military Intelligence under the Order in Council of 1895 was already under the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes, the Adjutant-General was the only alteration.

10745. Only that now the Director-General of Military Intelligence is a rather more important officer in the department than he was?—Yes.

10746. And he still remains under the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

10747. But the other heads of departments, the Quartermaster-General, the Director-General of Ordnance, the Inspector-General of Fortifications remain now, as before, under the supervision, but not under the control, of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

10747*. And, of course, the Financial Branch has never been under the control of the Commander-in-Chief?—No.

10748. Then the suggestion which you now make, so far as I understand it, is that the officers who are now under the Commander-in-Chief should be put into one division; that the other military heads should be put into a second division, and the Financial Branch should be a third division?—Yes.

10749. That is to say, so far as the control of the Commander-in-Chief is concerned, for I suppose he would remain the head of that branch?—He would.

10750. It would remain the same?—Yes.

10751. But the others would be sub-divided into military and financial divisions?—Yes.

10752. Then who would be the head of the Military Sub-Division?—I had the idea that it should be a sort of Military Member of Council.

10753. More like the Indian system?—Yes; but if that cannot be done the only change that I advocate strongly is that the little work which the present Quartermaster-General has to do, which is merely the movement of troops, should be transferred to the Director-General of Mobilisation, and that he should be called the Quartermaster-General. My object is to bring the divisional officers, the junior officers of that department, under the Quartermaster-General. Since I came to office they are called Quartermaster-Generals, but they are not under the Quartermaster-General; he has nothing to do with them. He is called Quartermaster-General, but he is very much what the Member of Council in India was; he has spending departments under him, and I want the officer who really does the work of the Quartermaster-General to be called Quartermaster-General, and for the junior officers of that Department to look to him as their head.

10754. That, no doubt, I take it from you, is important, but in the main it is a matter of nomenclature, is it not, because instead of the Director-General of Military Intelligence, as he is now called, he would be called Quartermaster-General under your control?—Yes.

10755. But there would still be an officer at the head of what is now the Quartermaster-General's Department?—Yes, and I should call him the Director-General of Supply and Transport.

10756. Is he under you?—No.

10757. But he is, under your idea, to be head of that sub-division?—Yes, I think he might be. I put forward the proposal, because I thought it worked so well in India, but I do not press it. It is not a necessity; work can be carried on, as at present, direct with the Secretary of State, and under the military supervision of the Commander-in-Chief. I only press the change as regards the proper officer being called Quartermaster-General.

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10758. But you do not want an officer of high rank independent of these great departments in the War Office at the head of that second sub-division?—No; I put it in my note because that is the system we had in India, which I thought worked well, but it is not what I would press for if it is considered undesirable. The work is very well done now; the officers are heads of their own departments, and they work directly under the Secretary of State for War.

10759. You see, my point is this. The Commander-in-Chief sits at the head of the First Sub-Division. I want to make clear whether you want a corresponding head of the Second Sub-Division?—As I have said, I think it is a good plan, but I do not press it.

10760. And that head would be independent of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

10761. Would he be under his supervision?—No, I do not think so.

10762. He would be entirely independent?—Yes, I think so.

10763. Then the Commander-in-Chief under that proposal would not be responsible, as he is now, for the supervision of all the departments?—It is very little responsibility, I consider, that I have over the spending departments. Supposing, for instance, a gun is in existence, and the Director-General of Ordnance wants to put in a gun of a more suitable type. He asks me whether I have any objection to moving the old gun; but I have very little to do with the actual working of the spending departments.

10764. Under the system as it obtained during the war, there was an Army Board, which was attended by all the heads of these departments?—Yes.

10765. And that Army Board is still in existence?—It is still in existence.

10766. We have been told that during the war it met with great frequency, and was found to be a very valuable Board?—Yes, I believe it was during the war. When I first came back it was used a good deal too.

10767. Since then I believe it has not been used so frequently?—It has not. The reason is because the War Office Council has practically taken the place of the Army Board. I am not sure whether the War Office Council existed before I came back; I believe it did. But since Mr. Brodrick became Secretary of State for War, the War Office Council assembles weekly, with scarcely any exception, every Monday; and, as I say, it has practically taken the place of the Army Board.

10768. But the War Office Council is quite a different organisation from the Army Board?—Yes, it is in so far as the Secretary of State is the President of it, and he is not of the Army Board; the Commander-in-Chief is President of the Army Board.

10769. And also it has different members from the civil side, I think?—It has the Financial Secretary, whereas the Army Board has the Assistant Financial Secretary.

10770. We were told that on the Army Board there were the Accountant-General and the Assistant Under Secretary?—The members of the Army Board are: the Commander-in-Chief as President, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, the Director-General of Ordnance, the Assistant Under-Secretary, the Military Secretary, the Director of Military Intelligence, and the Accountant-General. The War Office Council has the Secretary of State for President, and the members are the Commander-in-Chief, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary (that is an addition), the Permanent Under-Secretary of State (the Army Board has the Assistant Under-Secretary), the Financial Secretary, the Quartermaster-General, and the others are the same.

10771. That, of course, is an essentially different Board from this point of view: the Army Board is essentially a military Board, with the Commander-in-Chief at its head?—Yes.

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10772. We were told by the gentlemen who represented the civil side that they attended, but that they did not interfere in the discussion on any military matter unless they were asked for their opinion?—That is so.

10773. At the War Office Council I imagine that those who represent the civil side would take a free part in the discussion?—Yes.

10774. So that the Army Board was the Board in the War Office which would give a distinctly military opinion on any subject that was brought before it?—Yes.

10775. And we were told that the subjects that were dealt with by it during the war were principally military subjects?—They were.

10776. I understand that now they have also the duty of looking into the Estimates, but I suppose they would examine the Estimates from the same point of view?—Yes, from a military point of view, but the fact really is that the War Office Council takes up all the questions that used to come before the Army Board. I think, myself, it is a pity, but it is a fact, and this year even the Estimates were not taken up by the Army Board. We were on the point of considering them when Mr. Brodrick ordered the War Office Council to do it. I said to him, "We have not yet considered the Estimates," and he said, "Never mind, we will do it here instead." The War Office Council, practically speaking, usurped the work of the Army Board.

10777. We have found a good deal of difficulty in understanding the different functions of the different Boards at the War Office, and even in finding out whether the members understood the difference. I suppose it is the fact that they have been continually changing?—Yes, they have in this way, that the War Office Council takes up all sorts of little trivial matters and things which the Army Board could settle, and used to settle. But the War Office Council meets every Monday now, and the agenda is prepared by Mr. Brodrick's secretary on the Civil side, and all these questions which the Army Board would take up are brought up there as well as important questions, so that there is no work left for the Army Board to do. I am going to have an Army Board to-morrow, but it is to consider some questions that have come up from the Advisory Board of the Medical Department. I have never had any questions to put before them; they are all taken up by the War Office Council; even a question as to whether the Rifle regiments should have a brass button or a black button was brought before the War Office Council, or whether the braid of their coats should be red or black was brought before the War Office Council. Matters which I think might conveniently be settled by the Army Board.

See 21603; 21608.

10778. You think that those matters would be better brought before a Board representing the military opinion of the War Office, and a collective opinion obtained there?—Yes.

10779. And that could be done by a Board formed in the way that it is formed of the heads of the different departments, under the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

10780. Now would not a collective opinion of that sort be of great value?—Yes, I think so. I think that the officers who form the Army Board would speak much more openly, and be much more free under the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief than they would be at a Board under the presidency of the Secretary of State, where the Commander-in-Chief was only a member, such as the War Office Council. I think the Army Board should assemble and do as it did before, and only those matters come up to the War Office Council which are of supreme importance.

10781. We have had various opinions expressed as to the way in which the military opinion should be given its proper weight. One argument is that the Commander-in-Chief should have a right to give his opinion in a form and under conditions in which it must come not only before the Secretary of State, but before the Government. Another form is the one which you have expressed here, namely, that the War Office should be divided into sections, each section being under a head who has a distinct responsibility for his section. I want to suggest to you whether a third way which has been actually in operation, though not with its full effect, namely, that you should have a Board, representing all the military departments, and all the military opinion of the War Office, to give a collective opinion, would not have great merit and advantages?—You mean the Army Board, in fact.

10782. Yes, but to give it a position in which it would be its duty on all great military subjects to collect the whole military opinion, and to express it authoritatively?—Yes, I think that would be a very good plan. What I object to in the War Office, as it exists at present, is the system of concentration. The Army Board, which was the only place that the military heads had to express an opinion, has really been knocked on the head by the War Office Council.

10783. In reference to what you said with regard to the Secretary of State, surely you would admit that we must take into account the conditions of Parliamentary government?—Yes.

10784. And the Secretary of State cannot limit the questions which he is liable to be asked?—No.

10785. Until some means are found for still further limiting the power of members of Parliament in asking questions, he must be prepared to answer them?—Yes.

10786. But when you say he has to make himself conversant with all the minutiæ of the various departments of the War Office, does that not mean that he must get from somebody the necessary information to answer any questions that he is asked and he is bound to answer?—Certainly.

10787. And that would have to continue under any system of government?—Yes, but what I think is, that instead of the Secretary of State being held responsible to Parliament, why should not the Commander-in-Chief be held responsible; if the Secretary of State is held responsible he must necessarily see everything, and I say it is impossible for him to do so. No man can do the amount of work that would enable him to be responsible to Parliament for everything that has taken place. He may answer the questions and explain to Parliament, but if he is to be held responsible for action taken up to that point, he must see everything. Take the case of the insubordination at Sandhurst. I dealt with it, and I told Mr. Brodrick as I went on how I dealt with it. I noticed that in the House of Commons they objected to my having dealt with it. They said to Mr. Brodrick: "You ought to have dealt with it; you must deal with it." I want, if possible, to have some arrangement made with Parliament, by which the Secretary of State may say: "No, the Commander-in-Chief is responsible. If he is wrong come down upon him for it."

10788. Did the Secretary of State accept that position?—He did so far as he could, but members of Parliament took it up, and said: "It is your business; you are responsible to us for this case; you ought not to let these boys be sent away." My contention is that responsibility should be placed upon the person who has to do the work.

10789. We cannot, I am afraid, limit the powers of talk by members of Parliament?—No, I know that.

10790. But I should imagine that the Secretary of State would surely maintain the proposition that in matters of discipline the Commander-in-Chief was the responsible person?—Yes, I know that, but what I maintain is that if the Secretary of State is liable not only to be called upon to answer in Parliament but to be held responsible, as I understand Parliament holds him responsible for any case of discipline, he must necessarily see every case of discipline.

10791. Yes, if he is responsible for the whole of the details?—Take the case of an officer being retired compulsorily. It is almost impossible that the Secretary of State can go through the whole case, but if he is to be held responsible by Parliament to say that this man has been properly turned out, he must really acquaint himself with the whole story. I only want Parliament to let him say: "Well, the Commander-in-Chief did it, he is responsible; if he is to blame come down upon him for it."

10792. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) But in certain cases he has done that. I remember one or two cases in which he has distinctly sheltered himself behind the Commander-in-Chief; I will not say which Secretary of State or which Commander-in-Chief?—I do not want any sheltering behind the Commander-in-Chief. I want the Commander-in-Chief to be held responsible by Parliament for whatever he does, and for the Secretary of State to be only required to explain the matter. If the Secretary of State has to do more than that, he

must necessarily see every paper; and, in fact, he has to do so now. For instance, if I give it as my opinion that a certain officer should be retired because money matters have gone wrong, or something of the kind, before he can be retired the Secretary of State must see all the papers. It is an impossibility for any one man to see and know everything that goes on in the War Office, and if Parliament insists upon this being done, work at the War Office will always be extremely difficult.

10793. Yet he must be the man to explain things in Parliament unless you have a Commander-in-Chief entitled to come to Parliament and give an explanation?—I do not want the Commander-in-Chief to go to Parliament at all.

10794. In some cases a Minister who does not belong to the House goes to the French Parliament and makes an explanation?—No, I do not want him to be a Minister.

10795. Then I am afraid the Secretary of State must retain the responsibility?—Yes, but one man cannot do everything.

10796-8. (*Chairman.*) I suggest to you that it would assist in the direction that you are advocating if for all the larger military matters the Secretary of State should be able to produce the collective opinion of a Board like the Army Board under the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief, instead of having even the authority of a Commander-in-Chief, if I may so put it?—Yes, I think so. I think that would be very advisable.

10799. There is just one question that I should like to put with regard to the War Office Council. You say it takes up now all sorts of matters, even in great detail?—Yes.

10800. How are they brought before the War Office Council?—The agenda paper is prepared under the orders of the Secretary of State, and is then sent to the several members, generally speaking, on the Friday or Saturday, containing any questions which have been brought before the Secretary of State by any head of a department, chiefly by the Director-General of Ordnance, or the Quartermaster-General, or the Inspector-General of Fortifications.

10801. So I understand, but when you mentioned those small matters, buttons and so on, who is responsible for their being brought before it?—The Director-General of Ordnance brought that forward, because the clothing department is under him. The matter was brought to my notice by the regiments concerned, and I decided that the buttons on their Service coat should be of the colour they have always worn, and that the braid should match the buttons. The Director-General of Ordnance urged that this would give extra trouble to his department, and appealed to the Secretary of State, who put it before the War Office Council to be settled. In my opinion it was not a matter for the War Office Council, but for the Army Board to settle.

10802. There is one point on which I have not been able to get a very clear idea, but it has been stated—I might say officially—that quite recently a power of initiative in the matter of subjects to be brought before the War Office Council has been given to each member; that any member can ask that any subject which he wishes to be proposed should be put on the agenda paper. Is that so?—So far as I know, everybody can do that. The Secretary of State would settle himself whether it should or should not be on the agenda; it is under his orders.

10803. That is the old system—that is the distinction. The old system was that the Secretary of State decided absolutely on the agenda paper and excluded or included subjects at his discretion. But we have been told that now any member might ask that a question should be put on the agenda paper and that it would be put?—I believe it is the case. I never heard anybody say they could not get a question on the agenda paper.

10804. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) We were also told that it never had been done; is that the case?—I never heard of it.

10805. (*Chairman.*) It was brought under our notice because we were going through the Report of the Clinton Dawkins' Committee, and that was one of the that particular recommendation an alteration had been made as suggested, or practically as suggested, by the Committee?—I never heard of it.

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10806. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) What do you think would happen if it was done, supposing one member put down a thing on his own initiative?—I think it would be brought up.

10807. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You said, I think, that the Spending Departments of the War Office might be under somebody answering to the Military Member of Council in India, call him what you like, but would you have the other division under somebody who would be subordinate to the Secretary of State?—What other division?

10808. You said three?—The other is the Finance Division. Practically speaking, the Financial Secretary is subordinate to the Secretary of State.

10809. And that business goes direct to the Secretary of State through the Financial Secretary?—Yes, naturally, and it always used to do so.

10810. And he is a Parliamentary officer?—Yes.

10811. You would not have the Military Member of Council, or whatever you call him, a Parliamentary officer?—No, I only put that in as a sort of help to the Secretary of State, whose work is so tremendous that it is impossible for him to get through it alone, in addition to his Parliamentary duties.

10812. I do not think your proposal would get rid of his having to answer all these questions in Parliament?—No.

10813. The answers to which are really prepared by somebody else?—Yes, I know; but he is held responsible by Parliament for things which he cannot be responsible for.

10814. And you would like yourself in your own position to have a real responsibility, and the Secretary of State to practically acknowledge it?—Yes, and for this reason—because I think that if a man is responsible he must go into the cases himself, and this the Secretary of State really has not time to do.

10815. (*Chairman.*) There are just three questions which it has been suggested to me that I should ask you. It has been suggested to us that the Commander-in-Chief should have an opportunity, if he held a very strong opinion on some matters of military policy which was not accepted by the Secretary of State, of putting his views before the Cabinet. Have you any opinion on that matter?—I think he has now. If I had any particularly strong opinion upon a question, and Mr. Brodrick did not share it, I should ask him to put it before the Cabinet.

See Q. 21588.

10816. And it would be done?—Yes, I think so.

10817. In writing?—I think so.

10818. But this, I think, went further: that he should have an opportunity of personally discussing his views with the Cabinet—pressing his views, in fact?—Personally, I have never felt the want of it at all.

10819. I think you said, in answer to Sir George Taubman-Goldie, that you had no wish for the Commander-in-Chief to be a member of the Government?—No, not at all. Mr. Brodrick has referred questions for me to the Cabinet.

10820. No doubt papers prepared by the Commander-in-Chief would become Cabinet papers frequently?—I have never experienced any difficulty in that way.

10821. Then there is another point. It was suggested that the Commander-in-Chief ought to give a certificate to Parliament each year that the Force authorised by Parliament was in an efficient state. What is your opinion with regard to that suggestion?—The Commander-in-Chief could, of course, give a certificate to the effect that there were so many men available, and that there was sufficient of arms and ammunition and clothing for them, and tentage, and that kind of thing, perfectly well.

10822. I think the idea of a certificate was based on having two Army Corps ready for service, as was proposed under Mr. Stanhope's minute, and the certificate was to bear that the Commander-in-Chief certified that that Force was ready for action, to go abroad with its arms and equipment?—I think the Commander-in-Chief might be called upon to do that.

10823. Do you see any great advantage in doing it?—The Commander-in-Chief under such circumstances

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would, of course, be able to say if the corps were in any way inefficient—if anything was wanting.

10824. I think the idea was that if there were any deficiencies he would specify them in his certificate with regard to the two Army Corps?—Yes.

10825. The Secretary of State, of course, makes his annual statement, as we know, to Parliament?—Yes.

10826. But he does not do it with, at the same time, a certificate of the military head of the Army before Parliament?—I see no objection to making the Commander-in-Chief responsible in that way.

10827. Would you see any advantage?—Yes, I thinl it would be an advantage.

10828. And incidentally to that it was stated that the country at present did not entirely appreciate the policy laid down, in the first place by Mr. Stanhope's Minute, that the force which we undertook to have always ready for foreign service was to be two Army Corps. Do you think that that is not sufficiently made public, or that it ought to be put before the public in a more authoritative manner?—I do not quite understand your question.

10829. The Minute of Mr. Stanhope of 1888 laid down that the requirements that the Army was called upon to meet were summed up in having ready two Army Corps for foreign service and a third partly composed of the Militia for home service?—Yes.

10830. And this certificate, which I have spoken of, was to be to the effect that the two Army Corps for foreign service were always ready?—Yes.

10831. Sir Coleridge Grove thought that the public had not had sufficiently before them the fact that that was a requirement which we had placed upon the military administration?—Possibly not. I do not remember ever hearing the public refer to it in any way.

10832. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) But at present it is three Army Corps?—Yes.

10833. The public do know that fact; that has been stated very frequently in Parliament?—Yes.

See Q. 9505.

10834. (*Chairman.*) This is the question and answer: "As to the evidence you have just been giving, do you know whether Mr. Stanhope's five propositions have ever been before Parliament?—(A.) I am as certain as I can be that they have never been formally before Parliament. I am speaking from general knowledge, as I have not watched the proceedings of Parliament, but I feel quite sure." You think, at any rate, that the requirements that are placed upon the Army should be definitely made known to the country, so that they may know that in voting the Army Estimates they are voting for those requirements?—Yes, I think so, certainly.

10835. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Do you see any objection to it at all?—Not at all.

10836. I just want to ask you one question. Have you ever been called before the Defence Committee of the Cabinet?—Yes, during the war, three or four times.

10837. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) In the two Boards as at present constituted, the Army Board and the War Office Council, is it competent for any member to initiate at the Board any new business for discussion or consideration?—There is an agenda sent round three or four days before. If anything urgent has been put before us at the Army Board, I have always agreed to its being discussed.

10838. In case of urgency, anything that you desired in the morning to put before the Board you could put before the Board?—Yes.

10839. Or any member might do it?—Yes, it has been done.

10840. We understood that it could not be so—that they could not initiate anything at the Board?—I have known a thing brought in the morning before the Army Board, and then brought before the War Office Council and considered.

10841. By the Secretary of State?—The other day the Financial Secretary brought something from his Department

10842. Then it is competent for any member of the Board to bring forward any new matter?—Yes, I think so, certainly. I have known it done.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

10843. (*Chairman.*) We have now reached the "military operations up to the occupation of Pretoria"?—The situation in South Africa, when I was appointed to the chief command, on the 17th December, 1899, presented a difficult problem. Our three main forces, Lord Methuen's on the west, General Gatacre's in the centre, and Sir Redvers Buller's in Natal, had each met with a serious check, and were none of them apparently strong enough to force the enemy's positions in their front. The Fifth Division had just arrived in South Africa, the Sixth was on the point of embarking, and the Seventh was being prepared. The bases of the three columns were so far separated, and the difficulty of moving troops from one base to another, so great, it was essential that I should at once decide on the line best fitted for the advance of the force under my command, and communicate my views to Sir Redvers Buller. Before leaving England, I had practically determined that the advance must be through the Orange Free State, but by one, not by three lines through Cape Colony, as was originally intended; and the western line commended itself to me for the following reasons: (1) It was on that line only we had possession of a railway-bridge over the Orange River. (2) It was by that line only that Kimberley could be relieved in time, and had Kimberley fallen, Mafeking must have fallen also. (3) It was by that line only I could deal with the Boer forces in detail, and defeat Cronje before he could be reinforced. Both the Norval's Pont and Bethulie Bridges were in the hands of the enemy, and by the time I had forced them back into the Orange Free State, and had been able to repair either of these bridges (which I was certain would be destroyed, and which actually happened), and I had occupied Bloemfontein, I should have between me and Kimberley, not only Cronje, but the whole of the Boer force which was not engaged in Natal. I should nave then been obliged either to march across the veldt against this increased force, or to have transported the greater portion of my troops by rail to the Modder River Camp (if the railway could have been kept intact, which was hardly likely, seeing how weakly it was necessarily guarded, and the number of Boers who would have been available to destroy it), and then to turn the Magersfontein position. To carry out either of these operations, and for the onward advance on an extended front to Pretoria, at least the same amount of transport would have been required as was needed for the march from Modder River Camp to Bloemfontein. But this would not have been forthcoming had I adopted the railway line to Bloemfontein, and not organised the system of transport directly I arrived at the Cape. On the eve of my departure from England (23rd December, 1899), I telegraphed as follows to Sir Redvers Buller (Cipher No. 1, 23-12, '99): "So far as I can see at present, the best way I can cooperate with you on my arrival in South Africa will be by carrying out the original plan of campaign, and advancing in force through the Orange Free State. The following expression of my views may facilitate our cooperation. From what I can learn here I imagine that you are only waiting for sufficient reinforcements to enable you to hold an entrenched camp at or near Chieveley, while with the rest of your force you would turn the enemy's strong position on the Tugela. If you succeed the situation will have sensibly improved, and it would then, I imagine, be advisable to evacuate Ladysmith, and hold the line of the Tugela until the time comes for a general advance. Please consider what number of troops you will be able to spare when this operation is completed. In the same way, if Methuen relieves Kimberley, I think that he should fall back to the Orange River, in view of a strong concentration on that line, preliminary to an advance on Bloemfontein. The importance of concentrating all our available force in Cape Colony for this purpose should never be lost sight of. A certain amount of food and ammunition, and a very small increase to the garrison, would make Kimberley thoroughly secure, judging from what has happened there since the war began. I shall be greatly obliged if you will let me have a statement of your views on the general situation, to meet me on my arrival at Cape Town, and if you will inform me therein of the disposition and strength of the forces in South Africa, and particularly of the capacity and readiness for service of the land transport, on which anything like a rapid advance in sufficient strength into the Transvaal mainly depends." On reaching Gibraltar, on the 26th December, I sent the following telegram to Sir Redvers Buller: (Cipher No. 2, 26, 12, '99), "Your recent telegrams to Lord Lansdowne. I do not consider Methuen should retire from his position, unless forced to do so; and as long as his line of communication can be kept open. As regards railway extension, I fear that construction of line will so seriously interfere with utility of present

working line that I should ask you to consult Girouard on this subject before coming to a decision." (I must explain that. The extension proposed was from the Modder River to Bloemfontein, much by the line I marched. The proposal was—Sir Redvers Buller proposed it, and Colonel Girouard supported it—that a railway should be made along that route, as it was considered that an advance could only be made by a railway line.) "As I expect to reach Cape Town on 11th, I hope the troops arriving there after this date may be concentrated at Cape Town, or, if necessary, employed in keeping open Methuen's communications until I arrive." And on the 28th December I telegraphed as follows from Madeira: (Cipher No. 3, 28, 12, '99) "I feel considerable hesitation in expressing my opinion in regard to the conduct of affairs in South Africa, as I am necessarily imperfectly acquainted with the general situation, but so far as I can judge of it, I am inclined to think that Gatacre, who is operating in a difficult part of the country, and has apparently very few troops at his disposal, should confine himself to the defensive, and to endeavouring to allay the feeling of unrest amongst the colonists in his neighbourhood. It seems very desirable, too, that French should not attempt too much, and should save his horses in every respect. I have not information as to how long Kimberley can hold out, but if the supply of food and ammunition will last, we need be in no hurry to break up the Boer force now between Methuen and Kimberley. Were it dispersed, a portion of it would possibly proceed eastwards, and add to the numbers already confronting you, while the rest would cross the Orange River, and make Gatacre's and French's tasks still more difficult. Although I should be delighted to hear of your joining hands with White, still the *status quo*, until the Sixth Division has landed, does not appear to be altogether undesirable." I felt convinced that an advance on Bloemfontein must draw the Free Staters back from Kimberley and Natal, and that the occupation of their capital would render the Boer positions to the south of the Orange River untenable. To carry out this scheme, as large a force as could be collected was necessary, as the enemy had through railway communication (about two days' journey) between Natal and Bloemfontein, and could transfer a considerable portion of their forces from one of the theatres of the war to the other in infinitely less time than we could. Moreover, rapidity was essential in concentrating this force, and making an advance towards Bloemfontein, as Ladysmith and Kimberley were, so far as I know, only provisioned for a very limited time. On my arrival at Cape Town on the 10th January, I received a telegram from Sir Redvers Buller informing me that he was leaving Chieveley on the 11th for Springfield, and would operate against Ladysmith from Potgieter's Nek, or Trichard's Drift. Although, from a general point of view, I should have preferred that these operations should have been deferred to a later date, I refrained from expressing my opinion, or from giving any instructions with regard to them, for I felt I was not in a position to judge how far Sir Redvers Buller was committed to an immediate move, or whether the situation in front of him and in Ladysmith demanded prompt action. I therefore decided to let Sir Redvers Buller have an absolutely free hand to carry out the operations he had planned. At Cape Town I had the advantage of reading a letter from Lord Methuen, dated the 8th January, to Sir Alfred Milner, in which he gave a satisfactory account of his position, and stated that he had no anxiety for the security of his line of communication. I told Lord Methuen, in reply to his letter, that as he was unable to relieve Kimberley, I must ask him to act strictly on the defensive, and, as it might even be necessary for me to withdraw a portion of his force, he should consider how his line of entrenchments could be made secure with a reduced number of troops; at the same time I ordered to be sent to him four 4·7 guns, which he had asked for. On the 12th January I wrote a congratulatory letter to Major-General French, and informed him that I was sending him three battalions of the 12th Brigade, under Major-General Clements, and that Lieutenant-General Kelly-Kenny, with the eight battalions of the 6th Division, would proceed shortly to Naauwpoort Junction. I told General French I understood that the Boers were increasing in strength between Colesberg and the Orange River, and that should Sir Redvers Buller succeed in relieving Ladysmith, their numbers would certainly be further augmented, as Joubert would then be free to hurry his men south-west, and block our way into the Orange Free State; adding that this might make the seizure of the Norval's Pont Bridge out of the question, but the possession of this crossing was of such supreme importance that I wished him to let we know whether, by any means, he thought it could be got possession of. I informed General French that I could further increase his force, or, what would probably be even greater assistance to him, I could threaten the enemy's rear from the Orange River Station direction. I cautioned him that the greatest secrecy would be required, and that the seizure of the bridge could only be effected by a very carefully thought out and well-planned *coup de main;* for if the Boers had the slightest inkling of our intention, they would assuredly frustrate it by blowing up the bridge. I further impressed upon him that there would be no object in our getting possession of the bridge and risking a number of valuable lives unless it could be made perfectly secure on its nothern bank, which I recognised might not be possible from the nature of the ground. And I begged of him to take every care of his men and horses, and save the latter as much as possible, for until we could get hold of some of the regiments then in Ladysmith his was almost the only cavalry we had to depend upon. On the 14th January I wrote again to General French, pointing out how important it was that nothing should happen within the following few weeks that could possibly give heart to the enemy, adding "Risks must, of course, be run in war, but it is most desirable to minimise them as much as possible. Most of our accidents hitherto seem to have occurred from positions being attacked before they had been sufficiently reconnoitred." On the 19th January I wrote to Lieutenant-General Sir W. Gatacre, telling him it was apparent he required some more mounted troops, and that I would send him Colonel Brabant with 3,000 Colonial troops, some of which—such as the Cape Mounted Rifles, the Kaffrarian Rifles, etc.—were already in existence, and that the rest would be raised with the least possible delay. I told Sir William I wished him to send a sufficient garrison to hold Dordrecht, as it was very desirable that troops should not be withdrawn once that place had been re-occupied. I suggested that the garrisons of Port Elizabeth and Queenstown might be slightly reduced, in order to find a detachment for Dordrecht, and I expressed a hope that Brabant's move towards Jamestown would cause the Boers to vacate Stormberg, as they would feel their line of retreat was threatened. I concluded with the following words: "Stormberg is, as you well know, a most important point for us to secure; but, considering the weakness of your force, it is not desirable that you should attempt to take it until the result of Brabant's advance to Jamestown is known. . . . Meanwhile I would ask you to act strictly on the defensive." I had sent Lieutenant-General Kelly-Kenny with the greater portion of the 6th Division to Naauwpoort Junction, and on the 21st January I wrote to him that I was glad he was in that neighbourhood, as I had information that the Boers were increasing in numbers at Burghersdorp, Stormberg, and Dordrecht, in the hope of being able to drive Gatacre further south, and thus induce the many wavering settlers in that district to join them. I did not anticipate any serious onward move would be made by the Boers for a fortnight or so, by which time Brabant's cavalry should be working round their left; and I gave it as my opinion that nothing we were able to do south of the Orange River at present would force the Boers back into the Orange Free State, and that to attempt anything of the kind would be a waste of valuable lives. On the 25th January I communicated to Major Sir Henry Elliot, Commandant of the Native Territories, Englobo, my plan of operations in that part of the colony, and asked him to give me all the information he could obtain as to the enemy's numbers and dispositions. On the same day I telegraphed to Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson, Commandant-General, British South Africa Police, Bulawayo, asking him what force he considered would be necessary to relieve Mafeking, in addition to that already at his disposal? What number of Volunteers could be raised locally? And what number of police could be spared from Rhodesia, without risk, should the natives rise? On the same day I wrote also to Lieutenant-General Kelly-Kenny, who had forwarded to me a request from Major-General French for more infantry in view of his attempting to reach the Bethulie railway bridge by a forced march with horse artillery and cavalry, and told him I doubted French being able to achieve his object, owing to the difficult nature of the country, and the opposition he would probably meet with *en route*. Moreover, that I

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hoped that the same result would be attained by different measures ere long, and that it was of more importance to keep in view the object for which I had sent him (Kelly-Kenny) to Naauwpoort, viz., to open up the railway between that place and Steynsburg, in order that Gatacre might be reinforced by that route if necessary. The following day, the 26th, I received General Buller's telegram announcing the abandonment of the Spion Kop position. In replying to him I expressed my distress at what had happened, and said: "Unless you feel fairly confident of being able to relieve Ladysmith from Potgieter's Drift, would it not be better to postpone the attempt until I am in the Orange Free State? Strenuous efforts are being made to collect transport, and I am hopeful of having sufficient to enable me to move on or about 6th February. If White can hold out, and your position is secure, the presence of my force on the north of the Orange River should cause the enemy to lessen their hold on Natal, and thus make your task easier." On the 26th January I replied by letter to a telegram and letter of Sir Redvers Buller's, dated the 6th *idem*, which I received soon after my arrival in Cape Town, and informed him that the 6th Division had arrived, and had been sent up the country, and that the troops of the 7th Division were reaching Cape Town daily. I explained that what delayed me as much as the want of troops was the fact of there being no regularly organised system of transport, the large number of mules in the country being so scattered about, without any arrangement by which they could be got together, adding that however well suited the regimental system might be for a few days' manœuvres at home, it was eminently unfitted for a campaign on a large scale in a big country like South Africa, and that I had been much occupied since I arrived in reorganising the transport system. I then repeated the substance of the telegram I had despatched to him earlier in the day, and told him I had good news from Kimberley, which could "easily hold out till the end of February," and that by the latest account from Mafeking, they had, on the 10th January, 70 days' supplies in hand. I asked Sir Redvers Buller to let me know the general line of action he proposed to adopt, while I was advancing on Bloemfontein, and whether it was likely that he would be able to spare any troops to assist in future operations to the west of the Drakensburg. On the 27th I telegraphed, through Sir Redvers Buller, to Sir George White, congratulating him, and all serving under him, "on the heroic and splendid defence he had made," and I concluded thus: "I am doing all that is possible to hurry on my movements, and shall be greatly disappointed if by the end of February I have not been able to carry out such operations as will compel the enemy to materially reduce his force in Natal." On the same day I telegraphed to the Secretary of State for War that my intention was to enter the Orange Free State from the neighbourhood of Methuen's camp, and, by turning the enemy's flank, effect the relief of Kimberley. The want of accurate maps caused me the greatest inconvenience. I felt tolerably sure that a move towards Bloemfontein from some point between the Orange and Modder Rivers, on the De Aar-Kimberley Railway, would, by threatening their communications, have the effect of making the Boer forces retire from their position in front of Generals French and Gatacre, and Cronje from his in front of Methuen, and thus open the way to Kimberley; but it was extremely difficult to decide on the best route to take, as I could get no trustworthy information as to the nature of the ground between the De Aar-Kimberley and Springfontein-Bloemfontein Railways. There were no roads to speak of, and water was reported to be scarce; it was, indeed, the doubt of being able to find a sufficient supply of water that finally determined me to move along the Modder River. It was essential to success that my plan should be kept absolutely secret, and that the enemy should be deceived as to my intentions. Their own movements helped towards this end. With the object of damaging the De Aar-Modder River section of the railway, they sent parties round by the west of Methuen's camp. To cut them off I ordered Methuen to send a small force under Brigadier-General Hector Macdonald to the Koodesberg Drift, with orders to construct a little fort there. His move and the arrival in Methuen's camp of strong reinforcements, practically the whole of the 6th and 7th Divisions and French's cavalry, led the Boers to believe that I intended to commence a move on Kimberley by their right, and I encouraged this idea by making frequent reconnaissances in that direction. By the 6th February my arrangements were complete, even the great difficulty about the transport had been overcome, thanks to the able assistance I had received from Lord Kitchener and Sir William Nicholson, whose experience in transport arrangements in Egypt and India respectively were valuable. That evening I left Cape Town by rail for Methuen's camp. On the eve of my departure Sir Alfred Milner addressed a memorandum to me, reviewing the political and military situations, and laying great stress on the possibility of a general rising among the disaffected Dutch population, should the Cape Colony be denuded of troops for the purpose of carrying on offensive operations in the Orange Free State. But I felt I must not risk longer delay, and that, without so denuding Cape Colony, for a time, operations could not be successfully pushed on. I will hand in a copy of the memorandum from, and of the one I wrote in reply to, Sir Alfred Milner. I also will hand in copies of some memoranda I published at the same time—"Suggestions for lessening the weight to be carried on horses." "The paramount importance of officers doing all in their power to keep their horses in proper condition," and "Notes for guidance in South African Warfare," etc., etc. (*These were all handed in, vide Appendix, page* 529, *post*. I reached Modder River on the 10th February, and came into heliographic communication with Colonel Kekewich. He informed me of the trouble he was having with the leading civilians, who threatened to surrender unless they could be assured that they would be speedily relieved. In reply I ordered Colonel Kekewich to impress upon the inhabitants the disastrous and humiliating effect of surrender, after so prolonged and glorious defence; that every endeavour was being made to relieve Kimberley, and I added that as martial law had been proclaimed, he had full power to prohibit, by force, if necessary, any public meeting he considered undesirable, and also to arrest any individual, no matter how high his position, who acted in a manner prejudicial to national interests. On this date I received a very disquieting telegram from Sir Redvers Buller telling me that he required reinforcements to enable him to relieve Ladysmith. It was then out of my power to help him, Cape Colony was left with only just enough troops, under Lieutenant-General Sir W. Gatacre and Major-General Clements (who had taken French's place in front of Colesberg), to keep the Boers from advancing, and the force with me was not more than sufficient to effect the relief of Kimberley, and march on Bloemfontein. In my reply to Sir Redvers Buller, I pointed out that I had kept him fully informed of my plans from the first; that, so far from asking for reinforcements, he had represented more than once that it would be scarcely possible for him to make use of a larger force, the difficulty about supplies on the Tugela, without roads, being so enormous; and I reminded him that I had suggested that if the relief of Ladysmith was a more difficult task than he could carry out, he should postpone any further attempt until the operations which I contemplated had become apparent, and there had been time for the hostile pressure in Natal to be lessened by my advancing into the Orange Free State. I concluded by saying I was convinced that, in the prosecution of the plan of operations I had decided upon lay our only chance of success, both in Natal, and on the North of Cape Colony, and that to postpone or abandon it, would lead to failure, and, as Cape Colony was weakly held, might not improbably cause a general rising of the disaffected Dutch population. By the 11th February all arrangements were in readiness for the movement I intended to make round the left flank of Cronje's position, and that morning the cavalry division, under Lieutenant-General French, proceeded from Modder River camp to Ramdam, a short distance within the boundary of the Orange Free State; the 7th division, under Lieutenant-General Tucker, marching to the same place, from the railway stations at Enslin and Graspan. My instructions to Lieutant-General Franch were to push on the following morning early, to secure the De Kiel and Waterval Drifts over the Riet River, and to reconnitre to the north of that river. The 7th division followed the cavalry, and the 6th Division, under Lieutenant-General Kelly-Kenny, took the place of the 7th Division at Ramdam. I joined the 6th Division at Ramdam at noon on the 18th February. Marching during the night I came up to the cavalry division soon after daybreak on the 13th, and heard from General French the information he had received of the country onwards to the Modder River. Water was reported to be very scarce. Partly on this account, and also because I was anxious to secure the passage of the Modder River at

the Ronddavel and Klip Drifts, before they could be seized by Cronje, who, I felt sure, must have become aware of my movements, I pushed the cavalry on, with orders to reach the Modder, distant about 30 miles, without delay. During the day the 6th Division joined the 7th Division on the Riet River, and the 9th Division (which I had formed with some of Lord Methuen's troops, and placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Colvile) marched to Ramdam. All this day and the following night, the 7th Division was occupied in getting the supply wagons, etc., across the De Kiel Drift. The banks were very steep, the bed of the river was rocky, and the work was extremely hard (performed under a scorching sun) both for men and animals. On the 14th February, the cavalry reconnoitred to the north of the Modder River. The 6th Division moved down the Riet River from the Waterval Drift to the Wegdrai Drift; the 7th Division from the De Kiel Drift to the Waterval Drift; and the 9th Division from Ramdam to the Waterval Drift. Later in the day, in order to occupy the drifts over the Modder, while Lieutenant-General French made his dash on Kimberley, I moved the 6th Division to Ronddavel Drift, replacing it by the 7th Division (which I accompanied) at Wegdrai Drift. On the 15th Lieutenant-General French relieved Kimberley, with a loss of only one officer killed, and 20 of all ranks wounded. Cronje was now fairly on the move. He recognised that his communication with Bloemfontein was threatened, and hurridly abandoning the Magersfontein position, which he had held for two months, he endeavoured to slip between the cavalry and the 6th Division. He was too late, and was overtaken by Lieutenant-General Kelly-Kenny near Klip Drift. As soon as this important information reached me, I despatched the 9th (Colvile's) Division, which was with me at Wegdrai, to join the 6th Division, and I sent orders to General French to return as speedily as possible to head off Cronje on the Modder River. Unfortunately my orders did not reach French until 10.30 p.m. on the 16th, and not knowing that he was likely to be recalled so soon, he had started off his cavalry early that morning in the hope of capturing the Boer guns, which had been used in the siege of Kimberley. This he failed to do, and his horses were so done up by the six days' hard work they had gone through, that by the time he succeeded in heading off Cronje, a considerable number of them were lost, no less than 558 being either killed, dead, or missing. I moved my headquarters to Jacobsdal on the 16th, where I had to remain until the 19th. I was laid up with a bad chill, and it was, moreover, necessary to replace the 180 wagons of supplies which had been captured by the Boers at Waterval Drift. The Boers had been hovering about my rear from the time we entered the Orange Free State, and finding the length of time required to get heavily-laden wagons across the difficult drifts, I had ordered, before leaving Waterval Drift, on the 14th, that all wagons that had not crossed the Riet River, were to be sent back to Ramdam. Unfortunately this order was never delivered to the officer in charge of the convoy. The cause of its miscarriage I was never able to discover. The weather was oppressively hot, an unusually severe dust storm made the day for several hours as dark as night, and the messenger, I can only imagine, must have lost his way. The failure to deliver the message was not made known to me at the time, and, therefore, believing that no convoy would have to be protected, only the ordinary rear guard was left at Waterval, when we marched to Wegdrai. This was attacked by a large party of Boers under, I believe, De Wet, on the 15th, and though, with the assistance I sent back, the enemy were driven off, so many of the oxen had been killed, and so many of the native drivers had run away, that I had reluctantly to give orders to abandon the wagons and stores that could not be destroyed. Serious as was the loss of such a large quantity of stores, I had a far too important work in hand to be able to spare either troops or transport animals for their recovery. For the force with which I started from the Modder River 125 ox wagons were required for reserve ammunition, and 475 wagons for the month's groceries and the ten days' supplies of bread stuff and forage, which was all I considered it advisable to carry with me, thinking, as it turned out correctly, that the carts which would have to take away the sick and wounded would be able to bring back from Kimberley or Modder River camp sufficient to supply our wants. The 180 captured wagons were speedily replaced; 100 laden wagons being available at the Modder River, and 78 filled with all kinds of stores were captured from Cronje by the 6th Division. But for fear of another accident similar to that which occurred at Waterval Drift, or of being delayed by the enemy longer than I anticipated, I thought it better to place the troops on a reduced ration of biscuit for a few days, giving them an extra supply of meat instead. This did not, however, last for long, for, owing to our enforced halt at Paardeberg, we were able to procure so much food from Kimberley that, on reaching Bloemfontein, we had eight days' groceries and five days' bread and biscuit stuff in hand. Of forage there was only sufficient for one day. There certainly was great difficulty in feeding the troops while on the march, owing to the wide area over which they were necessarily scattered. It was no easy matter for the regimental mule carts to come to the supply depôt for their provisions. Nothwithstanding this, however, and the large proportion of each day the transport mules had necessarily to be kept harnessed, their having to feed at uncertain hours, the scarcity of water, and the very indifferent grazing available, the casualties amongst the transport animals during the march from Modder River to Bloemfontein were by no means excessive. On starting, the number of mules was 11,362; 10,566 reached Bloemfontein, the loss being 796, or 7 per cent. The total number of oxen was 9,788, and 8,968 reached Bloemfontein, the casualties being 820 or about 8½ per cent. This deficit included our losses at De Kiel Drift, which, as I have explained, were made up almost entirely by captures *en route*. While at Jacobsdal, I made arrangements for the military administration of Kimberley, and the protection of the railway line between that place and the Orange River. I placed Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen in command, and directed him to move his headquarters to Kimberley. I made a further reduction in Lord Methuen's force by taking from him the Guards Brigade, which I placed under the command of Major-General Pole-Carew. As I was not sure of being able to maintain communication between Generals French, Kelly-Kenny, and myself, I sent Lord Kitchener to join Lieutenant-General Kelly-Kenny, and to remain with the 6th Division until I overtook it. Meanwhile, he had orders to keep me informed of all that was going on. From Lord Kitchener I learnt of the series of rear-guard actions which Cronje had fought on the 17th, and that on the morning of the 18th he was found strongly entrenched in a position in the bed of the Modder River, three miles above the Paardeberg Drift. On receiving this news, I ordered the Brigade of Guards to march from their camp on the Modder to Klip Drift, and the 14th Brigade of the 7th Division, under Major-General Chermside, to proceed from Jacobsdal to Paardeberg. On the 19th February, at 4 a.m., I left Jacobsdal, and reached Paardeberg at 10 a.m. The previous day there had been very serious fighting, and we had lost heavily. At one time it appeared likely that the laager might be captured, but the Boers held their ground so obstinately, and it being almost impossible to force a passage through the trees and thick undergowth fringing the river on both banks, the troops were drawn off. Immediately on arrival, I carefully reconnoitred the position, and the result of my observations was that I decided not to allow another attack to be made at once. The troops were greatly exhausted by their exertions on the two previous days; Cronje's position had been materially strengthened during the night, and could not be forced without a great sacrifice of life; and, moreover, I felt certain that he would have to surrender shortly if I could only prevent reinforcements coming to his assistance. The Boers in the neighbourhood and the more distant commandos soon became aware of the predicament in which Cronje was placed, and parties of varying strength hurried to help him—even from Cape Colony and Ladysmith. We drove these off without any great difficulty, and day by day decreased the distance between our outposts and the laager, until early on the morning of the 27th February, the Royal Canadian Regiment, supported by the Gordon Highlanders, succeeded in entrenching themselves within 80 yards of the enemy's defences. Cronje had refused my offer to give his women and children a safe conduct, but the havoc made amongst his horses, transport animals, etc., by our constant bombardment, and the certainty that an assault would be made within a few hours, convinced him that it was hopeless to hold out any longer, and on the 27th February at 6 a.m. he hoisted the white flag, and sent me a letter, surrendering unconditionally, and throwing himself and his troops on Her Majesty's clemency. Two hours later Cronje was received by me in camp; and he with the other prisoners, numbering 3,919 men, exclusive of 150 wounded, were despatched in the afternoon to Cape Town. I allowed Mrs. Cronje to accompany her husband, and sent the remainder of the women and

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children to wherever they wished to go. In order to give a correct idea of all that took place, I must now go back to the 18th February, the day before I left Jacobsdal, on which date I telegraphed to Major-General Clements that I believed the numbers of the enemy opposing him would shortly materially decrease, and urged him to push on and repair the bridge over the Orange River, so soon as he felt himself able to do so. On the same day I received a telegram from Sir Redvers Buller, informing me that he was gradually progressing in his attempt to turn the enemy's left. I told him in reply that I quite recognised the importance of doing all he could to help Sir George White, but that as I had no map which showed the features of the difficult country he described clearly enough to justify my giving an opinion as to his being able to force his way through it, I could only say that the present appeared to me a favourable time for the attempt to be made, if he felt fairly confident of success. I also told him that Cronje was almost surrounded by our troops, and that I had heard that 3,000 Boers had been despatched from before Ladysmith to help him. I concluded as follows: "If we are successful during the next few days the Boers are bound to be discouraged, and if Ladysmith is ever to be relieved now would seem to be the time. Let Cronje's critical position be at once known throughout Natal, and inform White in a message *en clair*." I again telegraphed to Buller very much in the above sense from Paardeberg on the 20th; and on that date I informed Lieutenant-Colonel Girouard that the Boers were loosening their hold south of the Orange River, and that, as it would soon be necessary for us to change our line of communication to the Bloemfontein-Naauwpoort route, it was of immense importance to the existence of my force that there should be no delay in repairing the railway the moment the enemy were driven north of the river. As it was impossible for me to foretell how long I might be kept in front of Bloemfontein, or what amount of supplies might be procurable when I reached Paardeberg on the 22nd February, I sent Lord Kitchener to Naauwpoort to explain to Major-General Clements and Lieutenant-Colonel Girouard that the safety of my force might depend on our being able to get supplies from Cape Colony; and I told Lord Kitchener to satisfy himself as to whether the Norval's Pont or Bethulie Bridge could be repaired the quickest. Lord Kitchener was only absent a few days, and on the 1st March the joyful news of the relief of Ladysmith reached us as he and I were riding into Kimberley, where we went to ascertain what arrangements could be made for mule transport, when the time came to relieve Mafeking, and whether any reliable men, who knew the country, could be raised to take part in the expedition. We spent one night at Kimberley, returning the next day. My camp, meanwhile, had been moved to Osfontein, a short distance beyond Paardeberg. In anticipation of the speedy relief of Ladysmith, I had asked Sir Redvers Buller (my telegram of the 25th February) to send me a division of infantry as soon as he had succeeded in joining hands with Sir George White, "as the presence of a force landing at East London, and travelling through the South Eastern districts towards the Orange Free State, would have the best possible effect, and afford me material assistance." In reply Sir Redvers Buller promised to let me have every man he could spare, as soon as he reached Ladysmith, and on the 2nd March I received from him the following telegram: "I do not think there is any chance of the enemy making a stand on this side of Laing's Nek. Most authorities here consider that it is practically impossible for the enemy to collect more than one-half of the force that is now dispersed from here. Will you advise me as to what course you wish to pursue? My own view would be that we should send three brigades to re-occupy Northern Natal, restore order, and repair the railway, and with two divisions attack the three passes, Tintwa, Van Reenan's Pass, and Bezeidenhouts, and pass through one of them the division you wish sent to your side; or, in the alternative of your not wanting a division, that the force kept should re-occupy Northern Natal, and the Wakkerstroom-Vryheid district of the Transvaal. The latter is the alternative I incline to, as likely to be the most objectionable to the enemy. With reference to the officers you ask for, may I wait a day or two until I see whom I can spare? Both White's force and my own have lost such an immense number of officers that at this moment it is difficult to say if we can spare any. I find that the defeat of the Boers is more complete than I had dared to anticipate. This whole district is completely clear of them, and, except at the top of Van Reenan's Pass, where several wagons are visible, I can find no trace of them. Their last train left Modder Spruit Station about one o'clock yesterday, and they then blew up the bridge. They packed their wagons six days ago, and moved them to the north of Ladysmith, so I had no chance of intercepting them; but they have left vast quantities of ammunition of all sorts, entrenching tools, camps, and individual necessaries. They have got away all their guns except two. My troops want a week's rest, boots, and clothes. The Ladysmith garrison want a fortnight's food and exercise." I replied, on the 3rd March, as follows: "I do not think it would be wise now to embark on extensive operations in Natal, which is evidently extremely suitable for the enemy's tactics, and very difficult for our troops. To force the passes of the Drakensberg would, undoubtedly, be a very hazardous operation, and would probably enable the Boers, with a small force to hold up a very much larger number of our men for some considerable time. The force in Natal, three months ago, consisted of four divisions of infantry. It is, probably, not now of greater strength than three divisions of infantry and one brigade of cavalry, besides local mounted troops. Two of these divisions, with the brigade of cavalry, should, I imagine, suffice for the pacification of such portion of Natal as would ensure the safety of the railway towards Van Reenan's Pass, on the understanding that the Natal Field Force is to act entirely on the defensive, until such time as the operations of this column have caused the enemy to withdraw altogether from, or considerably reduce their numbers in the Drakensberg passes. The remaining division should be despatched at once to East London; this portion of Cape Colony has from the first been left dangerously weak. It is most desirable it should be strengthened sufficiently to drive the enemy beyond the Orange River, for until this is done, and railway communication re-opened to the position I propose to take up on the line a little to the south of Bloemfontein, my force will be in a somewhat risky situation, cut off from its base, and with the main Boer Army collected in its immediate front. Be good enough, therefore, to despatch one of your divisions with the least possible delay to East London. I should like it to be accompanied by its Brigade Division of Artillery, if this will leave you with sufficient number of guns. But if you consider you cannot spare any guns, you can keep the Brigade Division. Any mounted troops you can send will be most acceptable. There are very few with Gatacre at present." I had no desire to fetter Sir Redvers Buller's movements, but it was so essential that Gatacre should be strengthened without delay. I could not run the risk of the division I required in the eastern portion of Cape Colony being sent to me by the circuitous route of the Drakensberg, besides the certainty of its being strongly opposed by the way. Moreover, my intention was, after Cape Colony was cleared, to utilise this division in the arrangements for the relief of Mafeking. It was, therefore, necessary to have it on or near the line of railway. My original plan was to move towards Bloemfontein as soon as the enemy's force under Cronje had been obliged to surrender; but the cavalry and artillery horses were so exhausted by their rapid march to Kimberley and back, and so weakened by the scarcity of forage, that I found it absolutely necessary to give them a week's rest. Meanwhile, reports came in that the enemy were collecting in considerable strength to the east of Osfontein, and, as they completely blocked my advance, I determined to attack them. The following memorandum will explain my plan of operations: "Addressed to General Officers Commanding, Osfontein Camp, 6th March, 1900.—I have asked you to meet me here this afternoon in order to communicate to you the proposed plan of operations for to-morrow. The enemy, as you know, occupy a strong, but somewhat extended, position in our immediate front. Their object is, of course, to block the road to Bloemfontein, and, so far as the information we can procure goes, it is apparently the only place between here and Bloemfontein where our progress could be checked. It is difficult to calculate the exact strength of the enemy; but, allowing that the troops withdrawn from Colesberg, Stormberg, and Natal have joined, it seems scarcely possible that it can number more than 14,000 at the outside, with perhaps 20 guns. To meet this number we have some 30,000 men and 116 guns. My intention is to send the cavalry division, with Alderson and Ridley's Mounted Iinfantry, and seven batteries of Royal Horse Artillery to threaten the enemy's line of communication with Bloemfontein. To avoid coming under the enemy's fire throughout this distance the cavalry will have to make a detour of about

17 miles. This would bring them to the south bank of the Modder River, probably some two miles above the Poplar Grove Drift. It is very likely, however, that General French may find some vulnerable points which it would be desirable for him to attack before he reaches the river. The destruction of their laagers practically cripples the Boers, as we have learnt from experience. There are three or four laagers reported to be on the places marked on the plan, a copy of which has been supplied to all officers in command, and it would be well worth General French's while to bring the fire of his 42 guns to bear on them. The Boers are very clever at taking cover themselves, but they cannot hide their wagons, transport animals, and riding ponies, and the destruction of these must in time bring them to terms, the more especially as they will be cut off from their supplies at Bloemfontein. It is intended that the Sixth Division, with its Brigade Division of Artillery, and the Howitzer Battery, and also Martyr's mounted troops (except those ordered to join the Seventh Division) should follow the route to be taken by the Cavalry Division for about six miles. It will then be, on the south-east of the 'Seven Kopjes,' the southernmost limit of the Boer position. General Kelly-Kenny will not, I think, have much difficulty in driving the enemy off these kopjes. They will be shaken by knowing that the cavalry has passed round their rear, and a judicious use of mounted infantry, and a combined bombardment of 24 guns, will further dishearten them. The first position to which the Boers can retire from the 'Seven Kopjes' is 'Table Mountain,' distant 4¾ miles. They should be followed up by the 6th Division, which will be assisted in its attack on 'Table Mountain' by the Brigade of Guards, the four 4·7 naval guns, Flint's Brigade Division of Artillery, and the Le Gallais Mounted Troops. This latter force will assemble at daybreak at the posts now held by Le Gallais' and Martyr's troops, distant nearly two miles from the Headquarters Camp. The 'Table Mountain' is the key of the enemy's position, and with that in our possession they will have to retire into the Modder River, as Cronje did, or force their way across it. The 7th Division (14th Brigade only) is occupying the ground hitherto held by the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of Cavalry. It will have with it its Brigade Division of Artillery, Nesbit's Horse, New South Wales and Queensland Mounted Infantry. The duty of the 7th Division is to threaten the enemy as best it can, and draw their attention from the main attack on the 'Table Mountain.' Should they show signs of retiring across the river, the 7th Division should move eastwards towards the Drift and endeavour to harass them as much as possible. The 9th Division will act in the same way on the north bank of the river. It will have to look out for the hill on its left front, on which the Boers had a gun a day or two ago. This division will be accompanied by three naval 12-pounder guns, and its left flank will be protected by two regiments of mounted infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel De Lisle. Lieutenant-Colonel Rhodes will be good enough to arrange that signalling may be carried on throughout the day between the headquarters and the several infantry divisions. My headquarters will be with the Guards' Brigade, at the post now occupied by Le Gallais' Mounted Troops. The Principal Medical Officer will be pleased to see that medical arrangements are made suitable for the movements of the several divisions as above indicated. General officers in command will issue orders that their troops are to take cooked food with them, and that a supply of water is to be arranged for as well as circumstances will admit. All baggage should be left in camp."

The operations were carried out in accordance with the above scheme, but owing to the darkness of the night the Cavalry Division was delayed, and when day broke, instead of being, as I had hoped, well round the enemy's left flank, it had gone little more than a couple of miles, and for some time blocked the way of the 6th Division. This division further delayed matters by making too wide a detour to the south, with the result that the Boers had been driven off the "Seven Kopjes" by the fire of the Horse Artillery guns in reverse and of the 4·7 inch naval guns in front before it came up. The turning movement of the cavalry and horse artillery so shook the enemy that they evacuated "Table Mountain" without scarcely firing a shot, when they saw the Guards and the 9th Division advancing against them. The Poplar Grove day, however, was a most disappointing one to me, as I had quite calculated on cutting the enemy off from the Bloemfontein road, and forcing him to get entangled in the difficult drifts of the Modder; but, notwithstanding the comparative rest the horses had had after Cronje's surrender, they were in extremely poor condition, added to which, the ground was very heavy owing to recent rain. Had the mounted troops been able to move more rapidly, they could undoubtedly have intercepted the enemy's line of retreat, for when I reached Poplar Grove late in the afternoon with the infantry and heavy artillery their rearmost troops were still visible. Immediately on sighting them I hurried off a staff officer to tell General French what a short way off the enemy were, and to urge him to follow them up. The reply I received was that his horses had come to a standstill. The failure to effect my object was the more mortifying when I learnt that the Presidents of the Orange Free State and South African Republic had been present during the engagement, and had strongly urged the Boers to continue the fight. Their appeals to the burghers were, however, in vain. The capture of Cronje and his 4,000 men had utterly demoralised them, and they refused to fight any longer. I halted the whole force at Poplar Grove on the 8th March, and the following day moved the 1st Cavalry Brigade and the 6th Division to Waaihoek, on the road to Abraham's Kraal. It now became necessary for me to leave the Modder River, and move in a more southerly direction towards Bloemfontein, because I heard that it was by the former route that the Boers expected me to advance, and were ready to oppose me in a strongly entrenched position near Bainsblei. As I was not sure there might not be trouble with that portion of the enemy which was vacating Cape Colony, I divided my force into three columns. The left, under Lieutenant-General French, was directed to march through Baberspan and Venter's Vlei to Leeuwberg, on the railway line about 15 miles south of Bloemfontein. The right, under Lieutenant-General Tucker, was ordered to march through Petrusberg, Driekop, and Panfontein or Welbevvade, to Venter's Vlei, and I accompanied the centre or main column, which was intended to march through Driefontein, Aasvogel Kop, and Venter's Vlei to Leeuwberg. On the 10th the movement began as ordered. The right column occupied Petrusberg without opposition. The left found the enemy holding several kopjes behind Abraham's Kraal, and endeavoured to turn their left. The Boers, however, anticipated this movement by a rapid march southward, and took up a fresh position on a ridge, about four miles long, running north and south across the road two miles east of Driefontein. Lieutenant-General French followed the enemy, and came into contact with them at 11 a.m. Meanwhile the 2nd Cavalry Brigade had reached Driefontein, and endeavoured, in conjunction with the 1st Cavalry Division, to turn the rear of the Boers by operating in the plain behind the ridge which they were holding. The enemy's guns, however, had a longer range than our field guns, which were the only ones immediately available, and some time elapsed before the former could be silenced, especially a Creusot gun, which had been placed in a commanding position on an isolated kopje 2½ miles east of the northern end of the ridge. The infantry of the 6th Division reached this end of the ridge about 2 p.m., having been under the enemy's shell fire (which, however, did but little damage) for more than an hour. The Boers were gradually pushed back towards the centre of the ridge, where they made an obstinate stand. The 9th Division came up at 5 p.m., and I at once ordered the Guards' Brigade and the 19th Brigade to the assistance of the 6th Division; but before these reinforcements could reach the ridge the enemy's position was stormed in the most gallant manner by the 1st Battalions of the Essex and Welsh Regiments, supported by the 2nd Battalion of the Buffs. The bodies of 102 Boers were afterwards found along the ridge, mainly on the position which they held to the last. But for the weak state of the horses, the battle of Driefontein would have been even more decisive; as it was, it effectually demoralised the Boers who had come to Cronje's assistance, and enabled me to occupy Bloemfontein without further opposition. On the night of the 10th the left and centre columns bivouacked together in the vicinity of Driefontein, and the following day marched to Aasvogel Kop, a portion of the Cavalry Division proceeding to Venter's Vlei. While at Aasvogel Kop I sent the following proclamation to the inhabitants of Bloemfontein:—"Aasvogel Camp, 11th March, 1900.—Her Majesty's troops are within a short distance of Bloemfontein, and will enter the town in a few days. If no opposition is encountered the town will be protected, and peaceful inhabitants remain unmolested. If opposition is met with, the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief will be

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compelled to take such steps as may seem to him best to overcome it. This may result in damage to the town and loss of life, which the Field Marshal would regret. The inhabitants of Bloemfontein are hereby warned to take such measures as will, in the event of opposition being offered, tend to the security of their own safety." On the 12th March my headquarters, together with the 6th and 9th Divisions, moved to Venter's Vlei, while the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades, under Lieutenant-General French, pushed on to Brand Dam Kop, seven miles to the south-west of Bloemfontein. I diverted the cavalry from Leeuwberg, which was their original objective, to a point much nearer Bloemfontein, for two reasons. First, it was reported that reinforcements from the north were hourly expected at Bloemfontein, and it thus became imperatively necessary to forestall the enemy's movements, a report which was subsequently substantiated by a telegram from President Kruger to General Joubert which fell into my hands. Secondly, if there were any delay, the Boers would have time to remove the locomotives and rolling stock, which, I was informed, were still in the railway station at Bloemfontein. Some slight resistance was met with by the cavalry, but no serious fighting took place, and the only casualties that occurred were on the side of the Boers. Early the next morning I proceeded to Brand Dam Kop, accompanied by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and found that the hills commanding the town had already been occupied by the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades. At noon several of the leading citizens, including Mr. Fraser, drove out to the kopje which I had just reached, about a mile from the town, and tendered their submission to the British Government. I entered Bloemfontein at 1 p.m. I established my headquarters in the official residence of the State President, which Mr. Steyn had vacated at six o'clock on the previous evening. The 1st Infantry Brigade marched this day from Venter's Vlei to Bloemfontein, and the 6th and 9th Divisions from the same place to Brand Dam Kop. On the morning of the 14th the 6th Division advanced to Bloemfontein, being there joined in the course of the day by the 9th Division. On the evening of the 12th March, in accordance with orders I had previously given to General French, Major Hunter-Weston, R.E., broke up the railway line north and south of Bloemfontein for a sufficient distance to prevent the rolling stock being removed. This enterprising officer also succeeded in cutting the enemy's telegraph and telephone wires in both directions. Eleven locomotives, 20 carriages, and 140 trucks were captured at the Bloemfontein Railway Station. The acquisition of this amount of rolling stock greatly facilitated the reopening of railway communications with Cape Colony, in spite of the fact that the bridges at Norval's Pont and Bethulie had been blown up by the enemy when they withdrew to the north side of the Orange River. During the march to Bloemfontein I received several telegrams from Sir Alfred Milner, who was anxious about affairs in the north-west part of Cape Colony. Rebellion, he said, was spreading in Prieska, Kenhardt, Carnarvon, and Victoria West. But it was difficult to help him. I had hardly sufficient troops for the difficult task before me, and I knew that Lord Methuen could do nothing, as the Boers about Barkley West and Boshof were giving him a good deal of trouble. I had placed the disaffected part of Cape Colony under Major-General Settle, R.E., but as the area was very extensive, and I wished to afford Sir Alfred Milner every possible assistance, I instructed the General Officer Commanding at Cape Town to utilise any of the newly arrived troops that could be spared, and as soon as the Poplar Grove fight was over I sent Lord Kitchener to De Aar with directions to remain in that part of the country until order was restored. From this time, and until Sir Redvers Buller's column joined the main army under my personal command at Bergandal in September, frequent telegrams passed between him and me. I will hand in copies of all, and a perusal of them will, I think, explain my reasons for the part I assigned to Sir Redvers Buller's column during the operations which resulted in the annexation of the Transvaal. (*Copies of the telegrams were handed in.*) The matters which caused me the gravest anxiety when I reached Bloemfontein were: (1) Food and shelter for the troops, (2) remounts for the cavalry, artillery, and mounted infantry, (3) re-establishment of railway communication with Cape Colony, (4) additional medical officers, medical subordinates, nurses, medical comforts, etc. We had, as I have already stated, ten days' groceries and five days' bread stuffs at the end of the march, but I was afraid that these would scarcely last until the railway had been repaired, and it was a great relief to me when Colonel Richardson reported that he had collected 27 days' supplies for men and animals in Bloemfontein itself. Tents, and even more urgent articles required for the establishment of the hospitals which had been brought up, we had to wait for until the railway was opened. A few of the men were accommodated in houses, but the greater number had still to live in the open, as officers and men alike had done since we left the Modder River Camp. Long marches, incessant duty, a fierce sun, and a considerable amount of rain had tried the men greatly, but they were in grand spirits, and marched into Bloemfontein (the Guards covering 40 miles the last day, with scarcely a halt) in splendid form. I telegraphed home for medical aid, and I ordered all available nurses to be sent up from Cape Town. The second day after reaching Bloemfontein I despatched the Brigade of Guards down the line of railway to assist in its repairs, but Lieutenant-Colonel Girouard and his staff had exceeded my expectations as to the pace at which they repaired the railway, and constructed temporary bridges over the Orange River; and on the 18th March, five days after our arrival in Bloemfontein, I was able to report to the Secretary of State for War that "the English mail was despatched from this yesterday, and to-morrow the regular railway service with Cape Town will be re-opened." My great difficulty, and which remained a difficulty, more or less, until the end of the war, was the want of horses. In addition to the 558 horses lost during the Relief of Kimberley, 1,001 were killed or died from exhaustion, between the 18th February and the 13th March, in the Cavalry Division alone, and a great number of the remainder were quite unfit for work. The chief cause of this mortality among the horses was, in my opinion, their not having been acclimatised before they had to begin to work hard; most of them coming from a northern to a southern latitude, where the change of their coats was in reverse to the season. It has been proved by long experience in India that, if the horses from Australia have any strain put upon them before they have had ten months' or a year's acclimatisation, they break down. By the necessity of the case horses for the war were principally purchased off grass runs, and it is essential on board ship to keep them low; the result being that when they landed they were in soft condition and quite unfitted for immediate hard work. If any proof of this were needed, I would refer to the well-known fact that the horses which stood, by far the best, were those which came from the great omnibus companies. As these were in hard condition before they started, they benefited by the three or four weeks' rest on board ship, and were fit for work much more quickly than any of the others. Owing to the urgent demand for mounted men at the front, particularly in the early part of the war, I found it impossible to carry out my theory that horses should have a good rest on landing. Another cause of the heavy loss in horseflesh was that there was practically no forage procurable in South Africa except grass, and that of the poorest quality. More especially was this the case during the hot season of the year, in which I commenced operations. Water also was extremely scarce. An ample and regular supply of oats would, in a measure, have compensated for the poor grass, but it was at first impossible, and, later on, often most difficult, to provide the amount of transport which a full daily ration of oats would have necessitated. I would take this opportunity of drawing attention to the fact, which I do not think has been sufficiently recognised, that the transport required for the food of 1,000 horses would suffice for that of 12,000 men. Thus it came about that the regular supply of oats was often deficient (I have often heard people say: "Why not have more oats for them," but they fail to remember the enormous amount of transport that is required for the horses' food). I consider, further, that we have always weighted our horses too heavily, and I endeavoured to rectify this by issuing the two Army Orders referred to in the early part of this paper, and added to all this I am confident that, as a rule, officers and men do not know enough about the management of horses, and do not recognise the necessity for taking that care of them, without which they cannot be expected to make the extraordinary exertions required of them in time of war without deteriorating. I was most anxious to continue the operations onwards to Pretoria, but it was impossible for me to leave Bloemfontein until the southern portion of the Orange Free State had been fairly well cleared of the enemy; until a sufficient number of days' supplies had been collected at Bloem-

fontein; until enough troops had been brought up to enable me to advance with a front wide enough to prevent my flanks being turned; until additional transport had been organised; and until the cavalry, artillery, and mounted infantry were properly mounted. Bloemfontein is 750 miles distant from Cape Town, connected, as I have explained, by a single line of railway. From the country itself we were able to get scarcely anything in the shape of food, except meat, and every mile we advanced took us further away from the only place where all the stores, munitions of war, etc., required by the Army, were obtainable. This unavoidable delay was unfortunate in many respects. The enemy knew exactly how we were situated. They had accurate information as to the condition of our supplies, our transport, and our cavalry and artillery horses. They regained courage by our prolonged and enforced halt, and their retrograde movement was arrested. They showed tactical skill by reoccupying Ladybrand, and by concentrating a large force between Brandfort and Thabanchu. This gave them free access to the south-eastern districts of the Orange Free State, and prevented me moving until they had been forced back north of the Thabanchu-Ladybrand line. It was a portion of this force which, under De Wet, successfully surprised Brigadier-General Broadwood's column on the 30th March at Sannah's Post, and a day or two later captured a small detachment at Reddersburg. Elated by these successes the Boers pushed on and surrounded Wepener, where a party of Colonial troops, under Lieut. Colonel Dalgety, had arrived a few days before. A most gallant defence was made, but the enemy held their position for 16 days, until pressure from the south and west caused them to withdraw northward along the Basutoland border. While these events were taking place, the state of my mounted troops prevented me from attempting any operations which demanded rapidity of movement. I was determined, moreover, to adhere, if possible, to the plan of campaign I had decided upon at the first, and not to be led into diverting from it, for operations of subsidiary importance, the troops required to attain my main objective, namely, to advance in adequate strength through the northern portion of the Orange Free State, on Johannesberg and Pretoria. I had to content myself, therefore, with carefully guarding the line of railway, and with collecting a force strong enough to drive the enemy north of the Brandfort-Thabanchu line. For this purpose I brought the third Division up to its full strength by the addition of some Militia battalions, and concentrated it, as well as the newly arrived eighth Division, at Edenberg. I had previously (5th April) requested Sir Redvers Buller to transfer the tenth Division in place of the fifth Division, which had never been sent, under Lieut.-General Sir Archibald Hunter, together with the Imperial Light Horse, to Cape Colony, the state of affairs in Natal justifying some reduction in Sir Redvers Buller's force, and additional troops being urgently required to effect the relief of Mafeking. I utilised Major-General Hart's Brigade, of the tenth Division, for the relief of Wepener, in conjunction with the main body of the Colonial troops, under Brigadier-General Brabant, and I sent the remainder of the Division to Kimberley. I increased and reorganised the Mounted Infantry, supplementing it by several battalions of Imperial Yeomanry, and collected them, together with the fourth Cavalry Brigade, which had recently arrived from England, in the neighbourhood of Bloemfontein. My dispositions for protecting the railway and expelling the enemy from the south-eastern districts of the Orange Free State had the desired effect, and on the 24th April Wepener was relieved, and Dewetsdorp occupied by a body of troops under the command of Lieut.-General French. The enemy, finding themselves thwarted in the south-eastern portion of the Orange Free State, took up a position between Thabanchu and Ladybrand, from which they were gradually pushed back by the 8th Division under Lieut.-General Sir Leslie Rundle, Brigadier-General Brabant's Colonial Division, and a force under the command of Major-General Ian Hamilton. On the 28th and 29th April our troops were engaged with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Thabanchu, and on the 1st May the enemy was signally defeated at Houtnek, with comparatively small loss on our side, thanks to the admirable dispositions made by Major-General Ian Hamilton. It would, doubtless, have been more satisfactory had the troops employed at Dewetsdorp and Wepener been able to cut off the enemy's retreat and capture their guns; but, as I have already explained, they were limited in number, and during these operations the Boers moved with hardly any baggage, each fighting man carrying his blankets and food on a led horse. Being intimately acquainted with the resources of the country, and knowing exactly where grain and cattle were to be found, the enemy were not obliged to take their supplies with them, and could march at a pace which our troops could not hope to equal. It followed, therefore, that they were able to escape without suffering any other loss than that inflicted by our troops when dislodging them from the various positions they occupied. By the beginning of May I had all the strategical points in the south-eastern districts securely held, and I was no longer anxious for the safety of the railway. The condition of the cavalry, artillery, and mounted infantry had materially improved, and a considerable number of remounts had arrived; sufficient supplies had been collected at Bloemfontein, and the arrangements for the transport had been completed. Under these circumstances I felt justified in ordering a forward movement towards Kroonstad. On the 3rd May I left Bloemfontein by train for Karee Siding. To this point I had some days before despatched the 11th (Pole-Carew's) Division. The 1st (Hutton's) Brigade of mounted infantry had moved to Brakpan, ten miles to the west, while Lieut.-General Tucker, with the 15th (Wavell's) Brigade of the 7th Division, was two miles to the east of the Siding; the 14th (Maxwell's) Brigade was at Vlakfontein, five miles further east. On the morning of this day Major-General Ian Hamilton's force was at Isabellafontein. I have not been able to prepare my statement of the operations further than that point.

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10844. That is as far as you have been able to go at present?—Yes.

10845. We are greatly indebted to you for what you have said, and I have no doubt you will not mind coming back at some future date to give us the rest?—I will finish my description of the operations up to the occupation of Pretoria the next time I come. I would rather have some little time to enable me to complete it.

10846. There are just three or four general questions which I should like to ask. I think you are aware that we do not propose to pronounce opinions upon strategical points, but if any strategical point is raised we would like to have the opinion of military experts regarding it. Three questions were raised which I communicated to you, and upon which I should be glad to have your opinion. The first was whether, assuming that the proper line of advance was direct through the Orange River Colony, General Buller was right in his decision to abandon that line of advance, and to go himself to Natal and to send Lord Methuen against Kimberley?—On his first arrival?

10847. Yes?—I have always thought he was in a very difficult position when he first arrived with the alarming accounts from Natal, and I think I should have done as he did, and gone to Natal myself to see how matters stood. With regard to Methuen, I think I should have satisfied myself with sending him as far as what we call the Orange River Station—that is, the station of the railway which crosses the Orange River to the west.

10848. Without attempting to force his way to Kimberley?—Yes, until he was certain what was in front of him.

10849. The statement you have just made, I think, practically gives your answer on the second point, viz.: that you yourself determined, instead of advancing by the line of the railway through the Orange Free State, to take the westerly route?—Yes. Some few years before the war broke out, two young officers from the Staff College came to see me in London; they anticipated that war was to take place, and we had a discussion as to what should be done. We looked over all the maps, and at that time I gave my opinion against an advance through Natal, and said that the proper way was by the western line, for the reason that if the Orange Free State remained neutral it would not be available, and if it joined against us it would require a large force to make a way through it on account of the very difficult country to the north of the Orange River. I was quite opposed to going by either the East London line, or the Port Elizabeth line, or the Cape Colony line leading off to the east from De Aar Junction where you turn off to Naauwpoort. The line I adopted was the one I advised the two Staff College officers should be taken.

10850. Instead of following the railway from the Orange River to Bloemfontein?—I thought that line

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would prove troublesome, as the country is very difficult, and I hoped by doing what I did to be able to turn the enemy out of Cape Colony without fighting, which I succeeded in doing.

10851. And I understand that was the opinion you came to before the war?—Before the war; I think it was in 1897 that the two staff officers came and asked what I should do, and when I was appointed to the command in South Africa, I carried out the plan that I had recommended to those officers.

10852. You would not hold that the best line of advance was by the railway line to Bloemfontein?—I would not, for the reasons I have already stated. By the route I adopted my left flank was, practically speaking, safe; it was almost a desert; the country was easy, and the only fear I had of attack was on my right. Moreover, it was the direct route to Kimberley.

10853. I think, after what you said yesterday, I need not go into the Natal problem further. You told us yesterday that you thought that, as matters stood, Sir George White exercised a wise discretion in making his stand at Ladysmith?—Yes.

10854. There is one other general question, whether, when it was decided that it was impossible to hold certain bridges over the Orange River, and certain portions of the railways in Natal, those bridges ought not to have been destroyed?—You mean in the early part of the Natal occupation?

10855. Yes?—I think it would have been very desirable to have destroyed the bridges and the Laing's Nek tunnel north of Ladysmith. If that had been done the Boers would have been greatly hampered. I imagine these precautions were not taken because it was never anticipated that the enemy would advance in strength into Natal.

10856. I think, if you have no objection, it would suit us better if we had an opportunity of reading the very interesting statement you have made, and, if we have any questions in regard to it, that we should put them when you come back with the rest of the statement?—Certainly.

(*For continuation of Lord Roberts's Statement and Evidence, see page* 46, *Vol. II.*)

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Lieut.-General Sir Ian S. M. Hamilton, K.C.B., D.S.O., Military Secretary, called and examined.

10857. (*Chairman.*) We propose to-day merely to take you with regard to your position as Military Secretary, and to ask you to be so good as to come back again on some future date with regard to your experience in the war itself?—Yes, sir. I have drawn up a formal statement of the work of the Military Secretary as laid down for him, which I gave to Sir Coleridge Grove at his request, but I do not know whether he used it in any way here or not. (*The statement was handed in. Vide Appendix, page* 534, *post.*)

10858. You were appointed Military Secretary, I think, when Lord Roberts became Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

10859. And after that you went out to South Africa?—I served for a certain time here, and then was telegraphed for and went out again, and I came back again with Lord Kitchener.

10860. So that your experience is limited?—It is not very long.

10861. We had evidence from Sir Coleridge Grove, and he told us, I think, the general lines of the duties of the Military Secretary?—I think he must have.

10862. But I am not quite sure whether any alterations have been made in regard to the duties of the Military Secretary since Lord Roberts assumed command?—In the Order in Council in November, 1901, the duties were slightly modified from those under which Sir Coleridge Grove had always worked. The status of the position was rendered a little more independent and less personal to the Commander-in-Chief, and it was made in some respects more a department, but still the work is so very much connected with that of the Commander-in-Chief and with his patronage, that the Military Secretary practically remains to a great extent particularly the Staff Officer to the Commander-in-Chief.

10863. The main part of the work of the office is with regard to supplies of officers?—A very large part, yes, the candidates for commissions and their education, the first appointments to the Army, their promotion afterwards, and then, when they finish their time, their retirement, and confidential reports form a very large part of the work.

10864. Have you any statement you would like to make with regard to your impression of the office since you took it up?—I have formed certain views, which I can state very briefly, with regard to the War Office organisation. A question being asked in the House of Commons on any point, however small, and the responsibility of the Secretary of State being there insisted on, it almost drives him to say, "I must not have another case of this sort without its being brought to me," and it has to be brought up to him, and that delays things, and makes the machine work very slowly. I have thought a great deal about any possible remedy, and it seems to me that if the House of Commons would permit the Secretary of State on a minor matter to quote any large solid body of military opinion, such as the Army Board, or Selection Board, and to say, "This was a small point, and you would not expect me to look into this personally; it was the unanimous recommendation, after full consideration of the Army Board," in two out of three cases probably the House of Commons would ask no more. In the third case the House of Commons would say, "Well, we would rather you inquired further into it, and told us how such a thing came to pass, because there is something wrong about this." I think that whereas the House of Commons objects apparently to the Secretary of State saying, "This was Lord Roberts' doing," or "This was the doing of General Kelly-Kenny," they might sometimes accept without any further question that, for instance, an infantry officer was appointed to command a cavalry regiment, which is an unusual thing, if the answer was, "This was very carefully considered, and the Selection Board recommended it," I think they might accept it, and if they did accept it that would enable the Secretary of State to throw off a great deal of embarrassing detail which now takes up his time. That is one difficulty we have, and I think if it was not for that the machine would work very much more freely and better.

10865. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) And quicker?—Much quicker, I think, if in many minor things high officers could exercise their own discretion a little more. I quite see that under present circumstances it is impossible for the Secretary of State to let them do so—almost impossible; at least, it is difficult.

10866. (*Chairman.*) And if he had the opinion of the Army Board he should produce that?—Yes, and it might possibly be accepted.

10867. And the Army Board as at present constituted, if it met regularly and it was an understood thing that these points of military importance came before them, could do that work?—Certainly.

10868. It is a sort of body that could speak for military opinion?—Yes; anything at all unusual and likely to give rise to a question ought, by the head of the department, to be brought before the Army Board.

10869. I was not quite sure whether, although it might meet the ordinary military administration, it would be so easily adapted to the affairs of your office, where it is a matter of the supply and appointment of officers?—The Selection Board would usually fill the place of the Army Board in this connection, but take that very case that is coming up in the House, the appointment of Colonel De Lisle, an infantry officer, to the command of a provisional cavalry regiment at Hounslow, that is an unusual thing, which has excited some comment, and in such a case as that the Military Secretary would explain his reasons for doing this to the Board; he would say: "There are very good reasons for doing it," and they would all say, "This is expedient"; and the man who is asking that question in the House would probably be perfectly satisfied. He would be told that the military side of the House had considered this, and thought it expedient, and he would not want any more, and if he did not want any more, the Secretary of State would not trouble himself to go minutely into the thing at all.

10870. What I meant was that that is a class of case which does not now come before the Army Board?—No.

10871. Other points of military administration would naturally comes before the Army Board, if it sat at any

rate, as it did during the war, but I do not think this class of case which you have just mentioned has ever come before the Army Board?—Never. I have only attended one Army Board during the 14 or 15 months I have been at the War Office; there has been only one held.

10872. And Lord Roberts explained why?—Yes, but I know perfectly that the questions that come before them are mobilisation, estimates, and any important question which may happen to be referred to them by the War Office Council, so that it is very limited in its operation.

10873. That may be so now, but during the war any matter of importance was brought up by the head of a department, the Director-General of Ordnance, say, and the decision of the Army Board was given upon it, and, as you say, that would be an opinion which would have weight, and be of great value, and which could be quoted, but I do not think the business of your office ever came before it in the way you have described?—Never.

10874. So that that would be an addition?—Yes.

10875. And it is an addition which you would welcome?—It is an addition which I would welcome.

10876. At present, as you say, you are the Staff Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, and your cases go to him and him only?—Not quite; there is the Selection Board, and to that the higher class of appointments, such as a selection for the command of a regiment go now. Up to second in command, the Military Secretary practically does the whole thing himself, of course, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief; for second in command, the Military Secretary takes the advice of the Adjutant-General, and for the command of a regiment or the appointment to a General Officer's command the Selection Board is consulted.

10877. Subject to the approval of the Commander-in-Chief?—Well, it is really only an Advisory Board, and the Commander-in-Chief, I think, could legally dispense with it, but he does not, as far as my experience goes.

10878. And then the higher appointments go to the Secretary of State?—Afterwards these appointments go to the Secretary of State.

10879. (*Sir John Jackson.*) They do in practice go to the Secretary of State?—The higher appointments absolutely go to the Secretary of State.

10880. What about the appointments below the second in command?—They do not go to the Secretary of State; the Commander-in-Chief likes to know of them, but sometimes even the Commander-in-Chief may not see them. The appointment to second in command is settled between the Military Secretary and the Adjutant-General, and the Commander-in-Chief's wish is that he may see all these appointments.

10881. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Before they are made?—Yes. It is desirable that they should go before the Commander-in-Chief.

10882. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) It is only up to the rank of captain that it rests absolutely with the Military Secretary?—Yes, and major if he is not second in command.

10883. (*Chairman.*) Have you any difficulty about the supply of officers at present?—At present there is difficulty in the officering of the Militia and Volunteers, and providing a satisfactory Reserve of officers. My view is that we could do something, and at the same time provide a Reserve of officers, and increase the efficiency of the Militia, by permitting officers of the Regular line regiments to go for a period of several years as seconded officers, keeping their places in the regiment, to the Militia. I think that that would sometimes suit the private arrangements of officers if their regiment was going abroad, or if they had a family at a certain stage of existence, to go and serve with a Militia regiment on half-pay, keeping their places in their own regiment so that they might go back. That would, of course, increase the total number of officers, because their places would be filled up in their regiments. I do not think any large number of officers would avail themselves of this, but I think, as far as it went, it would help; it would give us more officers, and not in such an expensive way as providing for them on full pay, and putting them to their Regular battalions, where they would not have enough work to do. It would also tend greatly to improve the Militia. As regards the Reserve of officers, I have seen several schemes since I have been in the War Office, and they have almost always been some form or another of robbing Peter to pay Paul, such, for instance, as proposing to take a number of Militia officers from their regiments into your Army just at the time probably when the Militia officers would be required by their own regiments. I think that for the Reserve of officers we ought to try to tap an absolutely new supply; and going about Scotland lately, I was very greatly struck by the fact that the teachers of the secondary schools, and, in the Highlands, even of the elementary schools, are very fond of doing a little military training with their boys if they can get them to come out. It struck me then, and I have spoken to a certain number of them, that it might be very easy for the War Office to enter into some sort of arrangement with the Education Department by which the teachers of secondary schools might be given some small extra fee if they had a cadet company, and were officers to it, and undertook to go to Aldershot for two or three months to learn military business, which they would pick up very quickly because they are clever men. I think if they were given some small remuneration after passing certain tests in tactics and so on, they might be accounted and considered of use in a case of emergency as Reserve officers. I think they would be very proud and keen to do it, and as to one important thing that an officer should have, that is, the power of commanding, ordering, and teaching people, I think they, already, in their scholastic functions, acquire a certain grounding which would be useful.

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10884. (*Sir John Jackson.*) What length of vacation do these men have during the year?—The Education Department would have to work in with us and make it easy for them in every way. We would have to make some arrangement, and I suppose we would have to give something to help to pay them.

10885. What is the length of their vacation in the ordinary way?—I think they have a very small vacation.

10886. A couple of months?—I should think nothing like that; I should think three weeks probably.

10887. (*Chairman.*) Are you considering these as a Reserve of officers for the Regular Army?—I would take them in in a case of necessity.

10888. I thought we had had a good deal of evidence that even good officers taken from the Volunteers and Militia were not considered to be sufficient without a backbone of Regular officers for a corps in the field?—I think the commanders of Volunteer companies that came out to South Africa as officers did very well.

10889. Here is an expression that I would like to quote to you: "You must have your Reserve 'serving,' if I may use the expression. You cannot let your officer go back to civil life as you can your Reservist, and leave him there to forget what he knows, or if you do he will not be so good as he ought to be when called up. You ought to have all your Regular forces at home—I say it advisedly—at least twice their present establishment of officers." That is your predecessor's statement?—I say that no country could stand the expense of that sort of thing; you cannot keep up full effectives for an emergency which may only happen once in 50 years. It would be admirable from the purely military point of view.

See Q. 9383.

10890. From the military point of view Sir Coleridge Grove held that a Reserve of officers would not be effective as Regular officers unless they were officers who were actually serving?—I think Sir Coleridge Grove may have had in his mind the Regular officer who left the Army probably because he was sick of it, and who had been vegetating since, and he did not think he was likely to be very energetic or up-to-date.

10891. No, he was thinking of the junior ranks, and that is the difficulty with the junior ranks, and with a good many of these schemes—I imagine with yours also, that your men would be senior, and what you find is that there are no junior officers, as Sir Coleridge Grove says here: "Once you have taken away the men from Sandhurst and from Woolwich and exhausted the lists of the candidates who have passed the last examination and have not yet gone to Sandhurst and a few other very limited sources, you have used up your trained material"?—Yes, that is it; you have got absolutely to the end of your material, and therefore I propose some fresh material. I think if these cadet companies in secondary schools were instituted that in the cadet companies themselves a certain number of smart lads could, on occasion, be picked up.

See Q. 9383.

10892. Yes, but it was smart lads they had to use on the last occasion; we had evidence that the Militia regiments were left with only about eight officers to a whole regiment, and that the authorities had to take any

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young fellow, practically, that they could pass at all. Sir Coleridge Grove's view, I think, was that by having a total number of officers not serving with the establishment of the regiment, but supplying the places in the Militia, thus following practically your scheme for supplying the places of the Militia by officers from the Regulars, and also allowing them to take courses of instruction, you could have on the books of the Army, as serving officers, something like twice the number on the establishment of the regiments at home, and, as Lord Strathcona reminds me, that was to come also in place of Sandhurst?—You mean because of the number of courses they had been able to go through for their higher education?

10893. Yes?—Sir Coleridge Grove and I are quite at one about not having a very great opinion of Sandhurst as an educational establishment so far. I know that we are in accord in thinking that what we want in the Army is men of a broad general education whom we could very rapidly teach the military part of their work; but, according to what you tell me, sir, it seems that, as far as my Militia proposals are concerned, I am in accord with Sir Coleridge Grove. I say I would allow a certain number of officers to go to the Militia for a certain period, keeping their places in the regiment, and as their places would be filled up in their regiment, that would increase the number of officers.

10894. To that extent you are on the same lines, I think. That, as far as you have had time and opportunity to study, is the suggestion you would make?—These are my ideas.

10895. Sandhurst is under your office?—Yes.

10896. And Sandhurst you are not satisfied with?—Sandhurst has now been reorganised, and it is just making a start, and it is hoped that they will do great things there. I personally would sooner go to the Universities and public schools, if you could get the very pick of them, and teach them their work in the regiment. I have always felt that.

10897. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) A new Commandant has been appointed to Sandhurst?—Yes, Colonel Kitson has been appointed.

10898. One who had done good service in Canada in the Royal Military College at Kingston?—Yes. There are two schools of thought about this business; the one is that at these colleges the boys should be taught a great deal of military work, that they should be little corporals and sergeants, that they should drill and learn riding, entrenching, shooting, and so on.

10899. And some engineering?—Yes.

10900. All of them?—Yes, all of which would be useful to them thereafter. There are other people who say: "Give us a man who has an honours degree in any university, a man of more mature age, of broad mind, and cultivated, and we in the regiment will very quickly teach him that military work, to which he will apply himself with great enthusiasm, it being absolutely fresh to him." Those are the two ideas.

10901. (*Chairman.*) Which do you favour?—I favour the latter.

10902. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) On the other hand, on the whole, the Engineers have done very well all over the world?—The Engineers and Artillery are both quoted against my theory; but, on the other hand, has it not often been noted that, although admirable up to a certain point, when you want your commander you do not find him so readily from this Service?

10903. Lord Kitchener?—Engineers? I was thinking more of the gunners. The Engineers have a widening training all the remainder of their lives, and Lord Kitchener was for three years working in the Archæological Department in Palestine.

10904. I could run you off a great number of Artillery officers in the highest ranks, from Sir Henry Brackenbury downwards. What do you think of Lord Roberts?—Lord Roberts was a gunner, certainly, but if you look up his career you will find he has done no regimental work to speak of. My theory is that, in some ways, the very qualities and training which make a devoted and reliable regimental officer are apt to narrow his mind and disqualify him for high command.

10905. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Do you suppose you could get nearly enough officers with honours from Universities to fill up any considerable portion of the Army? How many vacancies have you in the year in normal times?—In normal times we have 700.

10906. You could not get 700 University men every year, I suppose, or half of that?—No, I would not propose that. You might also have to make some special arrangement, and have some special honours examination.

10907. (*Chairman.*) Is there not the difficulty in working the two things together, that the University candidate must come in, as you say, at a more advanced age, and that he would find himself below younger men?—Yes, he would have to go straight in as a Lieutenant if you were working the two systems together. The reason University men are shy of entering the Army at present, is that they have to enter below men who were their juniors at school, and whom they consider to be worse educated than themselves.

10908. (*Sir John Edge.*) Why do you take a man with a University honour? A simple graduate of a University would not do?—I would sooner have an honours man.

10909. Have you ever counted up, in your experience of professions, the number of successful practical men who have taken honours at the University?—You mean to say that they do not fulfil the promise of their youth?

10910. Yes, that is what I mean to say.

10911. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Why do you think the University education is a wider education than the one given at Woolwich? I think the Woolwich education is a very wide one, and highly calculated to open the mind and develop the brain?—The education at West Point is the best education to be got in America, and that given at Kingston is the best in Canada. Good in its way as the education at Woolwich may be, no one would claim for it even the ambition to compete against high University training.

10912. And if you go across to France you find that at the Polytechnique they get a capital education?—If Sandhurst could give an education such as our Universities give the thing would be settled.

10913. Or such as Woolwich gives?—I have given my views about Woolwich.

10914. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) The Scotch Universities are to some extent different from the English in that respect; the students go to the University at an earlier age and leave earlier compared to Oxford and Cambridge, is not that so?—Yes.

10915. Would you require in the examination of all those entering as officers in the Army some knowledge of applied science?—As long as a man had some diploma from his University to show that he was an able and competent man in any branch, I would take him as an officer. Just on first joining he might feel at some disadvantage on technical subjects, but he would bring a fresh, keen, and well-trained brain to their consideration, and in six months time he should be at no disadvantage even in this respect.

10916. I mean especially that they should have some knowledge of engineering: would it not be a very great advantage to have such an officer or officers in a battalion where they had not engineers with them—say, in the event of a bridge requiring to be repaired, or anything of that kind, as in such an emergency they could lend a hand, and a very useful and good one?—Certainly; of course, these things are very specialised now, but any special ability, particularly such a one as engineering, is very likely to come in handy some time.

10917-8. It must often be the case in such a war as that in South Africa that it would be of the greatest advantage?—That is so.

10919. (*Chairman.*) At any rate, the present position with regard to the supply of officers and their education leaves you in almost a dangerous position?—Yes; that has also struck me in connection with the question of outside influence which I rather bear the brunt of as Military Secretary. I think there is nothing that shows the fierce light which beats on the War Office more than the way that the ordinary human actions and feelings are twisted into something special against that department. Of course, influential people, political or social, ask for advancement for their friends frequently; but they do so knowing perfectly well that the Military Secretary will refuse it if it is improper; and they are thus able to satisfy their constituent, or who-

ever it is, and to put the odium on to somebody else's shoulders. What I mean is that people are perfectly satisfied if they ask a thing, and they are shown that it cannot be done under the Regulations, and, as a rule, there is no more trouble. As regards female outside influence, I think it is the most natural thing that mothers should wish to help their sons, and they come to see me or write to me, and very often I am able to meet their views without doing harm to anyone else, and if I cannot do it without harming someone I do not do it. I thought I would just mention the subject, as that part of the business, of course, comes specially to the Military Secretary. I do not think probably the War Department is different from any other department in that way.

10920. You admit that the practice exists, but you feel yourself strong enough to meet it?—I do.

10921. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) It came out in evidence here that a good many officers were recommended for appointment to the auxiliary forces, such as the Yeomanry, when there was a demand for them during the war, and that many of those recommendations were made with regard to persons who, when tried, were found to be worthless as officers. Has your experience ever shown you that recommendations are made for the advancement of people as to whom really such recommendations should not be made at all?—I should like to be quite clear as to what you mean. Do you mean the official recommendations by their military superiors?

10922. No, these were people brought in on letters from people highly placed?—These, of course, were dealt with by the Deputy Adjutant-General Imperial Yeomanry and the Yeomanry Committee. As to these Yeomanry Commissions, and so on, I have no doubt everybody said: "Here is a grand opportunity for getting something good for somebody or another."

10923. It was the Yeomanry Committee which got many of those recommendations which should not have been sent in at all?—Yes; the poor people were very much rushed, and they did their best to sift the recommendations, and to find out about the young gentlemen; but it was difficult to do so, in the time.

10924. I suppose occasionally even you receive recommendations which you think ought not to be made, from people in what you would call responsible positions?—Certainly.

10925. (*Chairman.*) Another point Sir Coleridge Grove dealt with was the selection of officers for the Staff; that comes under you?—Yes, that comes under me. We have to work on certain recognised lines. There are certain qualifications for the Staff without which a man cannot be appointed. He must have passed the Staff College, or he must be what is called Q.S., Qualified Staff, which is a very jealously guarded distinction. When an officer has served in a responsible Staff position on active service, and has shown himself thoroughly competent, he may be considered for the privilege of having these letters Q.S. put after his name, which put him, for all practical purposes, on an equal footing with a graduate of the Staff College. In connection with this South African war only 27 of these have been granted so far, and although many applications have been made, the Commander-in-Chief does not mean to give any more, or at most a very few more, because he feels that if he gave too many it would lessen the keenness of people to go up to the Staff College, as they would feel there was another way of getting it.

10926. (*Sir John Jackson.*) At what time do they usually go to the Staff College from the Army?—I should think their average age is about 30 to 32.

10927. (*Chairman.*) You prefer their going through the Staff College?—Yes, it can do no one any harm, and it ought to do them a great deal of good.

10928. What is the course?—There is a two years' course, and the first part of it consists in a general furbishing up of their education, and they go in, to a certain extent, for languages, besides the strictly military part, while the latter part of the course is more purely military; military history is the main study, with lectures, and they also go in for topography, staff duties, tactics, fortification, and writing reports, generally with a view to making them efficient Staff officers.

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10929. Are these Staff appointments made by the Selection Board?—The higher Staff appointments, such as Assistant Adjutant-General; appointments such as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, are made by the Military Secretary under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, but nothing above that; and even in the case of a Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General the Military Secretary consults the Adjutant-General.

10930. And for the commands of units?—The appointment to the commands of units is always brought before the Selection Board by the Military Secretary.

10931. And I suppose it is with regard to them, although you also use them all through, that you have the confidential reports?—It is particularly with regard to them, because the Selection Board get sent round the agenda with, in a sealed paper, the confidential reports, and it is very evident when you come to the Selection Board that every member has carefully studied the career of the officer in question. They then talk it over, and decide whether he should have it or not.

10932. (*Viscount Esher.*) On being promoted to a company, has an officer to go for a further examination?—Yes, he has to pass an important examination before he becomes a field officer, and then has to qualify before a Board as to tactical fitness before he becomes second in command.

10933. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) With regard to subalterns, in promotion to companies do you take account of the courses they have gone through at all?—We do not go into that so narrowly.

10934. Practically not at all?—The Military Secretary does. Everyone is brought to me by the Assistant Military Secretary; for instance, promotion from lieutenant to captain.

10935. Do you practically take account of the courses they have gone through or not?—What actually happens is this: The Assistant Military Secretary comes into my room with perhaps two or three cases of a lieutenant going to be made captain, and he says, "This man's reports have always been admirable; he is favourably reported upon as fit for promotion; he is fully qualified, having passed all examinations"; and I say, "All right." With regard to the second, it is probably the same, but the third is rather a doubtful case, whatever it may be, and we look most carefully into his back confidential reports, and if they are not satisfactory we pass him over.

10936. I think Lord Esher was thinking rather less of the confidential reports than of the actual courses he has been through?—Do you mean signalling, and that sort of thing?

10937. Yes?—Not at all; there are certain things he has to pass, and if he has passed these we do not consider any more.

10938. Lord Esher asked the same question of Sir Coleridge Grove; he wished to know whether you took account of the actual courses he has passed through over and above those which are compulsory?—We do not; because getting these certificates is often a question of time and opportunity, and a commanding officer cannot always let a Captain or Subaltern attend when he wishes to do so; but, on the other hand, if we come to a doubtful case about an officer we look very carefully at his confidential reports, and we may say, "He seems a zealous fellow; he has passed in five things," and give him a certain credit for that.

10939. (*Chairman.*) They would be mentioned in the confidential report?—Yes, every course he passes is mentioned on the back of his confidential report.

10940. Is there any other point with regard to the Military Secretary's position that you would like to mention?—No.

Recalled at Q. 13839.

TWENTY-SIXTH DAY.

Tuesday, 9th December 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., *Chairman.*

The Right Hon. The Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Hon. Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Hon. Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.
Sir JOHN JACKSON.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, ESQ., *Secretary.*

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Professor ALEXANDER OGSTON, C.M., called and examined.

10941. (*Chairman.*) You are a Professor at Aberdeen University?—Yes.

10942. You went out to South Africa, did you not?—I did.

10943. At what date did you go out?—In December, 1899.

10944. I see you say in the *précis* which you have been kind enough to give us, that you have always been interested in military surgery?—I have always been interested in military surgery.

10945. Have you seen anything of the foreign systems?—Yes; I have seen something of the foreign systems. At one time I was well acquainted with the Austrian foreign system, but of late years I do not know exactly what has been done in it. My knowledge regarding the German foreign system is much more recent, but within the last three years I have not been in touch with it. Also the Russian foreign system I know only to such an extent as it can be learnt by a visitor who goes there on purpose to study it.

10946. When you went out to South Africa you did not go to Natal?—I did not.

10947. Therefore, your experience is limited to the Cape Colony side?—To the Cape Colony side.

10948. I see that you say that our Army Medical Service is organised on too limited lines; what have you to say specially on that point?—That the general impression produced by observation and conversation with others, joined perhaps to previous knowledge of it, led me to conclude that the country was prepared only for wars of very limited extent, and had not an Army Medical Service organised to any such degree as would be required in the case of a very large war such as a European war, or such as this war in South Africa proved to be.

10949. Do you mean that the provision of officers and men was inadequate?—Quite inadequate. I should judge they had provision for about 40,000 of an army, straining their provision to the utmost, whereas there were a couple of hundred thousand perhaps altogether to be provided for.

10950. Were there as many as that in Africa while you were there? Between what dates were you there?—From the beginning of January, 1900, to July, 1900. I have no figures regarding that, but I imagine that including the troops of all kinds, the local troops, the Imperial troops, and the Colonial troops, and those also connected with the Army who had to be accommodated with medical attendance there must have been a number closely approaching to a couple of hundred thousand.

10951. Was your opinion formed from what you saw, or upon information which you obtained from officers and others who were scattered about?—Both, my Lord, but very much from what I saw myself. I visited Gatacre's column, which, at that time, was lying before Stormberg, after the reverse. I visited French's column, which was at that time lying at Rensburg, detained by the Dutch opposite Colesberg, and I also served with the Modder River Column, first of all visiting it, and then afterwards being attached to it for some months, and accompanying Lord Methuen's column across country from Kimberley to Boshof, Hoopstad, Bothaville, and Kroonstad.

10952. Were you with Lord Methuen's column at the time of Magersfontein?—Immediately after that.

10953. Were there a great number of wounded men still there?—No, not at my first visit. The wounded men had been, to a great extent, evacuated by that time down to Orange River and De Aar and Wynberg.

10954. During that march you took with Lord Methuen were there many casualties?—I was at Modder River during the Paardeberg advance, and at that time nearly all the sick and wounded from Lord Roberts' advance flowed down to Modder River, and a smaller number later to Kimberley, where I also was.

10955. When the wounded came back to Modder River from Paardeberg was the provision of officers and men of the Royal Army Medical Corps then deficient?—Very deficient.

10956. And they had a difficulty in dealing with the wounded?—Exceeding difficulty in dealing with the sick and wounded both in the convoys and at the hospitals at Modder River. There were at Modder River on one occasion 800 men, sick and wounded, brought back from Jacobsdal and the Paardeberg direction in one day. They had to be accommodated in two field hospitals, which had only equipment for one hundred men each.

10957. Where was that?—At Modder River.

10958. What was the force at Modder River at that time?—The force at Modder River was that left, I think, under the charge of Lord Methuen and those whom he appointed when he went on to Kimberley to take charge there.

10959. But those two field hospitals, of course, were attached to Lord Methuen's force?—They were.

10960. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Were they not also the base for the larger force at Paardeberg and Jacobsdal?—They had to act as a base on that occasion; the field hospitals had to act as a base for the time being.

10961. (*Chairman.*) In view then of what occurred, what do you consider should have been the proper number of field hospitals in order to deal with the wounded men who were brought back?—The circumstances of South Africa, as is well known to you, were exceedingly peculiar, and it was not possible to deal rigidly with base hospitals and field hospitals according to their theoretical organisation. The field hospitals at Modder River had to act as base hospitals, but to endeavour to evacuate their wounded as quickly as possible to what was the real base, Cape Town, or the supplementary bases at De Aar and Orange River, and some even to Naauwpoort, because the congestion became so great that some had even to be sent roundabout to Naauwpoort, towards the Port Elizabeth line.

10962. Yes; but your view, as I understand it, is that the field Hospital accommodation at Modder River was insufficient?—It was so, undoubtedly.

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10963. What do you consider it should have been—double or treble?—Well, I could not at the moment calculate, but such tents as we were provided with there should not have had more than four sick and wounded men in them, and they had many more than that; they had sometimes seven, and more, in a tent all through the hospitals. The accommodation was exceedingly deficient.

10964. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) What was the size of the tent?—It was an ordinary bell tent. I am not able to give the dimensions of it, but I should think 10ft. across or thereby, some of them with double roofs and some of them with single roofs. Many were, in fact, the tents belonging to the other regiments, some of which had gone forward in the Paardeberg advance, which were seized and extemporised for the use of the wounded and sick who were brought down.

10965. (*Chairman.*) Were you examined before the Royal Commission on South African Hospitals?—No. I declined the suggestion that was made to me, as I thought that was scarcely a proper time for saying many of the things I had to say.

10966. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Do you say there were 800 sick and wounded?—Yes.

10967. And accommodation for how many?—200.

10968. That would make four times the number that should have been put in the tents?—Yes.

10969. When you speak of seven in a tent instead of four, where were the balance put?—This was one day's accumulation.

10970. I am speaking of that one day?—We were full before.

10971. Still more, then, how did you deal with the balance?—I do not quite understand.

10972. If you had accommodation for 200 sick and wounded at the rate of four per tent, that is 50 tents, and you put seven in a tent, that makes 350; what did you do with the other 150 sick and wounded?—We had our hospitals pretty full on this day, when some 800 came in.

10973. (*Chairman.*) Were you at the same time drafting them away to the base?—As fast as possible.

10974. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I want to get at these figures if I can: you had tent accommodation for 200 at the rate of four in a tent—I am right in saying that from your evidence?—I think so, yes.

10975. That means 50 tents, practically?—Yes.

10976. And you put seven in a tent, which would accommodate 350 of these 800?—Yes.

10977. What did you do with the others?—I really cannot say. We were all so fully occupied on that occasion that what became of the balance I do not know, but I know the tents were gathered in from all sources, some of them marquees, which, of course, as you know, accommodate a much larger number, and we managed to put them all up somehow.

10978. That is really what I wanted to get at; as a matter of fact, you did manage to accommodate them all?—Oh, yes.

10979. Under canvas?—They were all accommodated under canvas.

10980. (*Sir John Edge.*) Were the 800 wounded men, or sick and wounded?—Sick and wounded.

10981. Not 800 wounded men?—Not 800 wounded men.

10982. (*Chairman.*) Were you very short of surgeons?—Very.

10983. At the Modder River?—At the Modder River. Our surgeons, besides attending to their field hospital duties, had to attend to the convoys down country, and a number of them were constantly away upon that duty, so that on some occasions there were in one of the field hospitals, I think, only two, or perhaps three, surgeons to attend to all that number that flowed into it.

10984. Do you remember on that date, when those 800 came down, how many surgeons there were there?—On the 21st February 35 tents accommodated 223 patients—that is, I think, about seven in a tent; and as to the surgeons——

10985. Is that a journal which you kept at the time that you are consulting?—Yes. There were three medical attendants to attend 400 sick and wounded on the 24th February.

10986. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) What do you say would be the right proportion?—Well, there were typhoid cases and very badly wounded cases, and we ought to have had four times that number to do anything like justice to them.

10987. (*Chairman.*) Were the three medical men you had at that time all Army surgeons?—No; on that occasion to which I refer I think only two of them were Army medical surgeons.

10988. And the third was a civilian?—Yes.

10989. Were there enough hospital orderlies?—By no means.

10990. Do you recollect anything as to the number?—No, I do not think that on any occasion I can give you data regarding the number of hospital orderlies, they were such a fluctuating body. They were attending the typhoid cases, and really they themselves were feeling ill and dying daily with typhoid fever, so that they were scarcely constant for one day.

10991. That was your impression wherever you happened to go, that the number of hospital orderlies was deficient?—I think generally it was so, but I should not say that on every occasion it was so; generally speaking, I think they were decidedly deficient.

10992. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) And generally a deficiency of doctors?—And generally a deficiency of doctors.

10993. (*Chairman.*) As to the quality of the non-commissioned officers and men of the Royal Army Medical Corps, you say that, although there were many exceptions, their quality was inferior and their training insufficient for the duties they had to fulfil?—I thought I could have referred you in a moment to occasions when no medical officers accompanied convoys, but talking merely from recollection I can remember one convoy that came in from Paardeberg of several hundred sick and wounded, and they had only one medical officer with them.

10994. That was after the Paardeberg fight?—It came in from Paardeberg direction, about Jacobsdal Klip Drift and Paardeberg, but its exact starting point I cannot at the moment recollect.

10995. You do not remember how many medical officers accompanied that force to Paardeberg?—No, I am quite unaware of that.

10996. Then with regard to the quality of the non-commissioned officers and men who were employed as hospital orderlies?—The non-commissioned officers and men cannot, I think, be accused of any lack of zeal and devotion. The way in which they sacrificed themselves to do what they could was, I think, beyond all words of praise; but they were, many of them, not at all the kind of men who ought to be non-commissioned officers and men in the Army Medical Corps. Many of them came into it untrained from other regiments, and if they received any training there it was merely a little training in First Aid and carrying wounded in the field. Many of them—most of them, I should say—were absolutely ignorant of anything like what was required for attending on the sick. They were utterly unaware of how to deal with a sick man, or of what was an absolute necessity for him; and hence, in spite of all their goodwill, they failed from the want of this training. There were, of course, exceptions, and some of them were exceedingly good, but they were few. Most of them seemed to have joined, whether they were Regulars or Volunteers, with the idea that their duty would be to go into the field behind an advancing regiment to pick up the wounded, to stop their bleeding, and to carry them to the tents, and then when they found their duties were nothing so brilliant as that, but consisted in the tedious watching night and day over men who were sick, delirious, and dying, and when their comrades were taken ill daily and dying around them they often lost heart. It required, in fact, a quiet heroism that very few of them possessed to enable them to carry out their duties, especially in attending on the sick and the fever cases, which were very numerous.

10997. Were they careful about disinfectants?—Disinfection, one might almost say, was absolutely unknown. The men knew nothing about disinfectants, they did not even know which were good and which were bad. They had no training in keeping themselves disinfected; in fact, it seemed to me that many of them looked upon it as a species of cowardice if they attended to such things as avoiding infection—a sort of shirking of duty. The hands were not disinfected, the utensils that the patients used for typhoid evacuations, and so forth, were not disinfected; when they were emptied out into pits they were not disinfected, and the wards were not dis-

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infected. In one hospital made to contain 53 beds, and which accommodated 53 cases, almost exclusively of typhoid, the only source of disinfection for the orderlies was one enamelled basin containing creoline and water, which was placed in the verandah at the exit from the hospital, and this they might or might not use, as they thought proper.

10998. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Was this a field hospital?—No, this was a hospital in Bloemfontein. They had no idea of disinfecting. The sick and the typhoid cases were sent down to the base, when they were able to be moved, many of them still suffering from diarrhœa, without any washing or disinfection of their bodies or clothes. Besides the hospital trains, they were sent down in ordinary trains, corridor trains, which were used, of course, on occasion for others; in those cases there was no disinfection whatever attempted, and consequently the disease was very widely spread.

10999. (*Chairman.*) Did these orderlies you are speaking of do any cooking?—Yes, the orderlies cooked.

11000. That, I suppose, increased the risk again if they were not careful about disinfection?—It did. One could see some of the orderlies, from lack of knowledge, washing their kettles in filthy puddles and scraping them with the infected earth around, and although careful instructions were issued to them and posted up in the buildings, wherever a building was available, there was no staff to compel attention to them, and as the men had not been trained, those instructions had not become a part of them, as ought to have been the case, with men entrusted with their duty, and hence sanitation was, practically, entirely neglected.

11001. Do you think the doctors did their best to inculcate prudence in these men?—I do not think it was possible for men to have done more than the doctors did. They toiled night and day. I have seen them going days without their food, that they might attend to those who were coming in or evacuate those going down country. There was absolutely no want of the most unselfish devotion on the part of the officers, but they could not do everything.

11002. Therefore, no blame attaches to them in connection with that matter?—Absolutely none.

11003. What is your view? Do you think that the men should have had a better training, and do you think that that is feasible, or that it would have been possible to have trained a sufficient number of orderlies in the use of disinfectants, and so on?—Perfectly, but not under the present system.

11004. What is your idea as to how the system might be improved?—The present system, as I have already partly stated, consists in training men for their duties in action, and that they have a fairly good grip of, but as to anything like the management of the sick, which are always enormously preponderating in every campaign, they have no useful instruction whatever. They could not be instructed unless they themselves received courses of instruction in attendance in hospitals where sick are being treated in times of peace, and where they would acquire the practical knowledge which a doctor and a nurse acquire, that would be of use to them in a campaign in attending to the sick. The attendance on the sick, in fact, is a more important matter than the attendance on the wounded, and it is very inadequately given under the present system.

11005. I suppose a lot of these men who acted as hospital orderlies had to be improvised on the spot, had they not?—Yes, that is so.

11006. How would you propose that men you have to pick up in the course of a campaign, that you have to take out of a regiment and use as orderlies, should receive any adequate training in time of peace, unless you trained a whole battalion?—I do not assume that a wealthy country like ours, so circumstanced that it must of necessity occasionally have large wars, should be dependent, in assisting its sick and wounded during them, upon the chance picking up of orderlies from Volunteers or from ordinary regiments; if it is going to fight and to have sickness and wounds, it ought to provide for them in time of peace. It is as much essential as artillery or engineering.

11007. What is your suggestion, then—would you explain how you would propose to train hospital orderlies?—I should suggest that hospital orderlies in our country should be trained very much as the Germans train them. They were constrained after their war of 1870-1871 to reorganise their Army Medical Department on a better footing, and on purpose to do so they now have their orderlies of the Army Medical Corps carefully instructed in time of peace in all the duties that will fall to them in time of war—attending on the wounded, attending on the sick, handling sick, washing sick, disinfection, and so on; and for that purpose they have special courses of training for these men. They have large field days, on which they are trained as far as possible in all of those things. They have much larger and better managed military hospitals than ours, and in them not only the officers, but the non-commissioned officers and men, receive a training that is superior to what exists, so far as I know it, in our Army.

11008. Do you happen to know what number of men per regiment are trained in that way in Germany?—No, I do not; but as regards the training itself of the orderlies, it is all to be found in the German Friedens Sanitäts Ordnung. They have arrangements there fully detailed regarding the instruction at pages 354 and 355, regarding male nurses at pages 360 and 546, regarding courses of instruction for the orderlies at page 363, and regarding schools for them at page 895. I think that is the edition of 1891.

11009. Do they employ females as well as male nurses in the German Army?—To a very considerable extent; under certain regulations they permit the charitable societies—I really do not remember what they call them, or how one would translate them into English—to assist, but the deaconesses and women of that class who, you may be aware, form large benevolent bodies in Germany, are admitted and made use of in the German Army in connection with the attendance on the sick and wounded. They also have female cooks in the German Army, and the consequence is that the cooking for sick men, men suffering from dysentery, typhoid, and so forth, where the feeding is the main part of their treatment, is very much better done than is possible with our male orderlies.

11010. Then you said that the German military hospitals were on a different line from ours?—More numerous. Our military hospitals do not treat the whole of their sick. Soldiers are, or were quite recently, sent to other places, I am informed, for attendance when they were sick, and our military hospital system in England has been cramped and cut down—pared down—to such a degree that it no longer forms a field where officers and men can be trained in peace for their duties in war.

11011. When you say "pared down," do you mean for economical reasons?—I can only give a recollection, but my impression is that in Lord Randolph Churchill's time an attempt was made to introduce economies into the Army, and that that was done almost exclusively by cutting down the hospitals and medical establishments of a kindred nature, and for that we suffer now. I might also say that in Russia—as it perhaps bears more to the point, and I have seen actually more of their hospitals than in Germany—they have large military hospitals where all kinds of cases are admitted.

11012. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) You mean from the civil population?—Yes, they are used for the civil population as well as for the military. They have eye cases, ear cases, fever cases, cases of ordinary sick in the medical wards, cases of ordinary surgical injuries and diseases. They have even gynæcological cases in their military hospitals, and in them the officers are, therefore, real professional men. They are medical men who are proud of being medical men, and they esteem it a higher distinction to be an accomplished medical man than to hold any officer's rank. They are interested in their profession, and they are trained in the most recent knowledge regarding it. They are, in fact, equal to civil medical men in every capacity, and they are provided with orderlies and nurses, and so on, and are, therefore, capable of importing into war all the attention that a sick or injured man claims in time of peace, and I think that a country like ours is bound to aim at giving to every sick and wounded man in a campaign, as far as is practicable, the same skill and attention as a civilian sick or injured man receives in time of peace.

11013. (*Chairman.*) Do I understand you to mean that from want of experience the Army medical officers are not equal to the civilian surgeons?—That is precisely what I think. They are not equal to the civil surgeon simply from want of practice. They are as a class superior to the civilian doctor, they are of a higher standard, selected by examination, but the moment they enter the Army they are cut off from all practice of their profession. Now, no man can practice medicine or surgery

unless he is continually at them; things advance rapidly, improvements are continually introduced, and the man who does not find his daily work amongst them cannot be equal to the civilian. I do not know if you admit my point, but I might say that if you were to deal in the same way, say, with engineers or artillerymen, and, after subjecting them to a testing examination on purpose to attain the highest class of men, were to cut them off from all knowledge of engineering and guns, projectiles, and so forth, they would turn out a very inadequate force in time of war, and it is precisely similar—I say it in all seriousness—with regard to medicine and surgery.

11014. Then the difference between our system and the Russian system is that in time of peace, owing to the fact that civilians are admitted into the military hospitals, the Army medical men in Russia gain their experience?—They gain their experience. They know what is being done. They demand, and are provided, with all the most modern equipment on a scale that does not exist in our Army, and they are familiar with everything of that sort. Bacteriology does not exist in our Army, save, I suppose, in the case of that eminent man, Professor Wright, of Netley, and a few others. There was no possibility of obtaining bacteriological investigation anywhere in South Africa, save, I suppose, by applying to the civilians there, and I am not aware that that was ever done. There was no Bacteriological Department at Wynberg. There was no bacteriologist sent with the troops who advanced to the front, and it was not even possible in a case of doubtful typhoid fever to apply the well-known Vidal's test, which enables one to know whether a man is going to have typhoid, and to provide either for his early evacuation to the base before the dangerous stage sets in, or to treat him where he is should that be desirable. There were no microscopes; there were no special instruments. If a man suffered from a suppurating ear there was no means of diagnosing it in those field hospitals.

11015. I observe you are coming to instruments, but what we were really upon at that time was the knowledge of the Army medical surgeons in those respects. If they had had the proper instruments were they qualified to apply them?—The men possessed all the qualifications, had they received adequate practice, or had the means of practice.

11016. But in your opinion they had not had sufficient practice?—It resulted in that, that they had not.

11017. What is the system in Germany?—The system in Germany is that every medical man in the Army, however remotely posted, can at set intervals apply to be admitted for a time to the practice of civil hospitals. I think one or two years in every ten, speaking from recollection, they are entitled to do so, and if they show any interest in their profession, or ability in it, they are permitted to do so, or rather ordered to do so. They then leave their post, and are attached for that time to civil hospitals as house surgeons, attend to all the instruction in them, have wards if they are sufficiently high in rank and show ability, become teachers of the civilians, and are put on a par with civilians in all respects. And in Russia the same thing obtains; every officer there can, after ten years' service, apply to be admitted to the civil hospital, to serve for two years, during which he can learn and instruct others, can teach set courses, afterwards become a professor in the large military hospital, can be appointed to the civil hospital in some of the provincial towns, where he still carries on his profession, and keeps up his knowledge, and yet is available in time of war.

11018. From what you know of our hospital system here, do you think it would be possible to give the Army medical surgeons any opportunity of practice in our hospitals?—I do. It is a mere question of expense, and the utility of it is so obvious that the expense I think, were it properly known, would not be permitted to stand in the way. In their own military hospitals a good deal more might be done than at present by teaching those connected with the Army, the children and the women, in them, and even by admitting civilians; if the benefit could be shown to repay the cost to the nation. I think it would be permitted, and they could also be allowed to leave the Army, to obtain what is called study-leave which is already granted to some degree—to become house surgeons, residents and assistants in civil hospitals, and to keep up their training equally with that of any civilian.

11019. Do you think there would be any difficulty with the civil surgeons and civil medical men—the civil profession generally—if you admitted Army medical officers to the hospitals?—There would be a little difficulty, and such a difficulty exists in Germany, but it is capable of being overcome, and is overcome there.

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11020. How would you propose to overcome it here?—I do not think the difficulties here would be great. There are a number of our provincial hospitals where very admirable medicine and surgery is carried out, where I think they would welcome such a set of men as our junior Army Medical officers, who might be permitted for a period of a year or so to serve in them as house surgeons. I think the quality of those men would ensure welcome to a great many of those provincial hospitals.

11021. In time of peace I suppose the Army on the whole is very healthy?—It suffers from trivial complaints and slight accidents.

11022. And the experience of the Army medical officers is limited to treating those slight complaints?—It is limited, and it used to be unnaturally limited. I was told by Sir William Stokes that there existed an order at the Curragh that any operation that occurred there was to be sent to the Dublin hospitals for treatment, but I believe that order was cancelled a few years back in consequence of the outcry that was made against it.

11023. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Had they no hospital at the Curragh?—Yes, they had hospitals at the Curragh.

11024. But not sufficient, or at least the men there had not sufficient skill to treat the cases?—The men might have had sufficient skill, but when their cases were sent away they could not acquire it, and it was a very unjust slur upon the Army Medical Department that such a regulation should have been issued.

11025. (*Chairman.*) Did many civil physicians go to South Africa?—Yes, many.

11026. Were their services accepted in the early stages of the war, or was it later, do you recollect?—I cannot say for certain.

11027. Then you say in the *précis* of your evidence, "The quantity and quality of the equipment prepared and supplied to the hospitals, field hospitals and bearer companies, were defective, and generally they were antiquated and badly organised"; what have you got to say about the equipment generally? I stopped you just now when you were on the point of referring to it?—I have mentioned the absence of bacteriological departments, and I would add that there were no serums for the treatment of disease there in any of the hospitals from Wynberg outwards. Those are important, and should not have been wanting in a modern Army Medical Department. There was X Ray apparatus at Wynberg, but there was none at De Aar for instance, there was none at Modder, there was none at Kimberley, and there was none at Sterkstroom. That was a thing that in those hospitals was absolutely necessary; even supposing that, as I am told, the regulations lay down that they were out of place in a field hospital, which I do not admit, when those field hospitals, as at Modder River, acted as base or intermediate hospitals, they should have been provided with them.

11028. Is the X Ray apparatus a very cumbersome thing?—Not very cumbersome, but it requires skilled men to work it.

11029. But I mean to carry about—is it a very big thing?—I do not suppose that a flying column could by any possibility carry it with them, with ease at any rate, but that in stationary hospitals, stationary for a considerable time, it should have been provided I do not hesitate to say. And there again a difficulty came in, I think—I cannot speak from indivdual experience in this—that when they were sent out the Army Medical officers from want of familiarity with them, which is a part of the equipment of every surgeon at home, were unable to use them. They got out of order, and they did not know how to use them. They had not instrument-makers or electricians, as they have in the German Army. There are instrument-makers attached to every force in the German Army, who repair and look after those things.

11030. Have we no such men attached to our forces?—I believe we have none. There may be one at Netley, but they are not a recognised part of every force. As regards equipment, I thought that everything was very antiquated. The lights in the hospitals were inadequate for the purpose of nocturnal operations, and they were utterly inadequate for searching for the

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wounded in the field—old feeble oil lamps, and candles in lanterns of certainly not the most modern construction, instead of the better sources of illumination that should have been introduced.

11031. What is the modern lamp you would suggest?—On the Continent they use and try in the Army all kinds of modern lamps, paraffin lamps, acetylene lamps, and such better sources of illumination. I do not think such a thing existed anywhere in our forces. It was absolutely impossible to perform satisfactorily an operation by night with the equipment that was provided, say, at Modder River.

11032. There, again, would not an acetylene lamp or a paraffin lamp be much more cumbersome to carry than a lantern with a candle?—I think not; I am not a specialist in lamps, but I think not.

11033. Do you know whether in the German Army acetylene lamps are provided?—I am not sure that they are adopted, but I believe that they and similar sources of illumination are on their trial. Regarding antiseptic matters, a great deal there depended upon antiseptics. The one feature of the whole campaign was that there was much less wound septicity than there was, say, in the Soudan campaign, which I also was present at, owing, I suppose, to the small bullets (there are a great number of causes connected with them), and owing to the pure surroundings in which the wounds were often inflicted; but, of course, there were a large number of septic cases—I do not say a large proportion, but a large number—and I think that the instruments and appliances for the treatment of them according to modern antiseptic ideas were limited and inadequate and old-fashioned. The sterilisers were too small for the work that had to be done. They might have sterilised an instrument or two, but not the number that one requires in doing such operations as often had to be done there. The irrigators for flushing wounds with antiseptics were too small. In Russia, for instance, they provide their army in a campaign with little portable stoves and irrigators by which they can prepare under the most adverse circumstances for the carrying out of an antiseptic operation adequately. They have their instruments there all arranged so that they can be boiled in those little very portable stoves and sterilising apparatus. Even the cases in which they are contained are such, made of vulcanite, that they can be popped into the steriliser and all boiled. In the Army in South Africa each instrument or two would have had to be sterilised by itself, and the instruments we had were not suitable for sterilising, as they had wooden handles, which would have boiled off, and altogether they were old. They were not such as one would see in a civil hospital in London or in the provinces. They would have been for the most part rejected in such hospitals as we have in every town of any magnitude in Great Britain.

See Q. 12181.

11034. I suppose civil consultants brought their instruments with them?—They did.

11035. And there was a very great contrast between the two sets?—A very great contrast between the two sets. I remember one case on the Modder River of opening the skull, for which one nowadays requires a number of cutting forceps which rapidly divide the bone and enable the operation to be done quickly, accurately, and without shock, but there was nothing there but an old-fashioned amputation bone forceps, such as was supplied in old-fashioned amputation cases. I suppose I have said sufficient in the way of giving instances of that sort of thing?

11036. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Were the Army Medical officers there competent even to requisition for those sort of things?—I do not know, but it was too late; when they were not provided at the beginning the work was there and had to be done, and requisitioning would have been too late; the lapse of time would have prevented the supply.

11037. Before they left for the war they might have requisitioned; I suppose they knew what they were supplied with?—That is a question I have difficulty in answering. I never was a military officer, and I do not know what their regulations are. My point of view is entirely that of a civilian.

11038. (*Chairman.*) I suppose you must have heard them comment very often on the instruments which the civil surgeons used?—Very severely they commented upon many such things.

11039. You mean they commented upon their want of them?—Upon their want of modern appliances and modern ideas in the department.

11040. Do you mean they envied the civil surgeons their instruments?—I cannot specifically say I ever heard that statement made, but I do not doubt its accuracy.

11041. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Were the military surgeons capable of using some of your modern instruments?—Many of them were.

11042. The younger men, I suppose?—Not exclusively the younger. There were a number of admirable Army Medical surgeons there of all grades, some of them exceedingly superior men.

11043. (*Chairman.*) Does not that rather clash with what you told us just now as to their deficiency from want of experience?—No, sir.

11044. It seems to me not to be quite consistent?—No, a talented man is not necessarily a man practically skilled in anything, and however able and theoretically well informed, he may not have the technical facility that only practice will confer. Our operations nowadays are pieces of very high art which a man acquires by daily training, weekly training. He comes to use his fingers like a conjurer uses his, and does things with his hands that have become a habit with him to do, but which at first are a little difficult and require technical skill, and if a man has not that daily practice he may know the theory most perfectly, he may be a most able and intelligent man, and yet he will not do such good technical work as the, perhaps, less able man who has had this practice. Do I make my point plain?

11045. Yes?—Splints were often wanting and very deficient.

11046. Deficient in quantity?—Deficient in quantity and quality, and other apparatus was wanting. For the treatment of a broken thigh, where a man's future depends upon his getting as nearly as possible the full length of his thigh, one requires extension apparatus to maintain the length while it is healing, and I know that in most places extension apparatus was not provided.

11047. Not even at the base hospitals?—I cannot answer for Wynberg. I think they had it there. Many of those cases depend upon being treated, in such a war as we had in South Africa, at or near the place where they were wounded. A man with a badly broken thigh, with a wound and splintering of the bone, is not a patient whom you would send down many hundred miles.

11048. What sort of an instrument is this extension apparatus? Is it a big thing again, because there you come to the difficulty of transport?—No, it is not a question of the difficulty of transport.

11049. And in your view such instruments should have been provided?—Certainly. I have no hesitation in saying they ought to have been provided. Dressings were often wanted, but that might have been a question of the difficulty of supply; and even as to drugs and stores, which I note are stated to have been pretty well provided, that was not my experience.

11050. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Do you mean such things as absorbent wool?—Often our stores ran short, and very short. Sometimes we had no splints save bits of zinc a foot or two long, quite too short for the treatment of a fractured thigh with a gunshot wound. We had just to manage with those as well as we could, but it was not what it ought to have been. We sometimes ran rather short, decidedly short, of our antiseptic dressings.

11051. Such as absorbent wool?—Such as absorbent wool, and so on, and even of such drugs, at some parts I witnessed, as calomel, which was wanting at Warrenton; and that is an instance of others which I cannot at this moment precisely specify. Another thing is that the drugs were badly designed. They were provided evidently according to a formula that was out of date. That refers to the drugs and surgical and medical stores, and they were not forwarded in such a way as to be of the best service to the sick and wounded. When things ran short at Modder River we got up boxes, weighing perhaps, I should guess, 80lbs. in weight, and when we opened those we found that one of them would contain cans of glycerine and another cans of spirit, and to open those boxes and get out what one wanted in suitable quantities for distribution where

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they were needed was a matter almost of impossibility. Again, on the advance from Boshof, where we were very badly off for drugs and appliances, the drugs and things were packed in the transport wagons which streamed everywhere over the veldt, amongst us and behind us, and we could not get at them, they were not available, and we did not know where they were to be had. Now in Russia, for instance, which I think is a model in those things, they have in time of peace a huge storehouse provided with bales of all the materials assorted. There are gigantic bales, and there are small bales containing suitable proportions of all the drugs and dressings and materials that are required, and if there be a small detachment to be provided with them, they get a small bale, or several small bales, while a large body of men get larger ones or a greater number, and all those bales are labelled outside with what they are and their quantities, so that a medical officer in want of anything for some urgent case has only to go to a bale and he is sure to find it there, a small bale if he wants a little or a big bale if he wants more. I think perhaps these are a few instances to bear out my contention.

11052. (*Chairman.*) I wanted to know about the form in which the drugs were carried?—The drugs seemed to me also to be arranged on antiquated ideas. They were such as you would have found 50 years ago in a chemist's shop, but not such as you would find nowadays, bottles of tinctures and effusions, and that sort of thing, instead of the compressed tabloids that are used elsewhere.

11053. They did use compressed tabloids in South Africa, did they not?—They did use compressed tabloids—yes.

11054. We have had evidence to that effect?—They did use them.

11055. But not in sufficient quantities?—No, but I mean that the whole system of drug supply had not been adequately thought out. No doubt tabloids were sent out, probably very abundantly when the difficulties began to be felt, but the Army Medical Department ought to have been organised beforehand with a view to supplying all those in the modern portable form of tabloids.

11056. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Do you mean they had not sufficient tabloids at first? Is that the point you are making?—I should conceive that they started with a very antiquated *armamentarium* of drugs.

11057. Not enough drugs in tabloid form: is that it?—Which were subsequently supplemented by quantities of tabloids sent out.

11058. At the start they had not a large supply of compressed drugs?—You see, sir, I was not there at the start, and I must not go beyond what I can actually vouch for.

11059. I want to find out what the point is?—If the provision of pharmacy requisites had been carried out according to modern ideas they would not have had all those bottles and so forth, that required transport.

11060. They would have had tabloids instead?—Yes.

11061. That is what I was asking you. When you got there and began to examine into things you found there were many articles in bottles that should have been in a tabloid form, is that it?—That is so.

11062. (*Chairman.*) A great deal was carried in bottle form, was it not?—I do not know so much about the pharmacy. I can only give the impressions that I formed so far as I have done.

11063. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Could you give a few striking instances of drugs that were in bottle form that should have been in tabloids?—No, I could not.

11064. (*Chairman.*) Take disinfectants, were they carried in tabloid form or in bottles?—It seemed to me that the Army Medical Department had not had any information before them as to what were good disinfectants and what were not, and they had, going upon a general knowledge, sent out quantities of everything where it was possible. They had sent out such disinfectants as, besides carbolic acid which everyone knows, creoline, Sanitas, and those sort of things which might be useful enough under certain circumstances, but which were not well adapted for a campaign.

11065. Take Sanitas, did that come out in bottles or in tabloids?—That I do not know, but I think in bottles. I do not know whether it would have compressed or not, as I do not know much about pharmacy. In some cases they had not sublimate; when I was lying ill in Bloemfontein I wanted to disinfect my hands and my person during the night, and I wanted to make the man who attended me disinfect his hands, and sometimes a bottle of carbolic acid was supplied and sometimes a bottle of Izal or Sanitas.

11066. So that they were supplied in bottles?—Yes, and sometimes there were none to be had at night, as they were locked up. The storekeeper had locked them up, and they were not obtainable, and all that meant that I was spreading infection to the poor man who attended me, and to others. He could not disinfect his hands, and had to go and lie down and attend to others, and he had to eat his food and bring food to others.

11067. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Was there no corrosive sublimate?—I think not. I think at Bloemfontein, where I was ill, there was none. I do not say in the whole of Bloemfontein, but in that particular hospital where I was.

11068. (*Sir John Edge.*) May I ask what you were suffering from?—Typhoid.

11069. (*Chairman.*) What I want quite to understand is: can pretty well every drug, if it is required, be carried in tabloid form nowadays?—A very large proportion of them, and the portability of pharmacy requisites is very much increased by that.

11070. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) For instance, corrosive sublimate, which I have just mentioned, can be carried in tabloid form?—Perfectly, and is best carried in that way.

11071. (*Chairman.*) Do the Russian Army carry many bottles?—They carry almost exclusively tabloids; wherever it is possible they have the condensed drugs in the tabloid form, whether for internal or external use.

11072. That is all you have to say with regard to equipment, is it not?—I should like to say something about the first dressings. Sometimes the first dressings were utterly unworthy of England. Some of the first dressings were evidently hastily made up at Cape Town. They were wrapped up in a piece of paper by, judging from their appearance, someone not specially trained to know the importance of purity, and so on, in regard to first dressings. They were not closed, but stitched with a bit of black cotton thread, and inside of them was a piece of linen, a piece of gamgee tissue in the form of cotton-wool, quite antiquated from the antiseptic point of view, and two safety pins lay loose, so that the first thing in opening them in the field, on the sand, or in the bush, was that they would have tumbled out and been lost, and outside was a label paper gummed on describing how those should be used. Now you know with a man in a campaign, subjected to dirt, rain, dust, and perspiration, that would soon have become illegible, immediately, in fact, and frayed off, and I doubt if any man could have sat down in the heat of an action and read those minute and almost illegible instructions regarding how the articles were to be used. Some of the troops were provided with no first dressings at all—Plumer's force had none.

11073. I see you go on to say in your *précis*, that "The Army Medical Department was unprepared to deal with such questions as have arisen in all large wars, as, for example, the organisation and utilisation of volunteered aid societies," and so on; what have you to say upon those three points you mention there?—The Army Medical Department seemed at first to pride itself on being entirely adequate to conduct the campaign without any external aid. They did not seem to have heard that ever since the American War between the North and the South, every big campaign had had as a marked feature of it the employment of voluntary aid—that in the Franco-German campaign of 1870-71, the Russian campaign of 1878, the American War in Cuba, and everywhere, voluntary aid was a great feature with civilised nations, and a thing the existence of which could not be overlooked. They had made no provision whatever to deal with that, and seemed rather to resent its appearance.

11074. Did they not welcome the civil surgeons, for example, and the aid which they afforded them?—Eventually they were glad to get the civil surgeons to make up for the deficiency of their own officers, but I do not think that their aid, even at first, was welcomed with any cordiality.

11075. They knew all about the Red Cross Society, for instance, and they must have known that they would

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have the advantage of assistance from them. I do not understand you to mean that they put any impediments in the way of those societies' work?—Yes, I think they did. I think they were jealous of the Red Cross Society from the very first, and impeded its usefulness as well as that of other voluntary agencies.

11076. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Who did that? Who were jealous?—The Army Medical Department.

11077. (*Chairman.*) How did that show itself?—The officials of the Red Cross Department with whom I talked, mentioned that it was difficult for them to be of use, as they should have liked to be, and that they were not able to get in touch with, or to supply the Army with, the things for which their funds were provided. There was even an order issued that no Army medical officer was to apply to the Red Cross Society for anything, unless it had been sanctioned by his superior authorities. That of itself was almost prohibitory, because away at a distance such as at Boshof, Bothaville—or rather we will say at Kimberley and Modder River, which are certainly within reach of the Red Cross Society, in the state of the transport and the postal department, it was impossible to requisition things at the time they were wanted, and save in the later stages which I witnessed, when the Red Cross Society were enabled to establish depôts, such as they did at Kimberley, the operations of the Red Cross in such places as Modder River really resolved themselves into the provision of a few pyjamas. An agent would come, he was not a medical man and had no sympathy with the Army medical officers, and did not know their wants; he would call like a commercial traveller, and say, "Do you want anything"? and, of course, there was nothing taken from him. I think a clinical thermometer or two were once given by the Red Cross Society at Modder River, and, I think, one or two pyjamas, but really I do not know of anything else which was given by the Red Cross Society there. At Kimberley, however, I believe it was different; when they took the schools and public buildings and converted them into hospitals, the depôt of the Red Cross Society was of considerable service there, but very much in the same direction supplying such things as I have mentioned, and it was not an agency by which the deficiencies as regards instruments and modern appliances could be made good.

11078. In your *précis* you also say: "The Army Medical Department were unprepared to deal with such questions as have arisen in all large wars, as, for example, the organisation and utilisation of Volunteer-aid societies, such as the Red Cross and Good Hope Societies, whose usefulness was thus paralysed," and then you say: "The employment of women and others as volunteer nurses and as aids in attending to the sick and wounded; the employment of volunteered aid in the form of hospitals and ambulances; many scandalous things resulted from the want of preparation to deal with such matters"; what is the sort of preparation that you suggest?—I think there should have been, as in Germany, a Commissioner appointed by the War Office, whose sole function was to organise voluntary aid. That is how Germany deals with it. He has a series of well-conceived instructions as to how voluntary aid is to be admitted, organised, and utilised. He arranges that it shall be taken advantage of in every way, that the funds shall be directed in the most useful channels, instead of allowed to find their efficiency in haphazard channels, and he arranges for the employment of ladies who wish to nurse, who wish to attend the wounded, who wish to arrange for writing, communication of the wounded and sick with their friends, and also organise—I do not remember what they call them—regular refreshment stations for the assistance of men who are being transported by convoys or trains, for the refreshment and provision of luxuries to those—all that is under this official, and at every halting station on the lines of communication there are under him organisations of voluntary aid by which the sick and wounded are provided with all kinds of luxuries that are suitable for them, and beneficial things, such as clothing, food, tobacco, and so forth. All that was entirely wasted in this war, and the people did not know what to give. If they gave goods, the chances were that they were ill selected and were laid aside, and if they gave money the chances were that it went to the Good Hope Society or the Red Cross Society, who were paralysed by want of organisation in connection with the Army Medical Department, and the money was really almost thrown away.

11079. In Germany is the Commissioner you have mentioned a Commissioner in the field?—Yes, in the field, and you will find his duties fully laid down in "Kriegs Sanitäts Ordnung," Ed. 1888, page 177; and all those questions or nursing, benevolence, and the provision of requisites and luxuries are organised in an admirable way.

11080. And your suggestion is that in future we should have some official appointed to deal with all these external societies?—Some enlightened official, with a staff, appointed to deal with voluntary aid, to organise it in time of peace, and to deal with it in war.

11081. Then, as regards the sick transport, how is that managed in Germany or Russia?—In Germany they have trains for the wounded, and they have trains for the sick, and what I saw in South Africa convinces me that it is of the utmost importance that we should have trains for fever, so that infection may not needlessly be conveyed. Those trains in Germany for the ordinary wounded and the sick trains are somewhat differently organised, I understand, and they are provided in time of peace. The fitting up of the carriages for the easy transport of the wounded, and their accommodation in all respects is well thought out and organised.

11082. But you understand that is a comparatively easy matter in Germany where they know pretty well the lines along which they would have to bring the wounded, we will say, back again from a possible frontier; but can you suggest how that could have been arranged in South Africa?—I think that if it had been well thought out beforehand it could have been better done in South Africa; but we may be fighting even in Germany some day.

11083. Have you ever been in India?—Never. The trains in South Africa were as well done as care and zeal could manage, but they were not what they should have been. They were dreadful things for a man with a bad fracture, or even for a patient badly ill with fever, to go down some hundreds of miles in; and I suppose you have been told that nearly all the cases of typhoid, which were transported when seriously ill, either died or had very dangerous complications, perforation or hemorrhage, from being transported in those trains.

11084. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Was that from shaking?—Yes, the shaking and the total inadequacy of them. The hospital trains were good, but even they might have been improved in many respects with regard to the shaking. The other trains that were used to carry the sick and the wounded (and only a small proportion of them were carried in the hospital trains) were very badly arranged for the purpose. There were convoys of sick with dysentery and diarrhœa, and even typhoid fever, sent down by them, and sometimes there was no water in the train, sometimes even orderlies were absent. The carriage latrines were utterly unsuitable, no water even sometimes in them, not disinfected, and sometimes the wounded were transported in improvised trucks. Hardships must occur in war, but it made one very sad to see a man getting his leg and his elbows and his head knocked about in a springless truck when he was ill and suffering, and, perhaps, wounded; it was very terrible to behold.

11085. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Surely the railway trucks had springs, had they not?—I should think probably they had some springs, but they were such as would suit coals, not men, merely to prevent damage from jolting, and not provided for the carriage of men.

11086. Really what the men wanted was beds under them laid on the truck?—I think they had hair mattresses on some of them; but, still, on the narrow gauge, jolty, South African lines, it was very terrible for a man to travel when seriously ill. Sometimes those trains were sent away without food for the sick and wounded.

11087. (*Chairman.*) In Germany and Russia they have those trains provided ready in times of peace?—They have those carriages provided and ready, and I have seen them; so that if trains had to be improvised they could be better done than in our country where we would have to get them hastily made.

11088. We do not possess any such, not even the model of such a carriage, so far as you know.

(*Sir John Hopkins.*) I think they have them on the South-Western, labelled "Ambulance"; I have seen them.

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11089. (*Chairman.*) Have you ever seen them, Professor Ogston?—No, I have not seen one of those.

11090. As to the organisation of voluntary aid, you have said something, but as to the arrangements concerning sanitary matters, especially in preventing and dealing with pestilences in the field, have you anything more to say on that point in connection with the German and Russian arrangements?—In Germany their Army Medical Corps, detailed for sanitary purposes, arrange regarding the water supply immediately any place is arrived at. The water supply is tested by their Bacteriological Department and their Chemical Department, even on expeditions, and wherever an impure source is found it is closed, or labelled, or a sentry put over it, and where a good source of water supply exists, indications are put up as to where it is, pointing for the men to go to it. In our army in South Africa, regarding the water supply, nothing of that kind was done, almost, perhaps not at all. There were no sentries put over impure sources. There was no indication by which a thirsty man could learn that a pure source was within his reach. The water supplies towards the front were not tested chemically or bacteriologically, and measures to secure their being cleaned and kept clean were not instituted. They did sometimes post sentries over them, but I suppose the sentries were not trained in sanitary matters, and probably did not know what to do, because the men would drink water and wash things where it was not quite right for them to do it. The water-carts were not regularly disinfected, and they were sent under drivers who filled them at the most convenient places, which were not always the most desirable places. Regarding latrines, and so on, in Germany that is most minutely cared for. The series of regulations laid down and practised regarding latrines in the field will be found in the "Kriegs Sanitäts Ordnung," at pages 222, 225, 226, 228, and 245, regarding the labelling of the water, in that same book at page 207, and the filtration of the water at page 209. As to the latrines, at the pages I have mentioned, their situation is planned to be a suitable distance unlikely to carry infection and unlikely to do harm; but in our army in South Africa, from want of a proper sanitary staff, such regulations were very ill attended to, and often not at all. One would camp where a previous expedition had passed, and there was nothing to mark where they had had their slaughter house or their latrines, and we would camp on the very ground that had been occupied by them. When we arrived unexpectedly at any place there was no one whose duty it was, or at least who found it possible from want of underlings, to look after the situation of the latrines. I remember on one occasion we arrived at a place just outside Kimberley, where we were a considerable time, with a number of sick men suffering from diarrhœa and the initial stages of typhoid fever, and hence constantly requiring to go forth, and for three days and two nights there were no latrines whatever dug there, and the men went out fifty yards into the veldt, and what with the heat and the dust storms, and the floods, all this was washed about, and, of course, it disseminated disease. The disinfection of latrines was attempted, but not practised in the thorough way in which it would have been had we possessed a proper sanitary corps with men trained to those duties to carry out the officer's instructions. Some of the officers had the duty of being sanitary officers attached to them, and I have seen the same thing in Egypt; but what can one man do? In a camp where he has no men to carry out his instructions whom he can trust, who are trained to do it, the name is nothing. We very badly want some sanitary corps, and I see that Mr. Brodrick proposes to institute some such establishment.

11091. Then in your *précis* you contrast the defects in our Service with the well-organised German and Russian Armies, and say: "In the Russian Army the training of Feldshers and the organisation for the efficiency of their officers, hospitals, and medical and surgical war material." What have you got to say upon that point?—The medical or surgical attendant, of course, cannot do everything for the sick in a campaign. His duty consists in supervision, but in the management of the thousand little necessities that the sick have it is impossible for him to be present. I think that in our Army there ought to be some class of men very highly trained, so as to be upon a footing somewhat equivalent to our nursing sisters, who would receive a thorough instruction in regard to anatomy, physiology, and disease generally, almost like a medical man, and who would, of course, receive correspondingly high pay, because he will be one upon whom a vast deal of responsibility will devolve. He should be able to deal nearly as a doctor would with all the questions that arise regarding the management of the sick, to superintend them during the night, to observe dangerous phases, to look after their proper disinfection by the orderlies, after the proper sanitation of the hospitals, after diet, after the difficulties of evacuating them in a pure state, and so forth, and able also intelligently to do dressings and assist the medical officers. The proper education, either on those lines or similar lines, of the non-commissioned officers of our Army Medical Corps is most desirable. The men who enter it at present—I have said already that there are many brilliant exceptions, but the men who enter it at present are not of a class superior to the ordinary soldier, which they ought to be to carry out such work as theirs. They should receive higher pay, and be more highly trained in harmony with the responsibilities they have to undertake. The Russian Feldsher is trained for three years. He receives a similar training to a doctor, but he takes no doctor's degree. He is fit to do minor operations, to do all dressings, to understand about temperature and pulse, and all the registration that is necessary regarding the sick, the analysis of their excretions, and everything concerning their treatment on the points I have already mentioned. Those are the Russian Feldshers, a most valuable set of men, who, so far as I know, do not exist in any other army of the world.

11092. Is that a corps of its own?—No, it is part of the Army Medical Department.

11093. Have you been in communication with the War Department at all since you came back from South Africa?—I was on Mr. Brodrick's Committee.

11094. Will you explain exactly what Mr. Brodrick's Committee was?—We were called together on purpose to consider the scheme which Mr. Brodrick and his advisers had drawn up; that was the whole of our duty.

11095. Who was the Chairman of that Committee?—Mr. Brodrick himself.

11096. Who were the members of it?—There were some of the Army Medical Department, there were some military men, there was a representative from the Indian Medical Department, and there were a number of civilians who had served in the South African war.

11097. Sir Frederick Treves?—Yes. Mr. Makins, Mr. Fripp, Dr. Tooth, and Mr. Perry from the College of Surgeons and Physicians.

11098. Is the work of that Committee finished?—Yes.

11099. Then Mr. Brodrick upon that has formulated a scheme?—Yes.

11100. Do you think it a good scheme?—I think it has the elements of good in it, but I do not think it was catholic enough. The one point which I thought saved it all was that he associated with the Army Medical Department a number of skilled civil doctors and surgeons, who will be able, knowing what is constantly going on, to advise the Army Medical Department, to keep them informed of what might be, and therefore to assist what probably will be. I think it is hopeful.

11101. Did that committee suggest any means by which the Army Medical Surgeons should, in time of peace, obtain wider experience?—No; only they favoured special study leave, but to a very limited degree, not in my opinion adequate.

11102. They did not go into the question of Army medical surgeons being attached to civil hospitals?—No, they did not.

11103. Is there anything else you want to add to your evidence?—I should like to say that the ambulance wagons were not suitable in South Africa. They were old wagons, and, not only from my own observation, but from the testimony of many others, they were not the best. They were fitted to contain only two, and, save the springs of the wagons, they had nothing to deaden the jolt to a wounded man. On several occasions I saw what torture they were to a wounded man. Some of the wounded brought in from Villebois' capture almost died on the way, with penetrating wounds of the thorax, although they had been allowed to remain over night in a Kaffir hut on purpose that they might somewhat recuperate. They jolted, and they were old-fashioned.

11104. How do they compare with the Russian and German wagons?—They are not nearly so good, and

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even compared with the Cape wagons, made at the Cape, I was told, somewhat on their principle, but very much better adapted to the country, they were very inferior. The Cape wagons had better springs, and they were lighter, and they held four men lying down in them instead of two, and some of the wagons in connection with the hospitals which voluntary aid provided, were provided with tortoise tents, which were very much better for the treatment of the sick, and much more modern, far better adapted both for the field immediately following an army in action, or for field hospital work. Some of those were beautifully equipped in that way, and one hospital had beautiful wagons with tortoise tents that formed part of the wagon itself. Then the stretchers were the same old stretchers we have known such a long time, and might have been improved upon, I think. The field hospitals furnished by private individuals were very much superior to the English. There is one other point, as you ask me, that I think I should emphasise: In the German Army, in time of peace, they provide huts on well-known, well-studied systems, capable of being packed into boxes and carried, and put up anywhere; and those huts, which are of all sizes, are taken out in their field manœuvres and elsewhere, and in a campaign. England had not one of those, and there was the very greatest want of them, as the storms of rain, with lightning, blew down sometimes the whole of the tents in a hospital where the wounded were lying, and we had to pick them grovelling out of the mud with the aid of the illumination of the lightning; so that that state of matters compared very badly with what might have been the case if we had been provided with proper huts. Of course, they would have required to be made in time of peace, but had even one or two of those been sent out we could have examined our wounded with very much greater advantage to them. Operations would have been possible of a style antiseptically that was quite impossible in the circumstances which existed, and for the treatment of very bad cases, both wounded and sick, they would have been invaluable. The Germans possess all of these, and you will find full information regarding them, even the designs and plans of the huts upon the two systems, in the "Kriegs Sanitäts Ordnung," at page 25, and the plans in the "Friedens Sanitäts Ordnung," pages, 499, 500, 503, and 508.

11105. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You are of opinion that much of the inefficiency in the treatment of the sick and wounded during the war in South Africa was owing to the antiquated methods in existence at the commencement of the war in the Army Medical Department?—Yes.

11106. You consider that sufficient attention had not been given to assure that the medical officers were well instructed in modern methods both as regarded surgery and medicine?—I do.

11107. And you think that it would have been quite possible to have done so here, as it is done to a large extent in Germany?—Quite possible.

11108. You would have had the medical officers given an opportunity of practising in the civil hospitals of the country, in London, or in the provinces?—I think, my Lord, that is one of the most important things that I can give testimony regarding. I conceive it absolutely impossible that we can ever have a proper Army Medical Department in this country until our medical officers and non-commissioned officers and men are allowed to discharge daily in time of peace the duties that they will have to discharge in time of war.

11109. You consider that they ought to be given the opportunity, and indeed that they ought to be encouraged to obtain the most up-to-date knowledge of medicine and surgery in its most modern form in the hospitals?—Yes.

11110. Do you think that these officers of the Army Medical Department, when in these hospitals, should be continued as members of that department as regards pay, privileges, and emoluments—just as if they were on active service?—I do; and I think, when they have to expend money in special courses of training, they ought to have some means of enabling them to recoup themselves for that, and that they should also be sent abroad to study the most modern researches, particularly in connection with their own department, and their expenses paid for that too.

11111. To the different schools and hospitals of the Continent?—Yes.

11112. As well as those of Great Britain?—Yes.

11113. You also think that there was a great want of the knowledge required in attending to the sick on the part of the "orderly" members of the medical staff?—Yes.

11114. At present in the military hospitals in this country what is the education required of the attendants? Are there male nurses?—There are male nurses, and most of the cases they have to treat are those of venereal disease.

11115. In the military hospitals?—Yes, venereal disease and trifling ailments. Our soldiers, of course, are strong, healthy, picked men, and, except an accident now and again, serious sickness is uncommon amongst them.

11116. What is the instruction given to them to fit them for the work in those hospitals, do you know? Have they any instruction with regard to surgery, anatomy, and so on?—Beyond what is usual in First Aid, I think not.

11117. Such instruction, for instance, as is given to a trained nurse, who has to be two or three years learning her profession?—A few of them may receive such training; for instance, at Netley it may be the case; but that the training is sufficiently widespread to filter through the whole of the non-commissioned officers and men of the Army Medical Department I do not believe.

11118. And you think that they ought to have superior and more general training than that which is given to them just now?—Yes.

11119. And the same remarks applies to all those in the Army Medial Corps?—Yes.

11120. The education in the first instance of the medical man—the surgeon or doctor—in the Army is the same as that of the civil surgeon or medical man, is it not?—When he enters the Service it is so.

11121. And then he has a special military education given him to a certain extent at Netley?—He has.

11122. But you think that the knowledge and experience which is gained by others in civil life should extend equally, or as far as is possible under the circumstances, to those in the Army Medical Service?—It is quite necessary that it should do so.

11123. I think that the medical men in the Army had to complain very much of their standing in the Service a few years ago?—Yes, my Lord, that is so.

11124. And you are aware that from this cause it was a very difficult thing at one time to get thoroughly competent young men to go into the Army Medical Service?—Yes.

11125. That is better now, is it not?—That is better now.

11126. I think there was a change during Lord Lansdowne's Administration?—Yes.

11127. Do you think it is now in that respect all that it ought to be?—It is partly a question of their remuneration, and partly a question of their professional standing. As to the remuneration, I believe that at the present instant they are sufficiently paid, and that there are no complaints on that score; but the second point, touching their position as men of science, is not yet adequately provided for. Under the system that has been in operation up to the beginning of the South African war a medical officer was cut off to a great extent from his own profession, and a number of them naturally looked upon themselves as officers, and aimed at being officers, in the Army. They had not the honest pride in their profession which would have made them greater men than officers in the Army, and which is only obtainable by a man who loves his profession and is constantly educated in it, who appreciates its advances, and has every facility for acquiring a knowledge of them.

11128. I think you mentioned that in the German or Austrian Army the military medical officer was proud of his position, and that he was regarded there as at least equal with the other officers of the Army in every respect?—That is so, in every respect.

11129. And you consider that it would be a very great advantage were it so in the British army?—Things never can be right in the British Army until it is so.

11130. You hardly think that it is so at the present time to the same extent as on the Continent?—I do not

11131. What would you recommend, with regard to

that, to bring it to the same point?—To condense, I should recommend that hospitals be cultivated and fostered in every respect in connection with the Army; that alone would bring about everything else.

11132. Did you find that a large number of female nurses were employed in South Africa?—They were at first refused, save perhaps at Cape Town, but they were of enormous value when they were introduced nearer the front. Both in the Soudan campaign and in the South African campaign the difference between a hospital where a woman had been introduced and one that was left to the orderlies was incredibly great. The eye told it at once upon entering—cleanliness, tidiness, care, with charts of temperature, all that was desirable was carried out very much better where women were present.

11133. So that while you recommend that there should be a body of good, well-trained male nurses, you think it would be of essential benefit that there should be also female nurses?—I believe so, and I do not think there is anything to prevent women going much nearer the front than has hitherto been assumed to be possible; if the proper class of women are enlisted into the Army Nursing Service, scandals such as would otherwise exist need not exist, and their utility is indisputable. They have as much courage in positions of danger as men, and the good that they do, not merely in the ways I have said, but in regard to the impression that they produce, the hopefulness they convey to the sick men who are in danger of death, is beyond words almost to express.

11134. I gathered from what you said that you thought it would also be of great advantage to have for the sick a certain number of female cooks?—That is so; for men suffering from dysentery and typhoid it is almost of more importance than medicine.

11135. They could more readily prepare little delicacies, and such things which are so desirable for the sick, than men?—They could, and when they were there in South Africa they did so.

11136. Had you an opportunity of comparing, with regard to different regiments or different contingents, whether there was a greater number sick from fever in the one or in the other, looking to their physique or intelligence?—I am afraid that in the turmoil of the South African war statistics were scarcely obtainable of a reliable kind, but I could see that nearly all the Army Medical Corps men took ill; in the few months I was attached to one field hospital I think nearly all the men died or were invalided from disease, and of nine officers who at different times were attached to it I think only three escaped typhoid fever or being invalided, several died, and one of those who escaped had just had typhoid in India, so that he was probably immune.

11137. Do you think that was owing in great measure to the defective method of disinfection?—Entirely. You asked me regarding physique, and some of the regiments, especially some of the Militia regiments, were physically very inferior and more liable to disease—boys and weeds. In one expedition where a regiment was expected to take part in an advance, over 300 of them—380, I think—were sent for examination as to their physical fitness, and 212 of that part of the regiment so sent for examination were rejected as unfit to sustain the toils of a march and as being liable to disease.

11138. Had you an opportunity of seeing some of the Colonial contingents?—I had.

11139. Did you consider that the medical arrangements for them, and which were sent with them from the Colonies (I now speak of the Colonies outside Africa), were of a good and satisfactory character?—I had not the opportunities that I desired of examining them, but I was told unanimously by those who had and knew, that they were vastly superior to the English.

11140. They had several female nurses attached to each battalion, I believe?—I do not know about being attached to each battalion, but we had Colonial nurses sent from the other Colonies than South Africa, who did most admirable work, and I am afraid some who died at their duty.

11141. I speak in this case of what was actually done. There were female nurses sent?—There were.

11142. There were from Canada, at any rate, and I presume they did very good work?—Well, I personally can testify that these women did incredible good to me and others.

11143. I think you spoke of several Sisters as nurses who were employed out there; were there any nuns, nurses of the Catholic community, so employed?—Yes, at Kimberley there was a community of Catholic nurses who were employed, and they did very valuable service to sick men who were sent into their building.

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11144. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) And at Mafeking also?—I am not aware. I think at Bloemfontein there was another similar establishment of Catholic nurses, who did very admirable work; but in speaking of Sisters, I meant trained nurses. I am not sure that I have always discriminated between perfectly trained nurses and those who had the standing of ward sisters. We called them all sisters.

11145. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You think a provision should be made during peace, both with regard to medical men, and male and female nurses, of a much better character than we have at present, so as to be prepared for emergencies?—I do think so.

11146. There is an institution in London—there may be others throughout the country—a post graduate establishment—the Polychlinic, I think. It would be of very great advantage, would it not, that medical officers should have frequent opportunities of studying at such institutions?—Of very great importance.

11147. And that added to practice in the hospitals would give, in your opinion, I understand, an efficiency for actual work, which it is impossible they can have under the present system?—That is my opinion.

11148. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) You have given your evidence so fully that I will only take you on one question, I think, and that is the question of *personnel*, the number of men to be supplied, because it is important to draw a distinction between the number of men that are provided under the system contemplated at home of only having two Army Corps in the field, and the number of men that would have been necessary for a war, such as this became, on an enormous scale. You understand there would be a distinction between those two?—Yes.

11149. There has been rather a conflict of evidence on the subject as regards the number of men provided for the two Army Corps, which we were supposed to have ready to send out of England. You said at the commencement of your evidence, I think, that practically there were only sufficient men of the Army Medical Department for 40,000 troops?—That is my belief.

11150. Approximately?—Yes, that is my belief.

11151. You would not say there was a sufficient number of the Army Medical Department for the supply of 80,000 men?—No.

11152. I want to get that quite clearly, because there is a conflict of evidence, and one witness has told us there was sufficient for 80,000 men?—Well, I perhaps can help you in this way; no reliable proportion is agreed upon, but the statistics of war, in the American War, between the North and the South, in the German war, and in the Russo-Turkish war, have shown that of a body of men put into the field the admissions for wounds and disease in the course of a year will exceed the total of that body. Suppose you have 100,000 men in the field you will have 120,000 of them ill in a year, and to provide against that it is necessary to have somewhere about 5 per cent. of the strength of the force connected with the Army Medical Department. I do not know what the numbers were, but possibly that will assist you; that you will find vouched for in all the campaigns that have been well studied, such as those I have named—about 4 or 5 per cent. I think of medical attendants ought to be present.

11153. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Do you mean 4 or 5 per cent. of doctors, or 4 to 5 per cent. of the whole corps?—Of the whole corps.

11154. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) When the Fifth Division arrived in South Africa, which, of course, meant about 50,000 men, to whom you must add, perhaps, 20,000 who were in South Africa before, that was 70,000 men, they had according to one witness 2,000 of the Royal Army Medical Corps, which would be, roughly speaking, 3 per cent.?—Yes.

11155. But you consider 5 per cent. has been proved by the experience of other nations to be necessary?—Three per cent. is decidedly too small. It means a catastrophe either threatening or occurring.

11156. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) You told us that you did not think the medicines as supplied were, practically

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speaking, up to date, but were the medicines that you had anything to do with, in your experience, of good quality?—They were of good quality always.

11157. Did you see anything of the Ambulance Corps belonging to the Colonials, not South African, but from Canada, Australia, and so on?—No, not so that I could give you information regarding them; I know that generally they were looked upon as most excellent and desirable. I know that the men wanted to get into them in preference, and the surgeons who had seen them reported that their instruments and all their appliances were very much superior, and some of those that were sent from Canada—one in particular that I saw a great deal of, was fitted up vastly better than ours alongside it.

11158. (*Sir John Jackson.*) As I came in a little late, I did not hear the whole of your evidence. Were you out at the war in South Africa?—Yes.

11159. And in the Soudan also?—Yes.

11160. About what percentage did the Army Medical Corps form out in South Africa to the total number of men engaged in the war?—I am afraid I could not give you that figure.

11161. I understood from what you said a few minutes ago that about 5 per cent. would be the proper proportion?—Yes.

11162. Of the whole men engaged there should be about 5 per cent. connected with the medical service?—Yes.

11163. If you had to have so large a proportion as 5 per cent. that would be a very serious burden to provide for in times of peace, would it not, assuming for the moment that these men were to be on the permanent staff of the Army Medical Corps?—But if they are of so much importance to the Army as they are, they must be provided.

11164. It obviously would be a serious burden?—It would be a large burden.

11165. So that really it becomes a question as to how, if practicable, the remedy could be provided without relying solely upon the permanent men?—Yes.

11166. You are a professor in Aberdeen; are you a Professor of Medicine?—I am Professor of Surgery in the University of Aberdeen.

11167. We all know that in Scotland, in the medical schools, in Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen, you have young men getting through their courses who find it somewhat difficult to get a start, as it were, with their work?—Yes.

11168. In order to provide for having men ready, in the event of war, quickly, do you think it is a practical suggestion that the Government might in some way bring in many of these young men qualified by the medical schools by giving them some grant, and then in consideration of that, having a call upon them at once in the event of war? A great many of these young men, I take it, go as junior assistants to medical men in practice?—I conceive that it would be quite practicable to do so, even if only in connection with the Volunteer force. They have a system like what you mentioned in Germany, which is the following: that every medical man who has not served in the German Army as a doctor, but who is practising as a doctor, receives annually from the German War Office an inquiry whether he is willing to serve in the case of war breaking out, and if so his place is allotted to him, and he receives some acknowledgement of it, which is adequate to secure his services.

11169. Some small monetary payment?—I believe so, and some little rank, I daresay; but I am not perfectly sure of that. All their University professors are similarly treated. The most eminent civil medical professors hold military rank, and they have to give courses to the younger medical officers in the Army, and they have places allotted to them also as consultants in the event of the outbreak of a war, and in acknowledgment for that they have a certain military status and certain emoluments. It will be found in the Friedens Sanitäts Ordnung that those consultants have a certain proportion to the Army in the event of the outbreak of war, which is fully determined and recognised, and adequate.

11170. So that that system you speak of is practically the system that I have suggested?—Yes, so far as it will apply to a nation which has compulsory service.

11171. In the case of the British nation, where there is not in the ordinary way compulsory service, there is no reason why the Government should not make an arrangement as I have suggested, which would compel these young men in the event of war, so long as they continued under the engagement in peace, to take foreign service as medical men?—The principle is perfectly applicable, and it would have this further advantage, that whereas in a prolonged war, such as that in South Africa, the eminent consultants served only for a short time, and were nearly all home at the end of six months or so, and the supply of very high-class consultants fell off very much towards the end of the war—and it would do so in any long continued large war—if it were part of their duty for which they received consideration in time of peace to serve in war, we would then ensure the quality being maintained all through, however prolonged the campaign might be.

11172. And you would also ensure that these men, who would come under that rule, would be a class of men who had recently had more practical experience in surgery; many of them would be about the hospitals, and so forth, and would have more practical experience in surgery than would be found in the case of the regular Army surgeons?—By such a plan as that you would obtain a very fine class of men indeed, but I should like to see the Army Medical Service in such a position that it could not be surpassed even by them.

11173. I take it your suggestion is that the regular Army medical men should have more opportunities of hospital work, and that kind of thing; but I am just on the one question as to whether what I have suggested is not a practical way of meeting the demands that would come about in the event of war without the country incurring any very great additional expense in connection with it?—I think such a principle is the only practicable way.

11174. (*Sir John Edge.*) How long does it take to efficiently train a medical orderly?—Two or three years.

11175. And I suppose the non-commissioned officers would require even a longer period than that?—Yes.

11176. In your judgment ought the Army Medical Department to have been strong enough before the war commenced to deal with the ordinary requirements for India and home, and for the 200,000 men in the field in South Africa?—I think had they been aware of what was taking place in other nations similarly situated to our own (I refer to continental nations), they would have been very much better prepared than they were.

11177. But I want to see whether you are prepared to advise, for instance, that we should keep up the normal strength of the Army Medical Corps for all our ordinary peace purposes, and for dealing with an army of 200,000 men in the field—in the case of a war breaking out—in addition. That is what your evidence comes to, is it not?—When you saw those poor men suffering, and the enormous waste of life such as we had in South Africa, for there is no doubt that enormous numbers of men might have been alive to-day who are not, one cannot but aim at the ideal.

11178. I am entirely in sympathy with you in that respect, but I only want to see what it comes to in figures. My question is: Do you suggest that the Government ought to provide a sufficient body of the Army Medical Corps for our ordinary peace establishment here at home and in India and our colonies, plus sufficient for dealing with 200,000 men in the field in the case of war?—It seems to me that our existence as a nation may depend upon our doing so.

11179. Do you suggest that it is reasonable, and that we ought to do it?—Yes.

11180. The orderlies of that corps would take from two to three years to be efficiently trained?—Yes.

11181. So that it would be a permanent corps?—Yes.

11182. I presume from your position that you are consulting surgeon, or attached to some hospital in Aberdeen?—Yes.

11183. How many house surgeons have they in that hospital?—Half-a-dozen.

11184. I am not a medical man, but I presume that some of the young men who go through the hospital desire to become house surgeons?—Yes, it is a point of ambition with them.

11185. And the fact that a man has been house surgeon gives him a chance of getting on in his profession?—It is always a certificate of excellence.

11186. Do you not think there would be little diffi-

culty if you were to introduce into hospitals similarly situated men who were already provided with a profession in the Army Medical Corps, as house surgeons?—I might explain that a hospital attached to a university town, where we are training hundreds of students per annum, and where, therefore, any such post is coveted by the cream of the young graduates, is very differently situated from a provincial town, where there is no medical school, but where there is a good hospital and good work being done both by physicians and surgeons. There is not there the same competition, and yet throughout the country there are large numbers of those smaller hospitals which would be quite capable of absorbing the Army medical officers who obtained leave for the purpose of joining them.

11187. I know there are a great number of hospitals in a great number of centres, but I presume that you would only contemplate the officers of the Army Medical Corps going to hospitals where there was much to learn from the surgeons and medical men who were in charge?—No, I should not; so many of these young men who join the Army are of a very high class indeed intellectually, and so far as regards their training, that they would even in provincial hospitals unprovided with teachers acquire most valuable information for themselves. Many of them are burning to do it when they join the Army. They have been trained to investigate, to think, and they are turned out with their minds active and modern. They go into the Army, and at once they are surrounded by an impassable wall. They can do no work, they have no materials for doing work, and they feel themselves lost.

11188. Your idea is that even in a hospital where there was no man of excellence as a surgeon or a doctor to be a guide, the young Army medical officer would obtain advancement in knowledge?—That is so.

11189. That is from his own application simply?—By his own application.

11190. Do you think that the medical officer in a station where troops are quartered has not got an opportunity of studying the application of medicine, for instance?—I do not think he has.

11191. Why not? I suppose amongst a thousand men you would find a percentage always who are ill?—The variety of interesting disease in military stations is exceedingly limited, and the funds that are supplied for providing them with the most modern apparatus and accessories are not adequate.

11192. That is another point, and I am not disputing that; but I want to see why it is that in a military station, where there might be 2,000 or 3,000 men, a young army surgeon would not have an opportunity of seeing most of the ordinary forms of disease amongst the men?—He cannot work without his tools; he cannot investigate the blood, he cannot do microscopic or bacteriological work or anything else of a skilled nature that is so daily practised in our profession.

11193. Supposing these tools were provided by the Government, would he have an opportunity of keeping himself up to the front walk in his profession in his daily life as an Army surgeon?—No, he would have a certain facility, but it would not be adequate; he would not have the variety of disease.

11194. Of what kind, for instance?—Injuries, operation, fevers, and those things he has to treat in war.

11195. Typhoid he probably would have?—No, I do not think so; I do not think typhoid would be treated in a military hospital in a station such as you refer to.

11196. In India, for instance, where is typhoid treated?—I have had no personal experience of India.

11197. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) From the money point of view every soldier's life has a distinct money value?—Yes.

11198. And therefore every soldier's life that can be saved to the country is of a distinct money value to the country?—Yes.

11199. And you think that if there had been a properly organised Army Medical Corps at the commencement of the war and during the war there might have been a great number of soldiers' lives saved to the country which were lost?—Yes.

11200. And therefore it is false economy in your opinion to starve the Army Medical Corps?—Yes.

11201. And money spent on the Army Medical Corps is really true economy?—I consider it so.

11202. With respect to nurses, it takes about three years' training in hospital to make a thoroughly trained nurse?—Yes.

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11203. And at the end of that time, if she is a clever and efficient woman, she is considered, and ought to be thoroughly trained for her duties?—Yes.

11204. Part of her duty is to assist the surgeon in operations?—Yes.

11205. She stands by and assists him with the sponges and handing instruments and so forth; she ought to know exactly what the surgeon requires, or, at least, to have it ready to hand to him?—She assists in a number of very valuable details.

11206. And that is part of her duty?—Yes.

11207. I suppose these orderlies were utterly incompetent to attempt anything of that kind?—With a very few exceptions they were incompetent to attempt anything of that kind.

11208. It requires considerable training to enable a nurse to do it?—Yes.

11209. Careful training under able medical men?—Careful training.

11210. In the same way with respect to sickness, apart from operations, a trained nurse is of very great assistance to a medical man in the taking of the temperature, the carrrying out of the sick chart, the giving of the medicines at the stated intervals required by the doctor, and the information she is able to furnish to the doctor when he attends as to the time the patient has slept, what he has eaten, and so forth: that is all the duty of the trained nurse?—That is so.

11211. One of those orderlies, I suppose, would be utterly unable to attend to anything of that kind?—With the exceptions I have mentioned.

11212. Again with respect to the bedding, a trained nurse is able, without injuring a sick patient, to attend to his bed in every way, and that requires training and knowledge?—Yes.

11213. All these details are the details which may save life?—Yes.

11214. I do not know whether you are aware of the report brought up by the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the care and treatment of the sick and wounded during the South African campaign?—I have not seen that report.

11215. The Commissioners recommend, at the close of the report (page 69), "the appointment at some early convenient time of a Departmental or other Committee of experts to inquire into and report upon the steps needed to effect" certain objects which they mention. I think you said you were acting on a Committee?—I was acting on a Committee.

11216. This report was in January, 1901: was the Committee you acted upon, of which Mr. Brodrick was Chairman, since that date?—I think the Committee was later than that.

11217. Then probably the Committee you acted upon was the Committee recommended by this report?—Very probably, or a similar one.

11218. This report was brought up by Lord Justice Romer, and I expect the others were doctors, the names being Richmond, Church, Cunningham, and Harrison. I find in that report (page 11) they say this, speaking of the Royal Army Medical Corps: "There is reason to fear that the prevalence of charges of the kind" (certain charges which were made) "has already had a prejudicial effect on the Army, and has led many private soldiers to distrust the military hospitals, and to be reluctant to go into them when ill." Was that your experience in South Africa?—Yes, I think those charges did a great deal of harm; whether they were right or wrong, they were made at a very wrong time, and in a wrong way.

11219. Then the report goes on (page 11): "But in connection with the subject of the general efficiency of officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps, we must refer to a fact which ought not to be ignored, either in the interests of the Royal Army Medical Corps itself, or of the Army generally, and that is the existence on the part of many military officers of a feeling of distrust of the skill and professional experience of doctors of the Royal Army Medical Corps as compared with civil doctors." It was your experience that there was that feeling of distrust amongst the military officers?—I think so: I fear it existed.

11220. Do you think that feeling of distrust which

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very likely erroneously existed could be got rid of if the military doctors had the training which you suggest they should have—the hospital training?—Without any difficulty, I think, because a number of the Army medical officers were men so superior that they were recognised on all hands as being at least equivalent to the civilians, and there was no distrust regarding them. Some of them were such brilliant exceptions that their skill was welcomed from all quarters, but there were many who were of another class who were, I think, distrusted.

See Q. 4004

11221. A witness who was examined before this Commission was asked this question by me with regard to military doctors: "After they have joined the Royal Army Medical Corps, what opportunity have they of following out their profession?—(A) I can tell you what is the course at present since the last warrant was published, about five or six months ago. They come to London and go through what is called the Medical Staff College on the Embankment, where they are taught hygiene, bacteriology, and different things. Then they go down to Aldershot, where they go through what is called the Aldershot course, equitation, company drill, field medical training, building field kitchens, and military law. Then they are posted to station hospitals all over the country." That is their training?—Yes.

11222. That training, in your opinion, is altogether insufficient?—It is insufficient in my opinion.

See Q. 4005

11223. Then I asked this question: "Still, with the exception of the Medical Staff College here, that would not give them any professional education? (A.) No; it teaches them what they are supposed not to have been taught before; it gives them a start in military life, as it were." Is it your opinion that there ought to be a special sanitary officer attached to each corps? Of course he would probably be a medical man; but should there be a special scientific sanitary officer attached?—I think he should be one of the Army Medical Corps.

11224. No doubt; but his duty being not so much to attend to the sick and wounded as to attend to sanitary matters only?—I think so. There should be an officer such as you name, and a staff of men to carry out his instructions, who have been trained for the purpose, for the prevention of disease.

11225. And you think if there had been such a staff at the early part of the war in South Africa and during the war, there might have been a good deal of prevention of disease?—There is no reason why in a campaign the mortality from zymotic disease should be heavier than in a large town.

11226. I suppose part of the duty of the sanitary officer would be to see that the men had proper water to drink, and were not allowed to drink anything but proper water?—Yes.

11227. And a great deal depends upon that?—Yes.

11228. It has been stated here that many men are refused to be admitted into the Army on account of their teeth being deficient, and that the services of men who are healthy in every other respect are declined on that ground only. Do you know whether there are any professional dentists attached to the Army Medical Corps in the field?—There were none, but I think Mr. Brodrick's Committee is providing for that defect.

11229. And you think there ought to be such a provision?—Certainly.

11230. I did not quite gather from your answer to Lord Strathcona with respect to the oversea as distinguished from the African Colonials, whether you had an opportunity of seeing their ambulance wagons and their outfit?—No, I had not an adequate opportunity, but I was informed upon testimony that I cannot doubt that they were vastly superior to our own.

11231. You did not meet any of their medical men?—I met some of their medical men.

11232. Do you remember who they were—Colonel Williams?—I met Colonel Williams.

11233. Vandeleur-Kelly?—No.

11234. But you met Colonel Williams, who was the officer in command?—Yes.

11235. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I suppose you do not think it would have been reasonable to expect the Government, say, in 1898 or 1899, when they thought war was pretty certain, to do all they could to start and maintain a medical establishment sufficient for 200,000 or 250,000 men, considering that in no war in which England had ever been engaged had half or even one-third of that number of men been employed?—I should not like to censure the Government, because, no doubt, they acted upon advice, but I think that the provision made by Governments during the last quarter of a century for the medical attendance upon their Army in the event of a possible campaign, has fallen very short of what it should have been. Would you allow me just to limit myself to that?

11236. What period does the professional education of a medical gentleman occupy to enable him to pass and to take those degrees which qualify him to go up for competition for the Army?—Five years.

11237. If he succeeds in getting into the Army, he then has to go, under the present system, to what is called the Medical Staff College?—Yes, a short training there.

11238. Six months, I think?—Six months, or thereby.

11239. And then he has to go to Aldershot for what seems to be more a military sort of training, as they did to Netley before?—Yes, for a few weeks. He has his riding course and his military instruction.

11240. And military law, I think, for six months?—Yes, I am not quite certain how they teach that; they have altered that within the last year. They brought them to London.

11241. He must have a great deal of instruction, and more than you have in any other profession, during those six years?—Yes.

11242. You mentioned that when you had the 800 men in that field hospital at the Modder River the men were being sent back to the base, and you were very short of medical officers and medical subordinates?—Yes.

11243. Was there an adequate supply of medical officers at the base—Cape Town and the one or two other places you mentioned?—They were better supplied with medical officers there than we were at the front.

11244. You have said more than once that the Army Medical Corps men were very badly trained, the majority of them, and you said there were some brilliant exceptions; were not all these men down doing work at the great military hospitals of Aldershot, Woolwich, and so on, and how is it they were not well trained?—There is not much training to be obtained in the way of attendance on the sick at a place like Netley.

11245. A good many of the men come home from India with very poor health, having had tropical diseases?—I cannot say how many of the non-commissioned officers and men are in training there. I am afraid you must get that from some of the officers of the department, but my impression would be that a hospital like Netley is quite unfitted to train either the numbers or the quality required.

11246. In fact, you cannot get wounded men anywhere, can you, and you must put up with the sort of men you get?—You can get wounded men everywhere, because civil accidents are quite the equivalent of military accidents, and it is the sick who form the vast proportion of those we have to treat in time of war.

11247. But you think in military hospitals, generally, at home, there is very little sickness, except the one disease you named?—I do.

11248. With regard to nurses, you are very strongly in favour of employing them?—Female nurses.

11249. Do you think their training is sufficient? I happen to know they require to be three years in a civil hospital before they can be allowed to come up for appointment to a military hospital, and then they go to Netley for a certain time, where they are on probation?—Yes.

11250. Do you think that is a good and sufficient system of training?—Yes.

11251. I believe they do not take them after three years in a small hospital, and it must be a large recognised hospital?—Yes.

11252. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) And they have to pass examinations?—Yes.

11253. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Do you think it would be of advantage to have a system of registration for female nurses who would be willing to serve in the Army, so that they could go on with their profession in civil life and be ready, if required, to join the Army Corps?—A kind of reserve?

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11254. Yes?—Well, it would require to be worked out very carefully, because the efficient life of a nurse, her life during which she is capable of performing such duties as would be required of her in a campaign, is a comparatively short time.

11255. For so many years?—Yes.

11256. (*Chairman.*) Up to what age?—35 or 40 at the latest—35 I should think.

11257. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You said something about the Army medical officers not having the opportunity of attending women and children, but surely a a great many of them are so employed. There are a large number of women at Aldershot, and in India there are a large number of women with the British regiments, so that the Army doctors must have a certain amount of practice with women and children in accouchements, and so on?—Insufficient.

11258. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Do you think it would be a very great advantage to have medicines as far as possible in the concentrated form of capsules, pills, and tabloids?—I do, especially upon expeditions such as were very common in South Africa, where for weeks they were cut off from their base.

11259. They are much less subject to being destroyed?—They are much less subject to damage or deterioration.

11260. Than when in liquid form?—Yes.

11261. I think you mentioned that the medical appliances obtained from America were found to be far better than those then in the hands of the military medical men?—I have no knowledge of that; I referred more to the surgical equipment, but I should think it was all of a similarly advanced nature.

11262. Those tabloids of which we speak are very much drawn from America, are they not?—Yes.

11263. And they are more prepared there, perhaps, than in this country?—Yes, they were introduced, I think, first in America.

11264. And they have continued to be made wholesale there, in large quantities, and sent here for use in Great Britain?—Yes.

(*After a short adjournment.*)

Lieut.-Colonel E. M. Wilson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Deputy Assistant Director-General, Army Medical Department, called and examined.

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(*For previous Evidence by the Army Medical Department. See Question* 3589–4068.)

11265. (*Chairman.*) I do not think you were in South Africa, were you?—No.

11266. What is the position you hold now?—I am in charge of the subordinate male *personnel* of the Royal Army Medical Corps, everything up to the rank of Quartermaster and Sergeant-Major—non-commissioned officers and men.

11267. Then it is that point, I suppose, that you especially wish to deal with?—Yes.

11268. You have given us a *précis* of the points upon which you propose to give evidence. Have you elaborated it at all in the form of any statement that you would like to make, or would you like to be taken through it?—I think I have very little to add.

11269. Have you got a copy of it here?—I fancy this is the same on the four points of "establishment," "additional men for South Africa," "additional men for home hospitals," and "men not expected to be well trained."

11270. Yes, that is it. Then let us take them in that order. What is it you would like to say with regard to the establishment?—It is the fact that the establishment is designed for the number of non-commissioned officers and men that are required on a peace basis for hospitals. We have never estimated for additional non-commissioned officers and men in view of war. What we have asked for every year are the number of men that are required for all the hospitals where the Army Medical Corps are employed.

11271. And no account has been taken in that estimate of the possibility of expansion?—No; of course, we have the Reserves.

11272. What do you call the Reserves?—In common with the rest of the Army after a certain period of years all the soldiers pass to the Army Reserve. That is our only Reserve.

11273. You mean that a certain number of hospital orderlies pass with other soldiers to the Reserve?—Yes.

11274. Men who have had a certain training?—Yes, that is in the ordinary course. There were at the commencement of the war somewhere about 1,000.

11275. There were in the Reserve about 1,000 who had had experience as hospital orderlies?—Yes, they belonged to the corps. They were the Royal Army Medical Corps Reserve.

11276. What were your total numbers then, including the establishment, plus the Reserve, when the war broke out?—4,000. The authorised establishment for the corps for the year in which the war commenced was 3,045, and in addition to that we had practically about 1,000 Reservists.

11277. (*Sir John Edge.*) Was that for the whole corps, India and elsewhere?—Not for India. The Army Medical Corps does not go to India. The nursing in the Indian hospitals is entirely done by Indian officials and Indian nurses.

11278. It is only the officers of the corps that go to India?—It is only the officers that go to India.

11279. (*Chairman.*) Then, supposing, instead of 250,000 men in South Africa, we had only sent out two Army Corps, what percentage then would you have sent of the Royal Army Medical Corps, as applied to two Army Corps?—Do you mean the percentage that would be required?

11280. In the first place, what would you consider would be the percentage required for two Army Corps?—In the first place, you must have the field units; every brigade has a field hospital and a bearer company, and there are three brigades to a division and two divisions to an Army Corps, so that for an Army Corps you want six bearer companies and 10 field hospitals. But the most essential thing is the number of sick that you estimate you will get in that climate, and for those you must have hospitals along the line of communications and at the base, which are really hospitals where the sick are treated. The Commission understands that the expression "field hospital" is rather a misnomer. It does not possess beds, it moves with the brigade; and, therefore, is only meant to take the sick and wounded, and take care of them until such time as they can be discharged along the line of communications by road or by train to the real hospitals, which are the base hospitals, or the stationary hospitals along the line of communications.

11281. But have the military authorities ever estimated the numbers of the Royal Army Medical Corps that would be required, we will say, for a force of 100,000 men?—Yes.

11282. What is the percentage?—As I said, it really depends upon the climate that you are working in.

11283. And you cannot tell beforehand what climate the Army may be sent to?—For South Africa they allowed 10 per cent. of sick.

11284. That is not my point. If you take the number of the Royal Army Medical Corps, I want to know about what number would be calculated that the Royal Army Medical Corps would require for an army of 100,000 men?—That, I say, would depend upon the number of sick you expect.

11285. Say in a European war—let me put it in that way; supposing you were fighting in a European war?—I think they would still require 10 per cent.

11286. Ten per cent. of sick?—Ten per cent. of sick and wounded.

11287. That is not my question?—Then you base on that the number of general hospitals and stationary hospitals that would be required. Say you expect to have 20,000 sick and wounded—is that what you mean? How many general hospitals and how many stationary hospitals would be required?

11288. No, my question is this: Supposing you assume that you are going to employ anywhere you like a force of 100,000 men, how would you calculate the number of the Royal Army Medical Corps that would be required for it, or have you never contemplated it in that way or looked at it from that point of view?—We generally say, if you anticipate that you

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will have 10,000 sick, that requires so many general hospitals and so many field hospitals.

11289. But how many?—That depends, as I said before, upon the number of sick and wounded that we anticipate, whether it is 8 per cent. or 10 per cent.

11290. Supposing it is 10 per cent.?—You require so many general hospitals, which contain 520 beds each, including 20 for the officers, and so many stationary hospitals, which contain 100 beds each; therefore, you have your 10,000 sick prepared for, and each of those hospitals has a fixed *personnel* of the Royal Army Medical Corps.

(*Sir John Edge.*) But will it not work out into a percentage of Army Medical Corps men to the number of men in the field?

11291. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Supposing you were the head of the Department, and you were told that we were sending 100,000 men to Kamschatka, and we wanted you to furnish us with the proper number of Army Medical Corps men for that force, what number would you send?—I would work it out on paper in that way in a few minutes. I should say, roughly speaking, between 4 and 5 per cent. practically of the fighting force, but it really depends, as I said before, upon the climate. The West Coast of Africa would be much more unhealthy probably than Europe, and also, if you were anticipating a big battle, you would get a very large number of wounded. I think, roughly speaking, you might say between 4 and 5 per cent. of the fighting force.

11292. (*Chairman.*) That is exactly what I wanted?—As I say, it varies, of course, very largely according to the climate that you are in, or according to the nature of the operations.

11293. Have you any idea whether you ever had in South Africa 4 or 5 per cent. of the fighting force there employed of the Royal Army Medical Corps, exclusive of doctors?—No, not at any one time.

11294. Do you know what percentage you did have?—We had a corps of just about 4,000 men, but I should like to tell the Commission that we were also very largely increased by the local corps; they had an Imperial Bearer Corps, and Imperial Hospital Corps, the Natal Volunteer Ambulance Corps, and the Cape Medical Staff Corps. Those were local corps which were raised on the spot; they, of course, helped us enormously.

11295. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I find in this report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the care and treatment of the sick and wounded during the South African campaign, it is stated that at the end of March (that was March, 1900, I think) the total force then engaged would be about 207,000; there were 800 medical officers, 6,000 hospital subordinates, and 800 nurses—that came to 8,900?—That would be about 4 per cent.

11296. (*Sir John Edge.*) Were they all Royal Army Medical Corps men?—No.

11297. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) It was not quite 4 per cent. then of 224,000?—In that are you including female nurses and doctors?

11298. Yes. It says 800 medical officers, 6,000 hospital subordinates, and 800 nurses?—Yes.

11299. (*Chairman.*) Take those 6,000 hospital subordinates; you say you only had 4,000; how did you make up the balance of 2,000?—From those local corps which I have just been mentioning. I know at one time, in the early part of the war, we had at least 1,400 of the Natal Volunteer Ambulance Corps, but they very soon became disembodied, and very often some of the same men joined the Imperial Hospital Corps and the Imperial Bearer Corps—those were all new corps. So far as I can tell you, there were about 600 of each. The Cape Medical Staff Corps is an old-established medical institution, which has been there for several years, but was then very largely increased.

11300. But I suppose, out of that 4,000 which you started with, there was a considerable wastage?—Yes.

11301. How did you make that wastage good?—We constantly received telegrams from South Africa, and it gradually settled down to a demand of 100 men a month.

11302. How did you supply that demand?—In the first place we got very considerable help from the St. John Ambulance Brigade. Altogether we had 2,300 men from the St. John Ambulance Brigade—of course, at different times. A large number were engaged under a special contract.

11303. Then they are civilians, are they not?—Yes. Afterwards we enlisted men under a special Army Order on purpose for medical subordinates.

11304. But they had had no training, had they?—They had had no training in nursing, but I should like to be allowed to mention to the Commission that it is quite impossible, when you are suddenly required to send a large number of men to South Africa, to expect that they should all be trained in nursing duties. The number of men in the United Kingdom at any one time who are competent male nurses is very small, and they, of course, are employed in the asylums and as valets to invalid gentlemen and in large hospitals, but the great majority are really our own men, and are in the Royal Army Medical Corps, who follow this profession when they leave the Army for the Reserve. Having been trained as male nurses, they follow that calling in civil life in the Reserve. Directly the war began we recalled those men who were trained male nurses of the United Kingdom to the extent of 1,000. Afterwards we tried to get others, and we did get them, from asylums and men who had had previous knowledge. But they do not exist in large numbers; and, therefore, we were obliged to take men like the St. John Ambulance Brigade men, who have had training in First Aid to the wounded, and stretcher drill and ambulance work, and the Volunteers of the Royal Army Medical Corps who have also had the same—they do their training. But they are not competent nurses to a sick man with typhoid fever until they have learnt.

11305. But even such as they were, had it occurred to you in time of peace, before the war broke out, that you would have to draw upon those sources?—No, not before the war broke out.

11306. Then what was the idea before the war broke out as to how you would deal with a state of war? Did you imagine that the Royal Army Medical Corps, such as it was, only organised for peace purposes, would be sufficient for war purposes?—No. No Director-General thought that.

11307. Then what was the Director-General's idea as to how he would meet a state of war?—It was said that we should employ very largely more female nurses, and get civilians.

11308. Where is that stated; in any official document or in regulations, or in any document which you could produce or which could be produced?—I do not think I could produce any document, but if you will allow me to refer you to the Royal Commission on South African Hospitals, you will find something very much to that effect stated by Director-General Jameson.

11309. But had you any idea in your own mind before war broke out as to how you would deal with a state of war?—We could do nothing but call up the Reserves.

11310. And in the Reserves you had 1,000 men?—Yes.

11311. And that was your limit?—I can tell you what we did do if you would like to hear it.

11312. If you please?—The first thing we did was to embody the Militia Medical Corps. The next thing was to issue a Special Army Order in 1900 allowing us to use or enlist the Volunteer Army Medical Corps. Then we issued another Army Order to use these Volunteer Army Medical Corps in the hospitals at home, and another Order to bring back all old soldiers of the Royal Army Medical Corps for hospital duties at home, and very largely we obtained authority to employ the St. John Ambulance Brigade, first of all under a civil contract, and then under another Army Order, which was issued in 1901. Then we also had a civil contract to employ civilians in hospitals at home, which we are doing still.

11313. Was that a contract which was thought of after the war broke out?—Yes.

11314. Most of these points were considered, I suppose, after the war broke out?—Yes.

11315. So far as you know, none of them had been considered before the war broke out?—Before the war broke out there had been a commencement made with the St. John Ambulance Brigade, and it was on the basis of those figures, which were got out comparatively

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early in 1899, that we were so successful when the war did begin. It was begun as a regular idea of the Reserve before I came into the office; but it rather hung fire until the urgency became manifest. When once the urgency became manifest, we got the greatest assistance, and there was very little difficulty in getting things done. I should like to say that the foundation of using the St. John Ambulance Brigade as a reserve had been laid before the war began.

11316. Supposing that the force in South Africa had been limited to two Army Corps, and that the war had been fought with two Army Corps, do you consider that your establishment would have been sufficient to have coped with the war?—It would not have been sufficient; but the difficulties would have been very much less, of course.

11317. Obviously; but even under those circumstances you think that you would have had to draw upon most of these sources of supply—you would have had to look to civilian aid?—Yes, we cannot take away men from our hospitals at home without replacing them; and to make up the force for any foreign campaign you must take away men from the hospitals at home.

11318. But the Army organisation as a whole is considered with a view to war, is it not?—Yes.

11319. Only it is the fact that your particular department is really organised for peace purposes and with no view to war? Is that what I am to understand?—That is the case. I should like to say, if I may be allowed, that naturally, as everybody knows, when the Estimates are submitted, year after year, there must be a tendency to dispense with what appears to be the least important, and it is always considered that female nursing is the best, as we know it is, so that perhaps too much reliance has been placed upon that, and that may have been the reason why we have been unable to obtain an increased number to the *personnel* of the Army Medical Corps.

11320. But with a view to expansion in war time, what you call maintaining an increased number in time of peace is not the only possible solution, probably?—Of course, the larger the number that you have enlisted the larger reserves you will get.

11321. Obviously; but with your experience now of the war in South Africa, can you not think of other methods of expansion? You probably have considered other methods of expansion besides merely adding to the number in time of peace of the Royal Army Medical Corps?—We did utilise very largely the Militia Medical Corps, and we also got a scheme for utilising bearer companies and the St. John Ambulance Brigade.

11322. You mean to say that all that is now being formulated into a scheme?—In the mobilisation tables which are drawn up from year to year as to the disposal of the medical *personnel*, all the existing *personnel*, both of the Army Medical Corps and the Militia and Volunteers, are fitted into their places, that is, usually with a view to invasion, for home defence. But what has happened since the war began is that all these branches have increased. We had only five companies of Militia, now we have nine, and I dare say if we can get the money voted we shall have more. And in the same way with the Volunteers, small corps of two companies have expanded into six and seven—in Manchester especially, and Glasgow. We have progressed in that way mainly, of course, because of the increase of interest which the war has created in the number of recruits who have come forward in these branches.

11323. And you think that you are profiting by the experiences of the war?—Very greatly.

11324. Then will you go to the fourth head of your *précis* now—that men are not expected to be well trained? What have you to say upon that point?—I think just what I have said before. It is a fact that there are a very small number of men who possess training as nurses in the United Kingdom, and of those the greater number are really our own men, and therefore they do not exist—I mean, are not available for recruiting purposes.

11325. Are you now speaking of men trained as hospital orderlies?—I mean literally as nurses. They are all very good hospital attendants for first aid to the wounded, stretcher drill, and ambulance drill.

11326. When you say that they are very good, are you satisfied with them?—We are not satisfied with them to take the places of nurses in the hospital. We try to improve them in nursing; but when we were getting a large number together in a short time we had to be content with them, of course.

11327. But taking your normal establishment in time of peace, not the men got together in a short time, do you consider that those men are well trained?—We are now increasing their training, and I dare say you know that it is intended to select the best and make them practically a nursing section, which shall do nothing but nursing.

11328. Whose suggestion is that?—The suggestion to make a distinct nursing section came from the Nursing Board, and we are carrying it out. We have always had, of course, what you might call degrees. Every orderly when he comes up is made a third class orderly; according to his capacity and knowledge he is made a second class orderly, and so he goes on to be a first class orderly; that is, for nursing, with very few exceptions. If a man is an exceptionally good cook or an exceptionally good clerk, he might be made a first class orderly, but it is for nursing in the vast majority of cases and so on up to the non-commissioned ranks.

11329. What is the training of a third class orderly; what is he supposed to know?—He does very little except the ordinary ward work under the sister. Of course, they always work under the nursing sisters in the hospital, and when a man has become a good nurse he will be posted to a hospital where there are no nursing sisters. The large majority of our hospitals are small hospitals at depôts where nursing sisters are not employed, and therefore the idea is that a highly-trained orderly shall go to those hospitals either at home or abroad, where he will not require to be looked after by a sister, and the sister will take part in the training of other orderlies.

11330. What is the ordinary work of a third class orderly?—First of all he goes into the ward the first thing in the morning, and sees that the patients who are allowed to be up, and ought to be up, get up, and are clean—washed and shaved. Then he would attend to anything that was urgent in bad cases, he looks after the cleaning of the ward, that it is swept, and sees that any slops and things are taken away, and that the ward is made neat and tidy. Then he would proceed to get the breakfasts, and, of course, the medicines according to the hours. Then after that it would be time for the medical officer to go round. If there is a sister, of course the orderly will not go round with the medical officer; he simply waits behind, and the sister or a non-commissioned officer goes round with the doctor, and they order the medicines and the diets for the morning. Then the orderly will proceed to get those diets from the kitchen, and give them, if there is a sister, to the sister for distribution; but if there is no sister, to the ward master, who is a non-commissioned officer—a sergeant.

11331. Then in that case the non-commissioned officer is acting as a nurse really where there is no sister?—Yes; he begins, of course, as an orderly, and is not made a non-commissioned officer unless he is recommended on account of his abilities in nursing.

11332. But do any of the orderlies, either first, second, or third class, ever act as nurses?—Yes.

11333. That is to say they would look after a man if he were sick, and would change the bed-linen and all that kind of thing?—Every third class orderly would do that.

11334. Are they competent to do that?—Yes, quite.

11335. Would you like them to do it for you?—Oh, yes. I would prefer men of my own corps. I should be quite satisfied with them as nurses.

11336. Would you be just as satisfied with one of them for a nurse as you would with a sister?—The sister is there.

11337. I am assuming that there is no sister there?—I would prefer, if I were dangerously ill, to have a sister, of course.

11338. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) What is the standard of training demanded of one of the orderlies; over how many years does it extend, and what does it consist of?—Roughly speaking, a man would not become a first class orderly under two years or probably 18 months.

11339. Two years of what?—Of service.

11340. During what period?—From his enlistment.

11341. But how is he trained—in what is he trained?—He is trained in all the duties of nursing from the

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lowest, which I have just told Lord Esher; he would do the rough work. Then as he became qualified he would be advanced to more important work; but the ordinary lifting and laying and changing of beds any third class orderly could do.

11342. (*Chairman.*) How does the training of your hospital orderlies compare with the training of a nursing sister, because you know exactly, I suppose, the course of a sister's training in a hospital?—It is conducted on the same lines as far as possible.

11343. What does "as far as possible" mean exactly; does a hospital orderly get, and can he get, by the nature of the case, as much experience as a nursing sister gets in a hospital?—No, probably not. I should think, with exceptions. There are some men who do nothing but nursing, and who do not wish to be promoted; they prefer the nursing duties. But there are other things in connection with the Army Medical Corps, of course; there are the soldiers' duties, and there is a very great deal of cleaning to be done in the corridors, and so on.

11344. You mean work which the nursing sister would not do in a hospital at all?—Yes.

11345. Fatigue work, in fact?—Yes.

11346. And a great deal of the time of these orderlies is taken up in that work?—Yes, a good deal.

11347. Then where is the hospital orderly trained?—He is trained in the first place at the depôt. He goes to the Royal Army Medical Corps depôt at Aldershot.

11348. Is there any military hospital at Aldershot?—His first training, like that of the ordinary soldier, is done on the barrack square.

11349. Will you describe the whole thing? First of all, you enlist the man?—Yes, and then he is sent to the Army Medical Corps depôt at Aldershot.

11350. At what point does he say whether he wishes to join the Royal Army Medical Corps or not?—He is enlisted for that corps.

11351. Then what happens to him?—He is clothed, and put on the barrack square to learn the ordinary soldiers' drill, and he is put to do stretcher drill.

11352. How long does his ordinary soldiers' drill go on—till he has passed squad drill?—Yes, squad drill and the rudiments of company drill.

11353. How long, as a rule, does that take him?—That takes him probably a month.

11354. Only a month. He is enlisted, we assume for three years?—Yes.

11355. Then he is a month learning drill. What happens to him next?—Stretcher drill.

11356. Does he learn that on the barrack square?—Yes, and, of course, wagon drill.

11357. Does he learn that on the barrack square?—Yes. The whole equipment, of course, is at the depôt.

11358. At the depôt at Aldershot?—Yes; all these various drills take place in the morning, and in the afternoon he has sets of lectures, beginning with the rudiments of anatomy and physiology and then first aid to the wounded, ambulance classes, treatment of fractures and wounds, and poisons and accidents, and that sort of thing.

11359. That is all lectures?—Yes.

11360. And that goes on simultaneously with his drill?—Yes; in the afternoon.

11361. And how long is that course?—If we can manage it, six months.

11362. For six months he is doing drill in the morning, and in the afternoon he is listening to lectures?—Yes.

11363. At the depôt?—Yes. In addition to that, also at the depôt at Aldershot, towards the end of their course, they go up to the hospital and receive lectures from the nurses, practical lectures; they are taught the administration of medicines, preparation of diets, drinks and foods, the nursing of patients, and the handling of them.

11364. This is all going on in the first six months?—Yes.

11365. Is that in the evenings?—They apportion it.

11366. How many men are there in the depôt doing this first six months' course?—They are divided into classes, and we generally find that a class of 50 is as much as can conveniently be managed.

11367. How many go up to a nurse and are taught to administer medicines?—I cannot tell you the exact numbers.

11368. Then what happens next?—Then they are stationed at the large hospitals, where they are under the training of the doctors, ward master, and sister; and they are trained there.

11369. Where are these hospitals?—At Aldershot, Netley, Woolwich, and Shorncliffe, where there are a large number of beds.

11370. Then where does this young orderly go for the next six months?—He may happen to stay there the whole of his service; it depends upon the demands for foreign service.

11371. Then the moment he gets there, what does he do; does his training begin to correspond with that of a nursing sister?—Yes.

11372. What experience does he get at the hospital, say at Netley?—At Netley you get a great deal of experience, because you get all the Indian invalids; and you get the great majority of invalids from South Africa at the present time.

11373. I mean in normal times of peace. You get Indian invalids then?—Yes; and there are a large number of them.

11374. And they suffer a good deal from the effects of fever?—Yes.

11375. Does he get experience of any accident cases there?—There is a good deal of surgery there.

11376. When you say there is a good deal, what amount do you say there is; there cannot be very much?—There are little wars in other parts of the world.

11377. Yes, there are. Then in the later stages of wounds, he may see something of that kind?—Yes.

11378. And now and then an operation is necessary in connection with the results of fever, and so on?—Yes.

11379. They might get that experience?—Yes.

11380. That would be the Netley experience?—Yes.

11381. Then what is the Aldershot experience?—It is very much the same. You do not get a great deal of surgery at Aldershot.

11382. Nor do you get so many cases of fever, I suppose?—No.

11383. I mean cases of Indian fever, West African fever, and so on; they go to Netley?—Yes.

11384. What are the sort of fevers, then, that men are suffering from at Aldershot?—Enteric.

11385. There may be a case of enteric, I suppose, now and again; and what training is there in surgery?—Not so much.

11386. Therefore, I suppose you would admit that the experience gained by a young orderly at Aldershot is not comparable with that gained by a nurse in a London hospital?—No; another thing, of course, is that in the largest hospitals there are always nursing sisters, and a nursing sister quite naturally likes to take the most important part herself.

11387. So that that again detracts from their experience?—Yes, it does, and I do not think that can be avoided. It sometimes happens that an orderly does not come out at his best until he is perhaps on active service, or until he is in a station where there are no sisters, when he learns more to rely and depend upon himself.

11388. Then what you call coming out at his best really means, of course, that in time of war he begins to get his experience?—Well, he has had a good deal of training before that.

11389. He has had a good deal of theoretical training, but not so much practical training?—Not so much practical training.

11390. Has the possibility of remedying that state of things ever occurred to you if you think it requires a remedy?—You cannot alter it, as a matter of fact. Everybody admits that you must have, and it is quite right that you should have, trained sisters and female nurses wherever you can, and wherever you have them nursing bad cases the men must be in the background; but in time of war, and in bad climates, where there are

no nurses, of course you would never get female nurses for the patients, and you would have to depend upon male nurses; and the only thing to do is what we are doing, and what is done to a very great extent, namely, to interest the sisters themselves in teaching the men, which they do exceedingly well, and then when a man is well trained to put him away where he will be on his own initiative, and give the sisters more junior orderlies to teach. That is the practice at the present time, and I am afraid we cannot alter it.

11391. So far as you know do you consider that the orderlies are to be trusted in connection with the use of disinfectants. Are they careful?—Yes, I think they are.

11392. When you say you think so, are you really satisfied with their competence and their care in that respect from what you have heard?—Yes. It is a large corps, and there have been exceptions, but think one would say that one was satisfied. We all want to improve. Perhaps I might be allowed to say that I have a few figures here which would show how difficult it is to judge of the average capacity of the men. In 1899, in the three months—October, November, and December—we sent out 2,200 men. In the year 1900 we sent out 3,660 men. In 1901 we sent out 1,794 men, and in 1902, up to September, we sent out 836, making a total of 8,490; and at the commencement of the war the whole corps was only 3,000 strong; therefore, if a case has occurred in which the men were not all equally trained, I think it is only fair to say that it was understood that they could not be; that out of that very large number of men you could not expect them all to be equally trained as competent nurses, although they might do very well, and did do very well, as stretcher bearers and for application of first aid to the wounded, and doing the rough routine work of a ward. It would be hardly fair to test the results in South Africa, and to say that that represents the Army Medical Corps as a general rule, because *barely a quarter of those men were really trained Army Medical Corps men.*

11393. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) And I suppose some of them were drivers?—No, that does not include the drivers. These are men who enlisted for medical duties, and it does not include those locally enlisted corps, who I know from my own information had had no nursing training at all; they were simply any man who could carry a stretcher.

11394. (*Chairman.*) Then has there been any recommendation to increase the number of the *personnel* of the Royal Army Medical Corps?—Yes.

11395. Recently?—Yes.

11396. Has that been done?—The estimates will come up next April.

11397. You are now speaking in reference to the Estimates for next year, 1903-4?—Yes.

11398. But the Director-General has made a proposal to increase the numbers?—He does that every year.

11399. Has he done it regularly for the last 25 years say?—I cannot speak for so long as that, but I can say that he has for the last 7 or 8 years.

11400. How have those applications been dealt with as a rule?—I said a little time ago that we have had a certain number given, but not to the amount that we hoped for, and I think the reason is that it is naturally considered that the fighting man must come first.

11401. Do you know what the amount of your Vote was in the last Estimates?—I could not tell you.

11402. Have you made a recommendation for a very large increase this year in connection with your Estimates?—Not very large. It really depends upon the number of troops kept in South Africa. I may say a considerable increase.

11403. Is there anything else that you would like to add to what you have said?—No, I do not think so.

11404. Was there before the war began a reserve of nurses?—Yes.

11405. What was it?—It is the Army Nursing Service Reserve, of which Her Royal Highness Princess Christian is the patron.

11406. What is that organisation?—I am almost afraid to profess to give evidence which is absolutely certain, because it is not my branch, but I can tell you as a matter of fact that it consists of nurses who have put their names down, and who sign a contract to serve either abroad or at home in time of national emergency, and that they must have had three years' experience.

11407. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) And their names are registered?—And they are seen too.

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11408. They give in their names, and say that they will be prepared to go when required?—Yes.

11409. Do those who have given in their names in that way get any consideration?—They wear a badge, but I do not think there is any money; I believe not.

11410. (*Chairman.*) But when was that registration first commenced?—I am not aware. I should be afraid to tell you.

11411. Are you sure that it was many years before the war?—I could not say that it was many years before.

11412. How many of them are registered, do you know?—I know we sent out over 800.

11413. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) Altogether to South Africa you sent out from here 800?—Yes.

11414. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) There were 900 altogether at one time. I suppose some of them came from other places?—Yes, a good many came I believe from Canada, and some from Australia, and some were locally engaged in South Africa, but it was a condition if they did engage that they must belong to the Army Nursing Service Reserve.

11415. Are any of the orderlies trained sufficiently to assist a surgeon during a serious operation?—I think some of them are; perhaps not a very large number. There are some undoubtedly. We keep them for use in the operating theatre.

11416. Do you think there ought to be more than "some"; do you not think there ought to be a good number trained to that very thing, even if they are not able to work at other things?—Yes.

11417. Do they understand instruments and how to sterilise them?—Yes, they all do that. I thought you were referring to assisting at the operations.

11418. I do mean assisting at the operations?—But the care of instruments and sterilising, and the preservation of surgical instruments is part of the examination of every non-commissioned officer; and a man is not promoted to be a non-commissioned officer until he has passed the examination.

11419. But supposing during actual operation, a surgeon wants instantly such and such a forceps or such and such a sponge, are some of these orderlies trained to do that work?—Yes.

11420. Do you not think there ought to be a good many?—Every non-commissioned officer is trained to that.

11421. Is he as competent for that duty as a trained nurse?—So far as a knowledge of and the care of instruments and handing the right one, and not making mistakes, is concerned, I should think so; but as to the delicacy of the operations and fingers and hands it is possible that many would prefer a woman. But there is no doubt as to his capacity.

11422. Is he trained to dress a wound?—Yes.

11423. Is he as competent to discharge that duty as a trained nurse?—I think so, but as I mentioned to Lord Esher just now, where you have nurses they will take the most important part, and therefore it happens over and over again that the soldier does not really get his best opportunity as long as there is a nurse there; but I have seen the dressing of wounds done by soldiers, and I have been quite satisfied with it, and there is no doubt that they can do it, I will not say as well, but almost as well, as a woman.

11424. Is he trained to keep a chart?—Yes.

11425. Are all the non-commissioned officers trained to that?—Yes. I might perhaps say that before a man is advanced from one grade of orderly to another he is set an examination paper, and one of the things included is the keeping of a chart of observation of a patient during illness—what you might call a nurse's report. That goes to the principal medical officer of the district, and if he is satisfied with it he sends it to me, and I qualify him as a second-class orderly. And for a first-class orderly the examination is the same, but it is more stringent. But from that onwards, to be a lance-corporal or higher, no one decides but the Director-General through me, and I see all those papers and the *viva voce* examination myself. If the result is not satisfactory the examination goes back. But the thing we lay most stress upon is his nursing capacity and his capability of imparting that knowledge to others.

11426. Is there a sufficiency of cases in the military

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hospitals at home in your opinion to train orderlies to the extent that nurses are trained in all the matters which I have just referred to?—No, we do not get the percentage of serious cases that a civil hospital has, because a civil hospital takes in nothing but what is a serious case, whereas a very large number of our cases are what in civil life would be treated as out-patients.

11427. So that you have a difficulty in educating the non-commmissioned officers from a want of sufficient serious cases to train them by?—Yes. Then, of course, we have foreign stations like Hong Kong and Singapore, and every foreign station except India, and they get experience there. But it is the fact that in the United Kingdom the majority of cases are of course trivial.

11428. Do you see any way in which that could be overcome by sending orderlies to the civil hospitals?—I think there you would meet with the same thing—that the nurses will do the work.

11429. It has been stated that in Russia, where the Army Medical Corps seems to be placed on a very high footing, in the military hospitals all the civil population are admitted for the purpose of training the doctors and training the orderlies; what would you think of that course being pursued here?—It would be a very good thing indeed, both for doctors and nurses and for the orderlies, if it could be done; but I fear that it is not very likely.

11430. In a large garrison town, for instance, there is a large military hospital, and it might be used as auxiliary to the hospitals of the place?—Yes.

11431. That, of course, is not done here?—No.

11432. Do you see any objection to its being done?—Not at all. I think it would be an excellent thing.

11433. (*Sir John Edge.*) Do you think it would be feasible to send officers from the Royal Army Medical Corps for a year to civil hospitals to act as house surgeons?—It is being done to this extent: that a young man who competes in the entrance examination, if he goes to be a house surgeon counts his time, and is seconded, and there are some now who, instead of going to Aldershot to go through a military course, are doing their work in civil hospitals as house-surgeons.

11434. But take the case of a man who has been in the service for some two or three or four years, do you think it would be possible for him to get an opportunity to act as house surgeon?—Do you mean would the civil hospitals take him?

11435. Yes, that is the point?—The large civil hospitals will not, of course, because they keep their own house surgeons, but a country civil hospital might. The difficulty hitherto has always been in obtaining leave for an Army Medical Corps officer to undergo such a training, but if the leave were granted, if he were not the house surgeon in charge, the civil authorities would probably make no difficulty in attaching him to a hospital, to be with the house surgeon in charge. I have just said that there are cases, as you know, in London where doctors of all sorts, military and civil, when they can get leave, go through that sort of training, and they are generally at small hospitals, where there are no students of their own, and where they get all the advantage of the operating theatre.

11436. It would add to the efficiency of the Army Medical Corps if that system were followed generally?—Yes; we have tried for several years to get what we call study leave, and it has been granted as a principle, but we have generally been so short-handed that it has been impossible to give it to officers. I meant that we shall have post-graduate courses of our own.

11437. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) You have nothing to do with the packing of the medical stores?—No.

11438. That does not come under your observation at all?—No. Everything to do with the stores was under Colonel Gubbins first, and afterwards under Colonel Johnston.

11439. (*Chairman.*) You have only to do with the *personnel* in the lower grades?—Yes, with providing the men.

11440. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) What standard of instruction is required of a man who becomes an orderly on his being admitted into the Corps?—He must be able to read and write, to cipher, and to read manuscript.

11441. To what extent—what standard?—I should say only moderate; it is not a very high standard, but it is supposed to be higher than that of the ordinary soldier, and it is, as a rule.

11442. And he must show himself to be a man of intelligence?—Yes.

11443. On examination?—Yes; he is examined by a military doctor, and it is specially laid down that it is the duty of the medical officer who examines him to test him in this reading, writing, and ciphering, and to certify upon the attestation form that he has examined him and finds him medically fit and suitable for the Royal Army Medical Corps.

11444. What part of the teaching and training of an officer who becomes a doctor and a surgeon after is required of an orderly?—An elementary knowledge in anatomy and physiology. Not before he enlists, of course.

11445. No, not before he enlists, but before he is accepted as a competent orderly and male nurse, what teaching and training is required of him?—As I say, he must know the elements of anatomy and physiology, the treatment of fractures, dislocations, sprains, and burns, the application of bandages and splints, sufficient of ventilation and hygiene to keep the ward pure, and a knowledge of the thermometer, both the clinical and bath thermometer, and the duty of being able to report upon the appearance of a patient, and what has occurred to him in the interval, say, from one day to another—the ordinary clinical observation.

11446. In every hospital of any consequence there are lectures, of course. Does he attend those lectures?—Yes, he ought to be lectured to by the sister, and also every morning, if possible, by the doctor in charge of the ward. When I was in charge of a ward I used to go round my ward and sign all the diets, and then I would call the orderlies together, and discuss for a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes some case that was in bed there, and ask them questions. Then before he can be advanced, as I mentioned a moment ago, he has to pass this examination, which is partly written and partly oral; and there is an examination, either written or oral, before every grade upwards to that of sergeant-major.

11447. You had about 2,100 of the Army Medical Corps here at the commencement of the war—2,092, I think, was the number in this country?—Yes.

11448. Those were more or less experienced men, of course?—Yes.

11449. And did you send the whole of those, or almost all of those, out to South Africa, and in their place outside—I mean, all of those including the 1,000 reservists? Did you send them, or almost all of them, reservists. Did you send them, or almost all of them, to South Africa, and in their stead take in for the hospital work very much less experienced men?—The First Army Corps took, out of those 2,100 that you are speaking of 1,700 men.

11450. Your first step was to send all the experienced men that you possibly could to Africa?—Yes, because, you see, we had nothing else to send. The Reservists were all detailed, of course, for their bearer companies and field hospitals; they are detailed in time of peace for that; and therefore when they sent out the First Army Corps so many bearer companies, so many field hospitals, and so many general hospitals went, and there were 1,700 went in the first two months.

11451. Did you consider the Reservists equal to those on active duty at the time, or were they more old-fashioned, more accustomed to old-fashioned practice?—I do not think so. As I said to Lord Esher a little time ago, a large number of those men who have been orderlies follow this profession when they go back to civil life. I have a book in which their names are kept, and people who want male nurses apply to me, and so my Reservists always get employment at once.

11452. I think you mentioned that you considered that from 4 to 5 per cent. of Royal Army Medical Corps men would be required for an army of a certain number?—I think so, approximately.

11453. I think at one time, and for a considerable time, the Army in South Africa numbered about 250,000 men, and you sent from here about 8,500, including female nurses?—No; those 8,500 are men.

11454. Then besides that you had at one time from 700 to 900 female nurses?—Yes.

11455. Bringing the number up altogether to 9,000?—Yes, over 9,000.

11456. The proportion, of course, for 250,000 men would, at 5 per cent., be 12,000?—Yes.

11457. So that you really were not up to that mark?—It was much worse than that, because you must remember that the vast majority of these men—at any rate, a very large number of them—were only enlisted for a year, and therefore they passed each other on the sea; as fast as some went out others came home. The Army Order was for 1,000 men of all sorts.

11458. Then there were not nearly so many at any one time out there?—No.

11459. How many would there have been on an average?—I should say 4,000.

11460. That is instead of 12,000 which you think would have been actually necessary?—Yes, but as I mentioned in my evidence, there were also a very considerable number locally enlisted in South Africa.

11461. Let us say that there were 1,000 of those, that would make 5,000 altogether only, instead of 11,000 or 12,000?—There were more than 1,000. I should say if you count regimental orderlies there were 2,000 men employed in South Africa.

11462. Make it 6,000, that would be just one-half the number which you think was necessary. At the outside, I gather, there were not more than 7,000. That would be 5,000 short of the number that you would recommend that there should be?—Yes, we were very short all through the war.

11463. And of that number a great many you would say were altogether inexperienced, and a considerable number of them were not such as you could have wished to have had at all if you could have done otherwise?—Yes, we must admit that.

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11464. What was the qualification—what did you require of a man on sending him out—on enlisting those who were sent out during the war?—The Army Order states that, "They must produce written evidence satisfactory to the medical officer who examines them that they possess a fair knowledge of ambulance and nursing duties, such as certificates of proficiency in first aid, ambulance and nursing, from recognised corps, institutions, or societies"—practically first aid.

11465. And were you mostly able to get such men?—No; we got men out really for first aid—they are very good men for binding up wounds, dressing fractures or splints, or carrying men on stretchers, but they are not qualified men in nursing to attend to men with typhoid fever.

11466. (*Chairman.*) Have you ever been in Germany, France, or Russia with a view to examining the system of orderlies there?—No.

11467. The military authorities have never suggested to you the desirability of your going out there to inquire?—I have been on my own account.

11468. But you have never been sent abroad officially?—No.

11469. Have you ever been provided with translations of any of the books from Germany or Russia?—I have no doubt that they have them in the library.

11470. Has the Director-General ever drawn your special attention to them in regard to your own branch, and to the system as adopted in Russia or Germany, or by any foreign nation?—I do not know that he has, but I daresay that I ought to have done it myself.

11471. That is another question?—I have been very busy during the last two or three years.

TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY.

Wednesday, 10th December 1902.

PRESENT:

The Right Hon. The Viscount ESHER, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., *Chairman.*

The Right Hon. The Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL, G.C.M.G.
The Right Hon. Sir GEORGE DASHWOOD TAUBMAN-GOLDIE, K.C.M.G.
Field-Marshal Sir HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E.
The Hon. Sir FREDERICK MATTHEW DARLEY, G.C.M.G.
Admiral Sir JOHN OMMANNEY HOPKINS, G.C.B.
Sir JOHN EDGE.

BERNARD H. HOLLAND, Esq., *Secretary.*

Surgeon-General J. JAMESON, C.B., M.D., called and examined.

Surgeon-General J. Jameson, C.B., M.D.

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11472. (*Chairman.*) What office did you hold when the war broke out?—I was Director-General of the Army Medical Service.

11473. How long had you held that office before the war broke out?—I was appointed on the 7th of May, 1896.

11474. You have given us a *précis* of the evidence which you propose to give?—Yes.

11475. Have you any statement that you would like to make on it, or would you like me to take you through it?—If you please, I would prefer that you should take me through it.

11476. Then, the first point is the establishment of the Army Medical Corps, as fixed in 1888?—Yes.

11477. That establishment was fixed by a committee?—Yes.

11478. Was that a War Office Committee?—A War Office Committee.

11479. Who presided over it?—I do not remember.

11480. And what was the establishment fixed at then?—The establishment was fixed then, as regards officers, for 514 officers, exclusive of India, and these, with the addition of 99 civil surgeons, were supposed to provide medical attendance for the colonies for two Army Corps and a cavalry division, with some lines of communication. The understanding was that when that service for the field army had been provided our home hospitals would be left destitute of *personnel.*

11481. The committee contemplated that?—The committee contemplated that.

11482. And that was part of their scheme?—That was part of their scheme. The belief was that with the aid of the retired military officers and civil surgeons there would be very little difficulty in carrying on the work.

11483. Does that apply to the colonies as well?—The colonies would be kept entire; that is to say, we would not denude the colonies at all.

11484. You had enough for the two Army Corps?—We had enough for the two Army Corps and the cavalry division.

11485. That applies to the officers?—Yes.

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11486. Does that also apply to the men?—No, that was a different arrangement. The establishment for the men was designed for a state of peace.

11487. Why were the two establishments placed upon a different basis?—I could hardly tell you.

11488. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) You were not on that committee?—I was not on the committee, and I was not in the office at the time.

11489. (*Chairman.*) Did it ever occur to you during the tenure of your office that that difference of system required some explanation?—There had been a very great number of changes in a number of years with regard to the organisation of the corps.

11490. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) What was the system as regards the men? We have not had that yet?—The system as regards the men was just sufficient to provide for a peace footing.

11491. (*Chairman.*) Yes, a peace footing was what you said?—Yes, for all the home garrisons, and for the garrisons abroad, exclusive of India.

11492. We had evidence yesterday as regards the men. Colonel Wilson explained to us that the non-commissioned officers and men were fixed for a peace footing?—Yes, for a peace footing.

11493. And a war establishment was never contemplated at all as regards the men?—That is correct.

11494. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) But a peace footing for what force?—For the strength of the Army. The only thing about that is that, while the Army went on increasing, our men did not increase in corresponding ratio, so that we have been very hard up for many years, even on a peace footing.

11495. During that interval, from 1888 to 1899, there was an increase in the Army?—Yes, a very great increase.

11496. (*Chairman.*) But did your hospitals increase?—Our hospitals increased very much.

11497. Since 1888?—Yes, there was a considerable increase of the Army all round, but not a corresponding increase of the men of the Royal Army Medical Corps.

11498. After you assumed your office did you represent that the men were not sufficient?—I did, repeatedly.

11499. But you did not succeed in getting the establishment increased?—We got a small increase. I can give you the exact time it was put forward. I have it here conveniently.

11500. If you please?—"To explain the small number of trained orderlies of the Royal Army Medical Corps at the commencement of the war, I must refer to the constant struggle that has been in progress for many years to obtain what was considered an adequate establishment for the corps. In our estimates for 1893-4 an increase of 212 was asked for, but only 54 were granted, and in the estimate of the following year, 1894-5, it was very strongly recommended that the balance, viz., 158, might be sanctioned, on the ground that we had to employ a considerable number of regimental orderlies, and we had not 'a single warrant officer, or non-commissioned officer under 'Reliefs and Miscellaneous' to meet casualties, and only 67 privates, as compared with nearly 200 of all ranks which had been allowed in 1886-7.' However, it was decided that only 53 should be sanctioned. Similarly, in 1896-7 105 were asked for, partly on account of increased establishment in Egypt; 52 were given. In 1897-8 the balance, viz., 53, was again asked for, and it was stated that 'every little expedition undertaken means that the non-commissioned officers and men of the corps have to be withdrawn from the hospitals at home in order that the necessary hospital staffs may be furnished to the expeditionary force.' An increase of 55 men was then sanctioned, but the Adjutant-General considered that wars are intended to be provided for by depleting our home hospitals, and that the remedy for that is extra women nurses and active recruiting."

11501. What are you reading from?—I am reading from the evidence which I gave before the Royal Commission on South African Hospitals.

11502. And when you made those representations, to whom did you make them?—To the Adjutant-General.

11503. And were your discussions carried on with the Adjutant-General alone?—The matter was frequently discussed at the Army Board; that is the usual place at which these things are discussed.

11504. But I want to know how you discussed them—personally? Were you present at the Army Board?—Yes.

11505. What years are you speaking of now?—I was usually present at all meetings of the Army Board when the Medical Department was concerned.

11506. That was when the Estimates were discussed?—At all times. There used to be a meeting of the Army Board about once a week, and if any subject connected with my department was dealt with I was invited to attend.

11507. And when you raised these questions before the Army Board was the decision of the Army Board against you on these points?—Yes, always.

11508. The Secretary of State was not present?—They did not want to increase the Medical Corps. The argument given was that the trained soldier is the only man you cannot purchase in the open market, and that all the money was wanted for trained soldiers.

11509. But what I want to arrive at is this: that it was the military opinion that was against you?—Quite so.

11510. And did you ever discuss this matter with any Secretary of State personally?—No. I have attended, of course, War Office Councils with the Secretary of State at which these subjects were discussed.

11511. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) Before the war?—It was only during the war that I was present.

11512. During the period prior to the war you had no opportunity of being present?—No, it would not come before the War Office Council.

11513. (*Chairman.*) But before the war you had discussed these questions with the Army Board?—Yes, with the Army Board.

11514. That is as regards the number of men. Were you satisfied with the number of officers for the establishment?—No; the number of officers for many years has been very much below what it ought to have been, in fact, some years ago, following Lord Randolph Churchill's Committee in cutting down the expenses all the time our establishment became insufficient; that is to say, in proportion to our requirements. At one time, I think, we had nearly 1,000 altogether, and although the Army had increased, our numbers had decreased.

11515. And how were those numbers cut down—annually when the Estimates came to be considered?—Yes, when the Estimates came to be considered.

11516. Then, again, did you discuss those points with the Army Board as to the number of officers?—I think that was before my time.

11517. Since your time has there been any considerable reduction?—No, it is practically the same since my time—that is to say, for the home establishment and Colonies 514 increased to 540, and since the war we raised it by 100 temporarily.

11518. During the Egyptian campaigns what happened?—We had to send out from our establishment at home a sufficient number to provide for their wants in Egypt by depleting the home establishment.

11519. And then how did you make good the depletion in the home establishment during the progress of the Egyptian campaigns?—Practically it amounted to this—that officers got a much shorter time of home service, and had to do double work. We had a smaller number of officers at each station, and we had difficulty in giving leave.

11520. Did you supplement it by the appointment of civilians?—A great deal. We have done that all along.

11521. And how did you make up your orderlies who were withdrawn from service in Egypt?—By taking them from the home establishment. If there was a war anywhere, in Egypt, or in Crete, and men were wanted, we took them from the home establishment, or very often, we took them from Malta, which was nearer, and then sent out to Malta the number of men required to replace them.

11522. For the home establishment?—From the home establishment.

11523. Then, how did you make good your home establishment in the meanwhile?—If the hospitals suffered, which they did to a certain extent, we had to apply to commanding officers for private soldiers.

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11524. Those, of course, were untrained men?—Those were untrained men.

11525. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Were they any use to you, being untrained?—They varied very much. Some were good and others were not good at all, and there was not always, I think, wisdom shown in the selection of them. We felt that especially during the war. When our establishment had been exhausted, we had to use a good many non-commissioned officers and men from regiments; some commanding officers sent us good men, and others sent us, I think, their worst. This was represented, and, I think, some improvement took place, when it was shown that it was a great mistake to send their worst men. Then the medical officers had some little discretion in choosing the men.

11526. (*Chairman.*) What is the meaning of 99 civil surgeons?—It was estimated, that with the addition of 99 civil surgeons, our establishments would be sufficient to meet the wants for Colonial garrisons, and for two Army Corps, and two Cavalry Brigades.

11527. Does that mean 99 casual civil surgeons?—99 civil surgeons who would be selected by the Director-General.

11528. If he could get them?—If he could get them.

11529. But they were not registered in any way beforehand?—No.

11530. You had no claim upon anybody?—We had no claim upon anybody.

11531. Then your establishment of officers is estimated as sufficient for two Army Corps. What happened when the South African war broke out?—The first idea was, that it was going to be one Army Corps, and we sent out the First Army Corps complete in every detail.

11532. That is as regards officers and men?—As regards officers and men.

11533. That, of course, did not deplete your officers?—No, we still had sufficient for a Second Army Corps and for two Cavalry Brigades and some for Lines of Communication.

11534. There never was a Second Army Corps?—But we had the establishment for a Second Army Corps. We sent out the First Army Corps complete. Then the Second Army Corps had to be formed. First of all, there was a demand made for South Africa for an additional number of base hospitals and stationary hospitals, according to the long line of communications. Then we had to send out these general hospitals and stationary hospitals, and to take our officers and men, that we intended for the Second Army Corps, to supply what was wanted along the line of communications; therefore, when we had to send the Second Army Corps we had not got them fully, and then we had to go to the highways and byways for them.

11535. How soon were your numbers exhausted, practically?—Before the end of the year. We sent out 2,200 of our men before the end of 1899.

11536. I am speaking now of the officers?—They were practically exhausted at the same time. We had not enough for the Second Army Corps.

11537. But, surely, your men were exhausted when you sent out the First Army Corps?—Not altogether.

11538. Practically, were they not?—Yes, practically, they were exhausted. We kept, of course, a few. We had to keep on our hospitals just the same, and we could not possibly take away all the men who knew the working of the regulations, and put in men who knew nothing about it. So that, we had to keep in every hospital, particularly the large ones, a certain number of non-commissioned officers.

11539. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) When you say that you sent out a complete establishment for the First Army Corps, how many men does that mean for an Army Corps?—An Army Corps takes about 800 non-commissioned officers and men.

11540. (*Chairman.*) What per cent. is that of the force sent out; an Army Corps is about 40,000 men?—About 2½ per cent.

11541. Do you consider that that is sufficient?—That depends a good deal upon what is required, and it depends a great deal upon the country you are operating in, and the amount of disease, of course.

11542. But take it under the most favourable condition?—I think that would be a fairly good estimate for an Army Corps.

11543. We have had it in evidence, that 5 per cent. is the right percentage of men of the Army Medical Corps for any force that you choose to employ under the most favourable conditions. What do you say to that percentage?—I think it is very liberal. I think it is, probably, more than we would ever get.

11544. It is more than you might get, but is it more than you think is properly required?—It depends a great deal, of course, upon where you are operating.

11545. I am not speaking of the 5 per cent. scale; I am speaking of the 5 per cent. of the Army Medical Corps?—I think it is considerably more than was estimated for by the Committee.

11546. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Would the long lines of communication greatly increase your need?—Then you require a great many more, of course. It altogether depends upon the length of your line of communications.

11547. (*Chairman.*) You cannot foresee, you cannot estimate the probable amount of sickness in an Army, can you?—You can, in a general way, by a knowledge of the percentage of sick in previous wars, and in other countries. We have had a good deal of experience in South Africa, and we have had a good deal of experience in Egypt, and other places, and we know exactly what other armies have done, and what they required.

11548. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) When you say other armies, do you mean foreign armies?—Yes, and English armies.

11549. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) The evidence which we had was to the effect that certain foreign armies always worked up to the standard of 5 per cent.?—They had occasion for it. The amount of sickness in foreign armies was always more than double ours; our results have always compared exceedingly favourably with the results of all other countries. I could give you just in a moment almost what these results are, to give you an idea of their requirements as compared with ours.

11550. (*Chairman.*) As worked out by the experience of the South African War, has it confirmed your previous views as to the percentage of sickness, or has it not?—The difficulty in South Africa was to provide attendants at a particular spot. In the country, I believe, so far as numbers were concerned, there were plenty; but not perhaps at one particular spot.

11551. But I am speaking of the percentage of sick and wounded. Has the percentage of sick and wounded in this recent war borne out your previous estimates?—Yes; I have got it here.

11552. I do not want the exact figures?—I have here the "percentage of medical to total strength." It began on the 2nd of October, 1890, with 1·39.

11553. But is this the percentage of sick?—The percentage of medical to total strength.

11554. The numbers?—Yes.

11555. We will take those now, and I will then go back to my previous question. Now you are giving me the percentage of medical aid to the numbers of men?—Yes, to the total strength.

11556. What do you say it was?—This gives the Royal Army Medical Corps, men and officers as well, altogether. This is a "Statement of the strength of Medical Corps and other arms, including Colonials and Voluntary Hospitals on certain dates from 2nd of October, 1899, to 16th July, 1900." That is the medical *personnel.*

11557. But, of course, that includes all sorts of things. That includes voluntary aid?—Yes, it does.

11558. That is travelling a little beyond the point at which we had arrived. What I wanted to get from you was this. Before the war broke out, you must have formed some estimate of the probable number of sick?—Yes.

11559. What was it?—Ten per cent.

11560. Then, I ask you now, how has the experience of South Africa borne out that estimate?—The percentage of sick in South Africa has never reached 10 per cent.

11561. Not even including the Bloemfontein enteric epidemic?—No; including that it was a little under it. The calculation was almost absolutely correct.

11562. What number of men and officers, total included, would you have considered before the war was

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the proper percentage for the number of men sent out; 2½ per cent. you told us just now?—Yes.

11563. You adhere to that?—Yes, I adhere to that, under favourable conditions.

11564. What was the percentage actually employed, including voluntary aid and everything else? Now you can look at that table?—The greatest was 4·23.

11565. That is very considerably in excess of what you think would have been required?—Yes.

11566. And yet you would not be prepared to say that there was a greater number of the Army Medical Corps, plus voluntary assistance, than was really required would you?—No, I do not think I would say that, under the circumstances.

11567. Do you not think under those circumstances that you would now rather correct your figure of 2½ per cent.?—Well, it is certainly not too liberal.

11568. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Do you know the percentage of the foreign armies?—I do not.

11569. I was under the impression that you had some note of that?—That was the result of expeditions—the mortality. I have got the mortality in the different expeditions, and compared them with our own.

11570. (*Chairman.*) What have you to say about the training of the officers in the Royal Army Medical Corps; is there anything that you would like to say upon that point?—I think the training has been very good, excepting that there is this to be said, that on account of our depleted establishment, or rather on account of the increase of the Army, it was very difficult indeed for officers to get leave to study. The training in preparation for entrance to the Army, I think, is very good.

11571. That is to say, you think that the young men who come into the Army as surgeons, up to the point of coming into the Army, are very well taught and trained?—Yes, they join at Netley, and for four months (in my time) they were put through a course of hygiene bacteriology, and military surgery and military medicine and regulations, and the work of a military hospital.

11572. And they compare at that point, at the point of entrance into the Royal Army Medical Corps, very favourably, you think, with the ordinary young surgeon or doctor?—Yes, I think so. They are considerably above the average.

11573. Of civil surgeons?—I think so; because only good men could pass the examination.

11574. Now, from that point onwards, what do you think?—From that point onwards, after four months at Netley, they were sent for two months to Aldershot, where they picked up chiefly the military part of the work; they were put in the barrack square and taught their drill.

11575. The officers?—Yes, and then they were taught ambulance drill, and then they had to do orderly officer, and were initiated into all the military ways.

11576. How long was that going on?—Two months. After that they were drafted usually to one of the large hospitals, such as the Herbert Hospital. It depended a good deal upon where the men wanted to go; as a rule, we allowed them to go to the place they preferred. If an officer was an Irishman, he would prefer Dublin. At all events, they were sent to one of the large hospitals.

11577. Take the Herbert Hospital, how many patients has the Herbert Hospital?—During the war it had over a thousand.

11578. In normal times, I mean?—About 700.

11579. As many as that?—Yes.

11580. And how many physicians and surgeons are attached to the Herbert Hospital?—It depends a good deal upon how many we could spare at the time. As a rule, a medical officer could take charge of 50 cases.

11581. Then, do you think that, from the point of view of an officer going into one of those big hospitals onwards in his training there, he gets as much experience, let us say, as a civil surgeon or civil physician in a civilian hospital?—Well, he gets experience of a certain kind. I do not think, take it all round, it is equal to the experience derived by a man doing duty in a civil hospital, a man appointed to a civil hospital; but he gets certain experience in some diseases. Venereal disease, of course, is ever there. But when he goes abroad he then gets very great experience in a disease that the civil surgeon does not get experience here to the same extent—that is enteric fever.

11582. Fevers generally?—Yes, and fevers generally, and rapid disease of different kinds.

11583. As to accidents, does he get any experience?—Accidents, as a rule, he does not see very much. There are a few appointments very good for that, at the Arsenal, for example, for the medical staff of our corps.

11584. But the average Army surgeon does not get surgical experience?—No; he does not get much surgical experience. I do not think I ever, myself, performed a major operation until I went to the Franco-German War.

11585. Yet for the actual duty which an Army surgeon has to perform in war I take it that would be the most valuable experience of all?—No doubt it would be valuable. He cannot get that experience in operating anywhere except on a dead subject.

11586. Not under the existing system?—No, under the existing system he cannot get it at home.

11587. Has it ever occurred to you that the system might be changed in some way to meet the difficulty?—Yes.

11588. Have you ever made any proposal with regard to that?—The subject has been discussed for years—that is to say, how to improve the medical officer on his return from foreign service.

11589. Or to give him more experience?—Or to give him more experience. The only way, it would appear, is to give him leave to study in one of the home schools.

11590. Has that ever been proposed?—Yes, and sanctioned. I never refused in my life a medical officer leave to study, but there were sometimes difficulties in regard to his own principal medical officer of the district. He would say, "Well, I am very sorry, but I cannot spare you."

11591. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) That would generally be the case, would it not?—Very often. So that very few men in my time availed themselves of that opportunity.

11592. (*Chairman.*) But that would be a voluntary system, would it not?—Yes, there was no other.

11593. And no other has ever been considered?—No.

11594. The military authorities have never considered some compulsory system?—Never.

11595. What would you say to that?—I think every medical officer on returning home should be granted leave to study.

11596. But should he not be made to study?—I think he should.

11597. Has that ever been seriously considered by the military authorities?—I do not think it ever could be on account of our strength, because we should require to increase the establishment enormously to provide for that sort of thing. If you ordered every man, say, for six months to a civil hospital I think you would have to increase your establishment almost one third to do that.

11598. Quite so; but that is worthy of consideration, too, is it not?—Yes.

11599. Would there be any difficulty in attaching military surgeons to civil hospitals?—Not the slightest.

11600. It is done now, is it not?—I believe it is done now. I raised the question several times with the London surgeons, saying, "Would you give us some of your appointments in the hospitals, such as house surgeons?" and as a rule they refused. They said, "No, these are for our own schools; we cannot afford it. We shall be very glad to see your officers, but we cannot give them the house surgeoncy." But that was what I wanted. I wanted our officer to reside there, and be treated in all respects the same as one of their own resident surgeons.

11601 Has it ever occurred to you that by contribution to civil hospitals, for example, the Government might obtain a claim to send a certain number of officers to reside at the hospitals?—Yes, it has occurred to me.

11602. But you are not aware that that question has ever been seriously raised?—No, it was never put forward in a concrete form.

11603. There is something in the contention of the

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civil surgeons at the present time, is there not?—Yes, I believe they are moving in that direction now.

11604. What I mean is that there is some justice in the contention of civil surgeons that it would be hardly fair under existing circumstances to admit military men?—Undoubtedly, to the exclusion of their own men, because house surgeoncies are looked upon as prizes.

11605. On the other hand, if the Government were to make some annual contribution to the hospitals, you would get rid of that objection?—I suggested that perhaps they might be made supernumeraries—not to deprive anybody, but to accept one of our officers as a supernumerary.

11606. Anyhow, your view is that it is desirable that the Army surgeons as a whole, after they have once joined the Army Medical Corps, should have increased experience?—Undoubtedly.

11607. There has been a good deal of criticism of the medical and surgical material sent out to South Africa. Who is responsible for that sending out?—There is an officer appointed at the War Office whose business it is .

11608. Is he under you?—Yes, he is directly under me.

11609. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Is he a medical man?—Yes; he is a man always chosen for his work, and a remarkably good man, who gave evidence here, I think, the other day, Colonel Johnston. He and Colonel Gubbins are the two men, and also the present Director-General, Sir William Taylor.

11610. (*Chairman.*) Had they perfect liberty of choice in choosing the equipment and instruments, and so on, that were sent out to Africa?—There was a certain pattern as regards instruments.

11611. When was that pattern settled and fixed?—In my time there was a great improvement made. There were old-fashioned instruments when I became Director-General.

11612. That was in 1896?—Yes, with wooden handles, and we got it all changed, and got new instruments and cases all fitted-up completely, and I do not understand how much criticism could have been applied, because I asked Mr. Makins, one of the consulting surgeons, a man I know intimately, before he went out, "Would you kindly look over our surgical equipment, and make any suggestions?" and he did so, and he said, "The only suggestion that I can make is perhaps a few more nail brushes."

11613. But when was this pattern fixed?—The new pattern was fixed, I think, about the year 1898.

11614. After you came into office?—Yes, after I came into office.

11615. Were the whole of the Army Medical Corps and the whole of the officers supplied with the new equipment between 1898 and December, 1899?—Perhaps not all.

11616. Would not that have involved very considerable expense?—That would have involved very considerable expense, and we wanted to use up the material as fast as we could.

11617. Did you obtain from the War Office sufficient funds to enable you to re-equip the whole of the Army Medical Corps between 1898 and December, 1899?—No.

11618. Therefore, I take it, it is not very surprising if a good many officers went out with the old equipment?—Very likely.

11619. That is no doubt the explanation of the criticisms we have heard?—Yes.

11620. But you are satisfied now with the equipment as it stands?—I think it is very good. Of course, you understand every surgeon has his own fads. There are not two surgeons in London who would agree as to what ought to be the proper instruments.

11621. However, I take it that one of the essentials is that instruments should be easily and quickly sterilised?—Certainly, that was our object in changing them. We could put them all into hot water, for example, and boil them at once.

11622. And with your new equipment can you put case and instruments into hot water at once?—Yes.

11623. That was not the case with the old equipment?—No, even our pocket cases were changed. They are made of metal, so that the whole thing can be boiled at once.

11624. As to medical stores, medicines, and things taken out, were they mostly in tabloid form?—A great many of them were.

11625. Was not that again an innovation?—Yes.

11626. Do you have a large medical store?—Yes.

11627. And when you assumed your office in 1896 what was the condition of that store?—It was unsatisfactory.

11628. Were there many medicines and things in tabloid form then?—Not very many at that time. There were a great many pills; a certain number of pills were kept.

11629. If you take, for instance, disinfectants, they can be carried in tabloid form, can they not?—Yes.

11630. Were they in tabloid form when you took office in 1896?—No.

11631. Did you make any effort to change that?—Yes, I reconstituted the whole part of that. In the first place, our chief want there was a proper store house. That was also a question of expense. They would not give us a proper storehouse, although it had been frequently asked for. At that time we had to keep all our medicines in the cellars of the Herbert Hospital underground, which were damp. Of course, there were a great many perishable articles in medicines, and they became useless after a time. But, although, I think, on several occasions the necessity for better storage was put forward, it was not given to us. And there it was. The instruments were suffering, and the medicines were perishing, and the only thing I could do at the time I did. I got all these perishable articles put into one of the wards of the hospital, and they are there up to this day in that ward—a dry place, with wooden flooring; so that now the custody is good, but it is at the expense of the hospital—that is to say, there is one ward which we have not the use of.

11632. I suppose that your deficiencies as regards storage room and so on were all represented by you to the War Office?—Yes.

11633. And there again you were refused the necessary funds?—Yes. The thing had been discussed over and over again.

11634. Was it discussed by military authorities or civilians?—Always by military authorities so far as I was concerned.

11635. Therefore, so far as you were concerned, you have been blocked all through by the Army Board?—Quite so.

11636. I suppose that when you came to sending out medicines and drugs, and so on, to South Africa you sent out what you had in the first instance, at any rate?—In the first instance, of course, we had sufficient for the field Army and for an advanced depôt and a base depôt, too; and we had a considerable reserve, of course, which we used.

11637. Your reserve was here?—Yes, our reserve was here.

11638. Was not your reserve rather old-fashioned?—Yes, perhaps it was. Then, immediately we saw what a big war it was going to be, we sent out immense quantities.

11639. Then you began to buy, of course?—Yes; we began to buy, and got them fresh.

11640. Then you began, I suppose, to buy the drugs in the more modern forms?—Yes; quite so.

11641. So that as the war progressed, I suppose the right kind of things were sent out?—The fact is that what we had in reserve was exhausted almost immediately in the first month.

11642. Then you began to buy?—Yes.

11643. And when you began to buy, did you buy and send out any drugs in the old-fashioned forms—in bottles, for instance—things which could perfectly well have been sent out in tabloid form?—Very few went out except in concentrated form.

11644. After the first were sent out?—Yes.

11645. Do you consider you had a large enough reserve?—I think it is very undesirable to keep a large reserve of drugs; they are perishable, and now we can always buy quicker than we can mobilise.

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11646. You never had any difficulty in buying?—Not the slightest.

11647. I asked you a good deal about the training of officers, but I did not say anything about the training of your hospital orderlies; do you think that is satisfactory?—I think it is fairly satisfactory.

11648. But, just as your officers are weak from want of experience, does not that apply equally to the orderlies?—I think not to the same extent as regards surgical work, because the patients are made use of. A man is supposed to have a fractured thigh; the men are given examples of a thigh, and they do just the same kind of work that they are called upon to do in war—putting on temporary splints, and the like. Of course, they have not a great deal of experience in serious disease, such as fever, in this country, although in Egypt and Malta they have. My experience of our men is that they are very good.

11649. But do these orderlies, in your opinion, get good training as nurses, because they have to act as nurses?—Yes, they have to act as nurses; they are taught by the nurses themselves. First of all, when they are enlisted, they are taught their military part of the training, simple manœuvres, so that they can march together, and they are taught the ambulance work, and then afterwards, after they have done the barrack-square duties, they are put into hospital, and then they are graded and put in as third class orderlies; then they are taught by the non-commissioned officers and by the nurses. The nurses themselves are the chief teachers.

11650. But the nurses practically do most of the nursing, do they not?—No, they do not.

11651. You think they do not?—No, they do not.

11652. Do you not think that the duties of the men are limited to a great extent to cleaning and assisting?—On the contrary, all the hard nursing work is done by our men.

11653. In the hospitals?—In the hospitals. For example, a female nurse was not on duty at night, except in a large hospital.

11654. Take the Herbert Hospital?—In the Herbert Hospital they have night duty.

11655. Then let us take Aldershot?—Aldershot would have night duties, and large hospitals have night duties.

11656. But in the smaller hospitals the men do the night duty, do they?—Yes; for example, in Egypt.

11657. You mean on service?—No; in the station hospital in Egypt; we had nurses there, but the nurses did no night duty.

11658. The orderlies did it?—The orderlies did it. Our nurses are chiefly superintending.

11659. Then what is the objection to the orderlies for practice doing night duties in the great hospitals here, the Herbert Hospital and Aldershot?—Well, the female nurses are superior in social position, and they look after the orderlies; it is a sort of guarantee.

11660. We quite understand that a woman nurse would probably be a much better nurse?—I think they keep the orderlies up to their work. The nurse, for example, goes round every ward, not necessarily her own ward. Each nurse would have under her charge, say, three wards and a certain number of orderlies. Then, when she was doing night duty she would go round the whole hospital, and see that the patients were being properly cared for by our own men.

11661. In any case, you think that the establishment of men requires an increase?—Yes, I think so; a considerable increase.

11662. It is obvious that if it is based upon a peace footing, you are not prepared to meet an emergency under which even two Army Corps would be sent abroad?—We are not prepared; we are very much undermanned.

11663. Is there anything you would like to add to what you have said?—There is one thing that I would like to add—not much notice has been taken of it. Not only when our establishment was exhausted, both for officers and men, it was the fact that all our home hospitals had to be carried on just the same, but in addition to that, we had 50,000 invalids sent home on the top of us, and all that had to be provided for by our depleted establishment, and you can imagine what a work that was. So that I think any plan whereby all our trained men are moved away from our own hospitals at the beginning of a war must necessarily be bad.

11664. However, it all resolves itself into this—that from 1896, when you assumed office, to the time at which you retired, you felt that you were starved by the War Department, and that you were in a continual state of conflict with them with regard to establishment; is not that so?—That is the case.

11665. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I suppose, in the war in South Africa, the lines of communication which had to be occupied, and so on, were much more extensive than in ordinary wars, and you had to have a great many intermediate hospitals?—Yes, a great many; that is the case.

11666. And sick men had to be sent back long distances?—Yes, they had.

11667. And that required medical officers to be sent to look after them on the way back to the Cape or the base hospitals?—Yes.

11668. So that, in point of fact, the requirements of the Medical Department in the South African war were very much greater than in any ordinary war?—I think they were greater than in almost any war I have ever heard of, on account of the enormous lines of communication and the roads of the country in which we were operating, which were very bad roads.

11669. And also there were many difficulties probably that would not have arisen in a civilised country like Germany or France?—Undoubtedly; there was nothing to be got out of the country. I have had experience of France. I have been with an ambulance in France, and I know exactly the difficulties there, but we had no difficulties there as compared with what we had in South Africa.

11670. There were very few towns, in fact, where you could get anything?—Nothing at all.

11671. You spoke of the nurses; do you think that they are very efficient?—I think our nurses are remarkably good. The establishment was 86 altogether; but they were always chosen from a large list of applicants. All their testimonials were very carefully considered by me, and then we selected from the top of the list. We put down all the various qualifications, and then, having chosen one, I would ask to see her, and if I thought she was suitable in every way she would be appointed, not permanently, but on probation. Then she would be sent to Netley for six months, where she would be under the careful observation of the lady superintendent, and if the lady superintendent expressed herself perfectly satisfied with her in every respect, she was then permanently appointed.

11672. Each appointment of a probationer nursing sister followed upon her having had three years' duty in one of the civil hospitals?—In one of the large civil hospitals.

11673. Did she get any certificate from that hospital?—I never took one unless she had a certificate from a hospital, usually from the head matron, and very often from the physicians and surgeons. In fact, they always came with a large number of certificates, and we never appointed anybody unless she was exceedingly well reported upon.

11674. Were any of those nursing sisters who went to Netley rejected during that probation?—Not in my time. I never heard, indeed, since the nursing service was first established, of any one of them going what you call wrong, except on one occasion, out of the whole number that have ever been there, and all the years there was only one person who made a mistake.

11675. And you have no suggestions to make for the improvement of the nursing service?—I believe that the whole nursing service has been changed since I left office. Now they have a committee for choosing them. I think Lady Roberts is connected with it, and a lot of civilians. In fact, the nursing service has been reformed since I left.

11676. Might I ask where the Army Nursing Service Reserve comes from, because I see they are so much more numerous than the sisters actually in the service?—The reserve of male nurses, that is men of the Royal Army Medical Corps, were enlisted on the same conditions that the private soldier is enlisted on; so many years' service with the colours and so many years' service with the reserve, and we had the same claim to

their services that the Commander-in-Chief had to the services of the ordinary soldier.

11677. But it is very largely in excess (the Nursing Service Reserve) of the numbers of the actual sisters?—The number of sisters employed was so small; there are only 86 of them altogether.

11678. How do they come to have such a large reserve?—They have been accumulating for years, taking into account the strength of the Corps. After so many years' service they went to the Reserve for a certain number of years, and then they were available. We had, altogether, about a thousand Reservists.

11679. What length of service must a nursing sister have to qualify her to go into the Army Nursing Service Reserve?—That is a different Reserve altogether. The Army Nursing Service Reserve is a service that was formed by Her Royal Highness Princess Christian. It was formed on the supposition that during war all our female nurses would be sent abroad, and therefore nurses would be required for our home hospitals, and Her Royal Highness got a number of names of those who were willing to come into our military hospitals and give their aid. Then it was only supposed at first that they would be required for service at home; but all these nurses were anxious to get to the war, every one of them; the difficulty was to keep them in our home hospitals. They all wanted to go to South Africa. Therefore it was called the Army Nursing Service Reserve, but it had no connection with the Reserve of our own nurses; it is entirely a civil institution.

11680. You state that you had 52 Army Nursing Sisters employed for 379 of the Army Nursing Service Reserve?—Yes. They are not a reserve from our own sisters at all; they have no connection with them whatever.

11681. You were in the Army Medical Service, I presume, before the Royal Army Medical Corps was constituted?—Yes, I joined in 1857.

11682. How was the nursing done then that is now done by the Royal Army Medical Corps?—It was done by orderlies from regiments.

11683. Was it very badly done?—In some instances it was badly done, and in others it was exceedingly well done. I have known private soldiers as good nurses as I ever saw anywhere. Nothing could exceed their devotion. I am speaking now of my experience in the West Indies during an epidemic of yellow fever. I never saw greater devotion in my life than I have seen by the private soldier.

11684. But they were not so well instructed, I suppose?—They were not so well instructed. In those days, of course, in a regiment, if we got good men, we took care to keep them as long as we could, and the regimental surgeons were training them the whole time and teaching them and encouraging them in their good work.

11685. And I suppose if you kept them too long in the hospitals it would probably interfere with their promotion?—That was the difficulty. If a man became an orderly he had to give up all chances of advancement. And it was only some men who were particularly constituted, who liked the work, that we kept. But one man I have a clear recollection of, and I was most grateful to him for all he did.

11686. You think, on the whole, that the present system is a much better one?—Undoubtedly; there is no comparison. It was perhaps quite the exception in the old days to get a good orderly.

11687. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) In the time you speak of, in the year 1857, there was a surgeon and assistant surgeon attached to each regiment?—Yes.

11688. I suppose at that time you were one of those?—Yes.

11689. Do you think that system as good as the present system?—No doubt the present system is much more economical. The disadvantage of the old system was that the man responsible for the administration of the department had not control over his officers, because they were attached to regiments, and the colonel would not give up his officers. I think the present system is much more economical as regards men. In my time, when I was in a regiment, at Aldershot, we had a surgeon and assistant-surgeon. Now there is one surgeon for a brigade, instead of two for each regiment.

11690. And how many assistant-surgeons?—None.

11691. What is the strength of a brigade?—Two to four regiments.

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11692. Does one surgeon do the work?—He does what you call the barrack work.

11693. Of two regiments?—Of two regiments; and in addition to that, he does field duties as well. It is very seldom that a man in charge of a brigade is put on duty in a hospital, but he has to take his turn on parade on certain days.

11694. So, in point of fact, he is doing the work that four men did formerly?—Quite so.

11695. You think that is an advantage?—From my experience, very often there was not any work for two doctors in the regiment, if the regiment was healthy. The surgeon and assistant-surgeon would both go to the hospital. Sometimes the surgeon had ward duties. At other times he delegated them to his assistant. He usually superintended, and the assistant-surgeon, as he was then called, would see the prisoners and the sick. He would probably have three-quarters of the patients in the hospital to attend, but perhaps in a regiment there would not be more than 20 sick, and half of them with venereal disease; so that the whole work was over by 11 o'clock, and there was nothing to do afterwards.

11696. In time of war are medical men told off to the different regiments?—Yes, always.

11697. What is the strength then?—There is one medical officer to each unit.

11698. What do you call a unit?—A unit is a regiment, or battery of artillery, or corps train, or a regiment of cavalry.

11699. Are the medical officers now instructed as sanitary officers?—All of them are. That was a part of our system at Netley.

11700. They go through a course of hygiene?—Hygiene and bacteriology.

11701. All of them?—For many years that has been the case.

11702. I do not think you mentioned whether you were in South Africa?—No, I was not in South Africa.

11703. Would you approve of a sanitary officer being attached to a brigade whose duty only would be concerning sanitary matters?—Undoubtedly. It is a great misfortune that the sanitary officer was done away with.

11704. There was no such thing during the war?—No. The regulation was that the principal medical officer should be his own sanitary officer.

11705. Then he had other duties to discharge?—Yes, he had a great many other administrative duties, and he could not devote time to sanitary work.

11706. Therefore you think that there should be a sanitary officer attached to the brigade?—Yes; and I rather went against the spirit of the Regulation, because on my own account I sent out the most experienced bacteriologist I had. I fitted him with a bacteriological and chemical laboratory of a portable kind. He was in constant communication with Professor Wright regarding enteric, and his instructions from me were to go out to South Africa and watch enteric fever. He went out in the same ship with Sir Redvers Buller. Sir Redvers placed him on his own staff, and he accompanied him to the Battle of Colenso, and was shot dead. What became of that laboratory, I never heard, and I do not know what was done with regard to sanitation beyond the instructions I gave him before leaving.

11707. I understand you to say that every medical officer was a sanitary expert?—Yes; and I gave them all written instructions as to the dangers that they were likely to meet, and how best to keep the camps in a good state of sanitation, pointing out at the time that enteric fever would be the difficulty with them.

11708. Ought there not to be a sanitary officer accustomed to bacteriology attached to every corps?—Yes undoubtedly.

11709. To every hospital, in fact?—Every officer now who has joined in late years understands bacteriology.

11710. Then you require certain instruments and appliances?—We have them in some of our large institutions. We have them at Aldershot, and, of course, they have them at Netley and the Herbert Hospital.

11711. Do you not think they should be at each large hospital, for instance, the large base hospital at the Cape and all the large hospitals there?—I do not know exactly what they have there.

11712. Very often they are able, are they not, to detect whether a certain illness is really enteric or

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something else by bacteriology?—Yes, it is said so; they can cultivate it.

11713. With regard to enteric, do you think there was more, or less, in our Army at the Cape than there is in foreign armies during campaigns; take the Franco-German campaign?—Taking many campaigns, there was about an average. It was not so bad as it was in the Afghan War, but with our own expeditions and various wars it is just about even.

11714. Of course, I need hardly ask you, after your evidence, that the orderlies are not trained as the nurses are trained?—No; they have not nearly the same training. A nurse must have had three years' training in a large hospital. An orderly is supposed to be efficient in a year.

11715. Then the nurse, after that three years' training, obtains, does she not, a certificate from the hospital that she is a competent nurse?—Yes.

11716. That is a regular thing?—Yes.

11717. They will not give her a certificate unless in their opinion she is competent?—That is the rule.

11718. But the orderly has no such training?—No, it is not nearly so long, of course, as with the nurse, and they have not the same opportunities that the nurse has in acquiring special knowledge.

11719. Take the ordinary orderly, is he capable of keeping a chart?—Yes, every one of them can keep a temperature chart.

11720. And assist the doctor by describing those symptoms that may occur during the intervals?—He has to do that; he is practised in that every day, because he has to report the next morning to the doctor all the symptoms, and every condition, and only a man of some intelligence can do that, and if he fails in one instance to point out a particular symptom, it would be brought to his notice by the doctor: "What about so-and-so, did that occur?" and then he would remember it for the future. So far as that goes they are thoroughly acquainted.

11721. Then, where is it that they fail—in comparison with the nurse, I mean?—In gentleness, perhaps, to the patient, and kind sympathy.

11722. That is a very important thing for a patient, is it not?—No doubt, and, of course, always a well-educated person, a person in a superior social position, naturally taking everything into consideration, must be a superior person.

11723. If the orderlies were better trained, if they were trained as completely as the nurses are trained, do you think the mortality amongst the soldiers would be less?—No doubt, theoretically, it would be, but it is very difficult working out "mortalities," because it so happened that the hospital in South Africa, at Bloemfontein, which was so unfavourably commented upon by Mr. Burdett-Coutts, where the persons were supposed to be lying on the ground uncared for, had a less mortality than any other hospital in South Africa from enteric.

11724. To what do you ascribe that?—I cannot tell you; I can only say it is the result. It is a very curious fact.

11725. Do you think it was the good air of the country?—No, but it was more favourable than the other hospitals—there was less mortality in that hospital than in any of the others.

11726. Were the medical men there more efficient, do you think?—The man in charge was not favourably reported on, he came to grief. I knew some of the men who were with him who were very good men indeed.

11727. Had they those requirements which are necessary to enteric patients—milk, for instance?—Milk was always a little difficult to get in South Africa at that time, when there was a very great demand for it; in fact, it was quite impossible to get fresh milk at all times, because, not only had we a difficulty in that respect, but people there competing against us, officers, and so on, wanted milk for themselves, so that the supply being limited, it was soon purchased. If they could get a higher price for the milk, they were not going to give it to the hospitals.

11728. What would you say, generally, were the lessons to be learnt from the war, so far as the Medical Department is concerned?—The great lesson to be learnt from the war, in my opinion is, greater attention to details as regards sanitation, with a view to preventing enteric fever, not only to assist medical officers, but in a greater degree to assist military officers and the men themselves. The men themselves require education as regards sanitation. They look upon it in a great measure, as they look upon all our recommendations—as fads. They take no care about the water—the character of the water. I may mention that we did what was never done in any other war before. After great trials with various kinds of sterilising filters, we adopted one, which we had subjected to a great trial with good results. That was the Berkfeld filter. That has the power of sterilising water, and we issued to every one hundred men in South Africa, one sterilising filter, which is capable of filtering a considerable amount of water in an hour. The ordinary Pasteur-Chamberlain filter was very unsatisfactory. We had tried it in West Africa, and it would not stand transport. Although we sent it to West Africa, even on board ship when the thing had never been knocked about at all, it was found not working, and it was immediately reported: "Filters you sent out are useless." I communicated with the contractor who sent it out, and he said: "This must be a mistake, I will send out one of my own men," and he sent out a man to West Africa, but he could make nothing of it at all, in fact, a great deal of it was India-rubber, and would not stand the heat; it deteriorated in a very short time, and never worked. And when we heard of this Berkfeld filter, we thought we had done a good thing by supplying it in such large numbers. Of course, the principle is the bougie—like a candle, you have to get pressure and exhaust the air. The Berkfeld filter was by suction, and the water was supposed to be taken from the outside of the candle to the inside, where it was supposed to be sterilised. But it required a very good deal of attention, because everything adhered to the outside; the particles of dust and dirt adhered to the outside of the candle, and unless it was frequently cleaned it got harder and harder to work. And it has been reported to me, that in a great many instances the men would not use them.

11729. They would not have patience, I suppose?—They would not have patience.

11730. So that you think the great lesson to learn from the war so far as the Medical Department is concerned, really is sanitation?—Sanitation is the great lesson. If sanitation had been understood, not alone by our own officers, but by the rank and file, and the military officers, commanding officers, I think it would have saved thousands of lives. Under ordinary circumstances one would have boiled water, but in the veldt you cannot get material to boil water. And another thing, too, even if you had the material, my experience is, that the men will not drink boiled water. I have been boiling water for 20 years for troops, both in India and Egypt, and I never stopped enteric fever by it.

11731. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) With regard to the instruments, they are all the property of the Crown—publicly supplied?—Yes, everything.

11732. Does a medical man take any instruments of his own, as a rule?—Each medical officer has to take a pocket case of instruments, a regulation pocket case, but that is all.

11733. Nothing more?—That is all, and, of course, some medical officers have private instruments.

11734. With regard to the stores sent out, you, of course, had nothing to do at headquarters with packing?—No, we had a department for that at the Herbert hospital.

11735. They pack them at the Herbert hospital?—Yes.

11736. We had it in evidence, yesterday, that some of the packages were not conspicuously labelled as to what was in the inside, and that there was a difficulty sometimes, when one thing was wanted, in having to open a case and find another, or the thing wanted was at the bottom. Can you imagine that to be the case?—I have never heard it reported. It is very strange it should not have been reported. I have never had a single complaint against the supplies from this country—not a single complaint.

11737. You do not happen to know the system of marking, do you?—No.

11738. (*Sir George Taubman-Goldie.*) I have only one point to ask you about. Of course, we know South

Africa is the country of enteric, par excellence, but, I think, we may take it that in all great wars enteric has been the main disease?—That is so.

11739. Then, it is specially towards enteric that the attention of medical officers in peace time should be directed?—That is the case.

11740. And, as I gather also, that in past wars, certainly, this last war, the number of deaths through disease largely exceeded the death from an action; has there been any special instruction given to medical officers as to how to deal with enteric in time of peace in your experience?—Yes, it is a part of the course at Netley.

11741. It is a part of the course, but does every officer go through it?—Yes, every officer; so far as enteric fever is concerned, there is no class of men in the world who have the same experience that our officers have with regard to the treatment of it.

11742. So you think we have nothing to complain of in that respect?—We have got far more experience than we want, I assure you.

11743. In time of peace?—In time of peace abroad our every day occupation is looking after enteric fever.

11744. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You were Director-General for a number of years, and, consequently, at the head of the Medical Board?—Yes.

11745. What was the composition of the Medical Board?—It was composed of three officers, the President was my Assistant; when I was Assistant, myself, I was President. Then there was a representative from India, and one of the officers in the headquarters' office, formed the third member.

11746. With regard to the officers, what were the qualifications required of medical officers on joining the Army. They were taken generally, were they not, after getting their diploma or degree from one or other of the principal schools in the three kingdoms?—That is the case. Then each medical officer had to submit to, first of all, a physical examination. He came to the office, there he was stripped, all his organs were examined, chiefly the heart, and very often whether or not he had varicose veins, but he was just subjected to the same examination that is given to every candidate for His Majesty's Commission.

11747. But as to his qualifications as a medical man?—Then, after he passed the physical examination, he was brought up before a special Board of Examiners appointed by the Secretary of State, and then it was a competitive examination. These examiners were the best men we could find anywhere, as a rule representatives from the different schools; that is to say, Scotland had a representative, Ireland had a representative, and then London would have perhaps two or three, and he would be examined on the various subjects of anatomy, physiology, the practice of medicine and surgery, and the diseases of women and children, not bacteriology as a rule, but in other questions pretty much about the same as what he was examined in for his diploma.

11748. I think you mentioned that after being appointed he went to Netley for hygiene and bacteriology?—Yes.

11749. That is not a necessary course now. It is a requirement and a necessary qualification in all the good schools now that they shall have studied both, is it not?—Yes, it is, especially, I believe, in the schools. In many of the medical schools they have laboratories, and degrees in Public Health are granted after examination. The candidates take a diploma of Public Health, but not in all the schools. I think in most they have it, but I do not think it is required for examination for the ordinary qualification of a member of the College of Surgeons.

11750. Would you consider that the officers entering the Army Medical Service were equal to those in civil life?—Not only that; I think they were very much superior. I do not think, perhaps, they were the very cream of the profession, but I think the average is high.

11751. They were all young men?—Yes.

11752. A few years ago there was a difficulty in getting the class of men you wished to have; that was before you took up the position?—Yes; and in my time, too, there was difficulty.

11753. And that was owing to their status, in a great measure, in the Army, and insufficiency of pay, was it not?—Exactly: they found, or they thought, they could do better in civil life. And there were certain conditions that the medical profession itself did not approve of, with regard to social standing and Army rank.

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11754. So that at times it was almost impossible to get the men that were wanted?—Nobody came up. There were no examinations held at all for some time, because there were no candidates.

11755. In short, the Service may be said to have been boycotted?—Public opinion, of course, exercises a great influence on young doctors, as upon anybody else, and the feeling throughout the schools was antagonistic to the Medical Department.

11756. Is it better now?—I believe, as far as I have heard, that there are a number of candidates coming up for the next examination; but then the Navy and India are suffering, because the pay has been very much increased, and now, apparently, it is becoming the popular Service, and everybody is running to the Army Medical, and neglecting the Navy, which until lately had always plenty of candidates; but I hear that they have not got one-half the number that they used to have; and India, which was always a very popular Service, has just barely sufficient. They say there is no competition.

11757. We have had evidence that in the Continental Armies, in Germany and in Austria, I think, and in Russia, the position of the medical officer is better. He is recognised as being equal, socially, and in every respect, to any of the military officers?—I think it is a great pity it should not exist here.

11758. Have you any recommendation to make, from your great experience, with regard to the position of the medical officer and the pay?—I think the pay is very good for the new warrant; I think it is remarkably good. Of course, there were other things that prevented men joining. The demand for the services of young men has been very great of late years, because the unqualified doctor or unqualified assistant was prevented from practising at all. It became illegal to employ any unqualified man, so that, with one sweep, there were hundreds of men sent adrift—men who had contracted for medical practice for large factories and mines—and they had to find assistants somewhere. They were not to be found, so that men were appealed to before they were qualified in the different schools: "Will you come and accept the appointment for so and so?" and the terms were raised about threefold. I can remember when it was a difficult thing to become a house surgeon in any of the country hospitals; for one vacancy there would be perhaps 50 or 100 applications. Of late years it has been difficult to find men.

11759. Do you put any stress upon the relative rank given to medical officers?—It is not relative rank now. What we did want for them was substantive rank, and that we have got. We have rank the same as any other officers.

11760. You have got it by the institution of the Corps?—Yes.

11761. (*Chairman.*) Do you attach any importance to that?—Very great.

11762. You think that really is of some use?—Of very great use. I think it has created what we very much wanted amongst us—*esprit de corps.* The men are getting to take a pride in the Service, and men with a pride in the Service will always do well.

11763. Do you not think that the same *esprit de corps* might exist if the man was frankly a medical man, and not half a medical man and half a military man?—In the Army there is no such thing; you must have substantive rank.

11764. You mean it would not be workable?—It would not be workable.

11765. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Have they that in all Continental Armies?—I think not in all.

11766. It was mentioned, I think, yesterday, that in the Russian Army the Russian officers, who, I understand, have not titles, are considered superior to the other officers?—I do not know about that. I do not know what the social standing of the other officers is.

11767. (*Chairman.*) But why should they differ from the chaplain? Has the chaplain military rank?—Yes, he has.

11768. What sort of military rank has he?—He is supposed to have a relative rank.

11769. He has not substantive military rank?—No, he has not got substantive military rank, but he is

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supposed to have relative rank. But then we have been told, on high authority, that relative rank has no meaning.

11770. Therefore chaplains have no substantive rank?—They have no substantive rank, and they have no relative rank, really.

11771. But their position is quite secured?—They are different altogether from us; they are not working with soldiers and living amongst soldiers, as we are, and having command of soldiers. We have to command our own corps, and patients in hospital; we have to sit on courts martial, and do everything that every other military officer has to do.

11772. And you think all that is good for the Army Medical Corps?—Undoubtedly.

11773. And you refuse to admit that they would be in a better position if they were treated frankly as members of the medical profession, only attached to the Army?—I think if they were simply medical men Tommy Atkins would show them very little deference.

11774. You think so?—I am quite sure of it.

11775. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) Before they got the military rank did the privates show a want of deference?—We had relative rank, and we were always content with relative rank until we were told it had no meaning.

11776. Who told you that?—The Secretary of State for War.

11777. But it had a meaning, because it gave you higher pay, higher quarters, and higher allowances?—Yes, but it was explicitly stated that it had no meaning, that there was no such thing as relative rank.

11778. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) But before they were given relative rank they were in a very awkward position towards the soldier, were they not?—What was called relative rank we always had.

11779. But not to the same extent, or in the same respect, as within the last, let us say, 15 or 20 years. Before that it was not so?—No, it was not. There was a warrant in 1858, which was called our Magna Charta, that Mr. Sydney Herbert, the War Minister, introduced, which gave relative rank, and it was supposed to be equal to any other rank; but it was gradually whittled away, and we were not in the same position as any other officers; that is to say, we were always junior to them. We never could take our place in a mixed Board, for example, according to our rank, but must always be junior.

11780. Is the training of the orderlies equal to that of female nurses?—A good deal of their nursing training is by female nurses, so I presume that anyone who has the power of imparting knowledge will impart everything she knows; she is constantly directing them, and showing them how to do things.

11781. But do the orderlies go through a course as do the nurses? The woman nurse has to do some three years, I think?—No, the training of the men is nothing like so long as that.

11782. So that you could hardly say that as nurses the orderlies are equal to a female nurse?—As a general rule, I should say they are inferior to a female nurse.

11783. It has been suggested that the medical military officers should have an opportunity of courses in civil hospitals and of getting off the rust that there must to some extent be, owing to their not having practice in such diseases as are to be found more generally in civil life than in military hospitals; would you approve of that being done?—I think it is most desirable.

11784. You think it would be well that they should have such experience?—Undoubtedly that they should have such experience.

11785. And that they should be able to attend post-graduate courses?—I think every time they come from a tour of service abroad they ought, as a matter of course, to be sent to a civil hospital and given leave, taking, of course, due precautions that they avail themselves of their opportunities, but given the opportunity of acquiring modern knowledge, because, if a man is away for five years, when he comes home a great many changes must necessarily have taken place in that period.

11786. And you yourself suggested that they might be received in the hospitals as supernumeraries, so as not to interfere with the ordinary staff?—Yes, that was the suggestion, to consult some of the civil hospitals on the subject; but they would not entertain the idea.

11787. And that they should continue to have their pay equally as if they were on active service?—Quite so. I may mention that in some instances they have done it—for example, the Royal Infirmary at Glasgow did take one of our officers in as a resident surgeon in the hospital for a six months' period.

11788. You think it would be desirable that they should be there six months?—That is the period that the hospitals usually appoint house surgeons for.

11789. But special arrangements, of course, could be made, no doubt, for that?—Yes.

11790. And how often—in what term of years—do you think they should be allowed leave in that way?—Usually a man goes abroad, say, after one year's service. If he goes to India he stays in India for five years. Then when he comes home after six years service, he has probably not done very much study, and he ought then to go to a civil institution. And again, after his next tour of foreign service he will probably be at home, say, two years, and then go abroad again for five years.

11791. Giving leave in that way would necessitate, of course, a larger staff?—Or the employment of civil surgeons in their places. While they were there the work would have to be done and paid for in some way.

11792. I think you mentioned that an economy has been effected latterly in that there is one surgeon only for two regiments?—Yes.

11793. Does not that interfere to some extent with the promotion of the younger men, the assistant surgeons, as there are not so many surgeons as formerly?—No, because ours is a time promotion in all the lower ranks. You serve so many years and you are promoted. It is only in the higher ranks that it is by vacancies. For example, a man joins as a lieutenant, and after three years he becomes a captain; after twelve years he becomes a major; after twenty years he becomes a lieutenant-colonel, and then it is by selection in the higher grades.

11794. And he may still be only an assistant surgeon of the regiment?—There is no such thing as an assistant surgeon of the regiment now. The assistant surgeon is an obsolete term. All the men now enter as "Lieutenant, Royal Army Medical Corps."

11795. As regards the reserve of officers that you had, do you think that they were equally capable with those on active service?—You have to consider the fact that a great many of our reserve of officers are men whose health has broken down, or perhaps they may have been in trouble, so that I should say that comparing man with man the reserve officer is not anything like so good as the full-pay officer.

11796. And they were not equally acquainted with the new methods?—Not only that, but we did not get a great many of them. They are out of touch not only with the Army, but in a great many cases with their profession. There were some remarkably good, of course. I took great care to get back, and tried to bring back, the men who would do good work. The hospital that was perhaps the most difficult to manage was the Cambridge Hospital at Aldershot. I knew a man who had worked it most successfully for many years before. He was in Ireland, and I got him to come back again. He remained there during the war, and did most excellent work.

11797. Up to what age did you take on reserve officers during the war?—Up to 60 years of age.

11798. They were found still to be sufficiently active for the work?—Yes, that was the regulation. We have, of course, a number of retired officers employed in some of our stations at the small cost of £150 a year, and, of course, they remain there. Of the others who had no other appointments a few came back, but not very many. In fact, a great many of them are in a state of health that would not permit of it.

11799. I think you mentioned that your reserve of medicines here was altogether exhausted on sending out the First Army Corps?—Yes, we sent an enormous quantity of medicines and stores out; in fact, we were very liberal. We thought it would be a good thing to go on sending out large quantities of everything likely to be used until they told us they had enough.

11800. Much of that was of an old character of medicine—in liquid, was it not?—Not much of it. We had been changing it, because all our experience for many years of these liquid medicines was that we could not carry them about, and we have used the modern medi-

cines in a great measure. There was very little sending out of the old stuff.

11801. You had tabloids?—Yes, tabloids chiefly.

11802. Capsules, and all those things?—Yes, and everything of that kind.

11803. And very little of the old kind?—Very little, hardly anything. Of course, there are some things you must send out. You will not please the ordinary private soldier with the tabloid; he wants a dose of physic. You will not content him, I mean, with the tabloid. You have to study rather the character of your patient, give him a good dose of black draught, and he will thank you a good deal; but give him a tabloid and he will think, "A small thing of this kind is no use."

11804. We have had evidence here that the medicines—a certain proportion of them—sent out were very old-fashioned?—I do not think it could have been so. As compared with the small quantity that existed and the amount of medicine that we sent out, it could only have been a fraction.

11805. And with regard to instruments—all appliances required in surgery and such things—the same has been said, that they were by no means up to the standard of to-day?—I can only say that Mr. Makins expressed quite a different opinion, and I take Mr. Makins to be as high an authority as any person who gave evidence.

11806. It was said that they were by no means equal to those that were brought out by civil surgeons who had served in South Africa?—No doubt in some of these civil hospitals they were very elaborate, and so very much so that their equipment was so large that they were practically useless, and they would be useless in most wars—that is to say, they were not mobile, and they weighed an enormous amount. As to the weight of the civil hospital equipment, I have a table here showing the difference in the weights of our hospitals and theirs, owing to their equipment being so elaborate.

11807. Were medicines sent out in chests such as we speak of—a medicine chest?—No. In the first instance, every ship would have a medicine chest for use there, but we sent them out in bulk.

11808. In bales?—Yes, in bales, and such like; barrels and bales.

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11809. We have been told that on the Continent, in Russia and other countries there, the medicines are stored in bales, containing a variety of all the different medicines and drugs usually required with an army; that one bale will be large, and another of moderate size, and another small, but that in these you will find the whole of what is considered necessary for use with an army, with a battalion, or it may be a company of soldiers, and that on that bale it is marked what is within. Is there anything of that kind here?—Yes, we have medical panniers, you know—portable things containing so many drugs and so many splints and instruments and appliances of different kinds. These are portable, just put on mules according to the country. You see, you have such a variety of climates to consider. We have got all those things to consider.

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11810. But they are not as a rule put up in bales or packages?—Not in bales, but they are all ready to be carted away. They are far better than in bales, because they are in wickerwork, and they are light.

11811. It was also said that in transport (you were not out there, of course, and you could not judge well of that) they were not put in wagons so as to be handy to be got at at once—they were bundled up with a thousand other things, so that it was most inconvenient?—I think that will always be the case in war. In my experience it must be so, because the packing of things we are not responsible for. They are sent down for demand transport, and they are put in anyhow.

11812. And as to disinfectants in the different hospitals, it was said that in one hospital all that was there of disinfectants was contained in an enamelled basin as you entered the passage?—"Disinfectants" are not under medical charge at all, you know; it is under the barrack charge, they have to provide disinfectants. We only use the carbolic acid and those things for professional work, but for all sanitary purposes as disinfectants it is a barrack supply, and if there is any deficiency it ought to be considered due to them.

Mr. Alfred Downing Fripp, C.B., C.V.O., M.S., M.B., F.R.C.S., called and examined.

Mr. A. D. Fripp C.B., C.V.O., M.S., M.B., F.R.C.S.

11813. (*Chairman.*) You were one of those who, with Sir Frederick Treves and others, volunteered for South Africa?—Yes.

11814. At what date did you go out?—I went out on the 10th of February, 1900.

11815. Where did you go to in the first instance?—To Cape Colony. I did most of my work near De Aar, at a place called Deelfontein. We took a large hospital out there.

11816. Was that the base hospital?—Yes, the Imperial Yeomanry Base Hospital, with 520 beds, and eventually enlarged to 1,000 beds.

11817. Was your principal work done in that Yeomanry Hospital?—Yes, for the greater part of my time; but I also travelled about a good deal, and I visited nearly all the hospitals in Cape Colony, including Kimberley and Mafeking, and in the Orange River Colony up as far as Kroonstad, and most of them in Natal, as far as Ladysmith.

11818. So that you had a pretty wide experience of the management of all those hospitals?—Yes.

11819. And what was the general impression that was left upon your mind by the base hospital?—That is a very large order.

11820. How would you compare, for instance, the Yeomanry Hospital with one of the regular hospitals?—Of course we had the great advantage of being always able to get anything that money could buy on making a reasonable representation to the Committee at home, and that is one of the great difficulties that the Royal Army Medical Corps officers labour under, and, I suppose, must labour under always—there is no way of doing away with the difficulty of having to get requisitions signed by a superior officer, and so on, before he can get an expensive demand carried out. We were in the happy position that we merely had to send a telegram home, saying: "Please authorise expenditure of such or such a sum," and there would come a telegram the same day, or the next day, saying: "Do as you think necessary"; whereas the Royal Army Medical Corps officers would never have any such chance, so that it is difficult and unfair to compare their hospitals with our voluntary ones; but I think that the base hospitals were as good as, under the circumstances, they could have been expected to be.

11821. That is what I wanted to put to you. Subject to that condition you think that the regular hospitals were well managed?—Yes, or would have been if there had only been a stronger brain-piece at the head of the Medical Department; but when you have a brain-piece that hesitates to check small abuses, which evidently may grow, such as difficulties with ladies, and so on, of which you have heard, or who does not see how such interferences tend to mix up all sorts of petticoat questions and ruffle the backs of the nurses, who should be left quiet to do their proper work unmolested, then of course, difficulties must arise.

11822. Upon whom did the responsibility really rest for that state of things; that is to say, for not coping with those difficulties?—One of the things that I should like to be allowed to speak openly about here is the fact that all the senior officers, from the principal Medical Officer, who was the most charming, delightful gentleman (Sir William Wilson), but from him downwards, through all the senior officers, they are impressed with a sort of feeling, first of all, that their service is looked at askance, that their branch is secondary; and, next, that they must not approach any General Commanding Officer, and certainly not if he has got a title, without their knees chattering together with alarm and fright; they must not think of advising him that it really would be for the good of the Army if a camp was not pitched on a certain proposed site, because it is covered by stinking horses in various degrees of decomposition. My impression is that Lord Roberts would have been only too delighted if somebody had warned him by saying to him: "I am sure such and such a site is already fouled by the enemy's camps; don't you think, my Lord, it would be better to put your camp a little further out?" But there is a general shirking

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of taking any responsibility of that kind, taking any initiative, and daring to do anything that is not already laid down in the Regulations. And I daresay that that general fear has a good deal of foundation in what has happened to individuals who have dared to exceed regulations in the past.

11823. Then if the Royal Army Medical Corps officers were rather more of doctors and rather less of soldiers you think they might show a little more courage in dealing with the commanding officers of the Army?—That is the direction in which we are working now, and a great many reforms have been already brought about in the Royal Army Medical Corps since the war.

11824. When you say "we," is that Mr. Brodrick's Committee?—Mr. Brodrick summoned a Committee and presided over it himself, and the Committee reported, and the first clause of their Report was to the effect that a permanent Board, constituted partly of junior Royal Army Medical Corps officers and partly of civilian surgeons and physicians, should be constituted to act as an Advisory Board to the Director-General of the Army Medical Service, who should himself be its chairman. So that he now has the chance of sharing responsibility with several civilian members.

11825. Are you a member of that Board?—I am.

11826. When you say you are working in that direction, what do you mean exactly?—We have already actually accomplished many reforms in the Royal Army Medical Corps; and I will put them somewhat in the order of their importance, as tending in the direction that you speak of, namely, as making the officers more of doctors. We have, to begin with, facilitated the entrance into that corps of a good class of young men from the best medical schools; we have tempted them in Hitherto the Royal Army Medical Corps has penalised them; it has said to a man: "No, you are so good that Guy's is going to give you a house-surgeoncy, and the result of your spending a year over thus improving yourself will be that if you come into the Royal Army Medical Corps you will find yourself a year junior to the man that you beat for that appointment, and when you have both arrived at 59 or 60 years that man will become Director-General over your head"—which is ludicrous. Now we take them both in together, the man who is good enough to get a house-surgeoncy, and the man who is not good enough, and if a man likes to take the post of house-surgeon after he has got into the Royal Army Medical Corps we second him for that purpose. That has resulted at once in our capturing many house-surgeons. I speak now with an experience of teaching at Guy's for 12 years; that is why I quote it as an example, and also because Guy's is, of course, one of the best medical schools (Guy's and Bartholomew's are possibly the two best in the Empire), and not one single man during that 12 years has gone into the Royal Army Medical Corps who was above the average until, under this new regulation, one or two have been tempted in, and several more are seriously thinking of it. I think that shows the good of that reform. In the next place, we have made it possible for a young and good man to get up more quickly through the service, to shorten his period in each rank so that he can pass over the merely average man who stands senior to him. By that means the good doctor will come to the front.

11827. Do you think that officers' rank is essential?—I always hoped that it was not, and I went out to South Africa very strongly hoping that it was not, but I am under the impression now, after visiting a number of military hospitals there, and in England also, that we should not be able to get on without the doctors having definite rank, and the badge of rank. I do not think that the Royal Army Medical Corps wish it so much themselves, as that it is essential for ordering the non-commissioned officers and men about, and getting proper deference for them. I hoped that it was not so, but I think it is. Those are two important reforms which we have accomplished: first, that we have got the good man in; and, secondly, that we have provided for his being able to come to the front more quickly. Among other reforms that we have brought about, there is what I mentioned just now, that the Royal Army Medical Corps is coming into touch with the civilian profession through this Advisory Board, and through examinerships and tutorships in connection with the Medical Staff College, and so on. Another great point which has tended to make a man a doctor first and an officer later is that we only examine him now in strictly medical subjects, so that a good young doctor comes out top, whereas a little time ago a man might beat him by being better at French and German, and other subjects of minor importance. That is all knocked out now. Then, again, greatly improved status has been given to the Director-General. He is now a member of the Secretary of State's War Office Council, I think it is called, which sits every week, and so he has direct access to the Secretary of State, which before he had not; he could only get to the Secretary of State through the Commander-in-Chief. And, similarly, his position on the headquarter staff has been recognised. It is not, of course, for the flattering of the individual that that is important; but it is because every member of the corps, even down to the latest joined orderly, is proud to be able to nudge his girl in the street and say: "There goes our Chief in the King's Procession"—that does make a difference.

11828. And also it enables him, I take it, to lay any point that he wishes before the Secretary of State?—That was the first point, and the most important; he has direct access to the Secretary of State. In that way, I think the young doctor is coming to the fore for his doctoring qualities, rather than for his qualities as an officer. And, similarly, the Advisory Board has been given the right to examine all an officer's qualifications for promotion, and, of course, the Board takes very largely into its consideration his professional rather than his soldierly qualifications. So that I think the medical officer will, in future, become more of the doctor and less of the officer. I am afraid he must remain an officer.

11829. All these things seem quite excellent, in order to enable you to get a better class of men into the Royal Army Medical Corps, and better qualified than they used to be, but does not the difficulty really begin when you have got your young medical man into the Royal Army Medical Corps? Do you think that, from that time onwards, he acquires sufficient experience to put him on anything like equal terms with a good civil surgeon in a civil post?—Under the new regulations he will have increased facilities for gaining experience.

11830. What change has been made in the regulations?—In the first place, he has to come back to London periodically for a post graduate course of instruction and attendance upon the practice of recognised civilian specialists in the schools and hospitals of London. We have instituted an examination for the step from captain to major, and he has to come back and do six months' practice, either in a civilian hospital, or in one of the large teaching military hospitals which are being created, before going up for that examination, and that brings him into touch with modern methods.

11831. Did you find these officers in South Africa to be lacking in a knowledge of modern methods?—They have been away such a long time, you see. I do not think they are more lacking than you would expect, but they undoubtedly are lacking. I think it is most essential to get them home to rub shoulders with the young men in the civilian schools, who really know the modern methods. That is a very important point. You see, our science is so essentially a progressive science that a man of 60, or even 50, or even 40, and it is no exaggeration to say, even a man of 30, who has been away for five years, when he comes back finds a whole lot of new developments, and he is not an up-to-date man until he has acquired them. And until the Royal Army Medical Corps was brought into touch with the civilian profession, as it is now, there was no chance for these Royal Army Medical Corps officers to bring themselves up to date.

11832. Quite so. In civil life a young surgeon of 30, or a young physician of 30, is constantly in touch with younger men, and possibly with a hospital?—That is the only way to keep yourself in touch with modern improvements.

11833. What chances, at the present time, have the Royal Army Medical Corps' officers of keeping themselves in touch with modern improvements?—None, whatever. A few inquiring spirits, of course, will always manage to keep themselves in touch, even in India—they get papers sent to them, and they read So-and-so's experiments, and they try to copy them, and keep themselves in touch, but the Royal Army Medical Corps officer has had no opportunities, except such as he has made for himself.

11834. The average man has had none?—None whatever, and I have no hesitation in saying, that if he

has shown keenness, by making opportunities for himself, he has got himself disliked thereby. You see that in many a confidential report.

11835. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Disliked by whom?—By his seniors—by the Colonel-in-command. As soon as a man becomes Colonel in command of a base hospital, he ceases to be a doctor at all, he becomes a purely administrative officer.

11836. (*Chairman.*) Surely, is not that an objection to the rank? I see exactly the force of what you say, as to the advantages of rank in dealing with non-commissioned officers and men, but is not that a drawback which you have just put your finger upon?—I think it is the greatest possible drawback. You see, Sir Frederick Treves, for instance, supposing he was in the Royal Army Medical Corps, or any other eminent surgeon, unless he happened to be appointed Professor of military surgery at the Medical Staff College, would not be able to take any post, except an administrative post. On the most favourable supposition this administrative post would be that of Principal Medical Officer of a large hospital, and then he would have two lieutenant-colonels under him, one the chief surgeon and the other the chief physician, but the great surgeon himself would be so inundated with administrative work, that he would not be able to find time for the actual practice of surgery.

11837. However eminent he might be as a professional man, he would not be actually practising his profession?—He would not have time, he could not possibly do it.

11838. Have your Board attempted to grapple with that subject?—We have attempted to do so, but I am afraid the attempt has failed, because you must have some alternative. Who is to have command of these general hospitals? Personally, I should be quite content to have simply an Army Service Corps officer.

11839. To do the administrative work?—Yes.

11840. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) But why should the gentleman who has to do the administrative work dislike a keen young officer who endeavours to improve himself outside the Royal Army Medical Corps?—I hope they will not, and I do not think they will much longer, but there is no doubt that, at the present time, there has drifted up into the senior ranks of the Royal Army Medical Corps, a body of men who should not be taken as representative of the better class of our profession. For many years, as I said just now, the Royal Army Medical Corps has only tempted in the weakest of our profession; some others have gone in, but I think the Corps has opened its doors specially to the weakest.

11841. (*Chairman.*) Is not what you are alluding to there, not an uncommon failing of men, after they reach a certain time of life—to object to all, what they consider, new-fangled notions?—Yes, I daresay that is one of the springs of action, but there is also the fact that these comparatively weak men have drifted up to being in command, and really they now are suffering from "swelled head," and have gone about much more bent on exacting salutes from everybody under them, and similar trifling matters of that kind, rather than with any keenness whatever as to scientific attainments.

11842. (*Sir John Edge.*) Possibly, they had never been keen as young men themselves in the Service?—Possibly not. One very eminent gentleman said: "Oh, the Royal Army Medical Corps, yes, I will undertake to make an excellent Corps of it if you will let me tear out the first two pages from the Army List." That was unnecessarily drastic—there are several excellent men I know in the first two pages of the Army List, but it remains true, that from the lower ranks very many weak men, who should never have been admitted at all, and certainly would not be under the new regulations, have drifted up to the higher administrative ranks in the Corps.

11843. (*Chairman.*) To go back to that point of rank, which seems to me to be worth consideration, if Sir Frederick Treves happened to be in the Royal Army Medical Corps, you think he would not be able to establish his position satisfactorily, unless he was called a General?—He would never have had the opportunities of becoming what Sir Frederick Treves is now—that is the difficulty; he would have been told off for some possibly uncongenial duty by some superior officer, and he must do implicitly what his superior officer tells him. I can give you an instance. My present house-surgeon at Guy's was out in the war in South Africa, and he was told that he was to attend to some typhoid patients in a tent, so, of course, he did attend to them. Three of these typhoid patients were very bad indeed, and he was told to sleep in the tent. He said to his superior officer: "I suppose, I need not sleep actually in the tent, need I, I may sleep with my head outside the tent, or I may sleep just outside with a string attached to my toe, so that if either of the patients wants me, he can pull it, and it will wake me up?" and it eventually ended in his being told that if he did not sleep actually in the tent he would be liable to be shot, which is ludicrous. The sequel is that the poor boy went down with enteric at exactly the right incubation time afterwards. There is too much of that kind of thing about it. There was an instance of a boy wanting to make a very good endeavour indeed, and being rather crushed in the bud, and getting out of the thing as soon as possible. Of course, a man of attainments and character would, most certainly, resign as soon as he got the chance after such treatment.

11844. All that seems to point rather to making the Royal Army Medical Corps more civilian than military—that an Army doctor should be more of a doctor and rather less of a soldier?—But I am afraid you must keep him a soldier.

11845. You see no hope of effecting that change?—I do not think I do.

11846. What did you think of the capacity of the orderlies and men who acted as nurses to a great extent?—I should not like to give an opinion with regard to them, because I did not reside long enough in any base hospital except my own, and my own base hospital was staffed entirely by volunteer men, whom we had to train on the spot, of course, very largely by the aid of nurses.

11847. Were the volunteer men that you had to train soldiers?—No; they were men from the St. John Ambulance Brigade, and other volunteer medical associations.

11848. When those men came out, were they trained at all;—They had only learned on a dummy.

11849. So that you had to train them after they came out?—Yes.

11850. But you had a good staff of nurses in your own hospital?—I took 50.

11851. Of the very best?—Absolutely the very best; every one of them had had three years' training, and every one was picked out, as a matter of fact, by myself.

11852. So that you had little trouble, I suppose, in training your men, even though the time was short?—Quite so; they did not have any actual nursing to do. Then there is another point I should like to mention. I think that the running of the base hospital would be improved enormously if we could divide every large hospital into Serious and Slight Departments. People who have not studied a large military hospital do not appreciate this. A civilian hospital consists of its beds, its out-patient department, and its convelescent home, to which are sent patients as soon as they are convalescent. A military hospital has to keep all those three classes in until they are fit to go back actually to the front, and live on biscuit and bully-beef; so that two-thirds or three fourths, and even in some cases nine-tenths, at least, of the cases in a military hospital are not such as would get admittance to a civilian hospital, they are not sufficiently serious cases. A soldier goes sick from a variety of trivial as well as serious causes, for instance the loss of an excessive number of teeth, or from a bad cut on his finger—anything that makes him short of a perfect fighting unit—and there is only one place where he can go to when sick, and that is the military hospital. The moment he is in the military hospital he is treated just as if he was seriously ill; that is to say, he monopolises the time and attention of people whose energies should be spent upon those who are seriously ill, and he occupies an expensively equipped bed. Every hospital should be divided into a hospital proper and a convalescent camp; that is what we did at Deelfontein.

11853. That is what you did with your own Yeomanry hospital?—Yes.

11854. Are you now making any suggestions at your board for dealing with that matter?—Yes. And also that plan was copied extensively in South Africa.

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Enormous convalescent camps were established, because it was found that these men were quite capable of cooking their own food and making their own beds, and there was no need for them to be attended to by the nursing sisters; on the contrary, they were so well that they were difficult to handle.

11855. Who devised that system?—It was my own idea. It was not copied from any other scheme. I simply sat down and thought out the hospital according to my own ideas of what a military base hospital should be like.

11856. Was that as soon as you got out to South Africa?—No; it was all evolved over here before we started. It was most amusing. I was told that it would be a complete wreck. I was solemnly advised by one gentleman on the Headquarters Staff of the Director-General. His last piece of advice to me was: "You are making an awful mistake about these nurses; they will all be tripping over each other's skirts; there will be nothing for them to do. Take my advice, and lose them."

11857. Was this a gentleman who had had some experience in a previous war?—Yes; but not in a war with whites. It was a very good thing for the Royal Army Medical Corps that the Boer war came, because they were basing all their ideas on wars with blacks, in which, of course, nurses cannot go anywhere near the fighting. In such black warfare they hamper the military movements because you cannot leave them behind as they could have been left behind at Dundee, for instance, or if Ladysmith had by any chance fallen; but in this South African war we knew that no harm would come to our women nurses if captured by the enemy, and that should have made all the difference in our hospital arrangements.

11858. You mean that the Royal Army Medical Corps here and the Director-General never realised that as fully as you did?—Not for a single moment, I am quite sure. There was a complete want of realisation out there, and at home, as to how much use nursing sisters could be; also as to how big the need for accommodation, and open-minded administration had become.

11859. You say that personally you have not had much experience of our military hospital orderlies?—No; I should not like to give an opinion upon them.

11860. What do you say of the equipment of the Army surgeons out there, their instruments and other appliances that they had; what were they like as compared with yours?—Generally speaking, I should say that they were quite adequate.

11861. We have heard that to a very great extent they were old-fashioned?—They were at first, because we had an old-fashioned Headquarter Staff of the Royal Army Medical Corps.

11862. You mean that they improved as they went on?—Yes; they could get pretty well anything they requisitioned for. Sometimes, of course, there were very long delays, but on the whole, taking it all round, I think the instruments were quite adequate, and the equipment.

11863. We have had evidence which went rather to show that the equipment was old-fashioned; that the instruments first of all had wooden handles, and that it was difficult to sterilise them?—If I may make a criticism on that, a wooden handle does not matter the slightest bit; you can sterilise it perfectly well. The only thing is that it will not bear sterilisation so repeatedly; but many instruments are very seldom used. The amount of surgery actually done, even at a big base hospital is not enormous. Surgery is a very secondary matter in the part that our medical profession ought to play in war nowadays. There is an enormous amount of lopping off and carpentry done in field hospitals just after, and during a battle, but such rough surgery does not require any elaborate instruments. And it is the same with antiseptics; if you have antiseptics you have no water, and if you have water it is commonly so insufficient and so bad that it has been said the only thing to do with it is "Boil it, then filter it, and then throw it away." So that you cannot dignify that work by the name of surgery as understood nowadays. The surgery proper is done at the base hospitals, but very little is done even there. Most of the cases could be sent home to England; at any rate, most cases of difficult surgery really needing an expert operator. We touch there on the all-important point, which I want to be allowed to bring out in my evidence with regard to the position of the Royal Army Medical Corps and of medicine in any future war. It is that our profession can be of enormous help to the combatant ranks if only they will realise how much we can do now to prevent disease; that is the great point, and therein lies the hope of our being able to help our country to win its next war.

11864. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) Sanitation?—Sanitation and hygiene, of which they do not understand the merest elements. Tommy does not understand it because he is not taught it, and he is not taught it because the officer looks askance at it and regards it as just a fad. With regard to that, our Advisory Board, through the Director-General, has recommended the Secretary of State that the combatant officers shall be educated in the elements of hygiene, and I think that is a most essential point. If only the combatant officer can be interested in just the elements of hygiene and sanitation, then he will see that his men obey the elementary laws of personal health as to boiling the water, and so on, when it can be done. It is, I fear, useless talking of boiling all the drinking water with mobile columns or out on picket duty; it never could be done. It can be done in any considerable garrison or standing camp or large hospital, and there it should be done; but it was not, at least not during the first year of the war when I was in South Africa. That is a point where the medical profession can be of great use, and may strengthen the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, if only he will let us help to prevent disease. And then, what we cannot get him to see—I am not speaking personally of the Commander-in-Chief in the late war, but what we cannot get the authorities to see is the *strategic importance* of it, which comes out very prominently if the figures are examined. If you look at the number of patients sick in Bloemfontein, and then calculate how much it cost the nation to put each one of those men at the front, I believe it works out at about £100 a man, and they went sick by scores and hundreds, as you know, from a disease which was to a large extent preventible. Then again just consider how much sooner Lord Roberts' hands would have been free to move from Bloemfontein, and dash after the Boers up towards Johannesburg if it had not been for that heavy epidemic; and if he had been able to make that move forward earlier it would have saved the nation a considerable number of men, and a correspondingly large amount of money.

11865. (*Chairman.*) What was there to prevent the Director-General of the Army Medical Corps from dealing with that problem years ago? It is not a fresh idea to you?—The quaking of the knees, I think. There is not the faintest doubt that that was a disease from which the responsible medical officers all suffered; they were all afraid to go to their commanding officer and ask for an interview and make suggestions. I mean that they were afraid to go to the head people, they would only dare to go up through the channels which the Regulations gave them the right to apply through.

11866. You received every encouragement, did you not, from the Army authorities when you volunteered to go out in the first instance?—Yes, every encouragement.

11867. And most of the eminent surgeons, from Sir William MacCormac downwards, all received encouragement?—Yes.

11868. But how about physicians? Do you know whether many physicians volunteered to go out?—I do not know whether they actually volunteered, but they would have been delighted to go if they had been asked.

11869. Were they encouraged to go?—Certainly not in the early days. I cannot speak of what happened after the time I left England. All I can say is that I was looked upon as a crank for taking a physician out with me. One comment that I remember was: "Take as many surgeons as you like, but, my dear fellow, the one thing that our officers do understand is the treatment of enteric." Well, they do not; at least, they did not. They do now that they have had an enormous experience, but they did not understand how even to write its name down in the slightest cases, because they called it "simple continued fever," unless it had very marked symptoms; and they allowed that man with simple continued fever to go about and infect other people, and the other people so infected may have the acutest enteric.

11870. And that was during the earliest stages of

the war?—Yes. They threw cold water on physicians, but they allowed me to take one. Dr. Washbourne came with me, and was of the greatest use. He was afterwards appointed consulting physician to the forces by Lord Kitchener, and I am sorry to say he has since died. Another thing they did not understand among modern methods was the enormous practical advantage of having steam disinfectors at each large hospital. An enteric sheet or blanket or anything used by an enteric patient, especially if he has soiled it with the discharges from either end of the alimentary canal, is most highly infective, and will give the disease to the next patient who uses it unless it is previously disinfected. The modern and most simple method of disinfecting it is by means of the steam steriliser. I took one out, and was roared at for taking it, but very soon they sent them out to as many of the hospitals as they could get them to. Similarly, all the excreta from typhoid patients ought to be destroyed in some way. At first they did not make any systematic efforts to destroy them, and that is the chief reason why the disease spread so rapidly and so widely.

11871. Did they use disinfectants?—Yes. It is always rather an individual opinion, of course, as to what are the best to use.

11872. But they know how to use them?—Yes.

11873. Then I see in your *précis* of your evidence one of the points upon which you might possibly touch is the organisation in time of peace of civil surgeons as a Royal Army Medical Corps Reserve. What have you to say about that?—I had it in my mind to say, very briefly, two things: First, that the civil profession is the natural reserve for the Royal Army Medical Corps, and I am not anxious to see any systematised effort made to draw up a large number of lists of names of doctors, and nurses, and students who would be willing to go out to the next war. What we want is the young house surgeon, who has just left the work of the big schools, and we can get him by the shoal, and at very short notice. That at least has been proved by the late war.

11874. Therefore you do not wish to have any registry?—I do not at all. I think the worst kind of doctor for the purpose is the doctor who has been out of practice for a few years and then comes back. Then the second point about organisation in time of peace is that I do not hold the view, for very similar reasons, that an effort should be made to get each big civilian hospital to keep up in time of peace a small organisation that shall be ready to be sent to the seat of war. It is thought by some, and by people whose opinion should be received with great respect, that a place like Guy's, for instance, should undertake to say: "All right; we will provide a field hospital, and keep it always ready, and have it out on training one week in the year." But I do not think it would work. I have been carefully into it, and I am against it. I think it is better that a reserve of material should be kept, and that *personnel* should be picked up rapidly from among the most energetic men in the civilian schools at the time. That is what happened in this late war. There was never any lack of civilian surgeons. There was a great deal of clumsiness in the choice of them. They could have had a much better class of civil surgeons if they had troubled to ask the authorities of the hospitals to select them. £365 a year was, of course, enough to tempt in many loafers who are not good enough for general practice, and so again they were appealing to the lower grades of our profession. If they had written to the Dean of the Medical School and said: "Will you kindly nominate 10 good men to go out?" we could have given them 10 of the very best, but they preferred to choose them themselves, and, of course, could not know them as well as their teachers did.

11875. Then, have you something to say with regard to the adequate supply of nursing sisters and their functions and limitations?—Only that they must be limited to the base and stationary hospitals.

11876. You do not believe in their going to the front?—Not, with the mobile field hospitals.

11877. That is also a suggestion that has been made to us?—I do not believe in their going with field hospitals. I think they should be limited to the base and stationary hospitals and the line of communications. I think they would be a handicap upon the movements of the general, and would be of very little use at the place of battle.

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11878. Are you satisfied now that your Board have got a grip of this question?—Yes; I am satisfied that we are getting on very well.

11879. You look now to this Advisory Board really to cope with all the defects of the Royal Army Medical Corps?—I believe that if it is only loyally supported, as it is by the present Secretary of State for War and the Permanent Under-Secretary, if that loyal support continues, the difficult task of popularising among the good men of one profession and rendering really efficient the Royal Army Medical Corps is practically accomplished.

11880. (*Sir Henry Norman.*) I observe that you think that nurses should not be sent to the front in war?—I do.

11881. But would you not make an exception, if it was possible to do so, in the case of defensible positions? For instance, we know that lady nurses were of very great use indeed at Ladysmith; and if I might go back to the siege of Lucknow, ladies were utilised there as nurses?—Yes; I would certainly have them in white warfare in any town or defensible position. I only meant that I would not have them in the field of operations, *i.e.*, with mobile troops. They should come up behind with the fully equipped hospitals.

11882. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) We have been told that in the Russian military hospitals the civilian sick are admitted, in order that the Russian medical officers may have a greater field of experience. Would you approve of that course being adopted in our large military hospitals here?—At the present time they will not come; the difficulty is to get even the wives and children of non-commissioned officers and men to come in. The military hospitals are too much like barracks or workhouses. We civilian members of the Advisory Board for Army Medical Services have been visiting them lately, and it will take time to live down the feeling that there is among the non-commissioned ranks, as well as the commissioned ranks, against the Royal Army Medical Corps. It will take a long time before they will realise that the Royal Army Medical Corps is efficient, and it will take some years, I think, before it really is so.

11883. I do not know whether you have seen the report on this subject of the Royal Commission on the Care and Treatment of the Sick and Wounded during the South African Campaign?—Yes, I have.

11884. You may have noticed that in that report the Committee speak of the prejudice or the distrust which the private soldier has of the military hospitals and of the reluctance to go there when sick. That is your experience also?—Yes, to go there for anything serious. They come trooping to the civilian hospitals, Guy's for instance, for any operation to be done, and it is a very good thing for them that they do at present, but we hope to make it different in the future.

11885. It is also stated that amongst military officers there is a feeling of distrust of the skill and professional experience of doctors of the Royal Army Medical Corps. You think that is so?—Undoubtedly.

11886. That you think ought to be done away with, if possible?—We must try and live it down, and in time we shall succeed.

11887. Do you not think that some arrangement might be made which would make these military hospitals less of a barrack and more of a hospital, and allow the civilian sick in, in order to educate the Medical Corps?—It would be excellent, but, of course, it means expense, and the Treasury is a very difficult body to get over.

11888. After all, would it not be the truest economy to have the Army Medical Corps thoroughly efficient men?—It would, because of the expense already alluded to of training Tommy and putting him at the front.

11889. And every man whose life is saved is a distinct gain to the country?—Yes. During the last month I have visited the military hospitals at Aldershot, Netley, York, Portsmouth, and Gosport, and in every case I found that considerable expense must be incurred before the hospital can be brought up to date as such. Several of them have not got an operating theatre at all, and not one has got a proper upward flushing jet of water to wash out a bed pan, for instance. The putting in of those fittings would cost a good deal of money, and if the Commission can possibly strengthen the hands of the Advisory Board in its endeavour to get control of a few thousand pounds, we are only too willing to go round the country and see that that money is

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properly spent on one or two military hospitals each year, and so gradually we shall get them all up to the standard of the 20th century. We want the Government to give us about £20,000 a year, for the next few years, to bring our military hospitals up to a state which will make them fit to be called hospitals. One, for instance, at Aldershot has a high road running through the middle of it! The operating theatre is on the one side of the road and the instruments have to be kept by regulation on the other side. The one side is called Hut Side, because it consists of old disused Crimean huts, and the other side is called Union Side, because, as I said in my report, it was in its palmy days a union or workhouse until it got too dilapidated for that, when it was turned over to be a military hospital. That is not good for the officer in command of it; it damps his ardour, and it certainly is not good for the non-commissioned officers and men, who are brought up to think that anything is good enough for a military hospital.

11890. And it certainly is not good for the patients?—He runs, of course, as hard as he can; he will not have anything done in that hospital, if he can possibly help it, and I do not blame him.

11891. You say that the combatant officers ought in your opinion to be made to study sanitation. Ought it not to be part of the education of combatant officers?—I think so. We want it to be a compulsory part, and the Advisory Board have reported to the Secretary of State to that effect. And there you could help us very greatly, too.

11892. It ought to be a part of his education?—Quite so, and right up through the different grade examinations that he has to pass prominence should be given to it because of its strategic importance.

11893. You spoke of the young medical man not being forced to learn French and German, but is it not very important that he should if possible know both German and French for the purpose of his profession—I mean, so as to be able to read medical works?—It is valuable, no doubt, but everything essential is translated nowadays. And, moreover, an officer of our profession has to be a general practitioner; he can only in a very few instances be a specialist surgeon or physician, and he has such an enormous amount already to read and do and carry in his head that I do not think I should be inclined to insist upon his showing proficiency in any subjects that are not absolutely essential.

11894. All the difficult cases are reported on the Continent, of course; but are they also translated?—Yes, they find their way into digests and appear in our papers.

11895. In a paper like the "Lancet"?—Yes. The "British Medical Journal," for instance, every week has four pages reserved for those cases reported from the Continent in English.

11896. Just to go back for one moment to the officer who has studied sanitation: he, then, you think, ought to impart that to his men to a certain extent?—Yes; if he came to see the importance of it, as we hope he would, he would see that the men learnt a smattering of it.

11897. That the men did it, in fact?—Yes.

11898. Just as an officer ought to be a good horsemaster, and to take care of his horse, and see his horse well cared for, so he ought to be able to see that his men are well cared for?—Yes.

11899. (*Sir John Edge.*) Do you not think that the distrust which you speak of applies more to the man himself than to the profession?—Yes, of course, the personal equation will always come in. A really capable man will soon engender trust among people who come in contact with him.

11900. An officer of the Royal Army Medical Corps, if he is a good man, will shove his way even in a civil station, will he not?—Even as a civil surgeon, do you mean?

11901. Yes, in a civil station?—He is not allowed to do private practice.

11902. Surely? I have employed them myself, particularly one man, whom I have in my mind now, who was a captain in the Army Medical Corps, who came to the station where I was?—That was in India?

11903. Yes?—I do not know anything about India. I daresay they are allowed to take private practice over there.

11904. All I can say with regard to the Royal Army Medical Corps is that that man was there for about three years, and he got about the best practice in a large station?—Yes, I daresay; but over here they are not allowed to do private practice.

11905. I suppose there are many men in the Royal Army Medical Corps who keep up their reading?—Yes, certainly. Any depreciatory remarks that I have made were not intended to apply universally.

11906. I know myself that there were two men, the one I have already spoken of and another, who kept up their reading all their lives?—Yes, and I know one officer of the Corps who has recently got a Fellowship of the Royal Society for original research.

11907. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) A certain percentage love their profession?—Undoubtedly, a very large percentage love it.

11908. (*Sir John Edge.*) On the other hand, I daresay there are a good many who do not keep up their reading?—Yes, a large number, who have been attracted by the fact that once in the Corps there they can stop and draw steadily increasing pay, and after twenty years' service get a pension, and they know that they will not be kicked out for anything less than gross misbehaviour.

11909. Now there will be an examination for promotion from lieutenant to captain?—Yes.

11910. Is there any further examination?—Yes, there are examinations also for promotion from captain to major and from major to lieutenant-colonel.

11911. That you look upon as of great importance?—Yes, certainly; it gives the authorities a hold on the man a few years later.

11912. With regard to the private soldier, does any part of his objection to the military hospital consist in the fact that he is under military discipline there?—No, I think not; he has a very good time.

11913. But you say that he prefers the civil hospital to the Army hospital?—If he has to have any serious operation done. He does not mind being in the military hospital, but if at the military hospital, he is told: "You must get that cured by an operation," then he prefers to come to a civilian hospital to have it done. To take rupture, which is a very common case: If a man has got a rupture they will not let him go into the Army, but if, while he is in the Army he acquires a rupture for the first time, and he is told: "You will be retired, unless you get this cured," then he prefers as a rule to go off to a civilian hospital to get it operated upon.

11914. May his going to a civilian hospital be accounted for by the fact that he knows that there he will probably have a specialist to operate upon him?—Yes, I think so; but specialists can be grown in the Royal Army Medical Corps. There are just the same elements for growing a specialist there; all that is required is practice, and suitability and keenness.

11915. But will an officer in the Royal Army Medical Corps have an opportunity of practising—take rupture, for instance?—Yes.

11916. Will he have an opportunity of seeing as much practice, as many operations, as he would at Guy's, for instance?—Perhaps hardly as much as that, because we have a larger body of patients; we have a larger body of acutely ill patients. If only you can rid the military hospitals of the enormous number of convalescents, who should be sent to big convalescent camps, where they will not be such a heavy expense to the State, then the military hospitals will be able to be put to their proper functions.

11917. How could that have been managed in South Africa, for instance, at the base hospitals; would you have had a convalescent camp, and sent men out of the base hospitals at once to the convalescent camp?—Yes, just across the railway. You are nearly always situated on the railway, or you have a branch railway running into the hospital to bring your stores and equipments and invalids.

11918. Then you say that in a military hospital these convalescents really take up as much of the medical time as the serious cases do?—Yes, because there are elaborate papers which have to be signed every day for every article of diet, which are written out by the medical officer, and this takes up his time and energies.

11919. (*Sir John Hopkins.*) You mention in your

précis that a dental surgeon would be valuable for a field force. I do not think you have given us any evidence with regard to that?—No, but I took one myself to South Africa upon the staff of the Imperial Yeomanry Hospital, and I was also rash enough to take a masseur, and they said I was completely mad for taking both of those persons—it was my lost proof of madness. But I have no hesitation in saying that that masseur was of more help to Lord Roberts' Army than any individual medical man, physician, or surgeon in South Africa. He paid as many as 51 visits a day, and was in enormous request, and he did a great deal in shortening the time, and in getting men back to the front quickly. The way in which he curtailed the stay of patients in hospital I verily believe helped the State more than did the work of any individual surgeon in South Africa. There, again, we were promptly copied, and masseurs were appointed to many different hospitals, or berths were found for them in some unofficial way.

11920. And you found the same value, practically, from having a dental-surgeon?—Yes, I took a really first-class dental-surgeon out with me, and later on the War Office appointed several more.

11921. And you have them in view now, in your future organisation?—Yes, we have a dental surgeon at Aldershot and Woolwich, and are experimenting as to the cost, and the amount of work that they will be called upon to do—it is a very difficult question.

11922. I only wanted to know whether you had that in view?—Yes, we have.

11923. You also touch on the strategic importance of hygiene and sanitation. Had you, so far as you know, in South Africa any officer who was told off for sanitation alone, in connection with Army matters?—No, I did not meet one, and I was told, and have always been led to believe, that such posts were done away with just before or at the beginning of the war. I was told that in the regulations it was laid down that there was to be a sanitary officer for each headquarters' staff of a certain size, each head of a division, for instance, but that it had been decided not to fill up the appointment. But we have advised their restitution. We have not advised the making of a separate sanitary corps, only separate sanitary officers to advise the combatant officers.

11924. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) The Medical Board is an executive body. Yours is an advisory body as apart from executive?—Yes.

11925. And as the result of the deliberations of the Advisory Board, instructions are given by the Secretary of State to the Medical Board?—Do you mean by the Medical Board the Invaliding Board?

11926. I mean the Director-General and his Board—that is an Executive Board, is it not?—It is not called a Board; it is called the Director-General, and the headquarter office of the Army Medical Service.

11927. Formerly, I think it was called a Board?—The word "Board" has disappeared now. The Medical Board now means the Invaliding Board.

11928. Yours is an Advisory Board?—Yes.

11929. And the instructions then are given through the Secretary of State, on the result of your deliberations, to the Director-General?—Yes.

11930. You consider it essential in the education of a medical man entering as an Army officer that he should have a knowledge of hygiene and bacteriology?—Yes.

11931. You look upon that as one of the most important things?—Certainly. But except for those officers who aspire to fill the post of specialist, I do not think the knowledge of bacteriology need be a very deep one; it does not necessitate a specialist training at all—only such as every young medical man has nowadays acquired by the time he takes his qualification.

11932. That is required of every medical man now, is it not, in all the principal schools?—Yes.

11933. It was customary, and is, perhaps, now the case, that medical officers, on entering the Army, should go to Netley to have a special course of training in bacteriology and hygiene?—Now we have brought the Netley School up to London. It is now called the Medical Staff College in London. I am sorry to say that it has not yet got a permanent building, but it has a temporary accommodation, and that is a great advantage. Thus the lieutenants on probation, the professors in the school, and the senior officers taking out their post-graduate courses of instruction before going up for their examination for promotion, are now rubbing shoulders with the civilian schools in London.

Mr. A. D. Fripp, C.B., C.V.O., M.S., M.B., F.R.C.S.

10 Dec. 1902.

11934. (*Chairman.*) Is that in Jermyn Street?—The laboratories are down here on the Embankment—the laboratories of the Royal Colleges of Surgeons and Physicians, next door to the Savoy, and the residential Mess is the Hotel Belgravia, in Victoria Street. But we very badly want and hope to get hold of (and, perhaps, you can help us) the plot at the back of the Tate Gallery, which is a Government plot of ground. We are very anxious to get it for the building of a permanent Medical Staff College.

11935. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You consider that under the present system, as recommended by your Advisory Board, you will be able to induce a superior class of young men to enter as officers of the Army?—Yes. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, is it not? I think you would have to go back ten years before you would find as many applications as there were vacancies announced for the Royal Army Medical Corps; and moreover they were formerly always afraid to announce the actual number of vacancies that existed; they would only announce 10, and then they would only get four or five applicants. The first examination under the new regulations was held last July, and for 30 advertised vacancies, we had 76 applicants—two and a-half times as many as there were vacancies, a sufficiently gratifying contrast to the former state of things!

11936. Then, you do not think they got the very best young men graduates from the different schools on the old system?—Certainly not.

11937. We have been told, I think, that they were perhaps superior to the average. You do not think so?—Oh dear, no. There would be a few quite good ones, certainly, but the majority of them were shocking. They were so shocking that we have made it one of our regulations that the candidates have to appear personally before the Advisory Board, and out of those 76 we stopped nine from going on for the examination at all, merely on account of their appearance and behaviour and their general illiterateness; it appeared impossible ever to make them into fit officers to bear the King's Commission and to do credit to the corps. That is what we are so very anxious about—to live down the feeling which undoubtedly exists among the combatant branches that the Army doctor is not a gentleman.

11938. Do you consider that the Reserve of Officers of the Army would be equal for work to those who are on active service, or at all compared with the generality of civil doctors and surgeons?—No.

11939. Not at all?—No.

11940. Of course, a great many of those Reserve Officers of the Army had to be sent out to South Africa, owing to the pressure of work?—I would rather have had more civil surgeons.

11941. There is one little point. I do not know whether you are acquainted with the procedure, but I believe that formerly, in the case of an officer going to Sandhurst, originally on entering the Army the examination of the District Board was final, and there was no appeal to a general Board in London?—Are you referring to the matter of medical examination for admission?

11942. Yes?—I would not like to answer that question.

11943. (*Chairman.*) You would not know that?—No.

11944. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) I hope now it is not so?—I do not know.

11945. (*Chairman.*) There is only one question I want to ask you. Have you ever contemplated what you would do at your Advisory Board if by any chance you had an unsympathetic Secretary of State?—No; indeed I have not. We have been so fully occupied working out in detail as much as possible of the scheme of reform embodied by Mr. Brodrick's committee, while we had a Secretary of State upon whose sympathy and support we could rely. But it is a truly terrible contemplation.

11946. You have no means of utterance, have you, beyond the walls of the room in which you meet?—No, we have not, but I rather imagine that if the civilian members were all to resign that would have some effect.

Mr. A. D. Fripp, C.B., C.V.O., M.S., M.B., F.R.C.S.

10 Dec. 1902.

11947. You think you could put pressure on in that way?—I think we could.

11948. But, then, on the other hand, there may be a great many recommendations which the Board might think highly desirable, which, nevertheless, they might not think so important as to lead to their resignation, but which they might like to press?—Yes.

11949. At present you have no means of doing that, because your advice is given to the Secretary of State?—That is so. The Permanent Under Secretary of State sees our advice first of all, then the Commander-in-Chief, and then the Secretary of State, and then each of them minute it, and return it to the Board, and so far they have always accepted out recommendations.

11950. I am thinking specially of the sum of money that you mentioned, £20,000 a year, which you think might well be spent in the next few years in improving the military hospitals?—That sum is the merest guess.

11951. It does not matter what sum it is, but whatever sum the Advisory Board thought necessary, you see it might be refused you?—Yes.

11952. And you have no means under the present system of letting anybody know that you have made that recommendation, have you?—None at all. You see philanthropic endeavour is always spasmodic in that way. At the time of the great row about the state of the hospitals in South Africa, when Mr. Burdett-Coutts's letters appeared, any amount of money would have been voted to put things right, but a year or two later, when things have quieted down again, the public cannot be got to take an interest, as we do, in the fact that £500 a year to endow a library and a journal, would, indirectly, do much to further reform and prevent a repetition in the future of the state of things that stirred them so deeply a few months ago. If you have a journal in which the officers can publish their scientific researches, they will make scientific researches in order that they may publish them. The Royal Engineers have one, and I believe the Royal Artillery have one, but we cannot get it.

11953. Are you trying for it?—We are trying hard. We are told that it shall go down in the Estimates for 1903-04.

11954. That is next year?—Yes.

11955. You do not know whether it has been accepted as part of the Estimates which are approved; you only know that it is going to be put in the Estimates?—That is all. Then we know that we shall get obstacles from Treasury clerks, and so on.

11956. I suppose that book of Lady Howe's on the Yeomanry hospitals really contains all the information on the subject; I suppose it is the great authority upon the management of hospitals in the field?—It is a curious thing that you should have asked me that question. It is just because I do not think that its contents should be so regarded or trusted that I have refused to have anything at all to do with the production of the book.

11957. I have not seen it. I only saw it mentioned yesterday in the papers, and wondered whether it contained any valuable information. You think not?—I know that it contains many misleading statements.

11958. Is it merely an advertisement?—I think it contains—I really do not know exactly how to put it, but I regard it as a perpetuation in print of a great deal of the spirit that should never have been evoked at all in the last war, and that one would have imagined would at least have been excluded from having any weight in the management of a large hospital financed by public voluntary subscriptions. I know for a certainty that a whole lot of the statistics are not right.

11959. I think it is very important that you should say so, because they will all be accepted?—I shall not rush into print and say it, but I know for a certainty that a lot of the statistics are simply what would be called, if it was a money matter, and was done in the City "cooked" so as to make an impressive number of figures, and I know that a whole lot of statements as to services rendered, and that kind of thing, are simply and absolutely untrue. There is no other word to adequately describe some of the statements and many of the inferences led up to.

11960. And were you asked to verify the statements?—Yes.

11961. And you said that you would not?—I said I would not. I went out as chief civilian medical officer and senior surgeon of this big hospital. I was responsible for its being increased from 100 to 520 beds, and I had the choosing of the medical staff, including the Royal Army Medical Corps commandant and the nurses. I had in addition the responsibility of choosing, or of ratifying the choice of all the equipment, which involved an expenditure of nearly £100,000. Further, I had to plan the establishment and the working of the institution, and I was responsible for all the features in which it differed from the military hospitals, and broke new ground, and after eight months of such work I did not feel inclined to simply write my article in this book without seeing what other people who went as my juniors chose to say.

11962. And that condition was not satisfied?—That condition was not satisfied.

11963. (*Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.*) You consider that a well-trained female nurse is better than a male nurse such as they have in the Royal Army Medical Corps?—Undoubtedly.

11964. There is no question about it?—There is no question about it.

11965. (*Sir Frederick Darley.*) I gather from your evidence that one great medical lesson to be learnt from the war is the necessity for good sanitation?—Yes, I think so undoubtedly.

APPENDICES.

ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

APPENDICES TO VOLUME I. OF THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

APPENDIX A.

REPLY BY GENERAL VISCOUNT KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM TO A LETTER ADDRESSED TO HIM BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION, ASKING WHETHER HE DESIRED TO ADD ANYTHING TO HIS EVIDENCE.

(*See Question* 233.)

Commander-in-Chief's Camp, India.
Hindubagh, April 13th, 1903.

My Lord,—Your Lordship's communication from the Royal Commission only reached me after I had started on an extended tour along the Afghan frontier, and I regret to say that I am, therefore, not at present in a position to offer any additional evidence that might be of special value to the Royal Commission.

2. I see that there has been a divergence of opinion on the question of how transport should be most profitably employed in a campaign. The point I should like to accentuate is that by the formation of a proper independent Transport Department, the question of transport in different parts of the world could be thoroughly studied, and a sound, practical system, adaptable to the ever-varying forms of transport at our disposal, could be developed. It must always depend on the General Commanding in the field how the available transport should be utilised to the best advantage. I can quite realise that cases may exist when the regimental system could be adapted, and as that system gives greater comfort to the officers and men, it would naturally be preferred; on the other hand, if extreme mobility is required for a large mixed force for a considerable time, the utmost development of transport resources necessitates the reduction to a minimum of regimental transport, and I consider that in such circumstances a General will be able to achieve his object far better by this means than by dividing his available transport amongst the units of his command.

3. I would urge that officers can, if properly selected, be trained to deal efficiently with financial questions of considerable importance, and that it would be greatly to the advantage of the State if officers were made to realise more fully than they do now, the grave importance of all Army expenditure. When Army officers have learnt to appreciate the financial bearing of military matters of importance, I feel sure greater economy, combined with necessary efficiency, will be obtained.

Though civilian advisers may be of the greatest assistance, and cause considerable savings in Army expenditure, still it is to my mind impossible for them to have the same effect on general economy in the Army as would surely follow on the employment of trained officers in similar positions.

The simplification of the present system of accounting in the Army is a matter of great importance if officers are to effectively deal with this subject.

By the introduction on the staff of trained officers for financial duties, I am of opinion decentralisation of financial control could be safely effected.—I have the honour to be, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

(Signed) KITCHENER.

Appendix B.

APPENDIX B.

LIST OF BOOKS, ETC. HANDED TO THE COMMISSION BY LIEUT.-COLONEL E. A. ALTHAM, C.M.G., ON OCTOBER 15TH, 1902, ON BEHALF OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

(*See Question* 524.)

Report on the Communications in Natal north of the latitude of Ladysmith, Intelligence Division, War Office, July, 1897

South African Republic: Road and Railway Reports.—Prepared in the Intelligence Division of the War Office, 1897.

Précis of Information: Swaziland.—Compiled by Major F. A. Fortescue, King's Royal Rifles, Intelligence Division, War Office February, 1898.

Précis of Information concerning Basutoland.—Prepared in the Intelligence Division of the War Office. Revised February, 1898.

Notes on the Lines of Communication in the Cape Colony.—Collated by Major E. A. Altham, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Intelligence Division, War Office, June, 1899

South Africa: Supplementary Reconnaissance Reports.—Intelligence Division, War Office, September, 1899.

Report on the Natal Government Railways and on the Defence of them and of the inland portion of the Colony, against possible invasion from South African Republic or Orange Free State, 1896.

Reconnaissance of the Bridges over the Vaal and Orange Rivers, by Major E. A. Altham, with Covering Letters from Lieut.-General W. H. Goodenough, C.B., Commanding Troops in South Africa, 1899.

Report on the Defence of Kimberley, Cape Colony, by Lieut.-Colonel J. K. Trotter, R.A., dated 11th June, 1898, with Remarks and Covering Letters by Lieut.-General Sir W. Goodenough, K.C.B., Commanding Troops, South Africa, dated 1st August, 1898.

One Case containing Reconnaissance Reports on the Lines of Advance through the Orange Free State. (2 books and 10 maps.) Part I. by Major E. A. Altham, the Royal Scots, Staff Captain, Intelligence Division, War Office; Part II. by Major M. F. Rimington, 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons; and Part III. by Captain H. Sloggett, R.E.; and the following Intelligence Division Maps:—

	Nos.	
Burghersdorp to Bethulie Bridges	1251	(a)
Bethulie Bridges to Springfontein	1251	(b)
Springfontein to Edenburg	1251	(c)
Edenburg to Bethanie Station	1251	(d)
Bethanie Station to Bloemfontein	1251	(e)
Bloemfontein	1254	
Colesberg to Norval's Pont	1251	(f)
Norval's Pont to Springfontein	1251	(g)
Colesberg to Colesberg Road Bridge	1251	(h)
Colesberg Road Bridge to Philippolis	1251	(i)
Philippolis to Springfontein	1251	(j)
Railway Traverse Bloemfontein to Viljoen's Drift	1260	

One case containing Reconnaissance Reports on the Lines of Advance through the Orange Free State. Part II., by Captain A. H. Wolley-Dod, R.A., 1897, and the following Intelligence Division Maps:—

	Nos.
Bloemfontein to Kroonstad	1303
Kroonstad to Viljoen's Drift	1304
Parys to Viljoen's Drift	1304
Parys to Venterskroon Drift	1304
Kroonstad to Shoeman's Drift	1304
Index Map	1305

One case containing (1) Supplementary Reconnaissance Reports, September, 1899; (2) Reconnaissance Sketches on the Lines of Advance through the Orange Free State and Transvaal; and the following Intelligence Division Maps:—

	Nos.	
Colesberg to Norval's Pont	1443	(a)
Colesberg to Orange River Bridges	1443	(b)
Philippolis to Jagersfontein	1443	(c)
Jagersfontein to Bethanie	1443	(d)
Bloemfontein to Petrusburg	1443	(e)
Petrusburg to Kimberley	1443	(f)
Mafeking to Johannesburg	1443	(g)
Klerksdorp to Warrenton	1443	(h)
Mafeking to Kunwana (*viâ* Lichtenberg)	1443	(i)
Tati District	1443	(j)
Tuli to Macloutsie	1443	(k)
Palapye to Macloutsie	1443	(l)
Orange River Station to Hopetown Road Bridge	1443	(m)
Reitzburg to Potchefstroom	1443	(n)
Charlestown to Heidelberg (*viâ* Standerton)	1443	(o)
Smithfield Position	1443	(p)
Plan of Warrenton and Fourteen Streams Bridge	1437	

APPENDIX C.

List of Plans, Maps, and Sketches supplied to the Commission by the War Office.

(*See Question* 753.)

Name of Map, Plan, or Sketch.	Number.	Date.
Military Sketch Map of the Biggarsberg, and of communications in Natal north of the parallel of Ladysmith, in 21 sheets, with index.	I.D.W.O. 1223	1897.
Map of the Colony of Natal, drawn in the Office of the Superintendent Inspector of Schools, 189?, in four sheets (better known as Jeppe's Map).	—	1893.
Bartholomew's Reduced Survey Map of South Africa	—	——
Map of the South African Republic and adjoining territories.	I.D.W.O. 1159	——
Sketch Map bounded by Colesberg, Steynsburg, and Adock.	—	——
Diagram of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, showing special maps by Intelligence Division, War Office, with dates in red, showing when the sheet was sent off from England.	I.D.W.O. 1445	——
Sketch issued with the object of illustrating the detail and hilly features, so far as they are known, of those portions of the South African Republic and Orange Free State bordering on the Northern portion of Natal.	I.D.W.O. 1190	May 1897
Map of the Biggarsberg Road Pass, from a sketch by Captain C. F. C. Beresford, R.E., 1881.	I.D.W.O. 1428	July 1899.
Military Sketch of the Biggarsberg, and of communications in Natal north of the parallel of Ladysmith.	I.D.W.O. 1442	September 1899.
Confidential, No. 26, South Africa.—Plan to accompany Report on the Defence of Kimberley.	I.D.W.O. 1360	August 1898.
Plan of Johannesburg - - - - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1245	1899.
Plan of Pretoria - - - - - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1438	1899.
Natal.—Map of the country round Pietermaritzburg, from a sketch by Captain C. B. FitzHenry, 7th Hussars, 1897.	I.D.W.O. 1294	——
Confidential, No. 183. –Natal.—Plan of Amajuba and Laing's Nek, from a survey by Lieutenant W. Yolland, R.E., November 1882 ; two sheets.	I.D.W.O. 1255	——
Sketches by the Intelligence Division of the following places :—		
Bethulie - - - - - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1367	1899 ; revised 3rd February 1900.
Bloemfontein - - - - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1367	1899 ; revised 8th February 1900.
Bloemhof - - - - - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1367	1900 ; revised 18th April 1900.
Boshof - - - - - - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1367	1900 ; revised 20th February 1900.
Ermelo - - - - - - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1367	1900 ; revised 21st May 1900.
Harrismith - - - - - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1367	1899 ; revised 5th February 1900.
Heidelberg - - - - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1367	1900 ; revised 9th April 1900.
Hopetown - - - - - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1367	1899 ; revised 22nd February 1900.
Kimberley - - - - - - - -	I.D.W.O. 1367	1899 ; revised 11th Febuary 1900

LIST of the Plans, Maps, and Sketches supplied to the Commission by the War Office—*continued.*

Name of Map, Plan, or Sketch.	Number.	Date.
Sketches by the Intelligence Division of the following places—*continued.*		
Komati Port	I.D.W.O. 1367	1900
Kroonstad		1900; revised 20th March 1900.
Ladybrand		1900; revised 27th April 1900.
Ladysmith		1900.
Lichtenburg		1900; revised 2nd March 1900.
Lydenburg		1900.
Mafeking		1900; revised February 1900.
Nylstroom		1900.
Pietermaritzburg		1900.
Philipstown		1900; revised 19th February 1900.
Pochefstroom		1900; revised 2nd April 1900.
Pretoria		1900; revised 27th March 1900.
Rouxville		1899.
Rustenburg		1900; revised 30th May 1900.
Taungs		1900; revised February and March 1900.
Vrede		1900; revised 4th May 1900.
Vryburg		1900; revised 9th March 1900.
Wakkerstroom		1900; revised 15th May 1900.
Winburg		1900; revised 7th March 1900.
Stanford's Large Map of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and neighbouring territories, compiled from the best available information.	--	1895.

APPENDIX D.

Précis of Evidence of the following Witnesses not Printed in the Minutes of Evidence.

1.—Major General Sir Elliott Wood, K.C.B.
2.—Colonel Sir C. E. Howard Vincent, K.C.M.G., C.B., V.D., M.P., A.D.C.
3.—Major Wyndham C. Knight, C.S.I., D.S.O.
4.—Mr. F. T. Marzials, C.B.

1.—Précis of Evidence by Major-General Sir Elliott Wood, K.C.B.

(*See Questions* 1835–2341.)

General Work of the Royal Engineers in the Field.

The Special Report on Organisation bnd Equipment of the Engineer Arm in South Africa (Confidential, 079/3305) practically covers nearly all the recommendations that I can make in order to ensure the most efficient carrying out of the general work of the Royal Engineers in the Field, which hardly needs description.

Those recommendations are the result of the most comprehensive experience which we have ever had in a campaign, and I might specially point to a few of them, though *all are important.*

e page 1 Report.

1st. As to Commanding Royal Engineers being on the Staff of Divisional Generals, I am very strongly of opinion that, until that is the case, full advantage of special Engineer training will not be desired ; and the early and intelligent direction of all available working power (Engineer, Infantry, and Civil) will be absolutely impossible. This affects very seriously the prompt and efficient development of Field Works in Attack and Defence and improvement of roads and communications, whereby delay in the movement of troops is minimised.

ge 2, 17 d 26 of eport.

2. The importance of carrying sappers on horseback became more and more apparent as the campaign went on.

On the march men continually had to work on the roads and drifts ; and, unless mounted, it was impossible for them to get to the front again to undertake fresh work there.

Again, if some sappers can arrive early and comparatively fresh at camping grounds the question of water supply would be greatly helped, and the health and comfort of the troops would be benefited to a most important extent. Moreover, the defence of the camp, if works are necessary, would be earlier secured.

To avoid heavy " Peace " expense, it would perhaps suffice for provision to be made for war only ; and for Field Company sappers to be taught just enough riding to enable them to sit on the quiet animals that generally obtain in war.

age 2 and 4 of Report

3. Great increase of Pontoon Establishment necessary. At the end of 1899 Natal applied to Cape Town for 60 pontoons, although the allowance for an Army Corps was barely one-third of that. We could only spare 30.

We had at the beginning of 1900 three bridges standing over the Modder River with Lord Methuen, two flying bridges over the Orange River at Zoutpan's Drift, and a bridge train with Lord Roberts' advance on Paardeborg.

Finally, we had also to bridge the Orange River for all Arms near Norvals Pont. This bridge was of unusual length, 266 yards.

Some of the old pontoons from Schools of Instruction practically unfit for service, sank before the troops began to cross, and had to be replaced by barrel piers, which had been prepared to meet casualties. We had exhausted all pontoons.

4. *Telegraphs.* Large increase of *personnel* and equipment necessary, especially to meet future requirements of Cavalry and Mounted Infantry. Pages 6 an 40 of Report

5. *Railways.* Although I think Colonel Girouard's estimate of Staff in Peace is too great, yet it is absolutely necessary to provide some staff. Possibly a branch at the Inspector-General of Fortifications' office, similar to that for Submarine Mining, might suffice. This is even more necessary for Home Defence than for War abroad. Page 35.

6. Steam Road Transport proved very economical and efficient. Page 83.

Its trains are compact, move rapidly, especially when returning empty, and are less liable to successful attack than other convoys. This will hardly, however, be an Engineer service in particular.

7. Motor-Car search lights should certainly form part of Engineer equipment, and might advantageously form part of the Field Company. We started them.

8. Wireless Telegraphy. Although this proved a failure when fully tried between Orange and Modder Rivers, yet its value in the field would have been incalculable had the system worked.

Experiments should be pushed on in high rough country, such as Wales or Scotland, and, if possible, on the high lands in South Africa.

9. Purchase of Stores, when in the Field, from any source, local, foreign, or home, by Commandant Royal Engineers and Directors should be freely admitted, subject, of course, to usual inspection and audit of books and accounts.

Although the War Orders for Engineer services impose no limit in this respect, yet in practice a freer hand as regards some special orders would have been distinctly advantageous.

Under our present system of training and experience, the officers in question have generally ample business aptitude for working such a system to the economical and rapid supply of the Engineer requirements of the Army. Rapidity of supply is generally of paramount importance in the Field.

10. As before stated, I would desire that effect may be given to all my recommendations in the special Report mentioned on the first page.

Elliott Wood, Major General.

18/10/1902.

Appendix D

Précis of Evidence by Colonel Sir C. E. Howard Vincent, K.C.M.G., C.B., V.D., M.P., A.D.C.

(*See Questions* 5444–5692.)

Absence of any Arrangements for Utilisation of Auxiliary Forces in the event of War.

1. Member of Parliament for Central Sheffield since 1885, Colonel Commandant Queen's Westminster Volunteers since 1864, and an Aide-de-camp to the King.

2. Joined the Royal Military College, 1866, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers in 1868, from 1873 to 1875 Captain Royal Berks Militia, from 1875 to 1878 Colonel Central London Rangers, and 1878 to 1884 Director of Criminal Investigations, Metropolitan Police.

3. Considerable experience with Continental armies; cognisant of all preparations by Prussia for war of 1866 and 1870, and by Russia for Turkish war in 1877. Was military correspondent of "Daily Telegraph" for part of two latter campaigns.

4. War appearing highly probable in August, 1899, wrote on the 16th of that month to the War Office offering to raise from the Volunteer Force at own expense a battalion 1,000 strong for active service, all members to be unmarried, between 20 and 30 years of age, returned as efficient for two years as marksmen, and also a battalion for garrison duty in London or at home. The offer was sent direct to the Under Secretary of State for War, according to the regulations, but the answer came back that it had reached the War Office "through the wrong channel."

5. A verbal offer was made about the same time to the Adjutant-General by Colonel Eustace Balfour to augment the Gordon Highlanders by a service company from the London Scottish. It was not accepted.

6. On the outbreak of war my offer was renewed through the General Commanding the Home District, who strongly recommended its acceptance, and a memorandum was sent giving full details. But no answer was made.

7. On October 31st, 1899, 20 days after the declaration of war, having since August received many hundreds of offers of service from the Volunteer Force, wrote again to the War Office. The reply of November 1st, 1899, was to the effect "that the Secretary of State fully appreciates the patriotic spirit which has led to so many offers of service by the Volunteers, and will not hesitate to avail himself of the powers given by the Volunteer Act of 1895 should the occasion arise. But that Act gives no powers to send Volunteers abroad. It is meant to facilitate the preparations for home defence. If any crisis arises in which a large increase in the home garrison is required (of which there is at present no sign) the Volunteers would be the appropriate force to use. As to enlistment, the Army Act only lays down that enlistment must not be for more than 12 years, but it allows enlistment for any shorter term. The Army Regulations, however, only allow it for terms of 3, 7, or 12 years with the colours. If it is decided to accept the offers of service from individual Volunteers to fill gaps, regulations will be published allowing enlistment for a short time and giving directions."

8. On November 24th, 1899, I again returned to the charge by a letter to Mr. Wyndham to the effect "that I ventured to make one more appeal before going abroad. Let the conditions be what they may, I suggest two years' efficient Volunteer service, age between 21 and 28, marksmanship this year, recommendation by the Commanding Officer and Adjutant, medical examination, and celibacy. I cannot believe that while the Volunteers of Cape Colony, Natal, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia are being given an opportunity, advantage is not to be taken of the occasion to see what reserves might be forthcoming from the Volunteers of Great Britain to cement the tie between the Regulars and the Volunteers, to improve the tone of Army recruits, to get them otherwise than at street corners, and to draw Volunteers into the Army. Am I to tell men, eager to serve their country, that the only course before them is to leave the Volunteers and join the Army for seven years or more? Of course, they are not prepared to do that, as many are in well remunerated positions. The casualties are already over 2,000, independently of the sick. Some of the vacancies could be well filled by zealous and approved marksmen or the Volunteers, rather than by the ordinary recruit, or some of the 36½ per cent. rejected as under age or lacking in physique."

The answer was: "It would be a great mistake to issue regulations for the special enlistment of Volunteers until there is some prospect of their services being required. There is at present no probability of this."

On November 29th, 1899, Lord Wolseley, then Commander-in-Chief, wrote himself:—"The idea is a good one, though many and serious difficulties stand in the way. There are many officers in the Volunteer Force who are admirable, and who have studied the military profession as closely as many of our good officers in the Regular Army. There are some corps, like the Westminsters, who have first-rate men in command of them, and who have been in the Regular Army. But there is not that evenness of efficiency in any Volunteer battalion that would bring it up to the level of an ordinary line regiment. However, the day may come when we shall be only too glad to employ Volunteer corps on active service, and I shall rejoice to see it."

9. After the reverses of Magersfontein, Stormberg, and Colenso, the temper of the public was such that the continued military refusal of Volunteers would not have been tolerated. I was in the South of France, having had a severe attack of displacement of the heart. But my proposals were sent for to the Queen's Westminster Headquarters, and the City Imperial Volunteers decided upon. I was offered the command of the Mounted Infantry, but, not well enough for that, was appointed to the command of the infantry, and even for that was unable to pass the doctors, the journey home and other disturbing influences having brought on a recurrence of the physical trouble.

But I took part in the preparations of the corps, the ordering of the equipment, the selection of the officers, and the enrolment of the men. It was but too evident that what might have been easily done in August or even in October or November could only be done extravagantly and badly at such speed, despite the liberality of the City Companies. I had even to call in and take all the belts off my own corps for the City Imperial Volunteers, so impossible was it to obtain leather and equipment. The officers, the non-commissioned officers, and the men were also hastily selected, and many went out whose campaign defects a few weeks in barracks would have discovered. Nor did the War Office show much disposition to help. No adjutant of Volunteers was allowed to go. It was proposed to send a cavalry adjutant with the infantry, and no qualified sergeant instructors of mounted infantry were sanctioned. It was all bustle, confusion, *laissez aller*, if not obstruction.

10. I left for South Africa on January 6th, 1900, arriving a week before the mounted infantry under Colonel Cholmondeley, and was able to get their camp pitched for them at Green Point and other arrangements made.

Returning from the Tugela and the headquarters of Sir Redvers Buller for the Army Headquarters at Paardeberg, I saw both the infantry battalion of the City Imperial Volunteers and the mounted infantry at Paardeberg. The former were kept in training at Orange River for several months. The latter had been rushed up to the front before they were ready, and the platforms up the line were littered with their equipment.

I bring this out to emphasise my contention that had the War Office made preparation in August, October, or even November, as was urged upon them, all this confusion and extravagance would have been avoided, and the units sent out been perfected at home instead of in the field.

11. In February, 1900, sixty-six special service companies were called for from the Volunteer Force, consisting entirely of single men, marksmen, twice efficient. The reports concerning these special service companies have been uniformly excellent, and corroborated by every single officer under whom or with whom they served in South Africa. The men proved

to be the best behaved, the most intelligent, and were invariably assigned to outposts and other stations requiring especial reliability and resource.

In 1901 further special service companies were called for, and again in 1902 further companies.

12. The response to the second and third calls was less good than to the first, and upon this ground, that whereas the Volunteers in the special service companies were men of especial military qualifications—two years' efficiency, marksmanship, celibacy, and received nothing but soldier's pay—1s. a day—men with very inferior qualifications or no qualifications at all, neither character, nor military training, nor marksmanship, nor riding, were taken haphazard and given 5s. a day.

The Volunteers desiring, therefore, to serve their country in the field in 1901 and 1902, naturally, therefore, went to the 5s. a day service, instead of to the 1s. a day. The former also offered great chances of advancement to commissioned and non-commissioned rank, which was wholly absent from the service companies. For instance, nearly every Queen's Westminster joining the Imperial Yeomanry was promoted at once to sergeant, and a large number received commissions subsequently.

The recruiting in 1901 for the second levy of Imperial Yeomanry was scandalous. It was conducted in the street. Officers commanding regiments were consulted in no way as to either officers or men, and no advantage was given either to Yeomen or Volunteers.

Even with the third or 1902 levy, exactly the same mistakes were made as in 1900, and the battalions were prevented by the War Office from obtaining the services of reliable officers and non-commissioned officers. On this point the evidence of Colonel Kemp, M.P., would be valuable to the Royal Commission, as he had experience of the levies both of 1900 and 1902.

It is difficult to exaggerate the extraordinary want of forethought or provision upon the military side of the War Office, and every concession had to be carried, so to say, at the point of the bayonet. It was extracted with evident unwillingness from scarcely concealed hostility. Appendix D

Nor even now, despite the efforts of General Sir Alfred Turner, the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces, does there appear to be the slightest realisation by the Adjutant-General's Department of the great lesson of the war, that it is essential to attract the largest possible number of men to some military training, to perfect the *cadres* of officers and non-commissioned officers, with a view to the most rapid and effective expansion in time of war or necessity.

Despite the fact that 589 officers of Volunteers and 19,161 Volunteers served with Volunteer units in the South African war, and that a large proportion of the 1,398 officers and 34,192 men of the Imperial Yeomanry were members of the Volunteer Force, the difficulties of the Volunteer Service have been greatly increased since the war. The duties have been made more onerous, more costly, more difficult to carry out, demanding a greater sacrifice of time and employment hours. The consequence is, thousands of resignations, greater difficulty in obtaining officers, greater difficulty in finance.

Army Order 16 of 1902, which stated in paragraph 5: "For some years past the Volunteer Force has constantly claimed to be seriously accepted as a reliable and organised section of the Army for Home Defence" was taken as insulting to a force which, without the slightest legal liability, had contributed to the Army in the field not less than 30,000 men, and had by their spirit and example practically saved the military situation at the end of 1900.

3.—Précis of Evidence by Major Wyndham C. Knight, C.S.I., D.S.O., late Chief Staff Officer, Imperial Yeomanry.

(*See Questions* 7089–7243.)

ment The first contingent Imperial Yeomanry raised at a time when the War Office were able to give little or no help beyond the grant of money for each man enlisted, was, thanks to the large funds subscribed by the public, sent out to South Africa equipped in a far superior manner to the regular Army.

Not only had they better clothes and more of them, but thanks to the generosity of private individuals a large proportion of the non-commissioned officers and men had field glasses or telescopes, and most battalions had machine guns.

In addition to these, in many cases, light carts had been provided for squadrons. The clothing supplied was of such superior quality that, after the occupation of Pretoria, officers were offering men of the Imperial Yeomanry a good deal more than the original cost in order to obtain their jackets, hats, and breeches.

The general excellence of the clothing reflected the greatest credit on the officers responsible for its selection and examination.

The Yeomanry stores of clothing were not replenished from England, and as those sent out became exhausted, the Yeomanry depended more and more on the Army Ordnance Department, and latterly were on exactly the same footing as regular troops.

Although the Yeomanry derived some benefit from having their own clothing, it led to the unnecessary multiplication of clothing depôts, and it is undoubtedly for the general good that in future campaigns volunteers of all kinds should be treated as integral parts of the regular Army, and clothed and equipped by the Army Ordnance Department.

ting. The Imperial Yeomanry at first had their own Remount Department, and purchased and sent out some 13,000 horses.

This was a great mistake, and should never be allowed again. It led to multiplication of remount officers and depôts, and to anomalous situations as to how far Yeomanry Remounts were available for general purposes, and *vice versâ*.

This system was abolished early in the campaign, and the Imperial Yeomanry drew their horses just like other mounted units.

Special qualities

These varied according to the contingent.

Men.

The first contingent, enlisted in a time of national emergency, consisted almost entirely of men superior to the classes ordinarily enlisted.. The bulk of these men could ride and handle fire-arms, though owing to want of experience with rifles, their shooting was in most cases indifferent.

There were a large number of men in the ranks who, after a short experience of actual warfare, were fit to fill vacancies in the commissioned ranks, and the men so promoted were the backbone of the Yeomanry when the officers, who had brought out the original contingents, went home.

In nearly every part of England more men had come forward than were actually required, so the local authorities had been able to get rid of men who after due trial proved incompetent or undesirable.

The presence of large numbers of educated men in the ranks was of great service as the country was gradually occupied, and a large number of positions of trust had to be taken over. Many of the non-commissioned officers and men of this contingent have already risen high in the civil administration of the Orange River Colony and Transvaal.

There were a number of men who had considerably understated their ages in their enthusiasm to get to the front.

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As a general rule these men were unable to stand the hard work and roughing, and it would have been better to adhere rigidly to the thirty-five years age limit.

The general physique of this contingent was excellent, and far above that of the regular Army.

Second contingent.

In the second contingent (17,000 men) enlisted as before at home Yeomanry centres and in the larger towns, the general stamp, though below that of the first contingent, was good. There were, however, exceptions. The contingents sent from Leicester and Reading were bad, and that enlisted at one of the London offices, as the Duke of Cambridge's Own, was disgraceful; and it is impossible to understand how an officer could have accepted or a medical officer have passed a large proportion of these men. Surgeon-Major C. R. Kilkelly, C.M.G., First Grenadier Guards, late in charge of the Imperial Yeomanry Hospitals at Pretoria and Elandsfontein, could give particulars of men sent home for medical reasons. A large number of this contingent could neither ride nor shoot in spite of having passed tests in both in England, and it was necessary to send home over a thousand men of this contingent, of whom a very large proportion belonged to the Duke of Cambridge's Own referred to above.

The shooting of those who remained compared favourably with that of the first contingent, but 75 per cent. could not ride at all. The men of this contingent were much younger than their predecessors, and it was necessary to keep them under much stricter discipline. Many men had been sent out who were too heavy for mounted work, and numbers suffered from organic disease and could not have been fit for military duty at the time they left England. There were numerous deaths on the way out.

After weeding, the bulk of this contingent made excellent soldiers, and the attached opinions of regular and other officers under whom they served show their value in the field.

Enclosures marked A. and B. and C. In latter, officers marked * were selected in South Africa, those marked † in England.

Third contingent.

This contingent had the advantage of four months' training at home before being sent out.

As they were never tried by the test of active service it is difficult to estimate their fighting value.

On arrival in South Africa they probably shot better than the other contingents, and rode better than the second contingent, but were far inferior to the first contingent in riding and horse management.

ENCLOSURE "A."

Captain Humby, old I.Y. officer.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 74th Irish Squadron Imperial Yeomanry, dated 8th October, 1901.

Am delighted to say my men are splendid, and a grand lot of fellows, though they are now beginning to get a little bit tired, and want a rest. I have had 25 per cent. of casualties, but they are always pleased with an engagement.

Lieut.-Col. Keir, P.S.C., R.H.A.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 1st Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 30th September, 1901.

Much indignation in 1st Imperial Yeomanry at reports in papers about new Yeoman. Most unjust. In my opinion my men are very good indeed.

Lieut.-Col. A. W. Jarvis.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 21st Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 28th September, 1901.

I took a small Commando out on Thursday night; left at seven p.m., and went twenty-eight miles out, rounding up some farms. Caught six Boers, and collared 160 head of cattle and 300 sheep, two Cape carts, some rifles, ammunition, etc., and got them all safe in here by nine a.m. yesterday morning. It was a long ride in the time. We covered at least sixty miles, and both horses and men did well.

Lieut.-Col. Banon, P.S.C., Shropshire L.I.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 17th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 10th September, 1901.

Now about the Regiment. I am more sanguine about it than I have ever been before. The two Squadrons here are getting much better. Two troops, 50th, the other day turned an equal number of Boers out of three positions, and chased them into some Yeomanry of another Column

I took out the 60th a few nights ago, and made a night march of 15 miles, and two hours after daylight bagged a patrol of 7 armed Boers with two horses and a telescope. Yesterday with a troop of the 60th we chased four Boers four or five miles and bagged them.

Lieut.-C Banon, Shropsh L.I.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 17th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 18th September, 1901.

You will be glad to hear that the 17th Imperial Yeomanry had another little success yesterday. I took out 70 of the best mounted men of the 50th for a 15-mile ride, and just after it was light we saw some horses near a kopje. I sent one troop to the left, one to the right, and some to the kopje, and found a small laager behind; they had seen us, but could not get their horses in time, and the few that did we galloped down. and the rest seeing the game was up put up their hands. We got 17 prisoners, adults four, white lads 13 to 15, and six natives, 45 horses, 50 cattle, and some 300 sheep. These two Squadrons have since the first of the month got themselves 26 adult prisoners and six white boys of 13 to 16, and helped to get the 10 prisoners four days ago, when we got into a Commando at dusk.

Lieut.-C Banon, Shropsh L.I.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 17th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 21st September, 1901.

I think I told you of my taking out 70 of the 50th Squadron a night march, and surprising a laager at sunrise, getting 17 adult prisoners and five lads, horses, cattle, etc. Two nights after I took half a Company of Mounted Infantry, and a troop each of the 50th and the 60th. We marched 26 miles, and at dawn laid up in some hills. I saw some Boers in a kloof and got a helio message to Williams, and he worked round them. They moved out when he was seven or eight miles away and came towards me; I got their first scout who came towards me, but the second saw me and gave the alarm. I had my men all ready, and forthwith sent a troop to gallop to cut them off from another lot of kopjes; they thought they were surrounded, and put up the white flag, and I took 50 prisoners, five white lads, five blacks, and nearly 150 horses. This is the third time in September I have got prisoners by making a long night march, and making for some spot one knows the Boers frequent, and I am sure that this despatching a party and following it up with the Column at daylight pays.

Capt. Ba win, P.S. D.A.A.G

EXTRACT from letter from Staff Officer, Mounted Troops, Kekewich's Column, dated October 2nd, 1901. Written after the attack on Kekewich's Camp by Delarey and Kemp.

The Boers, about 1,200, under Kemp and Delarey, meant business, and it was rather serious for a short time, but our men played up splendidly, not only the Derbys, but the Scottish and the Imperial Yeomanry, not a pin to choose between any of them. Do your best for us in officers, men, and horses, the latter especially we are very short of. They were shot down in scores.

Lieut.-Co S. B. Vo Donop, R

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding Mounted Troops, Methuen's Force, dated 12th September, 1901.

The Yeomanry are doing very well and are very keen.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 18th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 11th September, 1901.

We are getting on very well. All ranks have shaken into their work now, and are doing well. With the small Column we have now the duties are very heavy, and the men do not have an easy time in the field by any means.

Major D. Campbell 9th Lanc

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding Imperial Yeomanry, Damant's Column, dated October 6th, 1901.

It may interest you to know that the three Companies,

30th, 31st, and 91st, which I now have with Damant's Column have been doing excellent work and making a name for themselves quite worthy of the best traditions of the Old Yeomanry.

-Col. e, P.S.C., Fusrs.

EXTRACT from letter from Lieut.-Colonel Hickie, Commanding Column, Transvaal, dated September 16th, 1901.

I see that they have been asking questions in the House about the New Yeomanry. I send you the following unofficially, but if it is of any use to you at any time I shall be glad to repeat it officially. The 103rd and the 107th Companies joined me on May 1st at Syfer-keyl, near Klerksdorp. I was then commanding Babington's Mounted Troops. On May 17th I was appointed to the command of the Column, and the two Companies have therefore been with me now for nearly five months; during that time the men have gone on improving. I have served for nineteen months with the Mounted Infantry, and have been intimately acquainted with 18 regiments of Regulars and Irregulars. I would not change these two Companies for an equal number of men from any corps in South Africa. The officers are excellent and the men are A1. I put this down to, first, Captain Norman Stewart, Captain Haughton (especially to this officer), Captain Boyd, to the fact that nearly all the officers had previously served in the field, notably McEwen, Wolff, Tredennick, and Francis, are all very good officers. The Companies worked with the 14th Hussars and Imperial Light Horse, both of which regiments were particularly good. The men have improved wonderfully in physique, their morale is excellent, and their self-confidence enormous. They scout well, and they perform all the duties as I would wish them to do, and they look after their horses excellently. They have had a few little successes lately, and there is no holding them at present; they consider themselves much superior to any mounted troops in this part of the country. I wish I had four more companies of the same sort.

Col. Hamil- n D.G.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 9th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated August 17th, 1901.

They are doing very well. Broadbent, with his troop, captured 14 of the enemy the other day. I still hear good accounts of the 30th and 31st with Colonel Damant.

P.M. 2nd

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding Welsh Yeomanry Companies, Methuen's Force, dated September 16th, 1901.

The 89th did splendidly, and although there were only Jameson and two men unwounded at the end, plus myself legged, we kept the Boers at bay for three-quarters of an hour, and practically saved 20 ox waggons, a Maxim, and perhaps even more.

Col. ıge- P.S.C., R.A.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 12th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 6th September, 1901.

Can you enlighten me as to why everyone crabs the New Yeomanry? I consider they are extremely good, and brave as lions. They have been highly tried, having to be alongside Cavalry Regiments doing the same work.

Col. on, old ficer.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding 5th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, dated 1st October, 1901.

General efficiency. The men can now ride well and can shoot well; and are in a very good state of discipline. They appear to be keen, and fight well in action. The officers look well after their men and perform their duties conscientiously, and I have no complaints to make.

D.G. ell, ncers.

EXTRACT from letter from Officer Commanding Yeomanry, Damant's Column.

By judicious weeding and getting hold of good officers and non-commissioned officers, they improved by leaps and bounds, and are now, I think, as good a lot of Yeomanry as there are in South Africa; in fact, so pleased is Damant with the Yeomanry, that he is always applying for more. Of course, there are a certain number of wrong 'uns amongst the men, but those I have got rid of, and the remainder have found most willing, hard-working, and full of keenness, and in all the fighting we have had they have always shown up well.

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ENCLOSURE "B."

COPY of REPORT by Colonel R. G. KEKEWICH, C.B., 7th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry.

In bringing the good services of all ranks of this Battalion to notice, I trust that the valuable services it has rendered during the War may be taken into special consideration.

The Regiment came under my command in July, 1901, and its record is most distinguished. There has always been a real good fighting spirit in it, and all ranks have always "played the game" and fought well.

Once, when about a dozen men were cut off and surrounded by several hundred Boers, they fought it out until half of their number (six) had been killed and wounded.

Its casualties since March, 1901, have been:—

—	Officers.	Men.
Killed in action	8	43
Died of wounds	—	7
Wounded	6	96
Died of disease	—	16
Accidentally injured	—	2
	14	164

Not a single instance has ever come under my notice of any officer, non-commissioned officer, or men in any way showing the white feather," and this will probably be considered a very special record, considering that it was at Vlaakfontein (six officers killed), Middlefontein, Moedwil, and Rooiwal.

(Signed) R. E. KEKEWICH, Colonel
Commanding Mobile Force.

Kaalkraal,
3rd June, 1902.

ENCLOSURE "C."

Fauriesmith, 3rd August, 1901.

To C.S.O., Imperial Yeomanry,
Johannesburg.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward to you confidential reports on the officers of the 30th and 31st Imperial Yeomanry under my command.

*30th Company.—Blunt, R.A. Capt.**—A very good hard-working officer who thoroughly knows his work, and is getting his company into good working order as rapidly as possible.

*Bazley, W. H., Lieut.**—A very good officer—very keen—very willing and thoroughly up in his work.

*Gray, H. G. S., Lieut.**—A very good officer—very willing, and thoroughly up in his work.

Hope, A., 2nd Lieut.†—This officer was sadly lacking in the experience requisite to instruct untaught Yeomen in their work; he is, however, keen and willing, and will be all right in time.

Stewart, C. C., 2nd Lieut.†—Same as 2nd Lieut. Hope.

*31st Company.—Ardagh, G. H., Capt.**—A very hard-working officer, who thoroughly understands his work, and is making the best of the very raw material he has to work upon.

*Livingstone, A. M., Lieut.**—A very good officer indeed, and thoroughly up in his work. He is desirous of obtaining a commission in the Connaught Rangers, for which I wish most strongly to recommend him, as he is thoroughly fitted in every way, and the regiment will be lucky to get him. If he obtains his commission, I should like him to remain on with the 31st Company, as unless I have some good officers, I shall never be able to get the men up to the mark, as when I took them over such a crew in my life to be expected to ever take Boers—but thanks to the officers they are now rapidly coming to hand.

*Hunt, O. D., Lieut.**—A thoroughly good and reliable officer, who has been my Adjutant since I took over com-

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mand. He is hard-working and keen, and is perfectly up in his work. In fact, thanks to Lieut. Hunt, my work of getting the two companies into fighting order has been much easier than I ever expected. I have thorough confidence in him.

He wishes for a commission in the South African Constabulary, and I can most strongly recommend him as fitted in every way. Although, of course, I should not stand in his way of getting a good billet, I should like him to remain with the Yeomanry until it is in more ship-shape condition, as at present his services are invaluable, and I cannot spare any officer who knows his work with so much teaching to be done.

*Underwood, T. P. D., 2nd Lieut.**—A young officer who has the making of a first-class soldier—he is keen and hard-working, and seems to have a very good head on his shoulders.

Hine, A., 2nd Lieut.†—Lacking in knowledge to instruct untaught men, but is keen and willing and will be all right with more experience.

Noad, P. H., 2nd Lieut.†—This officer has been sick, and I have seen little of him, and do not feel justified in expressing an opinion, although I think he will be all right.

(Signed) DAVID G. M. CAMPBELL.
Commanding 30–31st Imperial Yeomanry.

Drafts.

There should never have been any second and third contingents.

The first contingent should have been fed by constant drafts sent out to a central Yeomanry Depôt, where they could have been at least partially trained, and then sent to join the squadron for which they were enlisted.

The manner in which the men of the second contingent were mixed up on arrival at Aldershot was extraordinary, and made it very difficult to send them, on arrival in South Africa, to the units for which they enlisted.

The success of any irregular force must depend on the way in which it is officered.

The most difficult task which devolved on the Yeomanry Staff in South Africa was the getting rid of the large number of undesirable and incapable officers sent out from England.

Here again the difference between the three contingents is very clearly marked.

First Contingent.

The officers were in most cases men of position and a certain age, with as far as possible previous military experience. They were selected at Yeomanry centres by the Colonels of home Yeomanry regiments, except the Commanding Officers, who were selected by the Yeomanry Committee.

Socially, they were rather above the average of Regular officers, and they showed great keenness and adaptability in the field. The officers of the regiments raised by small committees, as Paget's, Roughriders, Duke of Cambridge's Own, Sharpshooters, were not quite so good socially or professionally.

The weakest point about the officers of the first contingent was the large number who went home before their men after a very few months in the field.

Luckily there were in most cases better men in the ranks to take their places.

Second Contingent.

Consisting of four formed battalions, two formed squadrons, and 400 officers and 14,000 men as drafts.

This gave a total of about 530 officers. These officers were selected in England, and were far in excess of the number actually required.

They were supposed to have held a commission in some branch of the service, or to have had "previous South African experience during the War."

Instead of being selected by the County Yeomanry authorities, the Yeomanry office in London advertised for them.

The result, as seen in South Africa, was startling.

Some had never ridden, some had never been in decent society before, some had indifferent records as privates in the first contingent.

Many were physically unfit. From memory, I think it was necessary to get rid of over 100 of these officers, and that in one week's *London Gazette* over twenty resigned, or were dismissed.

The harm done to the name of the Imperial Yeomanry, and to the officer class generally, was incalculable.

Their ideas on money matters were so irregular that it became necessary for the Field Force canteen to refuse to cash Yeomanry officers' cheques.

This contingent contained a number of good officers, and a larger number of those capable of being made into good officers. Nearly sixty regular officers, mostly from units serving in South Africa, were lent to the Yeomanry, and by their work, and that of the officers of the first contingent who had remained on, coupled with constant weeding of those found inefficient or undesirable, the second contingent reach the standard of efficiency of which the regiment mentioned in Colonel Kekewich's letter (marked Enclosure B) was a fair example.

The Inspector-General Imperial Yeomanry had cabled asking that senior officers should not be sent, but no notice was taken of this, and four battalions were sent out fully officered, and in three cases so badly officered that it was found necessary to break them up and reform the four into two battalions, and even then to put in a regular officer to command one of them.

Third contingen

Selected as before by the central Yeomanry authorities without any reference to the counties. The general stamp of officer was not as good as it might have been, and men were sent out in higher positions without any reference to their previous record during the War.

In two cases men who had held subordinate positions were sent out in command of regiments. One of these left South Africa as a subaltern, and the other as a Quartermaster.

"Way in which the force was used in So Africa, a the purpo for which was foun most valu able."

It was used mostly by squadrons. At first there was a tendency to employ the Imperial Yeomanry on lines of communication, but latterly they were used exactly the same as any other mounted units. It became easier to work them in battalions towards the end of the War owing to the commanding officers and battalion staffs being either regular or those who had proved their fitness for their position during the campaign.

The first contingent was during the first ten months very much split up in squadrons, acting for themselves and with no central authority to whom they could refer.

Gradually this was changed and the whole force highly centralised, each squadron corresponding direct with the office of the Inspector-General Imperial Yeomanry, which was established in the neighbourhood of a large Yeomanry camp which was formed at Elandsfontein.

Pay.

A pay office was established at Elandsfontein, and every effort made to bring the pay work up to date, and to help the squadron commanders with their accounts. This work was made very much more difficult by the 1901 contingent having been sent out without numbers, last pay certificates, or next-of-kin rolls.

Owing to the way the country drafts had been mixed up at Aldershot, and the incompetency of the officers placed in charge of them, it was exceedingly difficult to trace some men at all.

This contingent left England in the spring of 1901, and in the autumn of the same year only a portion of the missing documents had reached South Africa. A few had not arrived by the end of the War.

Failure o pay syste

The system of making squadron or company commanders responsible for the compilation of the accounts of their units failed completely.

The futu

We ought to begin at once to form the nucleus from which to officer the Yeomanry of the future.

More than 2,200 officers have served in the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa, and there is a large amount of detailed information as to the capabilities or defects of these officers in the Imperial Yeomanry officers in South Africa.

I would propose that every officer who served with the Imperial Yeomanry during the campaign, and is certified by his late Commanding Officer and one of the late Inspector-Generals of Imperial Yeomanry as suitable, should be asked to record his name on the Reserve of the Imperial Yeomanry and be affiliated to one of the home Yeomanry regiments.

An officer so affiliated should be able to come out for training with such regiments as supernumerary in the rank he held in South Africa, and to draw the pay of his rank during training.

In this manner officers would be able to keep in touch not only with soldiering, but with units with which they could serve in a future campaign.

All enlistments of men and selection of officers in the future must be by the home regiments of Imperial Yeomanry, helped in the case of officers by the Lord-Lieutenants of counties, or committees selected by them. All appointments of officers to be approved by the Army Corps Commander, and if regimental staffs are formed, they should be selected by the Army Corps Commander. The weak point all through the successive contingents has been the difficulty of finding efficient regimental staffs, and, generally speaking, from Commandant down to Regimental Sergeant-Majors, it has been necessary to draw on the regular Army. Where amateurs were given field rank it was frequently impossible to employ them in active operations, owing to their being senior to the Column Commanders, and when they attempted duties of Quartermaster and Adjutant they generally failed.

To obviate these difficulties I would suggest that in future only squadrons should be formed, and that they should be attached to cavalry regiments and treated in every respect as the Volunteer service companies were treated, being kept up to a strength of 150 rank and file by drafts.

4.—Précis of Evidence by Mr. F. T. Marzials, c.b., Accountant-General, War Office.

(*See Questions* 7797–8016.)

Under the Order in Council of the 23rd June, 1870, the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance was charged "with preparing Estimates for all the above (following) services :—

"Providing, holding, and issuing to all branches of the army and reserve forces, food, forage, fuel and light, clothing, arms, accoutrements, munitions of war, and all other stores necessary for the efficient performance of their duties by such forces, of proper quality and pattern, and in proper quantities according to the regulations governing the provision, custody, and issue of such supplies ;

"With exercising a strict control over the expenditure of such supplies, and with seeing that they are properly accounted for by the several officers and others who may be charged with their custody, issue and use ;

"With the custody of all buildings in which troops are quartered, and with allotting quarters ;

"With providing transport for troops, and directing land and inland water transport."

Under another Order of the same date, the Financial Secretary was charged :—

"With preparing the annual Estimate for the Pay of the Army and Reserve Forces ; with collecting and incorporating into a general Estimate for Army Services the Estimates of the other departments of the War Office, and with financially reviewing the expenditure proposed in such Estimates ;

"With submitting for the instructions of the Secretary of State for War any proposed re-distribution of the sums allotted to the different sub-divisions of the Votes for Army Services ;

"With advising the Secretary of State on all questions of Pay, Retired Pay, and Pensions or the Army and Reserve Forces ;

"And with the duty of rendering such other advice and assistance as may be required of him by the Secretary of State for War."

The Order in Council of the 21st February, 1888, assigned the duty of preparing the Estimates generally to the Commander-in-Chief, and with that Order was issued a Memorandum defining the duties of various subordinate officers, assigning—

1. To the Quartermaster-General the duty of preparing Estimates for Transport and Provisions (Votes 6 and 7 of the Army Estimates).

2. To the Inspector-General of Fortifications the duty of preparing Estimates for Works (Vote 10).

3. To the Director of Artillery the duty of preparing Estimates for Warlike Stores (Vote 9).

4. To the Director-General Army Medical Department the duty of preparing Estimates for Medical Services.

5. To the Director-General of Ordnance Factories the duty of preparing the Estimates for those Factories.

Under the Order in Council of the 21st November, 1895, the Adjutant-General is charged "with annually submitting proposals for the Establishments * * *,"—the duties of the Quartermaster-General, Inspector-General of Fortifications, and Inspector-General of Ordnance remaining as before,—and in these respects the Order in Council of the 7th March, 1899, made no difference. It, however, gave to the Director-General of Ordnance the Estimates for the Factories, and repeated the former Order assigning to the Director-General Army Medical Department the Estimates for Medical Services.

Finally, on the 12th October, 1901, an "Office Memorandum," assigned to the Army Board, "in addition to its present duties," the "consideration of—

1. The annual Estimates prepared by heads of departments, and the allocation of the sums allotted for military purposes, and

2. The establishments of officers and men of the Regular Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteer Forces."

When the time for preparing the Estimates comes round, *i.e.*, in the autumn, the Adjutant-General puts forward his proposals for the establishments for the ensuing year, *i.e.*, his schedule of the proposed strength of the various corps and arms ; and the other military branches designated put forward their estimates of proposed expenditure, which are considered and reviewed by the Finance Branch.

The establishments are translated into money by the Finance Branch, which is, in the main, responsible for the preparation of what may be called the Votes dealing with personnel, *i.e.* :—

Vote 1.—The pay of the Army generally.
" 2.—The pay of Medical Establishments
" 3.—The pay of Militia.
" 4.—The pay of Yeomanry.
" 5.—The pay of Volunteers.
" 11.—The pay of Educational Establishments.
" 12.—Miscellaneous Services.
" 13.—Pay of War Office Establishments.
Votes 14 to 16.—Non-Effective Services.

With regard to Votes 6 and 7 which deal with Transport and Provisions, and Votes 8 and 9, Clothing and Stores, and Vote 10, Works, the Votes are prepared by the Military and Finance branches in concert, the demand for any new service or increased expenditure coming primarily from the Military branch.

Under the procedure inaugurated in 1901, all Votes, with the new proposals, are considered by the Army Board, and submitted to the Secretary of State, who, in view of the funds available, refers the proposals back to the Army Board, and finally decides, in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, and his military advisers, what is to be accepted and what rejected.

Appendix D.

Though, however, the Orders in Council above quoted assign to various Military Departments the preparation of Annual Estimates for specific services, and the War Office Memorandum assigns to the Army Board the general consideration of those Estimates, yet it is not to be understood that new proposals for increased or altered expenditure are only put forward while the Annual Estimates are in preparation. New proposals come forward all through the year. If urgent and approved, and if money is available, they are, with Treasury consent if necessary, carried into immediate effect. If not urgent they are reported upon by the various branches concerned, and the cost is calculated, and if considered *prima facie* desirable, noted for consideration when the next year's Estimates are in progress. It would be generally in this way that any large and important proposal would be put forward.

The proposals that have thus accumulated during the year are epitomised and scheduled in the Finance Branch, and considered by the Army Board and Secretary of State, as forming, in embryo, part of the Estimates under consideration.

With regard to No. (2) of Mr. Holland's letter (1) of the 5th November, it is rather difficult for me, as a financial officer, to say what proposals have been put forward by the Military Branches for increasing the warlike and other stores. Primarily it would be for the Director-General of Ordnance, for instance, to say what he had demanded in any specific case; and the reasons for refusal, if refusal had ensued, could then, no doubt, be obtained. As far as our records go we can trace no scmo of reheserves antecedent to that of the Director-General of Ordnance at the beginning of 1900, which was considered by Sir F. Mowatt's Committee. Of course, the Committee will bear in mind that before the War the scale of preparation was based on a force of three Army Corps and four Cavalry Brigades for service at home, of which two Army Corps, a Cavalry Division, and some troops for Line of Communication were available for foreign service, and in the years 1896–1899 we had made all necessary provision for their equipment, *i.e.*, we had locked up in special storehouses the complete "mobilization equipment" the troops have in war, but not in peace. Besides this, we had very considerable stocks of other stores of all kinds, not especially as War Reserves, but as working stocks. On 31st March, 1899, the total value of the stores in storehouses was eight and a-half millions, of which nearly three millions was at Woolwich.

If the Commission so desire I will hand in a statement showing the reserves in question.

It was considered that the trade of the country would be able to meet any further requirements for stores not of a specially warlike character.

In certain cases, which lay outside ordinary trade sources of supply, demands for the war reserves then considered necessary for the force authorised were formulated by the Military Authorities, and sanctioned. Thus—

Horse and Field Artillery: Batteries.

In February, 1897, the then Secretary of State, Lord Landsdowne, approved, on the recommendation of the Army Board, of the provision of guns to complete the *war* reserve for three Army Corps at 10 per cent. of the equipment.

This was then laid down by the Military Authorities as sufficient. They seemed to have based their opinion on the loss of guns in previous wars. It will be remembered that the losses in South Africa have been practically unprecedented.

Horse and Field Artillery: Ammunition.

In 1897 the question of *war* reserves of ammunition for Horse and Field Batteries was considered. After reviewing the expenditure of such batteries in the Franco-Prussian War, Military Authority fixed the necessary scale at 200 rounds per gun reserve, in addition to 300 rounds per gun to be carried with batteries, ammunition columns and parks. Most of this was already in existence, and provision to complete was approved by Secretary of State in January, 1898.

In December, 1898, in connection with the conversion of batteries to a "quick-firing" system, the Military Authorities asked for an increase of the *equipment* from 300 to 450 rounds a gun. This involved provision of extra wagons, harness, &c., and was approved as a two years' programme for provision in Estimates 1899–1900 and 1900–1.

Small Arms.

Sir R. Buller, in 1895, put forward definite proposals for reserve arms on a scale which he said would be "ample" for war:—

Regulars - - -	Arm for arm.
Reservists, Militia, and Volunteers - -	One arm for every two.

The Militia scale was subsequently raised by the Army Board to "arm for arm."

A programme of manufacture providing for these reserves as well as for the equipment of the Volunteers with the magazine rifle was commenced in 1896. It was not complete when the war broke out, but even with the large new forces raised we never ran short of rifles.

Small-arm Ammunition.

In 1895 a scale of 400 rounds per rifle for units in the Field Army and other units in other proportions was laid down, and provision has been based on that scale from 1896 onwards.

The war came at a time when we were changing the pattern of ammunition from Mark V. to Mark II., but otherwise there was nothing to show that the accepted reserve was insufficient for the force contemplated.

The producing power of the country was gradually expanded until we could produce four millions a week, half in the Government Factory and half in contractors' works, without overtime, and of course at a pinch this output could be considerably increased.

From the time when the war was begun it may be said that no question of money stood in the way of supply in any direction.

Food Reserves.

With regard to food reserve, the Commission have doubtless received information from the representatives of the Quartermaster-General's Department. Reserves of preserved meat, biscuit, forage, &c., were held before the war for a force of 40,000 men and 20,000 horses, for varying periods.

This scale of reserves had existed for some years.

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(1) Royal Commission on the War in South Africa,
St. Stephen's House,
Victoria Embankment,
Westminster, S.W.,
5th November, 1902.

Sir,—

I understand from my interview with you to-day that the procedure followed previously to 1901 with regard to the compilation of estimates and the representation and discussion of requirements makes it impossible to furnish a statement in the formal shape suggested in my letter of the 3rd instant.

The Commission will, however, desire to hear from you—

1. What that procedure was, including the action of your department in the case of any proposals involving expenditure.
2. Whether in the years preceding the War any specific proposals for the expenditure of large sums on increasing the warlike and other stores were definitely put forward in writing by the heads of any of the military departments, and, if so, what was the result of such action.

If there are any records of such demands they should be produced.

I should be furnished by the 15th instant, if possible, with a short *précis* of any information which you are able to give on this subject, to form a basis for oral examination.

The Commission will expect you to attend on Wednesday, the 19th instant.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) Bernard Holland,
Secretary.

The Accountant-General of the Army,
War Office, S.W.

APPENDIX E.

COPY OF LETTER FROM COLONEL A. G. LUCAS, C.B., M.V.O., TO LORD ROBERTS ON THE QUESTION OF RAISING DRAFTS FOR THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY, AND AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF APPOINTING INSPECTORS-GENERAL OF AUXILIARY FORCES.

(*See Question No.* 6606.)

6th July, 1901.

Dear Lord Roberts,—I called at the War Office the other day on the chance of seeing you with regard to the question of raising drafts. In all the letters I have received from Colonel Deane he most strongly advocates the immediate commencement of raising drafts, and if this is decided upon, I do most strongly urge that it should be commenced at once in a quiet and properly organised manner, and that the men should be assembled at certain places for at least a month's instruction before they go to South Africa.

Last year, when the organisation was entirely in our own hands, and the men were kept at the Yeomanry Headquarters and received a month or six weeks' instruction, they were, as you know, ready for work when they got to South Africa, and I believe acquitted themselves to your satisfaction. This year, unfortunately, the organization was different, and altogether too hurried, and it was quite impossible, under the circumstances, to prevent a certain number of undesirable officers and men being sent out. This would be guarded against if we could get them together for a time, when the useless ones could very soon be spotted and made to resign.

The question of providing suitable officers for a force such as the Imperial Yeomanry should, I think, receive the most serious consideration of the authorities. Our position this year was one of great difficulty, as the field for obtaining efficient officers was narrowed down to very small limits, and the drain on officers of all branches of the Service during the last 18 months has, as you know, been very heavy indeed. The rate at which recruiting was carried on this year was very rapid; and from various quarters the Imperial Yeomanry Headquarter Staff was urged to keep pace with the recruiting of the men in submitting recommendations for officers' commissions, so that no less than 500 names of officers had to be put forward in about 80 days. As a consequence, the extreme speed which was pressed on us proved detrimental to the leisurely selection of officers, which appears to me absolutely essential in such cases, although no name was submitted to the War Office without the specific recommendation of one or more officers of experience.

I cannot help thinking some system of registration of officers of the Auxiliary Forces, prepared to serve abroad in cases of emergency, might be made so as to prevent in future the difficulties we had to contend with.

With the large proposed increase in the three branches of the Auxiliary Forces, I venture to suggest it would be of advantage if three Inspector-Generals were appointed instead of one, as at present; as humanly speaking it seems impossible for one man to properly consider and superintend such a large force as the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, numbering, as proposed, close on 350,000 men. The three branches of the Auxiliary Forces have each their own traditions and peculiarities, which, in a voluntary force, should, I think, not be ignored; and by having an Inspector-General for each branch, more sympathy and appreciation would probably be shown by one who had only to think of the interests of one branch instead of three, as at present.

Should my suggestion meet with favour, it would be worthy of consideration whether it would not be advisable to place the Inspector-General of Yeomanry under the command of the Inspector-General of Cavalry, and so get all the mounted forces under one head.

If this scheme were carried out, a special staff from the three branches of the Auxiliary Forces should be selected from the officers of those forces to assist their own Inspector-General, and so keep closer in touch with the wants which long service and connection with their own particular branch of the Service has taught them are advisable.

I trust you will pardon my making these suggestions, but having already recommended in my report on last year's organisation certain administrative changes, and from the experience which I have had in my connection with the organisation of the Imeprial Yeomanry Force during the last 18 months, I should feel I am not doing my duty if I did not mention these important points which have come before my notice, and I am only actuated, in writing to you, by the hope that my proposals may be of use to the Service.

(Signed) A. G. LUCAS.

Appendi . F.

APPENDIX F.

CORRESPONDENCE between Colonel Lucas, C.B., M.V.O., and the War Office on the Question of Drafts for the Imperial Yeomanry.

(*See Question No.* 6511.)

Proposals to Raise more Imperial Yeomanry in 1900 as Drafts to the First Contingent, and War Office Letters declining the Offers.

[EXTRACT.]

"Imperial Yeomanry,
"2nd May, 1900.

No. 124A. "5. I am, however, to point out for the consideration of the Secretary of State for War that no arrangements have been made for the supply of drafts to the Imperial Yeomanry in the field, as the total number of men sent to the base have, with few exceptions, been specially enlisted therefor, and not for combatant duties. The Committee therefore await instructions from the War Office as to what is to be done in this matter, as, if the base depôt establishments are to be utilised for drafts at the front, they cannot be made available for remount organisation at the Cape.

"I have, etc.
(Signed) "A. G. LUCAS, D.A.G., I.Y."

"The Secretary of State for War,
"War Office."

Imperial Yeomanry,
16th May, 1900.

No. 134A Sir,—I am directed by the Committee of the Imperial Yeomanry to invite attention to the concluding paragraph of this Office letter, No. 124a, dated the 2nd of May, 1900, stating that instructions from the War Office are awaited as to what is to be done in the matter of the provision of drafts for the Imperial Yeomanry Forces in the field.

A telegram has been received from the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications, asking that more men may be sent to the Base Depôt, and that they should be enlisted for general service, as they are required at the front. Report has also been received that 150 men have been sent to Bloemfontein from the base to supply drafts required at the front. Under these circumstances, the Committee do not at present know whether more enlistments ought to be made in London for the purpose of supplying drafts in South Africa or not, and I am to request the favour of an early reply to the paragraph in this Office letter referred to.

The total strength of the Force, enrolled and despatched to date, amounts to 10,346, and there only remain 66 to be sent out to complete the strength authorised by the War Office, Base Depôt inclusive.

I have, etc.,
(Signed) A. G. LUCAS, Colonel,
D.A.G., I.Y.

The Under Secretary of State for War,
War Office.

War Office,
London, S.W.,
21st May, 1900.

079/10/1790. 1 Sir,—I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th inst., No. 134a, relating to the provision of drafts to make up losses in units of Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa.

In reply, I am to inform you that, after careful consideration of the matter, it has been decided to utilise the existing recruiting agencies for this purpose, and any recruits hereafter enlisted for the Imperial Yeomanry will be raised under arrangements made by this Department, and will be sent to Aldershot to be trained and formed into drafts.

Under these circumstances, Lord Lansdowne does not propose to ask your Committee to furnish any further drafts for South Africa.

I am, etc.,
(Signed) F. S. ROBB,
D.A.A.G., for A.G.

The Secretary,
Imperial Yeomanry Committee.

Imperial Yeomanry,
19th December, 1900.

Sir,—I have the honour to submit for your consideration the question as to whether it may not appear desirable, with reference to recent occurrences in South Africa, to increase the strength of the Imperial Yeomanry in that country to a figure which will make good the casualties which have occurred up to this date. No. 186.

Those casualties have, up till the 12th inst., amounted to 20 per cent. of the entire strength of the Force, so far as information on the subject is available here. It is probable, however, that sickness and other causes have still further reduced the strength of the Force, and that the casualties up to date may be computed at about 30 per cent.

Should it be considered desirable to make good these losses, I am prepared to arrange for the enlistment of drafts to the extent of from 3,000 to 5,000 men with the least possible delay. Past experience shows, with regard to the organisation of Imperial Yeomanry, under the Committee appointed by the War Office, that had not recruiting been stopped in May last a much larger Force could have been obtained. Irrespective of the numbers raised at the recruiting centres of the Imperial Yeomanry, the Committee received, and declined, offers from various gentlemen to raise Forces amounting to over 5,000 men. There would, in my opinion, be very little difficulty in obtaining a further Force to this extent in the same manner as was previously arranged, and all that would be necessary is the approval of the War Office to the capitation allowances previously given, and sanction to a small supplementary establishment at this office for the purpose required. The system by which the men could be raised is well known, and the preparation of the report on which I am now engaged gives all details of the method under which a similar Force to that sent out could be rapidly organised.

If active military operations in South Africa continue, it will, I assume, be necessary to relieve many of the regiments of the Regular Service which have endured considerable hardships for over a year. The men of the Imperial Yeomanry enlisted for a period of a year, or for as long as the war might last. I have no doubt that a large proportion of the Force would more willingly continue on active service, provided they knew that their losses were made good, and that it was the inten-

tion of the Government to keep them in the field with replenished ranks, as has been the case with the Regular Service. The Force has, however, been practically allowed almost to die out, and I trust, under the circumstances, I may be excused for pointing out what has occurred in the past, with reference to the supply of drafts for the Yeomanry.

079/10/ f 10th ary It was at one time decided that drafts should be provided at the calculation of 10 per cent. of the original numbers (10,000) which embarked. This involved the provision of a Force of the total strength of 11,608 men, as shown in the letter from the Imperial Yeomanry Committee, dated 27th March, 1900. Subsequently, however, this strength was reduced, and it was settled that no more than 10,500 men, Base Depôt included, should be enlisted for service in South Africa.

079/10/ In a letter from the War Office, dated 21st May, 1900, it was decided that if any more recruits were required they would be enlisted for the Imperial Yeomanry, under arrangements to be made by the War Office, but, so far as I am aware, none were thus obtained, and, there fore, with the casualties referred to in paragraph 1 of this letter, the strength of the Force in the field must be now a very attenuated one.

I am, therefore, encouraged to make the offer referred to regarding raising more men, feeling fully assured that, with the sanction and support of the War Office, a further efficient contingent of mounted men could be obtained in the manner already set forth.

I have, etc.,
(Signed) ALFRED G. LUCAS, Colonel,
D.A.G., I.Y.

To the Under Secretary of State for War.

War Office,
28th December, 1900.

/4943. Sir,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th inst., and to express the thanks of the Secretary of State for War for the suggestions you put forward with regard to the re-opening of recruiting for the Imperial Yeomanry, and the despatch of drafts to South Africa.

Appendix F.

As, however, steps are being taken to enrol a large number of men for service in the South African Constabulary, Mr. Brodrick is of opinion that it is not desirable to recommence recruiting for the Imperial Yeomanry.

I am, etc.,
(Signed) H. BORRETT,
I.G.R.

Colonel A. G. Lucas.

War Office Letters appointing Colonel Lucas, General Badcock, and Colonel Deane to a Committee to assist in raising Drafts for the Imperial Yeomanry.

"War Office,
"London, S.W.,
15th January, 1901.

"Sir,—I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to inform you that he has nominated you to serve on a Committee which he has appointed to assist in raising drafts for the Imperial Yeomanry. With you on this Committee will be associated Lieut.-General Badcock and Colonel Thomas Deane, C.B. 079/10/5475.

"The Committee will meet at once, and will advise as to the best way of obtaining the men, rates of pay, term of enlistment, etc.

"I am, etc.,
(Signed) "G. FLEETWOOD WILSON.

"Colonel A. G. Lucas,
"Deputy Adjutant-General, Imperial Yeomanry."

A similar letter was also sent to Lieut.-Gen. Badcock and Colonel Deane.

APPENDIX G.

Appendix G.

REMARKS ON MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE ORGANISATION OF THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY FORCE OF 1901 IN SOUTH AFRICA.

1. This Appendix has been written in connection with the following War Office letter:—

War Office, London, S.W., March 18th, 1901.

Sir,—

79 I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to
nanry inform you that the Commander-in-Chief has approved
70 of your being employed on special service in South Africa in connection with the Imperial Yeomanry.

You will report your arrival to the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa and take his instructions.

I am, etc.,
(Signed) J. H. LAYE, D.A.G.

Colonel T. DEANE, C.B.,
U.S.C., I.S. Corps, etc.

Appendix G.

Constitution of the Force.

The Appendices mentioned in this Report will be found in the Supplementary Report of the Deputy Adjutant General of the Imperial Yeomanry dated 1903, 1458.)

Formation.

2. The constitution of the new Yeomanry force in April, 1901, was that of its formation into 17 battalions, comprising in all 96 squadrons, *vide* Appendix No. 54.

Battalions. Squadrons.

3. The battalions were of various establishments, some being composed of four squadrons, and others of double that number. The squadrons were located over the country in positions where they were most required; thus, in some instances, a battalion might have one squadron at Graff Reinet, and another at Springfontein, and a third at Kimberley. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for the battalions to be worked as units complete, and they may, therefore, be said to have been thus organised more for administrative purposes, than anything else. Orders were received in May, from Army Headquarters, that all officers and men of the old Yeomanry were to be allowed to proceed home. In some instances, individuals were sent separately, as opportunity occurred, and in other, the remnants of the old squadrons, or battalions, were sent home complete. Various squadrons were distributed throughout the districts, and were with the several columns in the field, along the Pretoria-Naauwpoort line, down as far as Graff Reinet; on the lines to the westward between Johannesburg, Krugersdorp, and Klerkesdorp, and on the eastern lines, between Elandsfontein, Standerton, Harrismith, and Bethlehem; also from De Aar, northwards. Such stations as Kimberley and Mafeking, as far as Zeerust, were also garrisoned by squadrons of Yeomanry, ready to operate from these bases as they might be most required. Wynburg and Fitzburg, to the south-east of the main line, were also occupied by squadrons of the force, as may be seen from Appendix No. 55, which shows the names of the commanders of the various columns and their location. These squadrons were visited, as far as possible, by the Inspector-General of the Imperial Yeomanry, or by officers whom he deputed, for the purpose of ascertaining their requirements.

Distribution.

Organisation

4. With regard to this constitution of the force, there can be little doubt that, when it was possible to keep the battalions together, the regimental organisation answered best. Each unit was complete in itself, and had a sufficient staff, which was answerable for its well-being in all respects. The regimental unit, also, had perhaps a greater *esprit-de-corps* than that of the smaller squadron unit, but the latter was that which was found most useful in the field with the various columns. The strength of the new squadrons was increased to 155 all told, officers included, the old strength being 121. The increased strength was found better for work in the field, and, as the proportion of officers was not increased, it had the advantage of requiring less officers for the whole of the new force than would have been the case if the strength had remained as originally fixed. The difficulties in obtaining experienced officers for squadron commands were considerable, and these were eased by the new system introduced.

Increased strength of squadrons.

Squadron Commanders.

Permanent Yeomany.

5. It may be observed that in the establishment of the new Yeomanry force, authorised in the War Office order dated 17th April, 1901, the total number of all ranks per squadron, officers included, is 142. It would, perhaps, be better to fix the future strength at 155, in accord with what has been found to be the actual requirements of field service. This would increase the strength of each regiment by 52 men, making the total 648 instead of 596; the number of officers allowed per squadron, viz., 5, remaining the same.

6. In Appendix No. 60 is shown the constitution of the various divisions and brigades in the field and the operating columns to which the various squadrons of Yeomanry were attached during April, 1901. From this it will be seen how the Yeomanry force was divided, and how difficult, if not impossible, it was to keep regiments of Yeomanry intact. The appendix referred to shows the organisation of the forces during the specified period, but subsequent events often necessitated the transfer of the squadrons from one column to another, as circumstances might require. In one case, the second brigade of Major-General Elliott's division contained a brigade of Yeomanry of 12 squadrons; General Rundle's force at Harrismith had also two regiments of Yeomanry comprising 9 squadrons.

Officers.

Rank.

7. There is nothing in connection with the organisation of the new force of the Imperial Yeomanry which has been more generally discussed than the position of officers, and it cannot be said that the system of grading them has given satisfaction. In paragraph 157 of the former report the difficulties of the subject were pointed out, and it was admitted that a remedy to the method of making appointments adopted by the War Office was not apparent. Certain suggestions were, however, there made which it was thought, if adopted, might have mitigated the difficulties recently felt. This system was found to work in many respects with inconvenience.

Difficult of the situatio

8. The position of the officers of the new force is explained in paragraph 13 of Army Order dated 17th January, 1901 (see Appendix No. 6), whereby it was ruled that one second Lieutenant per section of 110 men would be given the temporary rank of Captain until arrival in South Africa, when all acting ranks were to cease. The officers who came out in charge of sections with the acting rank of Captain often had to perform what was practically Squadron Commander's work for a considerable period prior to their being posted to their regular squadrons as subalterns. In some instances these acting Captains thus remained in command of many hundreds of men, but according to the strict ruling of the Order referred to, they were not entitled to the temporary rank of Captain, and under the Order quoted were not allowed the pay of the temporary grades while performing Captain's duties. This was felt to be a hardship, and gave rise to a considerable amount of ill-feeling.

Tempor ranks.

9. In other instances officers of more than twelve months' previous experience in the field in South Africa found themselves junior as 2nd Lieutenants to others who had no experience in the field whatever, and who, moreover, knew little of horsemanship or of musketry. Endeavour was, of course, made to post to the permanent squadrons the most capable officers in accordance with their seniority and qualification, but this could not always be done, for it takes some time to correctly ascertain the ability of the various officers for positions of responsibility in the field.

Future grading Officers.

10. The question of how Yeomanry officers should in future be graded to prevent the occurrence of such difficulties as are here brought to notice is an intricate one, and it is difficult to make any definite suggestion whereby all the drawbacks referred to can be overcome. Possibly the best manner of solving the question would be to assemble a committee of officers who have had experience of dealing with the matter on service, in view to a report being submitted showing what is thought most suitable.

Propose Commit

Selectio South A

11. It may be here noted with regard to the officers referred to, that when the new force was raised in England, about 500 officers had to be appointed at the rate of three 2nd Lieutenants per 110 men, irrespective of the one Captain and one Lieutenant for that number, who had to be nominated by the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. The selection of officers in South Africa was a comparatively easy matter to that which had to be accomplished in London. Officers who had proved themselves capable in the field were nominated to the grades referred to by the Commander-in-Chief, and others who were thought likely to eventually become fit for these positions were nominated on probation, and were attached to the Imperial Yeomanry camp at Elandsfontein to be there reported on as to their likelihood of proving fit for permanent commissions. In London, however, the situation was different. The War Office placed restrictions on the selection of officers to be made, none belonging to embodied Militia regiments were allowed to be chosen, those who belonged to the Reserve of Officers were mostly required for the Regular forces, and those who were borne on the rolls of the latter were, of course, ineligible for selection. There, therefore, only remained officers of unembodied Militia battalions, Volunteer officers, and Yeomanry officers to select from, together with a certain proportion of non-commissioned officers and men belonging to the Imperial Yeomanry who had returned to England, and who were specially recommended for selection. A very limited number of

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Yeomanry officers were, however, available, as most of those wishing to serve had gone out with the first force.

12. The method of selection from this restricted field was that of obtaining from each individual a form, duly filled in, showing that he had some previous service in the forces referred to, that he was medically fit, and that his application was backed up by the Commanding Officer under whom he had previously served, or by some other officer whose opinion was likely to be of value, and who was prepared to vouch for his capabilities. When the selections were made, the names of the candidates, with a statement of their qualifications, were forwarded to the War Office, whose decisions on the recommendations made were awaited. In very few cases were any objections made to the names sent in.

13. Large numbers of applications were rejected for want of the necessary certificates, and on the whole it may be said that there was the greatest difficulty in obtaining the large number of officers required within the short space of about two months. It is very doubtful whether any better system could have been enforced than that alluded to, and it is believed that, although in some instances the officers recommended were found in South Africa to be unfit for their positions, the percentage of rejections was, under the circumstances, comparatively small for men who were expected to be ready to take the field after a period of training, which, however, they were unable to obtain either at Aldershot or Elandsfontein.

14. The directions in which the officers mostly failed were those of capability to command and powers of instructing their men, due, of course, to want of experience and opportunities of obtaining these necessary qualifications. In many instances officers were found deficient in horsemanship, and this added much to their difficulties of properly exercising their commands in the field. It would have been better to have appointed the second Lieutenants on probation, in view of their possible rejection, or to their being graded in accordance with the capabilities they might have shown in camp or elsewhere, promotion being based on *merit* alone.

15. This matter of the appointment of officers in large numbers for any future force will have to be carefully considered, with reference to the defects which have been found in those sent out with the 1901 force of Yeomanry. It is believed that one of the most difficult questions of Army reform has always been where to obtain trained officers in sufficient numbers for any large force suddenly called upon to take the field. The selection of officers for the original force of the Yeomanry was conducted in very much the same manner as that here alluded to, but the first force was a smaller one, and required fewer officers. Many of those obtained were of high social standing, and the number of applications for commissions from such during the enthusiasm which the war created was far greater than when the second supply was required. Socially, the officers of the second selection were, as a whole, much inferior; moreover, many of them, with the auxiliary forces from which they were selected, had comparatively few opportunities of exercising command, or of learning horsemanship. Under these circumstances, it is scarcely to be wondered at that there was a certain percentage of nominations which were not altogether satisfactory, or which, perhaps, had better not have been made at all. The alternative, however, was to admit that the supply of officers fit for their position was exhausted, and possibly to recommend that all further nominations should be made by the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa from men in the ranks who had proved themselves worthy of promotion, and who were thus capable of exercising command in the field owing to the opportunities they had gained of learning what was required on actual field service. This plan might have proved more satisfactory than the one adopted of obtaining officers from the auxiliary forces who were not up to the required standard.

16. It must at the same time, however, be borne in mind that it was originally intended to thoroughly test the capabilities of officers and men during a period of training at Aldershot or Elandsfontein. At Aldershot this was not found feasible, the accommodation being of a comparatively limited character, and the object sought being to equip and draft away both officers and men as rapidly as possible, in order to make room for others who were being recruited within a very short period, and to satisfy the urgent demand for troops from England. Doubtless had time been available to test the qualifications of both officers and men at Aldershot, some might have been weeded out with satisfactory results, and at Elandsfontein, if given two months' training, as was the original plan, better results still would have been obtained. Service requirements were such, however, that nearly all had to be drafted away to the various columns within a few days. By appointing the officers on probation, instead of gazetting them to Army rank at once, it might have been easier to have dispensed with the services of those who had not the required qualifications, than was the case in several instances.

Appendix G.

Capabilities

17. It is no easy matter in the Regular service to at once ascertain the capabilities of officers, socially or otherwise. Time and actual tests are necessary before a correct opinion can be arrived at as to the probability of those concerned being eventually fit for their positions. This time was not available for the Yeomanry force, and therefore it is all the more necessary to carefully consider how such large numbers of trained officers can be obtained in a short period in future. It has been suggested as a possible alternative that under any future similar conditions both officers and men might be recruited under an engagement to proceed to the seat of operations, subject to their being finally approved after, say, two months' trial, and that until finally approved they should not receive full pay, but only a small retaining fee. Short of the application of the actual test of this plan, it is difficult to say whether such conditions would secure a better supply of officers and men in the required numbers. There seems little doubt, however, that they would not have been obtained with the same rapidity had such a course been adopted, and the requirements of the position at the time being were such that the early recruitment of the large number decided on was of primary importance.

Appointment on probation.

Gradual drafts.

18. These circumstances seem all to point to the desirability of obtaining gradual and regular drafts, both in officers and men, for any force the constitution of which is once definitely fixed. It is possible to obtain gradually a better supply of both, than it is to collect a large force in a brief period. For this reason it is thought that in future the supply required for any force should be fixed at whatever percentage may be thought necessary, and that the percentage wanted should be gradually obtained and despatched to the front. All authorities consulted seem to agree in this opinion, and for the sake of true efficiency it is hoped that it may in future be adopted.

Undesirable officers.

19. Up to December, 1901, the number of inefficient or undesirable officers sent home from South Africa was, according to returns received from the War Office, 42, or about 8 per cent. on the total number appointed. Close enquiries were made into these cases, all necessary information on each individual's case being forwarded to the War Office (*vide* Appendix No. 3). These cases were carefully enquired into by a War Office Committee, in view of those who have been responsible for faulty selections of officers being called on for explanations.

Commissions in the line.

20. A considerable number of applications were made by officers of the Imperial Yeomanry for commissions into the Line, and the rules regarding these are in Appendix No. 50. When the candidates concerned were thought to have the necessary social and other qualifications, and to have done good service in the field, their names were sent in for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, with the necessary certificates attached in the form which he had laid down. In the case of officers of the new Yeomanry Force, it was decided that no names should be sent in until the General, or other officer commanding in the field, had had sufficient opportunities of judging the capabilities of the officers concerned for commissions, and this rule was also applied to non-commissioned officers and men of the Imperial Yeomanry, many of whom were applicants for commissions in that force. Commissions in it

Commissions from the ranks.

Appendix G.

were, in many cases, given to those who had done good service in the field, and who had proved themselves capable of exercising command, and it would, perhaps, have been better to have made a much larger selection from individuals of this class than from those of the limited field of selection which was fixed for the officers appointed in England.

Miscellaneous applications.

21. Many officers of the new force of Imperial Yeomanry also applied for employment in other departments, such as Transport, Remounts, Army Service Corps, Government farms, and various other appointments, for they had ascertained officers were wanted. As a rule, these applicants were such as were doubtful of their own capability of exercising command in the field, who felt that they had not sufficient military training, or who were indifferent horsemen. Every endeavour was made to meet the wishes of these officers, without prejudice to the efficiency of the departments referred to. There were some who, although not sufficiently trained or experienced to exercise command of Yeomanry on service, were capable of undertaking less responsible work where sedentary business had to be conducted in offices, such as the Transport, Railway Staff, etc. Many applications were also received from officers to be allowed to serve with the county corps with which, although they had not originally put down their names, they wished, owing to past associations, to be connected. These applications were, as far as possible, complied with, and much the same may be said regarding similar applications from a large number of non-commissioned officers and men.

Selections from men outside the Army.

22. It is open to question whether selections of officers might not, to some extent, have been made from gentlemen of good social position, accustomed to the hunting-field and to horses, good shots, and used to outdoor pursuits, although deficient in military training. Had selection been made in this manner, there is no doubt men of a better social class would have been obtained. The ordinary Volunteer officer, from which class many were selected, is neither a horseman nor has he generally any eye for a country. The majority of officers thus selected were unable to ride well, and although with training they might have become proficient, time was not available to make them so. On the other hand, those who were at home in the saddle readily picked up the comparatively simple drill which is required to work men in open ranks and extended order. It must be recognised that Volunteer and Militia officers know little or nothing about mounted work, and when they have, in addition, to learn riding themselves before exercising command, they are more handicapped than the gentleman who is at least accustomed to the saddle and to the general care of horses. Instances are not wanting in which very good officers were obtained from a class which had no previous military training whatever. This was notably the case in many of the South African contingents, which did not always select their officers on account of military qualifications, but because they were good all-round men, accustomed to shooting and riding, and such as their men would readily follow.

Selection from the ranks.

23. A large selection might, perhaps, also have been made from capable non-commissioned officers in the old force under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. The number of officers he had to nominate for the new force was about 150 in the grades of captain and lieutenant. It would have been better to have selected from this class also a proportion of 2nd lieutenants, instead of sending over 500 from England. The only difficulty in doing so would, perhaps, have been that the best men would not have accepted commissions, as most were anxious for a term at home before again commencing work.

Causes of failure.

24. Those who failed from the English nominations were mainly of three classes: (I) those socially unfitted, who did not secure the necessary respect of their men; (II) those who proved unreliable owing to inebriety or monetary difficulties; and (III) those who were unable to ride, and had not sufficient training to be entrusted with the command of men. The third class was, perhaps, the largest, but it may be said that many amongst them would have become efficient had time been available to instruct them. The military riding-schools in the Regular service often contain novices in the art of horsemanship not much better than was observed in the Yeomanry. Two or three months' instruction would have made many of the inefficients fair horsemen; this period was, however, not available, and so it must be recognised that in future it is almost impossible to secure, within a brief period, capable trained horsemen from the limited field of selection fixed. In the same way it may be also said that it is impossible to secure officers and non-commissioned officers, in any large numbers, sufficiently trained to instruct and efficiently command their untrained men. The Regular officer often learns his work from his own non-commissioned officers and men; the Yeomanry officer, often comparatively untrained himself, has really to instruct those under him in almost everything *de novo*. This is the difficulty which should be recognised.

APPENDIX H.

DOCUMENTS PUT IN BY FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS, K.G., IN CONNECTION WITH HIS STATEMENT AS TO HIS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Copy of Memorandum by Sir ALFRED MILNER, dated 4th February 1900, and addressed to LORD ROBERTS.

(*See Question* 10,843, *page* 462.)

Government House, Cape Town,
4th February, 1900.

THE FIELD MARSHAL COMMANDING IN CHIEF.

As almost the whole of the forces in the Colony will soon be at the front, and headquarters will also be removed to the north, I wish once more to call attention to the weakness of the position in the rear of our fighting forces, in the hope that you may give instructions to have it strengthened as effectively and as promptly as possible in your absence.

I often hear it said that the danger of rebellion in the Colony is now over. That is not my opinion. I consider that with every month that the war lasts without decisive result—and an immediate result is out of the question—the danger of rebellion increases.

It is quite true, that I expected rebellion before now. I never believed that after the Stormberg-Magersfontein-Colenso week the Colony could have kept quiet. I am sure that it was only the knowledge that large additional forces were coming which kept it quiet. The fear of fresh forces coming in from England is now greatly diminished.

It has been freely stated, over and over again, by people well acquainted with the Dutch mind, that the Colonial rebels would wait till the British troops were well to the front, and then attempt to cut them off by a general rising directed against the line of communications. Such an idea is eminently in accordance with Dutch habits of thought and methods of warfare.

I do not indeed believe in any concerted scheme for a rising, but I do believe that the idea is deeply rooted in the minds of the people, and needs very little to give it concrete form. If there were a small revolt anywhere, which was locally successful, the thing would spread like wildfire.

Further, it may be taken as an axiom that, wherever a fairly strong commando of the enemy appears, the Dutch population will join it *en masse*.

Widespread rebellion in the Colony means two things:

(1) Our lines of communication exposed to constant danger, and perhaps permanently interrupted;

(2) A large access of fighting men to the ranks of the enemy.

I believe it is perfectly possible to prevent such a catastrophe, but hitherto attention has been so preponderatingly directed to the fighting line that the protection of the Colony has only been temporarily, and so to speak, accidentally, provided for. The large bodies of troops passing through it have incidentally tended to discourage rebellion. But this influx will presently cease, and, unless some of the forces now arriving are so disposed as to render a serious rising in the Colony impossible, we shall from now to the end of the campaign be running a grave and wholly unnecessary risk, and one which will increase in gravity with every forward step our army takes beyond the Orange River.

The danger in the Colony is absolutely ubiquitous. There is no part of it in which the Dutch population are not rebels at heart, and would not rise against us if they saw a chance.

Under these circumstances, it is absolutely idle to rely upon the method of stationary defensive forces. One or two points of supreme importance, such as the ports, must, of course, be garrisoned. But to garrison the whole of the Colony would require 50,000 men. Probably one-tenth of that force, *if mobile and always ready*, would be equally effective.

There are two main objects which, in my opinion, should be constantly kept in view:—

(1) To keep the enemy out;

(2) To have a sufficient force stationed at two or three central points, and capable of being moved at a moment's notice, to deal with any local rising at the outset and prevent the flame spreading.

As regards (1), I have so often inflicted my views on this subject upon you that I need add little on that point. There are two points of danger, as regards invasion. One is the Stormberg-Steynsburg corner, which is by far the more important of the two. A commando successfully getting past Gatacre on his left would raise the whole of the Midlands and bring 10,000 recruits to the enemy, besides cutting the portions of the Colony remaining to us into two halves and making co-operation between them impossible. This danger can, of course, only be guarded against by the forces under Gatacre and by any force which we may be able to leave on the Naauwpoort-Steynsburg-Stormberg cross line, which I hope may be strengthened as further troops arrive.

The other danger of invasion is from the north-west—*i.e.*, the country just across the Orange River from Prieska to the German boundary. As regards this region, I have nothing to add to the representations already made to you.

Independently of invasion, there is no part of the Colony in which it can be said that the Dutch are more or less likely to rise than they are in another. The only thing is to be ready for them anywhere, from East London to Port Nolloth. This looks impossible, but it is not really so difficult as it looks, for any local rising, unaided from without, would not at first consist of great numbers, and the rebels would have but few magazine rifles and *no cannon*. Small but well-armed mounted forces with a gun or two would make short work of any of them, if brought up in time. The South-East district of the Colony may be regarded as sufficiently provided for by the Local Defence Corps already raised there, when they have recovered, as they soon will, from the withdrawal of a number of their members to swell the ranks of Brabant's force or of the Orange River Column.

In the rest of the Colony such local forces cannot be raised. If these parts are to be occupied at all in a military sense, it must be by some of the troops coming from across the sea.

At present only the railway lines are held by small detachments of infantry. These are not available to go any, even a small, distance from their stations. A whole countryside might be in revolt, but till the rebels actually attacked the line, they might be gathering and organising with impunity.

In my opinion, it is not enough merely to guard the lines. The most efficient way of guarding a line may be to strike a blow at some considerable distance from it.

My idea of the best way to keep the country quiet, and at the same time guard the lines, is as follows:—Select three or four central points at or near one of the main lines and establish a training camp at each of them. It should be an entrenched camp with a certain amount of supplies in reserve, so that, at an emergency, it could hold out for a few weeks against even a considerable force of the enemy.

Place in each such camp a militia battalion, some yeomanry (say three hundred), and half a field battery, with one or two machine guns; also a small body of

Appendix H.

Colonial mounted troops, as scouts, who might, as a rule, be raised in the neighbourhood. Let them all practice as hard as possible, especially in shooting and getting to know the country. Professedly every such camp should be merely a stationary garrison and training ground. But really it should be so organised that the artillery and mounted men, with or without a portion of the infantry, could be off at any moment up or down the line, and within a certain area of country on either side of it, to deal at once with any local trouble, the rest of the infantry remaining to guard the camp.

The best localities for such camps would be a matter for careful consideration. I am not by any means sure which would be the best, but, if only to illustrate my idea, I will mention a few possible sites. These are Cradock, Graaf Reinet, the neighbourhood of Hex River, and Carnarvon, but there are a number of others which might be considered. Carnarvon, no doubt, is not on any railway, and, as a rule, it would be better to stick to the main lines; but, on the other hand, it has always seemed to me that the total absence of any force to the left of the great western trunk-line, the fact that the line itself is, so to speak, our military boundary, without as much as an outpost in front of it, is strategically an unsound position. I think, therefore, that one strong post at least should be established well to the west of the line, though whether it should be at Carnarvon, Fraserburg, or some other point in that region, is a question on which I have an open mind.

Assuming there were four such posts, they would only require altogether some 5,000 men and two batteries, while they would enormously strengthen the position in the Colony during the approaching months. And the men stationed in them would all the time be learning their duties, and to know the country. They would thus be growing steadily more efficient to take their places in the front, if wanted to do so. The above may not be the best way of proceeding against the danger I have indicated. If so some other and better plan can doubtless be devised. My object is to direct attention to the matter, so that some system may be decided on for utilising such of the forces which will shortly be arriving, as are not absolutely required at the front, to guard the rest of the country in the most effective manner, and the manner most economical of numbers. If the general lines are laid down, the business could and ought to be proceeded with, while you are directing the more important operation to the front, without your being appealed to at every moment about details. If successful, the result should be to leave our main Field Force absolutely free to deal with the enemy in front without anxiety about its lines of railway communication or anything in its rear, and at the same time to prevent the enemy from drawing any further support from the Colony.

(Sd.) A. M.

4.2.1900.

COPY OF MEMORANDUM BY LORD ROBERTS, DATED 5th FEBRUARY 1900 IN REPLY TO SIR ALFRED MILNER.

Head Quarters, Cape Town,
5th February, 1900.

With reference to the High Commissioner's memorandum, dated 4th February, 1900, on the political and military position of affairs in Cape Colony, and the possible result of offensive action on a large scale in the direction of the Orange Free State, I recognise that the force at my disposal does not, at the present moment, admit of the Colony being held as strongly as would otherwise be desirable; and I can understand His Excellency's feeling of insecurity and his apprehension that the removal of regular troops may encourage the disloyal, and lead to local risings which, if left unchecked, may rapidly spread over a considerable area.

On the other hand, it seems unquestionable that the war cannot be brought to an end without prompt and decisive offensive action, and I observe that, in the High Commissioner's opinion, the longer the war lasts the greater is the danger of rebellion within the limits of the Colony.

Unless, moreover, immediate steps are taken for the relief of Kimberley, that place must fall into the enemy's hands. From the latest reports which I have received it would appear that the garrison cannot hold out beyond the end of the present month, and even now food supplies have to be carefully economised and reduced rations issued to the troops and civil population. Then, again, until Kimberley is relieved, Lord Methuen's force cannot be used for the general purposes of the campaign, and by operating through the Orange Free State I hope not only to extricate that force and to relieve Kimberley, but also to lessen the hostile pressure on Ladysmith, and enable Sir Redvers Buller to join hands with Sir George White. A serious rising in the Cape Colony is a problematical danger, while the fall of Kimberley and Ladysmith, which is inevitable unless those places can be relieved at an early date, would produce a far-reaching effect not only on the inhabitants of South Africa, but on the prestige of the British Army and on the prospects of the war. I am convinced that our only chance of striking a decisive blow is to carry the war into the enemy's country, and that action of this nature must necessarily lessen the risk of internal disaffection, inasmuch as, if the Boers are fully occupied in opposing our field army, they will be unable to render assistance to rebels in the Cape Colony, and without such assistance, as Sir Alfred Milner remarks, local risings are unlikely to occur, or, if they do occur, to be of a formidable description.

The High Commissioner thinks that the stoppage in the influx of fresh troops, combined with the withdrawal of troops for field operations, will encourage the disaffected and give the Dutch population the opportunity for which they have been waiting. On this point I would observe that, exclusive of the force which is being concentrated for offensive action on the Western railway line, every available man is being employed to strengthen the positions in rear and to guard the Midland and Eastern lines of communication. Reinforcements are arriving from England and the Colonies, and will continue to do so throughout the current month. No less than 15 batteries of Field Artillery and two companies of Garrison Artillery will reach Cape Town between the present date and the 19th instant. Artillery is also coming from New South Wales, Canada, and New Zealand. In addition to the City Imperial Volunteers, a large body of Yeomanry is being despatched from home, and Mounted Infantry from almost every Colony as well as India. The three Field Batteries which are expected on February 8th will go to the Orange River and De Aar; and the two Field Batteries and two Garrison Companies which are expected on the 12th will be allotted to Cape Town and the lines of communication; the two Field Batteries which are expected on the 13th will be quartered at Naauwpoort for service towards the Eastern Railway line; and of the five Field Batteries which are expected on the 18th, two will be sent to the Orange River, and three to East London to strengthen General Gatacre. Three Howitzer Batteries arriving the following day will be sent to Naauwpoort for any service that may be required. The Colonial and City Imperial Artillery will be placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication. Six more Militia battalions are expected in the course of this month, and I have asked that additional battalions may be sent out with the least possible delay. These troops will be available to strengthen the garrison of the Colony, which, by the end of this month, will be augmented to the extent of at least 10,000 men. It will be seen, therefore, that Sir Alfred Milner is mistaken in supposing that the influx of troops is about to cease, and as regards the unnecessary risk to which he alludes, I can only say that, so far as the means at my disposal will allow, I am as anxious to provide for the summary repression of rebellion within the Colony as to defeat the enemy outside the Colony. If I succeed in attaining the latter object, I shall go far towards securing the former, but the converse does not hold good. For this reason I consider it a sounder policy to incur some slight risk of internal disturbance than for the purpose of avoiding such a risk to abandon Kimberley, or endeavour to relieve it with an insufficient force.

With respect to the High Commissioner's remarks on the location and mobility of the Colonial garrisons

and the formation of training camps at certain strategic points, it may be observed that arrangements have been made for guarding those portions of the frontier which are specially liable to attack, that the other important centres are being held, that sufficient transport is being supplied to the troops employed for defensive purposes, and that the idea of forming the camps suggested by His Excellency will be carefully considered and acted on as reinforcements become available. As soon as a senior officer can be spared he will be ordered to Cape Town to organise and command the Imperial Yeomanry and to distribute them as Lieut.-General Forestier-Walker may consider expedient, after consultation with the High Commissioner. The City Imperial Infantry is being sent to Naauwpoort. Lieut.-General Gatacre is also getting more Field Artillery, which will enable him to keep his left clear of the enemy, and, as His Excellency is aware, Brigadier-General Brabant is about to move by General Gatacre's right to assist him in clearing his front. I agree with Sir Alfred Milner in thinking that the occupation of a position to the left of the Western Line would be desirable, whether at Prieska, Carnarvon, or somewhere closer to the railway. The Northern section of the line is protected by the Orange River and De Aar garrisons, which are not being reduced, and, if necessary, when Kimberley has been relieved, I shall be prepared to locate troops in the proposed direction. Before leaving Cape Town I will show the High Commissioner's Memorandum and my reply to the General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication, and will instruct him to do all in his power to meet His Excellency's views. I will also request him to keep His Excellency, as well as myself, constantly informed of the measures taken to keep the Dutch population under control, and to guard the Northern frontier against any further Boer advance. I trust that the precautions which I have briefly described, and the increasing force which will be available for defensive purposes, may ensure the tranquillity of the Colony during the operations in the Orange Free State.

(Sd.) Roberts, F.M.

Memorandum Issued by Lord Roberts in South Africa containing Suggestions for Lessening the Weight to be carried on Horses.

Chief of Staff Circular Memo., No. 8.

Cape Town,
5th February, 1900.

The following suggestions for lessening the weight carried by horses on active service, which have been drawn up by Major Rimington, 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, and are based on that officer's personal experience during the present campaign, are published for information.

The Field Marshal Commanding in Chief looks to officers commanding regiments or corps of the Mounted Branch to do what lies in their power to reduce the weight carried by horses under their charge to the lowest point consistent with efficiency in the field.

By Order.
(Sd.) Kitchener of Khartoum,
Chief of Staff.

I put on saddle and horse :—

A warm cloak (cavalry pattern and not a waterproof, but would take a waterproof sheet if the weather were broken).

Mess tin with rations (patrol tin is better, in leather case).

Nosebag (some extra ammunition, if required can go in this).

A good ox reim in the head collar, of a Colonial pattern, head stall.

Wire cutter.

Carbine (carried by a man in my corps).

Bandolier, carried by a man, 50 rounds.

Haversack, carried by a man, 50 rounds.

Knife and lanyard.

Water bottle on man or horse, as preferred.

Telescope, if possible to obtain it.

Holdall (in haversack).

The English made Cape Police pattern of saddle with a blanket (no numnah, except in special cases) only is much preferred as lighter and more comfortable. The blanket can be used by man or horse.

I have done away with :—

(*a*) Wallets.

(*b*) The changes of clothes put therein.

* (*c*) Grooming kit.

† (*d*) Shoe cases and extra shoes.

‡ (*e*) Hay nets.

(*f*) Extra highlows strapped on wallets.

(*g*) Breast plate (unless in special cases).

(*h*) Picketing gear of any sort.

(*i*) Hoof picks.

On the wagons should be carried, rolled in a blanket and waterproof sheet :—

1 pair light shoes.

1 pair socks.

1 spare shirt.

1 stocking cap.

1 pair spare trousers (or breeches).

1 cardigan jacket (in cold weather, *i.e.*, in April, or earlier, the man should have this on him).

1 towel and soap.

Note.—An extra blanket will be necessary in April.

Memorandum issued by Lord Roberts in South Africa entitled "Notes for Guidance in South African Warfare."

Chief of Staff Circular Memorandum.

Cape Town,
5th February, 1900.

The following notes by Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief are communicated for the guidance of all concerned.

By Order.
(Sd.) Kitchener of Khartoum,
Chief of Staff.

Notes for Guidance in South African Warfare

Cavalry.

1. On reconnaissances or patrols not likely to be prolonged beyond one day, the cavalry soldier's equipment should be lightened as much as possible, nothing being taken that can possibly be dispensed with.

2. It has been brought to my notice that our cavalry move too slowly when on reconnaissance duty, and

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* A wisp of straw or rushes can do all that is required and does not take the grease (which is his natural waterproofing in wet weather) out of a horse's coat.

† Shoes drop off a good deal after horses are first landed, as then feet are soft, but in a month this is all right, the horn grows hard, and the nails only require more than ordinary care on the part of officers, farriers, and troopers.

‡ But I would give the horses as much hay or straw or grass as they could eat. I use wheat or even barley straw, or green mealie stalks to stuff their bellies out, and use bran when obtainable for same reason. They must have a bellyful. I graze whenever safe (and sometimes when doubtful).

Appendix H. that unnecessary long halts are made, the result being that the enemy, although starting after the cavalry, are able to get ahead of it. I could understand this if the country were close and difficult, but between the Modder and the Orange rivers its general features are such as to admit of small parties of Cavalry, accompanied by Field guns, being employed with impunity.

Artillery.

3. If the enemy's guns have, in some instances, the advantage of ours in range, we have the advantage of theirs in mobility, and we should make use of them by not remaining in positions the precise distance of which from the enemy's batteries has evidently been fixed beforehand. Moreover, it has been proved that the Boers' fire is far less accurate at unknown distances. In taking up positions compact battery formations should be avoided. The guns should be opened out, or it may be desirable to advance by sections or batteries. Similarly, retirements should be carried out at considerably increased intervals, by alternate batteries or sections if necessary, and care should be taken to travel quickly through the danger zone of hostile artillery fire.

The following plan, frequently adopted by the Boers, has succeeded in deceiving our artillery on several occasions :—

Suppose "A" to be a gun emplacement, the gun firing smokeless powder; simultaneously with the discharge of the gun at "A a powder flask of black powder will be exploded at "B," a hill in rear, leading us to direct our projectile on "B." Careful calculation with a watch, however, will defeat this plan.

Infantry.

4. The present open formation renders it difficult for officers to exercise command over their men, except such as may be in their immediate vicinity. A remedy for this would appear to be a system of whistle calls by which a company lying in extended order could obey orders as readily as if in quarter column. I invite suggestions for such a system of whistle calls as would be useful.

5. It is difficult to recognise officers as equipped at present, and it seems desirable they should wear a distinguishing mark of some kind, either on the collar at the back of the neck, or on the back of the coat.

6. Soldiers, when under fire, do not take sufficient advantage of the sandy nature of the soil to construct cover for themselves. If such soil is scraped even with a canteen lid a certain amount of cover from rifle fire can be obtained in a short time.

7. The distribution of ammunition to the firing line is one of the most difficult problems of modern warfare. One solution which has been suggested to me is for a portion of the supports gradually to creep forward until a regular chain of men is established from the supports (where the ammunition carts should be) right up to the firing line. The ammunition could then be gradually worked up by hand till it reached the firing line, where it could be passed along as required This would, no doubt, be a slow method of distributing ammunition, but it appears to be an improvement on the present method, which is almost impossible to carry out under fire.

8. Reports received suggest that the Boers are less likely to hold entrenchments on the plain with the same tenacity and courage as they display when defending kopjes, and it is stated that this applies especially in night time, if they know that British infantry are within easy striking distance from them. How far this is true time only can show.

(Sd.) Roberts, Field Marshal.
Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.

Chief of Staff Circular Memo., No. 5.

Cape Town,
January 26th, 1900.

The following instructions by the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief are communicated for the guidance of all concerned.

By Order,
(Sd.) Kitchener of Khartoum.
Chief of Staff.

Notes for Guidance in South African Warfare.

Infantry.

As it is desirable that full advantage should be taken of the experience gained during the past three months by our troops in South Africa, the following notes are issued for the guidance of all who may find themselves in command of a Force (large or small) on service in the field.

We have to deal with an enemy possessing remarkable mobility, intimately acquainted with the country, thoroughly understanding how to take advantage of ground, adept in improvising colour, and most skilful in the use of their weapons.

Against such an enemy any attempt to take a position by direct attack will assuredly fail. The only hope of success lies in being able to turn one or both flanks, or what would in many instances be equally effective, to threaten to cut the enemy's line of communication.

Before any plan of attack can be decided upon, the position must be carefully examined by reconnoitring parties, and every endeavour must be made to obtain all possible information about it from the people of the country. It must, however, be remembered that the position ostensibly occupied is not always the one the Boers intend to defend; it is often merely a decoy, a stronger position in the vicinity having previously been prepared upon which they move rapidly, and from which they can frequently bring a destructive fire to bear upon the attacking line. Their marvellous mobility enables them to do this without much risk to themselves, and also to be in strength at any point of the position that may be seriously threatened. It follows, therefore, that our object should be to cripple the mobility of the Boers, and to effect this, next to inflicting heavy losses on the men themselves, the surest means would be the capture or destruction of their horses.

When the extreme rifle range from the position is reached (1,500 to 1,800 yards) by the advance troops, or before, if they find themselves under Artillery fire, all column formations must be given up, and, when advancing to the attack of the position, Infantry must be freely extended, even on occasion, if necessary, to six or eight paces, the front and both flanks being well covered with scouts. This extended formation will throw increased responsibility on Battalion and Company Commanders. The objective aimed at, therefore, should be carefully explained to them. They should be allowed to make use of any opportunity that may offer to further the scheme, on the distinct understanding that no isolated acts are attempted such as might endanger the general plan. During the attack, Commanding Officers must be careful not to lose touch with the troops on their right and left, and they should, as far as possible, ensure their co-operation. Every advantage should be taken of cover, and Battalion and Company Commanders should look out for and occupy positions from which they would be able to bring an enfilading fire to bear upon the enemy. The capacity of these officers will be judged by the initiation displayed in seizing rapidly every opportunity to further the general scheme of attack.

An essential point, and one which must never be lost sight of, is the power of endurance of the Infantry soldier. If Infantry soldiers (carrying as they do a considerable weight on their backs) are called upon to march a longer distance than can reasonably be expected from men in a normal state of health, or if they are injudiciously pressed as regards the pace, they will necessarily commence to feel the strain before they reach a point where their best energies are required to surmount the difficulties which lie before them. If, at such a period, a man feels exhausted, moral deterioration, and the consequences to our arms which such deterioration entails, must readily supervene.

Artillery.

As a general rule, the Artillery appear to have adapted themselves to the situation, and to the special conditions which present themselves in a campaign in South Africa.

The following points, however, require to be noticed :—

(1) At the commencement of an action Artillery should not be ordered to take up a position until it has been ascertained by scouts to be clear of the enemy, and out of range of infantry fire.

(2) When it is intended to take a position with Infantry the preparation by Artillery should be thorough and not spasmodic. Unless a strong force of Infantry is pushed within 900 yards of the position, the enemy will not occupy his trenches, and the guns will have no target. It is a mere waste of ammunition also to bombard an entrenchment when the Infantry attack is likely to be delayed, even for a short time. To be of real value the fire of the guns should be continuous until the assault is about to be delivered.

(3) The expenditure of ammunition is a matter which can only be regulated by the circumstances of the movement. Officers Commanding should, however, always bear in mind that the supply of Artillery ammunition in the field is necessarily limited.

(4) It is of great importance that Artillery horses should be kept fit for any special effort. They are not easily replaced, and it is the duty of Artillery officers to represent to the commander of the column whenever they consider that their horses are being unduly worked, as regards either pace or distance.

Cavalry and Mounted Troops.

Similarly with Cavalry horses. Every endeavour should be made to save them as much as possible, for unless this is done, they cannot be expected to last through a lengthened campaign.

The men should dismount on every available opportunity, if for a few minutes only at a time, and on the line of march it will be advantageous for them to occasionally lead instead of riding their horses.

Horses should be fed at short intervals, and not allowed to be kept too long without water. A sufficiency of grain is necessary to enable horses to withstand hard work, but they will never keep in condition unless they have an ample supply of hay or some bulky equivalent.

On the line of march scouting must be carried out by the mounted troops in the most searching manner, in front and on both flanks. All high ground should be visited, and, whenever practicable, horsemen should ride along ridges and hills. As soon as parties of the enemy are observed the Mounted troops (after sending back word to the Commander) should make a considerable detour round the position occupied by the Boers, endeavour to estimate their numbers, and to ascertain where their horses have been left. They should also see whether, by threatening the Boer line of communication, they would not be forced to fight on ground unprepared or defence.

(Sd.) ROBERTS, Field Marshal,
Commanding in Chief, South Africa.

MEMORANDUM ISSUED BY LORD ROBERTS IN SOUTH AFRICA ON THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF OFFICERS DOING ALL IN THEIR POWER TO KEEP THEIR HORSES IN PROPER CONDITION.

Government House, Bloemfontein,
11th April, 1900.

The Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief desires to call the attention of Commanding Officers of Cavalry, Artillery, and Mounted Infantry units, and of all Officers belonging or attached thereto, to the paramount importance of doing all in their power to keep their horses in proper condition.

In Circular Memorandum No. 5, dated 26th January, 1900, which was promulgated for the guidance of all concerned, Lord Roberts remarked as follows:—

"It is of great importance that Artillery horses should be kept fit for any special effort. They are not easily replaced, and it is the duty of Artillery Officers to represent to the Commander of a Column whenever they consider that their horses are being unduly worked as regards either pace or distance.

"Similarly with Cavalry horses. Every endeavour should be made to save them as much as possible, for unless this is done they cannot be expected to last through a lengthened campaign. The men should dismount on every available opportunity, if only for a few minutes at a time, and on the line of march it will be advantageous for them to occasionally lead instead of riding their horses. Horses should be fed at short intervals, and not allowed to be kept too long without water. A sufficiency of grain is necessary to enable horses to stand hard work, but they will never keep in condition unless they have an ample supply of hay or some bulky equivalent."

The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief fully recognises that under certain circumstances, and when some important advantage can be obtained by sustained rapidity of movement, the sacrifice of horses may become a military necessity. Contingencies of this nature have occurred during the recent operations, and have, no doubt, contributed in no small degree to the present condition of the mounted corps. On the other hand, there have been periods when the troops have halted or only marched short distances, and on these occasions it is to be feared that due care has not always been taken to feed the horses at short intervals, and to water them whenever the opportunity offered. Moreover, Lord Roberts has frequently observed that men remain mounted when there is no necessity for it, and on the line of march he has never yet seen the horses being led.

Making every allowance for long and rapid marches, want of water, and deficient forage, Lord Roberts is of opinion that, if the horses, more particularly those of the Cavalry and Mounted Infantry, had been better cared for, fewer of them would have become useless. The supply of remounts is not unlimited, besides which, fresh horses are not likely to be immediately forthcoming at the moment when they may be most urgently wanted. The success of military operations in this country largely depends upon the mobility of the troops employed, and this ceases as soon as the horses fall into a bad condition.

The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief is confident that the Officers to whom this order is addressed are as anxious as himself to maintain the efficiency of their respective corps, and he appeals to them to spare no trouble in looking after the feeding and watering of their horses, and to see that the men dismount, and that the horses are allowed to graze on every possible opportunity.

His Lordship draws the special attention of General and Commanding Officers to this subject, which is of vital importance to the Army in South Africa, and he holds them responsible that his instructions are clearly understood and strictly complied with by all those serving under them.

Appendix I.

APPENDIX, I.

Memorandum handed in by Lieutenant-General Sir Ian S. M. Hamilton, K.C.B., as to the Duties of the Military Secretary's Department.

(*Referred to in Q.* 10857.)

In normal times the duties of the Military Secretary's Department may be briefly defined under the following headings :—

- Candidates for Commissions, their qualifications and education.
- First Appointments.
- Promotion.
- Retirement.
- Reserve of Officers.
- Appointments to the Staff and other extra-regimental positions.
- Confidential Reports on Officers.
- Foreign and Colonial Services, Egyptian Army.
- Patronage, such as—
  - Gentlemen at Arms.
  - Exons and Yeomen of the Guard.
  - Military Knights of Windsor.
  - Good Service Rewards for Officers.
  - Medals for Meritorious Service.
  - Annuities to Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers.
  - Honours and Rewards.

Under the Order in Council of the 4th November, 1901, many of these duties are concentrated in the Commander-in-Chief, and some by the Military Secretary under control of the Commander-in-Chief, and in this respect he is a Personal Staff Officer of the Commander-in-Chief.

But practically he is a high departmental officer administering, under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, all the above services; and the office was raised from the status of a Division to that of a Department under the above-quoted Order in Council.

He sits on the Army and Selection Boards, and the recommendations of the Promotion Board are submitted by him to the Commander-in-Chief.

It is probable that the work connected with the education and examination of candidates for the Army will be taken from his charge, consequent on the Report of the Akers-Douglas Committee.

The work connected with most of the above subjects was enormously increased during the recent South African War.

The Colleges and the Militia were quite unequal to supply the demands for first appointments. These demands were, however, met from the undermentioned sources, and the qualifications exacted necessarily varied according to the urgency of the demands:—

- Militia Officers.
- Yeomanry Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.
- University Candidates.
- Malta Artillery Officers.
- Malta Militia Officers.
- Home Volunteer Officers and Men.
- Ceylon Volunteers.
- The various Local Colonial Military Forces.
- Irregular Regiments in South Africa.
- Lumsden's Horse and Corps.
- Non-Commissioned Officers from Regular Army (not below the rank of Corporal).

Retirements practically stopped when the War commenced; but the requirements of the Staff, Special Service, Lines of Communication, Mounted Infantry, Irregular Colonial Corps, etc., etc., involved the seconding of very large numbers of regimental officers, and regimental promotions followed on accordingly.

The Reserve of Officers were called out for duty. The lists had to be sifted and their qualifications noted, whether for Staff or Regimental duty, either in South Africa, or to fill temporarily appointments at home caused by their vacation, consequent on the permanent holders being selected for Active Service in South Africa.

4 Reserve Regiments of Cavalry.
18 Reserve Regiments of Infantry.
8 Provisional Regiments of Cavalry.
15 Provisional Regiments of Infantry.
(So far as the Regimental Staff went.)

The Royal Garrison Regiment, consisting of five battalions, has been officered from the Reserve of Officers, the Militia, and in a few cases by officers of the Regular Army.

Thirty-nine battalions of Imperial Yeomanry were raised. The officers who joined the battalions on formation were nominated by the Deputy Adjutant General Imperial Yeomanry, and approved here. Any vacancies which occurred afterwards were filled by the General Officer Commanding South Africa, subject to approval here. Each battalion had an Establishment of 26 officers, but the actual number of officers in each battalion was almost double this, as all invalided officers, etc., were succeeded. The battalions are disbanded as they return home to this country.

The sad duty of informing relatives of the death or wounding of officers also fell on the Department. After an engagement the office was crowded with anxious relatives of all classes of society, male and female, asking for particulars which, in many cases, it was not possible to give—such as nature of wounds or cause of death, etc., etc. They would be there before the casualty lists were even received. They wanted all sorts of possible and impossible inquiries made by telegraph. Directly the lists were received, the relatives were informed by telegraph and, week-day or Sunday, some one was always on the spot to pass out any urgent reports relating to casualties that came to hand.

The receipt of despatches from South Africa involved the noting of all officers and men who were mentioned. Their previous services were annexed and they were brought up for consideration when the question of honours and rewards was taken in hand and the Gazettes published. It has been a laborious task.

During recent years, too, the demand for officers for the Foreign and Colonial Services has largely increased; and it has been with difficulty that they have been met. They consist principally of :—

- West African Frontier Force.
- King's African Rifles.
- West African Regiment.
- And Officers in Civil Employment and Special Extra-Regimental Employment.

The demands of the Egyptian Army have also had to be met.

The Staff for the Army Corps was prepared by the Military Secretary under the personal direction of the Commander-in-Chief.

The Commands of Divisions and Brigades were filled by General Officers on the Active List, either already in employment or on the Half-Pay List waiting employment, and their qualifications and previous career were fully consulted in making the selections.

The higher Staff Officers on the General Staff were composed of officers filling staff or other appointments at home, or from the Half-Pay List. They were mostly officers either on, or who had seen service on, the Staff.

The minor appointments on the General Staff were largely filled by officers employed on the Staff at home or abroad, or by regimental officers who had obtained the Staff College Certificate, or by regimental officers whose qualifications appeared to warrant their employment on the Staff.

As regards questions bearing on the efficiency of the Army, the following points seem to take prominence :—

- The Military Education of Officers.
- The encouragement of independence of thought and action and decision in cases of emergency.
- A full knowledge of theory and practice of musketry.
- A. A reserve of candidates for Army Commissions.
- B. A reserve, an efficient one, for Military duty in emergency, and the more efficient it is made the less necessity will there be for suggestion A.

Ian Hamilton,
Military Secretary.

4th December, 1902.